The atheist turn'd deist and the deist turn'd Christian, or, The reasonableness and union of natural and the true Christian religion by Tho. Emes.

20. So far we have considered Creatures as com∣ing from the hands of God, and Good; or possible to be changed, and become evil in their Actions. We now come to consider them as actually evil: And it is, or may be apparent to any Man that will descend into himself, and consider that Man has not always and exactly done as he should; but has sometime will'd, or does will otherwise than God wills. Of this, I say, we may be soon convinced by our own Experience or Conscience, the surest of all Con∣victions. If it be true that as God is all perfect, or sufficient in himself; so that he hath created things

to manifest his Wisdom, Goodness and Power, &c. to the Intelligent Creatures, that they may be as happy as they are capable of Being, it is most cer∣tain; First, that if I have not considered my self, be∣ing once capable of Reasoning, and so found my Cause, and enquired and found what he is, ad∣mir'd, and lov'd him, and had thankful Thoughts of him, it is not because I was incapable of doing so, but because I would not, and I have not will'd as becomes me; as God wills I should, but have sin∣ned. Secondly, If I have will'd any thing that does not tend to make me as happy as I can be, or as much pleas'd with God in himself, and in his Works, as I should, I have will'd otherwise than God wills, and so have sinned. But I find even after I have found God, and somewhat consider'd him, I have very much forborn or neglected to consider him, and considered other things unworthy such conside∣ration more than him; nor have I loved him as the Self-sufficient Being, and my Cause, ought to be loved; but have loved my self, or other things un∣worthy such Love, more than him; while I am con∣vinced he is better than me, or any thing, and the Cause things are, and are any way condusive to my Good or Pleasure; and in so doing, as well as in o∣ther Instances, I find I have sometimes will'd those things which at other times I have found not tend∣ing to make me as much as may be happy. I have will'd things before I have consider'd, or inform'd my self of the Nature and Tendency of them, slight∣ing those Directions God has made me capable of receiving from him; and so acted, or will'd disor∣derly, or otherwise than becomes me. I have not always been pleas'd, or glad, in contemplating God in himself, and in his Works, and therefore I find I have not always will'd as God wills. I know (or may soon do) that God's Will is best in relation to

himself, and his Creatures: I have been convinced such and such a thing is according to God's Will; yet I have done otherwise, and chose that which my Judgment informs me is not God's Will, thereby asserting my own Will therein better than God's, or my Judgment truer than his. Again, I am con∣vinced (when I seriously consider) that God's Will is that wherein I can best be pleas'd; but I find I have been displeas'd, and uneasie in mind many a time, either because I have found I chose something not best for me, or because for want of Considera∣tion I have thought something good for me, and will'd it, which I could not possibly have: Thus I find infallibly I have will'd otherwise than God wills, and so have sinned.

Here we have from the Light of Nature, or our own Reason, an evident Conviction of Sin, or of Man's Fall and Degeneracy; every one may see it in himself, and the same we may observe tho' not some ways so apparently in others. And all Man∣kind in general, how dark soever their Light, and how little soever their Reason is, having once at∣tain'd to the use of Reason, have been sometimes ready to confess themselves indeed guilty of doing amiss, and forced to accuse others as guilty of Evil. What Man is there but that, if I do any thing to make him less happy, is sensible I do not as I would be done by, and so do not my Duty, but am a Sin∣ner? Now God cannot be suppos'd to make Man thus evil, and out of order, because he can do no∣thing but what is good; tho' he made Man capable of sinning, or going out of order: And as Man must needs be suppos'd to come out of God's hands good, and orderly; but is become evil, acting a miss, Man must be suppos'd to be fallen, and degenerated from his Primitive state.

21. The Greatness of Man's Sin in willing other∣wise than God wills, the Grievousness of his Fault in falling from what God made him, is apparent, or may be so if we but consider; That Man is no∣thing of himself, but is beholden to God for his Be∣ing, and All. It is therefore most highly unreason∣able that Man should deny to acknowledge such a one his Author, or dare to contradict or disbelieve his Wisdom and Goodness, in acting as if God did not know, or would not do what is best for his Creature. How unreasonable is it that Man should foolishly, and with an ungrateful Stubbornness, re∣fuse the Good, yea any Good God offers him? Had God made him less capable of Good, he had been bound to be thankful for any capacity; had God denied him some Good, he had made him ca∣pable of, he had been endebted to Love, and thank his Maker for any Good he had given him. It is a high Slight of the boundless ever-overflowing Foun∣tain of Goodness, for Man to refuse any, or the greatest Happiness God offers him; and whoever does not study God's Will as a Director to Happi∣ness, will certainly miss some Good. It might be Love to refuse what the Giver would loose or want, by giving it, or could not well spare; but a Slight not to take where the Giver has abundance, and will have never the less by giving. For Man to refuse any Happiness God offers him, is so far to desire not to be beholden to God. But he that is most be∣holden to God, is most happy; and he that is most happy, must consequently be most beholden to him. This will remain an everlasting Truth while God and Creatures have a Being. Is it not the height of Folly, yea Madness, as well as Injustice, to choose Misery rather than acknowledge one's Maker as the Author of Happiness? To desire not to be beholden to God, our Cause, our Lord and Soveraign, is the

highest Affront to the highest Majesty, and no less than an absurd Endeavour to dethrone him, and be of our selves, that is be God: To substract our selves from our Dependence on his Will, and to prosecute our own, in Distinction from, and Contradiction to his, is so unreasonable, bold, and mad a Presumption as to endeavour to overcome, and destroy him; so great a Folly and Absurdity as to endeavour the Im∣possibility of adnihilating the Being of all Beings, and consequently our Selves and All. So great a Treason, Boldness, Perverseness, Madness and In∣justice, is contain'd in Sin, or willing otherwise than God wills. And all Acts of Sin are essentially the same; and every reiterated Act of Sin, is virtually the Approbation and Ratification of all Sins past, and to come.

22. Now for as much as the Creature is found guilty, and convicted of this mighty Disorder, has done Evil, and it cannot possibly be undone, but that it will eternally remain true that the Creature has sinn'd; it follows to be consider'd what is now to be done, or how the Creature ought to behave him∣self, as guilty and conscious of Sin.

And there are these things which by natural and right consequence, should arise in Man from this Consideration: First, an humble Acknowledgment and Confession to God of what he hath foolishly done, not to fancy he can hide his Sin from God, or to go about to extenuate it, and excuse it. Se∣condly, A Sorrow, Regret, and Displeasure with himself for so foolish and unreasonable Doings; which Sorrow, tho' it supposes, and is naturally con∣sequent of Evil, yet it becomes a Medium in order to future Joy, because the troublesome Thoughts, or Sense of what we have done amiss, urges and insti∣gates to that; which is the Third, and chief thing Man should do, having sinn'd, viz. Repent, or

study what is God's Will, and resolve to do it, or will as he wills for the future. Which things on the same reason ought to be reiterated as oft as Man shall fall again, or reiterate Acts of Sin. With these there should be a hearty Desire to God that he will forgive, or manifest to us anew some Acts of his Wisdom, Goodness, and Power, whereby we may be effectually influenced to see as it is the Disorder, or Evil of our sinful Will, to change our Mind ful∣ly to conform for the future to God's Will, that God may be to us for time to come, as he would have been if we had never sinned. This, I say, is the natural Duty of a Sinner, To repent, or be sensible of his doing amiss, and to change his Mind to do well; and such a Sinner may boldly, if humbly ask, and expect Forgiveness of God. Now if we consider the Forgiveness of God well, I think no∣thing can be truely and properly Forgiveness but (as I have said) the New Manifestation of some Acts of God towards the Creature upon its Sinning and Sense of it, whereby it is effectually perswaded to change its Will, and go on to change it till it comes to will again as God wills: In which God relieves the Creature (more or less, according to the degree of its new Obedience it finds in it self) from the uneasie Thoughts of its past Sins, and affects it with the same Pleasure and Satisfaction (proportionable to the progress of its Repentance) the Creature would have had in God if it had never sinn'd, God abating so much of his due as cannot possibly be paid, viz. the keeping of his Law, which has not been done for the time past. This is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Forgiveness of Sin, to be pray'd for, and believed, and expected in God. But what-ever Acts of God we may suppose towards the Creature, if it is not brought to will again as God wills, sometime or other to do its Duty, it is not really forgiven, its

Sins pardoned, or done away, divorsed, or loosed from it, as the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies.

23. Now for as much as the Creature considering the Unreasonableness of its Sin, its Will not being quite changed, or but little changed, and its Under∣standing not fully inform'd, may be apt to doubt [as too inclinable to measure God by its self] whe∣ther God will indeed thus add to act towards the Happiness of a once Rebellious Creature: We shall consider by what rational Arguments we may be perswaded that God will indeed, yea is ready to for∣give. First, it is God's unchangeable Will and Command that the Creature be obedient to the Will of his Maker, as what is most just and reasonable; for God cannot be suppos'd to change his own Will, or will what is not just and reasonable: To suppose he can is all one as to suppose him imperfect, or not God, or not wise and good. If so he must needs be suppos'd willing Repentance, or a Leaving, or Re∣mission of Sins in the Creature that has sinn'd, and God cannot cross or contradict himself. Besides, it is better that the Sinner repent, and become obedi∣ent, than that he go on in Sin and Disobedience; and God cannot be suppos'd to will that which is not best. Again, if it be a Good to will as God wills, and the Creature having found the Unreason∣ableness of the contrary some what desires so to do, is somewhat inclinable so to do, it cannot be sup∣pos'd that the Creature should desire more Good than God does, or will any real, and to it possible and suitable Good which God does not will. God will therefore hear the Creatures desire, forgive, or promote the Creatures good desire, and give it fresh Arguments effectually to perswade it more and more to will as he wills; and when it is brought perfectly, or exactly so to do, it is perfectly, or fully acquitted, and fully justified, or made just, and not till then,

because it is not so till it is so; nor can God reckon, think or account, or declare it so till it is so, because he can neither be deceived nor deceive. But as Re∣pentance is a work of time, even of our whole Life; so Forgiveness, or Justification, is a work of time, not perfected till Sin is done away.

