Three discourses of happiness, virtue, and liberty collected from the works of the learn'd Gassendi, by Monsieur Bernier ; translated out of French.

CHAP. II. What sort of Pleasure it is that Epicurus Re∣commends as the End of a Happy Life.

TIS strange that the Word Pleasure should have blasted the Reputation of Epicurus, or, to make use of the Words of Seneca, That it hath given occasion for a Fiction; for it is certain that this word comprehends the honest Pleasures, as well as the loose and debauch'd. I say it is certain; for Plato, Aristotle, and all the other Ancient Philosophers, as well as their Disciples, speak in express words, that amongst the Pleasures, some are Innocent, others Impure; some are of the Mind, others are of the Body; some true, others false.

We Be∣lieve, saith Aristotle, that Pleasure ought to ac∣company Happiness. And as it is confess'd, that amongst the operations that are agreeable with Vertue, such as proceed from Wisdom are more Pleasant than the rest, therefore Wisdom seems to contain Pleasures that are pure, admirable, and fix'd. There is a Delight, saith Cicero, in seek∣ing after great and hidden things, and when there appears something of resemblance, the Mind is fill'd with a sweet Pleasure. In the Discoveries of Nature there is an unsatiable Pleasure, and those who delight in pursuit hereof, neither regard oft-times their Health, nor their Fortune; they suf∣fer all things, being Captivated with the love of Knowledge and Understanding, and with great labour they pay for the Pleasure they acquire by Learning. We read also in the Holy Scriptures, that God himself in the beginning Planted a Gar∣den or Paradise of Pleasure; that the Blessed shall

be filled with the Fatness of his House, and drink of the Rivers of his Pleasures.

I mention this, only because some imagin that this word Pleasure cannot nor ought not to be taken but in an ill sense. There∣fore when Epicurus saith that Pleasure is the chief End, they fancy that he cannot and ought not to be un∣derstood but of sordid and forbidden Pleasures. So that when we say, or when they read that there have been some Philosophers who were called Vo∣luptuous, they presently take Epicurus for their Chieftain, or Leader.

But let us examine this Business from the bottom, and first let us begin with the Accusation which they bring against him. And as amongst those who allow other Pleasures than of the Body, there are some that will have what he saith to be under∣stood only of Bodily Pleasures; let us weigh his own words as they are found in Laertius, for there he expresseth his Mind, and declares plainly what that Pleasure is which ought to be the End of our Life, and the Chief Good. The End of an Hap∣py Life, saith he, is nothing else but the Health of the Body, and the Tranquility of the Soul, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Because all our Actions aim and tend to this End, that we may be free from Pain and Trouble, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And because this End he stiles by the Name of Pleasure, some took occasion from thence to scandalize him, saying, that hereby he understood the mean and sordid Plea∣sures of the Body. Therefore he makes his own Apology, and clears himself from this Calumny, by declaring plainly what kind of Pleasure he means, and what not; for after having made it his main business to recommend a Sober Life, which is sa∣tisfied with plain Food, and easie to be got, you shall hear what he saith next. When we say that

Pleasure is the main End, we mean neither the Plea∣sures of Debauchery, nor the other sensual Delights, which terminate in the very moment of enjoyment, and by which the Senses are only gratified and pleased; as some ignorant Persons, and who are not of our Opinion, or who being enviously bent against us do thus Interpret. But we only understand this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, To feel no pain in the Body, and to have no trouble in the Soul; for 'tis not the Pleasure of continual Eating and Drinking, nor the Pleasure of Love, nor that of Rare Dainties, and de∣licious Bits of large and well-furnish'd Tables, that make a Pleasant Life; but a sound Judgment, assisted by Sobriety, and consequently by a serenity and tranquility of Mind, which throughly enquires into the Causes why we ought to embrace or avoid any thing; and that drives away all mistaken Opinions, or false Notions of things, which might raise much perplexity in the Soul. I might add another Passage which I shall only men∣tion, Venereorum usus nunquam prodest, praeclareque agitur nisi etiam noceat. That the Delights of Venus are not only unprofitable, but it is very rare if they be not mischievous. But this ingenuous and plain Declaration of his meaning is suf∣ficient to justifie him from the slanderous Accusa∣tions of his Enemies. Let us nevertheless take no∣tice of the difference and contrariety, that Laertius puts between Epicurus, and Aristippus; for this difference or antithesis shews clearly that Epicu∣rus believed no other Pleasure to be the End, but that which consists in a constant Repose, namely a freedom from pain of Body, and trouble of Mind. But Aristippus would have it consist in that Pleasure of the Body, which is chiefly Communicated to us by action, or by which our Senses are actually plea∣sed and gratified. This contrariety, I say, disco∣vers Epicurus's Opinion to have been misrepresented,

and taken in a wrong sense, such as Aristippus's deserved. So that all the Reproaches that were due to Aristippus, have been cast by this mistake upon Epicurus, and the other hath escap'd un∣blemish'd.

The Famous Dispute of Torquatus in Cicero, plain∣ly discovers this Truth; Hear his words.

I will explain, saith Torquatus, what that Pleasure is, that I may prevent all cause of mistake in them, who understand not the matter, and that I may make them apprehend that this Doctrin which they fancy to be loose and debauch'd, is Grave, Chast, and Regular. We do not pursue that Pleasure, which gratifies Nature with a little seeming sweetness, and that is relish'd by the Senses with a haut-gust. But we esteem that to be the chief Pleasure, that is taken without any sense of Pain; for as Thirst and Hunger are al∣layed by Eating and Drinking, this deliverance, freedom or privation from that, which is trouble∣som and uneasie, causeth Pleasure; so in all other things a deliverance from Pain begets Pleasure. Epicurus therefore admits of no Medium between Pain and Pleasure; for he maintained, that what appear'd to some to be a Medium, namely, the privation from all Pain, was not only a Pleasure, but the chief Pleasure. In truth, he that rightly understands himself, and knows what ails him, or what Condition he is in, he must needs be either in Pleasure, or in Pain. Now Epicurus was of Opinion, that the chief Pleasure consisted in a privation from all Pain, and by Consequence, that Pleasure may be diversified and distinguished, but not augmented, and encreas'd.

We might here produce some Witnesses of this matter. Certainly Seneca may be heard and cre∣dited before all others, as being without doubt a

Person of great worth, unspotted Reputation, of an Exemplary Life and Manners, and addicted to a Sect which had chiefly drawn upon Epicurus all the shame and disgrace that is commonly cast upon him instead of Aristippus, being thereunto encou∣raged by the evil sense and meaning that they have given to his words.

