Three discourses of happiness, virtue, and liberty collected from the works of the learn'd Gassendi, by Monsieur Bernier ; translated out of French.

Some Particulars needful to be examin'd, and con∣sider'd, which will contribute very much to the Repose and Happiness of the Mind.

THE First Particular, is the Knowledge and Fear of God. And certainly this Philosopher had good Reason to recommend to us in the first place, the right Ideas that we are to entertain of this Sovereign Being; because he that hath a right Notion of him, is so much inflamed with Love and Affection for God, that he constantly endeavours to please him by an honest and a vertuous Life, always trusting in his infinite Goodness, and expecting all things from him, who is the Fountain of all good: By this means he spends his Life sweetly, peaceably, and pleasantly. We shall not concern our selves here to shew the Existence of this Being, seeing we have already done it elsewhere: But shall only take no∣tice, that tho' Epicurus delivers some Notions that are very just and reasonable, yet he hath others that are not to be entertained by pious Men, tho' he inter∣prets 'em after his own Fashion; such are to be look'd upon as impious; for he believes, That God hath a Being, as Lucretius makes him acknowledge in his first Book.

For whatsoe'er's Divine must live in Peace, In undisturb'd and everlasting Ease; Not care for us; from Fears and Dangers free, Sufficient to it's own Felicity: Nought here below, nought in our Power it needs, Ne'er smiles at good, ne'er frowns at wicked deeds.

Now I say, to believe such a supreme Being, that exists to all Eternity, is immortal and infinitely hap∣py in it's own Nature, enjoying all things within it

self, and stands in no need of us, nor hath any Cause to fear; that is not subject to Pain, Anger, nor other Passions, are undeniable Truths, and an Opinion that is Praise-worthy, especially in a Heathen Philoso∣pher; but when he denies Providence, as these Ver∣ses do intimate, and when he thinks that it is not consisting with the highest Felicity, as if God had no particular Care of Men; That the Just are to ex∣pect nothing from his Goodness, nor the Wicked are not to dread his Justice, are such Opinions, that our Reason and Religion will not permit us to enter∣tain.

The second Particular relates to Death. For as Aristotle observes, Death is look'd upon as the most dreadful Evil, because none is exempted, being una∣voidable. Therefore Epicurus judges, That we ought to accustom our selves to think upon it, that we might learn by that means as much as is possible to free our selves from such Fears of Death, as might disturb our Tranquility, and consequently the Hap∣piness of our Life; and for that Reason, he endea∣vours to perswade us, that it is so far from being the most dreadful of all Evils, that in it self it is no Evil at all: And thus he argues; Death, saith he, don't affect us, and by consequence in respect of us, is not to be judged an Evil; for what affects us is attended by some but, now Death is the privation of Sense. He tells us also, with Anaxagoras, That as before we were capable of Sense, it was not grievous to us to have no Sense; so likewise when we shall have lost it, we shall not be troubled at the want of it. As when we are asleep, we are not concerned, because we are not awake: So when we shall be dead, it will not trouble us, that we are not living. He concludes with Archesilas, That Death, which is said to be an Evil, hath this belonging to it, that when it hath been present, it hath never troubled any body. And that it is through the Weakness of the Mind, and the dismal Apprehensions that we have of Death, that

makes it seem so terrible to us when absent, insomuch that some are struck dead with the very Fear of dying.

We may very well acknowledge, That Death is the Privation of our External Sense, or of Sense, properly so called. And Epicurus hath very good Reason to say, That in Death there is nothing to be feared, that may injure the Sight, the Hearing, the Smell, the Tast, or the Sense of Feeling; for all these Senses cannot be without the Body, and then the Body ceases to be, or is dissolved. But that which we are not to allow is, what he affirms elsewhere, That Death is also the Privation or Extinction of the Spirit, or Understanding, which is an internal Sense; a Sense according to his Notion. Therefore, that we may not be hindred, by this Impiety, which has been sufficiently refuted in treating of the Im∣mortality of the Soul; let us proceed to give a Check to the extraordinary Apprehensions of Death, and to those Fears that frequently disturb all the Peace and Quiet of our Life, and with a sullen Blackness infect and poison all our most innocent Pleasures, as Lucretius saith,

— Those idle Fears, That spoil our Lives with Jealousies and Cares, Disturb our Joys with dread of Pains beneath, And sully them with the black Fears of Death.

Let us therefore in the first place, remember to give a Check to that fond Desire of prolonging our days without bounds. Let us, I say, so remember this frail and infirm Condition of our Nature, as not to desire any thing above it's Reach and Capacity. Let us calmly and quietly, without repining, enjoy this Gift of Life, whether it be bestowed upon us for a longer or a shorter time. It is certain, that our Ma∣ker may deprive us of it without doing us any wrong. Let us thankfully acknowledge his Liberality, from

whom we have received it, and add this to the num∣ber of those Benefits, which we daily draw from his Bounty.

Nature favours us for a while with the use of the Prospect of those Enjoyments: Be not angry, that we must withdraw when the time is expired; for we were admitted upon no other Terms, but to yield our places to others, as our Ancestors have done to us. Our Bodies are naturally inclinable to Corruption, and the manner of our Nativity renders our Death unavoidable. If to be Born is pleasant, let not our Dissolution be grievous to us, to make use of Seneca's Words. If the striving against this Fatality could any ways advantage us, we should then perhaps ap∣prove of the Endeavours that are made, but all our Strugglings are to no purpose, we do but add to our pain.

The number of our Days is so appointed, that the time of our Life slides away, and is not to be reco∣vered; and we run our Race in such a manner, that whether we will or not, we are brought at last to the end.

