An essay upon reason, and the nature of spirits by Richard Burthogge ...

Of Human Reason. The First Part.

Chap. I. Of Reason in general.

SECT. I.

In what sense Reason is taken and discoursed of here. A double account of it; the first, more Notional; the second, more Real. Of the Agreements of Reason, Sense, and Ima∣gination. (1.) That all three are Cogitative and Conceptive Powers. Cogitation what. Monsieur des Cartes, and Honoratus Fa∣ber, their Opinion, that Sensation is not Cogitation, considered, (2.) That Sense, Imagination, and Reason are Mental and Spiritual, and not meerly Mechanick and Material Powers. The Differences of those Powers; that all Sensation is Imagination, and what is commonly called Imagination, is but Internal Sensation. Intellection or Rea∣soning, is Knowing without Imagination. Instances, setting out these several Notions. The power of Knowing without Imagining, why called Reason.

REASON taken for Human Mind, or Understanding (which is the sense I take it in now) is defined by most, the faculty whereby a Man is said to be Reasonable, or Understanding; in like manner as Sight is defined, the faculty whereby a Living Creature is Denominated Seeing, or Visive, or Reason is that faculty whereby a Man does Exercise the acts of Reason, or doth Understand; as Sight, the faculty whereby a Man or any other Animal doth see, or discern Objects.

Nor are they altogether without Rea∣son, who do so define and explicate it; for Acts of Perception properly so called, are not Known, or Knowable, but in and by themselves; we Know not, nor are capable of Knowing, what the Act of See∣ing is, but by seeing; nor what that of Hearing is, but by Hearing; or what the Act of Understanding is, but by Under∣standing. And again, Perceptive faculties are not Known, or Knowable, but by their Acts: We Know not what the faculty or power of Seeing is but relatively, with relation to the Act of Seeing: Nor what the faculty or Power of Hearing is, but by the Act of Hearing; nor what the faculty or power of Understanding or Reasoning is, but by Acts of Understanding or Rea∣soning:

In a word, no Faculties, no Powers are Known, or Knowable, but by their respective Acts or Exercises, and therefore they cannot be defined or set out but by them. All this is certain.

However, since this is but a notional fruitless way of Explicating Reason, and too short, too narrow to satisfie a Curious and Inquisitive Mind; therefore to settle an Idea of it, that may be more to pur∣pose, more real, and more edifying; I will show, in the first place, the Agreements it hath with other Conceptive Cogitative faculties, what it holds in common with them; and afterwards, set out the Diffe∣rences that do discriminate and divide these several faculties, each from other, and this particularly from the Rest.

The Conceptive Cogitative Faculties that are in Man, (for so I call the Faculties by which he makes acquaintance with exter∣nal Objects) are his external Sense, Imagi∣nation (as it is called) and Reason or Un∣derstanding: Three Faculties which do all Agree and Concur in this, that they are Conceptive and Cogitative, and consequent∣ly Mental and Spiritual, and not meerly Mechanick and Material Powers.

First; All three are Conceptive, Cogita∣tive Powers; Sensation and Imagination, as well as Reasoning or Intellection, are

Cogitations. Cogitation is conscious Af∣fection; Conscious Affection, is Affection with Consciousness of that Affection; and by another name is called Knowledge. Knowledge, as it has a double relation, so it may be considered two ways, to wit, ei∣ther in reference to the Object, which is Known, and so, properly, it is Appre∣hension or Conscious Perception; or, as it respects the Image and Idea, by means of which we do perceive or know that Ob∣ject, and so it may be called Conception. Conception properly speaking, is of the Image, or Idea; Apprehension, Knowledge, or conscious Perception is of the Object, by means of that Idea, or Image: It is as proper to say, that the Sense and Imagi∣nation do conceive, as that the Reason or Understanding doth; the former does as much conceive Images and Sentiments, as the latter does Ideas and Notions.

Conception and Cogitation, really are but one Act, and consequently, all Con∣ceptive are Cogitative Powers, and Co∣gitative Powers Conceptive. Only, to clear the Notion of Consciousness, by which Co∣gitation or Knowledge is distinguished, tho' never divided, from Conception, we must further consider the Way and Manner how Consciousness Arises. And it seems to me to arise, ordinarily, from the distinction

and difference that is in Conceptions; for, should any person have his Eye perpetu∣ally tied to one Object, without ever closing of, or turning it to another, he would no more be sensible that he saw that Ob∣ject, or know any more what it was to see, than if he had been blind from his Birth. For since Consciousness of Seeing is nothing but a perceiving by the Eye, that one is Affected, or otherwise Affected than he was, with the appearance of Light, or Co∣lour. If a person had never seen but one thing, and never but seen it, he could have no perceivance (that) he is so Affected, that is, he could not be sensible or conscious (that) he did see. Thus, tho' in our Members the parts that do compose them are contiguous one to another, and do al∣ways touch, yet we do not feel them touch, that is, they touch, but we are not sensible they do, because no difference being in the Affection, there is no Sense, no Conscious∣ness of it: But Dislocation is soon per∣ceived; as also it is when any part is pres∣sed unusually. I conclude, that as diffe∣rence of Conception arises from different Affections of the Faculties by Objects, so Consciousness, or Sense of Conception, arises from the difference of Conceptions. Did we know but one thing, or had but one Act of Conception, we should not know

that we did know that one, that is, that Conception would not properly be Cogitation, but would be, as toubhing without feeling. However, since there is so great a diversity of Objects in the World, all-around us, and consequently, so many various Impressions made upon the Mind, by those Objects, so that its Concep∣tive Power cannot but be diversly Affected, and moved, and the Mind also have a per∣ceivance of that diversity; hence it comes to pass, that Conception is always Cogi∣tation. In short, Conception is Modifica∣tion of Mind, and Cogitation is Concep∣tion with Consciousness of it. Conscious∣ness of Conception is a sense of the Alte∣ration made in the Mind by that Concep∣tion (of which it is conscious;) si nihil (says Cotta apud Cicer. l. 1. de Nat. Deor.) inter Deum & Deum differt, nulla est apud Deos cognitio nulla perceptio,

I know very well that Monsieur Des Cartes, the ingenious Honorato Fabri, and many others do differ from me, for deny∣ing (as they do) that Sensation is Know∣ledge, and consequently, excluding both Conception and Consciousness from the Idea of it, they must also deny, that Sense is a Cogitative or Conceptive Power. But then, it is hard to say, what that Idea is, that they have of Sensation. Besides, 'tis

most certain that in Men, Sensation is Con∣cious Perception, for whatever Impression is made upon our Eye by any Object, we do not for all that, discern, or see the Ob∣ject, if we do not atend unto, as well as receive, the Impression; that is, we do not discern or see, but when we Know we do. Then only we have a Sensation of Objects, when we are Conscious that they do Impress us; that is, when our Organs being Impressed, there arise and spring up in us, by means of those Impressions, cer∣tain Images or Conceptions, that (many of them) by a Natural delusion do seem as really to Exist without us, in the Objects themselves, as if they were indeed so ma∣ny real Affections of them, or Inherent Accidents in them. And those Images be∣ing but Modifications of Mind, arise not in us upon any Impressions but when the Mind Attends to them, for else they can∣not Affect it.

But happily it will be told me, that this Consciousness of Impressions, which is in men, when they do see, or hear, or other∣wise perceive Objects, by the Affections of their External Organs, Arises in them only from the Concomitance of the Under∣standing; because in men, whatevet Af∣fects the Sense, is also perceived by the Un∣derstanding; but that there neither is, nor

can be, any such thing in other Animals, which are as void of Consciousness of any Impression made upon their Organs, as they are of that Reason and Understand∣ing that makes it in Men. But as this may be said, so it may be as easily Replyed to; for 'tis as impossible, that Men should have any clear, or indeed any Idea, at all of Sensation, in other Species of Animals, but by that, which they have of their own; as it is certain, that Sensation in Men cannot be understood to be without Conception, nor Conception without At∣tention of Mind. Attention of Mind, is the Application of it unto Objects, and therefore in Men, is called Minding: Without Attention no Conception, and without Conception no Consciousness; Consciousness being (as I have said) no∣thing but a Sense of Alteration made in the Mind, by some new Affection of it, that is, by a new Thought or Conception. Besides, there are many other things that do make for this Opinion, that all Animal Sensation is Cogitation; particularly, that great Sagacity that is in some Animals, which cannot be accounted for with any clearness, but by allowing to them a great degree of Knowledge and Consciousness.

And hence it follows, that Sense and Imagination, as well as the Understand∣ing

and Reason, are Mental and Spiritu∣al, not meerly Mechanick and Material Powers By Mechanick and meerly Mate∣rial Powers I understand such as do result from Matter only, and the Modes of Matter; from Local Motion and Rest, and from Size, Figure and Texture. By Mental Spiritual Powers, I understand such as cannot be conceived to arise from Matter only, and the Modes of Matter, without the Influence of Mind; and in the number of these I reckon Sense, and Imagination, as well as the Understand∣ing or Reason. It is true, the term [Mind] is Appropriated, by way of ex∣cellency, to the Understanding or Reason, this being a faculty that hath the partici∣pation of Mind in a higher degree than the others have: But yet, there is Mind, and as much of Mind in all the Conceptive Cogitative Acts of Sense or Imagination, as there is of Conception and Cogitation in them. Thus I have shewed how Sense, Imagination, and Reason do agree, now I am to shew how they differ.

Sense, (by which I mean the power of Seeing, of Hearing, of Tasting, of Smel∣ling, and of Feeling,) is that by which we make acquaintance with External Ob∣jects, and have Knowledge of them by means of Images and Apparitions, or

(which is a better expression, as being more General and Comprehensive,) by Sen∣timents excited in the External Organs, through Impressions made upon them from Objects. Imagination is internal Sense, or an (After) Representation of the Images or Sentiments (that have been) excited be∣fore in the Sense: This is the Basis and Foundation of it; Composition, Division, and Enlargement of Images, is but Acces∣sory, but Superstructure, and an Improve∣ment of Sense. Reason or Understanding, is a faculty by which we know External Objects, as well as our own Acts, without framing Images of them;; only by Ideas or Notions. In short, Sensation, properly, is Imagination, for every Sense Imagines; and that, which commonly is called Imagi∣nation, is but Remembrance, or Recol∣lection of Sensation. Imagination, is Repe∣tition of Sensation made from within, Sen∣sation, is Imagination occasioned by imme∣diate Impressions from without us. Rea∣son or Understanding, is refined, Subli∣mated Sensation, that is, a conscious pre∣ception of things by Notions or Ideas, and not by Images, or sensible Representations. And thus, all the cogitative powers that are in Man, may be reduced to Two, to Sense and Reason; the former compre∣hending the Imagination, which is but

the power of Remembring Sensations, and of Amplifying them; and the Letter com∣prehending Intellectual Remembrance, which is only a recollection of Ideas or Notions.

But to make a Reflection of more light, it may be minded, that when we look on a Book, (to Instance in a thing that is next to hand,) and read any Sentence in it, as this, God is a Spirit, we have at that time in our Eyes the Figures of the Letters that compose the Words, and so do know by them, what the words are; and this is Sense. But if putting aside the Book we will endeavour to Recollect those words, we must do it one of two ways; either by Retrieving in our thoughts the very Fi∣gures and Imagies of the Letters and Words before presented to our Eyes; or (which we oftnest do) by recalling the Words and Sentence, and saying to our selves, or unto others, God is a Spirit, without thinking in the least, of any Fi∣gures of the Letters that do make the Words, or of the Images of the Words that compose the Sentence. In the for∣mer we do Imagine the Sentence, as raising again the Images of the Words that make it, and this is Sensible Remembrance; but in the latter, though, when we Recollect the Sentence, we must withal (some way

or other) mind again the words that com∣pose it, yet we do it without Imagining them, and this is Intellectual Remem∣brance, or the act of the Reason. Add, that at the same time that we do see the Schemes and Figures of the Letters, and have the portraictures and draughts of the words presented to our Eyes, which is Sense, we have, or may have, in our minds the sense and meaning of those words, of which sense or meaning however, we have neither Picture or Figure; and this is Un∣derstanding: In the former we have Images, in the latter only Ideas; we See the words, but understand the meaning This power of the Mind, (of perceiving without Ima∣gining,) is called Reason, because in those Acts in which it does converse with things by means of words (and those are most of the Acts exerted by it) the sense and meaning of the words is (as it were) In∣ferred and Reasoned from them. What I have said, suffices to make the Notion or Idea of Reason or Understanding conceiv∣able, by men who use Attention, and do think, but nothing will be enough to ex∣plicate and set it out to such as cannot en∣dure that trouble, but will swallow all things without chewing-

SECT. II.

Of Reason as taken for Contrivance, Contri∣vance, what, Sagacity what. Reason taken but for Contrivance, not Characte∣ristical to Man. Of the Imaginative Con∣trivance in Irrational Animals. An In∣stance of it in a certain Hen. Apprehen∣sion, Composition, Illation, Acts of the Ima∣gination, as well as of the Reason or Un∣derstanding. Composition of Phantasms, how Illustrated by Mr. Hobbs. That Rea∣son taken for the Understanding (in the Notion of Understanding setled before) a∣grees to no other Animal but Man. Of Prince Maurices Parrot. The Acts of Reason as taken for the Understanding, re∣duced to two, to wit, Apprehension and Judgment.

I Know very well, that most Men, and even most Philosophers do take Rea∣son but for Contrivance, or for Discourse, which is a sort of Contrivance; and that Contrivance (a dexterity in which they call Sagacity,) is a thinking upon means to compass and attain ends; as first upon the nearest means, then upon the means to that, and so on till all the necessary means are thought upon. But those who

think so, (to wit, that Reason is nothing but Contrivance,) can never evidence that Reason is the Character or sole Pre∣rogative of Man, (which yet it is com∣monly belived, and said to be;) since there is Imaginative, as well as Intellectu∣al Contrivance, and Imaginative Contri∣vance must be owned to belong to Inferior Animals, as well as to Men. My mean∣ing is, that other Animals besides Men, and below them too, have a faculty or power by which, after a sort, they do con∣ceive the next means (though not under the Notion of a Means) to what they would have, and then the means to that, and so by a train of Phantasms, go on till they have found enough for compassing the thing which they desire and prosecute. I have seen an Hen whose Chicken ran from her through a little hole that was in a Gate, through which she could not follow them, into a Court Inviorned with a very high Wall, that being in a passion to come to them, first she looks to see if she could fly to the top of the Wall, which was the nearest way and means, but upon Trial finding that unfeasible, and spying at some distance a Pent-House, from which she was able to gain it, away she flies to That; though it was to go farther than before from her Chickens, and consequently, no

ways for her purpose, but as it was a means to reach the top of the Wall, which was the nearest means to get to them: Thus did this Hen contrive for her pur∣poses.

The Instance I have given is a small one, and in a Creature not remarkable as many others are for Acts of Sagacity; it is not an Instance in the Elephant, in the Castor, the Fox, the Dog, or such other subtle Animals; and yet an Instance serving well enough for my design, which is to shew, that Reason which is proper and Characte∣ristical to Man, is not meer Contrivance or Discouse. For this it plainly sheweth, since it manifests, that Inferiour sensitive Creatures are Contriving and Discursive, and capable of making network of their Sentiments and Fantoms; and withal (manifests) that Apprehension, Composi∣tion and Illation are in some sort, as well the Acts of the Imagination, which is com∣mon to all sensitives, as of the Understand∣ing and Reason, which is peculiar to men. More, and Nobler Examples may be had in Rorarius, and in others of the Moderns; and in Cicero l. 2. De Natura Deorum, for the Ancients.

The way how Phantasms are com∣pounded by the Imagination, is prettily, though perhaps not adequately, Illustrated

by M. Hobbs, in a Similitude taken from Water;

'Water (says he) when moved at once by divers movements, receiveth one motion compounded of them all; so it is in the Brain or Spirits stirred by di∣vers objects; there is composed an Ima∣gination of divers conceptions; that ap∣peared single to the Sense. As Sense at one time sheweth the Figure of a Moun∣tain, at another of Gold, and the Ima∣gination afterwards composes them in a Golden Mountain.

But without determining that Images are compounded in the Imagination, just the same way as Mr. Hobbs has represent∣ed, this is certain, a composition of them there is, and contrivance too in that com∣position; and this as well in Animals that are called Irrational, as in Men, who may, in some measure, guess at the latitude and extend thereof in other Animals, by what they find in themselves, in common Dreams.

But whatever Contrivence (that Re∣sembles Reasoning) such Animals as are called Irrational may have, certain it is, that Reason taken for the Understanding, as the Understanding is a power of percei∣ving without Imagining, cannot be evi∣denced to be in them; they may Imagine, and by force of Imagination, after a sort

Contrive, but it cannot be shewed that they Understand, or that they do Con∣trive the same way that men do, who do it by vertue of their Understanding. The Contrivance (and consequently the Dis∣course) of Irrational Animals, is a pure Effect of Sense and Imagination, and per∣formed only by the Sequel of Images, which Sequels is not properly Illation made by way of Judgment, but as (in ef∣fects of the Plastick) the Images follow one another by means of their Congruity; or of some other Antecedent connexion; where∣in the Memory, which is the Exchequer or common Treasury of all Sensations, and the disposition and order of Images in it, serves to good purpose. Such Animals, as they have not that use of words that Men have (of which hereafter,) so they have not that Power of Understanding which is termed Judicative; a power that so Esti∣mates, and Weighs and Ballances Things, and their proportions one to another, by Comparing and Conferring them, that ac∣cordingly it pronounces upon them; This is That, or, This is not That, and This is Such, or, This is not Such; Which Senten∣ces so pronounced, are called Propositions, or Enunciations, and are, really, Judg∣ments. Whence it follows, that the so much talkt of Syllogisme of Hounds, (for

so Reisch in his Margarita Philosophica calls it, when he says, In bivio, feram alterâ declinasse parte Sillogizant canes,) is meer fallacy; the Hare is gone either this way or that way, he smells out the minor with his nose, he is not gone this way, and therefore concluding he is gone the other, doth with open mouth run that way, with∣out his putting Nose to ground. All this is but Sensation, and following of the Scent, without any thing of Enunciation or Judgment; there is nothing of Propositions, Major, Minor, or Conclusion, in the case: The Hound perhaps does put his Nose at first where the Scent is not, and not find∣ing it, turns another way, where it hap∣pens to be, so that upon turning being pre∣sently struck with the Scent, he follows it, with an out-cry; without putting of his Nose to the ground, to seek for what he has found already.

I confess, the story of Prince Maurice his Parrot is stupendious, and if no Illusi∣on was in it, as none Appears; or that it was not an Effect of Witchcraft, which I most suspect, (the Country of Brasill in which it was Acted, (as all the Indies) ha∣ving many Diabolical Agents, that work by Magick;) I should think it a very Cross Instance to my former Discourse. But considering it, as I do, only as an Ef∣fect

of Diabolical power, I put it in the number of the Extraordinary Events, with the Tricks of the Divining Ape which Mr. Terry writes of, in his Relation of a Voy∣age into the East-Indies; and then it may not be drawn into Argument. However, that thinking men may have an Occasion to employ their Thoughts, and to make an Impartial Judgment, I will tell the sto∣ry as I find it in Sir William Temples Me∣moirs p. 57. Ed. 2. in his own Words, together with the Reflexion he makes.

"With the Prince of Orange (says he) returned most of the General Officers to the Hague, and among the rest Old Prince Maurice of Nassaw, who, as the Prince told me, had with the greatest in∣dustry that could be, sought all occasions of dying fairly at the Battle of Seneffe without succeeding, which had given him great regrets; and I did not won∣der at it, considering his age of about Seventy Six, and his long habits both of Gout and Stone. When he came to visit me upon his return and before he went to his Government of Cleve, it came in my head to ask him an idle question, because I thought it not very likely for me to see him again, and I had a mind to Kown from his own Mouth the Ac∣count of a common but much credited

story, that I had heard so often from many others of an old Parrot he had in Brasill during his Government there, that spoke, and asked, and answered, common questions like a Reasonable Cteature; so that those of his train there, generally concluded it to be Witchery or Possession; and one of the Chaplains, who lived long after∣wards in Holland would never from that time endure a Parrot, but said they all had a Devil in them. I had heard many particulars of this Story, and assevered by People hard to be Discredited, which made me ask Prince Maurice what there was of it. He said with his usual plain∣ness and dryness in talk, there was some∣thing true, but a great deal false, of what had been reported. I desired to Know of him, what there was of the first, he told me short and coldly, that he had heard of such an old Parrot when he came to Brasill; and though he be∣lieved nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet he had so much curiosity as as to send for it; that it was a very great and a very old one; and when it came first into the room where the Prince was with a great many Dutchmen about him, it said presently, What a company of White men are here? They askt it what

he thought that Man was? pointing at at the Prince. It answered, Some Gene∣ral or other. When they brought it close to him, he askt it, Dou venes, vous? [Whence come you?] It answered, De Marinnan. [From Marinnan. The Prince, A qui est es vous? [To whom do you belong?] The Parrot, A un Por∣tugez. [To a Portugez.] Prince Que fais tula? [What do you there?] Par∣rot, Je garde les poulles. [I look after the Chickens?] The Prince laughed and said, Vous gardes les poulles? [You look after the Chickens?] The Parrot answered. Ouy moy & je Scay bien faire, [yes, I, and I know well enough how to do it.] And make the Chuck four or five times that people use to make to Chick∣ens when they call them. I set down the words of this worthy Dialogue in French, just as Prince Maurice said them to me. I asked him in what Language the Parrot spoke? And he said in Bra∣silian. I asked whether he understood Brasilian? He said, no, but he had taken care to have two Interpreters by him, one a Dutch-man that spoke Brisilian, and the other a Brisilian that spoke Dutch; that he asked them separately and privately, and both of them agreed in telling him just the same thing

that the Parrot said. I could not (says Sir William) but tell this odd Story, be because it is so much out of the way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for I dare say this Prince at least believed himself in all he told me, having ever passed for a very honest and pious man. I leave it to Naturalists to reason, and to other men to believe as they please upon it.

Thus that excellent Person. But to re∣turn, (for indeed, what I have said in this Section is a Kind of Digression, as be∣ing more proper for another place.)

The Acts of Reason (taking Reason for the Understanding) may be aptly enough reduced to two, to wit, Apprehension and Judgment; to the latter of which that dis∣position of our Conceptions into order and method, which commonly is called Or∣dinative Discourse, as also Argumentation and Deduction, which is termed Illative, and hath the name of Reasoning appropriat∣ed to it, do (both) belong, as Instruments and Means.

CHAP. II. Of Apprehension.

SECT. I.

Apprehension, the first Act of Reason. Of Words, the ordinary Means of Apprehensi∣on. The Ends and Uses of Words, 1. To distinguish things as they are in the Mind, in which, words do stand for things. Why Mind is called Understanding. 2. To ex∣press our Thoughts and Conceptions one to another. The Importance of Words unto Knowledge, in this second Use of them. Of the Sense of Words. Of Canting. All Use of New Words, not Canting. The Sense of Words twofold; Verbal, and Reall. This distinction of the Senses of Words Illustrated, and the Usefulness there∣of explained. Why the Meaning of Words is called Sense.

Apprehension, or that Act of the Rea∣son or Understanding, in respect of which it is said to see or perceive things, is the same in reference to this faculty, that seeing is unto the Eye: for the mind to ap∣prehend, perceive, or know any Object, is the same (to speak by way of allusion and similitude) as for the Eye to see, or discern one.

What I have said in the former Chapter, does cast some Light on this Subject; but yet to set it out more fully, I will consider, First, the Ordinary Means the Understand∣ing uses in its Acts of Apprehension, and those are Words. Secondly, The immedi∣ate Object of Apprehension, and that is Notion, or Intellectual Sentiment; Senti∣ment of the Mind. Thirdly, The two chies Affections of Apprehension, and those are clearness and distinctness; of which three considerations; the Second properly is a Subject of Metaphysicks; the Third of Lo∣gick; and the First is common to both.

Apprehension properly and primarily is of things, as things are taken largely, for (external) Objects of the Mind. By an (external) Object of the Mind, I mean whatever any wise is without, and thought upon by, it. Now, the mind may think upon Objects, two ways. First, it may think upon them nakedly and abstractly, as they are in themselves, (without consi∣dering them as marked and distinguished by Words, or any other Characters and Notes, that should betoken or signifie them,) only by having the Idea or notion of them. And this is to apprehend an Ob∣ject immmediately. For example, without considering of the Word [whiteness,] or having the least thought of it, one may

consider the Image of Whiteness, as ir doth appear in Snow, in Paper, or on a White wall. But Secondly, the mind may also think of things, and consider them by means of Words, that signifie them; as when having in our thoughts the word [whiteness], we do not think of the thing or Image, but under that word, which stands for it; or perhaps do think and speak of whiteness, without having the I∣mage of whiteness at all; for both ways we may think of things by means of words, since words may be used to call the Images or Notions of things into our minds, for else themselves may stand in our minds for these Images or Notions, and so may be discoursed of, or used in the Discourse of other things. This Instance I acknowledge is an Imaginative Apprehension; and I use it rather than another that is Intellectual, because the Understanding in its Acts of Apprehension, if not always, doth very of∣ten, summon in the aid of the Imagination; as also, because it serves well enough to manifest my meaning; which, in short, is, that the mind may think on things either immediately, without the help of words; or mediately by means of them.