According to Epicurus, saith Seneca, there are two Advantages required to the compleating the Sovereign Good, or Chief Happiness of Man. The First is, That the Body may be without Pain. The Second, That the Mind may be calm and sedate: These advan∣tages don't increase, if they be compleat; for how can that which is full increase? When the Body is free from Pain, what can be added to that Freedom? when the Mind enjoys it self, and is quiet, what may be added to this Tranquility? Like as the Serenity of the Heavens is perfect, and can't admit of any other new degrees of Light, when it is absolutely clear, and without the least shadow or mist: Thus the Condition of Man is perfect, when he hath taken care of his Body and Soul, making his chief Happiness to consist in the advantages of both together in a Freedom from all trouble of Mind, and from all pain of Body; for we may then say, that such a Man is arrived to the full accomplishment of all his Desires. And if beside all this, there happens to him an additional Repose, it don't increase his chief Good, but it only seasons it; for this compleat Happiness, the perfection of the Human Nature, is comprehended in the quiet of the Body, and the Mind.

In which words we may take notice, that Seneca expresseth clearly and plainly Epicurus's Opinion, as it is related by La∣ertius.

Moreover, because that Epicurus gave the Name of Chief Good, or Compleat Happiness to a free∣dom from Bodily Pain, and a perfect Tranquili∣ty of Mind, the loose and Debauched Persons of his time took incouragement from thence, mista∣king the word Pleasure, and boasting, that they had a Philosopher to countenance their Debauche∣ries. For this Reason Seneca argues with them in this manner in his Book of a Happy-Life. 'Tis not Epicurus that forces or perswades them to Luxury and Debauchery, but being accustomed to these Vices, they endeavour to conceal their Vices under the Covert of Philosophy, and they flock together when they hear Plea∣sure mentioned with Praise. Non ab Epicuro impulsi luxuriantur, sed vitiis dediti luxuriam suam in Phi∣losophiae sinu abscondunt, & eo concurrunt ubi au∣diunt laudari Voluptatem.

Without doubt it is not the Pleasure of Epicurus which is esteem'd and sought after; I know how sober and in∣nocent that Pleasure is. But they skip at the Name of Pleasure, seeking some protection and veil from their Lasciviousness, and filthy Delights. Nec aestimatur Voluptas illa Epicuri (ita enim me Hercules sentio quam sobria ac sicca sit) sed ad nomen ipsum ad∣volant, quaerentes libidinibus suis patrocinium ali∣quod ac velamentum. My Opinion, saith he again, is, (for I will speak it in despight of the Vulgar) The things that Epicurus teacheth are fair and just, and have something of solid, and serious, if we consider them exactly; for his Pleasure is reduc'd to very few things. He prescribes to it the very same Rules that we do to Vertue, and appoints it to be Obedient to Na∣ture, which is easily contented. Mea quidem senten∣tia (invitis hoc nostris popularibus dicam) Sancta Epicurum & recta praecipere, & si propius accesse∣ris, tristia. Voluptatibus enim illa ad parvum &

exile revocatur, & quam nos Virtuti Legem dicimus, eam ille dicit Voluptati. Jubet illam parere Naturae; Parum autem est Luxuriae quod Naturae satis est.

Will you then understand what it is? He that saith that the Happiness of Life consists in Idleness, in Good Cheer, in Ease and Wanton Pleasures, and calls that Happiness, seeks a good Excuse to an evil Cause, and when he comes flattering himself with the softness of the Name, he follows not that Pleasure which he hears Praised, but that which he brings with him; and when once he begins to believe his Vices to be consistent with the Doctrines professed, he freely adheres to them, no longer disguising and acting them in secret, but boldly and openly proclaiming them to the World.

Thus he concludes, I don't say what many don't scruple to affirm; That the Sect of Epicurus is the en∣courager of infamous Crimes, and lewd Debaucheries. But this is what I say, it is ill spoken of I confess, but without Cause, and this cannot easily be discovered, but by more narrowly prying into the very first grounds of their Opinions. The meer name of Pleasure occasions the mistake, and casts an odium upon it. Itaque non dico, quod plerique nostrum, Sectam Epicuri flagi∣tiorum Magistram esse, sed illud dico, male audit, infamis est & immerito; neque hoc scire quisquam potest nisi interius fuerit admissus; Frons ipsa dat lo∣cum Fabulae, & ad malam spem invitat.

We may after the Testimony of Seneca, bring that of Plutarch, who tho' he was an Enemy of Epi∣curus, yet he hath done him so much right, as to say, That the things that were objected against him ra∣ther proceeded from vulgar Mistakes, than from the Truth of the matter. Besides, in another place he merrily cries out upon the Pleasure of Epicurus, and his Disciples, O the vast Pleasure and Felicity

that there is in being insensible either of Sorrow or Pain! Elsewhere he saith, Tho' Epicurus placeth the Sove∣reign Happiness in a perfect Rest, and as it were in a Center of Quiet, &c. And in another place, That young Persons will learn from Epicurus, that Death doth not so much affect us, that the Riches of Nature are limited, that Felicity and a Happy-Life don't con∣sist in abundance of Silver, or in Large Possessions, in Dominion, or in Power, but in a freedom from Pain, in the Government of our Passions, and in that Dispo∣sition of the Mind, which confines all things within the limits of Nature. From hence it is evident that the chief Happiness of Epicurus is not that Pleasure which is in Motion, or in the pleasing of our Sen∣ses, but rather that which is and appears in Rest, in a freedom from trouble.

We might here farther add the Testimonies of Tertullian, of St. Gregory Nazianzen, of Ammonius, of Stobeus, of Suidas, of Lactantius, and of many others amongst the Ancients, who tho' being no entire Friends of Epicurus, yet some of them have declared, that the Pleasure that Epicurus recommends was nothing else, but a peaceable State agreeing with Nature, and not a mean and sordid Pleasure. Others have said, That between Epicurus and Aristippus there was this difference; that Aristippus placed the chief Happiness in the Pleasure of the Body, but Epicu∣rus in that of the Mind. Others, That the Pleasure which the Disciples of Epicurus propose to themselves for their End, certainly is not a sensual and a Bodily Pleasure, but a quiet Temper of the Soul, which is in∣separable from a Vertuous and an Honest Life. Others, as Lactantius, after he had abated of the warmth of his Stile, he saith, That Epicurus maintains the chief Happiness to be in the Pleasures of the Mind, and Ari∣stippus in that of the Body.