That God has given intelligent Creatures a Capa∣city of willing as he wills they should, is evident: If he had not, they could not be obliged so to do; and that they might possibly, and have will'd other∣wise, is as apparent as Experience can make a thing: It is moreover manifest, that he has given them a Capacity of knowing when they have will'd other∣wise than their Maker wills: An Understanding ca∣pable of seeing the Unreasonableness, with a Will sometime sensible of the Unhappiness of so doing. We have already found, that he wills his own Will to be done, and that his Will is best, and unchangeably so, is evident; that he adds upon the Creatures Sin fresh Arguments to perswade the sinning Creature to change, and go on to change its Evil will, till it is changed wholly; that it becomes God so to do, while nothing can be suppos'd better, or possibly so good, either to the Manifestation of God's Excel∣lencies, or the Creatures Happiness, makes us posi∣tively conclude that God will never be wanting on his part to the Sinner.

But here perhaps some will start a not-altogether impertinent Question.

24. Why God made the Creature capable of sinning, or willing contrary to his Maker's Will? I answer;

That it was most becoming the Perfections of God, and their Manifestation in, and to the Crea∣tures, and the Creatures Happiness thereby, to make them capable, or able either to obey, and will as God wills; or to disobey, or sin, by willing the con∣trary.

For the Illustration of this, consider; First, God's Dominion, Soveraignty, or Lordship, could not otherwise have been acknowledged: For if the Creature had not been capable of Sinning, it had not been capable of Obeying; Obedience to God being nothing but willing what God wills, because he wills we should, when we can possibly, will otherwise; and Disobedience to God can be no∣thing else than willing what God does not will, when we may will what he does. There is no O∣bedience properly so call'd, or of Mind, but what is free, nor no Disobedience of Mind but what is spontaneous. To Be or Do what we can't but Be or Do, is no proper Obedience; and not to Be or Do what we can't Be or Do, cannot well be call'd Disobedience. And God did not make Man capa∣ble of Obeying or Sinning, that he might Sin; but capable of Sinning or Obeying, that he might Obey, and so acknowledge, and shew God's Dominion and Lordship over him. Again, if Man had not been a Voluntary, or Free Being, he had been incapable of Pleasure or Happiness, (which consists in the Sa∣tisfaction of Will, or having ones Desire) and so had had no such occasion of acknowledging God's Good∣ness. Nor farther would he have had the Excellen∣cy of Being so much the Image, or Representation of God, who is a Free Agent, or has a Will tho' not indifferent to Good and Evil: God's Will be∣ing the Rule of Good, he cannot but will what he wills, nor can he suppose any thing otherwise than it is, his Wisdom being absolutely perfect. But Man is the Image of God as he is a Free Agent, or has a Will capable of willing Good. God's Will is his own Rule, he being Self-sufficient, can have none to obey that is wiser, or that can will better. Man's Good depends on God, as the Shadow on the Sub∣stance, as the Picture on the Thing painted out.

When Man's own will interposes between God and him, he so far ceaseth truly to represent God, and be happy. God's Will, which is best, is Man's Rule, or Exemplar; and the Creature can be no more like God than an Image can be to a thing it represents. An Image can never be the same thing it self of which it is the Image, (to say it may, is all one as to say it is the Image, and not the Image, which is a Contradiction) nor can any Image be equal, or in all respects such as the thing it is the Image of, or like it more than in some respects: For if we could suppose two things every way alike, nei∣ther of them could be said to be the Image of the other; because the other would with as much reason be said to be the Image of that: Nay it would be absurd to talk of a Distinction where we have sup∣pos'd no difference: And the Image of a Creature may be more like, or nearer an Equality with the Creature it represents, than an Image of God can be like God; for nothing can be the Image of God but a Creature; for there is nothing but God, and Creature, and between God and Creature, there cannot be less than infinite Distance and Inequality; which is not between Creature and Creature, tho' one be the most perfect, the other the most imper∣fect of Creatures, being both finite. Nothing, I say, can be said to be the Image of God but a Creature, unless there could be conceived any Third Being between God and the Creature. I say farther; God cannot be said to be the Image of God, or, which is the same, that which is the Image of God cannot be said in a proper sense to be God; for so the Image would either be said to be the Image, and yet the same thing it is the Image of, which is all one as to say it is the Image, and not the Image, or what it is, and something else than what it is, which is a Contradiction. But if the Image of God, being

something Else, or Another, than what it is the I∣mage of, be yet said to be God, it is consequential∣ly said to be Another God, and such a One who is but an Image of Another; which also affirms it in the Consequence at the same time not to be God, tho' inconsiderately said to be so: For what is in any sense but a Resemblance, or Imaginary, is not God. Things may be said in some respects to be like God, but God cannot be said to be like any thing, he being First, Original. Besides, nothing in God can be the Image of God, because that one thing would not be the Image of God, viz. of the compleat Divine Being, it being suppos'd to be the Image but of Something Else in God, not of All in God, it Self (if it were not absurd to call it, Self, there being not more than One Self in God) being something suppos'd in God. But to conclude this Digression; God being altogether Substance, and Original, there can be nothing Imaginary, or but a Copy in him; whatever therefore is an Image, or Copy of God, is but a Creature; and whoever af∣firms the contrary, affirms he knows not what, a Chimera, or his own vain Imagination, if not worse. But to return again from this occasional Digres∣sion.

If Man could not have will'd Evil, he could have had no Temptation to it, either from within or without; and his Disobedience could not have been so signal and great, could it be suppos'd any at all: Vertue that is never tried, is not so eminent. God did not make the Creature capable of supposing something preferable to its Subjection to the Will of its Maker, that it might seek such a thing, or ven∣ture to try whether it were so or no, but that it might have occasion to resist and overcome such a Suggestion, and own its Dependence; without which it had been uncapable of, or wanted that Hap∣piness

or Pleasure which is found in a sort of Self∣denial in doing what is pleasing to a more excel∣lent Person which one loves, which is not little, as every one may experience, the love of Men perhaps being always placed on the account of something seen of excellency in another which is not in one's self; and the degree of such Pleasure consists in the degree of Love, and the degree of Love in the de∣gree of Excellency in the Object; and God is the best of all things that can be loved.

25. But here may be objected what by many is asserted; That Man is not free to will either Good or Evil. And here some affirm, That Man since he hath sinned, and remains impenitent, is free only to will Evil. Others from more consideration, (tho' it may seem a Paradox to the former, and ought to be well explain'd) are perswaded that Man is not free to will Evil, but only to will Good. Let us for the farther clearing this whole matter, consider it funda∣mentally.

Good, or Pleasure, I take to be the same thing, and the Pleasure of the Self-sufficient Being is the su∣pream Good; he being of himself, and beholden to none for any Pleasure, but all beholden to him for whatever can truely please, it is but just and right that all Pleasure should be according to his Will and Pleasure, who knows what is best for all: Who tho' he take pleasure in his Works, it is because they are his, made according to his Wisdom and Good∣ness. He who is the cause of their Being, is conse∣quently the cause of any Pleasure he can be thought to take in them, as well as of that which Creatures may take in one another. Now Pleasure and Good, being the same, it is to be considered as in the dif∣ferent Subjects, God, or his Creatures; God being Self-sufficient, nothing can affect him with Displea∣sure, or uneasie Thoughts, all his Pleasure arising

from within, even from his unchangeable Self, who cannot will to be displeas'd, or uneasie, nor can any thing be suppos'd to force him to be displeased. Nor can the Creature properly be said to desire its own Unease or Displeasure, its Pleasure lying in having its Will; if it could desire to be displeas'd, it could will, and not will at the same time, which is a Con∣tradiction as bad as to say a Will is not a Will. But the Creatures Will becomes evil two ways. First, When it wills or desires that which in it self is a Good (yea perhaps the greatest Good) but to it im∣possible, or not belonging; as to be satisfied in its own proper Will, without regard of anothers, as if the reason of Good were to depend on its Will, which is a Prerogative only belonging and possible to God, whose Will can give Being to things, and who is sufficient in himself. The Evil of this (and indeed all sinful Desire includes it) lies in this, that the Creature wills a Contradiction, or Absurdi∣ty, and not only so, but foolishly and unjustly at∣tempts to rob God of his Prerogative, or his very Being, and to become God it self, or to be another God equal with him. And tho' this Attempt, which is virtually in all Sin, can really take nothing from God, or make him uneasie, yet in common Speech, or speaking improperly as if we were speaking of Men, God is said to be displeas'd or angry, with it; but it is indeed no more but that it is not according to God's Will, he does not will it, or does not take pleasure in the Creatures Folly and Absurdity. So that the Creature thus affecting Supream Good, does not only commit the Evil Act of Injustice in at∣tempting to take what is not its own, and of Folly, in affecting what is impossible; but also has will'd that which will bring in the Consequence, its own Displeasure; because willing what it can't have, while it so wills it is uneasie, or else is so when it re∣flects