Words are the Names of things, and of the Notions, Thoughts and Conceptions that we have of things. Names are Arti∣culate

Sounds, appointed to signifie things and Notions.

All Articulations of Sounds, all Voices (for Articulations of Sound are call'd Voices) tho they be, or may, by composition and conjugation, be multiplied, almost to infi∣nity, yet they are reducible within the compass of the Alphabet, and can be ex∣pressed by the four and twenty Letters, in their Combination; which certainly was an excellent Invention, and full of Admi∣ration. For Words, as properly they are but Sounds, so, as Sounds they could not be spoken, and consequently could not sig∣nifie, but unto persons that are present, and within hearing, and to them too but for the present. Whereas by means of Letters, becoming capable of being perma∣nent and fix'd in Writing, they become com∣municable, both to those that are present, and to those that are absent; even to the most remote, in time, and place. Again, Since Writing is a representation of our Words, as, Words of our Conceptions and Thoughts; so that Writings do signi∣fie, and stand for, our Words, as Words do signifie, and stand for, our Thoughts; therefore when I do discourse of Words, I would be understood to discourse of those that are written, as well as of those that are spoken. And in fine, since thoughts

may be signified by gestures and other Signs, as well as by Words; (for there are three ways of discoursing, or communicating of thoughts; to wit, by Words, by Writing, and by meer Signs and Gestures;) therefore what I say of Words must be taken as inten∣ded to be equally meant, mutatis mutandis, of Gestures and other Signs (so far as they are used to signify our thoughts) as well as of words themselves.

The Ʋses of words are divers. The First, to be as so many marks and tokens upon things, to signifie and show them; so that every man may be able to know them again in his own mind, and to distin∣guish and discern them in it.

For the clearing of this use, it must be considered, that the Understanding hath not of its own, (as the Imagination hath) any proper Images, any Figures of the things it converses with, whereby to know or di∣stinguish them; the only Images it has of things (besides those of the Sense, or the Imagination) are the Words which signify them; which do stand therein for the very things themselves. For to give an Exam∣ple; There is no such thing in the Under∣standing as an Image, or sensible Figure, of Substance, or of mind, or of matter, or of colour in general, as there is in the sense, or imagination of white, of black, of red,

of green, or of other particular Colours: The only Images it has of these, and of all things else that are purely intelligible and mental, are the Words that signify them: Ay, the very Ideas the Understanding hath of things, are nothing but its definitive conceptions of them, or definitions; and definitions as properly they are of Words (which Words since they stand in the mind for things, are commonly mistaken for, and consequently miscalled, Simple Ideas of these things;) so they are made by words. To such a degree, in this respect, are words of use to the understanding, which cannot work without them; a thing so certain, that even the denomination it self of [under∣standing] at least in part, arises from hence; for the Mind is called (the) Understand∣ing, because it has a power of seeing things under Words that stand for them; as well as because it has one of perceiving Substan∣ces under Accidents; and had Beasts this power, they would come but little short of men, as to Acts of mind.

But besides this use, (which is more pri∣vate and particular, an use that every man must have of Words for himself) there is a Second, an use that men have of them one for another? to wit, mutually to express their Sentiments and Thoughts; in respect of which, words are said to be as Mony:

the meaning is, That words used to con∣vey our minds to others, must be such as are current, and in use, or else they will not pass.

Speech or Language (the cloathing of our Sentiments and Thoughts in Words) is, in respect of both the mentioned uses, especially the latter, of so much moment to Reason (taken for Discourse, or Contri∣vance at large; that some have conceited, that men are little beholding to any thing else but the former, for that degree of the Latter, that doth divide and distinguish them from Beasts. Reason in their Opini∣on, in the Seeds and principles of it, being but as a Spark, which in men, by the ad∣vantage of Speech, becomes improved and blown into such a flame as has engrossed the Title; so that tho the same Principles of Reason are common to all Animals, yet this Improvement of them (that only carries the Name) is proper to man, because Speech is. And in truth, by means of Speech, or communication of Sentiments and Thoughts, as one man becomes assisted and aided by another; so if we do add Writing and Printing, which are but Fixa∣tions of Speech, it may be said, that eve∣ry man is assisted and aided with the Sen∣timents and thoughts of all; and how much help this may bring toward the im∣proving

of Reason, is nothing hard to be conceived by one that shall consider the great advantage a Consult has, for the ripening of Business, or making a judgment upon things, above the reasoning of any one particular solitary person; or hath ob∣served the difference that Cultivation and Savagenes, do make, in men. Should one permit himself to imagine that Ele∣phants, Castors, Dogs, Foxes, and other sugacious Animals, which can contrive and do so much singly, (as we find by ex∣perience they can, and do) should have the united Ingeny of their several Kinds; it would be hard for him to say, to what they might not improve, or to distinguish the near approaches that they would make to what commonly is called Reason, from the real use and enjoyment of it. Especial∣ly if he also consider, that Savage wild men, who want the benefit of Education, and of large Converse; so that tho they have the use of Speech, yet they receive not this advantage by it, do very little excel such Animals, but come infinitely short of civilized and well bred men; who living in great Societies, have all the furtherance that aid and mutual assistance can give unto them.

Some in regard of the former use that Words have, do call them Notes, or Marks;

and in respect of the latter, term them Signs; but in truth, in referenc to both their Uses, Words are Signs, since, in both, they do signifie, either to ones self, as in the first use, or unto others, as in the second. Words are Signs, but Signs that signifie but by agreement, consent, and Institution: For should any do it by Nature, the Lan∣guage that consisted of them would be uni∣versal, spoken and understood of all, which none is: so that the way of tryal in Herodo∣tus, of the most Ancient Language, was as ill grounded, as the Discovery made by it ridiculous. 'Tis true, Jacob Behman talks of a Language of Nature, but I think he rather intended by it the Language of Signatures, than that of Words; since the Language of Signatures, if understood, may be interpreted (as he affirms his Language of Nature may) in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Dutch, English, or any other vernacular Tongue: And in this sense too, That A∣dam understood the Language of Nature (as he says he did) was a truth, and perhaps implied in the History, which tells us, That whatsoever Adam called every living Creature, that was the Name thereof. But tho this may be, as he says, yet I cannot believe that That is so which he adds, That Adam had the Gift [of understanding the Languages of Nature] which was lost by

his Fall, restor'd to him by his Regenerati∣on: For that the New Birth, that con∣sists in renovation of the Mind, after the Image of God in Christ, has any thing to do with Philosophy, or the Knowledge of Nature, is a conceit that cannot enter into my thoughts: I do not find in the Holy-Scriptures, which can give us any certain∣ty herein, that our Saviour Christ himself did teach, or that his Apostles and first followers did profess, Philosophy and Science of Nature. But enough (if not too much) in this place, of the Language of Nature, since here we are to speak of the Language of men, and the Language of men is words, which are not natural but only instituted and imposed, signs.

The use of words of usual and current signification is called speaking; the use ei∣ther of uncurrent Fictitious words, or of current words abused from their usual com∣mon signification, to a private particular meaning, is called canting. Of the for∣mer sort of canting Basilides, Valentinus, and all the Gnosticks, in Theology; Para∣celsus, Van-Helmont, and all the Chymists generally, with many others, in Philosophy and Medicine, are not only common, but justly noted, Examples. Not that the use of every new Word is canting, or that we need be as nice as C. Caesar in Aulus Gellius,

and avoid a new word, tho necessary to express our meaning, as we would Charyb∣dis, or Scylla. Words are but the cloath∣ing of Thoughts, and therefore must be made and fitted to them; and if we keep (as near as conveniently we can) to the or∣dinary Rules and Laws of Speaking, the making of new Words, when none, or none so apt, are stampt already, to signifie our Sentiments, is a practice that calls for imitation, since Cicero himself has set us a Copy; many of the Words that how enrich the R man Language, and do make it so expressive, were Innovations of his: And Epicurus did so before him: For, (as Cicero tells us, l. 1. de Nat: Deorum) he either invented, or first applied the Word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; Sunt, says Cicero, rebus novis, nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus, ipse 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat.

The Essence of Words, if words are ta∣ken, not materially, only for Articulate Sounds, but formally; for Articulate Sounds as they are Signs, do lie in their signification; and their signification, (or that which is signified by them) has the Name of sense or meaning.

The sense or meaning of words (the want whereof we call Nonsense) is two fold; the sense and meaning of words in reference to

our common ordinary Conceptions; and the sense and meaning of words in reference to the things expressed and signified by them: The former may be term'd Verbal, the latter real sense; or (perhaps to speak more pro∣perly,) the former may be called the sense or meaning of the words, the latter the conception, the notion, or the Idea of the Thing. Should a Roman Catholick tell me he means by Transubstantiation, that a real and substantial mutation of the Elements of Bread and Wine is made in the Holy Sa∣crament, into the very Body and Blood of Christ, but yet so, that notwithstanding this mutation, the Species or Accidents of Bread and Wine do still remain to affect our senses: 'Tis possible I may conceive the sense and meaning of the several words he uses, and also apprehend what it is he would have me believe, when yet at the same time, I cannot apprehend that such a thing can really be, since I see a plain con∣tradiction it should; it being equally im∣possible to make a Conception; (that is, to frame a coherent consistent Notion or Idea) of the thing he means, and make all the parts of it to hang together, as to make one of a circular square, or of a Triangular Gir∣ole. Ecquem, says Cotta in Cicero, l. 3. de Nat. Deorum pag. 129. tam amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo Vescatur, deum credat esse?

A Distinction then there is (and that a remarkable one too) between the verbal, and real, meaning of words; which to set out more fully, I will show, First, The the Occasion, and Rise of it, and then Secondly, The Use and Benefit of it.

First then, this distinction Arises from the Imperfection and Inadequacy of Hu∣man Knowledge; we Knowing little of things but under words, and words being (immediately) the signs but, of our Con∣ceptions, which are always short and nar∣row, and, too often, indistinct and con∣fused. Now if the sentiments we have according to the Vulgar and Ordinary way of conceiving, which is but general and confused, do cohere and hang together, when one of them is affirmed or spoken of another, so that the Notions are compos∣sible in common acceptation, we call it sense, though really the things themselves (for which those words are understood to stand) be Incompossible, and repugnant each to other, and therefore indeed it is Nonsense. This is to be better understood in Examples. Such Propositions as these, that Colours (even as to their Images) are in the Objects in which they do appear; that Odours are in the things smelled; that Sapors are in the things that are tasted; these and the like Assertions are not com∣monly

understood, or said, to be Non∣sense, because, Knowing in the general and confusedly, what is meant by colour, what by Odor, and what by Sapor, as likewise what is meant by the thing seen, by the thing that is tasted, and by the thing which is smelled; nothing appears in those confused general Notions (which we have,) to hinder us from thinking that Colours, Sapors, and Odours do as really Inhere in those external objects, as they seem to do. And yet to a Person that hath distinct, real, and just conceptions of the several subjects and predicates in those pro∣positions, it is evident, that 'tis as gross and palpable Nonsense to affirm that Colours, Sapors, Odours, and other Accidents, (which are but Phaenomena and Inten∣tional beings) do really exist in the Sub∣jects where they seem to be, as to say, that there are Notions and Cogitations in a Wall, in a Figg, or in a Rose, than which there cannot be a greater Bull or absurdity.

The Usefulness of this distinction, is greater than most will think; since from the want of making, or of observing it, it comes to pass, that so many do run into great mistakes and errours, in their dis∣courses; Do skirmish one with another, to no purpose, and without end; and of∣ten

do differ from themselves, as much as each from other. For few there are that do fix and settle even the verbal Sense of words, (which often have a doubleness of meaning, and then are called Ambiguous;) and fewer that do think of the real, with∣out which yet, they can never come to any certainty; so that, (as Mr. Hobbs has in∣geniously said; words that are Wise Mens Counters, become Fools Mony.

The meaning of words, as well the ver∣bal, as the real, is called Sense, because the Perception of it ought to be as Clear, and distinct, and as steady and fixt, as that of Sense is: For words, to be under∣stood as they ought, must have their meanings be as clearly and distinctly per∣ceived, by the mind, as objects of Sense when they are Seen, or Heard, or Tasted, or Smelled, are by the Senses.

SECT. II-

All Falsity is not Nonsense; but all impossible Falsity is. Repugnance in the mind to yield assent to propositions that are Non∣sence. Whence it arises. Of Enthusiasm, as it is a Kind of Nonsence. What Enthu∣siasm is. The distributions of it. Exam∣ples of the several Kinds of Enthusiasm, out of Dr. Fludd, and in the Magick Apho∣risms of the Rosy-crusians. That Enthu∣siasts when they seem to understand one ano∣ther, do so by Sympathy only, and not by way of Apprehension and Judgment. How this may be, set out in a story very Remarkable.

I Have spoken of Sense and Nonsense in the general; but toward a further clearing of the Notions of them, and espe∣cially that of the latter, it must be obser∣ved, that falsity and Nonsence are not Sy∣nonimous terms; For all Falsity is not Nonsense, that is, every Proposition that is false, is not also Nonsensical; for many things are possible, that are not Actual; and therefore many propositions that are not actually true, might have been, or may hereafter be so; and as what is true, is

Sense, so Sense is compossibility, not actuali∣ty; not that only which at present is true, but whatever is any wise possible to be so But though all Falsity is not Nonsense; all impossible Falsity is. I mean, every propo∣sition is Nonsense, that is false to that de∣gree, that it is impossible (absolutely im∣possible) it should be true; for no pro∣position is absolutely impossible to be true but that which implies contradiction, and that which implies a contradiction must needs be Nonsense; since the Understand∣ing cannot frame any Notion or Idea of it, and so cannot make any real sense of the words, that compose it. Contradiction in Terms is plain or gross Nonsense, (cal∣led a Bull in English, or an Absurdity;) and where the terms in common acceptation are not Contradictory, yet if the thing they are designed to express do really imply a Con∣tradiction, the propositions, though Ver∣bal Sense, are really Nonsense; as in the Instances above.

Observe again, that there is in the mind a certain sensible Reluctance to give assent to Propositions that are Incongruous, and really Nonsensical; for whoever Attends to what does pass within himself, will be Conscious of a Pain (as it were of dislocati∣on) upon a serious predication of Abstracts one of another; as when he says, good∣ness

is Justice; or of Contraries, as when he affirms, love is hatred, and the like in other Instances. The Reason is plain. For as this is to say, that one thing is another, so he that says that one thing is another, says also, that neither is it self, that is, says a Contradiction, and a Contradiction (whither explicite or implicite,) being Affirmation and Negation of the same thing, and consequently an Assent and Dissent at the same time, and Assent and Dissent being contrary Motions, or Modi∣fications, it follows, that to say, or go about to Assent unto, a Contradiction, is to distract and distort the mind, and put it to pain, because it is to draw it contra∣ry ways at the same time.

Nonsense in persons who pretend to su∣pernatural Assistances, may be called En∣thusiasm, Enthusiasm properly, is a false conceit of being inspired; to be inspired, is to receive immediate motions and in∣stincts from the Spirit of God; the person that has this false conceit of his being im∣mediately Instincted, and moved by the Spirit of God, is called an Enthusiast. A person may be an Enthusiast as well in mat∣ters of Philosophy, as in those of Divinity, and many Examples there are of both sorts of Enthusiasts, some of which I have touched before; but I forbear to say any

more of them now, in reference to their Original, or the Quality and Causes of their Distemper, &c. Since now, it is not my business to treat of Enthusiasm, and to set out the Nature of it, under the Notion of an Imaginary Inspiration, so much as to speak of the Language of Enthusiasts, which usually is Nonsense.

And of this I find a full Example in Dr. Fludd, in the third Look of his Mosaick Philosophy, the first Section and fourth Chapter, when having cited the Seventh Chapter of the the Book of Wis∣dom, the 25th, verse. He infers in these terms,

'So that we may discern by this Discription of the Wise Man, what is the Spiritual Christ, who is the Wisdom, Vertue, and word of God, and how by his Apparition out of Darkness, that is, by the mutation or change of the first principle, (which was in Darkness, Qua∣si verbum in Principio,) from Dark Aleph to Light Aleph, the Waters which were contained in the profound Bowels of the Abyss were revealed, and were anima∣ted, that is to say, by the emanation or emission of this self same Spirit of Eternal Fire or Light, and afterward by his ad∣mirable activity, and restless motion and penetration (for by Solomon it is said to be Omnibus mobilibus mobilior, &c. Sap.

7.24.) It first distinguisheth and sepa∣rateth the Darkness from the Light, the obscure and gross Waters from the subtle and pure, and then it disposeth the Heavens into Spherees; lastly it di∣videth the grosser Waters into Sublunary Elements, as by the words of the first Chapter of Genesis each Man may plainly discern.

This is a full Example, and yet in fur∣ther entertainment of the Curious, and for more variety. I will add another in the Magick Aphorisms, (for so I find them cal∣led) of the Brethren of the Rosy-Cross, which are as little capable of real Sense (at least in my Understanding,) as that I cited before from Dr. Fludd: And I will give them in the same Language in which I find them, without pretending to the skill of Translating them exactly.

• 1. Ante Omnia punctum extitit, non 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 aut Mathematicum, sed diffusiovum, monas erat explicitè, implicitè myrias; lux erat & nox, Principium & finis Principii, omnia & nihil, est & non.
• 2. Commovet se monas in Diade, & per triadem egressae sunt facies luminis secundi.
• 3. Exivit ignis simplex, Increatus, est sub aquis, induit se tegumento ignis multiplicis.

• 4. Respexit ad fontem superiorem & infe∣riorem, deducto typo, triplici vultu sigilla∣vit.
• 5. Creavit unum unitas, & in tria distinx∣it, trinitas est & Quaternarius nexus & me∣dium reductionis.
• 6. Ex visibilibus primum effulsit aqua, Fae∣mina incumbentis ignis, & figurabilium gravi∣da mater.
• 7. Porosa erat interiùs & corticibus varia, cujus venter habuit coelos convolutos & astra indiscreta.
• 8. Separatus artifex divisit hanc in am∣plas regiones, & apparente faetu disparuit ma∣ter.
• 9. Peperit tamen mater filios lucidos, In∣fluentes, in terram Chai.
• 10. Hi generant matrem in novissimis, cujus sons cantat in luco miraculoso.
• 11. Sapientiae condus est hic: esto qui po∣tes promus.
• 12. Pater est totius creati, & ex filio cre∣ato per vivam filii Analysin pater generatur. Habes summum generantis circuli myste∣rium: filii filius est, qui filii pater fuit.

This it seems is the Rosycrucean Creed, in which perhaps there may be much of deep mystery and sense; but for my part I can make none, that is real; and I believe that

most of my Readers will be able to make of it as little as I; and therefore I have set it down as an Instance and Example of Nonsense, that Nonsense which I called Enthusiasm.

And here (since it may be demanded if such Enthusiasms really are Nonsense, and consequently unintelligible, how it comes to pass that Enthusiasts do understand one another?) I conceive it fit to observe, that when Enthusiasts think, that they under∣stand One Another (as in truth they pro∣fess to do, and this so seriously, that 'tis hard not to believe them to have some im∣pressions common to them, which may support their Profession;) yet for as much as no sober man, tho never so sagacious or inquisitive, can understand them, it must be reckon'd an effect of Sympathy, and not of Intellectual Apprehension; I mean, they understand one another not judiciously, by conceiving; that is, by framing clear and consistent Notions of what is said, but only simpathetically, by having, upon such Ex∣pressions some Notions, and consequent Thoughts, excited in them, that are con∣formable to theirs that use the Expressions: it being with Enthusiasts, who possess the same Frame and texture of mind, as with unison Lutes, or other Instruments fitly tuned; in which to touch one, is to affect and stir all within a convenient distance.

To evidence how much conformity in Body and mind may signifie to that purpose I will make a relation of a very credible Story which I have read of Twins; who exactly resembling each the other in all the Features and Lineaments of Body, and consequently in Frame and Texture of mind, did also simpath ze to a wonder; so that being at great distance one from ano∣ther, they would notwithstanding be stir∣red with the same Affections and motions. The Story is to be found in a Book enti∣tuled, Remarkable Antiquities of the City of Exeter, pag. 42, 43.) and is this;

'Henry Tracy, an Inhabitant of the City aforesaid, had a numerous Issue, being the Father of eight Sons, and eight Daughters; the the Sixth and Seventh Sons were of one Birth Twins, and so well like in a all Li∣naments, and so equal in Stature, so co∣loured in Hair, and so like in Face and Gestures, that they could not be known one from the other, no not by their Friends, Parents, Brothers or Sisters, but privately by some secret marks, and open∣ly by wearing some several coloured Rib∣bands alike, which in sport they would sometimes exchange to make tryal of their Friends Judgment; yet somewhat more strange was, that their Minds and Affecti∣ons were as one, for what the one loved,

the other desired; and so on the contrary; the loathing of any thing by the one, was the distasting of the same thing by the o∣ther; yea, such a consideration, or in∣bred Power or Sympathy was in their na∣tures, that if Nicholas were sick or grie∣ved, Andrew felt the like pain, (tho' far di∣stant and remote in their persons, and that too, without any intelligence given to ei∣ther party;) and 'twas also observed that if Andrew were merry, Nicholas was like∣wise so affected, altho' in different places which long they could not endure to be asunder; for they ever desired to eat, drink, sleep and walk together; yea, so they lived and died, for they both served the King in Arms against his Barons; and in a Battle, the one being slain, the other stept presently into his place; where in the height of danger (no perswasions able to remove or hinder him) was there like∣wise killed.

The like (if not the same) Story I find reported by the Author of the Book, Enti∣tuled, England's Worthies in Church and State, Printed London 1684. (pag. 165.) who tells it in these Words:

'Nicholas and Andrew Tremane (says he) were Twins alike in all Lineaments, and felt like pain, tho at distance, and without any Intelligence given; they equally desired

to walk, travel, sit, sleep, eat and drink to∣gether. In this they differed, that at New-Haven in France, the one was a Cap∣tain of Troop, the other but a Private Soldier; there they were both slain toge∣ther Ann. 1564.

These (two, if two) Stories open a great light for the understanding the Sym∣pathies and Consents that are in the World of Nature, as well as in the World of men; but I think it not so proper to insist any longer upon them at this time, since the very occasion that I have taken of men∣tioning them here, is but incident, and indirect.

SECT. III.

Of Questions, their Nature, and their di∣stribution. That a Question is neither true, nor false; neither Affirmative, nor Negative. An Objection remo∣ved. That proceeding by way of Que∣stion, or as it were of Inquiry, in Common Discourse, is very useful, as well as Civil. Judgment required in put∣ting Pertinent Questions.

AS Words when they are joined and put together; for Example, a Ver∣tuous

Woman, an Excellent man, are cal∣led Oration or Speech; and if joined by way of Affirmation, or Negation, are cal∣led Propositions, and Propositions joined by a Conjunction, a Compound Proposition; so a Proposition when there is added to it a Sign of Interrogation is called a Question. For Instance, Whether the Baptism of John is the same with Christ's? Whether the Heavens are solid? or Fluid? Whether the Sun is a Flame? Whether the Earth move? And since a Sign of Interrogation may be added to any Proposition whatever, it follows, that Questions are of as many kinds as Propositions themselves, in respect of their Substance and quantity; so that they are either Simple, or Compound; Universal, or Particular; Indefinite, or Singular. On∣ly as to the quality of Propositions, as well the Verbal, (which is the Affirmation, or the Negation is in them,) as the real, (their verity, or falsity,) it must be owned, that Questions are not capable of the same di∣stribution in respect of this, as Propositi∣ons are. For tho' Propositions may be divi∣ded into true and false, and into Affirmative and Negative, Questions cannot; since he who only asketh the Question, whether a thing is so? or not so? neither affirmeth, nor denieth it to be; and he that neither affirmeth, nor denieth a thing to be, speaks

nor true nor false of it. And yet it must be confessed, that as a Question may be asked, there may be implication of Affirma∣tion, or Negation in it; so that in this re∣gard a Question may have the Denomina∣tion of being affirmative, or negative, ac∣cordingly as it is made: But this is but accident, and arises not from the nature of a Question, nor belongs unto it as such, but rather is contrary, and only springs from the manner of putting the Question. I will give an Example in each: This Que∣stion, Is not Jesus Christ the Son of God? may be called Affirmative, because, being made in that manner, it seems to imply, that he who puts it, would have the An∣swer to be, he is; and this is Jesus Christ the Son of God? especially as it is toned in pronouncing, may be termed a Negative Question, because it seems to imply, he is not. But then either way of proposing the Question, is not barely the putting a Question, but also a directing the Answer: For to make a fair and naked Question, it should be worded thus; Whether Jesus Christ be the Son of God? else it may be only verbally a Question, but in effect an Assertion. Quaestio (says Cicero, lib. 4. Aca∣dem Quaest.) est Appetitio Cognitionis, Quaesti∣onisque finis Inventio.