I speak of the Ancients within these two hun∣dred years; that is to say, towards the end of the ignorant Ages; we have amongst others John Ger∣son, and Gemistus Pletho, that speak and verifie the same. The first having mentioned divers Opinions concerning Happiness, declares, that some are of Opinion that Man's Happiness consists in the Pleasures of the Mind, or in a peaceable Tranquility of Spirit, such as was that of Epicurus, mentioned often by Sene∣ca, in his Epistles, with very much respect. But, as to the other Epicurus, quoth he, Aristippus, Sardanapa∣lus, and Mahomet, who placed it in the Pleasures of the Body, they were no Philosophers. Here we must pardon the ignorance of that Age, and the common vogue, if he hath imagined that there have been two of that Name. The second Named Ge∣mistus Pletho, Treating of the Delight of Contem∣plation, shews, That Aristotle, never taught any other Doctrin than that of Epicurus, who placed the Chief Happiness in the Pleasures of the Mind. Now it is not without Reason that I have insinuated, that since these Men, there hath sprung up an Happier and a more Learned Age, that have revived Learn∣ing, that lay almost Languishing; for since that time an infinite number of knowing Men are risen up, who have entertained better thoughts of that Philosopher, as Philelphus, Alexander ab Alexandro, Volateranus, Johannes Franciscus Picus, and many more.

What shall we say then to those who Charge him with a contrary Opinion? Nothing else but what hath been spoken in the Apology of his Life, namely, that the Stoicks who very much hated him for Reasons there expressed at large, have not only misunderstood his Opinion, but they have also for∣ged and publish'd in his Name scandalous Books, whereof they themselves were the Authors, that

they might the more easily gain credit to their Ma∣licious Insinuations, and fasten upon him their Ca∣lumnies without suspicion. Now one of the Causes of their hatred against him was, that Zenon their Principal Leader was naturally melancholy, austere, rude, and severe, and his Disciples following their Guide, affected the same Air, and a severe Meen. This hath caused the Vertue of the Stoicks or their Wisdom to be represented as some very austere and reserved thing; and in regard that caused them to be admired and respected by the Common-Peo∣ple, and that we suffer our selves willingly to be carried away to vain-glory, and to be puft up with Pride, if we don't take great heed to prevent it, they fancied themselves to be the only possessors of Wisdom; and therefore they boasted that he alone was the Wiseman, whose Soul was strengthned and fortified with the Vertue of the Stoicks, that he alone was fit to be a King, a Captain, a Magi∣strate, a Citizen, (for such were their Expressions) an Orator, a Friend, Beautiful, Noble, and Rich. And that such a one never repents, is not touch'd with Remorse, cannot receive Affronts, is ignorant of nothing, never doubts of any thing, is free from Passion, is always at Liberty, full of Joy and Con∣tent, like God himself, and several other qualities they ascribe to him; which caused Plutarch to re∣proach them in these words. The Stoicks have taught some things far more ridiculous than the Poets. But Epicurus on the contrary was of a sweeter and more candid Temper, and as he acted with sincerity and plain-dealing, he could not endure this vanity and ostentation. So that when he consider'd be∣sides the weakness of our Human Nature, and what it was capable of undergoing, and what not, he quickly understood that all those great boastings which made such noise in the Schools of the Stoicks,

were but vain Fictions, when the Glory and the Pride of their words were removed; therefore he proposed to himself a Vertue that he knew our Human Nature capable of. And because he observ'd that Men in all their Proceedings were naturally carried to some Pleasure, and after he had well in∣quired into all the several kinds of Pleasure, there was none more Universal, more firm, more con∣stant, and more desirable, than that which consists in the Health of the Body, and the Tranquility of the Mind; he therefore declared, that to be the chief End of all Delights, and that Vertue alone was the best means to obtain it, and consequently, that a Wise or a Vertuous Man, did by his Sobriety and Chastity, that is to say, by the Vertue of Tem∣perance, preserve the health of his Body, as far as his Natural Constitution would permit; and that being assisted by Moral Vertues, by which he appeaseth the Passions of Lust, Gluttony, Covetous∣ness, and Ambition, he endeavours chiefly to pre∣serve likewise as much as he is able the Tranquility of his Thoughts. At the same time he also maintain'd, that true Pleasure was not to be found in the Act, or in the Motion, as Aristippus imagin'd, but in statu, in a state or manner of existing, without Pain in the Body, and disquiet in the Mind, as we have al∣ready often declared heretofore. And this was his plain and simple manner of acting; he cared not to obtain the reputation of the Vulgar by a glossy Rhetorick, or by a Majestick Deportment, that express'd a great deal of Vanity in Manners, as Ze∣non did, nor did he deceive the People, as the other did with a vain ostentation of things, which takes much with them, tho' they neither understand them, nor can practise them.

Now Zenon and the Stoicks understanding this simplicity of Manners and Doctrin, and seeing that

many Men of Parts were undeceived, and made no account of their great and glorious words and pro∣mises, conceived so great a prejudice against him, that they sought always how to defame him, taking occasion from the word Pleasure, and affirming that he thereby understood sensual and debauch'd Plea∣sure and Excess.

We are not therefore too easily to assent to what they say, nor too readily give credit to the Report of others, who being imposed upon by their Mi∣stakes, have exclaim'd against him. But if some honest Men have been guilty of this Error, it is to be supposed, as Seneca observes, that they never knew the inside of this Sect, but had only some for∣ged Books, or believed the Stoicks, his Enemies; or perhaps tho' they understood his Opinion, they believ'd nevertheless that it was not easie to unde∣ceive the People, as it was convenient to continue their Clamours against this Philosopher, that they might declare thereby their hatred to Vice, and Sensual Pleasures, by exclaiming against their sup∣posed Protector and Incourager.