on its Folly. Secondly, The Creature wills Evil in willing that which has really but the Ap∣pearance of Good, [Appearance, I say, for at least a Seeming, or Supposed Good, must be acknowledg'd the Object of Man's Will] as when a Man wills a thing which when he tries, has no Satisfaction in it at all, or when he wills a created Good, I mean the Enjoyment of some Creature that does really give him some small Satisfaction; but that present and small Satisfaction, takes away a greater and more last∣ing it might have had, if it had not will'd that thing; it being according to the Will of God, as well as for Man's Interest that Man be as much as possible pleas'd: Man really wills Evil, tho' under the form of Good, or even tho' there is some Good in the thing when he wills that which tends to hinder, or lessen his own Pleasure or Happiness, which is ac∣cording to the Will of God. Thirdly, A Man's Will is evil when, altho' he will that which is in it self a Good, and good for him he wills it so, or in such Circumstances as hinders good from another Man; for there is the same reason why another Man should be pleas'd as much as may be, as that I should be so; and in hindering the Good of ano∣ther I want the reasonable Acts of Love and Justice, and not only so but even also hinder Good from my self in thus disorderly seeking it; for I could be more happy and pleas'd if all my Fellow Creatures were so, than if they be not; and the more of them happy and pleas'd, the more may I; for the Unhap∣piness or Displeasure of others, adds to my Unhappi∣ness, if I have been any way the cause of their Un∣happiness, when I see my Injustice; or if I have not, as I am affected with Compassion, or as I therein do not see so much of the Manifestation of the Wisdom and Goodness of God, in the order of his Creatures, I have not such cause of Joy, as if I see my own

pleasure as it were multiplied in my Fellow Crea∣tures, or have the Satisfaction of being instrumen∣tal to their good. And perhaps from divers other reasons, the more of my Fellows are happy, the more in degree may I be so. But let us consider wherein the Evil of Man's Will consists, for more Clearness in an Instance or two. A Man desires a Bodily thing in the Application of which to his Body, God has annexed a Pleasure to the Mind; this Gratification of the Sense is good, and God causes it; but when the Man wills it in such a Circumstance, as of ne∣cessity robs him of a greater Pleasure he might other∣wise have had, or gives him in the consequence greater Displeasure than the want of that thing could be, the willing of that thing becomes an Evil to him in abating his Happiness, and which is worse an ungrateful Slight to his Maker, a greater Disorder in not consulting his Will to guide him, or not con∣fiding in his Wisdom and Goodness, who would have the Man as happy as might be. As the Pleasure a Man receives in Eating and Drinking is good; but if he eat or drink too much, he dulls his Appetite, and renders it less sensible, and often lays the foundation of a Disease that not only affects him with its conse∣quent Displeasure, but renders him incapable of the pleasure of Eating and Drinking for a much longer time than he had of pleasure when he disorderly, or immoderately sought it.

Or if he do not thus abate his Happiness, if he rob his Neighbour for it, that act of Injustice never fails one way or other to give him more Displeasure than he had Pleasure so unduly attained. So likewise the Pleasure in the Act of Generation is good; but when ever a Man goes out of the order God has set Man in the reason of that Satisfaction, he acts Evil, either in rendring himself less capable thereof, or by procuring himself far greater Evil or Displea∣sure,

in the many Mischiefs that the satisfying that Desire, any other way than with a Wife, naturally produces to him, and his Fellow Creatures, with the troublesome Reflection that he will sometime have on such Disorders, when he sees not only that he hath deceiv'd himself, but also the Unreasonableness of his Disbelief, slighting, disbelieving, and affronting his Maker in not studying, but rejecting his most wise Order and Direction. So that if a Man wills that which is good, but impossible to him, or what be∣longs not to him, that which is but little good, and takes away more good, hinders good to another, is but an appearance of good, his Will is evil. He that desires his Neighbour's Wife, wills Evil tho' she be the best Woman in the World; for tho' she be good, she is not his; he invades another's Proper∣ty, and so wills an Injustice; nor can he have his desire without abating the Happiness of his Neigh∣bour, and the Woman's too in her becoming Evil, and finding its Consequences.

And here I cannot but take notice of the a foolish Abuse, common among Mankind; that is, they confidently call the Desire One Man has to Ano∣ther's Wife, or a Woman to Another's Husband, with all such disorderly Desires, by the name of Love, meaning Love to the Person desired, when it is nothing less; being always that which so far as it is satisfied divers ways effects the Unhappiness of the Person said to be beloved, which such a Lover can hardly be so blind as not to see. Yea farther, that it is but a Self-love, (if it can be call'd Love at all) and a grosly mistaken one too, rendering the Lover himself more unhappy than he would have been had he never so affected, tho' he enjoy the Object of his Love, I would say his Lust, for that is the proper name on't.

But to draw towards a Conclusion of this matter; I say, whatever a Man desires, the Act of desire is free; to suppose otherwise would be all one as to suppose Volition not to be Volition, or a Will not a Will. A Will cannot be said to be compell'd; for tho' it cannot but Act, or Be, it is freely, or willing, Compulsion, and Volition are contrary and incom∣patible. But the Will is led by Arguments, and at least Appearances of Good. If there could be sup∣pos'd but one Object of the Will, it could not but apply to that, yet it would be freely; but where there are many Objects, it chooses by appearance. But Man having the Faculty of Reasoning as well as Desiring, ought to suspend the Acts of his Will by a kind of Indifferency, at least as to their Ef∣fects, till he is sure his choice will be good. The Will is led by Arguments: I say, whether the Act of Will be according to God's Will, or no, and Vo∣lition is Volition, or to be willing is to be willing. And a Man is (in short) more properly said to will, or desire Evilly, than to desire an Evil, I mean to himself; for that a Man may be so wicked as often to will, and consequently freely, yea and knowingly an Evil to another Man, and sometimes effects it, and would also affect God with an Evil, or a real Displeasure, if it were possible that Man's foolish Will could be so done, is daily apparent, and true beyond all dispute. And that Sinners may be said to will Evil continually, is not to be understood as if they never desired any thing that is good, but that every act of their desire, tho' they desire Good, hath some Evil Circumstance or other, as an Evil Man∣ner, Evil Means, or Evil Ends, &c.

Now God, as abovesaid, cannot will either an Evil, or Evilly, his Will being the Rule of Good; and to suppose God to will Evil, would be all one as to suppose him to will what he don't will: Nor

is it for want of Power or Freedom that God can't will or do Evil; but it is rather a Note of Power that he cannot be deceived, but can know all things as they are, and cannot be suppos'd ignorant of any Truth, because he is the Exemplar and Cause of all Truths: He cannot be suppos'd to do amiss, because he is All-perfect: He cannot will one thing now, another anon, because he is unchangeable, always knowing what is best.

And as God, in whose Being is no now and then, cannot will contrary to his own Will; so he cannot be suppos'd (without the height of Contradiction) to will that the Creature should will contrary to his Maker's Will; this would be to suppose God to will contrary to his own Will, or will a thing, and yet not will it. Besides, if God please to make known his Will, which he must be suppos'd to do one way or other, or the Creature cannot well obey it, or be determined to its Duty, when the Creature knows it, or has reason to believe God wills so and so, he can have no reason to suppose God can have a Se∣cret Will, or Determination, that the Creature should do the contrary: This would be to suppose God a Lyer, and to deceive his Creature, yea to de∣ny God to be either true or good. I have the great∣est reason to believe God would have me do what he commands me, that is any way causes me to take for his Will, and that he commands me what is best for me to do. I cannot err here, if I am sure he commands. If God could be suppos'd to will one thing, and command the contrary, he would contradict himself; for the Commands of God can be nothing but his Will made known to the Crea∣ture, and he cannot be supposed to frustrate his own Will. Such an Absurdity foolish Man would hard∣ly be capable of as to will his Child to do, what he commands him not to do; or to command him to

do that which he wills he should not do: Yet I have known some so bold, or inconsiderate, or displeas'd with the good Will of God, as to affirm in plain words, so unreasonable a thing of God, as that he will'd Man should do what he commanded him not to do. But God has done very great things, both within us and without us (and will do) to vin∣dicate his Wisdom, Truth and Goodness, against all those that are so hardy or foolish, as to deny them, either plainly, or in consequence.

26. And tho' God may oblige his Creature to a thing for a time, (especially in that which seems an Arbitrary Command) which he may not will him to do always, but afterwards something else, it is no Contradiction or Change in God's Will, (who wills that which is first, and last in respect to the Creature, altogether) but the Creature being changeable, what is best for him, or his Duty under one Circumstance, is not so under another: Which Will of God the Creature comes to know part now, part anon. As for instance; God wills me to do that when I am a Child, or a Servant, which is not my Duty when a Father, or a Master; and that when I am a Father, or Master, which is not, or ceaseth to be my Duty when I am in no such rela∣tion.

An Arbitrary Command of God I call that which Man sees not, or not clearly the reason of to him∣self; nor has any evident Argument to perswade the doing, or not doing of it, but because God com∣mands.

That which is not evidently a Natural Duty, but some Express Command, God may please to give the Creature without giving him the reason of it. Such a thing also God may oblige his Creature to, if he please only for a time: But those Duties that result from the very notion of our being God's

Creatures, as Love, Reverence, Trust, Depen∣dance, &c. are unchangeable while God is God, and the Creatures are Creatures, whether God ex∣presly command them or no. But if God shall ex∣presly command his Creature a thing, and yet not give the Creature the Reason of it as good to the Creature, it must nevertheless necessarily be sup∣pos'd to be good, and must so far at least appear to him as that he sees it is not evil, or contrary to a natural Duty, or former Command. And if we consider, we shall find it most reasonable and conve∣nient for Man to obey the Will of God, not only in things that are apparently agreeable to Man's relation to his Maker, and for Man's Benefit; but in things he may not readily see the Agreeableness or Benefit of: if first he be sure God commands them, tho' therein God may seem for the present to limit, or abridge Man's Happiness; concluding God is wiser and better than the Creature. For the Crea∣ture is beholden to God for all he has; and if God deny him something that he may now fancy a Good, he has no more reason to be displeased with God, (who arbitrarily gave him his Being) than because he made him a Man, and did not make him an An∣gel. As a Man who should have the Gift of a good Estate from a Person who was no way obliged to him, would be thought most unreasonable to deny a small quit Rent as an Acknowledgment to his Be∣nefactor, from whence he received the Estate.

