III. In whom this right of Punish∣ing is, natural∣ly.
But yet, to whom this right of punishing offenders is due, is not by nature it self deter∣mined; this natural reason dictates, that a Malefactor may be punished, but not, who should punish him; this only nature prompts us to, that it is most convenient, that it should be done by one that is his superiour: neither doth she demonstrate this to be al∣together necessary, unless, by superiour, we understand him that is innocent, and that we detrude the nocent beneath the degrees of men, and rank them with beasts which are subject unto men. Thus Democritus ascribes it to nature, that the better should govern the worse; and Aristotle observes, that in that order that nature hath placed every thing, that which is worser was had for the use and service of that which was better; which also holds true as well in artificial things, as in natural: The consequence whereof is, that he that is nocent ought not to be punished by him that is at least, equally nocent (for he that sits as Judge to punish Malefactors, should himself be free, not only from that particular crime, but from all others that may render him obnoxious to the same punishment) whence ariseth that of our Saviour to the Pharisees: Let him amongst you that is without sin, cast the first stone at her; which he therefore spake, because at that time, the manners of the Jews were extremely corrupted, insomuch that they who would seem to be the greatest Saints, were observed to wallow like swine in Adulteries and such like grievous Sins; as may appear by that of the Apostle to the Romans, Rom 2.22. Wherefore thou art inexcusable, O man, who∣ever thou art that judgest; for in that thou judgest another, thou condemnest thy self, seeing thou that judgest, doest the same things: whereunto appertaineth that of Seneca, non potest ullam autho∣ritatem habere sententia, ubi qui damnandus est, damnat; that sentence can never carry any face of authority, where he that condemneth another, may as justly be condemned himself: for as St. Ambrose saith in the Apology of David, he that goes about to judge another, ought first to judge himself, and not rashly to condemn the errours and oversights of other men, when he daily commits far greater himself. It is very good advice that St. Ambrose gives: Judicet ille de alterius errore, qui non habet in seipso quod condemnet, &c, Let him be Judge of the errours of others, that hatb in himself nothing condemnable: Let him be Judge, that is not guilty of the same crimes that he deemes worthy to be condemned in another; lest whilst he judgeth another, he pronounceth sentence against himself. Let us in the first place then consider with our selves, numquid ipsi tale commisimus? whether we our selves have not committed the like? and the regard that e∣very man hath to his own safety will make him more moderate in passing judgment on others.