As many Days as we pass over, so many are cut off from that Life that Nature hath alotted to us. So that Death being the Privation of Life, we are dy∣ing continually, as long as we live, and that by a Death that carries not all at once, but by degrees one step after another, tho' the last is that unto which the Name of Death is assigned. So true it is, that the end of our Life depends upon the first Mo∣ment.

Let us therefore moderate our Desires according to the Rule that Nature hath prescribed; and if the De∣stinies (to speak according to the ancient Poets) can∣not be prevail'd upon, so that against our Wills, we are hurried away; let us at least alleviate our Trouble by suffering our selves to be carried off willingly.

The best and only Remedy to pass our Life free and void of Trouble, is to suit our selves to our Nature, to desire nothing but what it requires, and to esteem the last Moment of our Life as a free Gift of Providence, and to dispose and prepare our selves in such a manner, that when Death approaches, we may say, I have lived, and I have finished the Race that Nature hath appointed me.

Vixi & quem dederas cursum Natura peregi.

She calls away, but I come of mine own accord. Nature requires of me what I am intrusted with, I yield it willingly: I am commanded to die, I expire without Regret. We might also very well make use of the Advice of Lucretius, and speak thus to our selves. The greatest and most mighty Monarchs of the World are dead; and Scipio, that Thunderbolt of War, and Terror of Carthage, hath left his Bones in the Earth, like as the vilest Slave: Anchises, the most Religious of all men, and Homer the Prince of the Poets, are dead; and shall we murmur to die?

But more to comfort thee— Consider, Ancus perish'd long ago; Ancus, a better Man by much than thou. Consider, mighty Kings in pamper'd State Fall, and ingloriously submit to Fate. Scipio that Scourge of Carthage, now the Grave Keeps Prisoner like the meanest common Slave; Nay, the great Wits and Poets too, that give Eternity to others, cease to live. Homer their Prince, the Darling of the Nine (What Troy would at a second fall repine To be thus sung?) is nothing now but Fame, A lasting, far diffus'd, but empty Name.

Let us say moreover, Gassendus himself is dead, and that great Man hath finished his Course like other Mortals; he who in profound Learning and Wisdom excell'd the rest of Mankind, and who rising like a Sun, darkned the Light of all the Stars.

Nay Great Gassendi's Race of Life is run, That Man of Wit, who other Men out-shone, As far as meaner Stars the mid-day Sun.

And can'st not thou, O Wretch, resolve to die?

Then how dar'st thou repine to die and grieve, Thou meaner Soul, thou dead ev'n whilst alive? That sleep'st and dream'st the most of Life away, Thy Night is full as rational as thy Day. Still vext with Cares, who never understood The Principles of ill, nor use of good, Nor whence thy Cares proceed, but reel'st about, In vain unsettled Thoughts, condemn'd to doubt.

Thou whose Life is as half dead; thou who spend∣est above half thy time in Sleep; who snorest, (as I may say) waking and feedest upon Fancies, and who livest in the midst of Fears and continual Troubles. It is what our famous Malherbe had in his Thoughts, when he bewails the unhappy Fate of great Men, who are subject to the same Laws of Death as the mean∣est Beggars.

Yet these are turn'd to Dust, and Fate Rules with such Arbitrary Sway, So binds its Laws on every State, That all their Equal's Doom Obey. With none e'er yet Impartial Destiny Of all it's num'rous Subjects wou'd dispense, Hear this ye Vulgar Souls, and hence Ʋnrepining Learn to Die.

But here some will object, we shall be depriv'd of all the Blessings of Life, as Lucretius Elegantly Ex∣presses it, Lib. 3.

Ay, but he now is snatcht from all his Joys; No more shall his Chast Wife, and Pratling Boys Run to their Dad, with eager hast, and strive Which shall have the first Kiss, as when alive. Ay, but he now no more from Wars shall come, Bring Peace and Safety to his Friends at home; Wretched, O Wretched Man! one Fatal Day Has snatch'd the vast Delights of Life away.

It is true, that this is commonly objected, but they seldom Consider that this supposed Unhappy Man shall then have no desire at all for such things; and that when he shall be really Dead, he shall not see any like himself standing near his Tomb, beating the Breast, and languishing with Grief, as the same Au∣thor Describes.

Thus they bewail, but go no further on, And add, that his Desires and Wants are gone. But the fond Fool n'er thinks, that when kind Death Shall close his Eyes in Night, and stop his Breath; Then nothing of this thinking thing remains, To mourn his Fate, and feel sharp Grief and Pains.

May not we likewise thus Argue, as Plutarch Ob∣serves, and which often occurs in our Thoughts? If our Life, which we esteem very long, when it extends to an Hundred Years, were naturally but of one Days continuance, as some Animals mention'd by Aristo∣tle, in the Kingdom of Pontus are; And if like them in the Morning we were in our Youth, at Noon in our Strength and full Growth, and at Night in our Old Age; It is certain, in this Case we should be as well pleas'd to live one Day till Night, as we are now to live an hundred years. And on the con∣trary,

if our Life did now extend to a thousand years, as did that of our first Fathers, in that Case it would grieve us as much to Die at the end of six hundred years, as to depart now at the expiration of three∣score. It is the same in respect of those, who first came into the World, if they had continued till this present time, it would trouble them as much to Die now, as it does us.

These Considerations therefore ought to teach us, that our Life of what sort soever, is to be computed, not by its length, but by the good Qualifications and Pleasures that attend it. In the same manner (saith Seneca) As the Perfection of a Circle ought to be compu∣ted, not by the Greatness, but by the exact Roundness of the Figure. O Vain and Indiscreet Diligence, saith Pliny, Men compute the number of their Days, where they should only seek their true Worth.

