The most excellent Hugo Grotius, his three books treating of the rights of war & peace in the first is handled, whether any war be just : in the second is shewed, the causes of war, both just and unjust : in the third is declared, what in war is lawful, that is, unpunishable : with the annotations digested into the body of every chapter / translated into English by William Evats ...

CHAP. XIX. Concerning Faith to be kept between Enemies.

• I. That faith is to be kept with all sorts of E∣nemies.
• II. The Opinion, That faith is not to be kept with Thieves and Tyrants, refuted.
• III. This Argument, That such deserve punish∣ment, answered; being not considerable when we treat with them as such.
• IV. Nor will it avail to urge, That the promise was extorted through fear, if he that made the promise was not himself affrighted;
• V. Or if the promise were confirmed by Oath, though with men such a violation is not punish∣able.
• VI. This fitted to rebellious Subjects in Armes.
• VII. A notable difficulty handled, concerning promises made to Subjects in respect of the Sovereign Power. Where it is shewed,
• VIII. That such promises may be confirmed by the Oath of the City:
• IX. Or it may be made to a third Person on the behalf of such Subjects.
• X. How the Government of a State may be changed.
• XI. That by the Law of Nations the exceptions of fear appertain not to a solemn War:
• XII. This to be understood of such a fear as is acknowledged by the Law of Nations.
• XIII. That faith is to be kept, even with such as are perfidious:
• XIV. But not if the Conditions are not fulfil∣led; Or if either Party refuse to stand to any part of the Agreement:
• XV. Nor if the thing promised be counterbal∣lanced by a just Debt:
• XVI. Though that Debt be due upon another account;
• XVII. Nor if the Promiser be otherwise damni∣fied to the like value:
• XVIII. Or if the value of the thing promised be due by way of punishment.
• XIX. How these take place in War.

I. That faith is to be kept w^th Enemies of all sorts.

WE have already shewed, What and how much may lawfully be done in War, simply and in it self considered. We are now to consider what and how much may be done, as considered in relation to some foregoing promise, namely, Concerning the faith which Enemies ought to keep one with another. It was no∣tably said by Silius, an Italian Poet, concerning a Roman Consul:

—Optimus ille Militiae, cui postremum primúmque tueri Inter Bella fidem.

He amongst Generals the best praise deserves, Who first and last in Wars his faith preserves.

Xenophon in his Oration concerning Agesilaus, from his Example concludes thus, So great and excellent a thing it is for every man, but especially Generals, to be just, and to be so accounted in the performance of their Oaths and Promises. So Aristides, In the preservation of Peace and of all other publick Agreements, they are ever most to be regarded that are most just. There is no man, as Cicero well observes, but approves of and commends that affection of mind by which no profit is sought after, but rather faith is preserved against profit. It is the publick faith only, as Quintilian the Father rightly observes, that makes Truces even a∣mong armed Troops, and that conserves the Right of surrendred Cities. Faith, saith the same Quintilian, is the strongest and most indissoluble Bond of humane Society. Sacra laus fidei inter Hostes, Its reputation is great, even amongst Enemies. Fides sanctissimum humani pe∣ctoris bonum; Faith, saith Seneca, is the most precious Ornament of the rational soul, the best gift that God bestows upon Men, the strongest support of humane Society. It is the Cement that

binds up all Traffick and Commerce between man and man,

Qua sine non Tellus Pacem, non Aequo••a norunt, Justitiae Consors, tacitúmque in pectore Numen.

—without her No Peace is firm either by Land or Sea, She's Justice's Mate, an inward Deitie.