Such a Reservation, of at least a Seeming Good from Man, was very suitable in his first Creation Make, and Excellency, as he was in the Likeness of God, Lord of all the Inferiour Creatures, that he might thereby acknowledge his Subjection and De∣pendance on God, and God's Sovereignty and Do∣minion over him. And yet it must also be affirm'd most for Man's Profit to part with this Acknowledg∣ment,

tho' the thing he fore-go should be suppos'd a Real, and not a Fancied Good for him; because he would have kept a vastly greater Good than can be suppos'd in any one particular Creature, that is the Satisfaction comes to a dependent Mind in obedi∣ence to his beloved Maker and Sustainer, with the most pleasing sense of his Love, and Favour to him, the Sweet Familiarity, Presence, or Converse with his God, which was consequently interrupted, or destroyed by Disobedience. Yet it may be a questi∣on whether what-ever God may be supposed to will Man to abstain from, is not in it self inconvenient for him, and whether it may not be thought a suffici∣ent tryal of Man's Submission and Acknowledg∣ment, when only the Reason of the Command is reserved from him. Whatever God has created is certainly Good, and for some wise End: Those things we call Poysons, or which eaten, or applied in a small quantity, will destroy the Frame of Man's Body, are good some way or other; but it is not always necessary Man should know the Uses of them.

If a loving and wise Father a Physician, should thus warn his beloved Son; Meddle not with that Drugg tho' it hath a pleasant Taste, if you eat it 'twill kill you; giving him no farther account of it, or for what use he keeps it: Yet this Son would not believe it, or be satisfied tell he had tryed the Expe∣riment, would he not be highly to blame, as discre∣diting his Father's Truth and Goodness, and disobey∣ing his Will? How could he come without Shame to his Father for a Remedy? So much more is Man blame-worthy if he refuse the Direction of God in the use of the Creatures what way soever he gives it.

27. But the keeping all the Commands of God, or whatsoever he can be known to will, certainly

tends to Man's Happiness; and tho' he be obliged to abstain from many things good in themselves, or rather from the use of them, according to his own hasty inconsiderate Fancy; yet a general Conformi∣ty to the Will of God, is so far from being an un∣pleasant Burthen or Yoak, that it is the only way of the greatest Happiness and Pleasure: The more o∣bedient, the more easie, the more joyous a Man is, or will soon be. And that Man is not perpetually, and as much as may be so, is because in some thing or other he has disobeyed, or yet disobeys, or the Disobedience of some other Creature affects him: But to be fully obedient, is the height of the Crea∣tures Felicity. The life of Obedience even at pre∣sent is not a way of Unpleasantness, Sadness and Thraldom; but a Path of Pleasure, Joy and Liber∣ty. There is nothing in doing the Will of God that in it self tends to make a Man uneasie, or that hinders his being pleas'd or happy as much as possi∣ble; and whoever fancieth there is, it is from some Mistake; as either a Supposition of that to be the Will of God which really is not, or that the Actions of the Creature tend to one thing when indeed they tend to another. I cannot forbear not only to assert this as that of which I have a most clear Rational Conviction; but also to witness it, as having here had something of unquestionable Experience: And that short Pleasure which a Sinner may take in an unduly enjoy'd Sensual Good, in stealing or snatch∣ing as it were from God what he would in better Time and Order have given him; I have found more than equall'd by the bare Satisfaction in the Thoughts of not having transgress'd, were the plea∣sure of Innocency no longer than the pleasure in Transgressing. But in obeying are sometimes, even in this life, Joys unspeakable, as Fore tastes of Joys future, full and perpetual, accompanying a State of

perfect and perpetual Obedience. Those that know nothing of these Felicities that are greater than can be in the disorderly Enjoyment, or abuse of God's Creatures; let them but try the Experiment (as I have done) of God's Goodness, of the pleasure of Divine Love, as they easily and freely may, and they will be for ever convinced. Neither let any think they loose any thing, even of the good of the Crea∣tures themselves, by being restrain'd, or rather di∣rected by whatever Rule God gives us how to use them; no, he envies us not the greatest Pleasure we are capable of taking in them. We cannot be sup∣pos'd while Creatures, to be capable of all Pleasure, or of full Satisfaction in Creatures. God has indeed given Man a quick Sense of Good, or Delight even in the use of Bodily things; and that not that it should be unsatisfied, but the Creatures design'd for Man's use are so numerous, that they cannot all be used by any Man, no nor by all Men; nor can a Man enjoy what he is capable of enjoying altoge∣ther, and at once. So that where ever God forbids what we could desire, it is but where a smaller En∣joyment will hinder our having a greater; one fru∣strate our having many; a small Present and short one, disappoint us of a future, great, and lasting one. And what Folly is it to be displeased, because God some way forbids a Bodily or Sensual Pleasure, that we may have a better, a Rational, or Mental one? or a Joy in a Creature, where it would hinder our Rejoycing in the Creator himself? I believe if we had time to trace in particular, the Disorders of Men, we should find that all and every of them (even their most beloved ones) do but abate their Felicity. Where is any that does not tend to destroy our Health, or Peace, or Wealth, or Ease, &c. and so bring upon us some Mischief or other, by which the little Pleasures in them are very much out-ballan∣ced?

Is it not highly reasonable, as well as for our In∣terest, that God who is most wise and good, should be our Chooser, if he condescends to choose for us? Is it not the greatest Presumption, and Affront to our Maker, who is the Cause of all our Good, that we should act as if we knew better than he what is best for us? Is it not the greatest Injustice not to love him, and study his Will to obey it, who has no profit by us, but does all for our Benefit? If we may receive all the Profit, shall we deny to give him all the Ho∣nour?

For God indeed cannot be profited by his Crea∣tures; he sees his own Excellencies in them as Sha∣dows, but in himself as in the Substance; but there can be no increase of his Perfections, who is Self-sufficient necessarily. Nor can Man's Disobedience take away any thing from his Happiness, or affect him with the least Infelicity. Sin does indeed ob∣scure his Glory; but not from himself, but only from the Sinners, who thereby loose that most plea∣sant and happy Vision. And a cause of that great dislike of Sin in God, which hath been sometimes express'd by the Symbols of Anger and Wrath, is that he loves his Creature so well, that he cannot approve any Action that in the least hides his Glo∣ry and Goodness, from his beloved Works. And as God neither looses nor gets any thing by the Crea∣tures Sin, or Obedience; so in particular his Justice or Righteousness, cannot be impaired. He is not unrighteous or unjust, tho' he suffers Man to be un∣righteous and unjust: The Creature cannot possibly bring any change upon God, or lay him under any necessity or obligation; God alone can oblige him∣self by his Promise, and that is not properly an O∣bligation in God, for 'tis but the Declaration of his constant and free-will. To say God cannot in Ju∣stice break his Promise, is no more than to say he

will not. If he leave the Creature to reap the fruits of Sin, he does him no wrong; if he perswade the Creature to leave his Sin and be happy, he wrongs not himself: He can neither loose nor get any thing by the Creatures Sin and Unhappiness, or Repen∣tance and Happiness. God is essentially righteous, or just, before Creatures had a Being; and his Es∣sential Righteousness, or Justice (as I have else-where said) is to love, and approve himself, and to do his own Will. His Justice in relation to the Creatures, is his Approbation of them so far as they are his Work, and according to his Will; what he has made, he shews his Approbation of by upholding and continuing the Being of. He approves not the Creatures denial of him in disobeying his Will, but shews the greatest Testimonies of his Dislike of its Disobedience: So that if the Creature goes on in willing or acting contrary to God's Will, God will not; or which is all one, he cannot make it hap∣py and joyous, in its continuing so to do, unless he could make it to be God, and cease to be God him∣self. For the Creature cannot be satisfied with wil∣ling Good, while it wills Evil; nor can it be plea∣sed in having its Will, while it wills that which is impossible; and while it leaves God's Will, or wil∣ling that which is good and possible, it must be mi∣serable, more or less, according to the strength of its Evil Will; and if it for ever goes on seeking Plea∣sure in vain, or to satisfie its Will so as it cannot be satisfied, it must for ever be unhappy, and reap the Natural Fruit, and Work of its own Doings; unless and until it acknowledge God's Will Sovereign, just and good, and its own Will as disagreeing with its Maker, unjust and evil, and that it ought to be sub∣ject, and be perswaded to change its foolish Will, and desire to know and do the Will of God for the future; that is, unless or until the Sinner repent.

28. But the Creature having once chose its own Will against the Will of God, having committed one Act of Rebellion against its Maker is, or seems much more inclinable and propense to go on, and persist in its Sin, than to repent and will well again. For having once affected to be its own Lord and Ar∣biter, or to be independant, which is the greatest Perfection, and best Manner of Being, (tho' impos∣sible to a Creature) it goes on with a strong Desire; whose perpetual Acts, perfuing so great a Thing, hin∣der its Understanding to judge, and reflect on the Impossibility, Absurdity, Injustice, and Consequents of such an Attempt. And every fresh act of Sin does but strengthen its Disobedience, in which perhaps it would go on for ever if God did not upon its mi∣stake, give it abundant Arguments by one means or other, to bring it to a stand, cause it to consider, con∣vict it of its Folly and Disorder, and so change its Will: Till which change is effectually begun, it is always, and only endeavouring the Impossibility of separating the unpleasant, or bitter effects it finds either in, or following, or fears may find the fruits of its disorderly Actions: So that it would not be saved from its evil Will, the Cause, but from the Displea∣sure it finds attending it, the Effect.