Heu vana, & imprudens diligentia, numerus dierum Computatur ubi quaeritur pondus!

We don't Consider, that as the Mass of this Earth, and all the World beside, and a thousand other such Worlds, if you please, are but as a Point, if compa∣red with the vast extended space of the Heavens: Thus the longest Life of Man, were it as long as that of the Hamadryades, or a thousand thousand times more, is but a Moment, if compared with Eter∣nity. This Life, saith Seneca, is but a Point, How can we extend this Point?

In hoc punctum conjectus es, Quod ut extendas, quousque extendes?

Know, saith Lucretius, That by the prolonging of our Days we diminish nothing from the time and long conti∣nuance of Death; and that he who dies to day, shall not be dead a less time than he who died a thousand years ago.

What tho' a thousand years prolong thy breath, How can this shorten the long state of Death? For tho' thy Life shall numerous Ages fill, The State of Death shall be Eternal still; And he that dies to day, shall be no more, As long as those who perish'd long before.

If Nature, saith he again, should in anger speak to us in this manner?

What Cause hast thou, O Mor∣tal to Weep, and to Complain of Death? If thy former Life hath been easie and pleasant, and if thou hast known how to make use of the good things and delights that I have afforded thee, why dost thou not as a Guest, depart when thou art full, and satisfied with Life? and why dost thou not accept, fond Creature, of the agreeable Repose that is offered thee? But if otherwise, thy Life hath been to thee a burthen, and if thou hast suf∣fered my Bounties to perish, why desirst thou more to mispend them after the same manner? for I can give thee no new thing. And if thou shouldst live thousands of years, thou wilt but still see the same things repeated over again.

If Nature should speak to us in this Language, should we not have reason to approve of this Discourse, and own that it hath cause to Reproach us in this manner?

Fond Mortal, what's the matter thou dost sigh? Why all these Tears, because thou once must die, And once submit to strong Necessity? For if the Race thou hast already run Was pleasant, if with joy thou saws't the Sun: If all thy Pleasures did not pass thy Mind, As thro' a Sieve, but left some Sweets behind; Why dost thou not then like a thankful Guest, Rise cheerfully from Life's abundant Feast, And with a quiet Mind go take thy Rest?

But if all those Delights are lost and gone, Spent idly all, and Life a burthen grown; Then why, fond Mortal, dost thou ask for more? Why still desire t'increase thy wretched store? And wish for what must wast like those before? Not rather free thy self from Pains and Fear, And end thy Life, and necessary care? My Pleasures always in a Circle run, The same returning with the yearly Sun: And thus, tho' thou dost still enjoy thy Prime, And tho' thy Limbs feel not the rage of Time; Yet I can find no new, no fresh Delight, The same dull Joys must vex thy Appetite: Altho' thou coud'st prolong thy wretched Breath For numerous Years; much more if free from Death.

At least we must acknowledge that a Wise Man who hath lived long enough to consider the World, ought of his own accord to submit himself to the Course of Nature, when he perceives that his time is come, and cannot but suppose that his Race is Run, and that the Circle that he hath finish'd is compleat; and if this Circle is not to be compared to Eternity, it is however with the continuance of the World.

As to what relates to the whole Prospect of Na∣ture, he hath often beheld the Heavens, the Earth, and other things included in the World; He hath often seen the rising and the setting of the Coelestial Bodies; He hath taken notice of several Eclipses, and many other Phaenomenas or unusual Appearances in the Skye, the constant succession of the Seasons, and in a word, many particular Generations, many Cor∣ruptions and Transmutations. And as to those things which relate to Mankind, he hath seen, or at least hath heard and understood from History the Transactions that have happen'd from the beginning; of Peace, and of War, of Faith kept, and violated; of a Polite Life, and of a rude and barbarous Beha∣viour;

of Laws Establish'd, and Abolish'd, of King∣doms and Commonwealths in their first Birth and Declension, and generally all other things that he hath any knowledge of, or which have been told him, and with which he is in any wise acquainted, as if he had been present when they first happen'd. So that he ought to consider, that all the time that is gone before him relates to him, as if his Life were begun with the things themselves. And because we must judge of the future by the time past, he ought also to think that all the subsequent time relates to him in the same manner; and that there shall be no∣thing hereafter, but what hath been already; that there is nothing but the Circumstances of things that alter, and that all things in general steer the same common Course, and make the like appearances; so that Holy Writ hath reason to say, The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be, and that which is done, is that which shall be done again, and there is no new thing under the Sun. Is there any thing whereof it may be said, see this is new? From whence we may conclude, that a Wise Man ought not to fancy his Life short; for by casting his eye upon the time past, and foreseeing the time to come, he may ex∣tend it to as great a length as the duration of the Universe.