The Romans placed her in their Capitol next to Jupiter himself; and deservedly, for a great cause of their prosperity may be attributed to their faith, which they religiously kept both with their Friends and Enemies. Though all other Laws sleep in War, yet must Faith and Ju∣stice be strictly observed, saith Ambrose. Of the same mind was S^t Augustine, Fides quando promittitur etiam hosti servanda est, contra quem Bellum geritur; When our word is past, it must be kept, though with an Enemy, against whom we wage War. Foedera jurastis, dexteras dedistis, quae etiam inter Hostes valent; Ye have sworn Leagues with us, saith Archelaus the Philosopher in Appian, Ye have plighted unto us your Faith, all which are in force even amongst Enemies. For in being Enemies they cease not to be rational men, but by being men endowed with reason they are capable of a Right by virtue of a promise. Camillus in Livy professeth, That there was between him and the Falisci such a Society as was common with all Mankind; but even from this common Society of discourse and reason, there naturally ariseth that ob∣ligation from a promise, whereof we now speak. Neither must we think that because (as many Authours hold) it is lawful, or at least blameless, to deceive an Enemy by falsehood; therefore by a parity of reason the same may be done, though we have given our faith. For the obligation of speaking truth proceeds from a cause long preceding any War, and which may haply be in some measure relaxed by War; but a promise doth of it self confer a new Right: which difference was clearly discerned by Aristotle, who treating of veracity thus distinguisheth, I speak not of him who speaketh truth in ordinary Contracts and A∣greements, and in those which appertain unto Justice and Injustice; which are indeed Branches of another Vertue. Pausanias, speaking of Philip of Macedon, gives of him this Character, No man, saith he, can well style him a good Emperour, as being (indeed) always regardless of his Oaths, though made by the Immortal Gods, and upon every slight advantage faithless in his promises; so that, though a King, no man was less to be believed, either upon his Word or Oath, than himself. The like testimony doth Valerius Maximus give of Hannibal, namely, That as profest an Enemy as he was to the people of Rome and all the Italians, yet was he a much greater Enemy to faith and sincerity, rejoycing always in falshood and lies, as if they had been com∣mendable Vertues; whereby it came to pass, That whereas he had otherwise bequeathed unto the World an honourable memory of himself, he hereby left it disputable, Whether his Vices did not exceed his Vertues. Thus the Trojans in Homer, being prick'd in conscience by reason of their perfi∣diousness, condemn themselves:

—rumpentes Foedera sacra, Juratamque fidem, pugnamus; non quibus fas est.

Breaking our sacred Leagues, and Faith, though sworn, We fight 'gainst those who such false Dealings scorn.

II. Faith to be kept with Thieves and Tyrants.

Neither, as we have already said, may we admit of that of Cicero, Nulla nobis Societas cum Tyrannis, That no Society is to be held with Tyrants. No, nor of the same Cicero, Pirata non est perduellium numero, cum hoc nec fides esse debet, nec jusjurandum commune; A Pyrate is not to be reckoned as any mans particular Enemy, with whom neither faith nor common Oath is to be kept. Nor that of Seneca, who speaking of a Tyrant, saith†, All Obligations to him are cancelled, if he cut off from that which is the common Right of all Mankind. From which impure Fountain proceeded that errour of Michael Ephesus, who taught, That it was not Adultery that was committed with the Wife of a Tyrant. Non putans Adulterium Ʋxorem Tyranni polluere; sicut nec homicidium, Tyranvum occidere: Supposing it, saith Seneca†, no Adultery to pollute the Wife of a Tyrant, nor Murder to kill him. Thus Julius Clarus con∣ceived that a Woman who stood out-lawed might be lain withal, without being punished as an Adulterer. And thus did some of the Jewish Doctors maintain the like errour concerning Strangers, whose Marriages they reckoned as none at all. But Pompey finished a great part of that Naval War which he made against Pyrates, by covenanting to preserve their lives, and to assign them a Country wherein they might live without rapine. And of Didius we read, That he was condemned as perfidious, for breaking faith with the Cel∣tibrians, who lived by robbery. Caesar also in the third of his Civil Wars, writes of a composition made by the Roman Captains, with the Tories and Renegadoes, who lay lurking in the Pirenaean Mountains. Now who can say, That such a composition being

made is not binding? 'Tis true indeed that such Agreements do not produce so friendly a Communion, as that which the Law of Nations hath introduced between Enemies engaged in a Solemn and Just War: But yet, being men, it may induce such a Communion as natural Right affords them; as Porphyry rightly argues, which is sufficient to prove that such Con∣tracts are to be performed. Thus did Lucullus keep his faith given to Apollonius, who was Captain of the Renegadoes; as Diodorus records. And thus did Augustus pay the ran∣some imposed on him by Crocata the Thief, being by him apprehended, rather than he would satisfie his word; as Dio testifies.