For the Holy Fathers of the Church as they de∣sign'd nothing but Piety and good Manners; they have furiously declaim'd not only against all filthy and bruitish Pleasures, but also against their Patrons and Protectors. And because the Report was al∣ready spread abroad, that Epicurus was the Chief, they have treated him according to the common mistake. So that it is not their fault, that he has been Scandaliz'd, for he was so before, and what they did, was only, as we have already hinted, to give a greater abhorrence of Vice, and of sordid and sensual Pleasures. This is so certainly true, that some, such as Lactantius, who being otherwise provok'd against Epicurus, have nevertheless retract∣ed their former Opinion. And St. Jerom amongst

the rest, writing against Jovinian, places not Epicurus amongst them, who commonly say, Let us Eat and Drink, &c. but looks upon him in another manner, than the common Report. It is wonderful, saith this great Saint, that Epicurus, the great Pa∣tron of Pleasure, fills his Books with nothing but Herbs and Fruits, affirming that the plainest Food is the best, because Flesh, and other dainty Dishes require a great deal of care and trouble to be fitted for our use, and that there is more Pains in seeking them, than Pleasure in abusing them; that our Bodies have no need but of plain Meats and Drinks, that where there is Bread and Water, and such like Necessaries, we may thereby ea∣sily satisfie Nature, but what is over and above is need∣less, and tends to gratify our Lust; that our Eating and Drinking is not for Delight, but to expel Hunger and Thirst; that Wisdom is inconsistent with the labo∣rious toil of procuring good Chear; that Nature's De∣sires are soon satisfied, and that by moderate Diet and plain Apparel we expel Cold and Hunger.

There is but one passage more that may seem to create some difficulty. It is that which Cicero ob∣jects, as being taken out of the Book wherein Epi∣curus's Ends and Designs are described; for he makes him say, That if we take away Bodily and Sen∣sual Pleasures, he knows no other good. But why may we not easily suppose that the Stoicks, who have been so bold to forge whole Books, and make Epi∣curus their Author, have maliciously put this Passage in his Book, and it being thus abused and falsified, it is come into the hands of Cicero, and Atheneus? That which makes us suspect this is, First, That Laertius, who hath left us a Catalogue of Epicurus's Books, and consequently ought to know what was in them, when he relates a passage out of his Book of The End, and others of the same, saith, That they are Fools that impose such things upon Epicurus,

for they are not to be found in the true Copies. And Hesichius assures us that they are gross Lyars, that assert any such thing of him. Secondly, Epicurus himself complains of their making him speak those words which were against his Judgment, and his Disciples would never acknowledge that passage; but they have rather always complain'd of it, and exclaim'd against it. Thirdly, These words are expresly contrary to those, which are known to be of Epicurus, Res Venereae nunquam prosunt, & multum est ni noceant, as we have already observ'd. Fourth∣ly, That Cicero amongst these Objections that he makes, cannot but propose this Question, as if Truth himself had forced him to it; What, do you believe that Epicurus was of this Perswasion, and that his Opinions were dishonest, sensual, and lewd? For my part I can't believe it; for I find, that he declares a great many excellent things, and very vertuous. Fifthly, That Cicero acknowledges, as he was a very Popular Man, that he did not tie up himself to speak according to the strict Opinions of the Philosophers, but agreeable with the Notions of the People. Verum ego non quaero nunc quae sit Phi∣losophia verissima, sed quae Oratori conjuncta maxime: Not to say that he could not bar himself from speaking well of Epicurus, as being a Man without Malice, or rather a right honest Man. Venit Epicu∣rus Vir minime malus, vel potius Vir optimus. And when he speaks of the Epicureans, he saith, that they are very good Men, that he hath never met with a sort of Persons less malicious; that the Epicureans complain of his endeavouring to speak ill of Epicurus; that whole Crowds of Epicureans came frequently to visit him, but that nevertheless he doth not despise them. Quos tamen non aspernor; These are his own words.

Wherein Epicurus, and Aristippus differ.

NOW that we may see exactly in what Epicu∣rus differs from Aristippus, we need but Ex∣amin Laertius. They differ, saith he, First, in Re∣lation to the word Pleasure, in that Epicurus ascribes it not only to that which proceeds from present action, and the immediate gratification of the Senses, but like∣wise to that, which he saith is settled firm and abiding, and is found in that sweet Repose which he Names 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Tranquility, and a freedom from Pain; whereas Aristippus ascribes it to that only which proceeds from action, laughing at that Tranquility, and Exemption from Pain of Epicurus, which is like the Condition of a Sleeping or a Dead Man. They differ therefore in this, that Epicurus hath placed the End or the Happiness of Man in that Pleasure that is in a continuing state, in statu, or in duration; but Aristippus in that which is in motion, in motu, transient. Epicurus places it in that of the Mind, but Aristippus in that of the Body. Epicurus amongst our Pleasures reckons the remem∣brance of past advantages, and the expectation of those which are to come; but Aristippus values them as nothing. But as we have before mention'd, these Particulars, so we shall at present hint but two things to you. First, That when Atheneus declares that not only Aristippus, but also Epicurus and his Disciples declared for the Pleasure that is transient and flitting; this relates to that Scandal, which hath caused some to believe that Epicurus was of the same Opinion as Aristippus, and which according to the Expressions of Atheneus, belong to Aristippus properly. These are his words, Aristippus, saith he,

being wholly addicted to the Pleasures of the Senses, judges those Pleasures to be the End and Happiness of Life, and making no account of former Enjoyments, nor of the expectation of any to come; he knows no ad∣vantages, but such as are present, as the most Debauched Persons do; and as those, who are immerged in De∣lights. And his Life was answerable to his Doctrin, for he spent it wholly in Luxury, and the great ex∣pences that he was at for that purpose; he never dissembled, nor offered to excuse, but answer'd in a pleasant manner jesting, I enjoy Lais, but she don't enjoy me; I live Sumptuously, but if that were Crimi∣nal, it would not be so much practised in the Festivals of the Gods. I give fifty Drachms for a Partridge, for which thou wouldst not spare a Half-penny: I buy a Dainty Bit dear, for which thou would'st grudge to bestow three half-pence. I have not therefore so great a fancy for Pleasure, as thou hast for thy Mony.

The Second thing that we must here take notice of, is, that these words of Seneca, I shall never call an exemption from Pain Happiness, which a Worm, a Bird, or a Flea enjoys, &c. cannot nor ought to be understood of an exemption from Pain, or the Plea∣sure that Epicurus places in a setled Rest, for that thereby he never understood a Lazy Life, or a Rest like that of a Drone, or of a Worm, but such a Life as Seneca himself praiseth, and highly esteems, when he saith, why may not that Rest in which he will dispose and settle the Ages to come, and will give Instructions to all Men, as well to them that are as shall be, be convenient for an Honest Man? or when speaking particularly of Epicurus, he saith, Nor is that Person, of whom we are wont to speak hard∣ly, for maintaining a soft and idle Pleasure, but for such as is consistent with Reason. As if he should describe it like that which Aristotle represents proceeding

from a Life of Contemplation, or that State of Rest and Tranquility which is employ'd in Specu∣lation, and Meditation, and therefore ought not to be call'd Idleness, and Laziness; for Contemplation is such an action, which alone does compleat the Divine Felicity. Besides, the same Aristotle de∣clares, action is not in motion, but that there is some in Repose, and that Pleasure consists rather in a Repose, than in Motion.