Moreover, tho' Epicurus had cause to say, That it is ridiculous to assert that there is no evil in Death when it is present, and yet to dread it, and be troubled when it must come; as if there were any reason to be disturbed for that which is absent, which when present never gives us the least sorrow: Nevertheless, because other Considerati∣ons represent Death dreadful, as the Evils and Pains that Usher it, and those that we think will be its neces∣sary Attendants; Seneca therefore makes it his busi∣ness to recommend divers Considerations, wherein he shews, that tho' Death in it self is no Evil, yet it appears so much in that Notion, that it ought not

to be lookt upon as an indifferent thing; for as he expresseth himself; Death is not indifferent in the same manner as it is indifferent whether the Hairs of my head be of one length, or not; for Death is to be reckon'd amongst those things, which tho' they be no real Evils, yet they appear to be so; for we love our selves; and na∣turally desire to subsist and preserve our selves, and we have an innate aversion from a dissolution, because it seems to deprive us of many advantages, and draws us away from that plenty of Enjoyments unto which we are accustomed. There is yet one thing more which cau∣seth us to dread Death. We know the things present, but we are altogether Strangers to those unto which we are a going; and therefore we fear that which is un∣known. Besides, we have a natural dread of Darkness, into which we imagin that Death is leading us: So that tho' Death is indifferent, yet it is not of the number of those things that are easily to be despised; we ought to inure and harden our Minds by a long accustomed Habit, to enable us the more willingly to undergo and encounter with the dismal approaches of Death.

The Third Particular relates to the abominable Opinion of the Stoicks, who were perswaded that in some Cases Men had the liberty to kill themselves; for thus you see Seneca represents them arguing. It is certainly a great affliction to live in want; but there is nothing that obliges us absolutely to continue in it; for which way soever we glance our eyes, we may see the end of our Sufferings, and our Deliverance, either in a Precipice, in a River, by a Dagger, by a Tree, by open∣ing a Vein, or by Abstinence. We ought to give God thanks that none of us is detained against his Will in this present Life. The Eternal Decree hath admirably well appointed that there should be but one kind of en∣trance into the World, but many out of it. Death, say they, is to be met with in every place; God hath very wisely contrived, that there is none but may take away

our Life, but no Man can take away our Death, tho' it hath a thousand Passages open to it.

Ubique Mors est; optime hoc cavit Deus: Eripere vitam nemo non homini potest; At nemo mortem; mille ad hanc exitus patent.

He that knows how to die, can free himself, and he hath always the Door of his Prison open. True it is, there is a Chain that holds us fast, name∣ly the Love of Life; and this Love, though we ought not absolutely to reject it, yet we should at least mitigate it, that if sometimes Accidents re∣quire, it may not keep us back, nor hinder us from being ready to perform at present, that which we must one day do or suffer. These following Tenets proceed from the same School. The Wise Man lives as long as he ought, tho' not so long as he may; He knows where he ought to live, with whom, and how, and what he ought to do. He considers the manner of his Life, and not the length. If he meets with Crosses, and Misfortunes, he frees him∣self, and don't stay for the last necessity to set him at liberty; but as soon as Fortune begins to frown upon him, he seriously considers, if he ought not at that time to end his days. He believes that if he himself hastens his end, or expects it from ano∣ther hand, it is the same thing; or whether it be brought to pass sooner or later, it grieves him not. Nevertheless sometimes though his Death is certain and appointed, and that he knows himself set apart for Execution, yet he won't lend his helping hand, nor will he be overwhelm'd with Sorrow. It is a folly to die for fear of Death. If he that is to kill thee is coming, wait for him, Why wilt thou pre∣vent him? and why wilt thou undertake to execute upon thy self another's Cruelty? Dost thou covet the Office of an Executioner? or wilt thou save

him the labour? Socrates ought to have ended his Days by Abstinence, and die by Hunger, rather than by Poison, yet he continued thirty days in Prison, in expectation of Death; not because du∣ring this time he had hopes of a Reprieve, but to shew himself Obedient to the Laws, and to give his Friends the Pleasure of enjoying the Conversation of Socrates, when he was ready to Die. When therefore an outward Violence threatens us with Death, we can't give any general or absolute Di∣rections, whether we are to prevent it, or to ex∣pect it with Patience, for there are many Circum∣stances to be considered. But if there be two kinds of Death, the one full of grievous Torments, the other sudden and easie, why may not we chuse the latter?

This was the Opinion of Hyeronimus, of all the Stoicks, and namely of Pliny, who stiles the Earth a good Mother, because it hath compassion of us, and hath appointed the Poisons for our use. It seems to be like∣wise the Opinion of Plato; for tho' Cicero makes him say, That we ought to preserve the Soul inclosed in the Body, and without the command of him who gave it, we must not depart out of this Life, that we might not thereby seem to despise this gift that God hath bestowed upon Man: Yet in his Book of Laws, he declares, That he who kills himself is not to be blamed, but when he doth the act, without being thereunto forced by the Sentence of the Judge, or by some unsufferable and unavoidable accident of Fortune, or by Misery and Publick shame. Not to mention Cicero, who in a certain place commends the Opinion of Pythagoras, because he forbids to depart out of our Fortress, or to quit our Station of Life without the appointment of the General, that is to say, of God. Yet elsewhere he teaches, That in our Life we ought to observe the same Rule, that is in the Banquetings of the Greeks, that is to say, either to Drink, or to Depart; so that if we

can't bear the injuries and affronts of Fortune, we must undergo them, by flying from them. To speak no∣thing of Cato, who seems not to have sought Death so much to avoid the sight of Caesar, as to obey the Decrees, and follow the Dictates of the Stoicks, esteeming it his Glory to observe them, and to leave his Name Famous to Posterity, by some Great and Notable Action; for Lactantius saith, Cato was du∣ring his Life a Follower of the Vanity of the Stoicks.

What relates to Democritus, Truly his Opinion, as the same Lactantius informs us, was different from that of the Stoicks; yet he suffered himself to die by ab∣stinence, when he found in his very great Age, that the strength of his Body, and the abilities of his Mind began to fail.

Sponte sua letho Caput obvius obtulit ipse.

