An answer to a printed book, intituled, Observations upon some of His Maiesties late answers and expresses

AN ANSWER TO A PRINTED BOOKE, INTITULED, OBSERVATIONS Vpon some of His MAIESTIES late Answers and Expresses.

IN this discourse concerning Re∣gall authority, it is needlesse to wast time in declaring the origi∣nall; since it is granted to be at least mediately from God. Who intending the good of mankind, which was not to be obtained without preserva∣tion of order, hath therefore commanded all to be subject to the lawes of society, not only for wrath, but for conscience sake: not only whil'st they en∣joy

the benefit of Governours, but likewise whilst they doe suffer under some accidentall abuses. The reason of which obligation may be this: we cannot reap the constant fruits of an established policy, unlesse by compact we submit our selves to some possible inconveniences.

Hence it follows, after a people hath by so∣lemne contract devested it selfe of that power, which was primarily in them, they cannot upon what pretence soever, without manifest breach of divine ordinance, and violation of publique faith, resume that authority, which they have placed in another; to the end that being united in one, it may thence receive strength, & be enabled to pro∣tect all, as also to prevent those fatall divisions which attend multitudes endued with equall power, where almost every one upon reall or fan∣cyed injuries undertakes to right himselfe, and al∣though before positive constitution this is not ab∣solutely unjust, yet reason informes us it is most fit by some agreement to part with this native right in consideration of greater good, and pre∣vention of greater evills which will ensue, and to restraine our selves from being judges in our own cause.

It followes moreover, though the people should

conceave they might live more happily, if the Kings prerogative were more bounded, his reve∣news diminished (and it is no hard matter to per∣swade them to think so, to effect this, wants not so much rhetorique, as malice, since what is taken from the King, turnes to their present profit, though they oft-times dearely pay for it, by disa∣bling their King to provide for their security) it were high sinne to entrench upon his rights. For hereby they loosen the very sinewes of govern∣ment, by receding from that compact, which craf∣ty men (out of their own private interests) per∣swade them they might have made more advan∣tagious.

It doth no way prejudice Regall authority, that God is the author of Aristocraticall, he may adde De∣mocraticall power also. If these were not lawfull formes of government, their execution of judge∣ment would be sinne, and whilst they punish, they would commit murder. Yet in these kindes, we may observe more or lesse perfection, accor∣ding to the aptnes they beare to those ends which States ayme at, which are safety and plenty. To haue riches, and not be able to defend them, is to expose our selves as a prey; to be safe, and poore, is to be securely miserable. Besides, if we had leisure

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to look back to the Originall of Governments, we might finde that God was the immediate donor of Regall power, whereas other formes referre to him, onely as confirming the peoples Act. This the Author cunningly dissembles, and therefore (treading in the steps of Mariana and Buchanan, sworn enemies to Monarchy) he presents us with J know not what rude multitudes, living without lawes, without government, till such time, as out of the sense of their sufferings, which evidently proceeded from this want, they were inforced to fly to such remedies. However this fancy might passe for currant among such heathen Polititians as were ignorant of the originall of the world, & dreamed that the first men were bred as Insects, out of the mud of the earth: whence that frequent mention in their writings of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Abori∣genes; yet we, who are satisfied with the history of the creation, cannot imagine, that Anarchy was before a regulated Government, and that God who had digested one Chaos into order, should leave the most noble creatures in a worse confusi∣on: unlesse we will deny to Adam, either that pow∣er or providence, which is naturall and ordinary in a father over his children; and granted by this observer, pag. 18. to be more then the King can

challenge over his people. We find in this infancy of the world, upon the multiplying of mankinde, Colonies were sent out, and a City was built by Cain. Those long lived Patriarchs had this advan∣tage, by begetting a numerous posterity, they might people a Nation out of their own loynes, and be saluted Patres patriae without a metaphor; the same being their subjects and their children. In relation to this, it was properly said by the An∣cients, a Kingdome was but a larger family; Ari∣stotle tells us, a Regall power belonged to the Pa∣terfamilias, and accordingly Homer

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

So that it was then no more possible in right for such a people to choose their rulers, then to choose their Fathers. Thus Regall power sprang first from Paternall, and Trogus made a truer observati∣on then this author, when he said, Principio rerum (as well as gentium, nationum{que}) imperium penes re∣ges erat. And therefore may challenge more from God, & nature, then other formes of government; and certainly it hath received larger elogies from God in Scripture, then any other can pretend to. To say nothing of the Kings of Israel, who are confest by the adversary to be of divine instituti∣on; very heathen Monarchs are acknowledged

by God himselfe to be no lesse. Where he calls Ne∣buchadrezzar his servant. Ier. 43.10. and Cyrus his annointed. Es. 45.1. Notwithstanding this, to the end I may give the clearest satisfaction, I have thought it fit not to take advantage from the ex∣cellency of Monarchy, whether in regard to its an∣tiquity (as being not much younger then man himselfe) or the severall commodities thereof. For the truth is, it were no excuse for such endea∣vours of innovation, were it the most imperfect governement.

I shall therefore take into consideration this Au∣thors grounds in the method they lye, upon which he would overthrow so ancient and well founded a monarchye.

His first exception is; The King attributeth the originall of his Royalty to God and the Law, making no mention of the grant, consent, or trust of man therein.] A groundles cavill; whē God is first named, under what notion can be apprehend Law, but as an a∣greement of the people, deriving their power, and committing the Kingdom to his trust? within few lines he confutes himselfe, telling us, that Law which the King mentioneth, is not to be understood, to be any speciall ordinance sent from heaven by the ministery of Angels, or Prophets, (as amongst the Iewes it some∣times

was) It can be nothing else amongst Christians but the pactions and agreements of such and such poli∣tique corporations] if so, he might have spared this observation.

That Dominion which is usurped, and not just, yet whilst it remaines dominion, and till it be legally againe devested, refers to God, as to it's author, and donor, as much as that, which is haereditary.] Usurpation & un∣just dominion can give no right to the possessor; he that looses a kingdome by force may recover it by the same title. So Athalia in the seventh yeare of her raigne was slaine by the command of Iehoi∣da, and Joash, anointed King, and restored to his right. He must againe answer him selfe. pag. 3. he tells us, Neither can the right of conquest be plead∣ed to acquit Princes &c. for meere force cannot alter the course of nature, or frustrate the tenour of law; and if it could, there were more reason why the people might justifie force to regaine due liberty, then the Prince might to subvert the same. And 'tis a shamefull stupidity in any man to think, that our Ancestors did not fight more nobly for their free customes and lawes, of which the conquerour and his successors had in part disinherited them by violence and perjury, then they which put them to such conflicts. Is it not a cleare contradiction to say that God is the author, and Do∣nor

of Dominion usurped, and not just, as well as of that which is haereditary? Certainly God being Lord Proprietary of all, his donation transfers a full right to him on whom he bestowes it. This deed of guift being knowne, it is not lawfull to endea∣vour a recovery. This was the case of Rehoboam, who after the defection of ten tribes, raised an ar∣my out of Judah, and the tribe of Benjamin, in hopes to reduce them to obedience. But he was warned by Shemajah the man of God, not to fight against his brethren (not because it was unlaw∣full in it selfe, or the successe improbable, but for that this was from the Lord. As this was not, (setting aside that extraordinary consideration) unlawfull; So neither was it, as he is pleased to terme it, a ridiculous attempt, to indeavour to reduce ten tribes by the strength of two. For he had raised an army consisting of one hundred and fourescore thousand chosen men, which were warriers. And it may probably be collected from the muster roll, which Ioab brought in to David, where the men of Iudah were 500000, that those two tribes were able to furnish an army strong enough to bid all Jsraell battell. Besides as he had lost them only by harsh language, so he might hope to regain them, by faire promises. It may be not

unworthy our observation, what good conse∣quences did attend the defection of these ten tribes. Did they not presently fall away from the true God, as well as their King, and were they not shortly after led into captivity?

This we must observe, though force be not law, yet if after conquest a people resigne their right in part or in whole, by a subsequent act of con∣sent, they are obliged to stand to those conditions, which they made perchance out of a probable feare of harder usage. For the law of God gene∣rally, and the civill law in this case makes the Act binding. That covenants should not be violated, will appeare by the revenge God took in behalfe of the Gibeonites. The children of Israell suffered three yeares famine, and after this seven of Sauls sonnes were hanged to make an atonement for this breach of promise. Notwithstanding the Gi∣beonites had overreached the Children of Jsraell by craft, yet they having sworne, were bound to performe their oath unto the Lord. Doli exceptio could not take of this obligation. That they were deceived, gave no right to them to imitate what they condemned, and to deceive againe. Thus we see what speciall care God takes to preserve the faith of contracts. He will returne abundantly,

what any mans honesty costs him; and therefore it is great reason, he that sweareth to his neigh∣bour, should not disappoint him, though it be to his own hindrance.

After some generall truths, he comes to this issue. The fountaine and efficient cause of power is the people, and from hence the inference is just, the King though he be singulis major, yet he is universis minor.] This inference most weak: the quite contrary may clearly be concluded. The people being the efficient cause of power (which can be no other way but by deriving their divided power, and uniting it in him) since they cannot retaine what they have parted with, nor have, what they gave away, it follows he which hath all their power (I may adde his own particular besides) must needs be greater and more power∣full then they. The truth is, he is now the only fountaine of all power and justice.

But he offers us a proofe; for if the people be the true efficient cause of power, it is a rule in nature, Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale.] Strange that men upon such palpable sophistry should endea∣vour to cast of Monarchy! He will be unwilling to follow the consequence of it. He hath an e∣state, which no question he would willingly im∣prove,

let him bestow it upon me, he will make me rich, and himselfe richer. For Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale. I believe rather then part with his meanes, he will finde an answer to his own argument. By the same reason one that entreth into his service, because he hath made him his master, shall conclude himselfe the better man, and challenge power over him. For Quicquid ••f∣ficit tale, est magis tale. But because to prove his reasoning absurd, is not fully to answer, I will shew the ground of this fallacy. The axiome is true ante effectum productum, not alwaies after. So a sparke firing a City, was once, more fire then the houses, nor so after the whole towne is be∣come one flame: or else thus, it is true in those a∣gents, in whom the quality by which they operate is inherent, and from whom it cannot be sepera∣ted: not true in those who by way of donation de∣vest themselves of power or wealth. Because a thing can not retaine a fullnesse, after it hath emp∣tied it selfe.

Jf the King be universis minor, then the people have placed a King not over, but under them; and they doe ••ll to petition when they might com∣mand; they may require it from the Prince their Subject.

Hence it appeares that at the founding of authori∣ties, when the consent of societies convaies rule into such and such hands, it may ordain what conditions, and prefix what bounds it pleases.] This is most true; and therefore J shall easily grant, the name King to signifie a person invested with different power ac∣cording to the varietie of lawes in severall nations. His Majesty doth most freely acknowledge, and will constantly maintain what ever rights the law doth give us; yet He is not bound to betray his own. The truth is, we should be equally misera∣ble under either extreme, if the Kings prerogative should swallow up the Subjects right, or the Sub∣jects right the Kings just prerogative.

No dissolution ought to be of rule convayed by the consent of societyes, into such and such hands, but by the same power by which it had it's constitution.] This J grant, being rightly understood; but because the sense may be easily mistaken, J shall enlarge my selfe upon it. It is most agreeable to reason, that the same power should by equall right, abrogate, as it did at first constitute. For it is not possible any body should lay a necessary obligation upon it selfe to doe thus, when it had liberty to doe other∣wise, except in relation to some other person; to whom I may part with that right I had, without

possibility of recalling it. And this either by actu∣all donation, so when I have given away my mo∣ney, J cannot challenge it as due on my repen∣tance; or by promise, which is an earnest of my performance. In these cases J cannot use my liber∣ty, because it would be to the injury of another; according to that rule grounded on great equity, Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius inju∣riam.

In a popular state there is but one simple pow∣er, and therefore the people upon consent may establish an Aristocracy, or Monarchy, when they please. But in the other two, where the authority is placed in the hands of a few, or of one, there are two parties in the contract, and therefore e∣ven the whole people have not any power of dis∣solving this government, unlesse this one, or those few, will voluntarily resigne up their power into those hands from which they received it; and that such resignation be not to the injury of a third par∣ty.

It were strange if the people in subjecting it selfe to command should aime at any thing but it's own good in the first and last place.] No question, rule and sub∣jection (divided paternall powers finding it ne∣cessary to yeeld to one Regall, and instead of ma∣ny,

to submit to one common father) did spring from reason directing man-kind to its greatest convenience. Therefore the people, ayming chief∣ly at their own good, yet perceiving this was not to be attained, except they had a common prote∣ctor to administer justice equally amongst them, they found it necessary in a higher degree to pro∣vide for his good, in recompense of their security, and out of their particular estates, to grant to him honourable demaines, to whose care and justice, they owed the peaceable possession of all. So the good of either is mutually involved, and that the people may be happy, they must first provide for the happinesse of their ruler.

What followes I shall think unworthy any an∣swer. He breaks out into a most scandalous, and false invective against the late government. That the subject groaned under some grievances, cannot be denied; and we owe to the goodnesse of his Majestie, that we are free even from the feare of them for the future. J speak sincerely, what I think, though the wit of malice should set before us the most exact table of all our sufferings, (let it not impose upon us, what we never felt) and com∣pare us to any other nation of the Christian world, we in our worst times were least unhap∣py.

Because we have no reason to be in love with any evils, I shall not endeavour to excuse them by comparison with our present miseries. Though neither be desirable, yet we are too sensible, which we have justest reason to complain of.

I hope under this word (protect) the King intends not onely to shield us from all kinde of evill, but to pro∣mote us also, to all kinde of Politicall happinesse, accor∣ding to his utmost de voyre.] I never before did appre∣hend in the word, Protect, this large notion; we may expect all happinesse from His goodnesse, we cannot challenge it from His duty. How should we conceave, that the Prince is obliged by oath to take care for his people in such a degree, as the most affectionate mother never yet took for her dearest children. If it were so, then all his Maje∣sties Royall ancestors, who did not provide for their people in such a high degree of happinesse, as he by the advise of this present Parliament hath done, were perjured, as having all taken the oath to Protect. Every particular subject hath a just ti∣tle, and may challenge an interest in whatsoever is meant by the word, Protection: Is the King there∣fore bound to promote every particular person to all kinds of politicall happinesse? to advance all to honours, offices, power, command?