And what Seneca asserts speaking of Pleasure, that it chiefly consists in action is much to the pur∣pose. This Pleasure, saith he, is extinguish'd when the Delight appears in its greatest strength; it is soon accomplish'd, it soon passeth over, and becomes te∣dious after its first impress. Now that which comes and passeth away so speedily, and perisheth in the use, and in the very act, hath neither substance, solidity, nor duration, but ceaseth the same moment that it ap∣pears, and in the very beginning it looks to the end, and perisheth.

'Tis true, what Plato speaking of this Concern maintains, that it may as well be stiled Pain as Pleasure, because as it is a Pleasure to pass from Pain to this; so it is Pain and Grief to fall from Pleasure into the same. Nor is it near so grievous, to cease from the enjoyment of Pleasure in case no Pain succeeds, as it is grateful to cease from being tor∣mented with Pain, tho' no Delight follows; there∣fore this State is reckon'd to be a State of Plea∣sure, rather than of Grief. This is the meaning of Torquatus in Cicero. I suppose that when Pleasure is removed, nothing immediately succeeds that is uneasie, unless by accident Pain follows after that Delight. On the contrary, we rejoyce to be deliver'd from Pain, tho' none of those Pleasures which gratifie the Senses succeed; from whence we may inferr, what a great Pleasure it is to be free from Pain.

But let us listen to Seneca, who esteems this State of Life to be not only a Pleasure, but even the chief Happiness of Man.

The Condition and Satisfaction of a Wise Man, ac∣cording to Epicurus's Opinion.

THE Wise-Man, saith Seneca, is he, who like the Gods lives pleasant and easie, with∣out trouble or discontent. Now examin your selves, if you are not often dejected, froward, and at some times transported with too violent Expectations, and earnest Desires, which render you uneasie. If your Mind continues always Day and Night in the same even temper, equal in re∣spect of it self, always exalted and content; If so, you may then say, that you are arrived to the most accomplish'd pitch of Happiness that Men are capable of. But if you are still in pursuit of all sorts of Pleasures, and seek them every where, know that in such a case you want as much Wis∣dom as content. You desire to attain this Chief Happiness, but you are deceived, if you expect to procure it by the means of Riches; if you seek Delight amongst Honours, 'tis to seek it amongst Cares and Troubles. That which you fancy will give you Pleasure, is the Origin and Cause of a thousand Torments. Pleasure and Content are the Universal desire of all Men; but they gene∣rally are ignorant of the Methods how to obtain such Content as may be fix'd and permanent. Some seek it in Feastings and Luxury, others in Riches and Great Offices and Dominion; others in the Favors and Smiles of their Dalilah's, others in a vain ostentation of their Learning and Parts,

which oftentimes stand the Soul in little stead. Their short-liv'd and deceitful Pastimes delude them, such as Ebriety, which for the seeming Pleasure of an hour, causeth many Months of real Sorrow and Trouble: Or the Applauses and Accla∣mations of the People, which we have already purchased by much unquietness, and which will not fail to draw upon us as much more. Remem∣ber therefore that a Wise-Man ought to procure to himself such a satisfaction of Mind as is always firm, constant, and equal. His Soul ought to be like that part of the World above the Moon, where a continual Serenity reigns. You have reason therefore to endeavour to be Wise, seeing the Wise-Man is always full of Content. This satisfaction proceeds from his own Conscience, and from his knowledge of being a vertuous Man. It is impossible to enjoy this quiet, unless we be Just, Magnanimous, and Temperate. But what, will you say, Don't Fools and Wicked Men re∣joyce? No more than Lyons, when they have found a Prey. When such have spent the Night in Debauchery, when they have gorged them∣selves with Wine, and consumed their strength in the Converse of Women, and that their Sto∣machs can no longer contain the quantity of Meats they have devoured, they may then well cry out, What miserable Wretches are we? We now plainly perceive that this Night hath been spent in vain and deceitful Pleasures.

Nám{que} ut supremam falsa inter gaudia noctem Egerimus, nosti—

The Joys and Pleasures of the Gods, and of those that imitate 'em, are never interrupted, and

never have an end. Their satisfaction would fail, if it came from without. That which Fortune ne∣ver gave, it can never take from us.

That the Pains and Pleasures of the Mind are greater than those of the Body.

THE last difference that Laertius puts be∣tween Epicurus and Aristippus is, that as Ari∣stippus esteems the Pains of the Body greater and more troublesom than those of the Mind, he suppo∣ses likewise the Pleasures of the Body much greater and more considerable than those of the Mind; whereas Epicurus is of a contrary Opinion.

In the Body, saith he, we can feel only things present, but the Mind can be sensible of things past, and to come. 'Tis manifest, that a great degree of Pleasure, or an extream Affliction of the Mind con∣tributes more to an happy or to an unhappy Life, than much Pleasure, or much Pain of the Body. If the painful Diseases of the Body imbitter the sweetness of our Lives, those of the Mind ought to render it much more unhappy. Now the Prin∣cipal Distempers of the Mind, are the greedy ex∣travagant Desires of Riches, of Glory, of Domi∣nion, of Sordid and Unlawful Pleasures: More∣over the Disturbances, Gripings and Sorrows that overwhelm the Mind, those anxious Cares that consume it, &c.

This seems to be what Ovid thought, when he upbraids us, because we can readily undergo the scorching heat of the Fire, the sharpnesess of Iron, and the trouble of Thirst, to free our selves from some Distempers of the Body, but to heal the Mind, which is of a far greater value, we scruple to suffer any thing.

Ʋt Corpus redimas, ferrum patieris & ignes, Arida nec sitiens ora lavabis aqua Ʋt valeas Animo quicquam tolerare negabis; At pretium pars haec Corpore majus habet.

And I suppose Horace had the same Fancy in the forementioned Passage.

—Nam cur Quae feriant oculos festinas demere, si quid Est animum differs curandi tempus in annum?