But to leave a Discourse that certainly will appear but dry and barren to some, and to refer such others, who are better pleased with it, and with the like, unto common Logicians and Summulists; I will only observe, that in common Discourse and Conversation, to make Objections by way of Question, as it is less offensive than that of asserting and dogmatizing, so, being well managed, it is no less convincing and perswasive. For this Reason the way was much in use with the Ancients, especially with Socrates and Plato, who preferr'd it before the Method of Syllogism, and Oppo∣sition; and in truth, to question, since it is not to affirm, or to deny, does not contra∣dict, or put a mistake upon Any, but seems only a further Inquiry, rather than Oppo∣sition of what is Affirmed; and yet as it requires a great proportion of Judgment, and of strength and clearness of understand∣ing, to do it pertinently and well; so be∣ing done in this manner, it gains more ea∣sily, and as it were by surprize. Besides, the way of questioning is broader and lar∣ger than that of Syllogizing, which is con∣fined to one medium, and which too is of∣ten used to divert and carry one off from the business in hand, for which purpose it serves most excellently well, if managed with dexterity..

CHAP. III. Of Notion, the immediate Object of Appre∣hension.

SECT. I.

That Notion may be considered two ways. 1st. In general; and 2ly. more specially. Of Notion in the general sense of the Word. No Original Native Notions. Why it seems as if there were. The Notion of Apprehension cleared. Of Notion in the special and limited Sense of the Word, what it is, That the understanding apprehends things but inadequately, and under Notions in the limited sense. This evidenced by se∣veral considerations. An Objection against it removed.

I Have spoken of words the ordinary, but instituted, means of Apprehensi∣on; I am now to speak of Notion, the im∣mediate Object (some would call it the na∣tural means) of Apprehension.

The word Notion, may be considered two ways, either as it does signifie more generally and largely, or as it is taken in a more restrained, special and particular sense.

A Notion in the general and larger ac∣eptation of the word, is any conception formed by the Mind in reference to Objects; and so taken, is the same with a thought, or that, in respect of the Mind, that a Sen∣timent largely taken, is, in respect of the sense. I say a Sentiment largely taken; for instance; when Sentiment is taken in spect of the Visive Power, not strictly and properly for light, or colour only; but largely, for any perception that the Eye has, by way of sight, of things, or of their relations and habitudes. And since there is so great an Analogy between the Eye and the Understanding, and between the Senti∣ments of the one, and of the other, it will be an easy inference, that no reason can be gi∣ven why there should be Original Innate No∣tions in the Understanding (as some imagine there must) that it may be able to appre∣hend, which will not equally argue, that there should be the like original Figures and Images in the Eye, which should enable it to see; and yet none will Allow of these.

But to show how lt comes to pass, that there are (as there are) appearances as if the mind had some original innate Noti∣ons, which for that reason are called Prolep∣ses and Anticipations, and withal to bring some light to the business of Apprehension,

which (as to the way of it) is obscure e∣nough, and but seldom touched to any pur∣pose: I will offer an Observation very common, but (as it may be applied) very luciferous in reference to this Sub∣ject.

Every body observes, that if a Blow is aimed at the Head of any person, he will hold up his Arm to receive it, and keep it from his head, without thinking either that, or why, he does so; and this is said to be done Naturally, and by instinct; because, in truth, it is done without premeditation, and so at that time, without any actual conceived design.

And yet again it is certain, that an In∣fant will not do so, or any Child before it has been taught and instructed to do it; which makes it plain, that the doing so in those who are come to reason, is no effect of natural instinct, but of use; only the Child was taught to do it so early, that by the time he comes to the Age of Discretion, having forgotten, or rather, having made no observation, when it was first taught, or first did it, and upon what Motives, and doing it now without deliberation it hath the aspect of a thing effected by Nature, and not of a custom or habit.

In the same manner in the business of Reason, we may, and often do proceed up∣on

Principles instilled into us very early, and are Acted by them, without Knowing how, or why, it being no Effect of pre∣sent consideration. Experience confirms this, since we may be certain, if we do but at∣tend to our own Actions, that, many times, we are carried to the Affection, or Dis∣affection of things, and the Approbation or Disapprobation of them, we Know not why, and yet all the passions and Mo∣tions of our Mind, have Reasons for them; for all Effects must have Causes; but these, sometimes, are so early graffed in us, and, at other times, so unawares, that we re∣member not they were so; and then the Effects, only being observed, and the causes lying deep, hidden and secret, we do call it Nature, or Instinct, though in truth, it be Reason, and habit, as much as any thing else is.

Again, much the same way we do com∣pute or reckon; for when we use any greater numbers, either in Addition, or in Substraction, or in any other Arithmeti∣cal operation, we do it without any actu∣al consideration of what the lesser particu∣lar numbers are that make the greater, for that we have done before, (perhaps long,) and consequently are possessed of the Ideas (may I so express it) without the Images of them. But at first, we had

a particular Knowledge. As, when we Multiply and say, Six and Six is Twelve, and Twelve and Twelve is Four and Twenty, we do it without considering actually at that time, that six is so many unites, though at first (but possibly so long ago that we do not remember it) we did so, and must (do so) to Know the particular value of that number; and the like is of others.

And thus also with an easie Application may it be conceived, how words come to stand in the mind for things, and that when we have the word, we think we have the simple Idea of the thing; it is just as the Figure [6] doth stand for the number [Six.] And that when once we have had a distinct Idea or Notion of the Number, afterward, (without actual thinking thereof,) we use the Figure instead of it, and that as well, or better than if we did distinctly consider the Number it self. Now, words do carry the same Relation unto things, that Figures do unto Num∣bers, and both Words and Figures seem to derive the power which they have of standing in the Mind as Representatives, from the connexion they have, Figures with Numbers, and Words with Things; after the same manner as we hold up our Arm, or a Stick, to save our Head, with∣out

thinking of saving it. For though the Action prevents all actual thought of the End of it, yet 'tis done for an End, in vertue of it its first Direction and Use. This Discourse attended to, and well di∣gested, will open a great light into the way in which the Understanding comes to have Apprehension of things by the means of Words; and to form its Ideas and Notions, taking Notions largely for any Thoughts or Conceptions.

But besides the former Sense of the Word [Notion,] there is Another which is more Restrained and Limited; in which a Notion is Modus Concipiendi, a certain particular manner of conceiving; a manner of conceiving things that corre∣sponds not to them but only as they are Objects, not as they are Things; there be∣ing in every Conception some thing that is purely Objective, purely Notional; in so much that few, if any, of the Ideas which we have of things are properly Pictures; our Conceptions of things no more resembling them in strict Propriety, than our Words do our Conceptions, for which yet they do stand, and with which they have a Kind of Correspondence and Answering: just as Figures that do stand for Numbers; yet are no wise like them.

To make this clearer, it must be consi∣dered that the Eye has no perception of things but under the Appearance of Light, and Colours, and yet Light and Colours do not really exist in the things them∣selves, that are perceived and seen by means or them, but are only in the Eye. Like∣wise the Ear has no perceivance of things, as of a Bell, of a Lute, or of a Viol, but under sounds, and yet sound is only a sen∣timent in the Ear that hears, and is not, or any thing like it, in the Bell, or Viol, or Lute that is heard. For as the Eye has no Perceivance of things but under Colours that are not in them, (and the same time with due alteration, must be said of the o∣ther Senses.) So the Understanding Appre∣not things, or any Habitudes or Aspects of them, but under Certain Notions that neither have that being in Objects, or that being of Objects, that they seem to have; but are, in all respects, the very same to the mind or Understanding, that Colours are to the Eye, and Sound to the Ear. To be more particular, the Uunderstand∣ing conceives not any thing but under the Notion of an Enity, and this either a Sub∣stance or an Accident; Under that of a whole, ore of a part; or of a Cause, or of an Effect, or the like; and yet all these and the like, are only Entities of Reason con∣ceived

within the mind, that have no more of any real true Existence without it, than Colours have without the Eye, or Sounds without the Ear. Every person that hath the least Understanding of the way in which we do apprehend things, will yield this to be true as to Whole and Part, to Cause and Effect, and to all the Notions which are commonly termed by Logicians the Second; and it is as certain∣ly true in reference to Substance and Acci∣dent, to Quantity, Quality, and those other General Notions under which the Under∣standing apprehends its Objects, though commonly they are called First ones, and in comparison of the others are so.

I have laboured the more to make the Notion that I have in this business plain and easie, because much of what is to be said hereafter will depend upon it; and now taking it for granted that my mean∣ing is Intelligible. what remains, is to evince true; and this I shall do, from the very Nature of Cogitation in general, (as it comprehends Sensation as well as Intel∣lection,) since that the Understanding doth Pinn its Notions upon Objects, arises not from its being Such a particular Kind of Cogitative Faculty, but from its being Cogitative at large; let us then reflect

again on the Nature of Cogitation at large.

It is certain that things to us Men are nothing but as they do stand in our Analogy that is, in plain terms, they are nothing to us but as they are known by us; and as certain, that they stand not in our Ana∣logy, nor are Known by us, but as they are in our Faculties, in our Senses, Ima∣gination, or Mind; and they are not in our Faculties, either in their own realities, or by way of a true Resemblance and Re∣presentation, but only in respect of certain Appearances or Sentiments, which, by the various impressions that they make upon us, they do either Occasion only, or Cause, or (which is most probable) concur unto in Causing with our Faculties. Every Cogitative Faculty, though it is not the Sole Cause of its own immediate [appa∣rant] Object, yet has a share in making it: Thus the Eye or Visive Faculty hath a share in making the Colours which it is said to see; the Ear or Auditive Power, a share in producing sounds, which yet it is said to hear; the Imagination has a part in making the Imagies stored in it; and there is the same Reason for the Under∣standing, that it should have a like share in framing the Primitive Notions under which it takes in and receives Objects: In

summ, the immediate Objects of cogitation, as it is exercised by men, are entia cogita∣tionis, all Phaenomena; Appearances that do no more exist without our faculties in the things themselves, than the Images that are seen in water, or behind a glass, do really exist in those places where they seem to be.

But as this is a truth that Many will admit with more facility in reference to the Objects of Sense, and Imagination, as Colours, Sapors, Sounds, &c. Than to those of the Mind or Understanding, such as Substance, Accident, Quality, Action, &c. So I find my self obliged to give a farther demonstration that it holds in these, as well as in those; which I hope to do by the following Considerations.

First, the understanding converses not with things ordinarily but by the Inter∣vention of the sense, and since sentiments of sense are but Appearances, not Pictures, or proper Representations, it is hard to conceive how such conceptions are fra∣med only by their occasion, and only wrought out of them, should be pour∣traits of the things themselves, and made just and exact to them.

Secondly, The understanding is a power

of that nature that many think it doth not immediately Attinge (as they call it) or reach particular singular beings, which yet are the only beings that compose the Universe, as members or parts of it; and really, it uses to proceed by way of Ab∣straction, and therefore doth more Conna∣turally converse with Universals, that are not of Mundane existence, than with sin∣gulars that are. Now, since things as they are in the mind, do undergo an Ab∣straction and sublimation, certain it is, they must put on another dress there, and so appear in quite another shape than that they have in the World. In short, All Agree that our conceptions of things are but inadequate, as indeed they must needs be, since things have much Refraction (may I so express it) both before they come, and after that they come, to the mind; and if they are inadequate, they cannot be commensurate, that is, they cannot bo so just and exact, to things, as to show them as they be, and in their own existences.

Thirdly, It may be Argued from the very nature of an Idea or notion; since this after a sort is a sentiment of the mind, as a sentiment (properly so called) is, after a sort, an Idea or Notion of the sense; the

immediate objects of the sense are sensible sentiments, and those of the understanding are Intellectual ones; which they must needs be, because the understanding it self is a kind of sense, only a more subli∣med and raised. Mens ipsa (says Cicero, l. 4. Academ. Quaest.) quae sensuum fons est, etiam ipsa Sensus est, &c.

In fine, this is so certain a truth, that whosoever reflects, tho' never so little, cannot chuse but observe, that as he takes in nothing by his sense but under senti∣ments, which are the notions of sense, so he receives in nothing in his understanding, but under certain notions, which are the sentiments of the mind; since he knows nothing Intellectually but either in general only, under the notion of a thing, or more specially under that of a substance, or else of an Accident; and what are all these but Objective Notions? as will appear in parti∣cular upon the examination and Tryal of them.

Let us then inquire first into the thing, (for we shall shew it of Substance and Acci∣dent hereafter) and what is thing but mo∣dus concipiendi? a notion or sentiment that the mind has, of whatsoever any wise is, because it is? Thing indeed is the most ge∣neral notion, but then it is but a notion, because it is general; and has the most of

a notion, because it is the most general. To be more particular; If the Question be asked, what thing is? or what is meant by that word? Some have no other Answer but this, that a thing is that which hath essence. But then it may be farther de∣manded, what is meant by essence, which is said to be had? What it is to have es∣sence? And what is meant by that, which hath it? Or if it be said, that a thing is that, which is, (as it is by others;) the same difficulties again occur: for it may be demanded, what that is, which is? And what is meant, when it is said to be? And whether Existence be Essence? espe∣cially since Existence seems not the first conception of a thing; but is a second, or after-conception; as not being that, which makes a thing to be what it is, [a thing;] but what only makes it a thing in being.

By this, it plainly appears, that the meaning of the word [thing,] is but an inadequate conception, arising in the mind upon its conversing with Objects, and so doth speak a certain particular sentiment, which the mind has of them; a sentiment better understood, than defined by words; but a sentiment too, that doth not enter us into the knowledge of the Reality it self (may I so express it,) of that which is; which we only apprehend inadequately,

under the Disguise and Masquerade of no∣tions. As, that it is that, which is; or that which has essence; or the like; but not by any adequate exact conception. And as for Substance and Accident, which yet are the first steps we make toward a distinct Perceivance and knowledge of things; what are they, but likewise Modi concipiendi? Entities of Reason, or notions, that (it is true) are not without grounds, but yet that have, themselves, no Formal being but only in the Mind, that frames them; there being no such thing in the World as a Substance, or an Accident, any more than such a thing as a Subject, or an Adjunct; and yet we apprehend not any thing but as one of these, to wit, as a Substance, or as an Accident; so that we apprehend not any at all, just as they are, in their own realities, but only under the Top-knots and Dresses of Notions, which our minds do put on them.

But here it will be told me, that plain unlearned men, who yet do exercise the Acts of Reasoning well enough, and per∣haps in the best manner, as doing it with∣out Art, and in a way the most agreeable to Nature, do conceive and speak of things without conceiving or minding of Noti∣ons, such as I have mention'd; for they conceive and speak of man, of good and

evil, of vertue and vice, and the like, without conceiving or minding of Substan∣ces, or Accidents. But this is easily got over. For tho' unlearned plain men do not explicitely and in terms denominate goodness, vertue, vice, &c. Accidents, yet since they do conceive them (as All do) all things that are in a man, or in some o∣ther thing, tho' they do not call them Ac∣cidents, yet do they conceive them as Ac∣cidents: And when they do conceive, or say of a man, for instance, that he is ver∣tuous or vicious, or the like, they do con∣ceive him to have vertue or vice in him; that is, tho' they do not think of the name substance, yet they do really conceive that person to be one; since a substance is no∣thing but a subject, or a thing that has o∣ther things in it as Accidents; whereas in truth, neither Accident, nor Substance hath any being but only in the mind, and by the only vertue of cogitation or thought.

SECT. II.

Inferences from the former Discourse; first, that human knowledge for the most part is but intentional, not real. The usefulness of this Inference; an Objection against it removed. (And yet) Secondly, That the immediate Objects of the cogitative Powers are somewise external to those powers; and this, both as to appearances, (which is sen∣sibly demonstrated) and as to their grounds. Two other Inferences added; the first in re∣ference to the grounds of the Doctrine of the old Academy; the second concerning the obligation we are under ordinarily to conceive and speak of things as they are in our Analogy, and do appear to our facul∣ties.

I Infer from the former Discourse; First, that human knowledge (at least for the most part) is but Intentional, not Real; and that we have no Perception of any thing, (in any degree to speak of,) just as it is in its own Reality and being. For all our notions and conceptions of things, are of them under sentiments; the understanding it self (as I argued before)

being but a higher and more sublimated sense; and sentiments (as such) are in their own formalities but apparently only, not existently, without the faculties that do conceive them. To be be particular, we have no perception or knowledge of any thing but as it is a Substance, or an Accident, or a Quality, &c. And these are only notions: for example, as to Wa∣ter; we have no knowledge of it by all, or any of our senses, what really it is in it self, just as it is, and absolutely speaking; for we are utterly ignorant (otherwise than by Conjecture) of the Magnitude and size of the little parts that compose it; Ignorant of their figure and shape; and Ignorant also of the kind, and degree of motion they have; all this we are Ignorant of, and yet this is all that is Real in Water But as Ignorant as we are of what it really is, in it self, and absolutely considered, we have much Comparative Relative Know∣ledge of it; for we know it by sense to be fluid; to have some degree of tenacity or viscosity; to be moist; in a word, to have so many Qualities (for so we conceive and speak) that all put together, do give the mind a sufficient rise to distinguish it, as a different substance, from Earth, or Fire; So that a person that has at any time had

the perception of them all, will not mi∣stake them afterward, one for the other.

But here it must be remembred, that (as I have shewed before) tho' we do not see the reality of things immediately, and just as it is in the things themselves, yet by means of sentiments and notions, we do, somewise, perceive it: as the Eye that sees not any thing immediately but Light or Colours, yet by means of Light and Co∣lours, discerns Gold, Silver, Stones, Wood, as also the Magnitudes, the Figures, the mo∣tions, the distances of things; with a thou∣sand other Realities, so the understanding discerns infinite Realities, infinite habitudes of things; not indeed immediately, but ei∣ther under the sentiments of sense, or by means of its own, which I call notions; as of Substance, Quality, Cause, Effect, Whole, Part, &c.

I have been somewhat longer in the Ex∣plication of this Inference, because to know the nature of our Knowledge, must needs be of great advantage unto us; and much relieve us in our Inquiry after the nature of Things; since it frees us from the confusion, that our mind must necessa∣rily be in, should it take the Apparitions of things (for such sentiments and notions are) to be external and real Existences. Would not a thinking man be much per∣plexed,

to make a satisfying conception, what that Image is, that he sees in a glass, or in water, if he was perswaded of its being a Reality (of Existence,) and not a meer Apparition? The like must he be, who takes Objective Notions for real Ex∣istences, and who confounds Attributes that are only Objective, and that do be∣long to things but as they are Objects with those that do belong unto them as they are Things, and that are Real,

However, it will not follow, as some have weakly Objected, that then nothing is Real; for tho' the Images themselves of Whiteness, Blackness, Redness, Greenness, that do seem inherent in visible Objects, are not really so, yet really there are Disposi∣tions and textures of particles in those Ob∣jects, that, by the various Modifications which they give the Light, do occasion in the Eye, to which the Light is reflected, all that diversity of sentiments (which we call colours) that does appear in those Ob∣jects. The same, mutatis mutandis must be said of sounds, sapors, odors, and of Tan∣gible qualities, and in proportion will hold also in mental notions. For tho' the very Notions of Entity, Substance, Acci∣dent, Whole, Part, Cause, Effect, and the like, do not really exist without the mind; yet as they do seem, Real, and some

more Real than others, so really they have in things without us certain grounds or Foundations, that, upon our converse with these things, do naturally Occasion, or Excite, such notions and sentiments in us. But I will speak to this matter more par∣ticularly; because it is of importance.

First then, the immediate Objects of Cogitation, both the Sensitive, and the Intellectual, are, in appearance, external to their several faculties; that is, such Objects do so seem to be without their se∣veral faculties, to which they correspond, that, in appearance, they are either the very ultimate Objects themselves of those faculties, or, at least, do Exist in them, and upon this account are called Objects; for Whiteness seems to the Eye to be in snow, or in a white wall; and sound to the Ear, to be in the Air; a Man doth seem to the understanding, to be really a Substance, or a thing that is invested with Accidents.

If it be Inquired how it comes to pass, that sentiments and notions, which really are not in the things that are without us, do yet appear as if they were, and conse∣quently that they seem to be Objects? it must be Answered, that this arises from the very nature of cogitation it self, and of

the cogitative faculties; and that both Reason and Experience do evidence, it must be so.

First, Reason sheweth that it must be so; for as we are conscious that we have a perceivance of Objects under certain Ima∣ges, and Notions, so we are not conscious of any Action by which our faculties should make those Images or Notions; and therefore being sensible that we are Af∣fected with such Images, and Notions, so long as, and no longer than we do Attend to things without us, (which things are therefore called Objects;) and not being sensible that we are so by any Action from within our selves, it cannot but appear unto us that we are Affected only from the things without us, and so, what really is only in our selves, must seem to come from those things, and consequently to be really in them.

Experience also shews; (to wit, that what is really but in the cogitative faculty, does yet seem without it;) for if the Eye by any accident becomes infected with Co∣lours, as, (to instance in a more received, than often experienced, Matter,) with yellow, by the yellow Jaundice, or with Green, (as I have sometimes observed, be∣fore the coming of Convulsions;) that is,

(for this is the Reality) if the Visive Spi∣rits, or whatever other parts of the Eye, that are immediately concerned in the Act of Vision, be Preter-naturally put into the same motions with those, which by the Impressions of Yellow or Green Ob∣jects they are naturally put into, in either of these Cases, the Object beheld by that Eye, will appear as yellow, or green, tho' to every bodies else, it is but White, or Red, or of some other colour. And whence comes this, but hence? that the Images conceived in the Eye, for in the Instances alledged, the Images of yellow and green are no where else,) are naturally pinned upon the Object. As is farther evident in Dazling; which is, when an Impression made upon the Eye by one Object, becomes translated to another; thus, coming out of a bright Sun-shine, on a Summers day, into a darkish room, one sees a splendor in every corner, and upon every Object. The like Appearance there is, upon the be∣holding of Objects thro' tinctur'd Glasses: So that it must be concluded, that the im∣mediate Objects of cogitation, I mean the very Images and sentiments that are per∣ceived, do, to all appearance, seem as ex∣ternal to the cogitative powers, as even the ultimate Objects themselves, that are

perceived under them; which was the first thing to be shewed.

The second point to be shewed is, that the immediate Objects of cogitation are external in their ground, as well as in ap∣pearance, and in truth, are therefore ex∣ternal in appearance, because they are so really in their grounds. And this is as certain, as that every Effect must have a Cause. For things without us, are the Causes that do excite such Images and Notions in us: In the order of Nature, we do see a thing so long as, and no lon∣ger than, we keep our Eye upon it; and therefore that we do see it, must come from some impression from the Thing; and since to see a thing, is nothing but to have some Image from it, and so of it, in the Eye, and the Image is as the Impression, and the Impression as the Thing that makes it, it follows that the grounds of the Image is in the Thing without us. And since the Image (by which I mean Light or Colour) is the immediate object of Vi∣sion, and, that what is instanced in one Act of cogitation, will equally hold in all, it follows, that the immediate Objects of all other cogitations, as well as of vision, are ordinarily and naturally as external in their grounds, as in appearance; that is, are fundamentally external, as well as ap∣parently.

I thought once to have ended this Chap∣ter here, but now before I do so, I will add an Inference or two from the former Doct∣rine; the first is, that we learn from it the Foundation of that Opinion the Academicks of old were in, That no judgment could be made of Truth; that things do seem to us, but cannot be perceived by us; and that no certainty, but great probability only, is to be Attained unto by men. For as this O∣pinion had all the Phaenomena of cogitation to give it countenance, so those Philosophers saw it; for they evidently perceived, that they saw not the Realities, but only the Appearances of things; Plato the chief of them, one of the most penetrating, as well as the most elegant, of all that ever were, affirmed that the present, was a word, of Veri similitude only, and not of Truth and Reality; That the beings in this World were only Shadows, but that the Substances themselves were in the Ideal. How far herein he went with the Truth, may easi∣ly be perceived by what I have discoursed before, concerning the Nature of Cogitati∣on; as also, where he strikes out.

The Second Inference is, That since Sen∣timents, and Notions bottomed upon Rea∣lities, do seem, the former to the Sense, the latter to the Understanding, to be Re∣alities; and since we are obliged to con∣ceive,

and speak, of things, ordinarily and popularly (for all are not Philosophers) in that way and manner that they seem to be; it follows, that we are obliged to conceive, and speak of Sentiments and Notions in Common Conversation, and to the people, as if really they were the things themselves that are perceived; or at least were in them: And so may say, the Snow is white, the Emerald is green, and the like.

CHAP. IV. Of the distribution of Notions in the Restrained sense of the Word.

SECT. I.

Notions are either the Notions of things, or Notions about things. Of the Notions of things. And first of Entity or Thing. The Pinax Entium, or general Table of things. Things are either Real, or Cogitable. And these either meer Cogitables, or real Cogitables. A Reality what A Cogitable what. Of Real Cogitables. Real Cogita∣bles, either Proper, or Reductive. Proper Real Cogitables of two sorts; of the Sense, or of the Mind. These of the Sense, of two kinds; Connatural, or Preternatural. Ap∣parent colours, are real Connatural Cogita∣bles. Real Cogitables of the Mind, like those of the Sense, of two Kinds; Connatu∣ral or Preternatural. Real Cogitables Re∣ductive, subdivided into those of sense (Ex∣ternal, Internal) and those of the Under∣standing.