III. This Objecti∣on. That such deserve punish∣ment, answer∣ed.

But let us now see what more probable Argument than those brought by Cicero may be produced. The first whereof is this, That such as are notoriously wicked, and are no part of a Civil Society, may by the Law of Nature be by any man punished, as we have else∣where shewed. But they that may lawfully be punished, even with death, may also be lawfully dispoiled of their Goods, and dispossest of their other Rights: as the same Cicero well observes, Non est contra Naturam spoliare eum si possis, quem honestum est necare; It is no violation of the Law of Nature to despoil him of his Goods if we can, whom it is lawful to kill. But among those things wherein he claims a Right, even those which accrew unto him by virtue of any promise that is made to him, may be included; and therefore even those, by way of punishment, may lawfully be taken from him. Whereunto I answer, That all this may be very true, if we did not knowingly treat with him as such: But in case we treat with a Thief, as such, we are so to be understood as if we were contented to remit the punishment due, as to that offence; because, as we have elsewhere said, promises are al∣ways to be taken in such a sense, as that we make not the act void. Thus the old Pimp in Terence,

Leno sum, fateor; Pernities communis Adolescentûm; Perjurus, Pestis; tamen tibi à me nulla est orta injuria.

A Bawd I am; Youth's Common Pest, 'tis known; Perjur'd; yet wrong by me Thou hast had none.

It was no ill Plea then that Nabis (in Livy) made, when his tyranny was objected against him by Quintius Flaminius, Concerning the name Tyrant, I answer, That whatsoever I am, I am the very same I was when thou, O Titus Quintius, entredst in League with me. And by and by, These things, whatsoever they are, I did when ye contracted friendship with me. Whereunto he presently adds, Si quid ego mut âssem, mihi inconstantiae meae; cum vos mutetis, vobis vestrae ratio reddenda est: If I had changed, I ought to have given the reason of my incon∣stancy; but seeing it is you that change, you ought to give the reason of yours. Not much unlike unto this is the Answer that Pericles in Thucydides gives unto his Subjects, Our Confederates we shall permit to enjoy their own freedom, and to live by their own Laws, if they did so when they first entred into League with us.

IV. Fear not to be objected, if the Promiser were not himself af∣frighted.

Another Objection may be made, which I have heretofore hinted, namely, That he that by fear hath extorted a promise, ought in Justice to release the Promiser; as having by his injustice damnified him, that is, by such an act as is repugnant both to the nature of humane Liberty, and to the nature of the act it self; for all promises that bind ought to be free. This, though in some cases true yet, is not to be extended to all promises that are made to Thieves; for that the Promised be bound to free the Promiser, it is requisite that he to whom the promise was made should have extorted the promise by an unjust fear: But in case a man shall come and promise to pay the ransome of his Friend, and thereby deliver him out of Bondage, he is bound to perform it; because there was no impression of fear upon this man, who in the behalf of his Friend came voluntarily to make this Contract.

V. What if the promise were bound by Oath.

Whereunto we may add, That he that is compelled, even by an unjust fear, to make a promise, may be obliged to perform it, if he confirm that promise with an Oath; for thereby (as we have shewed before) he stands bound, not unto men only, but unto God, against whom no exceptions can be admitted. But true it is notwithstanding, That by such a sole promise, though confirmed by Oath, the Heir of the Promiser stands not obli∣ged; for those things only descend to the Heir which by the original Right of Domini∣on may pass from man to man in ordinary Traffick. But those things that are due unto God, cannot, as such, be included amongst these. Moreover, here we must again re∣peat what we before delivered, That if a man do haply break his faith with a Thief, whe∣ther sworn or unsworn, he shall thereby incur no punishment amongst other Nations: For generally all Nations, in detestation of these men, whom they account as common ene∣mies to humane Society, are pleased to connive at whatsoever is (though unjustly) done a∣gainst them.