29. But when it is once throughly convinced that its own Will disagreeing with the Will of God, is an impossible way, or means of Happiness, or lasting Pleasure; and sees the Unreasonableness and Bad∣ness of such an Attempt, the Soul is very unapt to believe that God will forgive: And considering it Self and its Sin, more than God and his Goodness, the sight of its most irrational Acts which it hath committed, with the Tendency thereof, often makes such a horrid Impression on the Soul, and takes up its Thoughts so much, that tho' God has given Ar∣guments enough to perswade that he wills all Men

to repent, with various and clear Notices that he is ready to forgive, and yet make happy those that by persisting in Rebellion do not render themselves un∣capable of Forgiveness and Happiness; yet it is com∣monly blind to see God as he is, and is more apt to fly from him than come to him, measuring God by its own standard, it having been very apt to account it Justice to revenge the crossing its Will, on those it was able to affect, thinks God like it self; not con∣sidering that the perfect Good-will of God cannot take Pleasure or Satisfaction in the Miseries of his Creatures, tho' they are Enemies, much less in their Sin, or continuing Enmity, the formal Cause of their Unhappiness.

But tho' Man is so apt to look upon God as an in∣raged Enemy, hardly to be appeas'd, severe to rec∣kon with the Sinner, resolved that the Sinner shall never be happy, unless something can be given him to purchase his favour, that he values more than the Sinner's Repentance, or new Obedience: Yet, I say, tho' Man is so apt to look upon God as such, like himself, we must affirm that God is not, nor can he properly be said to be, an Enemy to Man, or any of his Creatures, as they are to him, and to one another. He hates, or sets himself against nothing but their Sins, their Unhappiness; wills nothing but what is for their good, nor can he but love whatsoever is his own Work; as the Beings of all his Creatures are, and their Good Order, which is their Happiness; therefore he cannot but will their Reconcilement to him, or to their Duty.

30. Now all that God hath done, does, or will do in order to Man's Recovery from Sin and Mise∣ry, tends unto this one thing; To bring Man again to will as God wills. Where ever this is done, it is done, and the End of God's Dealing with Sinners is accomplished, whatever the means were by which it

was brought about; and so far as we are come to∣wards this, so far we are in the way of Salvation, or saved. To will as God wills, or to love our God with all our Heart, Soul and Strength, and our Fel∣low Creature as our self, is the whole Law, that God does so much to perswade Man to keep. To will, and n'ill the same, is perfect Love; and Love is ma∣nifested by doing the Will of the Beloved. In doing the Will of God is Life, I mean Happiness not only in this Present State, but also in that which is to come.

31. And that there is a Life to come, and Immor∣tality, discoverable clearly even by Reason, and di∣vers Notices thereof implanted in Nature, we shall a little attempt to shew.

That Men are mortal, and live in this Life but a little while, is the experience of the whole World. That the Body is subject to decay, or the Order of its Motions wherein its Life consists, liable to be de∣stroyed and cease; and by another as to Life, disor∣derly Motion to be separated, and so its Organical Figure to be spoiled and changed, all Men perceive by the least Observation. But that Death is not a Termination or End of our Being, I think will ap∣pear by these Considerations. First, We have no reason to conclude that the End or Design of our Be∣ing, is fully accomplished in this Life. The Mani∣festations of God's Perfections to Man, and Man's Pleasure or Happiness in beholding them, (the End of Man) by reason of Sin, are not so clear and so great in this Life as they may be, should be, and are to be desired. God is not seen and enjoy'd by any now, as he may be, by some but very little. The desires of some (I may say of all) that desire God, are not satisfied in this short and sinful State. None have unerringly and sufficiently beheld the Divine Excellencies, and acknowledged God as he ought to

be acknowledged. Some have lived and died, and hardly ever truely confess'd and own'd their Maker; few or none have loved and obeyed him to their ca∣pacity, and been as pleas'd or happy in him as they may be: Therefore it is reasonable to conclude (nay we cannot well think otherwise) that there is a Life to come wherein the Ends of the Creation shall be accomplished. God cannot be thought to let his Works perish without fulfilling his, or their true Ends in them. The Good, those that have been so far convicted of the Disorders of Sin, as to repent, and change their Minds from willing contrary to God's Will, in some measure to will as God wills, and to desire that they may do so more, yea per∣fectly, and always: Those that have some-what be∣held God lovely, have not yet, or in this Life, been brought up to so great a degree of Obedience, as they are convinced is their Duty, nor seen so much of God's Excellence as they desire to see, nor been sa∣tisfied with the sense of his Love as they would. If these their Desires, Duties and Happiness, are good, convenient, suitable to the Natures of God, and his Creatures, as evidently they appear to be, certainly God wills them sometime or other to be, and that more than the Creature can will them, because God is the Supreme Good-will. So that it is altogether unlikely that the Good Man should perish, and not attain the Good that he is capable of; desires, is con∣venient, and God wills more than he. Nor is it any more likely that the Bad Man, he that hath seen no greater Delight than in contradicting the Will and Order of God, by the disorderly Enjoyment of the Creatures should perish, or cease under so great a Mistake as never to see, and be convinced of the Absurdity and Evil of prosecuting his own proper Will as the chief Good; as never to find that the way of Happiness is not in acting contrary to the

Will of God. That God should have an Intelligent Creature never to be made acknowledge his Maker, is a thing hard to be thought. It is more probable that even the Bad Man will remain one way or o∣ther, to be convinced of his Disorders, of his Rebelli∣on against God, Injustice, and want of Goodness to his Fellow Creatures. The Good Man in this Life seems often to be the Man of Sorrow, the Son of Adversity, that doth not gather the full-ripe Fruits of his Repentance and Obedience; being among a world of unhappy and injurious Impenitents. There∣fore it is requisite there should be a Future State, wherein he may reap in Joy what he has sowed in Tears. The Evil Man seems often to be the Man of Joy and Pleasure in this Life; he rejoyceth, and even glorieth in his Disorders, yea in that very great one of afflicting the Man that is better than he: Now it is most equal and just that he should some time or other come to see the Good Man before-hand with him, rejoycing, and happy in God, when he is so∣rowing to see he hath turn'd from the fountain of Joy and Blessedness. These things are not accom∣plished in this Life, therefore we must necessarily suppose a Future.

Again; It is certain that no Creature can cause it self, or another to cease: Nothing but the withdraw∣ing the Same Power that caused the Creature to be, and continueth its Being, can be suppos'd a reason of its Cessation. We can prove no such Death as an Adnihillation of any thing; nor does it appear to any that consider the matter, that even any Bodi∣ly Creature ceaseth to be. But the contrary might be shewn by many Arguments, if it were doubted of: Even those things which seem to the ignorant and inconsiderate, to be most likely to be destroyed, such as things that are burnt; I can at any time de∣monstrate, even to the eye, that none of their parts

cease, but are only separated, or altered. The Death of the Body is but some kind of alteration, or change of its Modes or Circumstances; as a Separation of the parts of its Organical Structure, or an Alteration of such and such Motions, requisite to continue its Particular Mechanism, or Animal Oeconomy. The Body remains, I mean all the Matter of it, after the Division of its parts; and it cannot rationally be suppos'd that the Mind, the more Substantial, and (as all are ready to acknowledge) the more Noble Part of Man should suffer more alteration by the Dissolution of the Body, than the Body it self does. The Change the Body undergoes is apparent, but what Change you will say may the Mind be reason∣nably suppos'd to suffer at its Separation from the Body, or whether not enough to be call'd Death? Many Treatises have been written, and Discourses made to prove the Immortality of the Soul, and some for its suppos'd Mortality; but the Authors have not been so happy as to agree in the Notion of Life and Death with one another, nor all so considerate as to fix any determinate Notion for themselves, or to tell their Readers what they mean by its Living or Dy∣ing; so that it may be true or false for them. But I shall here state the question more plainly, and tell you first, that by the Life of the Soul, I mean a Con∣tinuation of Thinking, or of Understanding and Willing. Where there are these Actions and Passi∣ons, there is enough to be call'd Life; and that which better deserves to be named Living than any whatsoever, Organization, and Motion in Bodies. And the plain Question is this; Whether upon the Death, or Dissolution of the Body, Thinking whol∣ly ceaseth? A Cessation of some of the Modes of Thinking, cannot be enough to be properly call'd the Death of the Soul; for so it would not only be always dying, but dead, as it alters so continually,

at least every night and day. An Alteration of some of the Modes of Thinking may in a figurative and improper Sense be called Death; but the Question is not of any such Death. It is probable that many, if not all those Thoughts and Ideas we have by oc∣casion, or on condition of our Body as so and so dis∣posed, may cease; tho' it cannot easily be thought absolutely necessary: for we cannot conceive the Body to be a natural Occasion of any Thoughts, but so by the Will of God; who if he please, we may well think, can cause the same Ideas and Thoughts with∣out it, tho' it seems not to any purpose, or probable that he will. For on the other hand, it is more like∣ly that God permitted Death for the Cessation of those Thoughts (or at least many of them) the Bo∣dy is the occasion of, since Man's fall into Sin, in Good and Bad: For as much as we are tempted to most of our Disorders by occasion of the Body, and to gratifie some Sense or other disorderly, or besides the Direction and Will of God, seems to be the first and most constant Temptation every Man is drawn aside with. Now the Good Man, or Repenting Sinner, through the Goodness of God, (on this Sup∣position of such Thoughts ceasing) gets this by Death, tho' in it self an Evil, that he is freed from all the Allurements of this Life occasioned by his use of this Body. The undue Gratifications of Sense can now no more perswade him, the unprofitable care of avoiding little Bodily Displeasures, now takes not up his Thoughts, the Difficulties from the Injustice and Cruelty of Sinners press him now no more to act against his Maker's Will; but he seems perfectly freed from Temptation, having perhaps now no Object of desire present but God, and nothing to interpose for his Love, as a Rival with his Maker. Nothing now seems necessary for him to know but God, and himself: Nor needs he, or values he, could