Notions taken in the limited Sense of the word, for Objective Ideas, by

and under which the Understanding ap∣prehends, and conceives, of, things, and which, for this reason, may be called Fun∣damental (as being essential to the business of Knowledge,) are either Notions of things; such as Entity, Reality, &c. Or Notions about Things, such as whole, part, cause, effect, &c. of which the former are conceived as absolute, the latter more as re∣lative Notions.

The Notions, (or Modi concipiendi, that I call the Notions) of things, may be re∣duced to four, to Entity or thing, Reali∣ty, Substance and Accident.

Entity or thing is taken in several senses; either first, in the largest, in which it is the same with something, or Aliquid. Or 2dly. more strictly, as it comprehends but sub∣stances, Accidents and Modes. Or 3dly. Most strictly, as it stands for Substances on∣ly. I take it not at this time in the largest Sense.

Thing in the largest Sense, is that which any wise is, or that is Knowable, directly: for Nothing, no wise is, nor is Knowable, but indirectly, and by means of thing, of which it is a Negation; Nothing is Not a thing.

And thing, or Entity, taken in the lar∣gest sense for

• Aliquid, some∣thing is, Either
  • Real
  • Cogi∣table, and this, Either
    • Meer Co∣gitable,
    • Real Cogi∣table,
    • Cogitabel, As,
      • A Thing
        • Substance,
        • Accident.
      • Some thing about Thing; As Cause, Effect, &c.

For that which any wise is, is either without the thinking of any one upon it; or it is no longer than while one is a thinking, and because he is a thinking, on it.

That which is without the thinking of any one upon it, and whether it be minded or no, is a real Thing, or a Reality; a thing that so is in the world, as that it is a part, or Appurtenance of it, and such a thing is matter, and every Affection, and every Sy∣stem of matter; and such a thing also is Mind.

That which no longer is than while one is a thinking, and because he is a thinking, on it; [so that tho it have that which is

called in the Schools an objective being, a being in the Cogitative Faculties, yet hath none without them in the World:] this I name a Cogitable; a Cngitable thing, or Entity. And thus, all the Sentiments of Sense, those of the Mind, and even meer Objective Notions, are Things, not things of Mundane and External Existence, but of Cogitation and Notion; Intentional, not Real things. For such are Colours, Sounds, Sapors, Time, Place, Substance, Accident, Cause, Effect; &c. they are In∣tentional things, things that, as such, have only an esse Objectivum, an esse Cognitum, as the Schoolmen phrase it.

Cogitables, or Things that have being only in the Faculties that apprehend them, and by vertue of their being apprehended, are of two sorts; For either they have a being in Faculties by means of the Impres∣sions made upon them from external Ob∣jects, and consequently have Grounds and Foundations in the things that are without us; or, they have a being in our Faculties, only by a working of the Faculties them∣selves, without any such Grounds.

Those Cogitables, that have being by means of Impressions made upon our Fa∣culties, by External Objects, I call Real Co∣gitables; Cogitables, because the being which they have, is, formally a being in

Cogitation only; Real Cogitables, because they have Grounds and Foundations, in things that are Real. Thus the Sentiments of Sense, such as Colours, Sounds, &c. the Fundamental Notions of Mind, those of things, and those about them, such as Sub∣stance, Accident, Cause, Effect, Whole, Part, &c. are Real Cogitables; Cogitables, for that the very Images themselves, the ve∣ry Ideas, are Entities only of Cogitation, as having but an esse cognitum; and Real Cogitables, because they have Grounds, in things that are Real; for, antecedently to any Operation of the mind concerning these Cogitables, there do really exist, in the world, Things that in their own natures are fitted to produce, or to occasion them in our Faculties, in a certain correspon∣dence to themselves.

Real Cogitables are either properly so, or but reductively.

Real Cogitables proper, are such things as have being in our Faculties, by the im∣pressions of External Causes, that are Ob∣jects, as well as Causes, of the Acts that make those Cogitables. And these are of two sorts. For Example, (for things of this nature are best conceived in Examples) there is Greenness in Grass, as also in an E∣merauld,

and there is Bowedness in an Oar, or a Staff, that is in the Water, so, as that part of it is in, part out: Now both these [the Greens and the Bowedness] are but Ap∣pearances, or Poenomena; and having equal∣ly (one as much as another) their Grounds and Foundations in the things that are ex∣ternal to our Faculties, both are equally Real; and yet every one that considers must Ac∣knowledge, that they are of very different natures, and that Bowedness is Not, in all respects, of the same sort of Appearance that Green is, as to its General Na∣ture.

The differences that are in such Appear∣ances, depend upon the differences that are in their Grounds, and therefore must be ac∣counted for from these.

Some Appearances there are, that do Arise from sensation (for I will begin with those of sense) when it is made with all the Conditions and Circumstances that are Re∣quisite, to make it Right; and these I call Connatural Appearances; such as the Greens in Grass, or in an Emerauld: But there are others that arise from sensation when it is not made with all the Conditions and Cir∣cumstances that are requisite to its being right and natural; as, when Vision is made thro' a double Medium, a thicker and a thinner; and these Appearances I call Pre∣ternatural,

of which sort is that of Bowedness in the Oar, or Staff. These Appearances I call, the former Connatural, the latter Preternatural; not in reference to Nature as it is taken for the complex of all, or any, Causes; (for in relation to their proper Causes, all Effects are equally natural;) but as Nature is taken in a more restrained spe∣cial sense (of which more hereafter) for a cer∣tain particular order of Causes and Effects.

As for the Colours in a Rainbow; those of a Pigeons neck, and others of like nature, tho' they are commonly call'd Apparent and Emphatical, and by that Denomination di∣stinguished in School Philosophy, from those that are Real and Existent; yet I think not fit to make another Classis for them. For those fugitive changeable Colours, tho' they are not so fix'd and permanent as others are, yet they are as Real, and as Connatural as they; the fugitive waving Colours of Changeable Taffata, and those of standing Corn (while Green) Agitated and waved by the wind, are equally as real and Conna∣tural, as the certain fixed Colour in Scar∣let Cloth, or in Purple. Only, tho' all these Colours are equally Real, as having causes of their Appearance that are equally real, and all equally Connatural, because All (alike) are Results of sensations duly made, with all their requisite Circumstances; yet, since

their Causes are not equally permanent and fixed, but some are more, some less; it follows, that some of these Colours are more abiding and permanent, and some but Transient and Fugitive; for all Effects must be, as their Causes Are. But to re∣turn.

What I have said concerning Real Cogi∣tables of Sense, as to their Distribution, may likewise be said of those of the Under∣standing, that some are Connatural, some Preternatural: Those I call Connatural that result in the Understanding when it has all the requisite Conditions and Circumstan∣ces; and these Preternatural, that arise from the working of the Understanding when it wants at least some of the Requi∣site Conditions and Circumstances; parti∣cularly, when it is Prejudiced, or not well Ballasted with Observations, and Experi∣ments, made by sense: In a word, there are Visa animi, as well as Visa sensus; and some of them Connatural, some Preternatural; of the former, every one that is well weigh∣ed, and well Grounded, is an Example; and for the latter, we have as many Exam∣ples, as there are ungrounded and sense∣less distinctions, and Notions; of which the Schoolmen afford us but too ma∣ny, in their Substantial Forms, Inherent Accidents, &c.

Real Cogitables Reductive, are such as come from Causes that are Causes only, and not Objects as well as Causes, of the Act of Cogitation, which immediately produces them: And these as well as those that are proper, are either of the External sense, or of the Imagination, or of the Rea∣son and Understanding: Since whatever is an Effect of Cogitation, and withal arises from an external Cause that is but a Cause, and not also an Object, of that Act, is a Real Cogitable Reductive, and not a Fiction only of the mind; and there may be such in the sense, and Imagination, as well as in the Understanding and Reason.

Before I give any Instances of Real Cogita∣bles Reductive, it may be necessary that I shou'd explain the meaning of a Term that I have used, to wit [External Cause;] by which I understand whatever is without the Facul∣ty, and forreign to it; tho' in other respects it may be internal, as being within the A∣gent: To be plain, whatever the Under∣standing, the Imagination, or any of the external Senses conceive, by means of any Impressions, (even of Causes within the Agent, if they act without its will) is inten∣ded by me to come from an external Cause; and these Objective Conceptions, if they come from Causes, that are not also Ob∣jects, I call Real Cogitables Reductive.

In this Classis of Beings I do reckon Dreams, not only Divine (if any such there be) and Angelical Dreams, Dreams that are the effects of Divine, or of Ange∣lical Impression, but also ordinary Dreams; as also the Visions of the Feaverish, the Me∣lancholly and the Hysterical: And here likewise I reckon that Appearances in our ears, of the Ringing of Bells, which is only made by Agitation of the Internal Air, as also those Sparkles as of Fire, that do appear to the eye, upon a smart percus∣sion or shaking of the Fibres of the Optick Nerves, either by a vehement Agitation of the spirits within, or a violent Stroke, or a strong Frication of the eye from with∣out.

SECT. II.

Of meer Cogitables, or Fictions. What a Fiction is. That all Fictions are Creatures either of the Mind, or of the Internal Sense; None made by the External Sen∣ses. The Reason of it. Two Philosophical Doctrines observed, one concerning meer Cogitables, the other about Real Cogita∣bles Reductive. Why the Representations of things in Prophetical Dreams, are al∣ways made as if they were present.

ALL that I have said already, relates to things that are in our Faculties, by virtue of impressions made upon them from External Causes, which Causes are either Causes and also Objects, or Causes only and not Objects; there are others that do arise in us from the working of our Faculties, (of themselves,) without any grounds for it, in any thing that is external, either as a Cause, or as an Ob∣ject; and these I call meer Cogitables, or Fictions; such as an Hirco-cervus, or a Chimaera, a Golden Mountain, and the like.

Fictions are all forged, either by the Mind and Understanding, or by the Ima∣gination

and internal Sense; there are none in the external, the Eye, the Ear, or the like; and the Reason is evident, for Fictions are voluntary things, things that have always something of the Will in them, and therefore cannot be created by any Faculty but That, which is under the Em∣pire of the Will, which the External Sen∣ses are not, but the other Powers are: For though we may think, and also imagine, what we will, we cannot See, or Hear, or Taste, or Smell, or Feel, what we will. The Reason of which difference may be this, that if the Understanding, and Ima∣gination, were not some wise under the power of the Will, there could be no Dis∣course; and if the External Senses were so so too, there could be no certainty; and therefore that there may be both Dis∣course and certainty, our Faculties are so contrived, and so ordered, with excel∣lent Wisdom.

Here it must be observed,

(1) That there is some Reality even in meer Cogitables, (not indeed the same that is in those that are real, which have a reality of Grounds and Foundations; but a reality) both in respect of the Co∣gitative Act, which doth produce them, and of that Cogitable and Objective Ex∣istence, which they have in the Mind;

since it is as truly said, that one does think, or conceive such things, as it is of him that Dreams, or sees a Vision, that he does Dream, or see a Vision. Where∣fore such Cogitables as these, in respect of their Objective Existence, may be referred to Realities of Appearance, as Dreams and Visions are; for as the Act of Dreaming Really is, and the thing Dreamt doth Re∣ally seem; so the Act that produces a Ficti∣on Really is, and the Fiction also really seems. However, meer Cogitables, and Real Cogitables Reductive, or more plain∣ly, meer Fictions, and Dreams, and Visi∣ons do not agree in all respects, even in point of Appearance; but as in some re∣gards there is an Agreement, so in others, there is a difference, between them, in this point; for if any is to be made (as doubtless some is) between Real seeming, and a seeming to be Real; there is this between the foresaid Cogitables; that Dreams and Visions do not on∣ly Really seem, but seem to be Real; Whereas Fictions, do only really seem, but do not seem to be Real; at least not al∣way, and as Fictions.

2. It must be also noted, that in the Real Cogitables which I call Reductive, though their Causes are not Objects, yet they do impress our Faculties the same

way, and with the same kind of motions, that Objects use to do, and that such Ob∣jects as do seem to Appear would really have done, had they been indeed the Causes of these Images and Forms, that do Represent them, in such Instances. Thus when we have the sound as of Bells in our Ears, and yet none are Ringing, the In∣ternal Air in them, though Agitated only by a Vapor, Affects the Auditory Nerve the same way it would have done, had the External Air been really Agitated by the Ringing of Bells, and the Internal moved by the External. Thus also a smart Percussion of the Eye, Affects its Nervous parts the same way, and with the same kind of Motion, that a spark of Fire beheld by it would have done: And thus too in ordinary Dreams, the Spirits of that part of the Brain (if indeed it be the Brain) that is the Organ of Imagination, are moved by the internal causes of such Dreams, just in the same manner that they would have been, had they been im∣pressed by Eternal Objects; which also must be said of Angelical Dreams, and of Visions.

And if our Faculties be moved by Ex∣ternal causes that are not Objects, in the same manner as they be by external causes that are Objects, it can remain no longer

a Wonder, that the Images and Forms ex∣cited in us by such Impressions, should seem as real, and as much external, as if they were excited by Objects, Since our Facul∣ties can make no difference. Hence it is, that in Angelical Dreams, as also in Visions, all the Representations which are made unto the Prophet, are as of things that Are in present, not of things that Shall be, in Future; I saw a stone cut out of the Moun∣tain without Hands, says Daniel; or if a declaration must be made of somewhat which is to come, that declaration is made by way of Discourse, by a person present; so that still the Dream or Vision is Narra∣tive and Historical; as in that of the Angel to Joseph, Thou shalt call his Name Jesus. Many Divines have taken notice of this Appearance, in the Old Testament Prophe∣sies, having observed that these are always made in a Narrative Form, and as Repre∣sentations of things present; but the Rea∣son which they give for it, which is, that it is done to signifie, that the things Pre∣dicted shall as certainly come to pass, as if they were already, seems not so well grounded as the Observation it self; for I take it, the account that I have given is the more Genuine and Natural, which is, that External Causes that are not Ob∣jects do yet impress the Faculties which

they Act upon, in the same manner that Objects do; and therefore all the Images that do Arise from such Impressions, must be of things as present, and in being; because they Represent them as if Really they were Objects in Act, that had excited and stirred the Faculties.

SECT. II.

Of Thing strictly taken, and of the Difference betwixt the Notions of things, and those that are only about things. Of the Idea of Substance, and that of Accident. Spi∣nosas Notion of Substance, and that of an Accident considered. Maxims of Thing in general.

THing taken strictly, as it compre∣hends but Substances, Modes and Acccidents, is whatever seems External to any Faculty, and consequently, seems to have Being in the World, as a Part, or an Appurtenance, of it, whither it be re∣ally so or no. And in this sense of the Word, as Real Things themselves, (which are eminently called Things.) So likewise the Sentiments we have of these things, as Colours, Sounds Sapors, &c. are Things; and thus also, Notions are

Things, both the more general and com∣mon Notions, those of Substance and Ac∣cident, and the more special, the Notions of the several Species of Quality, and those of Relations, &c-

But when I say, that not only things themselves, but the Sentiments and No∣tions we have of them, are Things, it must be understood with distinction; for the Things themselves, (so I call the grounds of Sentiments and Notions) are Realities of True Existence; but Sentiments and Notions being only Real Cogitables, are only seeming Realities; Realities of Apparition only, not of Existence: Thus, the Notion of Substance is a Reality of Appearance only, but the things that we apply it to, are Realities of Ex∣istence.

By the Notion of thing as taken strictly, we have a Rise afforded us to apprehend the difference between the Notions the Understanding hath of things, and those it hath only about things; for the Notions that I call the Notions of things, appear to the Understanding as Things External unto it; for (not to mention Substan∣ces) even some Relations, and Intelligible Qualities do seem to the Understanding, as really Inherent in the things they are Attributed to, as the sentiments of

Colours, Odors, and Sounds do unto the Senses. But for Notions that are only framed by the Mind about Things, such as Cause, Effect, Measure, Measured, &c. they seem not to it to have being in the things themselves, but to arise from its own Reflexions, upon comparing and consider∣ing of Things. Thus, at the same time that the mind conceives of Almighty God, that he is the Cause of all, as it does conceive, that the word [God] is the name of a Real Being, so it conceives also, than the term [Cause] is not, but that it only signifies a certain Kind of Relation be∣tween God and Things, as these do spring from him, and so is only the name of a certain Objective, and not of a Real, Being.

Of the things that do Appear unto our Faculties to have a Reality of being, some are perceived by them immediately, in their own proper Formal Natures, and those are either Modes, or Compleat Accidents; Others are not perceived by them immedi∣ately, in their own proper Formal Na∣tures; but only by means of, and under, those that are perceived so; and these are called Substances: Compleat Accidents and Modes are Appurtenances, Substances are the things to which they do Appertain.

It is true, Spionosa is in another perswa∣sion; who tells us, that he understands by Substance, that which is in it self, and is conceived by it self, that is, as he ex∣presses it, a thing in whose conception that of another is not involved. Adding, that by Attribute he understands the same that he means by Substance, to wit, a thing conceived in and by it self, in whose conception that of another is not involved. Thus says he, Extension, in as much as it is capable of being conceived in and by it self, is an Attribute; but Motion that can∣not be conceived but as something in ano∣ther thing, is None. Only he says too, to prevent Objections; that a Notional distinction may be made between a Sub∣stance and an Attribute, in this manner, that a thing may be called an Attribute in respect of the Understanding, which doth Attribute such a certain Nature to a Sub∣stance; and then a Substance is the thing that the Understanding doth Attribute that Nature unto.

But as what this Philosopher says on this occasion is not very clear, so it is cer∣tain, that the Notion of Substance, as also that of an Attribute, is Relative; nor are the Instances he puts so well adjusted, but that some exceptions may be brought against them. I can no more conceive

any Real Extension, than I can any Mo∣tion, but as a thing that belongs to another; Extension to the thing extended, as Moti∣on to the thing moved. And tho' I do not believe my Understanding, the measure of other mens; yet I cannnot but think, it will be found on tryal, as hard a task for any other, as it is for me, to think o∣therwise; For what is meer Extension, but an Extension that belongs to nothing? And what is Extension that belongs to no∣thing, but an Extension of nothing? and certainly, an Extension of nothing, is no∣thing really, whatever it may be in Ima∣gination; but more of this in another place.

Maxims concerning Thing in general.

• 1. Nothing can be, and not be at once.
• 2. Things that but Appear, do equally Affect the Mind as those that really are.
• 3. Things are not to be Multiplied Un∣necessarily; as they are, when the Ficti∣ons of Men, are made to pass for the Crea∣tures of God.

CHAP. V. Of Substance.

SECT. I.

The Idea or Notion of Substance. Self Sub∣sistence, how in the Idea of it. The Idea of Substance only Relative. Neither Ex∣tension nor Existence the Idea of it. Sub¦stances are either Principles, or Principi∣ates. The Grounds of this Division. Sub∣stance that is a Principle, is either Mind, or Matter. Considerations premised for the better Understanding of this Discourse. The Ideas of Mind and Matter. The Grounds of the distribution of Substance in∣to Mind and Matter. Abstracted Mind is as conceiveable as Matter, under the Notion of Substance. Spinosa's Notion of Mind rejected.

THE Primary Notion or Idea which we have of Substance, is (as I have hinted in the former Chapter) that of a thing which is a Subject, or an Ultimate Object; that is, we have not any Real immediate Conception of it, but only a Notional. Or (to speak more plainly,

according to the Principles laid before) Substance as such, is not a thing conceived just as it is in its own Reality, but a thing conceived under a certain notion; that is, a substance is a thing that is a Subject. For when the Understanding does think of the things we call Accidents (which are the only things that do immediately, and at first present themselves unto us,) for ex∣ample, when it thinks of Odours, Co∣lours, sapors, figures, &c. it doth at the same time conceive, that besides these there must be other things that have them, in which those odors, colours, sapors, figures, &c. are. And those things that are conceived to have thers, we call substances; as those that are conceived to be had of others, or to be in them, we call Accidents: but what those things, which we do Denominate Substan∣ces, Are, in themselves, stript of all their Accidents, is no wise known; All we know of any substance is, that it is the subject of such and such Accidents; or that it is Qualified so or so; and hath these, and the other Qualities.

This Notion of a substance [that it is the same with a subject,] I call Prima∣ry, because though that [of subsisting by it self,] is deemed so by others, yet, in our ordinary way of Reasoning, and In∣vestigating of things, this [of self-subsist∣ing] is a consequent one, to that of being

a subject. For conversing with things; as the first that do present themselves to our consideration, are the Accidents of them; so the first Reflection the understanding makes, upon these Accidents, is, that o∣ther things are under them, which do uphold and support them, and consequent∣ly, that are subjects, or substances. But then indeed, when it comes again to con∣sider, whether these subjects are also in subjects, finding in its self a certain Re∣luctance to conceive (that) they are, be∣cause, if they were, there would be no end, things would be in one another in∣finitely; therefore it concludes, that that, which is a subject of Accidents, is it self in no subject; that is, it is self-subsistent. Thus the notion of being self-subsistent, a∣rises from that of being a subject: Nor is the notion of [being self-subsistent] a more Real one, than that of [being a subject.] For what is Self-subsistence but an Attri∣bute that belongs to something else? but what that something else is, to which it belongs, I am willing to learn; and will ever honour as my great Master, that Per∣son who will effectually teach me. We have no Ideas of any substances, but such as are Notional and Relative; that is, such as do arise from them as they stand in our Analogy, and are cloathed with Accidents.

A truth that might be made to appear by a full Induction of all the particulars; But will instance but in some; but those the most obvious, and most commonly discour∣sed of. For what Idea have we of Earth, but that it is something material, that it is fixt and tastless? What of Salt? but that of something sapid, and easily soluble in water? And what Idea have we of water? but that it is something material, moist, and fluid in such a degree, and the like? So that the Idea of a substance is that of a thing which is a subject; and this is a Relative Idea.

But many, who cannot satisfie them∣selves with the former, do conceit that they have found a Better, a Real, a Posi∣tive Idea of Substance. Of these, some do hold, Extension is that Idea, so that substance is Extension; and accordingly as Extension is either Penetrable, or Impene∣trable, so they frame the Notions of Spi∣rit, and Body; or the species of substance, as it is immaterial, or material. Others hold, that Existence or Being is the Idea of substance in general, and that substan∣ces of this or that particular species, are only determinate Talities of Being; for since in being is the Idea of an Accident, being (say they) must be that of a sub∣stance, and as to be is to exist, so being is nothing but existence.

I shall have another occasion hereafter to consider the first of those Opinions when I come to Answer a certain Object∣ion, touching the Idea of God; but will say of it now, that those who profess it, cannot make out (as they ought to do) a clear and satisfactory Idea of Extension in general, that shall agree in common, both to that which is Impenetrable, and to that which is Penetrable. Besides, it is not conceiveable, that a Spirit should be only a Penetrable Extension, since (as will ap∣pear more fully hereafter) Extension has but little to do with mind or thought, which is Essential to a Spirit, and without which a Spirit cannot be a Spirit: and Penetrability, and Impenetrability has all as little.

Nor is the second Opinion more con∣ceiveable. For not to Insist, that Exist∣ence properly taken is only of Causates, (existere properly being [esse extra causas,] and nothing properly is [extra causas] that was not first (in causis;) I will take it at large, for any being in act; yet even so, it is not of the Idea, or first Conception, of substance: for [being] taken not as a Noun, but as a Participle, (as here it is ta∣ken,) is in the very sense of the term, a word of Relation; being is not a thing, but of a thing; not a thing, but a mode of it,

and consequently presupposing it; and that which presupposes thing or substance, cannot possibly be in the Idea, or first con∣ception of it. In short, Accidents have being, tho' not the same being as substan∣ces; but to proceed.

Now, if this is the proper notion of substance in general, that it is a thing that is a subject of Accidents, it will fol∣low, that we cannot frame any Notions of substances in particular, or make any a∣greeable Distributions of them, but accord∣ing to the several Accidents, of which they are subjects. And this I desire may be no∣ted, because it will be of very great use in clearing what I shall say hereafter, in the prosecution of this Discourse.

Of Substances some are Principles, some Principiates. By Principles, I mean sub∣stances that are causes of other things, but are themselves uncaused. By Principiates, (give me leave to make an English word of one not very good Latin) I mean sub∣stances that are caused, or composed of Principles. Principles make, Principiates are made to be.

That there are substantial Causes, and substantial Effects, in the World, is evi∣dent to sense; For even to sense, some sub∣stances begin to be, and some do cease be∣ing. Now that which begins to be, is

made to be after having not been, must of necessity have Something, (and this some∣thing must of necessity be another thing,) that makes it to be; that is, it must have a Cause. So that Causes and Effects there are; else nothing could begin to be, or cease being. And if there are Causes, ei∣ther those Causes, all of them have Causes also, and consequently, as they (as Causes) make other things to be; so, (as things that have Causes) themselves are made to be by others; or else, at least some of them have no causes, but are self-subsistent and uncaused. If all Causes have Causes, then an infinite Progression must be owned in the account of Causes, than which no∣thing can be more repugnant to the mind of Man; to Science; and to the Order and Unity of the Universe. And indeed then, there must be a number actually in∣finite, since all Causes are actual. But if any Causes are uncaused, (as certainly some must be, for the reasons Alledged) those uncaused Causes are Principles, or first Causes. More shortly, either some∣thing in the Universe of being is uncaused, and so is a Principle, for what is uncau∣sed is a Principle; or else, every thing is Caused; but every thing cannot be Cau∣sed; for if every thing is Caused, Nothing must be the cause of Something. For if

every thing is caused, every thing was once nothing, for what is Caused was no∣thing before it was Caused; and if every thing was once Nothing, either Nothing must be the Cause of some, or, (which in effect is the same) nothing may become something without any cause, than which No thought can be more unreasonable.