Though all single persons ought to look upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of Grace, with all thankfulnesse and humility, yet the King himselfe loo∣king upon the whole state ought to acknowledge, that he cannot merit of it &c. all hath proceeded but from his meere duty. It was believed heretofore, the grea∣test happinesse of a Prince, that he was able, & his greatest glory, to be willing to oblige his people. But now he is made not capable of doing any courtesie. When he hath done all that he can, he hath discharged the duty of a trusty servant. I am confident never any age was guilty of the like ir∣reverence, and disrespect to Princes, as is shewne in this book. If all single persons ought to look upon the late bills passed by the King, as matters of Grace, then they truly are so; for no obligation can lay up∣on a man, to believe things otherwise then they are. This ground destroyes the power of benefi∣cence in a Prince, and the duty of gratitude in Sub∣jects. We should think it very hard, if we, who are but subjects, should be dealt with by the same rule. All owe a duty to their King, to their country; yet upon extraordinary services we beleive, we de∣serve well of both. The example of the House of Commons, will better instruct him, who have se∣verall times presented their thanks, and humble

acknowledgment of his Majesties gracious favours; and have likewise received thanks from most Counties in the Kingdome, for procuring those bills so beneficiall to the subject: and yet surely the trust reposed in them, by those that chose them, and the end for which they met, did no lesse oblige them in point of duty to doe whatsoever might conduce to the generall good of the King∣dome.

The King ought not to account that a profit, or strength to him, which is a losse and wasting to the peo∣ple, nor ought he to think that perisht to him, which is gained to the people.] By the same argument the people may share all that he hath, and he is bound to believe, he has lost nothing. If King and peo∣ple have severall rights, what law is there, which binds the King suo jure cedere, and enables the people to preserve their rights, nay to challenge his? And if they have not, but the interests of King and people be either altogether one and the same, or so inseparably united, as they cannot be seve∣red, then it equally follows, the people ought not to account that a profit or strength to them, which is a losse and wasting to the King, nor ought they to think that perisht to them, which is gained to him.

Regall dignity was erected to preserve the commo∣nalty.] It was so; for out of the sense of those mi∣series, which the want of due administration of justice produced, routs became societies, and pla∣ced a head over them, to whom they paid the tri∣bute of reverence, for the benefit of Protection.

But that which is the end is farre more honourable, and valuable in nature, and policy, then that which is the meanes.] The conclusion implied is, therefore the Commons more honourable then the Sove∣raign. J will frame some other arguments upon the same principle, & see how he approves them. Angels are ministring spirits for the good of men, but the end more honourable, and valuable then the meanes, therefore men more honourable then Angels. Once more in a closer paralel; Christ is made the head of the Church for the salvation of man, but that which is the end is far more honourable, and valuable &c then that which is the meanes; there∣fore man far more honourable and valuable then Christ. If any should think these instances doe not fully conclude, because the highest end of Angels ministration, and the obedience of Christ, is the glory of God, he must consider, Gods glory is the supream end of government also. And therefore this being common to both, cannot difference

the case. Though we grant, the good of the peo∣ple is more valuable, he cannot hence infer a grea∣ter worthinesse, or more power to be in them: though the safety of patients is most to be regar∣ded, yet the Physitian is much better qualified to effect that end. Marriage was ordained for the lawfull procreation of children, that is honoura∣ble amongst all men, we doe not read, this is so. The rule doth hold in such meanes, as are only va∣luable by that relation they beare unto their ends, and have no proper goodnes of their owne. But a King is not so to his people; if we looke back un∣to his first extraction, when he was taken from among the people to be set over them, we must needs behold him even then as a man of some worth, honour and eminency, which the superad∣dition of Royalty did not destroy, but encrease. To be a meanes of his peoples preservation, is ve∣ry consistent with the height of honour. The case is not unlike in the noblest professors, the Divine, the Lawyer, the Physition, compared to their se∣verall charges; they the meanes, these the ends: shall we from thence conclude the poore client a better man, then his learned counsell, or the sim∣ple patient, then his Doctor.

This directs as to the transcendent 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of all po∣litiques,

to the Paramount law that shall give law to all humane lawes whatsoever, and that is Salus popu∣li.] How many nations hath this abused princi∣ple brought to ruine and confusion! It is unquest∣ionable, in the constitution of all Governments, this is the prime end, as being most agreeable with the joynt interest both of rulers and people. It is as much without doubt, that after estates esta∣blished, the governours proportion all their lawes to this end; for who that is wise will not provide for their safety, as well as he can, in whose de∣struction, his own is involv'd. notwithstanding this, the multitude (not comprehending the rea∣son which made all people commit themselves, their lives, and fortunes to the trust of their rulers, who were wiser, and therefore could better fore∣see dangers, and had the greatest share in the pre∣sent state, and therefore would more carefully en∣deavour to prevent them) readily hearken to craf∣ty men, who seeme to pitty their sufferings, and tell them they are not so well governed as they might be. Thus Absalon stole away the hearts of his Fathers Subjects. O that I were made judge in the land, that every man which hath any suit or cause, might come unto me, and I would doe him justice. There is little good to be expected

from those, who will doe wrong, that they may have opportunity to do right. Such men have great advantage on weake understandings, because there is no state wherein it might not be wished that somethings were amended, and they presse upon them present inconveniences, and frame some new form, wherein they promise them, they shall be free from all, and therefore desire their assistance in bringing this happy change a∣bout. The people full of great hopes cry up these men as the only fit instruments of state, who pre∣tend only to take care for the publique, and though they have nothing, yet would be thought, not to desire any thing. Having thus gained the affecti∣ons of the people, their next worke is to pick a quarrell with great officers (they conceave be∣cause they accuse so zealously, it will be presumed they are innocent themselves) that by displacing them, they may make roome for themselves. If such men will not easily out of their preferments, the people are acquainted, these are the only rubs, which stand betwixt them and an happy govern∣ment; these are the close enemies to the State (and so much the more dangerous, because they carry their malignant designes so secretly, they cannot find proofes against them) Salus populi is now

concerned, the whole Kingdome is in danger; no way to scape this imminent perill, but by tearing these men from the Prince, if in a Monarchy, or putting them out of the Senate, if in an Aristocracy. Amongst these distractions, and unsettlement of Government, what course is to be taken? The best way I know, (but 'tis difficult) is to make the people wise, and make it appeare, there is no reall danger, except from their tumultuous endea∣vours to avoyd those which are imaginary. Let them rely upon their governours, who have most to loose: (especially if they have given them great & late signes of their affection to & care of them) this is the most probable way of safety; but if they should miscarry (which they can have no reason to suspect) they will perish with a great deale of discretion.

It seemes unnaturall to me, that any nation should be bound to contribute its owne inherent puissance, meerely to abet Tyranny, and support slavery.] The inconveniences of Tyranny conclude nothing a∣gainst just monarchs, we are acquainted only with those happy names of King and Subject. It is so farre from being unnaturall that any nation should be bound (by which I suppose he meaneth consent, from which an obligation naturally fol∣lowes,

for it is, as with him in the Comoedy, vo∣luntate coactus sum meâ) to contribute it's power to that end, that some have made it their choice, others their refuge. Seneca tells us, speaking of the state of Rome in Iulius and Augustus his times, Salva esse Roma non poterat, nisi beneficio servitutis. How is it against nature for the Turkes to be obe∣dient to the grand Seigneur, or the French Pesant to his Prince? There may be reasonable motives why a people should consent to slavery; as if in danger of a potent enemy, they could hire none on gentler conditions to undertake their defence, or if reduced to extream want, they had not wherewith to sustain themselves, they may very probably, like Esau, passe away their birthright, li∣berty. We finde an example of each case in holy Scripture. The Egyptians parted with all their mony, and cattle, and past away the right to their lands, and became servants to Pharaoh, upon this condition that Joseph would afford them bread. And the Gibeonites bought their lives of the chil∣dren of Israel with the price of their liberty, and thought they had a cheap purchase.

From the word trust used by his Majesty, he gathers, the King does admit his interest in the crown in part conditionate. No ground for this collection:

for there may be a trust, and that is so much the greater, if free from condition. But the thing is true de facto in some sense, and his Majestie hath alwaies acknowledged, He is bound to maintain the rights and liberty of the subject. Yet we must not so understand it, as if the right to His King∣dome were so conditionate that it were capable of forfeiture upon a not exact performance of co∣venant.

As for the word elegerit, whether it be future or past, it skills not much.] If he take notice of the con∣clusion deduced thence he may find as much dif∣ference between the Tenses, as between Demo∣cracy, & Monarchy. But the consuetudines, which cannot refer to the future, undeniably evinces, it was meant of the time past, and the oath in eng∣lish is free from all ambiguity, rendring consuetu∣dines quas vulgus elegerit, by rightfull customes which the commonalty of this your Kingdome have. I may adde the different manner of the Kings answer as it is set down in their Remon∣strance. Where to other questions which respect the future, the King answers in the future; in this as referring to what is past, He answers per verba de praesenti, concedo & permitto.

The King is bound to consent to new lawes, if they

be necessary, as well as defend the old.] His Majestie never thought otherwise; but He is not bound to an implicite faith, to believe all necessary, which is pretended to be so.

The word elegerit, if it be in the preterperfecttense, yet shewes, that the peoples election had been the ground of ancient lawes and customes, and why the peo∣ples election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever J cannot discover.] The ele∣ction there spoken of is the election of the diffu∣sive, not of any representative body, and that with the tacite consent of the Prince, and so of much o∣ther authority, and for the representative, their an∣cient right is not denyed, no law shall be abroga∣ted, none enacted without their assent. But there is a mean between doing nothing, and all.

The result of all is, our Kings cannot be said to have so unconditionate and high a propriety in all the sub∣jects lives, liberties, and possessions, or in any thing else to the crown appertaining, as subjects have in the Kings dignity.] The King pretends not to have a∣ny unconditionate proprietie in the subjects lives liberties, and possessions, he would onely be al∣lowd it in his own? And what he can mean, by subjects having an unconditionate and high pro∣priety in the Kings dignity, surpasses my under∣standing.

It may seem to speak this wicked do∣ctrine, that subjects may dispose of the Soveraign∣ty as they please; for this right an absolute propri∣ety gives.

If the King had such high right as subjects, it were not lawfull or naturall for him to expose his life and fortune for his country.] How is it lawfull for sub∣jects then to doe so? The people have as great, nay greater obligation of exposing their lives for the King. This appeares by the Protestation, as also by the ancient oath of fealty at the Coronation, Je deviene vostre Liege de vie, & de biens, &c. Sir Hen Spelman gives us a form of sacramentum ligi∣antiae still in use. Tu I. S. jurabis quòd ab ista die in antea, eris sidelis & legalis (leaux) domino nostro Regi, & suis haeredibus: & fidelitatem & legalitatem (Leaultie) ei portabis de vita & de membro, & de ter∣reno honore, & quòd tu eorum malum aut damnum nec noveris, nec audiveris quod non defendes (i.e. prohibebis) pro posse tuo, ita Deus te adjuvet.

I cannot imagine any possible colour for such an inference; I would sooner make a rope of sand hang together. may not a tyrant expose his life in defence of his slave, without breach of any law? He doth but defend his owne goods, for the Scri∣pture calls his slave his money. His owne instance

confutes him, bonus pastor ponit vitam pro ovibus suis; for it is evident, this good pastor, was our Saviour, absolute Lord of his flock.

Parliaments have the same efficient cause as Mo∣narchyes, if not higher.] What, higher then the law of God and of the whole land? yes, for in truth the whole Kingdome is not so properly the author as the essence itselfe of Parliaments.] just as a Proctour is the essence of him for whom he appeares, or an Ambassador is essentially the King: But suppose it true; this declares the materiall cause, proves no greater dignity in the efficient. But the reason is to come, by the former rule (he had no good for∣tune with that before) 'tis magis tale, because we see ipsum quid quod efficit tale.] what, magis tale in essences? or can a thing be magis tale then it selfe? This I conceave is beyond the sense of the house. However this confession and the rule quod efficit tale est magis tale subjects the Parliament to the people, as well as the same rule would doe the King; and proves as well that the Parliament is vniversis minus though it be singulis majus.

Parliaments have also the same finall cause as Mo∣narchyes, if not greater.] what, greater then salus populi, nay then to promote the Subject to all kind of Politicall happines, which he told us, was the end

and duty of a King? His reason is, publique safety and liberty could not be so effectually provided for by Monarchs till Parliaments were constituted. This proves not the end higher, but shewes they are good helpes in government, which is readily granted.

Two things especially are aimed at in Parliaments, not to be attained to by other meanes.] Not so easily attained indeed; but certainly many Kingdomes have enjoyed a most high degree of civill happi∣nes under arbitrary Monarchs, who knew no Parliaments. Such as have abundantly satisfied [the inter est of the people;] & in all weighty affaires [advised with the ablest counsellors.] Two other ends might have been named as essentiall as those; which are to supply his Majesties wants by sub∣sidies, and assent to the abrogation of old lawes, and enacting new, as necessity shall require.