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he have them, any little pleasures in Creatures when he is at God, the Fountain and Cause of all. On the other side, the Evil Man also looses all those Gratifications of Sense he so much affected, and err∣ingly counted his chiefest Good; and must needs find that he foolishly set his Heart on that which would not make him happy, but so soon left him. And as his Will is not reconcil'd, and subjected to God's; but he desires still that which cannot be, God cannot so communicate himself to him to make him joyous, but he must be subject to all that Anguish that the Reflection on the loss of the Creatures he so much delighted in, and that he hath miss'd the Foun∣tain of all Good can cause in him; with all the Vexation and Trouble that all the disorderly Thoughts of such a Soul can raise to it self. But to come to the point in hand again; It cannot well be thought that the Soul or Mind of either Good or Bad should die, or Thinking wholly and for ever cease; or yet for a time, upon the Body's Death; because the Continuation of Thinking, or Life of the Soul can't rationally be suppos'd to depend on the Body, (a thing more ignoble than it self, being very unlikely to be its cause) but upon the Will of God its Author. And God cannot well be sup∣pos'd thus to let any of his Creatures cease, or dis∣own his Works that are good, as the Beings of all things are; much less can Minds, the Intelligent and Active Beings, be thought to be adnihilated, or cease Thinking so soon, and to no purpose. Change they may, and do, as all Creatures are mutable; but what of God would be seen in the Cessation of any, especially of Minds, who are the only kind of Beings capable of beholding God? If the Soul ceaseth to think, and so dies more than a figurative Death, it ceaseth to be; for Thinking and Mind are the same Being: which if you will not be perswaded to be∣lieve,

you must at least acknowledge them insepa∣rable. For a Mind that does not think, or a Think∣er that cannot think, is a Contradiction; and to call that a Power or Agent, that can do nothing, is absurd; for that which can do nothing, is no Power or Agent; and a Power or Agent that will do nothing, is as great a Contradiction; for Willing is Doing, even Thinking.

Again; Nothing is more strongly implanted, I may say concreated in the Mind of Man, than a desire to continue; and if Being is good, the Conti∣nuation of Being is good; if the Desire to continue be good, God is the Cause and Implanter of such a Desire, and consequently wills we should have such a Desire. I think none can but desire to continue, if it were the Will of God we should cease to be, the desire to continue would be a Sin; but God can't be suppos'd to will we should desire that which he don't will should be; that would be to will us to will con∣trary to his Will. Now whatever God wills to con∣tinue, cannot be supposed to cease. If God wills to manifest himself in, and to his Creatures, to be loved and feared by them, he must continue them; for by their Cessation, all these things will cease and be im∣possible. Every Good Man that loves God, would continue to love him; it's God's Will he should love him: Can God be suppos'd to make him cease to love his Maker? To what purpose? Let it but be granted, that it is not God's Will I should cease to love him, and the Immortality of my Soul is secu∣red; for while I love I live, viz. mentally. Nor can the Evil Man, that don't love God, nor fear to act contrary to his Will, be suppos'd to be for ever, or for a long time exempted from the Evils of his Rebellion against his Maker, or rendered by God himself uncapable of all Conviction: Or can it be thought probable, that God should make Creatures

to deny him a little while, and then cease under so great a Mistake as never to believe and confess God to be their Sovereign Lord, and Sufficient Benefactor. But if God approve himself, and his own Works, he will rather continue them, and suffer them to make themselves miserable, and find they are not God's, than not assert himself God, one way or other, to all his Intelligent Creatures. Besides, the Soul either of Good or Bad cannot with any reason be suppos'd to cease for a time, and then be again; for if it cease to be it is not, and nothing can be properly affirm'd or deny'd, but of that which is. Where there is no Being, neither Life nor Death can be as∣serted. So that if a Soul cease to be, and a Soul be afterwards, it cannot be the same, but a new one, to whom can be charged no account of the ceased Souls past Actions. There must be a Continuation of Being, or there can be no Identity or Sameness; and the Essentials of the thing must remain, or there is not the thing, but another. If there be not a Continuation of Thinking and Conscience of former Thoughts, it cannot be conceived how the Sameness of a Mind can be ascertained; and if a Soul in this present State be wicked, and cease at the Dissolution of the Body, it can neither be just nor good, that a new one should be miserable, because the ceased Soul was unrighteous, nor be determined what new one should be so: Nor that a Soul, penitent in this World, should not it self be happy hereafter, but have its hopes of future Happiness utterly frustrated, and be put off with the Mock-happiness of being happy in another Soul. What Encouragement can I have to my Duty, if I suppose I must not continue to the Perfection and Happiness of my Obedience; but must perish, and only now be contented to think that God will create a Soul hereafter, and perhaps give it my Dust, to be happy, because I only began

to be holy? Or how shall I be deterr'd from Sin, if I am perswaded I my self must be discontinued, and that it is not I but another Mind that is in danger of everlasting Vexation; (it may be with my old Body) if I now die impenitent? When we say a Man is dead, (if we talk like Rational Creatures) we must have some determinate Sense of those words; He is dead: Who is dead? He. The He or Person must remain. What is dead? Such a thing. A Man. The thing or Man is, tho'dead. A Man is a Compound of Soul and Body: Or a Mind doing and suffering, with, or by occasion of an Organical Body. A Man's be∣ing dead is the Cessation of this manner of Life, not of either of the Components, Beings, or Essential Properties. The Body unacted by the Mind, is use∣less among Men, and tends to Corruption, or Disso∣lution of parts; so the Living, put it out of their sight: the Soul or Mind is invisible of its self, and can neither converse with Men, nor Men with it, with∣out the use of Body; so when separate, it is not to Men; yet it no way follows but that it may well be to God, and to it self, which is Being enough. But the Soul consider'd apart, can have no Dissolu∣tion of parts, having none to be separated, nor can it die otherwise than in a figurative, or Metaphorical Sense. As it may be said to be morally dead, or dead in Sin, when it is impenitent, and not con∣formable to its Duty. To be Spiritually dead, when it thinks not of, or is not busied about Spiritual things: To be dead to Sin, or dead to this World, when its disorderly Thoughts, or undue Manners of Thinking on earthly, vile, sordid things cease: It may be said to be dead to Joy or Comfort, when it has lost all pleasant Thoughts, and has only grievous, horrid, anxious ones, without all hope, or rest con∣tinually; and if such a State always continue, whe∣ther the Soul be separate from, or joyned to a Body,

it is that which is properly call'd everlasting Death. Thus, I think, it is apparent that the Soul is immor∣tal, and that which is its proper or natural Life, viz. Thinking, does not cease.

Tho' to suppose the Soul immortal of its own Na∣ture, or that it is, or has any thing in it self, which necessarily infers its Continuance, would be as great or a greater Error than to fancy it mortal; for that would be to suppose it immortal, as its Author is. But it cannot be suppos'd thus to be immortal; for whatsoever had a Beginning, or had not Being al∣ways, may be supposed to have an End, and cease to be. Such are all Creatures, who would fall into nothing, if God should not will their Continuance. But that he does will them to continue, I think we may be perswaded by the foregoing Considera∣tions.

32. Moreover, we have not only reason to be∣lieve that Souls do continue tho' separate from, that is disusing their Bodies, and such a Life they lived with them; but that they shall have their Bodies again after some time; because the end of the Souls having a Body, cannot easily be thought to be fully attained in this Life. This material World seems to be made chiefly for Man to be concern'd with, and the things therein to be Objects of his Knowledge, and Subjects of his Actions. It is by means of his Body that he is now capable of knowing and acting in Bodily Nature; but what he knows and does therein, is so imperfect, notwithstanding all the Wonders that have come within the reach of his Understanding, and great things have been effected by his hand, that we believe God will not let him loose his Body, or cut the bond of Corporal and Spiritual Nature for ever; but rather give it him a∣gain, and that so alter'd as where-with he may be more capable of all those things he ought to do,

and be in Bodily Nature. The Creatures, inferiour to Man, and subject to his Knowledge and use, are but very little known, or duly used in this Life; therefore it is probable they will in another: and without a Body we cannot see that the material World can signifie any thing to the Mind of Man. Man at his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Dissolution, probably cea∣ses to be to the BodilyWorld, and the Bodily World to him; but in his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Resurrection, standing up, or using a Body again, he is again uni∣ted to Bodily Nature, to do, and be something again therein. And that he may be more capable of what he should be and do, than he was in his first State, or of finding the great Unreasonableness and Unhap∣piness of persisting in the contrary to his Duty, it is requisite that the Body he receives should be alte∣red, or not exactly the same, but otherwise modi∣fied; so as to be capable of the state the Soul is then determined to. And if we have reason to believe the Body shall be changed, we cannot well think it shall be exactly the same numerical and like figured Parts of Matter it had before; such a Supposition is needless as well as groundless, if not contradictory. The Body a Man of Forty or Fifty has, is not the same numerical Matter he had at his Birth, but has received the greatest part of its bulk from the vari∣ous matters of his Food; so that he was truly eating from his Trencher, what is his Body. But every Soul hath its own Body, tho' the Body now be in conti∣nual change. The Matter of the Bodies of Men and Brutes, in the long tract of the Ages of this World, hath been confounded; and the same Mat∣ter, or part of it, that was the Body of one at one time, has become the Body, or part of the Body of another, at another time; but that needs not trouble us, when the Sameness of a Person does not consist in the Sameness of the Matter of his Body, but in

the Continuation of his Thinking, and Conscience of his Thoughts. Nor perhaps have we any ground to suppose the raised Body will be altogether un∣changeable; it will be enough if to the happy, it be such as will never any way hinder their Happiness; to the wicked such as will continue, tho' in the want of all the disorderly beloved Gratifications of Sense. To believe the Possibility of a Soul's having a Rai∣sed or Refitted Body, either from the common Mat∣ter of the Earth, or partly from those very Parti∣cles it formerly had, is no difficulty, when the Will of God is supposed the Cause: Nor need we per∣swade the Possibility of a Recollection of dispersed Matter, or tell you that even the Art of Man can gather together that which seems to be separated as much as a rotten Corps. There is no manner of Difficulty or Contradiction in believing the Resur∣rection to those that believe a God. The Difficulties that some have pretended in the notion of the Nume∣rical Sameness of every Particle of Matter, are no∣thing, when we are no way obliged to believe it such a Resurrection.