Again, as nothing is more certain than that there is some Principle, so the Stoicks (the Wisest of all the Philosophers, as well as the most Devout) affirmed, that there are two, Mind, and Matter. Thus Seneca in his Epistles (Ep. 65.) Universa ex Materia & ex Deo constant. All things (says he) are composed, or, do Consist of God and Matter. And indeed, we cannot be more assured by all our faculties, that there is Action, and Passion in the World, and that the World could neither be, or persevere in being, without them, than we are to speak Philosophically, that there are two Principles, one, the Principle of all the Action; the other, the Principle of all the Passion is in it; the former the Active Principle, or first subject of Activity, the latter the Passive Principle, or first subject of Passivity; of which, I call the first, Mind, the second, Matter. This Asser∣tion Zeno in Laertius fully agrees unto, when he tells us, that the Principles of

things are two, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Active, and the Passive; Nor doth the great Originist Moses say much less, when in his Genesis, he writeth of the Spirit of God that moved, and of the Abyss and Waters upon which he moved; and me∣thinks, in all Animal Generations, in which there must be a Male and a Female, as who should say, an Active and a Passive Principle, there is some (and this no very Dark or Obscure) Adumbration of it.

Before I do proceed to a more particu∣lar Consideration of these Principles, I would have it be observed, that we ought to Distinguish what is manifest, certain, and of undoubted truth concerning them, from that which is but doubtful and uncertain. Now it is certain, that there is such a thing as we do call Matter; such a thing as Mind, such a thing as Motion; and that Matter is alter'd, figured, textur'd, and infinite ways wrought upon & moulded by means of mo∣tion. Again, it is certain that all things have not Mind in equal proportions, but that some exert the acts of it in a higher way and degree, and some in more ways for kind than others do; and also certain, that the exercises of Acts of Mind in all the ways and all the degrees of them in Cor∣poreal Animals, (for we are not so well acquainted with others,) do much depend

upon the Nature and Qualifications of their Organs; that is, upon Texture and Disposition of matter. These things we are as certain of, as that our selves be, and have a true use of our faculties. But if we advance farther, and to endeavour to Enter and Penetrate into the very nature of Matter, into that of Mind, and into the Nature of Motion; here being forsaken and destitute of sense to hunt for us, we are much at a loss, and as unable to pro∣ceed in our search an inquiry after them, as to their just Realities, as we are in that of things, which are wholly out of our view. It is hard to conceive just what matter is in its own Positive Reality; also what Mind is, and even what Motion is, (as taken for a subordinate Principle.) Nor can it be Demonstrated, that (as some will have it) there is only one substance in the Universe, and that Matter and Mind are only several Modifications of that one sub∣stance; nor be Demonstrated, that Mat∣ter (for this I think they mean by sub∣stance,) is in its own Nature, a vital Ener∣getical thing; and that the diverse Grada∣tions of Life, that are observed in the seve∣ral species of Animals, arise only from the several Modifications of Matter, and of that life of nature (as those Philosophers call it) which is Essential thereto, and is

the root of those Perceptive, Appetitive, and Motive Powers that do dress up being in all the Shapes and Forms in which it appears upon the Stage of the World. I will not build upon such Hypothesis; which being unevident, must needs be doubtful and uncertain, if not false. A Philosophy that shall be solid, and sound, must have its Ground-work and Foundations firmly, laid; which none can have, but that which is bottomed, rais'd and built upon evi∣dence; I mean, upon the certain Testimony of our faculties. And therefore since our faculties do rather go upon Notions, than on Realities, and do plainly Distinguish be∣tween Mind and Matter, and (as I will show in the Progress of this Discourse) do Contradistinguish them, I hold my self o∣bliged to treat of these distinctly, but still in the Real Notional way.

Mind then is Cogitative, thinking, or perceiving substance; or, Mind is the first subject of Cogitation. Matter is Exten∣sive, spacious, substance; or, the first sub∣ject of dimensive spacious Quantity. In other, but Equivalent terms; Mind is Active substance, Matter Passive substance. I affirm, that these latter Definitions are e∣quivalent to the former, because, in effect, it is the same to say, that Mind is Active, as to say, it is Cogitative; and the same to

say, that Matter is Passive, as to say, it is Spatious Extensive substance. Nor is Mind Cogitation, or matter extension, as Des Cartes makes them; but the former is Co∣gitative, the latter Extensive substance. We find a Reluctance in our minds to con∣ceive that Cogitation is a substance, as also to conceive Extension as one; and yet we cannot conceive Mind and Matter but as substances.

The main Reason why I do distinguish Substance into Mind and Matter, as into first Original kinds, is, because (as I hin∣ted before) Cogitation and Extension, that do Constitute their several Ideas, are of no Relation one to another, for what hath a Thought to do with a Cube, or a Tri∣angle? or with Length, or Breadth, or Depth? Certainly Cogitation and Exten∣sion are quite different Accidents, with∣out any thing in their Ideas, that is Com∣mon to both; and therefore the first subject of the one, cannot be conceived the first subject of the other; their subjects must be substances of quite as different kinds as themselves are, at least to us; since all the diversity we can conceive in substances, is and must be, taken from the accidents they have, these being the Characters by, and under which alone, we do perceive and know, and by consequence, can only di∣stinguish them.

I insist herein the more, for that many think that Mind is only an Accident, and that taken for a substance, it is unintelli∣gible, and a meer Chimera: so that, tho' Matter is acknowledged (by them) to be a substance, it will not be yielded, that Abstract, separate mind can be one. But those that think it so, if they consider'd, that men have no conception of substance, nor can have any of it, but as it is a sub∣ject of Accidents, they would soon change their Opinion. For the Accident of Cogi∣tation, or of Activity, that Mind is the sub∣ject of, is as distinctly and clearly conceive∣able, as that of Extension, or of Passivity, which matter is the subject of. Nor is the thing it self that is the subject of Extension, or of Passivity; any more Conceiveable but by, and under this; that is, the substance of mind and matter are equally conceive∣able, and equally unconceiveable. They know no more what that is in it self, that is extended, than what that is, that is Cogi∣tative; and may be as sure, that they do think, as they are, that they are spacious, ay, they cannot know that they are spaci∣ous, but by thinking. But of spatiosity or extension, (the Accident that constitutes matter,) I shall have occasion to discourse hereafter, when I come to speak of quantity, I proceed now to discourse of Mind.

The Idea I have given of Mind, that it is the Immediate subject, or (as others per∣haps would chuse to say) the Immediate Principle, of Cogitation, Energy, or Acti∣vity, is much more easie to be conceived than that of Spinosa, when he defines the human mind to be the Idea of a body, or thing, actually existing: for Mind, even the human, is not so properly said to be an Idea, as to be the Principle, our Cause efficient, of Ideas; since all Ideas (even in common sense) are conceived; and Mind is that, which conceives them. Thus it is in our Refracted, Inadequate, Real-Notio∣nal way of conceiving; and for an Ade∣quate and just one, as it is above our facul∣ties, so I do not find that Spinosa, or Mal. Branche after all their Ambitious Researches in that higher way, have edified the World thereby to any great Degree. This way of seeing all things in God, and in their own proper Realities, is a way much out of the way. Otherwise, when they keep the lower way of sense, many of their thoughts are surprizing, and excellent.

SECT. II.

A two fold Consideration of Mind; one, as it is Abstracted from Matter; the other as it is Concerned with Matter. What is meant by Concernment of Mind with Matter- Of Mind. That is the Idea of God. God as pure Mind, is in himself, and directly in∣comprehensible. However, he is knowable as it were by Refraction, and Reflection; in an Hypothesis, and by way of similitude That a Parabolical, Comparative way of knowing God, ought to content us. Of the Divine Attributes; the true conception of them. The vanity of those who talk of seeing all things in God. Spinosa's Opi∣nion that God is all substance Rejected, for several Reasons. That this Opinion seems to imply, that God is no singular self-existent, self-subsistent Being. The Ground of this Opinion touched. Another sentiment concerning God, that he is in∣finite Extension indued with Goodness, Wisdom, and Power, considered. The Ground of this underminded, and the na∣ture of the Divine Omnipresence repre∣sented.

MIND may be considered, either in it self, as it is Abstract and simple, free from all Concretion and Composition with matter; or else as it is concreted or concerned therewith.

By the Concretion of mind with matter, I mean nothing but the acting of Mind in this or that particular manner, by means of matter. As it is in our selves, who do not see, or hear, or feel, but by means of Organs, that is, of matter.

Mind as it is in it self, Abstract and Simple, free from all concretion or con∣cernment with Matter, I call Pure Mind; Mind Concreted with Matter, I term, Mind in Matter.

Pure Mind, is the Notion or Idea of God; as is implied by our Saviour, when he says, John 4.24. God is Spirit; he does not say, God is a Spirit, but God is Spirit; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, All Spirit, nothing but Spirit. In like manner Seneca, in the Pre∣face to his natural Questions, first demand∣ing what God is? Answers, he is Mens universi, the mind of the the Universe; and being obliged, for the cleering of his no∣tion to show the difference between the nature of God, and that of Man, adds, Mind is only the Principal part of our na∣ture, but the whole of Gods, which is no∣thing

but Mind God is pure Mind, all Reason. In his own terms thus, Quid ergo interest inter naturam Dei & nostram? No∣stri melior pars Animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum. Again, in his Epistles (Ep. 65.) He has this expression, Nos nunc primam & Generalem causam quaerimus, haec simplex esse debet; nam & materia simplex est; now, says he, we seek the first Uni∣versal cause, which ought to be simple (or uncompounded) for even matter it it self is simple. Only, I doubt, he (as many other Philosophers did) took God but for an immanent an ingredient Cause of all; which perhaps is only true of the Mosaical Spirit of God.

But God as he is Pure mind, is an Inac∣cesible Light, that dazzels all the eyes that behold it; and therefore, we can hope to acquire but very little particular know∣ledge of him or acquaintance with him, under this notion. But then again, as the Sun that cannot be beheld directly, in its own proper light, may yet be seen by Re∣flection; so may the Deity, in an Hypo∣thesis, and by way of Parable; by speak∣ing of him after the manner of men. The holy Scriptures themselves go this way. They Represent God as an Infinite Al∣mighty Person, (suppose a man,) that hath Understanding, Will, and Affections; that

consults and decrees; and that is touched (as men are) with the motions of Love, Hatred, Desire, Aversion; and in conse∣quence of this Notion, do further Repre∣sent him, sometimes as a Father, some∣times as a Lord, or as a great King, that Governs the Universe, according to the Rules and Laws that he himself hath set, and by rewards and punishments. Now, all this is Parabolical, and but Compara∣tive Knowledge: However, we ought to satisfie and Content our selves therewith; for though it is not to know the Deity in in the Reality, as he is in himself, yet it suffices for the Principal End for which we should endeavour to know him; which is to Adore and Obey him. Besides, it is well nigh the only particular Knowledge of him that we Mortals are capable of, in this Terrestial State; and, in fine, is al∣most as much, in effect, as that which we have of any thing else, even in the Corpo∣real World.

It is true we understand that Matter and Motion are Real things, and that all others that are Corporeal, do result from these; but this (at least) is only a General Confused Knowledge, and no more than that we have of the Abstracted Pure Mind. For, as to the particular Natures of things, their Internal Fabrick and Texture,

and that degree of Motion, that is in the particles which compose them, (of this) we have only a weak imperfect Conjecture, without certainty. All the particular Knowledge that we have of things by which we distinguish them one from ano∣ther, both in reference to their Kinds, and to the Individuals of those Kinds, and by which we resolve their Operations, is of nothing (to speak of) but of Acci∣dents; and Accidents are nothing but (as I have touched before, and shall shew again more fully hereafter) the Sentiments we have of things; they be∣ing not so much as Grounds or proper Representations of Grounds, but only certain Appearances, under which our several Senses do dress up things, and so show them unto us: and this is e∣nough for use.

As therefore any person would know but little of this Corporeal World, and no∣thing usefully, that would not take it in by his Senses, and know it (as he only can) under the Mascarade of Sentiments, that are not without him, but only in Ap∣pearances, and in their Grounds; so, he shall know but little of God, that will not condescend to see him in an Hypothesis, by way of Analogy and Similitude. What was said by God himself unto Moses, will

hold true in every Mortal; Thou shalt see my Backparts, but my Face shall not be seen: All our Knowledge of him at present, is but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, we can but Riddle at him; the Ideas we have of him, are only Attributes; and Attributes are not Quali∣ties really Inherent in him, but only No∣tions of his Operations, and of the various Relations and Aspects which they bear, to one Another, and to Us,) that are exci∣ted into us, upon the view and considera∣tions which we take of his works. Thus the several Attributes of God, that we conceive and know him under, are, in re∣ference to him, just as the Accidents of things Corporeal, their Colours, their O∣dors, their Sounds, their Tangible Quali∣ties are unto them; we see him but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as in a Glass; and to see a thing as in a Glass, is not to see the thing it self, but only by Appea∣rances; and yet, he that will look be∣hind the Glass, to see more, shall see nothing at all.

What, then, must be said of those, who think, they See all things in God? When God, though in himself he is Pure Light, without any Mixture of Darkness, yet, as to us, in respect of any clear, just, distinct Knowledge of him, He dwells in the thickest Darkness: No

Windows in the Sanctum Sanctorum, where the Seat of God was; and the very Heathen, many of them, Adored him with Silence, as one that was In∣effable and Unconceiveable: Methinks, it is meer Enthusiasm, to talk of Seeing All Things in the Original, when we cannot so much as look upon it; God is Pure Mind, and Pure Mind is Pure Light, of too Transcendent Glory to be immediately beheld by us, but Blear-eyed, Weak-sighted Mortals.

There are two Opinions in reference to the Nature of God, that Differ from mine; both of which I will con∣sider.

The First is, that of Spinosa, That he is all Substance, and that Particu∣lar Beings (even formally taken) are but Participations of his; as being only so many several Modifications of the Divine Attributes. But this is a Notion (of the Deity) that I can∣not receive, as for other Reasons, so for this particularly, that it makes him to be the Universe, and to be Matter, as well as Mind; whereas, God is neither Matter, nor the World or Universe, but only Pure Mind; for

the Great World has a Mind, that made, and Governs it, as well as the Little Even Mr. Hobbs, has said, He that thinks this World without a Mind, I shall think him without a Mind: And says Seneca, Nat. Quast. Lib. 1. C. 45. Eundem quem nos Jovem intelligunt, Custo∣dem, Rectorem{que} Universi; Animum ac Spi∣ritum, Mundani hujus operis Dominum & Artificem, cui nomen omne convenit, &c. Which I would Render thus; God is the Father All-mighty, All-wise, All good, the Maker of Heaven and Earth, Soveraign Preserver and Gover∣nor of All.

For my own part, I much doubt that those Philosophers, who profess them∣selves in this Opinion, [that God is all Substance, or that he is the World,] do really believe he has no Being at all, but, only in Fiction of Mind, and by way of Prosopopaeia; and that as Na∣ture, Fortune, Chance, which yet are said to do This, and to do That, do, really, only signifie Causes so or so con∣sidered; so, God, with them, is only a Notion, a Name, a Mode of Expression, by which they mean all Causes taken together; and so no more the Name of a Real Individual singular Being, than that of Nature, or Fortune. Sunt (says

Lucilius in Cicero l. 2. de Nat. Deor.) Qui omnia Naturae nomine appellent, ut Epicurus, &c.

The unwary Expression of some Theo∣logues, and Theologizing Philosophers, who Denominated God Nature Naturing, might give occasion to this improper con∣ceit of him, among the moderns; as might also that mistaken Idea of Infinity (as an Attribute of God) that some have given, which seems to shock his distinction and singularity of Being. For thence it is Argued, how can God, be Infinite Be∣ing, if he be not all Beings? And it he be, how can he be One by himself? be a Singular Individual Being, distinct from all others? These were the speculations, that obliged Spinosa to conceive of God, that he is the Ingredient, Immanent Cause of all Things; and the speculations too, that tempt others, to other mistakes con∣cerning him. But when I come to dis∣course of the Notions of Finite and Infinite, and to Represent in what Sense the latter is truly Ascribed to God, I hope to mani∣fest, that there is great Mistake in such Speculations and Arguings, and to exempt the true received Notion of Infinity both from these, and from all the like intang∣ling Embarrasments and Difficulties.

The Second Opinion, is that of Dr. More and his Followers, who do hold, that God is an Infinite Extension; that he is in∣dued indeed with all Goodness, Wisdom, and Power, but he is an Extension so in∣dued; and of this they are so confident, that some require a belief thereof as of an Article as great as any in the Creed; an Article that is the Foundation of all Religion; both revealed and Natural. But as I believe, that no Man hath known the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son hath revealed him, so, since among all the Revelations that the Son has pleased to make of God the Fa∣ther, this is none [that he is an Exten∣sion] I cannot admit his being so, to be a Notion so Essential unto all Religion, as they would make it; Especially when I consider, that it might as easily have been said, that God is Extension, as, that he is a Spirit; and Christ hath said the lat∣ter but not the former. Besides, I cannot understand how Wisdom, Goodness, and Power should be said of meer Extension, which is but space; it seems to me a lesser Incongruity (though even this is Incon∣gruity enough) to say that God is Matter so indued, than that he is Space so indued; seeing, even in common sense, there is more of Reality and Being in meer Matter,

than there is in meer Extension or Space. But to urge this Argument more home. By Extension, (which the persons who are in this Opinion do Attribute to God,) they must mean either meer Space, or else a thing that in the Idea of it is Spatious. If meer Space is intended; As this does no ways differ from inane or vacuum, so one may think, it might as well be said (which yet its hard to say) that God is an Infinite inane or vacuum, that is, in pla∣in English, an Infinite Nothing indued with Wisdom, Goodness and Power, as, that he is infinite Extension so indued. On the other side, if by Extension is under∣stood a thing that in the Idea and first Conception of it is Extensive, that is, a thing that does essentially take up space, so as that it cannot be conceived, but withal space must be Imagined, as an Ap∣purtenant of it; in this Sense, I cannot see how it differs from Matter; and then to say, that God is Extension, is to say, that he is Matter; whereas, God is Pure Mind, not Matter. In fine, as it is cer∣tain, that God is Mind, rather than Mat∣ter; so likewise it is certain, that in the Ideas that we frame of Mind, and of all the things that properly relate to it, such as Wisdom, Goodness, Thought, &c. We never do once think of Extension or

Space: And if at any time we do endea∣vour to apply Extension or Space unto Mind, or to any thing properly mental, there always arises a Repugnance in us, upon but the thoughts of it; an Inch, a Foot, a Yard of Understanding, or Good∣ness, is a Bull.

I know it is Argued from the Omnipre∣sence of God, that he is Extended; and in truth it is very hard to imagine any pre∣sence with things that are extended, but withal, there must be an Imagination of some Extension in the thing that is pre∣sent: but still, this is but Imagination, which is apt to impose upon us, and there∣fore it must be examined by Reason. And Reason tells us, that we cannot have a distinct and clear conception of the presence of God, if we have not (as we have not) such an one of his Essence, since the pre∣sence of God is but a Mode of his Essence; and if we have no distinct and clear Con∣ception of the presence of God, nor con∣sequently of his Omnipresence, or the way how he is present with all his Creatures, where ever they are; I do not see with what Cogency or Force an Argument can be Deduced from it, in this business- In short, since things are present one with another very differently, in proportion to their several Natures, it will follow, that

things Mental, must be present with o∣thers, in much another way than those that are Material, and Consequently that God who is pure Mind, must be present with Material Beings, much otherwise, than these themselves are, one with ano∣ther. Mind can no more be present the same way that Matter is, than be the same thing with Matter.

CHAP. IV. Of Mind in Matter.

SECT. I.

Mind as concerned with Matter comes under a double consideration, 1 As it actuates a most subtle and more than Etherial Mat∣ter, that is diffus'd throughout the World. 2ly. As it actuates some particular Vechicle or Body. In the first Notion of it, Mind in Matter is the Idea of the Mosaical Spi∣rit of God This Spirit according to the Scriptural Hypothesis, is the Immediate cause of all things in the first Creation, and ever since. The Being of this Spirit E∣vinced, both by Authority and by Argu∣ment. Dr. Mores Distinction, between the Spirit of Nature (which he calls Principium Hylarchicum) and the Spi∣rit of God, considered.

AFter a Consideration of Mind as it is in it self, Pure and Abstract, Exempt from all Intrinsecal concernment, and composition with Matter: I come now to consider it as concerned with Matter, that

is, as Acting in, and by means of Matter; in which consideration Mind may be cal∣led second Mind, as in the former, it may be termed the first.

Mind concerned with Matter, may be considered in two respects, either as it has for the Vehicle which it actuates, and by which it acts, all that most subtle Matter that does permeate the Universe, in the utmost Extent and Capacity of it; or, as it actuates some particular system of Mat∣ter, that may be called a Body, and it is a particular Vehicle.

Mind in the former Consideration of it, as it doth actuate, and act in, and by, a most subtle matter diffused throughout the Universe, seems to me to be the Mosaical Spirit of God, mentioned, Gen. 1. v. 2. And the same that in the Scriptural Hypo∣thesis (which never mentions Nature as the Efficient Cause of any thing, but Re∣presents Philosophy only as a Theology, that swallows up the second Causes in Contem∣plation of the first,) is the Cause of all pro∣ductions, the Births, the Growths, and all the Alterations and Changes that come to pass in the World. This, in that ac∣count, is the Principle of Human Souls, Mal, 2.15. Did he not make one? Yet had he the Residue, of the Spirit: As if he had said, he wanted not Spirit, [he had more

left] to Animate more, had he been pleased to make them, but he made but one; and the Principal too of all Corporeal Effects, even of Snow, of Hail, of Ice, of Wind, &c. Psal. 147.15, 16, 17, 18. He sendeth forth his Commandment upon the Earth, his word runneth very swiftly. He giveth Sonw like Wool he scattereth the Hoar Frost like Ashes. He Casteth forth his Ice like Morsels; who can stand before his Cold? He sendeth out his word and melteth them; he causeth his Wind to blow and the Waters Flow.

To understand this Text with the more clearness, we must have Recourse unto Genesis, Ch. 1. v. 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 14, 20, 24, 26. In which we find, in, v. 2. men∣tion made of the Spirit of God that moved upon the Face of the Waters, as the Active Principle that wrought all; and in the 3. and the following verses, of the Word or Commandment of God, that as a Directive Principle, did regulate and order all, so that the Spirit acted accordingly; thus v. 3. God said let there be Light, and there was Light; and v. 6. God said let there be a Firmament, or rather an Expanse, in the midst of the Waters, and it was so, and v. 9. God said, Let the Waters under the Hea∣ven be gathered together into one place, and let the Dry Land Appear and it was so.

The like in the following works. Now the World in the account of the Holy Scriptures, has the same for its Conserving, that it had for its Procreating Cause; and therefore as God at first did make All by his Almighty Spirit through his Word, so the Psalmist tells us, that he still doth; for as at first he said, [Let there be] so still, he Sendeth forth his [Commandment,] and as all was ordered at first by the Di∣vine Word, [He said, let there be Light; He said, let there be a Firmament, &c.] So still his WORD Runneth very swiftly: The Spirit of God doth still Execute, as he did at first, all the Directions and Commands are given it; He Produces the Snow; the Hoar Frost; and Ice; he maketh Cold; and Raiseth Winds; and causes all the Alterations that are made in the Air, in the Earth, in a Word, in all the Elements, and in all above them. This is the Scriptural Hypothesis; the meaning of which is, that God by his infinite Wisdom, as well as Power; both Made and Governs, the World; but to Return.

Of this Spirit, that Penetrates through all the World, and that doth All in it, not only Moses has written, but many of the Old Philosophers, have also told. Vel∣leius in Cicero, l. 1. de Nat. Deor. ac∣quaints

us, concerning Pythagoras, Quod censuit animum esse per Naturam rerum om∣nem intentum & Commeantem, that he be∣lieved a Mind diffused throughout the whole Nature of things. The same Vel∣leius also reports, concerning Zeno, that he in some of his Books, discoursed of what he called the Reason of the Universe; [Rationem per omnem pertinentem Natu∣ram.] In fine, (to omit others) Plutarch mentions a Spirit that Penetrates through∣out the World, [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] And what can this Spirit be, that Pene∣trates throughout the Universe; that a∣nimates it; and is as a common Reason in it (for I will unite the Expressions, and so compleat the Idea;) but the Mosa∣ical Spirit?

But not only Authority (Sacred and Pro∣phane) evinces, that there is such a Spirit, an Energetical Vital Principle, diffused throughout the World; but Experience also shows it, if the Experience that we have of such a Principle Diffused through∣out one Region of it; [our own] may be sufficient to conclude, it is so in all; of which Experience I shall speak hereafter, when also the Nature of this Spirit, and the Influence it has upon, and in things, will be set out more clearly, and more fully.