In the summons of Edw. 1. (claus. 7. m. 3. dors.) we see the first end of Parliaments expressed: for he in∣serts in the writ, that whatsoever affaire is of publique concernement, ought to receive publique approbation, Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbari debet, or tractari.] I have not the convenience of exami∣ning this record, and therefore cannot be able to satisfie my selfe in circumstances, which perhaps

might afford some light to the cleerer understand∣ing of this rule. For the present therefore, I will allow it to be certaine law (though he would not be willing I should have the same liberty, and argue the legality of a thing, from a Princes bare affirmation) and see what advantage he can make of it. It seems to me to be deduced from an evi∣dent principle of reason, and to flow hence; it is against equity, that the act of one, should preju∣dice another without his consent. There is much caution required to the managing this rule. For if it be understood in its full latitude, without all limitation, it will dissolve the bonds of Govern∣ment, by reducing us to that primitive state, wherein every one had absolute right, to dispole of his owne as he pleased. Therefore we must take into consideration, that multitudes finding a necessity of Government, did restraine this na∣tive right by positive Constitutions, so that in the best governed States, the greater part of men were presumed by a fiction of law, to handle and ap∣prove such things as they never heard of. The ground of which fiction is very reasonable; for the people though they are not advised with, may well be said to consent to what their rulers doe, because they have entrusted them with their

safety, which without this power convaied into such or such hands, could not be so effectually provided for. Thus in absolute Monarchies, what Princes doe is legally the act of all: thus in our Kingdom two hundred thousand debate and approve things by the suffrages of two; who many times vote quite contrary to their de∣sires who have entrusted them, and yet the people shall be said in law to affirme, what really and in truth they doe deny. The result of all is this: those things which the law doth re∣quire shall be transacted only by Parliament, the people doe handle & approve of by their Knights or Burgesses: in those things which the Law hath entrusted the King with (many of which concerne the good of the whole) what he does, is their act. Hence it may appear, the Kings Writ by which he calls the Houses together to consult de quibusdam arduis & urgentibus negotiis, is no waies opposite to this supposed Law, understood with due limitations. The desire of the Com∣mons in the Raigne of Edw. 3. seems to mee fully to justify the same, which was, that they might not advise in things de queux ils n'ont pas cogni∣zance. The matters in debate were of no small concernment, being no lesse then the setling inte∣stine

commotions, guarding the marches of Scot∣land, and the Seas. But the answer is, herein they renounce not their right of consent, they only excuse themselves in point of counsell, referring it rather to the King and his Councell. Here then we have the judgement of the House of Commons that in af∣faires of some nature, and those too very much concerning the safety of the whole Kingdome, there may be fitter Counsellors then they are. I had conceived, n' avoir pas cognizance, had not sig∣nified to be ignorant, or not to understand things so thoroughly; since cognisance uses to be taken in a Law-notion, and to signifie a right of handling matters judicially, or power and jurisdiction, as cognisance of Plea. We meet with a very observ∣able passage, and which will give us great light in this buisines; it is to be seen in a diary (MS.) of the Parliament held, 1. Hen. 4. Et le lundy ensui∣vant S. lendemayn des almes, les communes priont qu'eux ne soyiant pas entrez en les rolles de Parlement come parties as juggementez quex sount donez acest Parlement mes la ou ils sount in rei veritate partie et prive a cella quar lez juggementz appartient solement au Roy fos{que} la ou ascun juggement est renduz sur vn estatute feat par le comune prositz de Royalme.

Le quel fuist grante.

In English thus.

And the munday following, scil: the morrow after all Soules-day, the Commons prayed that they might not be entred upon the Roles of the Parliament, as parties to any judgements given this Parliament, save only where in rei veritate they are part and privy thereto. For that the judgements appertaine only to the King, except where any judgement is given vpon a Statute made for the common profit of the Kingdome.

The which was granted.

How this shall derogate from Parliaments either in point of consent, or counsell, I doe not know, for at last they did give both, and the King would not be satisfied without them, and the passage evinces no more but this, that that King was very wise and warlike, and had a very wise Counsell of Warr, so that in those particulars the Commons thought them most fit to be consulted, as perhaps the more knowing men.] The conclusion which more naturally followes is this; when the King requires and will not otherwise be satisfied, they may advise in matters not properly of their cognisance.

The conclusion by which he thinkes he hath gained so much, may without any inconvenience be assented to. These words, ad tract andum, or dinan∣dum, saciendum, doe fully prove, that the people in those

dayes were s••mmoned ad consensum, as well as ad con∣silium.] Be it so, in those things which belong to their cognisance. The formes which are used in passing a bill confesse so much: les Communes ont assentés, and les Seignevrs out assenás.

I have not yee done with his rule, Quod omnes tangit, ah omnibus approbari debet.] It is true the most popular state could never punctually observe it. For some of the poorer, & some of the young∣er sort, and women generally, by reason of their sex are excluded, yet all those, having lives to loose, are concerned in the publique safety. But with what equity can he then thinke a considerable party of this Kingdome, can be denyed the benefit of that, which he conceives a most reasonable law? I meane the Clergy, who certainly cannot deserve to forfeit the priviledge of common men, because they are more immediately the servants of God.

His next endeavour is to shew that Parliaments have been much lessened, and injuried of late by some passages in his Majesties answers. But he can never make it appeare, that any part of their truly ancient power is denyed to them. The Kings words are, what the extent of their Commission, and Trust is, nothing can better teach them, then

the writ whereby they are met. We called them (and without that call they could not have come together) to be our Counsellors, not Comman∣ders; for however they frequently confound them, the offices are severall.

The writ runs, super dictis negotijs tractaturi, vestrum{que} consilium impensuri; so that the cleare meaning is, their advise is not Law, except the Royall assent establish it into an act.

'Tis alleadged, he calls them Counsellors not in all things, but in quibusdam arduis, &c. and the case of Wentworth is cited, who being a member of the House of Commons, was committed by Q. Eliz. but for proposing, they might advise the Queen in a matter Shee thought they had nothing to doe to meddle with. He answers, a meere ex∣ample (though of Q. Elizabeth) is no law.] It is true, a bare example shewes only what was, not what ought to be; but when grounded on authority, and no way excepted against, by those, who have alwayes been earnest defenders of their Priviled∣ges, it may be reckoned amongst sound Presi∣dents: what he adds, that some of Her actions were retracted, is a confirmation of this; for this being out of the number, it seems it was accompted le∣gall. Exceptio firmat regulam, in non exceptis. Yet

neither did the King so quote this president as to build a right upon it.

He alleadges, the King denyes the Assembly of the Lords and Commons, when he withdrawes himselfe to be rightly named a Parliament, or to have any power of any court, and consequently to be any thing, but a meere convention of so many private men.] This is falsly imposed on His Majesty; His Answers and Messages speak the contrary, which are directed to both Houses of Parliament. Besides He hath passed some bills since his withdrawing. All that He affirms is that the sole power of making or re∣pealing lawes, and altering any thing established is not in them, but if He upon mature deliberation shal preferr the present government to the proposed change, then their order is not to have the force of law, and oblige the Kingdom.

The King is said to assert, that because the law hath trusted him with a prerogative to discontinue Parliaments, therefore if He do discontinue Parlia∣ments, to the danger or prejudice of the Kingdome, this is no breach of that trust, because in formality of law, the people may not assemble in Parliament but by His writ.] This is grosse forgery: if it appeare to him necessary or expedient for the Kingdom, He acknowledges He is obliged by that trust reposed

in him to issue out his writs. And to this end He gratiously signed the bill for a trienniall Parliament; which like Physick well timed, may preserve the body of this state in health and strength, by not sufferring ill humors to grow to any head.

Another assertion of the Kings he saies is, if the Parliament make any transition in other matters, then what he pleases to propose, they are lyable to im∣prisonment at his pleasure. All this he collects from the citation of Wentworths case. The sence of his inference is this; because they cannot justify the medling with things which belong not to their cognisance, therefore they may be punisht, if they medle with those that do. We may observe an affected mistake in this author, of which he makes frequent use; and this animadversion though once laid down, may often be applyed. Whatsoever the Houses do, he calls that, the Act of the people. Whereas the truth is, they represent them only to some purposes, and ends. So that if they ex∣ceed their commission, and vote things not be∣longing to their cognisance, the People by no meanes is engaged in it, as having no legall way of expressing themselves in such cases.

His Majesty clearly to prove, that the trust committed to both Houses, cannot bind Him to

assent, to what ever they propose, seem it of never so dangerous consequence to the Kingdom; nor absolve Him in point of conscience, if His rea∣son tell Him, His people will extreamly suffer vn∣der the grant, argues thus. It is impossible that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to Us, and Our heires for ever, and the same trust, and a power above that trust, (for such is the po∣wer they pretend) be committed to others: did not the people, that sent them look upon them, as a body but temporary, and dissoluble at Our plea∣sure? and can it be beleived, that they intend∣ed them for Our Guardians and comptrollers in the managing of that trust, which God and the law hath granted to Us and Our posterity for e∣ver?

Strange it is, that affection should so blinde the understanding, and worke mens beliefe not ac∣cording to reason but desire! I must needs think the let lies only in his will, else he could never sa∣tisfy himselfe with such weak answers. It is true, faith he, two supreames cannot be in the same sence and respect.] If he had not hoped to hide himselfe in generalls, he would have descended to particulars, and told us, in what sence, what respect, and what matters the King was supream, in what the

two Houses. But an application would have discovered the truth, even to weak understan∣dings.

Nothing is more knowne, or assented to, then this, that the King is singulis major, and yet universis minor.] I have already evidenced the contrary; yet I will speak something to it here. By universis he must mean the representative all, which there∣fore he concludes to be above, and have greater power then the King, that is such a power as He is bound to obey. So it seems the King hath ta∣ken the oath of allegiance as well as we, and we may call Him, our fellow subject. Yet the oath of Supremacy he tells us, is no waies endangered.] The sense of his reason is, because he is a better man then any one of us, take us single. He tels us He is better then any one, He does not tell us, He is better then two; if the Kings supreamacy be no more but this, it is no more then possibly He might have and probably had before He was King. It is not the Prince singulis major? nay may not any Lord in the Land challenge the same supreamacy over all the Knights, any Knight o∣ver all esquiers to be singulis major, though uni∣versis minor? But perhaps some othes limitation may be found out; the meaning shortly shall be,

that he is above the Pope in these his dominions, not but that He is under His subjects. to take of these and all other corrupt glosses, I shall refer him to cap. 12. vices, 4^o. Hen 8. In the preface of which statute the Kings supreamacy (not over single per∣sōs) but the body Politique is clearly delivered. The words are these; Where by divers, sundry, old, authen∣tick histories & chronicles, it is manifestly declared & expressed, that this Realm of England is an Empire and so hath been accepted in the world, governed by one Su∣pream head and King, having the dignity and Royall estate of the Imperiall Crown of the same: unto whom a Body Politique, compact of all sorts and de∣grees of people, divided in tearmes, and by names of spiritualty and temporalty, been bounden and owen to beare next to God, a naturall and humble obedience.

If there were no King at all in England, you would call this government an Aristocracy; and why I beseech you do you not confesse that name now, seeing the thing is altogether the same? for if they give his voice, tis all one, as if he had no voice, if their power must over-rule his, tis all one, as if he were devested of all, nay, why is it thought fit to send to him and sollicite his consent, when it is legally past in that the two houses have voted it? why to all publique bills do they require this con∣firmation,

Le Roy Le voet? (is it only for the same reason that Bellarmine gives why the Pope being alone infallible, calls generall councells, ut res suavius transigatur?) suppose he should re∣turne in answer, that of SENECA, Si vultis scire an velim, efficite ut possim nolle. Thus though he plead for a new government, he is ashamed to own it by the right name. For he tells us, not without some indignation at the very thought of such an innovation. This new Aristocraticall fa∣brique cannot seem to any impartiall man, but as emp∣ty a shadow, as airy a dream as ever mans fancy abu∣sed it selfe withall. I dare say he cannot meet in all histories, and records (except of such Parlia∣ments as have depos'd Kings, which he confess∣eth no free one ever did) with one example of this nature, that the two Houses should pretend to a power, which must of necessity over-rule the King. Indeed a reasonable man cannot imagine, any president possible, because, since the law hath given the King a power, by dissolving the Parliament, to take away that power (as is pre∣tended) greater then his own, if they had ever made claim to superiority over him, he would quickly have put an end to that dispute. Before this power be challenged, it would befit, to vote

down, that clause in a law made 2. Hen. ••. cited by His Majesty, that it is of the Kings regality to grant or deny such of their Petitions, as pleaseth him∣selfe.

Yet notwithstanding this, he must be UNIVER∣SIS MINOR, for this wee see in all conditionate Princes, such as the Prince of Orange &c. I never knew he had Regall power before. This in∣stance abundantly manifests his designe, though he is pleased to say, he speakes nothing in favour of any alteration, but is as zealously addicted to Monar∣chy, as any man can, without dotage.]

To the most absolute Empire in the world, this condi∣tion is most naturall and necessary, that the safety of the people is to be valued above any right of his.] It is against common sense to suppose a King that is in his wits, (me thinkes all good people should take to heart those desperate conclusions, which are built upon most unreasonable and most unwor∣thy suppositions of a King that is mad, or a child; since never subjects had greater obligation to be thankfull to Allmighty God for giving them a Prince as eminently able, as vertuous) who will not provide for the safety of His people, nay who will not part with some of His right, rather then they should perish, because in their destruction

He looses all. Yet this does not prove a King should part with His rights, as often, as they will pretend to be in danger. If this were once admit∣ted, what wild plots would be invented, what strange intelligence would be received from in∣visible spyes? and as often as crafty men were am∣bitious or covetous, so often the filly people were to be frighted.

Since all naturall power is in those which obey, they which contract to obey to their owne ruine, or having so contracted, they which esteeme such a contract before their owne preservation, are felonious to themselves and rebellious to nature.]

He cannot mean any people contracting to their own certain ruine; there never was govern∣ment, guilty of this madnes: therefore He must understand a contract to a possible ruine; for ex∣ample, an agreement patiently to submit them∣selves to the ordinary tryall of Law, and to suffer, if it should so fall out, though under an undeser∣ved sentence. In this case, he that does not make resistance, and prefer his preservation to his con∣tract, is pronounced felo dese, and a rebell to na∣ture. Unhappy thiefe, who for felony is condem∣ned to be hang'd, and will be guilty of another felony in being hanged! what way is left unto

innocency? He must kill as many as he can in His own defence, so shall He escape, or dye in the quarrell; either way He hath done right to nature. Let us put another case; an innocent man by the ordinary course of justice is adjudged to dye, upon the testimony of two bearing false witnes: he was free from fault before; now he is in some dan∣ger, except he refuse to be punisht, he becomes guilty, no lesse then a selfe murderer. I wonder what opinion this man hath of Martyrs, who va∣lew not their owne preservation; can he think by submitting themselves to one fire, they deserve to be cast into another? nay, what of Christ him∣selfe? who certainly suffered most injuriously, & though he had strength enough to preserve him∣selfe, and could have been assisted by an Army of Angells, yet he was obedient to death. I cannot imagine from what principle he should draw such a conclusion, unlesse it be from this, (whence indeed most of his book will naturally flow,) that there is no such thing as justice, but suprema lex, the paramount law, is profit; and the faults of men consist, in the not violation of contracts, in the not breaking promises, if they be for their dis∣advantage: for it were a sinne against native liber∣ty to make our selves the slaves of justice.