Which we may say, is altogether Criminal; for if a Murderer is an Offender, because he kills a Man, he that murders himself is guilty of the same Crime, because he also kills a Man. It is very probable that this is the greatest Crime, whereof the Vengeance is reserved to God alone; for as we do not enter upon Life of our own accord, so neither are we to depart out of it of our own heads, but by his Order, who hath placed us in the Body to inhabit there. And if any violence or injury be done us, we must bear it patiently, because the Life of a guitless Person that is destroyed, cannot be unreven∣ged; for we have a Powerful God, unto whom Vengeance always belongs.

Finally, As for Epicurus, it is thought that he was not of the same Judgment with the Stoicks; not only because he saith, That the Wise Man is easie under his Torments, but also because that he himself being grie∣vously tormented with the Stone and Gravel, he ne∣ver hasten'd his Death, but waited for it patiently. Besides, Seneca assures us, that Epicurus does as much

blame those that desire Death, as those that fear it; and that there is a great indiscretion, nay folly, in advancing our Death, for fear of Death.

Yet this happens very often, as Lucretius tells us, not only because that the extraordinary fear that Death begets in us, casts us sometimes into a dismal Melancholy, which renders all things uneasie to us, and proceeds so far as to make Life it self to become a troublesome, incommodious, and an intolerable thing; and at last to seek out the strangest means to deliver our selves from it, and to procure our Death:

Et saepe usque adeo mortis formidine, vitae Percipit ingratos odium, lucis{que} videnda Ʋt sibi conciscant moerenti pectore lethum.

But this extraordinary Fear causeth by degrees a certain kind of Melancholy, which depresseth the Heart, enfeebles the Spirits, and obstructs all the operations of Life. It stops Digestion, and draws upon us many Diseases, that are the immediate Cau∣ses of Death.

However, the Opinion of the Stoicks is not only contrary to the Sacred Precepts of our Religion, but is also contrary to Nature, and right Reason. We must except some certain Persons, who being di∣rected by a Particular and Divine Instinct, have been instrumental in procuring their own Deaths, as Samson, and others in the Old-Testament, and So∣phronia and Pelagia since the New; for Nature fur∣nishes all sorts of Animals with a Natural love of Life, and there is none besides Man, let them be tormented with never so grievous pain, but labours to preserve Life as much as they can, and to avoid Death. This is a sign that none but Man doth by his mistaken Opinions corrupt the Institution of Na∣ture, when he refuseth the benefit of Life, and ad∣vanceth

his Death; he acts then by a wickedness pe∣culiar to himself; for the true state of Nature is to be consider'd in the general body of the Creatures, and not in some few individuals of one single Species, that hasten their own destruction, and cast away themselves before the time appointed by Nature. From hence we may conclude, that such are injurious to God, and Nature, who being design'd and order'd to perform a certain Race, stop in the middle of their Course of their own accord, and who being ap∣pointed to watch, forsake and abandon their Post, without waiting for Orders from their Superiors.

Besides, Reason forbids us to be Cruel against the Innocent, who never did us any harm; and by con∣sequence it don't allow that we should act inhumanly upon our selves, from whom we never experienced any Hatred, but rather too much Love.

Moreover, upon what occasion can our Vertue ap∣pear more conspicuous, than in suffering Courageously the Evils that our hard Fortune imposes upon us? To die, saith Aristotle, because of our Poverty, or for Love, or for some other mischievous accident, is not the act of a Man of Spirit and Courage, but of a mean and timorous Soul, for it is the part of a weak Mind to shun and flye from things hard to be endured. Stout Men, saith Curtius, are wont to despise Death, rather than to hate Life. 'Tis the trouble and impatience of Suffering that carries the Cowards to base Actions, that makes them despised, and scorned. Vertue leaves no∣thing unattempted, and Death is the last thing with which we must Encounter, but not as timerous, lazy, and unwilling Souls.

I shall not here stay to examin the Opinion of those, who imagining, saith Lactantius, that the Souls are Eternal, have therefore kill'd themselves, as Clean∣thes, Chrysippus, and Zeno, expecting to be trans∣ported at the same time to Heaven; or as Empedocles, who cast himself in the Night into the Flames of Mount-Aetna,

that by disappearing so suddenly, the World might think that he was gone to the Gods; or, as Cato, who was during his Life-time a Follower of the vanity of the Stoicks; who before he kill'd himself, as it is Reported, had read Plato's Book of the Eternity of the Soul; or finally, as Cleombrotus, who after he had read the same Book, cast himself down a Precipice. This is a Cursed and Abominable Doctrin, that drives Men out of their Lives.

Neither shall I trouble my self with that Cyrenaick of Hegesius, who Disputed so Elegantly concerning the Miseries of Life, and the Blessed Place of the Souls after Death, that King Ptolomy was forced to forbid him to speak in Publick, because so many of his Disciples after they had heard him, destroyed themselves, as Cicero Re∣ports, and some others. For the Evils that we in∣dure in this Life may happen to be so great, and in∣crease in such a manner, that when the time of Death is come, the loss of Life may not be unpleasant, and that in such a Case, Death may be esteem'd as the Haven that shelters us from the Miseries and Tor∣ments of Life. But to aggravate our Afflictions so far, as to beget in us a scorn and hatred of Life, is to be injurious and unthankful to Nature, as if the Gift of Life that hath been bestowed upon us for our use, were to be rashly cast away; or as if we were not to accept of it any longer, nor honestly and quietly to enjoy it, as long as is possible.

'Tis true, what Theognis said formerly,

That it were much better for Men not to be Born, or to Die as soon as they are Born, is a Celebrated Saying.

Non nasci res est mortalibus optima longe, Nec Solis radiis acre videre Jubar, Aut natum Ditis quamprimum lumen adire.