33. Moreover, as all things in this sinful Life are very much out of order, and Men do not sufficient∣ly see their Disorders, but think well of that which is ill, and ill of that which is well: It is very requi∣site, and becoming the Perfections of God, beseem∣ing his Justice and Truth, or his Approbation of his Will to Man, and of his Constancy, with the Mani∣festation of the true Causes of all Good and Evil; that there should be some time or other after this Life, for a time of Discovering, Determination, Judgment, or Declaration of the Truth of things. That the Work of Repentance and Obedience may be approved, and appear to be good, and most pro∣fitable for the Creature; and Disobedience and Im∣penitence may be no more mistaken by Sinners for

the way of Goodness and Happiness: That Justice and Injustice may no more be taken one for the o∣ther; that the Good may appear to be delivered from the power of the Wicked, and the Wicked ap∣pear to be the Fools that were deceived: And that the Truth of things may be most manifest, and the Determination of them clear even to wicked Men, it is not only highly probable, but necessary that Men shall appear again in such Bodies, as whereby they may be known to one another; and these things be effected by such a means, and in such a manner, as may most aptly tend to the undoubted Determination of all things to their due, and lasting Condition.

34. Now as it is evident that Man's Business is to be conformable to the Will of his Maker, according to that order the Most Wise thinks fit, wherein his Perfections may be most seen, and whereby the Creature may be most happy or pleas'd; and since it is as evident that Man has failed, and gone out of this order, and vainly sought out himself an impos∣sible way of Happiness, wherein his Maker cannot be duly seen: It follows that Man ought to repent, and change his Mind. To the doing of which, it is necessary that Man should be capable of so doing. It cannot be an immediate Obligation on a Crea∣ture to do what he cannot do. Tho' the Creature has disobey'd, yet the Obligation to future Obedi∣ence still remains, so consequently a Capacity of o∣beying. It would be very hard to be required to give what one has not, and cannot have. The Dif∣ficulty that may seem in several Instances wherein a Man may in some sort render himself uncapable of what he ought to do, may be solved by this Con∣sideration: That Man cannot be thought to be dis∣abled of a Will, or Faculty of Desire: While he has a Being he always wills, or desires something, and

his Will is changeable by the strength of Argument, or new appearance of Good from one thing to ano∣ther. There are the greatest Arguments on the side of Duty, which may possibly appear to the Man, whereby his Will may be changed; and the willing according to God's Will, is the act of Obedience, which God accepts where the Soul cannot effect the outward things, which are to Men the Testimonies, Signs, and Effects of it: And such hearty Desires continued, God often assists to be shewn forth, and have their Effects to others; or by his Providence some way or other rectifies the matter.

As for instance; If a Man borrows Money, spends it, and then can't pay it, he repents that he has done amiss, desires and endeavours to get Money to pay, but can't; God forgives his Sin wherein he willed a∣miss, accepts of his Will to pay, for the deed, sup∣plies his Creditor another way, or incites him to for∣give him: If he forgives him, the Debter is no lon∣ger obliged to pay the Debt, or a Debter in that matter; if the Creditor will not forgive the poor Man that would, and cannot pay, he looseth the Condition of Forgiveness with God, who will not re∣quire what the Creature cannot do. God has not been wanting to the Creature; he first made him innocent, and capable of continuing so, as well as of sinning; and he has made him capable of repenting, and becoming obedient and happy, tho' he has sinn'd: He has given him a Faculty of considering, and reasoning with himself, whereby, as aforesaid, he may be, and is, whenever he is convinced. Now if Man notwithstanding he hath sinn'd, shall repent, and become (as he should be) obedient, he will also become happy, and the end of his Being will be at∣tain'd what-ever means God may please to make ef∣fectual to this end.

35. And that God has given divers means tend∣ing to this end ever since Man hath sinned, is plain∣ly seen. Every Man hath a Conscience, a kind of Court of Judgment in himself, accusing more or less, as he hath seen his Actions to have been more or less disorderly, and telling him he ought to do other∣wise. Besides, the experience of the Disquiet, or Unhappiness every Man has as the fruits of his own, and other Mens Sins, a little consideration will make an Argument to perswade him to repent, or do no more such things as make him so uneasie. The due Consideration of God and himself will certainly give every Man an Argument enough to perswade him to behave himself according to God's Will, even for his own profit. But besides this Natural Light of Con∣viction, and these Motives in self to Repentance, which are or may be always present with a Man, it cannot be thought unbecoming the Goodness and Power of God sometimes himself to make more strong Impressions on the Mind of Man, or imme∣diately to cause him to have such or such more seri∣ous, and right Thoughts. He that made us Thinkers, may if he please inject particular Thoughts into our Minds without any Medium; yet it is not unreason∣able to suppose that he may, and does often employ the Good Spirits in such Errants, to instigate Men to Good, as he suffers the Evil ones to tempt to Wickedness. The Existence of both which sort of Spirits any one may easily be perswaded to believe from the consideration of his own Mind, as a Spirit capable of subsisting without a Body, either obedient or disobedient. But to distinguish these Thoughts which come into our Minds by the silent Language of Spirits, (if I may use such an Expression) may not be so easie: The Good Thoughts are easily known from the Bad; the bad must be our own, or from Evil Spirits; but commonly those that come thus by

way of Injection, are strong and suddain. But to distinguish the Injections from Good Spirits, and those from God himself, seems more difficult. Some will not be pleas'd with these Considerations; but those that attend seriously and judiciously to what passes in their own Minds, may easily find something of these things. But to leave this Digression: God has made Man capable of, and given him yet more External Motives to Repentance, for the rectifying his Disorders; as the beholding the Actions of o∣thers, in whom the Disorders are more easily seen. The fond Love of Self may sometime make my own Action seem well to me, but an Action in another is judged more impartially; but then from the Judg∣ment I make of another I may reflect back again to my self, and say: If a thing seem uncomely, and ill in another, I may easily conclude the Action is a∣like ill in me. For instance; I presently see the In∣justice of another, doing any thing that abates my Happiness, or takes away any Good from me, or confers to my Misery; thence I cannot but con∣clude there is the same Unreasonableness in my hurting him or another. But there is yet a more extrinsick way of Conviction, and leading to Re∣pentance; and that is the express Admonitions, and Perswasions of those who have repented, and do re∣pent. If I have seen the Evil of disagreeing with my Maker, the Unhappiness and farther Tendency to Misery of Sin, and have left it; if I have seen the Reasonableness of loving and obeying God, and con∣sequently do it; I shall also be desirous that my Fellow Sinner should come to his right Mind. What measure of Love to God I have, or see I ought to have, I shall desire in another. The Love of God infallibly influences me not only for God's sake, but even for the Creatures sake, to love my Fellow Creature, and endeavour to perswade him to Re∣pentance,

Obedience, and Happiness. Such repent∣ing Sinners have there been in all ages, (tho' some∣times but a few) perswading others, and one ano∣ther to Repentance; and such repenting Sinners God may expresly command to preach Repentance and Obedience to others. But yet in all these (tho' by them many have been perswaded) there is still wanting something of the height of external Argu∣ment. These repenting Sinners have been Sinners sometime, and in some measure Sinners still, and may possibly err, as well as my self, and be partial in their Admonitions and Councels, and speak more or less than God's Will; and above all may some∣times give Examples not agreeing with their Pre∣cepts, or may change, and say, and be one thing now another thing anon, as the ballance of Good and Evil goes up and down with them. Therefore if God will give the greatest, and most suitable means to perswade Sinners, as it is agreeable to his Wisdom and Goodness to do, there ought to be some Infallible Instructer in the Will of God, confirm'd to be such beyond all exception, giving an Example (with his Instructions) of perfect Obedience to his Maker; a Creature perswading both by Perfection of Precepts, and Exactness of Example, to the per∣fect way of Obedience: One that hath no false by as for which he may be question'd to be defective of being a perfect Rule to the rest of the Creatures, but is capable and sufficient to give the most convincing Arguments to enforce Repentance and Obedience. That God has given such a means to reduce Man's disorderly Will, we shall consider by and by, when the thread of our Discourse brings us to speak of Revelation, and the Perfection and Substance of all Revelation.

Divers repenting Sinners God has expresly com∣manded, and sent to the rest of Mankind to mani∣fest his Will and Pleasure by them, and to assure them that they will therein find their own Interest and Ad∣vantage.

36. And this Consideration brings me at length to the business of Express Revelation, which when con∣sidered in the Sum and Substance, Design and End of it, will be found to dictate, and enforce no other thing to Men than what we call Natural Religion, of which we have been somewhat discoursing. It is but as it were a more fair Edition of the same Law, a more particular and express, more clear and convincing Manifestation of God's Will, a second Witness of the same Truths, confirming what is testi∣fied by the natural Light of Reason: which alone were enough to leave all without excuse who do not hearken to its Dictates, and sufficient to lead all to the way of Obedience were it hearkened unto. But Revelation being added, dictating and enforcing in a manner plain, and clear enough for any Capacity, whatever is absolutely necessary for Man to believe, and do in order to Happiness; is enough to inform, and convince any of their Duty that do not strongly resist. For the clearing of which matter, let us take these Considerations.