If we examine the ground of this doctrine most destructive of all commerce, all govern∣ment, we shall discover it to be no other but this, that the law of nature doth allow a man to defend himselfe, and provide for his owne preservation. But the observer takes no notice, that it is in our power to part with this right, & yet doe nothing contrary to nature, if reason tell us, we shall there∣by obtaine a more excellent good, the benefit of peace and society; nay, that this restraining Our selves by compact of that naturall liberty to de∣fend our selves, will conduce more, to that end, for which it was given us, our preservation and safety. Because in probability, we shall be in lesse danger, living amongst men who have agreed to be governed by certaine lawes, then if every one followed his owne inclination. Where one suf∣fers hereby wrongfully, thousands enjoy the be∣nefit of being protected from wrong. And there∣fore though it should happen to me in particular, to be condemned by the magistrate without cause, I am bound to suffer patiently, because having made such a bargain, which might have been pro∣fitable, I have no right to recall it, when it appears disadvantageous. I owe, that I have been safe thus long to the benefit of this covenant, & there∣fore

am bound in justice to share the inconvenien∣ces. If reason will not satisfie, perhaps Christianity may. Qui resistunt potestati, ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt. To resist the magistrate, damnable. The powers here spoken of, were heathen, yet Christ commanded his, to be subject even to them. That answer (with which too many are deceived) cannot excuse disobedience, and Rebellion; This precept obliges private men, but not magistrates. Since inferiour magistrates being opposed to the supreame power are but as private men, and in this respect the reason of obedience is common to both. Neither is this a hard law, if duly consi∣dered. If we suffer justly, we have no reason to complain: if undeservedly, we are punished, but not hurt. The magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum, because God will abundantly reward us for our patient suffering in obedience to his com∣mand. But this is against nature.] He must mean nature guided by right reason; and doth that di∣ctate, that rather then part with a temporall life, we ought to forfeit an eternall?

It is objected that a temporary power, ought not to be greater, then that which is lasting and vnalterable.] He does not frame the Kings argument aright; which concludes on this ground, that it is not pro∣bable

the lawes should place a power greater then his in such a body, and yet leave it to his disposall, when to call that body together, when to dissolve it; that is, to determine, when and how long he would be over-ruled, & when be King again. His Majesty presses it farther (which he dissembles.) This trust being irrevocably committed to Him and His heires for ever, it cannot be conceived, how it should sleep, during the sitting of the Houses.

But if this were so, the Romans had done unpoli∣tiquely, in creating Dictators, when any great extre∣mity assailed them and yet we know it was very prospe∣rous to them, sometimes to change the form of govern∣ment.] Hence we may conclude it good policy, in imminent danger, to trust to a Monarchy, not an Aristocracy, and much lesse to a democracy. The Romans successe cannot be imputed meere∣ly to their change, but to this, that they altered their form from worse to better, (as to their pre∣sent ends) but that will not justifie his desire of in∣novation from better to worse.

It is further objected, He sayes, if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more then counsel∣lors, we make them Comptrollers, and this is not suitable to Royalty. He answers, we say here, that

to consent is more then to counsell, and yet not alwayes so much, as to command and comptroll.] True, not al∣wayes; but then it is, when their consent shall im∣pose a necessity upon the King of doing the like. He hath not laid down his Majesties words faith∣fully. The point He stands on is, that their advise, is not His law, neither is He bound to captivate His reason, or submit His conscience to their Votes.

Yes, it must be so; because in inferiour Courts, the Judges are so counsellors for the King, as that the King may not countermand their judgements, and yet it were a harsh thing to say, that they are therefore Guardians and Comptrollers of the King; therefore it holds in Parliaments a fortiori.]

The reason why the King cannot countermand their judgement, is because they sustain His per∣son, and His consent is by law involv'd in what by law they do, and there would be no end, if He should undoe what He hath done. Authoritas rei judicatae vim legis habet; there can be no appeal from himselfe to himselfe. He therefore makes the Judges take an oath, they will deny to no man common right by His letters, because He is not to passe sentence in private, but in publique and in a Judiciall way. That it is his owne act, appears

from this, that He delegates his power to them, and this is a known rule, Quod Rex facit per offi∣ciarios, per se facere videtur. The truth is Kings have a right, and heretofore they made use of it, to sit in judicature personally. Camden tells us, that Bancus Regius ita dictus erat, quòd Rex ipse in eo praesidere solebat. Sir Tho: Smith too in his des∣cription of England, Subsellia Regia (vulgo Bancus Regius) ex eo sortita sunt appellationem, quia ibi ipsi Angliae Regessedere consueverunt. This Court was called the Kings Bench, because the King sate as judge in it in His proper person. It removed with the King, as is to be seen 9. Hen. 3. cap. 11. by which the Court of common Pleas is fixed. Common pleas shall not follow our court, but shall be holden in some cer∣tain place.

Moreover the Judges swear, they will not assent to any thing which may turne the King in damage, or disherison, by any manner, way, or colour. 18. Edw: 3. when he can make these things agree to the two Houses, he shall conclude from the Iudges sen∣tence to their votes. But since it will clearly ap∣peare, that they are not the mouth of the King, the Lords sitting in a personall capacity, and the House of Commons as representing the body of the Kingdom (though not that to all intents and

purposes) the inference must by no means be gran∣ted. I shall adde this to make the answer more clear, and to avoid mistake: in matters of Law, there lyes an appeal to them, a writ of errour be∣ing brought, as to the highest Court; not so in matters of state. Because whilst they passe sen∣tence according to known lawes, the state is no way indangered thereby, but if they challenge to themselves a liberty of passing sentence according to reason of state, they may when they please over∣throw our lawes. The Counties which intrusted them looke upon them as Judges, not Politicians.

But we ought not to conceive, that they well either Councell, or consent to any thing, but what is pub∣liquely advantagious.

When the King conceives they do not other∣wise, He will most willingly follow their ad∣vise. This fallacy (though extreamly weak) hath influenced on all his book. He takes the two Houses in such a Notion as not failing of their duty, but doing every thing as they ought, and supposeth the King to be wanting to that trust which is committed to him.

By such Councell and consent we cannot imagine the King limited or lessened.]

Such a Consent, in which his is necessarily in∣volv'd,

renders his Power not so properly lesse as none at all, it doth not limit, but take it away. Pray put the Case, a thousand pounds is left to Titius and Sempronius, to be bestowed upon joynt consent, Sempronius being just and reasonable grants to Titius the right of a Negative, so that without he will concurre, he confesses he can doe nothing, (The King doth not pretend to have po∣wer of repealing old or constituting new Lawes without them) Titius not content with this Nega∣gative, affirmes Sempronius is bound to consent to what ever he thinks fit; if so, is not this money wholely at Titius his disposall? Can any one be so stupid as to tell Sempronius notwithstanding this, He hath a full power? How did ship-money de∣stroy our propriety, but by this very consequence? Law and Reason informe us, that Ejus est velle qui potest nolle. Hence Tryphonius determines that a Captive cannot consent to his sonnes Marriage. Why? Cum uti{que} nec dissentire posset. And Aristotle, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

It is alledged in derogation of Parliaments: that whatsoever the right of Parliaments is, to assemble or treate in all cases of a publicke nature, yet without the Kings concurrence and consent, they are livelesse con∣ventions without all vertue and power, the very name

of Parliaments is not due to them.

If this Man had a mind to deale candidly, he would deliver the Kings sense truly, and let Him speak His own words. The summe of which is onely this, the two Houses have not power of making lawes and altering the established gover∣ment without Him.

But this Allegation at one blow confounds all Par∣liaments, and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will, as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under.] Very tragically expressed and with high confidence, but not any colour of rea∣son. For are we not left in the same state in which we were? His Majesties denying to bring in a new government, doth not take away the old. If He thinke it not convenient to alter that forme which the least deceitfull Argument, long experi∣ence under so many of His glorious Ancestors hath proved happy, can any who is not in love with error inferre hence, this subjects us to a lawlesse and most unbounded regiment?

Vpon the same reason by the Kings desertion other Courts must needs be vertuelesse and void.] It were a strange consequence to conclude that, because that may be done without the King, to which His consent by law is not required, therefore that

may be done without him, to which his consent is by law necessary.

Many Kings have dissented from Bills, yet the people were never so mad, as to feare a desertion of all Courts. It is against common sense to fancy that He which enjoyes all by the benefit of Laws, should hinder the due administration of Justice according to those Lawes, so willfully endanger, not onely his rights, but safety, by putting His Kingdome into tumults and combustion. Every wise man may have as strong security, he shall not suffer from the (onely not impossible) execu∣tion of such a power, because it is so manifestly destructive of the Kings own interest (and made evident to be so as well by experience as by rea∣son) as any man can have reason, not to be afraid of himselfe, because he hath a full power over himselfe and may destroy himselfe, when he pleases.

The intent of the King is, that the great Assembly of the Lords and Commons doe not represent and ap∣peare in the Right of the whole Kingdome, or else that there is no honour nor power, nor Iudicature residering in that great Majesticall Body, then which scarce any thing can be more unnaturall.

A most impudent collection, the meaning in

breife is onely this, when the particular consents of three are necessary, it's not in the power of any two, to effect whatsoever they please. A most pru∣dent establishment in favour of present govern∣ment: that we may have no innovation without the mutuall agreement of King and people.

It is attempted to divide further between part and part in Parliament. Who these attempters are, I en∣quire not. I suppose he meanes those who devided the Lords into good and bad, the Members of the House of Commons, into well, and ill affected.

So making the major part not fully concluding. They are not denyed to conclude as far as the power of that House extendeth, but this cannot reach to an absolute and finall decision.

It is a wonderfull thing that the King's papers be∣ing fraited scarce with any thing else but such doctrines of division, ('tis more wonderfull that in a well go∣verned state such disrespectfull language of Prin∣ces from private pennes should passe unregarded, unpunished) tending all to the subversion of our an∣cient fundamentall constitutions, which support all our ancient liberties, and to the erection of Arbitrary rule, should find such applause in the world.]

There is a vast difference between declaring what divisions are, and causing them to be; to

shew, is not to teach division. But it is beyond admiration, if the King's aimes are such, as He would have the world beleeve, that they should find such applause. Especially if we consider the persons from whom; men that have much more to loose, then some who may ayme at getting greater fortunes, by pretending they are in danger to loose what they have: Men that are knowen not to value their lives equall to their liberties; men of as great wisdome, as honesty, neither of which would permit them to be active to make themselves miserable, and pull upon their posteri∣ty and Countrey perpetuall slavery. What impu∣dence of malice is it, to accuse the King to intend that, when the world sees how much He hath suffered meerly to prevent it? Could our Ancestors ever have beleeved there should come a King, who would plead for Magna Charta, who would hazard His Crown in defence of the subjects Li∣berty, and desire nothing more, then the utter abo∣lition of all Arbitrary rule?

If the King have parted from his Parliament meerely because they sought His oppression, & He had no other means to withstand their tyrany, Let this proclaim them a voyd assembly.

His Majesty never layd such charge to the Par∣liament,

yet it is most evident there was too great reason elsewhere to justifie His feares; when not∣withstanding His deepest Protestations to main∣taine the true established Religion, they still im∣puted to Him inclining to Popery; when not∣withstanding His utmost endeavours to suppresse that unhappy Rebellion in Ireland, and after the Houses had taken that worke into their care, His frequent pressing them to send over sufficient sup∣plyes, and not to spend their time in businesses of little moment, whilst their poore Brethren were dayly butcherd, yet the people were made beleeve He was a favourer of their bloody designes; when the baser sort of the people were permitted to come even to the Parliament, in Clamarous, and unwarrantable multitudes, and there was a kind of discipline in disorder, tumults being rea∣dy at command, upon a watch-word given; when seditious Pamphlets hourely came out, and many Presses laboured day and night to abuse the King; when factious Preachers were incouraged, whilst they did cast publick obloquies on the Lawes which stood in full force, and which if they had been duly executed, would have justifi∣ed themselves, by restoring Us to our former Peace and happinesse, which We so long injoyed,

as We knew how to obey; when such seditious fellowes out of their Pulpits did dare to strike even at the highest, and with more boldnesse, be∣cause with lesse danger, as meaning to fight with other mens hands.

If the King could be more wisely or faithfully ad∣vised by any other Court, or if His single judgment were to be preferd before all advice whatsoever; it were not onely vaine but extreamly inconvenient that the whole Kingdome should be troubled to make elections, and that the parties elected should attend the publike businesse.

There are other Ends besides this for which they are called together, yet this is one main end, as appears by the Kings writ, and therefore He never refused to advise with them. The usuall (but not the onely) forme of the Kings Answers to such Bills as they were not willing to passe (which I beleeve was never objected to any Prince before to His Majesty) le Roy s' avisera, proves that after the advice of this His great Councell, He is yet at liberty to advise further with persons or occasions, as His owne wisdome shall think meet. But this Author will by no meanes take notice, that the use of Counsell, is to perswade, not to compell: as if a man in a busi∣nesse

of great concernment, might not very pru∣dently consult with many friends, and yet at last follow the advice perhaps of one, if it appeare more proportionable to the end he aymes at.

Not so, because the many eyes of so many choise Gentlemen out of all parts, see more then fewer.

This Argument, I beleeve will conclude too much, and therefore nothing at all. For the same reason which denyes a liberty of dissenting to the King, (that is such a number, who see more, be∣cause they are more) may deny it to the House of Pears, in comparison of the House of Commons, and to that House too, in comparison of the Peo∣ple, and so both King and Lords and Commons are voted out of Parliament. Besides experience shews this rule is not generally true, for I dare say if we ask almost any Parliament man, he will tell us, upon the reading of a Bill, sometimes one man in the House hath found more faults, and urged more just exceptions, then three hundred would have been able to espy. There have been Parlia∣ments wherein Acts have been made to remedy former mistakes. Nay, whole Parliaments have been repeal'd and declared Null by succeeding Parliaments, so 21. Rich. 2. cap. 12. does voyd and disanull all the Statutes made in a former Parlia∣ment

held 11. Rich. 2. so 1. Hen. 4. cap. 3. repeales this whole Parliament of 21. Rich. 2. So 39. Hen. 6. In a Statute made at Westminster We find a totall re∣peal of a Parliament held at Coventry the yeare be∣fore, as made against all good faith and conscience, &c: the Acts and Statutes laboured by the conspira∣cy, procurement and excitation of some ill disposed Persons for the introduction and accomplishment of their rancour and inordinate Covetise. So 49. Hen. 6. A Parliament held at Westminster is made Null, in regard diverse matters had there been treated and wrought by the laboured exhortation of Persons not fearing God, nor willing to be under the rule of any earthly Prince; but inclined of sensuall appetite to have the whole governance of the Realme under their owne power and domination. These are the testimo∣nies that one great Councell bestowes upon another.

I could urge the same Arguments, in the very same words, onely ••••anging a Lay-councell, into an Ecclesiasticall Councell, and upon equall ne∣cessity, require the King to assent to what ever they shall vote. I make no doubt, the Author will in this case give him leave to make his conscience his guide, and if he doe, he will think his Argu∣ments deserve no further answer.