VI. This applied to Subjects that make War.

But what shall we say concerning the War that Subjects make against their King, or a∣gainst such as have the Supreme Authority? Though they may haply have a cause not in it self altogether unjust, yet that they can have no Right to act by force against their Prince, we have elsewhere shewed. But yet it sometimes so happens, That either their Cause is so noto∣riously unjust, or their obstinacy in resisting so great, that it may be severely punished. But yet, if they be treated with as Rebels or Traitors, and therein any promise made unto them, the punishment though justly due for their Treason ought not to be pleaded in Bar to the performance of that promise. For such was the piety of the Ancients, that they durst not break their faith, no not with their very Slaves; as may appear by the Lacedemonians, who were generally believed to have been justly punished for putting their Tenarensian Pri∣soners to death, contrary to their Covenants. And it is likewise observed by Diodorus, That the faith given to Slaves in the Temple of the Palici was never broken by any of their Lords. Neither will any exceptions of fear be allowed of in this Case, if the faith given be by Oath confirmed: as we may collect from M. Pomponius, the Tribune of the People, who being bound by Oath, punctually performed what he had, though compelled by fear, promised to L. Manlius.

VII. Of Promises made by So∣vereign Prin∣ces unto their Subjects.

But a greater difficulty than any before mentioned may arise from the Legislative Power, and from that supereminent Right of Dominion which every City hath over the things of their Citizens, and which is exercised in its name by him who hath the Supreme Power therein: Which supereminent Right, if it extend it self to all that is the Subjects, why should it not likewise unto that Right which ariseth from any promise made in War? Which being granted, then it should seem that all such Promises and Agreements may be null'd, and so all hopes of concluding a War, unless by Victory, would be lost. But on the contrary, we must observe, That this superlative Right is not fit to be put in execution promiscuously, at all times; but so far forth as it is commonly expedient to the preservati∣on of the publick safety in a Government not Tyrannical, but Civil, yea even Regal. But for the most part it is commonly expedient, That all such Promises and Agreements should be fulfilled. Very apposite to this purpose is that which we have already written concern∣ing the defence of the present Government; adding thereunto, That where the publick safety requires that this Sovereign Right should be made use of, satisfaction ought to be given out of the publick to such particular persons as shall be thereby damnified, as shall be hereafter more fully explained.

VIII. That such pro∣mises may be confirmed by the Oath of the City.

Moreover, Agreements may be confirmed by Oath, and that not by the King or Senate alone, but by the whole Body Politick; as Lycurgus bound the Lacedemonians, and Solon the Athenians, by Oath to observe the Laws they had given them. And lest the change of Citizens should in time relax the binding power of this Oath, (and so at length it be forgotten, or left arbitrary) this Oath may be every Year renewed; which if done, the Citizens could by no means recede from their Engagements, no though it were for their publick profit. For a City hath power to grant away even what is her own. Now the words of the Oath may be so clear and so full as not to admit of any exceptions, Lege Legem, quae te jurejurando obstrictum tenet; Read over your own Law, saith Valerius Maximus to the City of Athens, whereunto ye stand bound by your Oath. And such Laws the Romans held as sacred, because the people of Rome were obliged by Oath to keep them, as Cicero testifies. We find in Livy a very pertinent Discourse as to this matter, though of it self more obscure, where (as the opinion of the best Expositors of the Laws) he asserts, That the Tribunes of the people were sacrosanct, that is, so holy, that they could not be injured without perjury. But so were neither the Aediles, Judges, nor Decemviri; and yet to injure either of these was punishable by the Laws. The ground of which difference was this, Be∣cause these latter were thought sufficiently defended by the severity of the Laws alone. But that which was in the last place enacted by the people was most inviolable, yet whilst the Law remained in force, no man could pretend to a Right to act contrary to the Laws. But that which defended the Tribunes, besides the Law, was the publick Religion of the Romans; for they were all bound by a solemn Oath not to offer violence unto them, which they that took, could not break without giving a publick scandal to their Religion. This light we receive from a place in Dionysius Halicarnassensis, where it is thus recorded, Brutus calling the Assembly together, proposed it to the People of Rome, That the Tribunes of the People might thenceforth be rendred inviolable, not by the Laws only, but by a publick Oath, whereunto all the People gave consent. And hence it was that this Law was called sacred. And therefore that fact of Tiberius Gracchas in deposing Octavius from the Tribuneship, (alledging that the Tribunitial Power had its sanctimony from the people, but not to be exercised against them) was much condemned by all honest men. And therefore, as I have said, as well a City as a King may be bound up by Oath in such Agreements as they make with their own Citizens or Subjects.