This is confirmed by the Example of Cleobis, of Biton, of Agamedes, of Pindarus, and of some others, who having Petitioned the Gods to grant to them the thing which was best and most desirable, were admitted to this great favour, To die in a short time. Answerable to this is the Custom of the Thracians, who wept at the Birth of their Children, but Con∣gratulated the Happiness of such as Died. Not to mention Menander, who wish'd a young Man dead, because he was well beloved by the Gods.

Quem diligunt Dii, Juvenis ipse interit.

Nor to say any thing of that Famous Sentence;

Vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus,

That no body would accept of Life willingly, if it were given to them that knew what it were. But pray who will believe that Theognis, and the rest, have spoken seriously, and without any Restriction? I say without any Restriction; for if they would have it, that it is better for such only, who are to be miserable all their Lives, that they had not been Born, or to have Died at the very moment of their Birth, the Saying might be tolerable, and allowable; but to speak this in relation to all Men, is to affront Nature, the Mistriss both of our Life and Death, that hath orde∣red and appointed our Birth, and our Dissolution, as she hath all other things for the preservation of the Universe. It were to expose our selves to be con∣tradicted, if not by all, yet by the most part of Men, who are not weary of Life, but seek to pre∣serve it as carefully as they can. For Life, as we have already observed, hath something in it very pleasing and lovely; therefore he that speaks in this manner, shall feel himself bound and held fast; and I am apt to believe, that he may be like the Old Man

in Aesop, who sent Death back again, tho' he had often called for it before; or like another, who re∣fused to make use of the Dagger that he had desired to be brought, to free himself, as he pretended, from the Misery that he could no longer endure. Certainly that Person was in jest, who said, That to Live, or to Die, were Acts of Indifferency. And when one ask'd him, Why then don't you Die? his Answer was, Because it was indifferent to him. But I am perswaded, if any had assaulted him with a Naked Sword in his hand, he would have chosen rather to Live than to Die. Another answered more ingenuously, who when some Re∣proached him, that he having made profession of Wisdom, acted not accordingly, when he trembled at the approach of Danger, said, For your part you have no reason to be afraid, because your Soul is of small value; but I am afraid for the Precious Soul of Aristippus. And another, when some told him, that he had no reason to have such a desire of li∣ving to be Old; Well, quoth he, I but just now arriv'd to the Knowledge of Wisdom, and I desire therefore a little time to enjoy it; as they who enter into Matrimony well stricken in years wish for long Life to breed up their Children. But there is no∣thing more remarkable than what Cicero relates of Leontinus Gorgias, who having attain'd to the Age of one hundred and seven years, without any in∣terruption by his Labours, and ordinary Occupa∣tions, answered, to those, who desired to know from him why he had a mind to live so long?

Nihil habeo quod incusem Senectutem.

I have, says he, no reason to complain of my Old Age.

The Fourth Particular relates to the time to come, and forbids either impatiently to expect, or totally to despair; that so we may not feed our selves with vain Hopes, nor depend upon that, which neither is, nor it may be ever shall happen. For Fortune being of it's own Nature changeable and inconstant, nothing that is within her Power can be foreseen, or relied upon with so much cer∣tainty, but it may often deceive him who expects it. So that it is much our surer way, not absolute∣ly to despair of the things that we foresee, nor yet to be too much assured of them as Infallible; and in the mean while to prepare our selves in such a manner for all Events, that in case it happens o∣therwise than we expect, we may not think our selves deprived of a thing which is of absolute necessity to us. This kind of Sentence, Ni trop esperer, ni trop desperer, Neither too much Hope, nor too much Despair, tends to the same Purpose: For as to Hope and Expect with too great Reliance makes Men neglect other things, and the Mind wanders else∣where; so to have no Hopes, causeth Men to be altogether careless, and to forsake all things. Whereas he that hath a Mind moderated in respect of both Passions, finds himself in an admirable Tem∣per, and is not forced to Exclaim,

O Jupiter venerande, quale Spes malum est.

O what a miserable thing is Hope!

'Tis what Torquatus expresseth very well in Ci∣cero, when he saith, That the Wise Man lives in expectation of Future Events, as if they might chance to be; but nevertheless he depends not upon them, be∣cause it may so happen, that they may not be; in the mean while he enjoys the things present, and remem∣bers

with satisfaction the things past. 'Tis to the same purpose that he speaks also in another place; That we ought not rashly to Despair in a mean, abject and cowardly manner, nor to be too confidently transported by an immoderate Desire. This is the Reason, that when Epicurus speaks of a Fool, in opposition to a Wise Man, he saith, That the Life of the Fool is uneasie, full of Fears, and altogether depending on the time to come.

Stulti vita ingrata est, trepida est, tota in futurum fertur.

A Fool's Life is troublesome and uneasie, always transported with the thoughts of what may happen hereafter.

The Fifth Particular is but a Disgrace or Re∣proach to Mankind; for by deferring from Day to Day, their Life passeth away without any profit, always depending upon the time to come. Con∣sider, saith Seneca, according to Epicurus, how plea∣sant it is to desire nothing, and what a greatness of Mind it is to be always full, and not to depend upon For∣tune! Take hold of, and secure the present time, whereby you will have less occasion of dependance on the future. By deferring the enjoyment of Life our Life vanisheth insensibly. Dum differtur, vita trans∣currit. To the same purpose he says in Plutarch; He that needs not to Morrow, nor wishes for it, comes to it insensibly; as if he should say, That the Wise Man ought so to reckon, as if he consider'd every Day of his Life as the last, and as that which was to Compleat the Circle; for by this means he will not put off the Pleasure of the Enjoyment 'till the Morrow; and if he arrives to To Morrow, that Day will be so much the more Pleasant, it being the less expected, and being added as an overplus to

the rest; it will be look'd upon as an Advantage, and esteem'd as pure Gain.