Truly as the Soul is infinitely more Noble than the Body, and according to the Opinion of Aristo∣tle, it alone makes up almost the entire Man; it must therefore necessarily be much more susceptible as well of the impressions of Good, of Pleasure and Delight, as of Evil, Trouble, and Disquietness. Besides, the Diseases of the Mind are so much the more dangerous than the Diseases of the Body, be∣cause these have signs to make us understand them, but the other are often concealed from us; for our Reason that ought to ponder them is disturb'd, and cannot make a right estimation. Therefore such as are Sick in Body seek a Remedy from Physick, but such as are Distemper'd in Mind, from Philosophy, yet will not obey its Directions. Again, amongst the Diseases of the Body, those are the greatest and the most dangerous of all, which cast us into a slumber, and are not felt by the Patient, as a Le∣thargy, the Falling-Sickness, and that burning Fever which causeth a Dilirium. Now there is scarce any Distemper of the Mind, but ought to be reckon'd of as dangerous a Consequence; and the rather, because they are not known to be what they are, and oftimes are covered over with a fair

shew and pretence of contrary Vertues; for Exam∣ple, Fury and Wrath, are stiled Courage; Fear and Cowardise, usurp the name of Prudence. In short, Discontent, which is a grief of the Mind, and a Di∣stemper which generally causeth the other Diseases to be more unpleasant, sad and troublesom, affects nothing more, than to seem to be taken and caused not without great Provocation and just Resentments. Neither are we to pretend with Aristippus, That Criminals are commonly punished with Pains and bodily Torments, as being more severe and uneasy to be undergone. For as the Legislator or the Judge, hath not the same power over the Mind, as over the Body, so it is as true, that he cannot appoint, that the Offender should be tortured in his Mind, but in his Body, that so a visible Punishment might be inflicted upon the Offender, whereby the People might be kept in stricter awe from Offending: But it follows not from thence, that there is no greater pain than that, or, that the pain of the Mind may not be a more grievous Torment.

Besides, when a Man is really under the actual sufferings of the Body, or when he supposes that he shall shortly be so, he fancies in his Mind, that he shall be tied to the Rack, or perhaps, that his Head shall be cut off; that he shall be broken upon the Wheel, or burnt at the Stake; that he shall lose his Life in sight of the World with publick Shame, and be accounted a perpetual Ignominy and Reproach to his Family and dearest Friends; and who cannot but be troubled at this? And can you imagin any torture of the Body (supposing it to be separa∣ted from all this) that can stand in competition with this inward kind of Grief and cruel Vexation of the Mind? And for this reason it is, that I have as∣serted, that the Pains and Torments are not direct∣ly appointed by the Judge, but are thereby indi∣rectly

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designed, to the end they might increase the former, and render the punishment more grievous. To this purpose, have we not seen, that the Threats and terrible apprehensions of Death, have changed the Hair of the Head into a hoary colour in one Night; have dried up the moisture of the Body, and have Killed several? This plainly shews, that the last and greatest Torment, is not that of the Body, but that of the Mind, &c.

I don't here recount the grief and disturbance of Mind, which Envy, Ambition, and the remorse of Conscience causeth in an evil Man, a Tyrant, or a∣mbitious Wretch; I will at present only insert what Juvenal, Horace, and Persius mention of it, as a greater Torment, than ever Caeditius, or Rhadaman∣tus ever invented.

Juv. Sat. XIII. Not sharp Revenge, nor Hell it self can find A fiercer Torment, than a guilty Mind, Which day and night do's dreadfully accuse, Condemns the Wretch, and still the Charge renews.

And Horace, Epist. 2. Lib. I. The fiercest Tyrants never yet could find A greater Rack, than Envy to the Mind.

And Persius, Sat. III. Great Father of the Gods, when for our Crimes, Thou send'st some heavy Judgment on the Times, Some Tyrant King, the Terror of his Age, The Type and true Vice-gerent of thy Rage; Thus punish him; set Vertue in his sight, With all her Charms, adorn'd with all her Graces bright. But set her distant, make her pale to see His Gains outvi'd by lost Felicity.

And, tho some pretend, that a wicked Varlet by his repeated Crimes and long accustomed habit in Villany, may attain at last to such an insensibility, as to have none of those ordinary Remorses, which rack the Minds of the cruellest Tyrant, and by that means may become Happy: And, besides, that the freedom from Remorse, makes not a Man Happy, I will farther add, That in the ordinary course of Life, this supposition is not only scarce to be found, as is easy to be proved, but altogether impossible; and, that there is no man, tho' never so much hardened in Wickedness, that can banish, or expel out of his Mind, this inward Executioner. Again, such a Wretch cannot be reckoned in the number of Men, but of Monsters, that are to be Strangled; and not only so, but in the number of Fools, because he hath lost his Sense and Reason, by brutishly expo∣sing himself to the Rage, if I may so say, and to the Fury of all Men, who abominate him, and look upon him as a Beast of Prey, or as a Tyrant, that deserves to be cut off.

Wherein Epicurus differs from the Stoicks.

LAertius takes also notice, in what Particulars Epicu∣rus differs in Opinion from the Stoicks, upon ac∣count of that irreconcilable hatred they bore him. He says, that Epicurus having declar'd, That Vertue is desirable for Pleasure's sake, they took this pretence to exclaim against him, as if he had spoken of sor∣did and sensual Pleasures; saying, That it is unwor∣thily spoken, and scandalous to maintain, That Vertue was not to be sought for it self, but for this sort of Pleasure. Amongst others, there was one named Cleanthes, who to heighten the matter, and render Epicurus more Odious, made this Picture, which Cicero objects to Torquatus.

Fancy to your selves,

(said he to his Disciples) Pleasure finely drawn, sitting upon a Royal Throne, shining in very splendid and magnificent Attire, attended by all the Vertues, standing about her as so many Ser∣vants, yet acting nothing else, nor performing any other Office, but to Advise and Whisper her in the Ear; Take heed that you commit nothing im∣prudently, and that might offend the Minds of Men, or from whence some Reluctance and Displeasure may proceed: We are the Vertues, born for to tender you this Service, and our Office is only to admonish you.

This is the Picture that the Envy and Jealousie of Cleanthes made of Epicurus's Pleasure. There want∣ed but one thing more, the saying of a certain Per∣son.

That Epicurus had imitated Paris, who of the three Goddesses, selected Venus, upon whom he be∣stow'd the Golden Apple. That Epicurus by Plea∣sure, had nothing else in prospect but mean and low Pleasures, such as a beautiful Face, Hair loosly spread, with Perfumes, gaudy Attire, and a wan∣ton Carriage and Behaviour, tending to all Soft∣liness and Effiminacy, to Lust, Lasciviousness and Debauchery,

Altera Achaemenium spirabat vertice odorem, Ambrosias diffusa comas, & veste refulgens Ostrum, quam fulvo Tyrium suffuderat auro; Fronte decor quaesitus acu, lasciva{que} crebras Ancipiti motu jaciebant lumina flammas.