IX. Or if the pro∣mise be made to a third per∣son, for the Subjects—

But yet farther, A Promise or Agreement made by Princes or States to their own Sub∣jects shall be valid, being made to a third person, who hath given no cause of fear. But wherein and how far forth that third person may stand interessed in that promise, being one of the niceties of the Roman Law, we shall not here search into. For naturally it concerned all men to provide (as much as in them lyes) for the safety of others. Thus we read, That King Philip having made his Peace with the Romans, bound himself by promise, Not to revenge himself on those Fugitives, who during the War had sided with the Romans.

X. How the pub∣lick State may be changed.

But yet possible it is, as we have elsewhere proved, that a State may sometimes become mixt; and as from an Absolute Monarchy it may pass into an Absolute A∣ristocracy or Democracy, so also it may by Covenants and Agreements be trans∣ferred from any one of these simple, into one mixt, of any two, or of all. So as they which before were Subjects, may begin to settle the Government in themselves, or at least some part thereof, even with a liberty to defend and protect their own Party by Force of Armes.

XI. That fear in a Solemn War, by the Law of Nations, is no Just Excepti∣on.

But a Solemn War, that is, such a War as is on both sides publick and denounced, a∣mong many other things which (by that Right which we call external) it peculiarly enjoys, hath this also, That all promises made in that War, or that conduce to the concluding of it, are so firm and valid, that though they were caused through a fear unjustly brought, yet can they not be null'd or made void without the consent of him to whom they were made; because, as many other things, though in themselves not altogether just, yet are by the Law of Nations reputed so, so fear, though it be in either side unjustly caused, yet shall it in such a War by the same Law be accounted just: Which unless granted, it would follow that such solemn Wars, which are indeed but too frequent, could be neither moderated nor ended; both which are very expedient for the conservation of Mankind. And this we have reason to believe is that Right in War which Cicero tells us is to be kept even with Enemies, to whom also it was elsewhere said, That there were some Rights which an Enemy might retain, though in War, namely, Not such only as are allowed of by the Law of Nature, but some such also as are introduced by the consent of Nations. Neither doth it hence follow, That he who in an unjust War hath extorted any such thing may without the breach of piety or honesty retain what he hath thereby got, or compel another to perform such a promise sworn or unsworn. For internally, and in the very nature of the thing it still remains unjust. Neither can this internal injustice of the act be otherwise removed than by the new and absolutely free consent of the Pro∣miser. Again,

XII. This to be understood of such a fear as is allowed by the Law of Na∣tions.

Whereas that fear is said here to be just which is caused in a Solemn War, it is to be understood of such a fear as the Law of Nations doth not disallow: As for example, A promise wrested from an Ambassadour that is taken Prisoner, shall not yield the least advantage to him that extorts it; as Mariana testifies. So in case any thing be extorted through the fear of Ravishment, or through any other the like terrour or affrightment, contrary to our faith given; this ought to be judged by the Law of Nature, because the Law of Nations takes no cognizance of any such fear. Again,

XIII. That faith is to be kept with the perfidious:

That faith ought to be kept with such as are notoriously perfidious, we have in a more general Treatise already proved: Which also we may learn from S^t Ambrose, which with∣out doubt reacheth even unto such enemies as are altogether faithless. Such as the Cartha∣ginians were unto the Romans, who notwithstanding kept their faith inviolably with them. For, as Valerius Maximus well observes, The Roman Senate regarded not what the Cartha∣ginians deserved, but what in honour became the People of Rome; which is the Testimony that Salust gives of them, In all the Wars, saith he, between Rome and Carthage, though the Carthaginians, as well in times of Peace as during their Truces, committed many outrages, yet would not the Romans upon any provocation permit that the like should be done unto them. And concerning that fact of Sergius Galba, who, in revenge upon the Portuguese for so often breaking their League with him, first deceived them with a new League, and then slew eight thousand of them; Appian gives this Answer, Perfidiâ perfidiam ultus, contra Roma∣nam Dignitatem, Barbaros imitabatur; In revenging one treachery with another, he wounded the Majesty of the people of Rome, imitating therein the Barbarians. For which he was af∣terwards worthily accused by Labo, a Tribune of the People, whereof Valerius Maxi∣mus gives his opinion thus, Is was not equity, but compassion, that pleaded in that Cause: For that absolution which his own innocency could not challenge, was given to his innocent Babes: which also is confirmed by Cato, He had certainly died for his treachery, had not his own tears, and the innocency of his Children, procured his pardon.