Pacuvius, a Vice-Roy of Syria, having spent a whole Day in Feasting, and Drinking, was wont when they carried him home from the Table to his Bed, to cause these words to be sung to him, Vixit, Vixit; he hath Lived, he hath Lived. What this Glutton did, saith Seneca, out of a Spirit of Debauchery, let us Practise in Reality; and when we shall have Seriously and Virtuously spent the Day, and are retiring to our Rest, let us say with Joy and Contentment,

Vixi, & quem dederas cursum Fortuna peregi.

I have Lived, and have accomplish'd the Race that Providence hath appointed me; if God adds another Day, let us receive it with Joy and Thank∣fulness. He is certainly Happy, and enjoys him∣self most, who expects the Morrow without anxiety of thought. And whosoever after this manner can say, I have Lived, arrives every Day to a new Advantage.

Horace gives almost the same Advice. We must, saith he, suppose every Day to be the last of our Life. Thus the time which we don't expect will become grateful to us.

Omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum, Grata superveniet, quae non sperabitur hora.

Let us quietly make use of this present time, ne∣ver reckoning upon that which is to come.

Be not inquisitive what shall happen to Morrow; but as if you were to Die this very Day, look upon it as an advantage, if Providence grants you any longer continuance.

Quid sit futurum cras fuge quaerere, et Quam Sors dierum cumque ferat, lucro Appone—

Accept with thankfulness the time that God be∣stows on you, and do not deferr the Enjoyment of the Comforts and Pleasures of Life 'till the next Year.

Tu, quamcunque Deus tibi fortunaverit horam, Grata sume manu, nec dulcia differ in annum.

The best of our Days are those that past first.

Optima quaeque Dies miseris mortalibus aevi Prima fugit—

As if every Day we drew nearer to the Dregs of our Life. And as if the purest Pleasures that we delay, could never be recover'd again, and those that follow, were not to be compared with the Pleasures that are past. From hence proceed the frequent Complaints of the time ill spent.

The Years I once have spent, could Heaven restore! And nevertheless, we don't endeavour so to Hus∣band the present time, that if God did restore the former, we might say, Now I understand how I might better employ it. We fancy always that our time of living Happily is not yet come; that the good things we expect, are far above those that we have already enjoy'd, or could enjoy. So that what is past we esteem as nothing, but have always in our eye and thoughts the time to come, being now as desirous of Life as ever.

Sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur Coetera, post aliud cum contigit, illud avemus, Et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantes.

As if we were not to reckon the Time past as any way acceptable or pleasing, but at the same time to rejoyce, that it is as it were put out of danger; and the rather, because many expect the same For∣tune, and are deceived in their expectations. We must do this piece of Justice to Epicurus, saith Se∣neca, That he continually complains of our being un∣grateful for the time past, that we call not to mind the good things that we have enjoy'd, nor so much as reckon them amongst the real Advantages and solid Pleasures of Life, because there is no Delight more certain than that, which we cannot be deprived of. Praesentia bona nondum tota in solido sunt, potest illa casus aliquis incidere, futura pendent, & incerta sunt; quod praeteriit inter tuta sepositum est.

Therefore Plutarch concludes, That the Nature of Good consists not only in shunning the Evil, but also in the Remembrance, and in pleasing our selves with the thoughts that the thing is thus come to pass. But to instance once more in these ridiculous delays, and deferring of things 'till the Morrow.

'Tis a strange thing, saith Epicurus, that consider∣ing we are Born but once, that our Days are to have an end, and that the Morrow being out of our Power, nevertheless we always put off 'till the next day to Live: So that our Life is spent miserably in these continual delays, and there are none but die busied in such Af∣fairs as concern not their real Happiness; for we occupy our selves in every thing else, but to Live. From hence proceeds that other just Complaint of Seneca, Amongst other Evils, this also attends Folly, That it is always a beginning to Live. And Martial saith,

Thou art for Living to Morrow: Alas! consider, it is already late to Live to Day; he is a Wise Man who knew how to Live Yesterday.

Cras vives? hodie jam vivere, Postume, serum est. Ille sapit quisquis, Postume, vixit heri.

To the same purpose are those Verses of Manilius.

Quid tam sollicitis vitam consumimus annis, Torquemurque metu, caecaque cupidine rerum, Aeternisque senes curis, dum quaerimus aevum Perdimus, & nullo votorum fine beati, Victuros agimus semper, nec vivimus unquam?

Wherefore do we spend our Days in continual Cares and Troubles, tormented with vain Fears, and greedy Desires? We grow old in endless Vex∣ation, we lose our Life in seeking it, and without enjoying the end of our Desires; we are always la∣bouring to Live, and never really Live.

The Sixth Particular relates to our Lusts or De∣sires, the Knowledge whereof is of that import∣ance, that our Skill ought chiefly to be employ'd in distinguishing between such as are really to be ter∣med Natural and Necessary, and such as are Vain and Superfluous; for the Happiness of Life depends upon the denial of the latter, and our being con∣tent with the enjoyment of the former. But as we shall have occasion to speak of this in other places, we shall here rest satisfied only to have mention'd 'em.