I Know the Learned Dr. More hath told us of a Principium Hylarchicum; which he defines an Incorporeal Substance, with∣out Sense and Animadversion, that pervades the Matter of the whole Universe, and ex∣ercises in it a Plastical Power according as the Portions of the said Matter are Predis∣posed; and this he calls the Spirit of Na∣ture, and Distinguishes it from the Spirit of God; Affirming, that God doth actuate all the Matter of the Natural Corporeal World by the Spirit of Nature; but that he actually acts in and governs the world of Men and Angels by the Spirit of God. But I have shewed already from the Scrip∣tural Hypothesis, that it is one Spirit, [the Mosaical] that Actuates, and Acts in All, in Men and other Animals, as well as in the World of meer Nature, as to all the operations commonly called Natural; for as to those that are called Supernatural, that come from the Holy Ghost, or the Comforter, these as they are of another Nature, so the Consideration of them be∣longs to another place: In fine, the Prin∣cipium Hylarchicum, or Spirit of Nature (as this Learned person calls it,) is but a Plastick Faculty, of the Mosaical Spirit.

SECT. II.

An Inquiry into the Original and Rise of Mo∣tion. What is meant by Motion in this Inquiry. That Motion comes from Mind in Matter, or the Mosaical Spirit. This shewed in many instances, by the Connexi∣on between Cogitation and Motion. How Motion comes from a Principle at Rest, and how Matter from Mind set out in the Metaphysical Hypothesis, and by other Il∣lustrations.

I Think I shall not step much (if I do at all) out of my way to make Inquiry in this place into the Original and Rise of Motion. By Motion now I mean not Actual Motion, or Motion as it is the (actual) Translation of Bodies from place to place; which some define [The Successive Application of a Body in all it hath out wardly, unto the several parts of the Bo∣dies which touch it immediately;] which is the most usual Sense of the word. But here I mean by it, that Force, Energy, or Motive Vertue called in Latine Impetus, from which this Actual Translation, or Successive Application of Bodies does im∣mediately come. And my Enquiry now

shall be concerning the Original of This, not in particular as it is in this or that par∣ticular Body, but the Rise of Impetus or Motive Force in general, which having found, I will first remove an Objection, and then improve the Discovery, to shew how Matter comes from Mind, as well as how Motion doth from a Principle that is at rest.

It must be acknowledged, that there is some appearance (at first sight) of cause to believe, that as mind is the first subject of Cogitation, and matter the first subject of Extension, so, since Energy or Force (the immediate Principle of Action and of Act∣ual motion) is neither Cogitation, nor Extension, that some third substance Di∣stinct both from mind and matter, should be the first subject of it, and consequently, that there should, be three Principles, Mind, Matter, and the first Mover. And indeed it looks as if the Scripture Hypothesis did countenance this; for there mention is made of the Spirit which wrought, as the first subject of motion; of the Abyss of Waters wrought upon, as the first Recipi∣ent Subject; and of the word Reason, or Wisdom which directed the Work. But on second Consideration, as it is clear, that all that Moses says in his Genesis, con∣cerning the Spirit, and the Word, is not

said with design to intimate, that really the Spirit was only a meer sensless inarti∣ficial Force, or Energy, and that Wisdom or the Word was another distinct Princi∣ple, that directed and guided it in all its Motions; but to shew, since we men (in our inadequate way of Conceiving) do distinguish Wisdom and Power, that all the works of God were made in Both, but Both united in one Demiurgical Mind, or (to use Seneca's Expression) on Ratio fa∣ciens. Thus, Ratio faciens is the Idea or Notion of the Mosaical Spirit, the true Na∣tura Naturans, that concurred to make the World, not in the manner that God him∣self did, who, in the Mosaical Hypothe∣sis, Acted only as an External Efficient, but in the way that the Soul would do in a living Creature, if first by its Plastic vertue it should form all the members of the Body of it, and afterwards, should inform it, and act in it. And Gotta in Ci∣cero has as finely as compendiously expres∣sed the Difference between these two seve∣ral ways of working, even in Reference to the World. When L. 3. de Nat. Deor. he says, Ita prorsus existimarem, si illum [mundum] aedificatum, non quemadmodum docebo, à naturâ conformatum putarem.

It is this Spirit that is the Original Cause of the Impetus, that is the nearest cause of

Local Motion; and indeed, it is the Ori∣ginal Cause of all Mundane Activity and Energy: Motion comes from Energy or Action, and all Energy and Action from the Mosaical Spirit; [not from meer mat∣ter, but from mind in matter.] In short, Impetus or Force arises from the same Prin∣ciple that Cogitation or Perception does; as is evident by the following Conside∣rations.

First, The first mention that we have of motion, or Corporeal Action, is in Rela∣tion to the Mosaical Spirit, in Gen. 1.2. where it is said, that the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. It is true, the word used in this Text for mo∣tion, is seldom used, [but thrice in the whole Scripture, to wit, in this place, in Deut. 32.11. and in Jer. 23.9.] And therefore the direct particular meaning of it will not be easily agreed, but that it imports some motion (which is as much as I do urge it for,) is beyond dispute: Motum aliquem Notari, (says Hotting. in Exam. Hist. Creat. Quest. 33.) non est Dubitandum.

Secondly, It is farther Evident from the very Ideas that we have of things: For we cannot conceive mind as a Perceptive

Cogitative substance, but withall, we must conceive it as Active, and that there is something Energetical in it; whereas, on the other hand, matter may (and in its own proper Idea must) be conceived as a thing that is only Passive, not Active; there being nothing of Active or Energe∣tical in it as it is but spacious extensive substance; and therefore Energy and Action cannot be conceived to proceed but from matter, which in its self is Idle and unactive; but rather from mind, which is essentially active and busie.

Thirdly, It may also be argued from the relation, that (Experience assures us,) is between Cogitation and Actual motion. For we clearly perceive, that all our vo∣luntary motions do arise from Thought or Imagination; we do move our selves, or any particular part that hath the proper instruments of voluntary motion, and these duly qualified, at our pleasure, when we will; that is, by imagination and thought. We go, we stand still (which is by Tonic motion;) we put our hands, feet, heads, eyes, and other parts of our bodies into mo∣tion, and regulate them in their several motions, by will or thought, ay, even co∣gitation it self in all the several modes of it, as it is sensation, imagination, or rati∣ocination,

does ever bear a proportion to some motion; insomuch that as the minute parts of any Organ that serves unto Cogi∣tation of any kind, are more or less in mo∣tion; or, (which is meant and is Equiva∣lent,) as the Organ is in more or less Dis∣position and Aptitude to receive impressi∣ons; so answerably, the Act of Cogitation is graduated. Organs that are affected with heaviness or torpor, (as those are whose Particles are too little in motion, and consequently indisposed for receiving fitting impressions,) are answerably under a Stupor, or Diminution of sense and per∣ception: but inflamed Organs, whose par∣ticles have too much motion, and conse∣quently are apt to be too easily, or too much stirred, these are exquisitely sensible and tender. In fine, Reason it self, as to its grounds, is but Harmony; a certain mo∣dification and turning of the parts, (either the Spirits, or the Filaments,) that are the immediate instruments of that kind of co∣gitation; so that they be not wound up too high, or let down too low; that is, that they be not in too much motion, or aptitude unto it, or in too little, but in a just mediocrity; and this is to be in Tune, or in Harmony. The truth hereof is evi∣dent. For if the Organ of Reason is infla∣med, so that the Particles of it are too

much in motion, the action that it exerts in that instance is not reason, but madness of one sort or another; and again, if the Organ is torpid, through a defect of mo∣tion in the Particles of it, the Cogitation that is exercised in this instance is plain stu∣pidity and folly; and the power a dulness or shortness of wit. Wherefore Aristoxe∣nus the Musician, who affirmed that the Soul was a Harmony, as he receded not from his Art, so he did not much wander from the true nature of the Soul. In truth, Harmony or Proportion is the Soul of the World. For if we look well, we shall find that, that which formalizes things, and qualities, and which makes them be of this or that kind, and to act in this or that way, is nothing but the Proportion or Logos that is in them; that is, it is the Tuning of them in the world, and one to another, as to parts, and motions: most, if not all the Specifical Qualities and Opera∣tions that are in the World, arise from hence; which are therefore called Occult, because this Spring and Original of them is so little regarded; but of this more in another, and perhaps a more proper place,

But to more illustrate the former Argu∣ment, and show in a fuller light, the rela∣tion

between Cogitation and actual mo∣tion; I will enter farther into the Conside∣ration of motion; and will manifest, both the subtlety of it, and also the Correspondence which it holds with Mind, or the Percep∣tive. I will not speak now of the motion that is Local to such a Degree, that it falls under Observation of the sense, but of that motion (for motion it is) that contri∣butes to the being of sense; which for Di∣stinction sake may be called Impression. We are convinced by sense, that in the Impres∣sions that make it, there is a great deal of subtlety, and this too in various Degrees; and we are equally convinced, that there are various sensitive Powers to receive them, in those several Degrees. Thus the im∣pression made upon the Eye, that causes Vision, is by many Degrees more delicate and fine than that which causes the Feel∣ing; since the Object seen by the Eye, and Consequently making a Visive impres∣sion (upon it) ordinarily doth not make any upon the sense of feeling. I say ordi∣narily, because sometimes, where the im∣pression of the visible is very strong, as when one looks upon the Sun, or on some other very strong and vigorous Light, the feeling of the Eye is affected, as well as the Sight, so that there is a sense of pain, from a solution of Continuity. Which plainly

evinces (to note it by the by) that all vi∣sible impression, tho' it be not sensibly a motion, yet really is so, since even visible impressions, if strong and vigorous, are painful; and consequently, are motions; for nothing causes pain but motion; pain being nothing but little Spasms and Ten∣sions of the parts; and if strong impres∣sions be motions, weaker ones are so too; tho' in a less degree.

Again, The impression made upon the Ear, that causes sound, tho' it be by much a less fine and delicate one than that upon the Eye, which causes Light or Colour, it is however of far greater fineness and de∣licacy than that Impression which produces pain in the Ear; For as we see without pain, so, ordinarily we hear without it; that is, we are affected by sonorous Ob∣jects, which do propagate their motions to our ears, with the sentiment of sound, without being sensible of this Affection any other way. And yet if the sound be too intense, it always pains, and often breaks, or too much stretches the Timpa∣num or Drum of the Ear. The observa∣tion that some Philosophers have taken of this latter effect, occasion'd them to make a Maxim, that an Excellent Object destroys the Sense; but possibly this must be under∣stood with Correction, not so much in re∣spect

of the Faculty or Perceptive Power, as of the Organ; for could the Organ bear those stronger impressions, without Alte∣ration or Hurt, the perceptive Faculty would not be offended, it is not the senti∣ment, either that of Light, or that of Sound, that offends, but the motion that causes it, which is too strong for the Or∣gan, and dissolves or alters its Texture. In fine, the impression that causes Intel∣lection, is by much a finer and more sub∣tle one, than that which causes sensation, whether External, or Internal; and that by as many degrees as Intellectual Ideas are more fine and subtle than Images, and the Understanding a finer and more delicate Fa∣culty than the Sense.

By Finer and Delicater Impressions, I mean such as have less of Local Motion. By Finer and Delicater Faculties, I mean such as are sensible of Finer and Delica∣ter Touches, or Impressions.

In this sense, the Imagination must needs be a finer and more delicate faculty than any external sense, for as much as it re∣ceives the impressions of External Objects but by Reflection, or Communication from the Sensories, but these have them directly from the very Objects themselves; and by the same Reason, the Understanding, that receives impressions from the internal sense,

must needs be (as indeed it is) a much finer and delicater faculty than That.

Upon the whole, it is evident, that there is a near relation between actual mo∣tion and cogitation, and consequently, that it is no unreasonable thought to think, that as they are near of kin, so both are Off-springs of one Original cause, [mind in matter;] but then it will follow also, that motion, and indeed all Energy whatever in the Spring and Principle of it is Rest, for so mind is. But this is the difficulty. For that motion should come from a Prin∣ciple that is at rest, appears as unintelli∣gible, as that Frost should come from Fire, or Darkness from Light.

Wherefore to make this clear, I must consider things in the Metaphysical Hypo∣thesis, as all are understood to come from one, by way of Emanation: and thus, all Created Being is compared to Light, that flows from the Sun; and then its Emana∣tion is in the same manner, as the Radiation of Light, which is from a Center into an Orb or Sphere, in Extenuating Lines. Now in this Hypothesis, as all Beings (even those that are most opposite) do come from one, so they come from it in this way, that the more Removed any is from the Central Being, the more Extenuated it is; that is, as God or pure mind is the Central Being,

that Sun, that is the Father of Lights; so all the Being that proceeds from him, has less of Light and more of Darkness, in proportion to the distance it has, upon the Scale of Being, and in its utmost Elonga∣tion or Removal from him, terminates in that, which in Appearance has nothing of Resemblance to the Original Light; but (to be compared with it) is only Darkness and shadow; and this last is the Idea of meer matter, as that of the Central Light is of pure Mind. God is Light; Matter is Darkness; all intermediate Beings are Light and Darkness, in several propor∣tions.

What I have said is sensibly set out in the shades of Colours, and in Colours them∣selves, which are but shades of Light; For the Extremes of any Colour, for Ex∣ample, the Brightest Red, and the Darkest; or the Extreams of all Colours, as White and Black; compare them each with o∣ther, and they are so contrary, that no∣thing can be more, especially the two lat∣ter; and yet they do participate, the for∣mer not only of Colour in general, but also of Red; and the latter, tho' of no particular Colour, yet of Light, which is the Ground of Colour in general; and also the Darkest Red, if it doth not come from the Brightest; and the Blackest Co∣lour

from the Whitest; yet, by the Gra∣dation of Shades, or Participle, interme∣diate Colours, they are so continued one to another, that the Ascent and Descent from one unto the other is most Agree∣able and Delightful, as made by easie steps, without any Patches, or Chasms. It is true, if we look on Contraries in their Physical Consideration, so they are of opposite Natures, opposite Operations, and one expels the other, when they are immediately set together; but if we look upon them in their Metaphysical Conside∣ration, so they are but degrees of the same nature, and capable of being United and Reconciled; insomuch, that One in a right sense may be said to come from Another; as Darkness from Light. For however contrary Light and Darkness are, each unto other, as to Qualities and Physical Opera∣tion, and so in their Physical Considera∣tion, yet as to their Metaphysical, they differ but in degrees; both have the same grounds; for Shadow really is but lesser Light, occasion'd by the interposition of an Opaque Body, and Darkness is but a great Shadow. And thus a Flat and a Sharp, tho' contrary sounds, as to their Physical Consideration, yet as to their me∣taphysical, they are but different degrees; the Sharp a greater, the Flat a lesser de∣gree

of Celerity. And thus as Darkness comes from Light, only by the Lessning or Extenuating of it; so may matter come from mind: mind is pure Light, or, all Being in Eminence; but matter, as it doth Participate nothing at all of mind, but only by meer Existence, so it is meer dark∣ness, without the least degree of Vitality or Life; and all Beings between Mind and Matter, are as Colours, in respect of Light, or as Shades, in respect of any particular Colour.

But to add some further cleering to this Subject, and to shew how actual local mo∣tion may come from a Principle that is at rest, which being shewed, will shew with∣all how Matter may come from mind, since there is no greater Repugnance (even to common sense) in the one, than is in the other, I will consider the Relation that the Center of a Circle has unto its Circum∣ference, and how things are in the one, and how in the other; For this will afford it much Illustration. In the Center then of a Circle, or of a moved Sphere, all is at Rest, and out of it all in motion, but in such proportion, that that portion of a Radius which is at a farther distance from the Center, is more in motion, by reason of that distance, and that which is nearer

is less; which is evident even to sense, in the following Diagram.

In the three Concentrical Circles, B. C. D. E. F. G. if the Ray A. B. D. F. is supposed to be moved from F. to G. it will appear to any that considers, that in the same time that in the inmost Circle it doth move from B. to C. and in the middle from D. to E it moves in the outmost from F. to G. that is, it moves faster, and is more in motion, the farther it is from the Center A. and only because it is so. Again, on the Contrary, in the same time that the Ra∣dius moves in the outmost Circle from F. to G. it moves in the middle but from D. to E. and in the inmost (which is nearest to the Center A.) but from B. to C. that is, it has more of Rest, and less of Motion, the nearer it is to the Center, and in the Center has no motion at all, but is at pure rest. Even sense acquaints us, that the Arch or Space F. G. is much Greater than the Space D. E. and that D. E. is Greater than B. C. and so on the contrary, that the Arch or Space B. C. is less by much than D. E. and D. E. (by much) than the Arch or Space. F. G. and yet all the Spaces are supposed to be passed by the Ray A. B. D. F. in the same

time. Now that which passes a greater space in the same time, is more in motion, and has greater Celerity; and that which passes a less, is less in motion, and has less of Celerity; and therefore since the nearer the Ray is unto the Center, the less space it passes in the same time, and the farther off it is, the more it passes, and that more or less as it is farther off, or nearer, it evidently follows, that farther off from the Center, a Ray has more of motion, and as it is nearer to it, it has less, and in the Center has none.

[illustration] geometric diagram

Well then, supposing that the Princi∣ple of Energy and Motion is in the Center of the Orb of Being, (and we may well suppose it, since even Nature has its Sphere of Activity, and Acts as from a Center to a Circumference; (so Seeds Act, so Light Acts and Diffuses it self;) it is cer∣tain that motion must come from some∣thing not in Motion, but at Rest; for so that is, which is in the Center; and in∣deed, else there must be infinite progres∣sion in Motions. Again, since in the Orb of being, Pure Mind is in the Center,

and matter in the utmost Circumference, it follows, that the nearer things are unto pure mind, and the more they do partici∣pate of that, the more they have of Rest, and the less of motion; but the farther off they are from pure Mind, and the nearer to matter, the more in motion they are. And indeed, all Energy in matter is Lo∣cal Motion. Thus all the Effects of Me∣chanism, as they are purely material, so they are performed only by Local Motion; but the business of Cogitation, even in the lowest step of it, which is sensation, as it is of nearer Relation unto mind than to matter, so it is performed rather by way of mutation, than of Local motion; the Eye is not sensible of any motion; imparted to it, nor is the Ear, or the Nose, or any other of our Sensories, and yet each is sensible of a mutation made therein, (or rather in the Faculty) which comes from motion. But tho' the more refined any Beings are, and the nearer that they are to the Central Mind, the more at rest they be, and the less in motion in their several Actions; and consequently Ab∣stract Spirits that do not live in gross Elementary Bodies, are more at rest, and have less of motion, in the exercises of their several Powers, than Men have, who are imbodied in Elementary Vehi∣cles;

yet no Spirit whatsoever but only God himself, who only is Pure Mind, is so wholly, so Absolutely at Rest, as that it sees all Things at once, by one Entire view and Intuition; all Principles and all Conclusions in them; all Ends and all Means and Motives to them; without the least degree of Succession, or any Ad∣dition. Only the Central Being sees so, and he doe's.

For seeing all the Circumference is in the Center, so that all the Lines how∣ever divided they be in the former, do meet together in the latter; it is plain, that an Eye placed in the Center, must needs see all in the Circle, as clearly as any thing in it; and this too with one Individual, single Intuition, without Suc∣cession, or, Addition; seeing there is no∣thing of Motion, but all is Rest in the Center. And this properly is to see in Eternity. Thus God sees. But all other Beings beside God, as they are not God, or Pure mind, so they are not in the Cen∣ter, and not being the Center, but at Di∣stance from it, some at Greater, some at Lesser, but All at some, they All have something of Motion, and consequently cannot Act, or See, in the same manner as Central Pure Mind, by way of Absolute Rest, without Succession, or Addition,

and without Distinction of past, present, and to come: For tho' all the Lines do meet in the Center, yet there being no place without it in which they do so, Creatures cannot see as God sees, no more than they can be in the Center as God is. It is too short and Inadequate a way of Ar∣guing to Infer that any Creatures can see All things at once, but from the notions (confused enough) that we Mortals have of Time and Eternity; as that Time is Suc∣cessive, Eternity a Permanent Duration; together with a Conceit, that all Spirits (they being things Abstract and Separate from Bodies,) both Are, and Act, in E∣ternity, as all Imbodied Beings Are, and do Act, in Time. Certainly every Being but God, is in Time, tho' not in the same Kind of Time; for as God only is in the Center, so he only is Absolutely in Eternity. And if Time is taken for all Duration that is not Eternity, God only is without Time, and so without Succession of Actions. But to Return.

SECT. III.

Of Mind as it Actuates a certain Particular Body; Mind in this Notion called a Soul. Body is a System of Organs. Soul and Body an Animal. Body Considered two ways. To wit, in Reference to Exter∣nal Objects, and in Reference to the In∣ternal Principle that Acts it. In the First Consideration of Body, the Ends and uses of Organs are shewed, and withal the Rea∣son of their variety. This Illustrated by several Instances and Observations. The use of Body in Relation to the Internal Principle that Actuates it, is to Individu∣ate and Singularize that Principle. This set out in sensible and plain Resemblances. A Comparison between Vital and Locomo∣tive Energy; with a Recapitulation of the whole Discourse, as it unfolds the Mystery of Animals.

WE have Considered Mind in the first Step of Relation that it carries unto Matter, Namely, as it doe's Actuate a most subtle Matter diffused throughout the Universe, in which Notion it is called Spi∣rit simply, as was showed from Malachy, Ch. 2. v. 15. Come we now to Consider

it in the next place, as it Actuates some Particular System of Matter, in a Particu∣lar Manner; and so it is called a Soul; and that Particular System of Matter, which it doth Actuate, is a Body, or a Particular Vehicle; and the Result of both an Animal. An Animal is nothing but Soul and Body together; or a Body Actuated by a Soul. A Body is a System of Organs; an Organ is Matter framed and Contrived after a Particular Manner for some Animal Use, and End; some Use, End, or Action of a Soul: A Soul is a certain Determinate Vital Energy; or a certain Portion of the Spirit of the Universe, Vested in a Body, or particular Vehicle; in which Notion all Souls are Spirits; as indeed they are stiled in the Holy Scripture, wherein we Read of the Spirit of the Beast, tho' it goes Downward, as well as of the Spirit of a Man that goes Upward.

This Discourse I fear will seem a little Mysterious; and therefore to Inlighten it, and withal to open (tho' but in general) the Mystery of the Animal Nature, and, by Analogy unto it, the Nature of other Vivents, I will Resume it from the Be∣ginning, and speak more Distinctly: ta∣king my Rise from Bodies, or Systems of Organs, which coming under Sense, are

better known unto us than Spirits or Souls.

Body then, as it is a System of Organs, has a Double Relation, and so may be Considered two ways; either with Re∣spect to External Objects by which it self is Affected, and by means thereof, the Mind; or else with Respect to the Internal Princi∣ple that doth Inform and Actuate it, and Act in it, which Principle it doth Indi∣viduate and Singularize.

We will first Consider a Body in the Relation that it has unto External Ob∣jects, and here we must set out the Na∣ture, that is, the Ends and Uses of the Or∣gans which compose a Body, as also the Reason of the Variety, and number of those Organs; why any Organs at all, and why many: both which will be done with one Performance. An Organ properly, is Matter Particularly Textured, and Framed for some Particular use: And an Animal Or∣gan is Particularly Textured, and Framed for an Animal use: I will give the Ex∣ample in only Sensitive Animals, and in the Acts of Sensation, as being best under∣stood; but what is said of Sensation, and of the Organs of it, will, by Proportion, hold in all the other Actions of Animals, and in all other Organs, with a due Al∣teration.

In all Acts of Sensation there is first an Affection of the Organ, and then a Percep∣tion of that Affection by the Soul; or rather, a Perception Excited in the Soul by means of that Affection; and this is the End of the Organ, and the only Use of it, that the Soul makes, to wit, to come by means thereof unto a Perception of External Objects; as, to see their Co∣lours, to hear their Sounds, to Relish the several Tasts they have, and the like. In short, a Soul cannot but by the means of Organs, take any notice of External Objects, nor the Organ be a means of con∣veying any notice to the Soul, but by be∣ing first Affected it self. Now the Affection of the Organ arises from a Perception (may I so express it) or a Reception of the Mo∣tions Communicated to it by Objects; and a Capacity for this Reception from the Par∣ticular Frame of the Organ. For since all Matter indifferently is not capable of re∣ceiving all kinds of Motions and Impressi∣ons; but that for some Particular Motions and Impressions (of which sort are sensi∣ble ones) there must be Particular Tex∣tures and Frames of Matter to Catch them; it follows, that there must be Organs; and these too in such Variety and Number: there must be Organs, to Receive the Im∣pression and Motions of Objects, which

without a Particular Texture of Matter could not be Received; and there must be Variety of Organs, to Correspond these va∣rious Kinds of Motions and Impressions that are in Coloured, in Sonorous, in Sa∣pid, and in other Species of Objects.