The few private ends they can have to deprave them must needs render their counsells more faithfull, impartiall, and religious then any other.] Certainly they may have as many, as any other private Sub∣ject, and that this Kingdome hath seldome here∣tofore suffered under the prosecution of private interest is to be imputed to the excellent policy, which he endeavours to overthrow. They are strangely transported with the love of a popular state, who can so overrule their understandings as to force themselves to think the members of it may not be extreamly subject to ambition, which would easily prompt them to alter the good old wayes of bestowing Offices, and collating Ho∣nours; to covetousnesse, which would tempt them to draw the determination of causes out of the ordinary Courts of Iustice; to hatred, which would make them prosecute their enimies with bitter violence, and upon the least suspition of a fault, to punish them first by imprisonments, and to prove them guilty at leasure; to affection, which would make them shield their friends from be∣ing questioned, though their corruptions were notorious to all the world.

The Bishop of Durham his case speaks home to the businesse, we are told in the 3. c. of the 2.

Parliament held 1. Mar. how the Bishoprick of Durham was dissolved in a former Parliament, 7. Edw. 6. which was compassed, and brought to passe, by the sinister labour, great malice, and corrupt means of certain ambitious persons, then being in Authority, rather for to enrich themselves, and their friends with a great part of the possessions of the said Bishoprick, then upon just occasion, or Godly zeale. Let the world judge, whether this Age may not be subject to the same temptation, and whether a desire to share the means of the Church may not have as strong operations as formerly.

Nothing more common in the Roman story then the bribing of the Senate. This made Ju∣gurtha cry out (who by his guifts governed their Parliament) O Vrbem venalem & maturè peritu∣ram, si emptorem invenerit! Had it been our un∣happinesse to have lived in a popular state (ex∣cept they are altered from what Histories deliver them) we should have found injustice a trade, and that the most compendious way to wealth was to buy no land, but of the Judges. Tacitus gives us a full character of what we might well feare. When the government of Rome was chan∣ged into a Monarchy under Augustus, the Provin∣ces were very well contented Suspecto Senatûs

populi{que} imperio, obcertamen Potentium, & avariti∣am Magistratuum: invalido legum auxilio, quae vi, ambitu, postremò pecuniâ turbabantur.

They must evidently have more private ends then the King, who may be mislead upon wan∣tonnesse, but they must struggle with solid temp∣tations, desire of riches, desire of honours, there being an emptinesse in them, whereas He is full and satisfied. Si violandum est Jus, regni causâ vio∣landum est; the greatest motive that can be, a hope to share in Soveraignty, the Parliament to rule the King and they to rule the Parliament.

We have ever found enmity and antipathy betwixt the Court and the Country, but never any till now be∣twixt the representatives and the body of the Kingdom represented.] How betwixt them and those ma∣ny that intrusted them? are not they satisfied with their carriage? If this were never till now, it may seem to be upon some causes, which never were till now.

Except M^r Hollis his rich Widdow, I never heard that promotion came to any man by serving in Parlia∣ment.] What service commended M^r Hollis to the rich Widdow I cannot judge, this I know, if the ninteen propositions had past, it would have been no newes to heare of many promoted, and they

might easily have redeemed the time that they have lost, and challenged so much greater ho∣nours, because they could not have them sooner. It would have been rare, to have heard of any ad∣vanced out of Parliament, & this would have bred good stirring blood in the Countrey, the Gentry would have justled to get in at the common gate of Offices and Honours.

The Lords and Commons ought not to be deserted, unlesse we will allow, that the King may chuse whether He will admit of any Councell at all or no, in the dispo∣sing of our Lives, Lands and Liberties.

By Law He cannot, He will not refuse to hearken to His great Councell, neither doth He challenge to Himselfe any right of disposing of your Lives, Lands and Liberties, but will protect you and them according to the established Lawes: He only sayes, He is not bound to re∣nounce his own understanding, or to contradict His own conscience for any Counsellors sake whatsoever. He must satisfy that before their de∣sires, nor must that, which they call policy, give Law to that, which He knowes to be religion.

Tis granted in things visible, and certain, that judge which is a sole judge, and has competent power to see his own judgement executed, ought not to deter∣mine

against the light of nature, or evidence of fact.]

Sole judge, or not, alters not the case, neither is there any restraint only to visible and certain things; in the discharging of a trust, the consci∣ence must be guided by a morall certainty, or high probability.

The sinne of Pilate was, that when he might have saved our Saviour from an unjust death, yet upon ac∣ousations contradictory in themselves; contrary to strange revelations from Heaven, he would suffer In∣nocence to fall, and passe sentence of death, meerly to satisfy a blood-thirsty multitude.]

The sinne of Pilate all confesse hainous, yet if examined according to his rule of justice, he must either condemne his own judgement, or absolve his. For first, concerning strange revelations to the contrary, all that I meet with is this, his wife sent unto him, saying; have thou nothing to doe with that just man, for I have suffered many things this day in a dream because of him. What was revelation to her, was but a single tradition to him, she was obliged to beleeve God speaking to her, he was not bound to believe a woman speaking to him: he might think she might be willing to deceive, out of naturall compassion strong in that sexe, or might be deceived her selfe, calling that inspira∣tion,

which was fancy. That it was true de fa∣cto, makes nothing against him, for a Iudge, he knew, was to be guided by proofes, he that will passe sentence according to what any shall pre∣tend to have from Heaven, may well deserve to goe to Hell for it.

2^ly Concerning accurations contradictory in themselves, he saw that plainly and therefore pro∣fesses their testimonies invalid, I find no fault in him. But it may be objected, he knew that for envy they had delivered him. That indeed was his pri∣vate opinion, which the Iewes perswade him was to be overruled by their authority, and una∣nimous consent. This therefore seems to be the case; Pilate thinks it not enough that all the chief Priests, and Elders of the people, cry out against him as a malefactor and enemy to the state, he re∣quires some proofes, Ioh. 18.29. they returned this answer, if he were not a malefactor, we would not have delivered him unto thee, Populisalus, the Com∣mon-wealth was in danger, not did it stand with the honour of that Assembly to give more particu∣lar reasons. At length he is resolved to passe his assent, and yeelds to their votes upon these grounds:

His single judgement was not to be preferred be∣fore

all advice; then many eyes of all the choycest of the people see more then his, and many spy faults which he could not find; besides there was a Maxime and it was grounded upon nature (and which the Author saies was never 'till this Parliament withstood, there∣fore then in full force) that a community can have no private ends to mislead it.

J shall only adde, the case can no way be vary∣ed, though they had not a joynt judiciall power, for if he thought him innocent, and knew he had such a right, that except he passed sentence against him he was not condemned, and ought not to suffer, it had been as high a fault to concurre with them in their injustice.

Not so; because if one Iudge on the Bench dissent from three, or one Iuror at the barre from eleven, they may submit to the major number, though perhaps lesse skilfull then themselves, without imputation of guilt.]

The Oath of the Iurors is this, as we find in M^r Lamberd, Se virum aliquem innocentem haud condemnaturos, sonten••ve absoluturos. Laying their hands upon the holy Gospell, every man swears, he will not condemne the innocent, nor absolve the guilty. The words of their Oath now in use speak the same sense; They sweare that they will doe right betwixt party and party, according to

evidence given in: wherefore they ought to con∣sult information by witnesses, not their fellowes votes. How his casuists will satisfy a mans con∣science when he violates this Oath, I know not. 'Tis true, in many cases, there may be a legall sub∣mission, but then the law doth not require a per∣sonall act contrary to conscience, but provides for the preservation of the innocency of the dis∣senting parties, by making the act of the major part, have the force of the whole, according to that, Refertur ad vniversos, quod publicè fit per ma∣jorem partem.

Jf so in Law, much more in State, where the very satisfying a multitude, some times in things not other∣wise expedient, may prove not only expedient but ne∣cessary, for the setling of peace and ceasing of strife.] True, if in Law, not otherwise: a Governour must not displease God to please the people. The second thing must be ordered according to the Rulers prudence. For many times, granting an unreasonable request, doth not satisfy, but en∣crease their desires. And whereas the more he gives, he becomes the lesse able, so the more they receive, they become the more craving.

That the Militia and Magazine of Hull &c. should be intrusted into such hands as were in the peoples good

esteeme, conscience and understanding could plead no∣thing against it.] Understanding and conse∣quently conscience very much, if the King had more distrust of some, and more confidence in the fidelity of others.

If it could have been averred (as it could not, for the contrary was true) that this would have bred di∣sturbance, and have been the occasion of greater dan∣ger.] Truly then he shall get the better, if he can impose upon our sense, and make the Kingdom beleeve contrary to what they see, and suffer un∣der. What hath been the cause of these unhappy distractions, but as the taking the Kings Towne from him by force, and the illegall alteration of the Militia, upon pretence of apparent danger? Though for a time, they were afraid, where no feare was, (quis illis sic timere permisit?) yet after they have had so long a time to recover their un∣derstandings, and to consider with themselves, if the danger were apparent, it might in so many months be made evident, and they might know, whence to expect the blow, I dare now appeale to the weakest part of men their distrusts, and aske them, if they can now believe, there was any just ground for jealousies. It is not improbable, since they have raised a house without a foun∣dation,

it may fall upon the heads of the master builders.

Where the people by publique authority will seek any inconvenience to themselves, and the King is not so much interessed in it as themselves, 'tis more incon∣venience and injustice to deny, then to grant it.]

More injustice to deny then grant, therefore it seemes, that injustice too. Into what streights must a King be brought by the mindes of the people! If they seek any inconvenience, injustice to deny it: O unheard of Maxims out of these new Politiques! that a King should be bound by Law to destroy his people, and kill them out of duty; that he doth not preserve their rights, except he doe them wrong. This affabile odium hath often had, but never deserved thanks. Can a man imagine, those people, of whom Juvenall speaks,

Evertêre domos totas optantibus ipsis Dii faciles,

if they had understood their own prayers, would have accused the Gods for denying them? Charior est Regipopulus, quàm sibi. How great are His de∣serts towards His People, that will not suffer them to be miserable, though they intreat him; though they provoke him to it; and can content

himselfe with the conscience of merit, whilst his honour suffers under the envy of wrong doing! Indeed this is the end of all government; for the people finding they were not fit to govern them∣selves, resolved to be ruled by those that were wi∣ser, and so committed their safety to the trust of others. Now this were to reduce themselves to that first state, which their sufferings made them weary of, to place a Governour over them and to governe that Governour.

What blame is it then in Princes, when they will pretend reluctance of conscience and reason?

No man justifies pretended conscience, no man can condemne reall. But what grounds can ma∣lice have to cast this aspersion of pretence of con∣science and reason? If we looke either on that un∣happy misunderstanding of the people, who would not be undeceaved by pretences, his acti∣ons must appeare unto them as cleare as the day; or on his owne necessities, his owne extreame wants, it cannot be. For certainly he that hath granted so much in this Parliament, and that in a short time, as put all his Royall Ancestors Acts of grace together, they fall much short of his, would not have denyed any thing which was reasona∣ble, not any thing (since his wants required sup∣plyes

from them) but what should put him into farre worse condition then that of Poverty.

After a long and generall discourse of the ori∣ginall of government, the various formes, and se∣verall distempers, whil'st policy was yet imper∣fect, he returnes to the present matter.

The vertue of Representation hath been denyed to the Commons, and a severance has been made betwixt the parties chosen, and the parties choosing, and so that great priviledge of all priviledges, that unmoveable Basis of all honour, and power, whereby the House of Commons, claimes the entire right of all the Gentry and commonalty of England, has been attempted to be shaken and disturbed.]

The sense of it is, a trust is committed to them, and they are to be guided according to conscience in the performance of it. Let it be so: but is not this cleerly the Kings case, who is entrusted cer∣tainly as highly as they? So that they will find the ready way to endanger their own rights, is to en∣trench upon the Kings. Yet there may be a mi∣stake in the imputation of severance and denyall of representation to the Commons. For put the case; if a few men of a County present a Petition to the House against established lawes, and the setled Discipline of the Church; this is received,

and thanks returned: if after, another Petition (modestly and discreetly expressing their desires, and withall due respects to the House, as to in∣stance in that most excellent Petition of Kent) be presented, attested by men much more eminent then the former, whether we respect number, Gentry, meanes or reputation; and this in favour of present government, which they have found happy by long experience, and therefore have no reason to be so desirous of a change, of which they are not able to judge so well without tryall; this by no meanes is to be called a severance or deny∣all of representation, though I confesse, the King∣dome (apt to mistake) may easily be deceived, and learn to miscall it, because the Gentlemen were imprisoned who presented it.

Most of our late distempers and obstructions in Parliaments have proceeded from this: that the peo∣ple, upon causelesse defamation, and unproved accusa∣tions, have been so prone to withdraw themselves from their representatives, and yet there can be nothing un∣der Heaven, next to renouncing God, which can be more perfidious, and more pernitious in the people then this.]

Here we may see the strength of passion above reason. Certainly we never took the oath of Su∣premacy, nor of Allegiance unto them. Hence it

will evidently follow, that Treason against a Burgesse, is higher then that against the King.

This he grants as unquestionable, that the legis∣lative power of this Kingdome, is partly in the King, and partly in the Kingdome, so that neither the King can make a generall binding Ordinance or Law, without the Parliament, or the Parliament without the King.

This one truth, if constantly stood to, would have prevented our miseryes; and if yet embraced, might restore the Kingdome to happinesse. But alas! it is soon recalled, as bolding only in ordinary cases, but if the safety of the people be concerned, if it may prove dangerous, or inconvenient to them, then an extraordinary course may justly be taken.

This is it which hath so miserably rent this Kingdome and caused these sad divisions. First, the people are made beleeve they are in danger; and then a prevention of those dangers is promi∣sed: This must needs be very gratefull to them, so out of that naturall love they bear to them∣selves, they favour that side, which pretends to take care of their safety. His way of arguing is ve∣ry plausible, and seemeth to carry more strength, because it worketh upon our understanding by our affection. The summe is this; in case of ap∣parent and imminent danger the Peoples safety

is not to be neglected; they ought not to be expo∣sed as a Prey to the enemy, who if he take them unprovided will destroy them all, therefore most fit they should be put into a posture of defence: now none so fit Iudges of this apparent and im∣minent danger, as the two Houses; wherefore they to order this Militia. So that it must be in their power, to command Men, raise Horses, seize on all the Ammunition, send for what sup∣plies of mony they think necessary for repelling these dangers, else they are not sufficiently enabled for that great work, the peoples preservation. Here we are falne back again into (what we so much complained of). Arbitrary power, nor is the thing taken away, but placed in another body; all that we have gained is only this, we shall not be beaten by the same hand. Was not this the ve∣ry case of Ship-mony? upon supposall of a neces∣sity, and the Kingdom being in danger, very fit to secure it and the people; this cannot be done without money, the danger will not allow the delay of asking the Subjects consent, and going the ordinary way of Law, therefore an extraor∣dinary course them becomes legall, and very rea∣sonable it is, the Subject should be content to part with some, rather then loose all now who fitter

to judge of this necessity then the King, as being most fully informed by His advantage of intelli∣gence from His Embassadors, Agents &c. of the designes of forraigne Princes and States.