The last Particular that Epicurus recommends to our Consideration, is properly an Exhortation to Study Philosophy, it being the best Physick for the Soul; for Philosophy, if we rightly consider the Etymology of the word, is The Study of Wisdom; and Wisdom to the Mind, is not only as Physick,

by which our Health is procured and preserved, but is as the very Health it self. In truth, as the Health of the Body consists in a convenient Temper and Disposition of the Humours and Qualities, so the Health of the Mind consists in a moderation of the Passions, We need but listen to Cicero to un∣derstand the Reason of this Comparison. All Passions, says he, are adjudg'd by the Philosophers the Distempers of the Mind; and they deny, that amongst such as are Fools, there are any that are exempt from these Distempers. Now such as are Distemper'd, saith he, are not Healthy; therefore every one that is a Fool is really Sick. For according to the Judgment of the Philosophers, the Health of the Mind consists in a certain Tranquility, and fix'd Constancy; and such as are not in that Disposition, they esteem'd to be Sick, or Distemper'd. Now we must suppose with Epicurus, and the rest, that usually there is nothing dearer and more valuable than the Health of the Body, which plainly demon∣strates how dear and precious the Health of the Mind ought to be, seeing, as we shall take notice hereafter, that the Goods and Evils of the Mind are of far great∣er and more considerable value than those of the Body, and consequently the end of a Happy Life, consisting in the Tranquility of the Mind, and the Health of the Body (as shall hereafter be made appear) the former is much more valuable than the latter; for he that hath a sedate Mind, composed according to the Rules of Wisdom, earnestly stu∣dies Temperance and Sobriety, which are the most solid and best supporters of Bodily Health. We must then, quoth Epicurus, act the part of a Philoso∣pher, not in appearance, or out of Ostentation, but ef∣fectually, and seriously, because it concerns us not only to seem to be in Health, but to be really so. Old Men as well as Young must apply themselves to this

Study, because it is the interest of both to be sound in Mind, as well as in Body. So that none may reproach us, with Horace, that if we have any thing in our Eye that hurts us, we are very earnest to take it out quickly, nevertheless we spend many Years, and not once think of Curing our Minds.

Quae laedunt oculos festinas demere, si quid, Est Animum, differs curandi tempus in annum.

We ought to deal otherwise with Philosophy, than Thales did with Marriage. When his Mother perswaded him to Marry, he had still some pretence to offer, that it was yet time enough, but after∣wards, he said it was too late. And as it is ridiculous to say that it is not yet time, or that the time to Heal or Cure the Body is over, so it is as ridiculous to say, that the time to play the Philosopher, that is to heal the Mind, is not yet come, or that the time is past to be Happy. 'Tis strange that we should thus miserably wast and con∣sume our time, and should not apply our selves to that which will be as useful to the Rich, as to the Poor, and which being neglected, is as prejudicial to the Young as to the Old. 'Tis a Reproach that Horace applies to himself.

—Fluunt mihi tarda —Ingrataque tempora, quae spem Consiliumque morantur agendi gnaviter id quod Aeque pauperibus prodest, locupletibus aeque, Aeque neglectum pueris, senibusque nocebit.

Take from hence, both Young and Old, take from hence with you the Viaticum, the Enter∣tainment,

and the Consolation of poor Old Age.

—Petite hinc Juvenesque, senesque miseris viatica canis,

For 'tis of the Study of Philosophy that the Poet speaks, according to Biantes, Aristippus, Antisthenes, Aristotle, and other Philosophers, stiling it the Via∣ticum of Old Age. But to mention that chiefly which ought to perswade young Men to Study Phi∣losophy, is that there is nothing more Excellent and Commendable, than to accustom our selves be∣times to good things, and to adorn the Beauty of Youth with the sweetness of Wisdom, which com∣monly is the Blessing of a more mature Age. Nor is there any thing more agreeable than to prepare and make our selves fit to meet and receive Old Age, which besides it's proper Blessings of Matu∣rity, may also shine forth with the lustre of those Vertues, which were Splendid and Remarkable in our Youth. So that by the frequent remembrance of the Vertuous Actions of our Youth, we may in our Elder Years seem to grow young again. More∣over, Wisdom is not only a proper and true Orna∣ment, but a very useful Prop and assistance against the Inconveniencies and Infirmities of Age. 'Tis that which animates Old Men with the same Vigour as it doth the young. Here we again ought to li∣sten to Seneca, who when he was very Old, was wont to hear the Lessons of Sextus the Philosopher. The same was practis'd in imitation of him, by the Emperor Antoninus.

Behold, says he, this is the fifth Day that I frequent the Schools, and that I listen to a Philosopher, who Disputes from Eight a Clock. You may perhaps say, 'tis time indeed to Study in our younger years. And why not in

this Age? Is there any thing more ridiculous than to refuse Learning, because we have not Learn'd a long while before? Shall I be asham'd to go and meet a Philosopher? We ought to Learn while we are Ignorant, and according to the Pro∣verb, As long as we Live. Go, Lucillus, and make hast, for fear that it should happen to you, as to me, to be oblig'd to Study in your declining years; and make what speed you can, the rather because you have undertaken that which you will scarce Learn when you come to be Decrepit. But what advantage shall I gather, may you say? As much as you will endeavour for: What do you expect? No Man becomes Wise by Chance. Riches may come to us of themselves, Honours may be of∣fered to us, and we may be advanc'd to Employ∣ments and Dignities, but Vertue won't come and seek us; we must endeavour to find her, for she ne∣ver bestows her Blessings, but upon such as take Labour and Pains.

These are the Particulars which the Ancient Philosophers, and chiefly Epicu∣rus, have recommended to our serious Consideration, as the best means, not only to discover to us the surest way to true Happiness, but also to render it easie and pleasant.