This will be better conceived in some Instances, by which it shall be made ap∣pear, that for the Reception of certain Particular Motions, there must be certain Particular Textures, and Dispositions of Matter; so that Matter in some certain Frames and Dispositions of it will Catch, and be Affected with, some cer∣tain Particular Motions, that in others, it will not be Touched with. It is Gene∣rally Observed, that an Unison string will Receive the Motion, and so, Tremble, when another also Unison is made to Sound, and yet all other Strings of the same Instrument, that are not Unisons, shall remain insensible and unmov'd. Cardan Observed, that in a certain Church, in which were several Images of Wax, but one would move and Tremble, and one always would, at the Ringing of a Sacring Bell. Mr. Boile has taken notice of the like Mechanical Perception, in several Empty Drinking-Glasses of Fine white Metal; he says, that causing the Strings of a Musical Instrument to be variously

screwed up, and let down, and briskly struck, he observed, that the Motion of one String, when it was stretched to a certain Note, or Tone, would make one of the Glasses Ring, and not the other; nor would the sound of the same String Tuned to another Note, sensibly Affect the same Glass; tho' perhaps, says he, it might have its Operation upon another. In fine, there are Yonical Echo's, that Re∣turn not the Voice but when it has some Peculiar Musical Note, and then it doe's. Thus Organs are Matter Particularly Tex∣tur'd, to the End to make them capable of Receiving some Particular Motions: so that a Sensitive Organ may be Defined, a System of Matter Particularly Framed, Disposed, and Textured for receiving some Particular Motion of External Bodies, and for Conveying it to the Soul.

So much concerning Body in its Rela∣tion to External Objects; come I now to consider it in the Relation which it has to the Soul, (the Internal Principle that Actuates it, and Acts in, and by it; and so, the Great work and Business of the Body is to Singularize and Individuate the General Vital Principle of the Universe, that it may become a Soul, or a Particular Vital Principle of a certain Particular Body. To understand this it must be

Consider'd, that the Mosaical Spirit (the Rise and Principle of all Created Cogita∣tion,) as it is Extended throughout the whole Universe; so, to become in Parti∣cular a Soul, of any Particular Animal, it must be Singularized, and Individuated, that is, it must be Apportioned (as it were) to that Particular Animal, which it comes to be by means of the Body. To Illustrate this, it must be Remembred, that a Voice or Sound Diffused throughout the whole capacity of the Medium (as the Mosaical Spirit is throughout that of the universe) is yet in the Phonocamptick Center or object (which is nothing but a place conveniently Disposed for this Pur∣pose,) so Individuated and Singularized (as the Mosaical Spirit is supposed to be by a Congruous fit Body,) that Really it has other Affections and Properties, than those it owns, in all the rest of the Medium, in∣somuch that by Vertue of it, this place instead of being a Medium of Sound, be∣comes to all Appearance a Principle of it, and so a Speaker, and this is called an Echo. It may also be set out in a Speculum or Looking-Glass, (for a Body is to the Mosaical Spirit, what a Speculum or Look∣ing-Glass is to the Image of an Object in the Medium;) A Speculum Catches the Diffused Image, and so Singularizes it, that

it becomes a very Different thing, and puts on other very Different Properties than those it has in the Medium, for in the Looking-Glass it doth appear as an Object which it doe's not out of it. But what doe's set it out most naturally, is, that it is so in Man; For the Soul or Co∣gitative Principle of a Man, as it is Extend∣ded throughout the whole Capacity of the Body, in like manner as the Mosaical Spi∣rit is, throughout that of the Universe; so it is Singularized and Individuated, in, and by, the particular Organs: insomuch that the Eye only does See; the Ear only does Hear, and only the Tongue Tasts, in Vertue thereof; for which Reason these are owned to have several particular Fa∣culties, which are as so many several Souls unto them. Now what the Organs are to the Soul in any Body (that is but a System of Organs,) Bodies themselves are, unto the Mosaical Spirit, the great Soul of the Universe, of which all par∣ticular Bodies are Organs. But since this Notion is of so much Importance, that it will deserve a more particular Considera∣tion, and I design to give it one in another Chapter, I shall dismiss it at present, with∣out further Insisting on it; and now will only add some Improvement to the former Discourse, by making a Comparison be∣tween

the Vital and the Mechanical E∣nergy.

First then I lay it down as certain, that there is such a thing as a Vital, as well as a Mechanical Energy: by Vital Energy I mean all that is not meerly Mechanical; and therefore do comprehend in that Term whatever is properly Mental; by Mechanical Energy I mean Impulse or Springines, the nearest Physical Principle of Actual Local Motion. Now we are as sure by our senses, and by the Reflection that we make upon our selves, and upon the Notices which we receive from Things without us, that there is such a thing as a Vital Energy, as we are that there is a Mechanical: Because we are as much assured of the Effects of the one, as we are of those of the other; as much assured that there is Life, Sensation, and Intellection, that come from a Vital; as we are that there are Actual Local Motions; Motions of Ascent and Descent, Motions Direct, and Motions Circular, &c. which (as Motions) come from Impulse, the Me∣chanical Energy.

Again; As it is Certain that Local Mo∣tion, or that Impulse which is the nearest Physical Principle of it, is not Matter, or Materiate, but yet is in Matter, as United unto it: so by this Consideration we may

become as certain, that Vital Energy and the Effects of it, though they be Immateri∣al, yet they may be in Matter; since there needs no more of Hooks and Crooks to make the Latter, than to make the For∣mer, to stick, and hold together.

In the next place; As the Mechanical, or Loco-motive Energy is Diffused through∣out the World (for there is nothing in this, that is Entirely at Rest;) so is the Vital: Since it is certain that wherever, and whenever, any Matter becomes Disposed, the Vital Principle is always at hand to Actuate that Matter, and Act in it, ac∣cording as the Dispositions of it do Invite or Permit: All Putrefaction or Digestion any where, determines in Insects, or little Animals, (as Experience evinces,) the Spirits being Unfettered and let Loose thereby.

And yet as the Mechanick or Loco-mo∣tive Impulse is not Received in all Tex∣tures of Matter indifferently, but that, (as I have showed already) there must for some certain Modifications of Local Motion, be certain particular Textures of Matter, so neither is the Vital Energy Catcht and Received indifferently by all Textures of Matter; but as all Life consists in Motion, or in something Analogous, so for certain Gradations and Exercises of

Life, there must be cerain particular Fa∣bricks and Textures of Matter, called Or∣gans, and also certain particular Disposi∣tions in the Mechanical Spirits (for so I call the subtle Active Corpuscles in every Concrete) that are the immediate instru∣ments of the Vital Principle in all its Acti∣ons of Life, in this Corporeal World.

So that as Actual Motion, the Effect of Loco-motive Energy, and even Loco-mo∣tive Energy it self (as taken for Impulse) is not Material in this Sense, that it does consist of Matter, yet, if to be material be understood of that which is Dependent on Matter, and so Dependent that it cannot be without it; in the Sense of the word, not only actual Motion, but even Impulse (the nearest Physical principle of Motion) is material, since neither of them can be but in, and by the means of Matter. In like manner, the Vital Principle that Ani∣mates Corporeal Beings, though it is not material in this Sense, that it is only Mat∣ter, or a mode of Matter, yet in another it is, that it so Depends in all its Animal Operations, that it cannot exercise any but by means of Mater, and according to the Texture and Quality of it. Nothing can be plainer than this is to Sense, for in all the Acts of Perception, not only the sensi∣tive, but the Intellectual, as the Organs

are, so are the Actions; if the Organs are sound and duly Disposed, the Actions are Conformable; but if the Organs are out of Tune and Vitiated, the Actions are so likewise; Ay, are Totally Abolished, if the Organs are spoiled; Besides, the se∣veral Kinds, and Degrees, of Deliration, that men themselves are Subject unto, ac∣cordingly as their Spirits are ill Qualified and Distempered, do further Confirm it.

Upon the whole, as the Vital Energy it Diffused (as Light is) throughout the Universe; so according to the se∣veral Textures of Matter that do catch it, as a Speculum does the Light, it Exerts it self; and being Catcht and Retained by the Congruity of the Body, (for it is Congruity only, not Hooks or Crooks, that holds them together,) it is cal∣led a Soul, and the whole Complex, [of Body and Soul] an Animal.

What I have said, does more particu∣larly regard the Animals, I call Visible, which we are better Acquainted with, than with others of a Higher Nature; but yet, with a very easie Application, and by way of Analogy, it will also open the Nature of these: However, this Admoni∣tion doth Remind me of the next Head to which I must pass, and that is, the Distri∣bution of Animals.

CHAP. VII.

Animals are either Invisible or Visible; in the Former sort I reckon Angels, Good and Bad, which are Etherial: As also the Genii, which are Aerial Animals. In∣visible Animals, why called Spirits. That there are Spirits Evinced, 1. From the general Tradition of the World. Mr. Hobbs's Evasion of this Argument Consi∣dered. 2. From Operations that cannot be Accounted for but from such Causes. 3. From Intelligences and Notifications that cannot be Resolved but upon this Hy∣pothesis. 4. From Spectra or Apparitions. Of the way and manner how Spirits do Appear, that it is twofold, Real and Visi∣onal. That Good Angels when they do Appear are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Spirits; and the Bad 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Fantomes.

SECT. II.

I Have spoken of Animals in General, but to bring a greater Light toward the Understanding of the Animal Nature, I must consider its Distribution, and show the General Kinds or sorts of Animals

that are in the Universe. And Animals in Conformity unto the Bodies that do help to compose them, are either Visible, or Invisible. By Visible Animals, I mean such as do consist of gross matter, and so have Bodies that naturally come under the perception of the external sense; by In∣visible Animals, I mean such as have Bo∣dies so refined, that naturally they come not under the perception of All, or Any of the External Senses.

Visible Animals, which are the Ani∣mals that compose this Lower Elemen∣tary World, (for I will not undertake to speak of any such as may be in the o∣ther, commonly called the Superiour and Celestial,) the farther Discourse of them is properly referred unto Physicks, and therefore I shall enter no farther thereinto at this time, but proceed to treat of the Invisible.

By Invisible Animals, I mean Angels, good and bad, which I call Aetherial Ani∣mals, as also those Aereal ones (some Lu∣dicrous, some Torvous) that are called Genii; all which, with the several kinds they farther branch into, I will compre∣hend under one name [of Spirits,] and so speak something of their Nature; De∣monstrate their Reality and Existence; and

in fine, add something concerning their Apparition, and the ways of it.

As to their Nature in General, I think I shall have said all is necessary for me to say at this time, when I shall have shew∣ed, that there is a sense in which it may be truly said, they are Incorporeal, (as said they are, generally;) and yet there is a sense too, in which, they must be acknow∣ledged to be Corporeal, if the having any mixture of matter in their Composition can suffice (as I know it will be yielded me it doth) to make them properly deno∣minated such.

The sense in which Spirits are truly said to be Incorporeal, will be best under∣stood by shewing the reason how the At∣tribute of being Corporeal becomes Appro∣priated unto visible Animals; to compre∣hend which, we must consider, that in order to our conversing with Objects, and taking Cognizance of them, we are en∣dowed with two sorts of Faculties, the Sense, and the Understanding; and that the Sense (even to Sense) is an Organical Ma∣terial Power, for we do see the Organs it uses, the Eye for Seeing, the Ear for Hearing, and the like for all the rest; but that the Understanding is (to Sense) an In∣organical Immaterial Power, there not Ap∣pearing any Sensible Organ, by means of

which, it does exert or put forth its Acts. Now in conformity to this Distinction be∣tween our Faculties, we do make one of their Objects, (nor can we do it more a∣greeably:) calling the Substances that do properly come under the notice and obser∣vation of our sense, Bodies; and those that do not, but are only inferred and per∣ceived by the understanding, Spirits: the former are corporeal material Substances; because perceived by sense, which is a ma∣terial Organical Power; but the latter, such as Angels and other Spirits, are said to be immaterial, incorporeal, because we cannot See, or Feel, or Tast, or Smell them in their own Subsistences: In a word, we cannot perceive them in their own pro∣per beings by any of the Senses we have, but only by the Ratiocination and Dis∣course of the Understanding, which (to sense) is an Inorganical Immaterial Power. And our Saviour Christ, when after his Resurrection, he appeared to his Disciples, and they apprehended that they had seen a Vision, to convince them of the Reality of his Corporeal Existence, and that he was not a Spirit, or an Apparition only, as they took him to be, he Appeals unto their Sense, and particularly to that of Touch, Luke 24.39. Behold, says he, my Hands, and my Feet, that it is I my

self, for a Spirit hath no Flesh and Bones as you see me have: Wherein he goes upon these Notions, that a Spirit is an invisible Thing, a Thing that in its own reality cannot be seen, nor be felt, but only be understood; and that, that substance which comes under the notice and cognisance of the sense is a Body.

And in this sense of the word [Body] all Spirits are really un-imbodied incorpo∣real things; they have not such Bodies of Flesh and Bone, or Organs that come un∣der the Observation and notices of sense, as we have; but in another sense of the word, as Body is not taken restrainedly, for that only which is sensible, but more largely, for any System of Matter whatever, (whether so refined and subtle that it comes not within the compass of any ex∣ternal sense, or so gross, that it may be perceived by it;) so Spirits are Corporeal and Embodied: That is, they are mate∣rial (as well as mental) Beings; minds in∣deed they are, but Minds in Matter, or Animals. In this, Scaliger consents with me, who in his Exercitations (Exerc. 307. §. 38.) boldly says, Spiritus Latinis & Grae∣cis Omnibus, Philosophis, Medicis, Orato∣ribus, Corpus est: id est, Materia, & Forma.

This will be Evident, if we consider (1.) That Absolute Purity, or Exemption

from all Matter, is the peculiar Prerogative of God, who only is Pure Light, without any mixture of Darkness; it is only he, the Central Being, (he that is absolute pure being) that is pure unmixed mind; all other beings but he must be impure, and have some ingredience of matter in their Composition; without which, as they would be pure Mind, so (being pure mind) they would be God. Secondly, Were all or any Spirits, except the infi∣nite Almighty Center and Spring of All Absolutely pure, without any mixture of Matter; absolutely simple, without any Real Composition; there could be no Di∣stinction among them, either in Respect of Kinds, or of Individuals; since Alterity (and where there is Distinction, there must be Alterity; unus & alius, est alter & alter,) cannot consist with Absolute simplicity; Composition is Unity, but simplicity is Unicity.

To be more Particular; were Spirits Absolutely Pure and Simple, without any Admission of Matter, there could be no Distinction among them in respect of Kinds. For what should difference them? if there were nothing in them but that, wherein they did all agree; as there would be nothing else but that, if all of them were pure and simple: Things that Differ

in something, and withal in something Agree, cannot be Pure or Simple: for all have something that is Common, in which they do agree, and all something not Com∣mon, in which they differ; it is plain, that each of them Consists of Thing, and Thing; and Things that Consist of Thing and Thing are Compounded; not Pure and Simple Things.

Again, were Spirits absolutely pure and simple, without any Concretion of Mat∣ter, there could be no distinction among them as to Individuals, as well as none in relation to Kinds. For since all Individu∣ation (except only that of the Central pure mind) is Numerication, and all Numerica∣tion arises from Division, and Division has no place but in Matter, or in Things by means of matter. It is evident that there can be no distinction of Spirits as to Indi∣viduation, if there be no ingredience of matter in their making. Things are said to differ in number, (and so all Individuals differ, as well those of one and the same, as those of divers Species,) that however identified they be in other Respects, yet do so differ, that one is not the other; which cannot be without Division, of one from the other; nor Division be without matter: Unum is not only Indivisum in se, but Divisum à Quolibet alio. As for Meta∣physical

Matter and Metaphysical Form, or that distinction that some make of (sub∣stantial•…•… Power and Act, they are but meer Words, without any signification (at least in my understanding,) if they are not re∣duced to Matter and Mind; which are the only Metaphysical Principles of Things, that are Existent and Real. In short, we may observe in our selves, (that Mind as I have noted before) is Individuated by Mat∣ter, since even sense is seeing in the Eye; Hearing in the Ear; Tasting in the Tongue, &c.

Another Consideration that Induces me to believe, that all Spirits are Animals, and vitally united unto Matter, of one sort or another, is, that the Apostle Paul, in a Discourse of his Concerning the Resur∣rection, 1 Cor. 15. doe's Speak of a Spi∣ritual Body, in Contradiction to a Natural, as of the Body that All that do Arise in Christ shall be Cloathed withal; and Christ himself tells us, that All that shall Attain that glorious Resurrection, shall be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Angels; to wit, in Respect of their Spiritual Bodies, that shall Invest them: and if Glorified Men shall be as Angels, Angels must be as Glorified Men; that is, they must have Bodies, tho' Glo∣rious and Spiritual Bodies.

In fine, that Spirits are Incorporeal Be∣ings in this sense, that they have not such Gross Elementary Bodies as we have, of Flesh and Blood and ••ones, doe's not ••n∣fer, that they are so in every sense of that word; especially if we Consider, that (as the Apostle assures us) there may be Spi∣ritual Bodies; and there Appears not any Incoherence (in this,) that Spirits should have Spiritual Bodies. Besides, the Un∣derstanding it self, that, unto sense, is an Inorganical Immaterial Faculty, is not Ab∣solutely so, but has the Animal Spirits for an Organ, since as these are Disposed and Textured, well or ill, even so the Exer∣cises of that noble power, are either right, or depraved; and from the differences in these Spirits do come the differences of Wits, which are many. Ay, possibly those Animal Spirits (or something that resem∣bles them) may compose the Body which accompanies the departing Soul: for that some kind of Body does, which in the Greek is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Learned Origen has told us, L. 2. Contra Celsum: which Body he also says, is that, the Sepa∣rated Soul is used to appear in; but as to this, I shall offer something hereafter.

By this Discourse it is Evident against Mr. Hobbs, and others of the Sadducean Opinion, that Spirits in their own Nature

are Real and Subsistent Beings, and not meerly Powers, or Operations and Actions; tho at the same time it must be acknow∣ledged, that in the Language of the Scrip∣ture, such Active and Directive Qualities as are Intelligible only, and do not come directly within the Cognizance of the sense are called Spirits; thus we read of a Spi∣rit of Government and of Prophecy, that was first upon Moses, and afterward imparted to the 70 Elders, Numb. 11. of a Spirit of Wisdom, Deut. 4.9. of the Spirit of Un∣derstanding; the Spirit of Counsel and Might; the Spirit of Knowledge, and of the Fear of the Lord, Isa. 11.2. Ay, that vexatious Distemper that afflicted Saul, and that seems to have been nothing else but melancholly, is called an Evil Spirit from the Lord, 1 Sam. 16.14. and in Luke 13.11, 12. we read of a Spirit of Infirmity.

But tho' Spirit in the Holy Scriptures is often taken in the instanced sense; and that the Name of Angel is a Name of Office, rather than of Nature; yet it is certain, that Angels are represented in those Sacred Writings as Real subsisting Beings, all as real and subsisting as men themselves are, if the ascribing to them the like Affections, Offices, and Personal Operations, that

Men have, and do execute and exert, can prove them so.

SECT. II.

That there are Spirits, proved by General Tradition. Mr. Hobb's Answer to this Argument shewed to be but an Evasion, from the Evangelists Matthew, and Mark, &c.

AND this reminds me of the Second Point I have proposed to Discourse on, in relation to Spirits, and that is, their Existence or Being; wherein I shall endeavour to make it manifest, that really there are such Subsistent intellectual Beings, as are incorporated, but invisible, which commonly we call Spirits; so that the Names of Spirits, both of the Good ones, as Raphael, Gabriel, &c. And of the Evil ones, as Belzebub, &c. are Names of Substances or Persons, and not of Qua∣lities only; ay, are proper, and not (as Mr. Hobbs tells us, the name of Sathan and Devil is) only Appellative Names.

The first Argument that I will use to Evidence that there are Spirits, shall be taken from the General Tradition of the World; it being received among all Na∣tions, as well the Civilized, as the Barba∣rous,

and among all Philosophers except the Epicureans, the Ancient and the Mo∣dern, and some Peripateticks; and to me it is very unintelligible, how such a Senti∣ment should obtain so generally, if it had not some foundation of Truth; for who should spread the Opinion to such an ex∣tent? and what should make it to take?

Mr. Hobbs himself acknowledges it a truth, that the belief of Spirits was very general all the World over; only he has a way (which is peculiar to him) of avoid∣ing the Cogency and Force of the Argu∣ment, and therefore I will here consider what he says.

It is true, says he,

'that the Heathens, and all the Nations of the World have acknowledged that there be Spirits, which for the most part they hold to be incor∣poreal, whereby it may be thought that a man by natural Reason may arrive without the Scriptures to the knowledge of this, that Spirits are, but the errone∣ous Collection thereof by the Heathens, may proceed as I have said before, from the ignorance of the Cause of Ghosts and Fantoms, and such other Apparitions. And from thence had the Grecians their number of Gods, their number of De∣mons good, or bad, and for every Man his Genius, which is not the acknowledg∣ing

of this truth, that Spirits are, but a false Opinion concerning the force of Ima∣gination.

Thus Mr. Hobbs, in his Treatise of Hu∣man Nature, Ch. 11. S. 6. wherein he plainly Affirms, that Spirits and Ghosts are meer Fantomes, or Effects of the Ima∣gination: a conceit, in which he seems to have the Concurrence of Seneca, for this Philosopher Epist. 24. tells us as Mr. Hobbs doe's, Nemo tam Puer est ut Cerberum ti∣meat, & Tenebras, & LARVARUM habitum nudis ossibus Cohaerentium.

This Notion of Spirits, that Mr. Hobbs Insinuates, Reminds me of Another, that a Person whom I knew, and who was Re∣puted not of the Wisest, had of them; for being Asked what he thought a Spirit was, He Answered, that it was the Shadow of Concscience; and further Demanded, concerning a Good Angel, what that was; He Replied, a Good is the Shadow of a Good Conscience, and a Devil the Shadow of a Bad one, And Methinks he comes near to Mr. Hobbs. But without jesting.

I Find, that Apparitions of Spirits are stiled Fantoms [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] by two Evan∣gelists, Matthew and Mark. For when the Disciples of our Lord saw him walking upon the Sea, and believed him to be a Spirit, the Former of those Evangelists tells

us that they said 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it is a Phantasm, or, as our Translators Render it, a Sprite, Matt. 14.26. And the Lat∣ter has the same Expression, when speak∣ing of the same Miracle, he says, they supposed him to be a Phantasm, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; or as in our English Ver∣sion, they supposed it had been a Sprite. Mark. 6.49. Whence it Evidently fol∣lows, against Mr. Hobbs, that Men that were not Ignorant of the power of Fancy, and of the Interest it had in the Appari∣tions of Spirits, yet believed their Real Existence. For the Disciples that believed our Lord to be a Spirit, Appearing, and therefore said he was a Phantasm (which it seems was the usual Expression at that time for such Apparitions,) did withal believe that a Spirit was a Reality, and of great Power. For upon the supposed Apparition, They are said, by one of the Evangelists, to be much Disturbed, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 says Matthew, Chap. 14.26. They were troubled and cryed out for Fear; and the other says no less, for he says, They cried out, (for They all saw him and were Troubled,) Mark. 6.49, 50. I would De∣mand of Mr. Hobbs, were he Alive, what can be Conceived to occasion so much Con∣sternation, so much Affrightment, in the Disciples, at the Apparition of a Spirit,

if they did not take a Spirit to be some∣thing Real, tho' they called the Appear∣ing of it a Phantome. Certainly, when they were so much Affrighted at it, They must be Apprehensive that it was a Thing of Great Power, that was come to hurt Them; for else, had They believed it to be a meer Effect of Their own Imagina∣tion, they would have been as Unconcerned, as Mr. Hobbs himself would be, at such an Appearance.

I Conclude then, that as Mr. Hobbs was not the First that called Spirits Phantas∣mata, or Fantomes, but that they were called so of Old, (and indeed the word Spectrum in the Latin, and this of Appa∣rition in the English Tongue, does an∣swer very Properly to the word Phantasma in the Greek, a word too Adopted by the Romans, in the same sense;) so this De∣nomination was Given to them, not with Design to signify their Nature and Essence, (as Mr. Hobbs would have it,) but to set out the usual way of Their Appearing, of which more hereafter. This is Evident from the Younger Pliny, who in one of his Epistles, having put the Question, whether Apparitions or Phantasmata (for this is the word he uses) were Real and subsistent Things, he Affirms they are, and Instances in several Remarkable Sto∣ries

(as I shall shew hereafter) to Prove it.

So that this First Argument for the Real Existence of Spirits, taken from the General belief that all the World has of it (as Mr. Hobbs himself Acknowledges,) doe's hold Good and Conclusive, Notwithstand∣ing all that this Philosopher has suggested against it. And indeed what he Proposes, is said so Timorously by him, [for he say's, the Erroneous Collection thereof may [but may] Proceed &c.] and that so Precari∣ously, (being only an Assertion, without any Proof), that I need not have Given my self the trouble of saying so much in An∣swer to it, but that in Things of this Na∣ture, some have so very strong a Byass, both of Credulity on one hand, and Incre∣dulity on the other, that if any Room were left for Cavil, they would be sure to make it.

SUB. I.

Another Argument to Prove Spirits. Of the Conversion of an Indian Raja. A Re∣markable Story of Witchcraft, out of Mr. Gage's Survey.