To wind our selves out of this Labyrinth, we will goe on those grounds, on which they argu∣ed against Ship-mony, for as the Argument runnes parallell, so will the answer. This there∣fore was laid downe as a sure ground of reason, that it was better for the Kingdom, though it were in reall danger, in arenâ consilium capere, to shift for it selfe, as well as it was able, by a suddain defence, then that the Law should provide such a remedy, which would be so easily, so frequent∣ly abused upon every pretence of danger, to pre∣vent such an evill, which could extreamly sel∣dome, or almost never happen, for an Army and Navy could not be so secretly provided, but that we must have some intelligence of it. So in the case of the Militia, it is much better, that by being continued in the old legall way, it should hazard it selfe to such a possible danger, then that Law should provide such a remedy (for what proba∣bly will never happen) as being abused upon pretences, may every three years put the King∣dom in combustion. To repell danger any way

but by Law, is the greatest danger of all.

Let the world judge, whether the pronouncing S^r Iohn Hotham's act: Treason be not contrary to the clearest beams of humane reason, and the strongest in∣clinations of nature: for every private man may de∣fend himselfe by force, if assaulted, though by the force of a Magistrate, or his own father, and though he be not without all confidence by flight.]

He is strongly resolved upon the conclusion, that will bring it in upon such premises. S^r John Hotham his asseizing on the Kings Towne and Ammunition was it seemes in his own defence; who assaulted him? did His Majesty drive him into Hull? what can he think of the Gunpowder∣traitors, was their resistance a just defence? then certainly every Rebellion is a just warre. Indeed what is that thing which we call obedience, if a man may refuse to submit to Law in his own de∣fence?

Here whole Nations being exposed to enmity and hazard, being utterly uncapable of flight, must yeeld their throats and submit to assassinates, if their King will not allow them defence.] There is great diffe∣rence betwixt a Subjects defending himselfe, and offending his King. His fears are over-witty, if they will not permit him to think himselfe safe,

except he get into one of the Kings sorts for his better security.

See if we are not left as a prey to the same bloody hands, as have done such diabolicall exploits in Ire∣land &c. if we may not take up armes for our own safe∣ty, or if it be possible for us to take up armes, without some Votes, or Ordinances to regulate the Militia.] Subjects upon in vasion would not have wanted Commission to take up armes; till then they are safe enough by the benefit of the Law, which could not possibly have better provided for their safety, then by denying them a power to take armes as often as ambitious: choletick men for their own ends shall perswa••e them they are it danger. For by this meanes, being easily deceived, whilest they endeavoured to avoyd false, they would run themselves headlong into true pe∣rills.

The King saies; the Parliament denies &c. to whether now in this uncertainty, is the Subject bound to adhere?]

It is possible, circumstances may afford us some light for our direction. We may consider, whether the Houses doe not barely say; and whe∣ther His Majesty doth not descend so farre, as to give reasons for what He does; and to shew the

Kingdom the ground of His actions, by particu∣lar citation of the Lawes, which justify them. We ought to agree whether swerving from Law, be to be judged by the action, or by the au∣thors that is, if the King should have done; what∣ever they did, and the Houses what ever He did, whether all would not then have been legall, be∣cause done by them. The King doth not desire to captivate any mans understanding to His au∣thority, but is willing to make all the world the judge of His actions▪ neither is a blind obedi∣ence a part of any mans duty to the Houses. The best way to discerne a right, will be to consult the rule, which is Law, and not measure the legality of an act by the doer. Some things are matters of fact, here we may be guided by sense, and judge as we see. As whether the King has seized on any thing, wherein the Subject hath a property? or whether the Subject hath not seized upon some∣thing wherein the King hath a property? whe∣ther the King hath raised warre against the Par∣liament, that is, whether His Guard was an Ar∣my, and whether Hull is now London.

We had a maxime and it was grounded upon na∣ture, and never till this Parliament withstood, that a community can have no private ends to mislead it,

and make it injurious to it selfe.]

True in a state where the collective body as∣sembles: and the reason of it is evident; for though every man aime at his greatest particular interest, yet except it be agreeable to the interest of the major part it will never passe into an Act; and if it be advantageous for the most, it is to be estee∣med publique. Now what service this can doe the two Houses, I cannot see, because they are a representative body. If he please to consult Li∣vy or Tacitus, he may find what most unworthy ends the Senate of Rome proposed to themselves, and be quickly satisfied in the falsehood of this Maxime, taken in his sense. The truth is he raises probabilities into demonstrations, and because it is not so likely, (it being a work of greater dif∣ficulty) that four hundred should contrive things for their private interests, as that four should, the takes it for impossible. Whereas experience clear∣ly confutes him; in other states we find nothing more common. That we in England have so sel∣dome suffered under such corruptions, proceeds from causes which are peculiar to this govern∣ment. It was a court for the most part, but of short continuance, so that they had not time to mould and fashion their aimes; and when called

together againe, the body was much altered. But the chief reason, and that to which the Subject especially owes his security, is this, that the finall determination, is not in one, nor two houses, but the joynt consent of three Estates is necessary. So that nothing is likely to passe, but what is for the interest of the major part, and what is so, is pub∣liquely advantagious. It is more possible they may now prosequute private interests, since they challenge a power to themselves sufficient to ad∣vance their designes; which heretofore they ne∣ver pretending to, could not hope to compasse particular ends.

The King may safely leave His highest rights to Parliaments.] If this be all the motive, he may as safely keep them. Why did the Lawes entrust Him with them, if it were fitting for Him to make no use of them?

None knows better, or affects more the sweetnesse of this so well ballanced a Monarchy.] I believe they af∣fect Monarchy, why then doth this Author en∣deavour to take it away, by denying the King a power of dissent, which our Ancestors inviola∣bly preserved, as a most happy restraint of Aristo∣cracy or Democracy?

It hath been often in the power of former Parlia∣ments

to load that rule with greater fetters and cloggs, but they would not.] A very good argument, there is little reason now to doe it. After a commenda∣tion of the exact temper and due proportion be∣tween the three Estates, the many affecting Mo∣narchy better then Aristocracy, and the Nobility preferring it as much beyond Democracy.

He exhorts us not to seek to corrupt this purity of composition.] Very good counsell: but which he overthrowes in the words immediatly follow∣ing. We must not conceive, that both Gentry and No∣bility can combine against the King. Therefore it will be fitting for the King to leave all to their disposall, who certainly can doe nothing, but what is fitting. In how few words hath he de∣stroyed that constitution, which he told us was so perfect, it could admit of no change but for worse? But we could not stay here, if the Kings negative were once taken away, like decaying bodies, our health would dayly impaire. The next step must be, the Lords sitting in a personall ca∣pacity, no reason they should deny what the Kingdom hath voted to be necessary or conveni∣ent; either let them not speak at all, or let the greater part of Commons joyne with the lesser part of Peeres.

The right of all the Lords and Commons in this State is so great, that no change of government can be advantage to them, except they could each one attain an hereditary Crowne.] May they not attain as much as Malignant Counsellors are pretended to aime at, Honours, Offices, Wealth, Power, Com∣mands?

Their power is meerly derivative, so that except we will conceive that both King and People will be con∣senting to the usurpation, nothing can be done.] Then it is confest, the King hath a right of dissenting. Except both King and People; here a power is given to the People collectively, beyond the Lords, Commons and King.

If the King be an affector of true Liberty, He has in Parliament a Power as extensive as ever the Ro∣man Dictators was for the preventing of publike di∣stresses.] The Dictator had absolute Authority; nor was he circumscribed in power, but in time on∣ly. There lay no appeale from him, neither was he questionable for any action after his govern∣ment expired. Though the humor of that people could not endure the name of King, they had the same thing; for in imminent dangers, whether from forrain invasions, or intestine seditions, ne∣cessity of state forced them to submit to his Au∣thority,

which relieved them in their greatest ex∣tremities.

Hence we may make the truest judgement, what forme of government the wisest Romans esteemed most convenient, their actions, which proceeded from feare, were unfeigned interpre∣ters of their thoughts. That they fell back still in∣to their old rule, and were not as wise to prevent dangers by conserving that Authority, as they were to encounter them by erecting it, must be imputed to the inconstant temper of the people, who in times of peace were as proud and inso∣lent, as when ruine threatned (which their wan∣tonnesse pulled upon themselves) they were basely humble: Since then the Romans preferred even the unbounded power of one to a popular sway, wee have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this government, where∣in Monarchy is so wisely ballanced, that as we are not exposed to the dangers which attend the rule of the many, so we may avoyd the inconve∣niences, which might probably flow from the Arbitrary power of one.

He hath met in the field with two contrary Armies of His own Subjects, and yet that Army, which He went to destroy, and advanced their colours against Him,

was more loyall then that which himselfe commanded.] Had he made a Conscience of unjust slander, or had he any sense of the honour of his Nation, these words had never fowled the paper.

That which the King here calls conscience and rea∣son, can be nothing else but meer private opinion.] What other possible notion can any man have of conscience? is it not the light of reason infor∣ming us in our duty? If the Counsell of the Parli∣ament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience, and the Counsell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto, there needed no such contestation.] If the Counsell of the Court were di∣rectly opposite to common understanding and good conscience, and the Counsell of the Parlia∣ment were evidently consonant thereunto, there would be no such contestation.

It is a very unfaithfull way of judging, to mea∣sure the goodnesse of Counsell by the person ad∣vising, not by the thing advised. His Majesty all∣wayes examined what, not who, and hath given His Subjects a most certain pledge of His Royall affection, in passing so many good Acts, and was resolved to grant, as long as any thing could in reason be desired. After He hath fully satisfied the publique interest, even to the utmost extent, of

what most understanding and disingaged men wish for, he is not bound to undoe again in part, and so farre to comply with the interests of pri∣vate men, as to place a power in some, by which they shall be able to hinder His good people from enjoying the full benefits of His Royall Grace, if such a consent appear to Him to doe it.

The following discourse keeps all in generalls (which easily deceive weaker apprehensions) and hath its strength from this ground, that it can∣not reasonably be supposed the great & publique Councell of the Kingdome should not give the most faithfull advice.

Therefore Princes, if they may not be led by their owne opinions, rather then by the sacred and awfull Councells of whole Nations, unreasonably complain they are denyed liberty of Conscience, and ravisht out of their own understandings.] I appeal to any mans judgment, whether any thing can be urged for the authority of a Lay-Councell, that it ought to en∣force a submission of judgment, & a performance of dutyes arising from trust agreeable thereto, which may not with at least equall advantages, be pressed for the same binding power in Coun∣cells Ecclesiasticall. To instance in that of Trent, if a Papist should, (as Campian doth) bragg of that

to him as the representative body of almost all the Western Church, wherein was a concourse of so many choise, able, eminent Di∣vines, such as had addicted their whole times to the study of truth, and therefore in all probability could not be deceived themselves, & such as had conversed so long with Heaven and Heavenly things, they knew sufficiently how much it con∣cerned them not to deceive others, and conclude it therefore unlawfull for any to pretend conscience (which is but private opinion) against so pub∣lique and unanimous determination. Notwith∣standing these high probabilities, and (what will much more justify mens absolute obedience, and captivating their reasons, some plausible argu∣ments for a divine assistance, and immediate di∣rections in all their decisions, which the Houses will not pretend to;) yet it shall goe hard but he will find some answer (as esily he might) whereby to justifie his liberty of dissenting in some things, which when he hath done, he may with very little alteration apply to civill Councells and be satisfied. Suppose it thus: though amongst probable Arguments, that drawn from authority of wise men carry with it greatest weight, yet it must give place to a greater

reason. Now to every man belongs a judgment of discretion, which must decide for what con∣cernes his particular duty. So in the Kings case: the Votes which carry in them the authority of both Houses, shall bear great sway, and if it be in things extreamly dubious, they may turn the scales of their side. But if greater reason seem to contra∣dict them, his Majesty will not hoodwink His understanding, and blindly follow whither they please to lead him, He will walke by the greater Light; For example his Majesty perceiving how much His people may suffer under arbitrary pow∣er, is resolved never to make use of it, & thinks it lesse fitting any other should. But it is told him now the use of it will be for their good, by reason of apparent imminent dangers. His Majesty un∣derstands the bottome of plausible pretences, & knows to how great mischiefes a way would be opened, if it were sufficient upon such specious grounds to have a right to over-rule all known and certain Lawes.

Concerning the action at Hull, he confesses, to take possession of the Kings town and shut the gates a∣gainst Him is Treason, if circumstances doe not vary the nature of the act, as in this Case he pretends they doe. For the first thing to be lookt on is, that the King

was meerly denyed entrance for that time, His generall right was not denyed.] If then a Subject take up Armes against his Soveraign in a temporary warr, it must not come within the compasse of Trea∣son, and he may legally possesse himselfe of the King's forts, and maintaine them against Him, so He confesse he hath no right in them.

No defying language was given. If a man take a∣way my purse, shall he be acquitted from felony because he did not give me ill language too? No act of violence was used. This he may say who hath pickt anothers pocket; but it is no sufficient plea against the Law.

But he used no violence, though the King for di∣verse houres together did stand within Musket shot, &c:] It is no argument of innocence that he had opportunity to be more highly guilty, and abstained.

The King used tearmes of defiance, and this makes the act meerly defensive, or rather passive.] If this were true, there was never any warr but defen∣sive; for those, who by some great injustice offe∣red, provoke a Nation to right it self, fight as well to maintain their lives, as what they unlawfully possesse. How this should administer to the King any ground to leavy guards at York, many men wonder,

or that it should seem the same thing to the King, as if He had been pursued to the gates of York.]

Certainly it was a sufficient ground, not only to raise a guard for His safety, but an Army to pu∣nish that high indignity, and right His Honour: but out of tender care of His Peoples safety (least they should chance to suffer upon mistakes) He afforded him so long time of repentance, that the Kingdome might first be satisfyed, and then his justice.