XIV. But not if the Condition be not perform∣ed, or if either Party stand not to the Agree∣ment:

But this also we may observe, That there are two ways whereby a man, though he perform not that which he promised, yet may avoid perfidiousness, as namely, If the Condition be not performed whereupon that promise was grounded, or if some other com∣pensation be made for it; for want of the Condition the Promiser is not really discharged: But it will appear by the event, That there had been no obligation but what was contract∣ed upon Condition; therefore that Condition being not performed, there needed no dis∣charge. Whereunto we may refer another Case, namely, If the other do not perform that which he was first bound on his part to fulfil. For the particular Heads of one and the same Agreement seem to be complicated each with other in the manner of a Condition, as if it had been thus exprest. Thus will I do, if you do so or so, which he hath promised. Wherefore Tullus in his Answer to the Albans, calls the Gods to witness, Whether of the two Nations were the first Aggressors; praying earnestly, That all the miseries of the War might befal that Nation. For as Ʋlpian notes, He breaks not the League, who there∣fore renounceth his Associates, because they do not perform some Articles, whereupon the League was at the first made. For which Cause, where it is otherwise intended, it is usually thus exprest, That if either Party shall transgress in this or that Article, yet shall the rest re∣main firm and inviolable.

XV. Nor when there is other∣wise a just compensation made:

The original of compensation or recompence we have elsewhere declared, namely, When we cannot otherwise recover either what is our own, or what is justly owing unto us, we may take away from him that either detains it or owes it the full value, thereof in any thing else; whence it follows, That whatsoever is actually in our possession, whe∣ther it be Corporeal or Incorporeal, we may much more lawfully detain and keep. Whatsoever ther••fore it is that we have promised, it is in our power not to perform; if it be of no greater value than that which being once ours, he to whom the promise was made injuriously keeps from us. Comparatio nulli invidiosa est, ubi aut Gratiae aut Injuriae communis est ratio; That comparison is to no man odious, wherein a common regard is had to either courtesie or injury. Thus in a wager at Law, saith Seneca, the Debtor doth sometimes cast the Creditor, when he hath upon some other account got more from him than his Debt a∣mounted unto. For between the Creditor and the Debtor only the Judge sits as an equal Arbitra∣tor, who may say to the Creditor, It was thy money that thou lentest, how camest thou then by the Land which thou possessest, but never boughtest? wherefore upon a just valuation, Thou that camest in a Creditor, Depart hence a Debtor.

XVI. Although due by another Contract:

The Case is the same if he with whom we have to do owes me as much upon any o∣ther Contract, which I cannot otherwise recover but by detaining that which I have promised to him. In Courts of Justice there are, saith Seneca, some separate Actions, neither is the form confounded. But those Precedents, as it is there said, are con∣tained within certain Laws, which are necessarily to be followed. One Law is not mix∣ed with another. We must walk as every Law doth lead us. But the Law of Na∣tions admits of no such distinctions, namely, Where there is no other hopes of re∣covering what is our own.

XVII. Or some da∣mage done.

The like may be said where he that exacts a promise hath damnified the Promiser to the value of the thing promised. Thus the same Seneca, The Farmer is not bound to his Landlord, though his Lease be not cancelled, in case he wilfully trample down his Corn, and cut down his Fruit-trees; not because he hath received what he agreed for, but because he hath hindred his Tenant from receiving the Fruits of his Grounds, whereby he should have paid his Rent. Where also he subjoins another Example, Pecus abegisti, Ser∣vum occidisti; Thou hast haply driven away his Cattel, or slain his Servant. And a little after, It is lawful for me to compare the good that any man doth me, with the hart that he doth me; and thereby to pronounce my self his Debtor, or him mine.