Whereas, he ought to have imitated Hercules, who meeting with Pleasure and Vertue together, gave the preference to the latter, tho' Vertue appear'd to him with an austere Countenance, in a careless Undress, making her approach with a Masculine Aspect, accompanied with a becoming Modesty, as the Poet saith;

— Frons hirta, nec unquam Composita mutata coma, stans vultus & ore Incessu{que} viro propior, laetique pudoris.

That Vertue, (according to Epicurus) is essentially re∣lated to Pleasure, as it tends to the main end and de∣sign of an happy Life.

BUt there is no need that we should stop here to deface this Picture of Cleanthes, or busy our selves in discovering what Malice and Detraction have in∣vented. What hath been already spoken, may suf∣fice for that purpose; and the rather, because we have plainly made it appear, that the Pleasure meant by Epicurus, is not that soft, sensual, and debauch'd Pleasure represented in this Picture, but that which he intends, is quite contrary, Pure and Undefiled, viz. An Indolency of the Body, and the Tranqui∣lity of the Mind, but chiefly the latter. So that this kind of Pleasure cannot hinder any from seeking after Vertue, seeing that it is in this only that Felicity or Happiness of Life consists; and that Epicurus proposes no more than the Stoicks them∣selves do, who affirm, That Vertue is sufficient to pro∣cure a pleasant and a happy Life.

And truly this Maxim alone does sufficiently evince, That what Shift or Excuse soever they may seem to frame, yet they suppose Vertue designed for no other end, but to live well and happily. So, that an happy Life is desirable for it self; but Ver∣tue is not so much desirable for itself, as for an happy Life. Now, when I mention this nice Di∣stinction, I include Seneca himself, who makes Plea∣sure an accidental Companion only, or something that is casually incident to Vertue; like as a small Weed, which grows and flourisheth amongst Wheat. This

seems Popular and Taking. And we may truly compare Vertue to the Wheat; but as we seek and covet the Wheat, not simply for the sake of Wheat, nor for that small Weed that grows amongst it, but for the uses of Life that we expect from it: So Vertue is not sought after simply for it self, or for its own sake, or for any slight thing that may in∣tervene, but chiefly in order to Happiness, or which amounts to the same, for this kind of Pleasure that we now treat of. Therefore, when he adds, Thou art mistaken when thou askest, what that thing is which moveth us to seek after Vertue, for it is to ask for some∣thing above that which is the highest of all; I seek and desire Vertue it self; I desire it for it self; there is no∣thing better; it carries with it a sufficient Reward. It is manifest, that this Question is full and to the Purpose; and we may say, That when we desire something beyond Vertue, we don't desire a trivial thing, but something that is above the highest and Supream. It is true, that in order to all the means which are used to render Life happy, it is impossi∣ble to find any more conducive thereunto than Ver∣tue. Nevertheless, we are to esteem an happy Life above Vertue; for Vertue only relates to Happi∣ness, or an happy Life, as to its proper End.

And therefore Aristotle seems to be very exact in this point, when he speaks of that Happiness which Vertue above all things can procure.

Is is, saith he, evident, That the recompence or reward of Vertue, is something very Excellent, something Divine and Happy. And elsewhere, That Feli∣city is not a thing that happens to us by a Divine appointment alone, but is to be obtain'd by Ver∣tue, or by Learning, or by our Endeavours; there is nothing can be more Excellent, nothing more Happy. Besides, he makes this distinction with Plato and Architas. There are some things saith he, That are desirable for themselves, and not for

any thing else, as Felicity; and others are desired for something else, and not for themselves, as Riches; and other things, are desired for themselves, and for others, as Vertue.

This I instance on purpose that one may see what sort of Men may be opposed to Seneca, when he is so confident, that Vertue can∣not nor ought not to be desired for any thing else but it self. By this Opinion, we offer no wrong to Vertue; for just as much as we value Pleasure, Fe∣licity, and the chief Good, so much do we praise and esteem Vertue, which leads us to, and is the proper means of obtaining them.

But not to busy our selves any longer about this matter, it sufficeth to relate here what Cicero makes Torquatus speak according to the Sentiments of Epi∣curus. The Text is long, but excellent, and it explains and decides, as I may say, the whole Mat∣ter. When therefore after a long Dispute, it was concluded, That whatsoever is Right, Just, and Praise-worthy, tends to live Pleasantly, and with Delight, Torquatus continues thus to speak;

In regard therefore that this is the chief and supream Good, which the Greeks have called by the name of End, because it tends to no other thing, and that all things center in it; We ought to confess, that to live with delight and Pleasure, is the chief Good or Happiness. They who place it in Vertue alone, and whose Understandings are dazled with the glory of the Name, not rightly comprehending what Nature requires, may be freed from a gross Mistake, if they please to hearken to Epicurus; for to instance in all your laudable and excellent Vertues, and First, of Wisdom, Who can believe them to be Praise-worthy or desirable, if they pro∣cured no Pleasure? Truly, as we don't esteem the Art of a Physician for the Art sake, but for the Preservation of Health; so we should never

desire Wisdom, which is the Art of Living, if it were Insignificant and Useless: But as it drives us in the search, and helps us in the obtaining true and real Pleasure, we earnestly desire and pursue after it. You understand now what Pleasure I speak of; and lest the ambiguous acceptation of words should render our Discourse untelligible or doubtful, I must explain my self, That it is Wis∣dom alone that banisheth Sorrow and all uneasi∣ness of Mind, that supports us under our anxious Fears, that curbs the fury of our Lusts and Ap∣petites, and causeth us to live Peaceably and Easy. These are the unsatiable Appetites, that ruin not only every particular Person, but also Families, and oft-times the whole Common-wealth. From these Appetites proceed Hatred, Quarrels, Discords, Seditions, Wars. And these Passions break not only outwardly upon other Persons with a blind Fury, but struggle inwardly, and War within themselves in our Minds. It is this that must needs cause our anxi∣ous and uneasy Life. So that the Wise Man alone having banish'd all boundless and irregular Desires, confines himself, and is satisfied within the limits of Nature, and by that means may spend his time without Grief, Sorrow, or Fear. If therefore we see all our Life disturb'd by Error and Ignorance, and that it is Wisdom only which delivers from the Af∣fronts of our vain Desires, and groundless Fears, and that adviseth us to bear with Patience the in∣juries of Fortune, and teaches the ways that lead to Rest and Tranquility, ought we not to say, that Wisdom is desirable, because of Pleasure; and that we are to shun Folly, because of the Mischief which attends it, by bringing Trouble and Di∣sturbance to our Minds?