As God is the Fountain and Cause of all Truths, so he is the Giver or Discoverer of all Truths that come within the reach of Created Understandings. But he doth not make known things to his Creatures always the same way. He hath given us Sense and Reason; by which, with his general and common Assistance, we most commonly come to know things for some time unknown to us. But whenso∣ever it pleaseth God to discover some Truth in an express, particular, or extraordinary manner, then there is that which we call Divine Revelation, Now

this Revelation may be considered two ways: In re∣lation to the thing made known: And in relation to the Manner, or Measure of the Manifestation. But before we come to consider it these ways, let it be noted, that as we have said Revelation is some Truth discover'd, or made known to the Creatures; so we at the same must necessarily suppose it a Truth knowable to the created Understanding. For to suppose a thing that is above our Understanding to be revealed to us, is to suppose a Revelation, and yet no Revelation; whatever is made known to us we know, and what we know is not above our Knowledge. The Capacity of Man's Understand∣ing we readily believe may be enlarged; so that he may hereafter know what at present he is not ca∣pable of; but till he is capable of knowing such or such a Truth, or at least seeing it knowable, it can be no Revelation to him. As for instance; None can pretend that the Doctrine of Transubstantiation is revealed, while it is that which is inconceivable. That all the Properties wherein the Nature and Es∣sence of Bread consists should remain, and yet the Bread be changed into Flesh, is that which is unintel∣ligible, and not a Revelation. Nor can they well say that tho' the manner how this unseen Change can be, is not revealed; yet that it is indeed changed into Flesh, (and yet more strange! the Flesh of Christ) is revealed: For how this Change can be conceived to be made, and that it can be conceived to be made, is the very same thing, or at least as un∣intelligible: Nay such a supposed Change is a Con∣tradiction, and a Contradiction can with the least reason of all be suppos'd a Revelation. For Man is not only unable to know how it can be, but is able to know, yea clearly sees it is impossible to be. With as good a pretence might a Man say, that tho' to any Man's Understanding, two and one make three,

yet God has revealed to him that in God's Under∣standing, two and one is but one, or is nine, or what you please.

But as to Divine Revelation, it may be (as I said) considered either as to the Thing revealed, or the Manner of the Revelation. As to the Thing revea∣led, it may be either that which is, or can be known no other way, viz. a Truth God has reserved to such his Peculiar Teaching, or that which might be known without Revelation; but not so clearly, easily, or soon, and in both it may be of a Truth past, present, or to come. As to the Manner of Revelation, a Truth may be communicated either immediately to the Understanding, supposing only that it is God's special Will that I, or he thus immediately know such or such a Truth we knew not before; or yet to the Understanding mediately by the Ministry of some superiour Intelligent Creature that God first made know the thing; or yet still more mediately a Truth may be made known in way of Revelation, even by our very Senses; by means of some Bodily Object, as a Voice, Vision, or the like. Again, as to the Manner of Revelation, it may be more gene∣ral or particular, more partial or full; or in other words, fewer or more Truths may be thus made known at the same time. Now that God can, and may in a particular and express manner make a Truth known to his Creature, or to one and ano∣ther, and yet not to the third, or to every one; that he may give a Revelation to some immediate∣ly, and command them to tell it others; none but those that disbelieve the Power Goodness, and So∣vereignty of God, can deny. It cannot rationally be suppos'd but that the Author of Truths, can make a Truth known. He who has made Creatures sensi∣ble, and capable of Reasoning, and finding out Truths by way of Induction and Argument, may if

he please sometimes give Men the Knowledge of some Truths, a nearer and easier way, or cause them to understand Truths not knowable by Sense and Reason alone; and this immediately to whom he pleaseth, and to others by them. Creatures that can come to the Knowledge of many things by their own Industry, or Application of Thought, may ei∣ther know the same things, or things they would never have found out so, by a special Instruction. As a Man unassisted by a Master may find out many things in Arts, but by the Instruction of a skilful Ar∣tist he may come to know the same and more, and in far less time than he could have known without such a Teacher. Now it cannot be thought unbe∣coming the Wisdom and Goodness of God, or un∣suitable, or unnecessary for the present Condition of Mankind, if we consider it, that God should have had some special Scholars of his own particular in∣structing, and have commanded them to teach other Men in things most profitable and necessary to them; or that he should have sent some particular Messengers to the rest of Mankind to teach his Will to those that through their own Negligence, or others Hinderance knew it not, or to teach it more clearly and fully to those that knew it but in part, and to urge it upon all that were negligent to do it. That God may do thus, I think is now undoubted: That he has done so, seems to me the only thing needs farther to be proved to any rational Man. And that we may rationally be perswaded that God has thus instructed, or sent some particular Men, ei∣ther to teach others, or urge them to do their known Duty, let us take these Considerations.

It is most evident to all those who have took no∣tice of the Actions of Mankind, conveighed by the most unquestionable Tradition from Generation to Generation, that now and then in the Ages of this

World there have been some Men teaching and per∣swading others things, which when duly considered will be found Truths tending to their Good; and some of these have declar'd themselves sent of God, and commanded to teach, and perswade the things they have taught and perswaded. Now suppose some of them have not had the things they taught in this Special Manner immediately from God, yet they are Revelations to those to whom they were before un∣known, tho' not properly Divine Ones, as to the manner of their Discovery. But yet if the Persons were really sent by God's express and special Com∣mand, to teach Men even what they might have found out themselves, nevertheless that such a Per∣son was thus sent of God, is a Divine Revelation, and a high Argument to perswade Compliance with the things taught. But if they have received the Truths from God in this extraordinary, special, and particu∣lar Manner; and been expresly sent, and command∣ed to teach, and enforce them, there is all that can be desired to a Divine Revelation. We have two things here principally to be satisfied in.

First, Whether the Person teaching Men, was thus particularly taught of God?

Secondly, Whether he was expresly commanded of God to teach, either this his expresly received Di∣vine Doctrine, or what he otherwise knew?

That the things are of God, we cannot doubt if they appear when declar'd, with Evidence and De∣monstration, God being the Author and Fountain of all Truths. That the things are Revelations, we cannot doubt if they are such as were not knowable, or could not then be known any other way. As for instance; If the Person tells us, or brings to re∣membrance, some things past and forgotten, that were never committed either to written or unwritten Tradition; or if he gives us the Knowledge of

things present, done at a distance, which he could not know any ordinary way, or such things to come which can be fore-known to none but God, (who is incomprehensible in Knowledge) and to whom he is pleas'd to reveal them.

That the Person was sent of God, we may be per∣swaded, partly by the things he declares appearing thus to be Revelations, partly by their being such as were good, very necessary, and beneficial to be known, or done by the Persons to whom he declares himself sent: But fully and sufficiently, if some ex∣traordinary Effect is also produced by means of the Person, such as never is done, or at least could be done by him without the special and uncommon Operation of the Divine Power, or the Finger of God; such as we call a Miracle. When such Effects accompany Persons asserting themselves sent of God to teach and exhort Men things in themselves, shew∣ing no Repugnancy to Truth, there can be no more rational Doubt of them, or of the Authority, and Divine Mission of the Persons. God cannot be sup∣pos'd to alter the common order of things in his Creatures, in Concurrence to perswade a Lye, or to give his Special Testimony to any Deceiver. But yet here we had need use our Reason, and have some skill to judge of, and distinguish a True Miracle from a False one, that we may be certain of the Matter of Fact: For there have perhaps been more Pretences to Miracles, or False and Lying Wonders, than True ones. Now that I may a little help those who have not so well consider'd this Matter, I shall lay down a few more Considerations of the nature of a Miracle, before I come to consider how these things may be apply'd particularly to the Book com∣monly call'd the Holy Scripture. A Miracle, ne∣gatively, is not a Contradiction in nature, or any thing that implyeth a Contradiction, Absurdity, or

absolute Impossibility; as that a thing should be made to be and not to be, so and so, and not so and so at the same time: That which the Understand∣ing of Man can no ways apprehend, but as absurd or impossible, can neither be pretended as a Miracle, nor could it so be, would it ever have the end of a Miracle. As for instance; That a certain Saint be∣headed, should afterwards carry his Head in his Mouth for some miles; or that the Body of Christ should be in divers places at the same time: Nor can the Almighty Power of God be any pretence for the Belief of such Absurdies; for Things or Truths are the Products and Subjects of Divine Power, and not Contradictions. Again; A Mira∣cle is not a Fallacy or Deception of Mens Senses, or Understanding; for a Deceit hath the nature of a Lye, and is not likely to come from the God of Truth. Nor is a Miracle a thing done by the Power or Art of the Man, howsoever great or strange, any Man's Power or Art may be to others that are weak or ignorant. Nor is a Miracle any more in the Will of Man, than in his Power or Skill; the Time or Subject for a Miracle is not determin'd by Man's vain Will to satisfie Curiosity, or unnecessary Desires, but is generally wrought upon serious and weighty Occasions; nor is God's Will so properly said to concur with Man's Will, when Man would work a Miracle, as Man's Will to concur with God's Will when God pleases, and sees fit to work one. But a Miracle is an extraordinary Effect, or Altera∣tion in Nature, wrought by the Will of God, above the Power and Art of Man, at least of him who is the Instrument of effecting it, in the way it was ef∣fected: A thing done by the Special and Uncom∣mon Operation of the Divine Power. The end of a Miracle is the Confirmation of some Revelation or Truth as from God, to promote some considera∣ble

Good; no less than to perswade Sinners to re∣pent, or will as God wills, or to confirm them that so do, in their well-willing. And where-ever there is said to be a Miracle that tends not to this end, it ought to be suspected, and will be found upon seri∣ous Examination to be but a Pretence, and no real Miracle. But now to come a little nearer to Mat∣ters of Fact, that we may be perswaded that there have indeed been Divine Revelations, and some Per∣sons sent to declare the Will of God to others, and the Truth of their Mission, and of the things decla∣red, confirm'd by Miracles, we need no more but seriously read and consider the Books of Moses and the Prophets, and especially the Writings of the A∣postles and Disciples of Jesus Christ. In the Reading and Consideration of which Books, if these two things appear, I think there is enough to satisfie any rational Man in this matter.