XVIII. Or for some punishment justly due.

Lastly, Whatsoever also is due to the Promiser by way of punishment, may be em∣ballanced with what he hath promised; which Seneca in the same place thus clearly illustrates, Beneficio Gratia debetur, injuriae ultio; Thanks is due for a courtesie, revenge for an injury: If therefore I pay him no thanks, nor require that punishment from him that I lawfully might; there is nothing at all due to either, for the one acquits the other. And anon, By comparing the good turns I receive with the wrongs I receive, I shall easily discern whether I am indebted unto him, or he to me.

XIX. How these take place in War.

But as whatsoever is contended for by a wager at Law cannot whilst the Suit de∣pends be counterballanced against that which is promised, whether it be the thing sued for, or the costs and damages sustained in the Suit; so neither can the injuries that first occasioned the War, nor any of the losses or expences which are usually through the licence in War caused, be recompenced as long as the War lasts. For the very nature of this business, lest nothing at all be done, shews that set∣ting a part on either side the controversies of the War, they are agreed. For other∣wise there can be no Agreement so firmly made, that may not be avoided. Where∣unto may that of Seneca not unfitly be applyed, Our Ancestors would admit of no excu∣ses

at all for the breach of promises, that so they might teach us that our faith was altoge∣ther to be kept: For better it was not to admit of some excuses, though just, from a few, than to encourage all to make what excuses they would for the breach of their faith. But what things are those which may countervail that which is promised? Surely in the first place, Whatsoever by any other Contract made since the War is owing unto us by him to whom our promise was made, or whatsoever damages we have sustained by him in the times of Truces, or in case the Persons or Rights of Ambassadors have been by him violated, or, in brief, if he have done any other thing which between E∣nemies is not justifiable by the Law of Nations, where this also is to be understood, That the satisfaction be made between the same persons, and that the Right of no third person be thereby injured; but yet with this allowance, That the Goods of Citizens may stand obliged for the Debts of their own City, as those of Subjects may for the Debt of their Prince; as we have already shewed. Whereunto we may add, That it is the sign of a generous Soul strictly to observe his faith in Leagues given, notwithstanding all provocations to the contrary by injuries received: Upon which account it was that that wise Indian Jarchas so highly commended that King, who being much injured by his Confederates, yet would never break his faith given, saying, Tam sancte se jurâsse, ut alteri ne post acceptam injuriam nociturus esset; That the Oath he had taken was so sacred, that he durst not injure him to whom he had given his faith, though he were sufficiently provoked. Now look what other Questions usually arise concerning our faith given to Enemies, may almost all of them be resolved by applying them to those Rules heretofore prescribed, concerning the Obligatory Power, as of Promises in general, so of those special promises made by Oaths, Leagues, Spon∣sions, and of the Right and Obligation of Kings, and concerning the interpretation of such promises as are ambiguous. But yet notwithstanding for the better use of what hath been already said, and for the clearing of any other doubts which may happen to a∣rise, it shall not at all be troublesome to me briefly to unfold such of these special Cases as are most notable, and as do most frequently occur.

Notes

• Leuct. 4.
• Lib. 2. c. 29.
• Ep. 205. ad Bonif.
• Appian. Civil. 4.
• Lib. 2. c. 13. Sect. 5.
• †

  Lib. 7. de Be∣nef.
• Ad 5. Nicom.
• †

  Sen. in excerp. 4. 7.
• In Sect. Homi∣cid. n. 56.
• R. Levi Ben. Gerson. in Le∣vit. 20.10.
• Offic. lib. 3.
• Lib. 2. c. 11. § 7.
• Lib. 3. c. 4. §. 10.
• Lib. 1. c. 4.
• Aelian. 6, 7.
• Lib. 11.
• Sen. de benef. l. 3. c. 37.
• Lib. 5. c. 3.
• Orat. pro Balbo. Lib. 3.
• Plut. vit. Grac∣chi.
• De Offic. l. 3. Ver. 4.
• Lib. 6. c. 6.
• Book 2. Ch. 7. § 2.
• Tertul.
• De benef. lib. 6. cap. 4.
• Eod. Lib. c. 6, 7.
• Eod. lib. c. 4.
• Ib. c. 6.
• De Benef. lib. 7, cap. 15.
• Lib. 2. c. 2.
• Philost. l. 3. c. 6.
• Lib. 2. c. 11. & seq.