By the same Reason we will say, that Tempe∣rance is not desirable for it self, but because it

brings Peace into our Minds; it sweetens and pre∣serves them in quiet. Because 'tis Temperance that directs us to follow Reason, either in things that we ought to desire and follow, or things that we are to shun and avoid; for it is not sufficient to judge what ought to be, and what ought not to be, but we must likewise continue constant and resolved, in what we have so judged. Now, there are many who cannot remain firm in what they have resolved, but being overcome by a seeming and mistaken Pleasure, give themselves over to the slavery of their Lusts, without foreseeing what will from thence ensue; and from hence it hap∣pens, that for a small and trivial Pleasure, which might be otherwise obtain'd, and which we might easily want without Pain, they fall into great Sicknesses, into Loss, into Shame, and incur many times the penalty of the Laws and Courts of Judicature. But such as will so enjoy their Pleasures, that no inconveniency nor trouble may thereby ensue, and who continue constant in their well-grounded Resolutions, for fear of being overcome by false Pleasures, and lest they should be perswaded to do what they understand ought not to be done; such I say, find a great pleasure in denying themselves these seeming Delights. They oftentimes easily undergo small Pains and Troubles, lest by shunning of these, they might fall into greater. From hence we may learn, that Debauchery is not to be shunn'd for its own sake, nor Sobriety to be desired because it declines some Pleasures, but because it procureth greater and more substantial ones.

We shall find the same Arguments for Forti∣tude; for it is neither Labour, nor Pain, nor Pa∣tience, nor Constancy, nor Industry, nor Courage, nor Watchfulness, that draw us of themselves;

but we are perswaded by these actions, that we may live without Trouble or Fear, and that we might free our selves as much as is possible from that which incommodes either the Mind or the Body; for oftentimes the Calm of our Life is di∣sturb'd with the extraordinary fear of Death; and it is a miserable thing to be oppress'd with Pain, and to bear it with a mean and feeble Courage; insomuch, that by this weakness of Spirit, many have lost their Parents, many their Friends, and many their Native Country, nay, have altogether lost themselves. But a generous, stout and coura∣gious Spirit, is free from such Cares and Troubles, because it despiseth Death, and is so provided to receive Grief and Pain, that it knows the greatest are cur'd by Death, and the least have divers in∣tervals of Rest; and that as for moderate Griefs, we are Masters of them. Besides, a noble Spirit considers, that if the Pains be not extraordinary, they are easily suffered; but if they be very grie∣vous, we shall then willingly surrender and quit our Life, which in such a case, becomes unpleasant to us; so that we leave it in the same manner as we go off a Theatre. From hence we may con∣clude, that Fear and Cowardise are not in them∣selves blame-worthy; neither do Courage and Pa∣tience of themselves, merit Praise. But the first are slighted, because they increase Pain and Sor∣row, and the other are desired, because they pro∣cure real Pleasure.

There remains nothing else to be examin'd but Justice, of which we may almost say the same. For as I have already demonstrated, that Wisdom, Temperance and Fortitude, are so joyned with Pleasure, that they cannot be separated from it, we ought to say the same of Justice, which is not only inoffensive to all Men, but does also constant∣ly

bring with it such advantages, as by the strength of its own nature, does quiet and settle the Thoughts, by affording continual hopes of never wanting those things which an honest Mind may desire. And as Timerousness, Covetousness, and Cowardise do perpetually torment the Mind, and are continually vexing and disturbing its quiet: So where Injustice bears sway in the Soul, it be∣gets much Trouble and Vexation; and if it hath committed any evil action, tho' never so secretly, yet it can never be assured that it shall always re∣main undiscover'd. Jealousy and fear of being found out, do commonly attend evil Actions, and we suppose every one to be our Accuser, and rea∣dy to Inform against us. Nay, some out of fear of being Discovered, have been their own Accu∣sers. If some think their Riches a sufficient shel∣ter, and capable of quieting their Conscience, yet they have such a dread of the Justice of God in punishing their Crimes, that upon a due resent∣ment of this, their Thoughts labour under a per∣petual Agony and Disturbance. Now, their wick∣ed Actions can never be able so much to lessen the anxiety of their Life, as the gripings of a Wounded Conscience, or the Laws of the Coun∣try, and the hatred of their Acquaintance, have to increase it. Nevertheless, such is the unsatiable desire of some Men after Riches, Luxury, Honour, Dominion, &c. that in the obtaining of them, they will stick at no indirect Means; so that nothing but a severe Punishment inflicted on them by the Laws, is able to stop their Career. True Reason therefore directs all Men of sound Judgment to observe the Rules of Justice, Equity and Fidelity, which are the best means to procure to our selves the good Esteem and Love of others, and which is abso∣lutely necessary to render our Lives Pleasant and Se∣date:

And the rather because hereby we have no temptation to do what is ill, because that the de∣sires which proceed from Nature may easily be appeased without doing wrong to any Person; and as for other vain Desires, we are not to re∣gard them; for they prompt us to nothing that is really worthy seeking after; and Injustice it self brings a greater damage to us than the recompence it can be able to make us, by the seeming good things it brings along with it. Therefore we cannot say, That Justice is of it self desirable, but only because it is attended with a great deal of Pleasure and Content; for we are not a little pleased with the esteem and good will of others, which renders our Life Comfortable and Pleasant. Thus we don't believe that we ought to shun Vice only because of the inconveniencies that fall upon the Wicked, but chiefly because it never suffers the Mind to be at rest, where it hath once taken pos∣session.

I might here mention the Objections that are brought against this Opinion, but they relate to no∣thing but sensual and dishonest Pleasures, which Epi∣curus abhors in express words. I will only take no∣tice, that the Pleasure that is here understood, is such true real and natural Pleasure, in which our Happiness consists. We therefore say, That Vertue is inseparably accompanied with it, being the real and genuine cause of it; for where that is suppo∣sed, Happiness immediately attends, and when that is removed, Pleasure it self must needs decay. In the same manner as the Sun is said to be inseparable from the Day, because it alone is the true and ne∣cessary cause thereof; for as soon as the Sun appears over our Horizon, the Day must needs be, and when it withdraws, the Day dis-appears. Now, the rea∣son

why Epicurus supposes Vertue to be the efficient cause of Happiness, is because he thinks that Pru∣dence doth as it were contain all other Vertues; for all the rest proceed from this, and have in a great measure a dependence upon her.