If the Parliament have hereupon turned any of the Townes-men out of their Estates. His Majesty did not charge the two Houses; Sir Iohn Hotham kept Him out, without any publike order from them. But if it had been done de facto, the same law would have justified this act, as well as the other. But since, not only the Country about, but the In∣habitants within the Town have suffered in their Estates, and libertyes.

Or if claimed any interest in it to themselves. So much the lesse reason to seize on it, if he cannot so much as pretend title to it. or have disseized the King, utterly denying the right for the future. If any Law can be produced to justifie taking away the Kings goods for a time, the case will be cleered. Or have made any other use of their possession but

meerly to prevent civill warr. There is not any way more likely to create a Civill warr, then endea∣vours to prevent it by illegall courses. And to dis∣furnish the King's seducers of Armes & Ammunition: therefore the most essentiall property of Treason, inten∣tion, must needs here be absent in this act.] The Law hath judged otherwise in the case of the Earle of Essex, whose plea was, he intended the removall of evill Counsellors.

If the Parliament (the shutting the King out of Hull was not their act) be not vertually the whole Kingdome it selfe. The King excluded it is not; If it be not the Supream judicature, as well in matters of State, as matters of Law. Till new lawes are ena∣cted, the Subject cannot justify any act, but what is warrantable by the old. If it be not the great Councell of the Kingdome as well as of the King, to whom it belongeth by the consent of all Nations to pro∣vide in all extraordinary cases, ••e quid detriment capiat Respublica, let the brand of Treason stick upon it. No provisions are allowed, but what are legall least the Remedy should prove the greatest disease. Nay if the Parliament would have used this forcible meanes unlesse petitioning would not have pre∣vailed. It is no just excuse to take away a mans money, and say he did first desire him to deliver it.

Or if their grounds of jealousy were meerly vaine. It is against all equity to doe wrong, because there is a possibility of suffering it; no man can have a full security; and therefore we must arme our selves against uncertain feares, not by injuries, but a wary innocence. Or if the jealousy of a whole Kingdom can be counted vaine.] Too large an ex∣pression; much the greater part of the Kingdom apprehend no just grounds of jealousies.

Though the mindes of many were a long time unsetled, being daily disturbed by suggesti∣tons of plots at home, and invasions from abroad, yet if we duly weigh the businesse, such fears ought not to be valued. If forty severall men re∣porte the same thing, yet if upon examination thirty nine of them say they had it from the other man, this in Law makes but one witnesse; so the fears of many thousands, if grounded upon infor∣mations, and those informations come from ve∣ry few, who can no way evidence the probabi∣lity of such reports, they ought not to be regar∣ded, they will vanish into nothing. Or if they claime any such right of judging of dangers and pre∣venting them without the King's consent as ordinary and perpetuall. As often as they have a mind to make use of such a right, 'tis easy for them to call

the case extraordinary, and pretend a publike danger. For my part I know not how they can ever be confuted, if not now. For certainly appa∣rent dangers did never lesse appeare. It would more abundantly have satisfied me, if I had been frighted with secret plots, and conceald de∣signes.

The King might have prevented the same repulse by sending a messenger before hand. That is, if He had not come to get in, He had not been shut out; if He would have stayed away, he would not have denyed Him entrance. Or by coming without any such considerable forces. Let His forces be great, he was not to give Law to his Prince. but nei∣ther is it likely he would have admitted Him then, for you confesse a little above, He offered to enter Hull with twenty horse only, unarmed.

The Scots in England took New-castle but by private authority, yet there were other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason.

The King and Parliament deserved so much respect from you, as not to have instanced so fre∣quently in their Act; you might well let that passe in silence, which they have buried in an Act of oblivion.

He flourishes at large upon the example of

Richard the second (he means Edw. 2.) misled by Spencer. It doth not follow, because one King hearkned to evill counsell, therefore all must be denied the liberty to hearken to good.

Spencer's party was but of inconsiderable fortunes. He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the Scales, and ballancing their reputations. At length yet there is some little hopes he may prove a convert, since he doth almost promise to suspend his judgement, till he may have full sa∣tisfaction from His Majesties Narration, which in due time will more fully informe him.

An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withoutsome means, and what this means shall be, is yet to us altogether inscrutable. Certainly he is quicker sighted then not to perceive what is so obvious. Deny the King a negative, and the thing is done.

The power of Parliaments is but derivative and de∣pending upon publique consent, and how publique con∣sent should be gained for the erection of a new unlaw∣full odious Tyranny amongst us, is not discernable.] It is not thought this was the intent of those that entrusted them, but it may be the abuse of power, if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs. For though their power depend upon a

publique consent in the election, yet not so after they are met together. The necessities of the time made His Majesty grant, that this Parliament should not be dissolved without their consent; but they may now challenge it as their right, if the King be bound to confirme, what they vote necessary or expedient.

But it cannot be: and his reason is, the Kingdom would not obey them.] In truth a very probable thing: I beleeve they would not be able to goe through in that new way. But yet they must needs have a great party; considering their severall rela∣tions, and the advantage they have, in advancing the interests, whether religious or civill, of some, which may be able to doe them service, and this would create division in the Kingdom.

His Majesty expresses His just indignation, that they (He imputes it not to the Houses, though this Author still involve them, but to the contrivers & penners of the Declaration) should dare to tell their King, they may without want of modesty or duty depose him: He returnes answer, this cannot be collected from those words, That if they should make the highest presidents of other Par∣liaments their patterne, there would be no cause to complain of want of modesty and duty, because

it may justly be denied that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the dethroning of any King of Eng∣land. What was there affirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of Free in it. If the ••. of Hen. 4. Were indeed not Free, why were Statutes cited out of it? The authors of those quo∣tations must be presumed to accompt it so.

The King is offended at their franck expressi∣ons, disguised under the charge of a malignant party. The sense of his answer is this, they have no other way to cleere themselves: for there be∣ing faults somewhere, not to lay them upon o∣thers, were to take them upon themselves. His Majesty hath proposed a very good way which will fully satisfy the world in their innocency, and that is not alwaies to accuse, but sometimes to prove.

The King demands justice for tumults and high indignities offered, and complaines of a pro∣hibition sent from the House of Commons into Southwarke, to hinder the processe against a Riot according to Law. His answer is, equall justice could not be obtained against the Court-Cavaleeres. His Majesty never protected them from legall tryall; it was free for them to have proved what they could against them.

The Kingsaies, it being granted by them, that their priviledges doe not extend to Treason, Felo∣ny, or breach of the Peace, so as to exempt the Members from all manner of tryall, yet if they be so priviledged in the method of their tryall, that the cause must first be brough before them, and their consent asked before you can proceed, then their Priviledges extend as farre in these, as in the most unquestioned cases; because no priviledge exempts them from all manner of tryall, the House being acquainted and leave given, He sayes nothing can take of this: it was fully inten∣ded the Members should have had a legall and speedy tryall; for His Majesty conceives it high injustice to clap men up upon a bare charge, and after they are in prison, forget there are such men in the world.

The Parliament does not deny the King a true reall interest in anything held by him, either in jure Coro∣nae, or in jure Personae, but only affirmes that in the same thing the State hath an interest Paramont in cases of publique extremity; by vertue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its own necessary pre∣servation.] The King is a part of the state, and therefore the other part hath not any power war∣ranted by Law, to doe what they think fit to His

prejudice, upon pretence of publique extremity. This is ship-money again; in every mans lands & goods, the State hath an interest Paramount in cases of publique extremity, by vertue of which it may justly seize, and use the same for its own ne∣cessary preservation. Heres the difference, the head without the body was the State before; now it is the body without a head. The King hath gra∣ciously freed us from that inconvenience, and we hope He will not suffer us to be opprest with this. The prudence of our lawes hath provided against either; but were there a necessity we must fall into one, we ought in reason to choose the former, we are acquainted with that, and therefore could better digest it: It would be a great affliction to fall from such hopes, and what we lookt on as a remedy, to find that our disease: but especially it would be lesse burthen to our estates, to satisfy one, then five hundred.

But the King's things are still reserved for him in better hands, then he would have put them. Though this were true it were an ill president for the Sub∣ject, who must be bound to give up his meanes as oft as they conceive they could dispose it more wisely, as they yet keep them away from him for his good, so hereafter they may spend them a∣gainst

him for his advantage. Let what will be pretended; the Subject cannot be so stupid, as not to understand, these, who undertake to manage the Paramount interest of the State, may seize on any subjects fortunes, by the same right they take the King's.

That there is an Arbitrary power in every State somewhere, 'tis true, 'tis necessary, and no inconvenience followes upon it.] If he mean by arbitrary, a legisla∣tive power, this is granted, yet not to a part, but the whole body. But this speakes not to the case; for still they give us a certain rule to live by. The old lawes are in force, till repealed, and when new are once enacted, we must conform our acti∣ons to those standing rules. He is to justifie, there is such a Paramount Law, which shall make all our other lawes truly Oracles, that is, capable of contrary meanings. So that now a man may be justly punisht for doing such a thing, because he hath disobeyed the letter of the law; a week af∣ter he shall be justly punisht too, for not doing the same thing, because he hath disobeyed the equity of the Law. Aristotle tells us (and 'tis very wise∣ly said) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Rhet. l. 1. c. 1. Those lawes are

with greatest prudence established, which define most cases, and leave nothing, which possibly may be determined, to the brest of the judge. The reason of it is this; Lawes are made without any respects to persons, it cannot be foreseen what parties would be engaged; but Judges doe not all∣wayes abstract from these; they may be mislead by the relation of Kinsman, friend, Patron, or other interests. Now how fully may these cor∣rupt ends be satisfied by this equitable constructi∣on of Law?

M^r Hooker does not say, that the Anabaptists in Germany did deceive Parliaments with their hypo∣crisye.] No man told you he did; we only learne thus much from that story of their foul injustice and cruelty, that upon proportionable principles, such mischiefes being then, may be again. For ex∣ample, if a power be placed in a certain body of men, by which they are allowed to breake all in∣feriour lawes, if they think it is for the good of the people, &c: and if this body be backt by the greater part of the people, as having gained on their affections by fair promises of a perfect refor∣mation, and that they shall at length enjoy the pu∣rity and simplicity of the Gospell; in this case may it not be a sufficient motive to take away mens

estates, because they cannot confide in them? is it not just to take from enemies of the State the power of hurting it? 'Tis very obvious, that for those men, of whom they have no good opinion to have wealth may be a crime, to have honours treasonable.

As for the thirty Tyrants of Athens, we know they were not chosen by the people, as our Knights, Citizens, &c: This circumstance alters not the case, if after they are elected, they challenge as unquestionable and as irrevocable power. But the main intent of that instance was, to shew there may be a tyran∣ny of many, and that much more miserable then that of one, in many respects. If the inordinate de∣sires of one are hardly satisfied, how much more may we suffer under those of many? we cannot hope to weary them. If we must be slaves, better to have one master, then foure hundred. Though the blowes were equall, that from a Royall hand would not smart so much; it wounds the very soul to be trampled on by equalls. The weight of present evills would lesse afflict, then the fear of future. There may be continuall supply of tor∣ment; new and hungry flyes may succeed in the room of the old, and suck strongly, not regarding many have already been glutted. Neither can we

expect an end of these miseries, such a body is im∣mortall, whereas the vices of a Prince are perso∣nall and dye with the man, we may be restored to happinesse by His successor.

I will in briefe relate the story of their reigne. They had got into their hands the power of de∣claring what was Law, and this by the consent of the people. In the beginning they call some men into Question, who were much hated by the Citty; and though the law could not take hold of them so farre, yet they past sentence of death. This was very plausible to most, who judged of this proceeding by the rule of their present affe∣ctions, not looking so farre into the future, as to consider, what ill consequences this might pro∣duce; for by the same way innocent men might be cut off, if they were pleas'd to call them enemies of the State. After this they gave some part of pub∣lique authority to three thousand of the Citti∣zens, and disarmed all the rest, by this means (and the benefit of a Militia from Sparta) the Citty was wholly in their disposall. In a short time they had committed so many outrages, and such high injustice, that Theramenes, one of their own body, one of the thirty, professed his publique dislike of those proceedings. Then was he accused as a

Traitor to them, and (though it was a priviledge of the three thousand, that none of them should suffer death by the sentence of the thirty, but ac∣cording to accustomed processe and tryall) yet Critias wip't his name out of that number, and so reduced him to their tryall. Theramenes pleads for himselfe; they ought to look upon his as a com∣mon case; their names might as easily be blotted out, he advises them to be very wary in making such a president which might ruine them and their posterity. The issue was this: Particular men being over-awed by their fears, thought it their wisest way to hold their peace, since if they should speak in his behalfe, there was little hopes to redeeme him, but great probability to ruine themselves. So they chose rather to expose them∣selves to those future inconveniences, which pos∣sibly might not come upon them, then hazard a present danger. By this advantage the Tyrants prevailed and condemned him to dye.

The things taken from the King at Hull were Armes, which are of more danger then other kind of chattels.] By the same Law all that part of the Kingdom which is not confided in may be disar∣med, nay why may not their mony be taken too, upon probable feare they may buy armes with it?

The Subject is in a miserable condition that is ly∣able to be undone as often as they please to be fearfull. It is so farre from excusing, it aggravates the fact, to take away the Kings Armes, that is the meanes whereby he may seize what ever else belongs unto His Majesty. The Law of this King∣dom hath only intrusted the Prince with Armes, so, that the Subject ought not to be arraied, trai∣ned, and mustered, but by His Commission.

But some determination must be supream, and therefore either the Kings power and trust must be gui∣ded by the discretion of the Parliament, or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the Kings meer discretion.] No necessity of either; For in cases of this nature, which he confesses to be extraordinary, if the King and Parliament dis∣sent, things must be at a stand, and the Subject must be obedient to the ordinary Law. The case of Ireland, as it is laid down by His Majesty, is unanswerable, and therefore he is forced to ex∣treme shifts, being unable to say any thing materi∣all, and yet unwilling to hold his peace.

England and Ireland are one and the same Domi∣nion, there is as true and intimate an union betwixt them, as betwixt England and Wales.] If this were so, Irish Barons would be English Peeres, and

English Peeres would have a right to vote in Irish Parliaments. Besides all lawes here enacted would stand in full force in Ireland, as they doe in the Kings dominion of Wales.

Though the major part should vote a thing, yet if it be disliked here, they would want authority to over∣rule the thing so voted. For the reason why the minor part in all suffrages subscribes to the major, is, that blood may not be shed, for in probability the ma∣jor part will prevaile. This is a good reason for such a contract, that the minor part should sub∣scribe; but after such agreement in States, justice laies an obligation on them so to doe: upon his grounds, if the lesser part in Parliament though never so few, can make it appeare the greater part of the Kingdom are of their opinion, the ma∣jor part ought to subscribe to the minor. Nay, if at any time the major part of Ireland joyning with the minor part of England, make a major of the whole, then the major part in our Parliament must sit downe. He takes no notice of the other case: suppose the malignant party should be a major part of both Houses, which His Majesty shewes how very probably it might have been, and were there a new election, it is not impossi∣ble, the Counties should send up the greater

part of such men as he calls malignant, would he think the King bound to consent to all such alte∣rations, as they should propose?

Some scattering reasons are laid down con∣cerning the Militia, which are but repetitions of what I have formerly answered.

A Faction is said to have prevailed upon a ma∣jor part, by cunning, force, absence, or accident. He argues thus against it; if by cunning, we must suppose the King's party in Parliament, has lost all their Law policy and subtilty.] The reason why they are over-borne, may be this; not because they have lesse Law, but more Honesty, which will not permit them to maintain a good cause by ill meanes. We all know in how great stead those piae fraudes, holy falshoods, and religious un∣truths stood the Church of Rome, though there were such who laid down better reasons for the contrary opinions, yet truth prevailed slowly and with a few only, because the minds of most were craftily prepossest with prejudice against it, be∣gotten and nourished by fained stories. The dispute proceeded upon very unequall termes; for the Roman party gave themselves the liberty of taking all advantages, whereas their adversa∣ries were forced to betray a good cause out of

meer ingenuity: they had none of their side who could lye. We ought to examine, whether this policy work not (at least in the beginning, till a discovery of their falshoods is made, and the people is undeceived) the same effects in a civill State; whether there are not such things, as fraudes (pretended to be) reipublicae salutares, which have so strong an influence on the under∣standings of many, that they can submit to the votes of some, who have insinuated themselves into their affections, against the cleer reasons of others, whom they have been taught causelesly to suspect. How easy is it to deceive by giving in false informations of dangers from abroad? If some, more scrupulous then to be abused and led away by light reports, inquire after the hand that they may judge of the probability of the in∣telligence, according to the faith and credit of the relator, they must be satisfied with this, the infor∣mer desires his name should be concealed, Pour l'eviter••le tiltre d'espion.

It cannot be by force, because they have no army visible.] A thing is said in Law to be done by force, not only when men actually suffer, if they make use of their liberty, and refuse to satisfy the passion and humor of some, but then also when

they have just grounds of feare, for this works on the mind, as strongly as the other on the body. And therefore Seneca tells us, stating this point of freedom, vim & majorem, & metum excipio, quibus adhibitis electio perit; and Cicero, nec quicquam aequi∣tati tam infestum est, quàm convocati homines, & ar∣mati. It remaines then we examine, whether the names of many gentlemen were not openly read in tumults; whether they were not posted, with directions to their particular lodgings; whether the way to the house were not so beset with cla∣marous multitudes, that they must passe tho∣rough the midst of them, whilst they inform them, what is fit to be voted, and inquire after their names, and what side they take. The other two may be reduced to those; It is no wonder many stay away, since they must be absent even whilst they are there.

The Parliament requests of the King, that all great Officers of State, by whom publique affaires shall be transacted, may be chosen by approbation or nomina∣tion of the great Councell: could the King conceive this dishonourable for him &c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to Royalty?]

Is that the reason why each man preserves his own rights, because he takes all the rest of man∣kind

for deadly enemies? Can he with honour confesse himselfe unfit to manage that trust which the law hath committed to him? with equall reason they may challenge to themselves the no∣mination of all Bishops, Ministers, Sheriffs, Justi∣ces, &c: and dispose of all the Preferments in England.

The substance of the request seemes to be no more but this, that it would please the King to be advised by Parliaments, &c:] What an affected mistake is this? He is ashamed to call it by the true name, and therefore styles that advice, which is properly command, if it be not in His power to reject their counsell, seem it never so unreasonable.

If the King choose such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of His own good liking only, or upon recommenda∣tion of such a Courtier, here he is devested of no power; but if it be upon the recommēdation of the whole King∣dome in Parliament, who in all probability can judge better, and are more concerned, this is an emptying himselfe of Majesty and devesting himselfe of power.]

If this will content them, they shall have as much power, as He grants to His Courtiers. Counsellors are not names of authority: they are the Princes eares, His eyes, (this relation is neare enough) He sees, and heares by them: yet they

must not passe their bounds; they must be like to the outward senses still, and make a bare repre∣sentation; the office of reason is peculiar to him; to passe judgement thereon: Their information is not alwayes faithfull; he may consult reason, and, by the benefit of that, correct their errour misrepresenting an object as crooked, which in it selfe is streight.

If not out of duty to their King, and a just sense of His honour, yet out of love to themselves, and a naturall care of their own safety, Subjects are bound in all legall wayes to expresse their dislike of this proposition. For they must expect to suffer all those evills which Faction can produce; and what happinesse can be hoped for in a Kingdome divided in it selfe? This were the ready way to kindle a fire in our own bowells, which would first break out in the Countyes electing, and di∣vide the familyes of the gentry by irreconcileable hatred. For it cannot be imagined, but that power will bandy against power, and relations against relations, to put Sons or Kinsmen into that roade, which only leads unto preferment. Nor would the flames be quenched, but rather burn more fiercely even in the Houses, (as being pent in a narrow room) to which the insolency of some

attaining offices, (to which they are not equall) the shame and discontents of others repulsed, and the ambition of all would adde continuall fuell. But the greatest misery of all is, were their corrup∣tions never so high, we could have but slender hopes of redresse. Since the prevayling party (jea∣lous of their own honour) would easily maintain the reputation of their choice, and perhaps it would be necessary for them to wink one at ano∣ther. He that cannot think it probable, that out of private ends they should so farre neglect justice and honour, let him only examine, whether in some Parliaments most known offendours, and active instruments in the peoples misery, by stri∣king in with the prevailing side, have not been more safe then innocency could have made them.

There are severall degrees of Prerogatives Royall, some whereof have greater power of protection, and lesse of oppression, and such J am most studious of.]

Certainly it were to be desired, we might en∣joy the benefits of power, and not be subject to the possible abuse thereof. But since this cannot be fully provided for, because the same hand which is enabled to protect, may injure; the aimes of wisest States have been, not so much to take a∣way the power (because then they should be

likely to suffer under a weak Protector) as the will of oppression. The most probable means to effect this, is, (after a certain rule is agreed upon, and Lawes are established, to acquaint a gover∣nor, what he ought to doe, in performance of that trust committed to him) so to order his interests, that to advance the peoples good shall be for the Princes advantage. Subjects will have great rea∣son to promise to themselves a full happinesse from the faithfull discharge of his Regall office, to which he is so strongly tyed by those bonds of justice and profit. This the wisdom of our An∣cestors hath provided for in a high degree, and so temper'd this governement, that both King, and people, will be joyntly happy, or joyntly misera∣ble. The severall goods of each forme are here u∣nited; we have great Democraticall advantages, and yet may avoyd the evills of a popular State, as long as Monarchy is kept up in its due height, and tumultuous insolent multitudes are not protected from a legall tryall: we have the good of Aristo∣cracy, counsell of the best experienced (such as have studied nations and men) nor yet are we ac∣quainted with the disease of it, faction amongst the Nobility. The Counsell of many is profitable, but the resolve of one is necessary. Since they

looking upon one another as equalls would be very apt to quarrell; for when one contradicts, what another hath advised, the debate between them seems to be, which is the wiser man. Their discourses are like so many pleadings for honour, and we know what issue such suites would come to, when the thing in controversy is so highly va∣lued, if there were not a judge to determine. And this is the benefit of Monarchy; which is so re∣strained by some power proper to the Houses it cannot degenerate into a tyranny. For how should this enter in? The old lawes (the security of our libertyes) cannot be taken away till both Houses give consent: but grant an illegall, violent Govern∣ment should break in upon us, by what meanes could it be maintained? The King can have no supply of money, without the House of Com∣mons, and without these sinewes his arm would not be strong enough to hold the reines, which should govern that provoked beast, the multitude. But He may take it by force, He cannot doe it in person, and it is not to be imagined, any conside∣rable number of His people, will be active in their owne slavery. Besides what can he propose to himselfe? The people will give more then can be forced from them; so he looses by it, and then how

much doth he hazard against lesse then nothing? He hath least reason to break the lawes willfully, because he injoyes most by them, and experience having shew'd the benefit of observing them, and the ill of the contrary, He cannot but doubt, the People would fail of their duty, if he doe in per∣formance of trust, and cast of the bond of obedi∣ence, if he doe that of Protection. These things duly weighed, render that malice inexcuseable, which hath long time exercised the people with most unreasonable feares, of lands, and liberty, and Religion being in danger; and this notwith∣standing the King's many sacred Protestations to the contrary before God and all the world, and the whole course of his proceedings, which evidently tend to the securing all.

Now I think it doth fully appeare, that the do∣ctrine of that Remonstrance, laid down by His Majesty, by way of recapitulation in seven posi∣tions, is most justly offensive; being such as doth threaten ruine to both Church, and State, not per∣mitting us, either to obey the King, or serve God as we ought.

1. That the Parliament has an absolute indis∣putable power of declaring Law; so that all the right of King and People depends upon their plea∣sure.

This power must rest in them, or in the King, or in some inferior Court, or else all suits must be end∣lesse, and it can no where rest more safely then in Parliament.]

The two Houses are not the Parliament. The subject of such power is the intire body, which consists of three estates. Some things are cleare and evident in Law, and want no declarer; if o∣therwise, all the Subjects right would lye in the brest of the Iudge. If the two Houses should Vote, younger Brothers ought to inherite by the Law of England, could this destroy the right of the first born?

2. That Parliaments are bound to no Presi∣dents.

Statutes are not binding to them, why then should Presidents? yet there is no obligation stronger then the Justice and Honour of a Parliament.]

This is an excellent ground to justifie their in∣nocence against all the world. For if they can make it appeare, they are not bound to keepe any law, no man can accuse them for the breach of any. What obligation can justice lay on them, who by astrange vertue of representation, are not ca∣pable of doing wrong. It will become justice, be∣cause they did it▪ when he hath declared what Ho∣nour

is, I shall be able to judge of that bond; it may perchance not stand with their honour, not to be able to prove men guilty, after they have once accused and imprisoned them. Statutes stand in, full force to the two Houses, as being not voyd, till repealed by a joynt consent of all the Estates.

3. That they are Parliaments, and may judge of publique necessity without the King, and dis∣pose of any thing.

They may not desert the King, but being deser∣ted by the King, when the Kingdome is in distresse, they may judge of that distresse and relieve it, and are to be accompted by the vertue of Representa∣tion, as the whole body of the State.]

To dissent, after he hath granted what ever can in reason be desired, is not to desert the Houses. Upon pretence of distresse, to take illegall courses, is as if they should perswade us, we are not in health, and therefore they must breake our heads to forward our recovery. They represent the peo∣ple to some purposes, not the King to any, and therefore are but a part of the State.

4. That no member of Parliament ought to be troubled for Treason &c. without leave.

This is intended of suspicion only, and when leave may seasonably be bad, and when competent

accusers appeare not in the impeachment.]

If by suspicions be meant only a bare not con∣siding in, this in justice cannot be sufficient ground. But upon Articles drawn and proofes in readinesse, which it is not fit to produce, while the accused partyes are at liberty, they may be medled with: for designes of this nature may brook no delay, because it might prove dangerous to the King's safety, or at least afford them liberty to escape. If the Houses being adjourned were not able to give consent, or upon too much confi∣dence, should not be willing, hath not the Law provided in such a case for triall of Treason?

5. That the soveraigne power resides in both Houses of Parliament, the King having no negative voyce.

This power is not claimed as ordinary, nor to any purpose, but to save the Kingdom from ruine, and in case where the King is so seduced, as that be pro∣ferres dangerous men, and prosequutes his loyall Subjects.]

Not as ordinary; that is they will only be King's as long as they please, and when they are weary of Reigning, the Kingdome shall be out of dan∣ger, and then it shall be his turne to command a∣gaine. To save it from ruine; the Law hath better

provided for the Peoples safety, by prohibiting all illegall executions of power, grounded upon what specious pretences soever, And in case where the King is seduced; that is, when he is not so wise as he should be, because he does not think as they doe, and refuses to satisfy the humors, and inte∣rests of some. And prefers; (this seems to be the true cause of all; preferments doe not goe the right way) dangerous men, i. e. such as desire he should govern according to the known Lawes of the Land. And prosequutes his loyall Subjects; i. e. is driven from London to Yorke, where He long time patiently expected the undeceiving of His People.

6. That leavying Forces against the personall commands of the King (though accompanyed with his presence) is not leavying warre against the King: but warr against his Authority, though not Person, is warre against the King.

If this were not so, the Parliament seeing a se∣duced King ruining himselfe and the Kingdom, could not save both, but must stand and look on.]

It is against common sense to fancy a King rui∣ning Himselfe and Kingdom; He can neither be willing nor able. Upon a mad supposall, mad consequences will follow.

7. That according to some Parliaments, they may depose Kings.

'Tis denyed that any King was deposed by a free Parliament fairely elected.]

This is most certain, but takes not off those words upon which this Proposition is grounded.

These might well have been omitted, as being more fully handled in the book. But least he should complaine any thing was past over, I chose by a short review to be his remembrancer. The Propositions collected out of His Majesties Declarations, are but the brief of his Observations, to all which I have already spoken.

To conclude, if the people hearken to reason they must needs think, His Majesty will be more ready to prevent all reall danger, then any Subject whatsoever, because He is sure to beare the grea∣test share in the losse. It alwaies was the master Policy amongst the wisest Legislators to grant to them the greatest power of government, to whom the preservation of the present state would be most beneficiall; because their private interests were the same with the publique, from which if they swarv'd by error or misinformati∣on their own disadvantage did soon appeare.

Notes

• I. 1. pol. c. 8. Odyss••••
• 2. King. 11.
• 2. Kin. 12.
• v. 21.
• 2. Sam. 24.9.
• L. si mulier. D. quod me t. cau.
• L nemo D. de reg. jur.
• 2. Sam. 15.4.
• Gen. 47.
• Jos. 9.
• ••xod 21.1.
• Rom. 13.
• ••rit. 112.
• l. 2. c. 14.
• L. in bello. §. medio. D. de cap∣tiv. & post∣lim.
• Mat. 27.19
• Ioh. 19.6.
• Mat. 27.18.
• v. 30.