AND Thus much for the First Ar∣gument, I now proceed to the se∣cond. And the second Argument that I will use to Evidence that there are Spi∣rits, shall be taken from Operations we are certain of, which cannot be Accounted for but by supposing such Agents.

I have Read in Purchas, that a certain Indian, a Great Raja, and Greater Atheist, was brought to a Confession, as well as Conviction of his Folly, by a strange Pro∣vidence. The Relation in that Author, goes in these Terms.

"A Great Raja a Gentile, a Notorious Atheist, and Con∣temner of all Deity, Glorying to pro∣fess he knew no other God than the King, nor believing nor fearing none: sitting Dallying with his Women, one of them plucked a Hair from his Breast, which being fast Rooted, Plucked off a little of the Skin, that Blood Appear∣ed; this small Skar Festred and Gan∣grened Incurably, so that in few days

he Despaired of Life, and being Ac∣companied with all his Friends and Divers Courtiers he brake out into these Excellent words: Which of you would not have Thought that I being a Man of War should have died by the Stroak of a Sword, Spear, or Bow? But now I am enforced to confess the Power of that Great God, whom I have so long Despised, that he needs no other Lance than a little Hair to kill so Blasphemous a wretch and Contemner of his Majesty, as I have been.

Part. 1. l. 4. f. 600. Thus God, is known in the World, by the Judgments which he Executes

And as God is known by his Judg∣ments, so may other Spirits, by some E∣vents that happen in the World, when they are so Extraordinary, and out of common course, that they cannot be Ascri∣bed but to such Causes. I have here a very Large Field, but my Business being not to handle this Subject as a Common Place, but only to Touch it by way of Argu∣ment, I shall content my self with the General Mention of Prodigies, that all History, Ancient and Modern, abounds withal; and the strange Performances of Witches and Wizards; of which Last I will give an Instance or two, that carry great Credibility, and yet are Absolutely

Unaccountable, if we do not Admit of Spi∣rits, and in Truth not very Easy to be Conceived if we do. But the Matter of Fact, being Related by an Author not in every Bodies hand, I will lay it out at large in all its Circumstances, as I Find them set down by him, that so Ingeni∣ous Men, who have the Curiosity to In∣quire into Things of this Nature, may have the surer Grounds to go upon, in making their Judgment.

In Pinola (say's Mr. Gage in his new Survey of the West-Indies, C. 20.) there were some who were much given to Witchcraft, and by the Power of the Devil did Act strange things; amongst the Rest there was one Old Woman Named Martha de Carillo, who had been by some of the Town formerly Accused for Be∣witching many; but the Spanish Justices quitted her, finding no sure Evidence against her; with this she grew worse and worse, and did much Harm; when I was there, two or three died, withering away, Declaring at their Death that this Carillo had Killed them, and that they saw her often about their Beds, threatning them with a Frowning and Angry Look. The Indians for fear of her durst not complain against her, nor meddle with her; where∣upon I sent word unto Don Juan de Guzman

the Lord of that Town, that if he took not order with her, she would destroy his Town. He Hearing of it, got for me a Commission from the Bishop and another Officer of the Inquisition to make Diligent and Private Inquiry after her Life and Actions, which I did, and found among the Indians many and Grievous Com∣plaints against her, most of the Town Affir∣ming that certainly she was a Notorious Witch, and that before her former Accu∣sation she was wont withersoever she went about the Town to go with a Duck Fol∣lowing her, which when she came to the Church would stay at the door till she came out again, and then would Return home with her, which Duck they Imagi∣ned was her Beloved Devil and Familiar Spirit, for that they had often set Dogs at her and they would not meddle with her, but rather run away from her. This Duck never Appeared more with her, since she was formerly Accused before the Justice, which was thought to be her policy, that she might be no more sus∣pected thereby. This Old Woman was a Widow, and of the Poorest of the Town in outward shew, and yet she had always store of Money, which none could tell which way she might come by it. Whilst I was thus Taking Privy Information

against her (it being the Time of Lent, when all the Town came to Confession) she among the Rest came to the Church to Confess her sins, and brought me the best Present and Offering of all the Town; for whereas a Riall is Common, she brought me four, and besides, a Turkey, Eggs, Fish, and a little Bottle of Honey. She thought thereby to get with me a better Opinion than I had of her from the whole Town. I Accepted of her Great Offering, and heard her Confession, which was of nothing but Trifles, which could scarce be Judged sinful Actions. I Examined her very close of what was the Common Judgment of all the Indians, and especially of those who dying, had declared to my self at their Death that She had Bewitched them, and before their Sickness had Threatned them, and in their Sickness Appeared Threatning them with Death about their beds, none but they themselves seeing her; to which she Replyed Weeping that she was Wronged. I Asked her, how she be∣ing a Poor Widow without any Sons to help her, without any means of Lively∣hood, had so much Money, as to give me more than the Richest of the Town; how She came by that Fish, Turkey, and Ho∣ney, having none of this of her own a∣bout her House? to which she Replied,

that God Loved her and gave her all these Things, and that with her Money she Bought the rest. I Asked her of whom? She Answered that out of the Town she had them. I Persuaded her to much Re∣pentance, and to forsake the Devil and all Fellowship with him; but her Words and Answers were of a Saintly and Holy Woman; and she earnestly desired me to give her the Communion with the Rest that were to Receive the next day. Which I told her I durst not do, using Christ's Words, Give not the Childrens bread unto dogs, nor cast your Pearls unto Swine; and it would be a great Scandal to give the Com∣munion unto her, who was suspected ge∣nerally, and had been Accused for a Witch. This she took very ill, telling me that she had many Years Received the Communion, and now in her Old Age it Grieved her to be Deprived of it, her tears were many, yet I could not be moved with them, but Resolutely denied her the Communion, and so Dismissed her. At Noon when I had done my work in the Church, I bad my Servants go to gather up the Offerings, and gave order to have the Fish Dressed for my Dinner which she had brought, but no sooner was it carried into the Kitchen, when the Cook looking on it found it full of Maggots, and stinking; so

that I was forced to hurl it away; with that I began to supect my Old Witch, and went to look on her Honey, and Pouring it out into a Dish, I found it full of Worms; her Eggs I could not know from others, there being near a Hundred Offered that day, but after as I used them, we found some Rotten, some with dead Chickens in them; the next Morning the Turkey was found dead; As for her four Rials, I could not Perceive whether she had Bewitched them out of my Pocket, for that I had put them with many other, which that day had been given Given me, yet as far as I could I called to Memory who and what had been Given me, and in my Judg∣ment and Reckoning I verily thought that I missed four Rials; At Night when my Servants the Indians were gone to Bed, I sat up late in my Chamber betaking my self to my Books and Study, for I was the next Morning to make an Exhortation to those that Received the Communion. After I had Studied a while, it being between Ten and Eleven of the Clock; on a sud∣den the Chief door in the Hall (where in a Lower Room was my Chamber, and the Servants, and three other doors) flew open, and I heard one come in, and for a while walk about; then was Another door opened which went into a Little Room,

where my Saddles were Laid; with this I thought it might be the Black-More Miguel Dalva, who would often come late to my House to Lodge there, Especially since my fear of Montenegro, and I Con∣jectured that he was Laying up his Saddle, I called unto him by his Name two or three times, from within my Chamber, but no Answer was made, but suddenly Another door that went out to a Garden flew also open, wherewith I began with∣in to fear, my joynts Trembled, my Hair stood up, I would have called out to the Servants, and my Voice was as it were stop∣ped with the sudden Affrightment; I be∣gan to think of the Witch, and put my trust in God against her and Encouraged my self and Voice, calling out to the Ser∣vants, and knocking with a Cane at my door within that they might hear me, for I durst not open it and go out; with the Noise that I made the Servants Awaked, and came out to my Chamber door; then I opened it, and asked them if they had not heard some Body in the Hall, and all the doors opened, they said they were A∣sleep, and heard nothing, only one Boy said he heard all, and Related unto me the same that I had heard; I took my Candle then in my hand and went out with them into the Hall to view the doors, and I found them

all shut, as the Servants said they had left them. Then I Perceived that the Witch would have Affrighted me, but had no power to do me any harm; I made two of the Servants lie in my Chamber, and went to bed; in the morning early I sent for my Fiscal the Clerk of the Church, and told him what had happen'd that Night, he smiled upon me, and told me it was the Widdow Carillo, who had often played such Tricks in the Town with those that had offended her, and therefore he had the night before come unto me from her, desiring me to give her the Communion, lest she should do me some hurt, which I denied unto him, as I had done to her self; the Clerk bad me be of good cheer, for he knew she had no power over me to do me any hurt. After the Communion that day, some of the Chief Indians came unto me, and told me that Old Carillo had Boasted that she would play me some trick or other, because I would not give her the Communion. But I, to rid the Town of such a Limb of Satan, sent her to Gua∣temala, with all the Evidences and Wit∣nesses which I had found against her, unto the President and Bishop, who comman∣ded her to be put in Prison, where she died within two months.

Many more Indians there were in that Town, who were said in my time to do very strange things. One called John Gon∣zalez, was reported to Change himself into the shape of a Lion, and in that shape was one day shot in the nose by a poor harm∣less Spaniard, who chiefly got his living by going about the Woods and Mountains, and shooting at Wild Deer, and other Beasts to make Mony of them. He espied one day a Lion, and having no other aim at him but his Snout behind a Tree, he shot at him, the Lion ran away; the same day this Gonzalez was taken sick; I was sent for to hear his Confession, I saw his face and nose all bruised, and asked how it came? he told me then that he had fal∣len from a Tree, and almost killed him∣self, yet afterwards he accused the poor Spaniard for shooting at him; the business was examined by a Spanish Justice, my Evidence was taken for what Gonzalez told me of his fall from a Tree; the Spaniard was put to his Oath, who swore that he shot at a Lion in a Thick Wood, where an Indian could scarce be thought to have any business; the Tree was found out in the Wood, whereat the shot had been made, and was still marked with the shot and Bullet; which Gonzalez confessed was to be the place; and was Examined how

he neither fell nor was seen by the Spani∣ard, when he came to seek for the Lion, thinking he had killed him; to which he answered, that he ran away lest the Spa∣niard should kill him indeed. But his An∣swers seemed frivolous, the Spaniards in∣tegrity being known, and the great suspi∣cion that was in the Town, of Gonzalez his dealing with the Devil, cleared the Spaniard from what was laid against him.

But this was nothing to what after hap∣pened to one John Gomez, the chiefest In∣dian of that Town of near fourscore years of Age, the Head and Ruler of the Princi∣pallest Tribe among the Indians, whose Advice and Counsel was taken and prefer∣red before all the rest; who seemed to be a very Godly Indian, and very seldom missed Morning and Evening Prayers in the Church, and had bestowed great Riches there. This Indian very suddenly was ta∣ken sick (I being then in my other Town of Mixco) the Mayordomos or Stewards of the Sodality of the Virgin, fearing that he might die without Confession, and they be chid for their negligence, at Mid∣night called me up at Mixco, desiring me to go presently and help John Gomez to die, whom also they said desired much to see me, and to receive some comfort from

me. I judging it a work of Charity, al∣though the time of the night were unsea∣sonable, and the great Rain at the present might have stopped my Charity, yet I would not be hindred by either of them, and so set forth to ride nine Miles both in the Dark, and Wet. When I came to Pinola, being thorow wet to the skin, I went immediately to the House of Old Sick Gomez, who lay with his face all muffled up, thanked me for my pains and care I had for his Soul, he desired to con∣fess, and by his Confession and Weeping Evidenced nothing but a Godly Life, and a willing desire to die, and to be with Christ, I comforted him, and prepared him for Death, and before I departed, asked him how he felt himself; he an∣swered that his Sickness was nothing but Old Age, and Weakness; with this I went to my House, changed my self, and lay down a while to rest, when suddenly I was called up again to give Gomez the Extream Unction, which the Indians (as they have been ignorantly taught) will not omit to receive before they die. As I Anointed him in his Nose, his Lips, his Eyes, his Hands and his Feet, I perceived that he was swelled, and black and blew, but made nothing of it, judging it to pro∣ceed from the sickness of his Body; I went

home again, being now break of the day, when after I had taken a small nap, some Indians came to my door to buy Candles to offer up for John Gomez his Soul, whom they told me was departed, and was that day to be Buried very solemnly at Mass. I arose with drousie Eyes after so unquiet a nights rest; and walked to the Church, where I saw the Grave was preparing. I met with two or three Spaniards who li∣ved near the Town, and were come to Mass that Morning, who went in with me to my Chamber, and with them I fell into Discourse about John Gomez, telling them what comfort I had received at his Death, whom I judged to have lived very Holy, and doubted not of his Salvation, and that the Town would much want him, for that he was their Chief Guide, and Leader, Ruling them with good Ad∣vice and Counsel. At this time the Spa∣niards smiled one at another, and told me I was much deceived by all the Indians, but especially by the deceased Gomez, if I judged him to have been a Saint, and Holy Man. I told them, that they, as Enemies to the Indians, judged still uncharitably of them; but that I who knew very well their Consciences, could judge better of them than they. One then Replyed, that it seemed I little knew the truth of John

Gomez his death by the Confession which he made unto me, and that I seemed to be ignorant of the stir which was made in the Town concerning his Death. This seemed so strange unto me, that I desired them to inform me of the Truth. Then they told me that the report went, that John Gomez was the Chief Wizard of all the Wizards and Witches in the Town, and that com∣monly he was wont to be changed into the shape of a Lion, and so to walk about the Mountains. That he was ever a dead∣ly Enemy to one Sebastian Lopez an An∣cient Indian, and head of another Tribe; and that both of them two days before had met in the Mountain. Gomez in the shape of a Lion, and Lopez in the shape of a Tyger; and that they fought most cruelly, till Gomez (who was the older and weaker) was tired, much bit and bruised, and died of it. And farther, that I might be assured of this truth, they told me that Lopez was in Prison for it, and the two Tribes striving about it, and that the Tribe and Kindred of Gomez demanded from Lopez and his Tribe and Kindred sa∣tisfaction, and a great Sum of Money, or else did threaten to make the Case known unto the Spanish Power and Authority, which yet they were unwilling to do, if they could agree and smother it up among

themselves, that they might not bring an aspersion upon their whole Town. This seemed very strange unto me, and I could not resolve what to believe, and thought I would never more believe an Indian, if I found John Gomez to have so much Dis∣sembled and Deceived me. I took my leave of the Spaniards, and went my self to the Prison, where I found Lopez with Fetters. I called one of the Officers of the Town, who was Alguazil Major, and my great Friend, unto my House, and pri∣vately examined him why Lopez was kept so close Prisoner? he was loath to tell me, fearing the rest of the Indians, and hoping the business would be taken up and agreed by the two Tribes, and not noised about the Country, which at that instant the two Alcades and Regidores, Majors, and Jurates, with the Chief of both Tribes were sitting about in the Town-House all that Morning. But I seeing the Officer so timorous, was more desirous to know something, and pressed more upon him for the Truth, giving him an inkling of what I had heard from the Spaniards be∣fore. To which he answered, that if they could agree amongst themselves, they feared no ill report from the Spaniards against their Town; I told him I must know what they were agreeing upon amongst

themselves so closely in the Town-House. He told me, if I would promise to say nothing of him (for he feared the whole Town if they should know he had revealed any thing unto me) he would tell me the Truth. With this I comforted him, and gave him a Cup of Wine, and encouraged him, warranting him that no harm should come unto him for what he told me. Then he related the business unto me as the Spaniards had done, and told me that he thought the Tribes amongst themselves would not agree; for that some of Gomez his Friends hated Lopez, and all such as were so Familiar with the Devil, and ca∣red not if Gomez his dissembling Life were laid open to the World; but others he said, who were as bad as Lopez, and Gomez, would have kept it close, lest they, and all the Witches and Wizards in the Town should be discovered. This struck me to the very heart, to think that I should live amongst such People, whom I saw were spending all they could get by their Work and Labour upon the Church, Saints, and in Offerings, and yet were so privy to the Counsels of Satan; it grie∣ved me that the word I preached unto them did no more good; and I resolved from that time forward to spend most of my indeavours against Satans subtilty, and

to shew them more than I had done, the great danger of their Souls who had made any Compact with the Devil, that I might make them abandon and abjure his Works, and close with Christ by Faith. I dismissed the Indian, and went to the Church to see if the People were come to Mass; I found there no body but only two who were making Gomez his Grave. I went back to my Chamber, troubled much within my self, whether I should allow him a Christian Burial, who had li∣ved and died so wickedly, as I had been informed. Yet I thought I was not bound to believe one Indian against him, nor the Spaniards, whom I supposed spoke but by hear-say. Whilst I was thus musing, there came unto me at least twenty of the Chiefest of the Town, with the two Majors, Jurates, and all the Officers of Justice, who desired me to forbear that day the Burying of John Gomez, for that they had resolved to call a Crown Officer to view his Corps, and examine his death, lest they should all be troubled for him, and he be again unburied. I made as if I knew nothing, but inquired of them the reason; then they related all unto me, and told me how there were Witnesses in the Town, who saw a Lyon and a Tyger Fighting, and presently lost the sight of

the Beasts, and saw John Gomez, and Se∣bastian Lopez, much about the same time parting one from another, and that imme∣diately John Gomez came home bruised to his Bed, from whence he never rose more, and that he declared upon his Death-Bed unto some of his Friends that Sebastian Lo∣pez had killed him; whereupon they had him in safe Custody. Farther they told me, that though they had never known so much wickedness of these two Chief Heads of their Town whom they had much re∣spected and followed; yet now upon this occasion, from the one Tribe and the o∣ther they were certainly informed that both of them did constantly deal with the Devil, which would be a great aspersion upon their Town, but they for their parts abjured all such wicked ways, and prayed me not to conceive the worse of all for a few, whom they were resolved to perse∣cute, and not suffer to live amongst them. I told them I much liked their good zeal, and incouraged them as good Christians to endeavour the rooting out of Satan from their Town, and they did very well in gi∣ving notice to Guatemala, to the Spanish Power of this Accident; and that if they had concealed it, they might all have been punished as guilty of Gomez his death, and Agents with Satan, and his Instruments.

I assured them I had no ill conceit of them, but rather judged well of them for what they agreed to do. The Crown Officer was sent for, who came that night and searched Gomez his Body; I was present with him, and found it all bruised, scratch∣ed, and in many places Bitten and sore wounded. Many Evidences and suspicions were brought in against Lopez by the In∣dians of the Town, especially by Gomez, his Friends, whereupon he was carryed away to Guatemala, and there again was Tryed by the same Witnesses, and not much Denying the Fact himself, was there Hanged. And Gomez, though his Grave was opened in the Church, he was not Buried in it, but in another made Ready for him in a Ditch. So far in Gage.

There are multitudes of Instances in ma∣ny Authors, of a Nature all as strange, and as surprizing, as the former; and tho' perhaps most of the Relations handed a∣bout with great Confidence, do, upon impartial Examination, prove either Im∣postures of Malicious, or Mistakes of Igno∣rant and Superstitious Persons; yet some come so well Attested, that it were to bid defiance to all Human Testimony to refuse them belief. Among Forreign Writers I will mention only the Learned & Judicious Bodin in his Damonomania, and

the Curious Gasper Schottus in his Physica Curiosa, Part 1. C. 16. § 3. and C. 17. § 2. Among our own, the Eloquent Mr. Glan∣vil, in his Sadducismus Triumphatus; and Mr. Baxter (as Sagacious and Inquisitive a person as any) his Historical Discourse of Apparitions and Witches, who all a∣bound with very Prodigious, but Credi∣ble Relations. To all which I might add the Confessions I have in Manuscript, (all Original Papers, and well vouched,) of a great number of Witches, (some of which were Executed) that were taken by a Justice of Peace in Cornwall above thir∣ty Years agoe: In which there are so ma∣ny Rare and Curious Passages, that I find my self under great Temptation of Pro∣mising to Annex them to the Second Part of this Discourse, when I shall have Occa∣sion to say more upon the present Sub∣ject, under the Head of Supernatural Pow∣er. And Thus much for the Second Ar∣gument, which leads me to the Third.

SUBS. II.

The Third Argument from Supernatural Ad∣vertisements. An Instance out of Simo∣catto. Another, of a strange Omen out of Sir W. Rawleigh. Of the Corps-Can∣dles in Wales, &c.

THE Third Argument to prove the Real Being of Spirits, shall be taken from the strange Advertisements of Events, and as strange Premonitions, that are some∣times Given, which cannot be Resolved but upon that Hypothesis. I will but mention the Oracles of Old; the many Admonishing and Predictive Dreams, that some Persons, in all Ages, have been Fa∣voured with, (of which there is a Large Collection by Strozzo Cicogna in his Magia Omnifariâ, Part 1. l. 2. C. 4. as also in Cicero, in his First Book of Divination;) and in fine, the Prodigious Omens that do often occur.

Nor will I insist on what I find in Mr. Stow and other Historians, that William, Surnamed the Conquerour, though he died at Roan in Normandy, sooner than was Expected, yet his Death was known at Rome the same day he Died. But I lay more stress upon an Advertisement I find in

Theophylact Simocatta, concerning the Murther of the Emperour Mauritius, be∣cause the Relation of it being Particular and Circumstantial, carries Greater Evi∣dence than the Former, and will endure the Test. There happened, says the Histo∣rian, on the very day in which Mauritius [the Emepror] was Murdred, a thing at Alexandria worthy to be Recorded. A certain Writing-Master or Scrivener (for so I do Adventure to interpret the word Calligraphus) being (that day) at a Merchants House at a kind of Gossips Feast, where he was obliged to stay till the Fourth Watch of the Night; as he was going homeward, being come to the Tycha∣um, a noted part of the City, (about midnight) he saw some of the chiefest Statues that stood there removing from off their Bases, and at the same time heard a Voice that seemed to come from the same Statues, which called on him aloud, by Name, and withal, very shrilly, but brief∣ly, Related the Accident that that day had befaln Mauritius. In the morning the Writing-Master goes to the Palace to Dis∣cover what had happened to him, which coming to the Ear of Peter the Prefect of Aegypt then residing there (who was nearly Related to Simocatta) he diligent∣ly inquires concerning the whole Affair,

and after he had fully informed himself thereof, injoyns the Relater to Secrecy, and then setting down, in his Note Book, the whole Relation, he waits the Event. Of this not long after, he was assured by an Express, which on the Ninth day brought him News of the Emperours Death, and of the Time of it; and then he Declared Publickly, how that this Ac∣cident had been Foretold by the Statues, or rather by the Demons, in the manner a∣bove Related, and Vouched the Writing-Master as the Author. This is the sum of the Story, as Simocatta has Related it, (Hist. Mauritian. l. 8. Ch. 13.) A Story that is not told at Random, or by an Ob∣scure Person, or by a Person Remote from the Scene, or from the time it was Acted on; but a Story told by a Grave and Un∣derstanding Historian, who lived at the same time; was well acquainted with the Persons concerned; and who made a Fi∣gure in the Government; so that he had all the Advantages that could be desired to render him certain of the truth of it. Lucilius in Cicero l. 2. de Nat. Deor. tells us a story of the like Nature, viz. That the Elder P. Vatienus coming by night to Rome, was Advertized by the Tyndarida in the shape of two young men, on White Horses, that that day Perses was over∣come

by the Roman Army, and taken Pri∣soner; This he Reports to the Senate, by whom he was committed to Prison for spreading False News; but afterwards, when it Appeared by the Consuls Letters, that the Advertisement was true, he was both Released and Rewarded.

And as for Omens, than which nothing is more Ridiculous to the Epicureans, and all those that deny the Reality of Spirits, (so says Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2. Nihil tam Ierridet Epicurus quam Praedictionem rerum futurarum;) I will Instance in one that leaves no Room for any Evasion, since I take it from a Person who was very Con∣fident of the Truth of it and yet was a Person as little subject to Superstition, or to Fancy, as any Epicurean whatever. Sir Walter Rawleigh (for it is he I mean) in his History of the World (B. 4. C. 2. S. 7.) says,

'The strangest thing that I have Read of in this kind [speaking of Omens] being certainly true, was, that the Night be∣fore the Battle at Novara, All, [not one, or some, which might be Chance, but All,] the Doggs which Followed the French Army Ran from them to the Switzers, Leaping and Fawning upon them, as if they had been Bred and Fed by them all their Lives. And in the Morning Following, Trivulzi and Tremovilli Gene∣ralls

for Lewis the 12th were by these Imperial Switzers utterly Broken and put to Ruine.

But to Proceed, What will an Epicu∣rean, or meer Somatist, say to the Corps-Candles, or Dead Mens Lights in Wales? if all be true that is Reported of them in Mr. B's. Historical Discourse, Ch. 6. And Methinks his Vouchers are Good. I will Relate the Account they give in their own Terms; The First is one Mr. Lewis, who in his First Letter to Mr. B. (October 20. 1656.) speaking of the Appearance of those Lights which are called Dead-Mens Candles, before Mortality, He says,

'This is so or∣dinary in most of our Counties [of Wales] that I never scarce heard of any sort young or old, but this is seen be∣fore Death, and often observed to part from the very Bodies of the Persons, all along the way to the Place of Burial, and Infallibly Death will Ensue. In his Third Letter Dated Febr. 14. 1656. He says, as for the Candles, all the Parts I know of Wales, as our Neighbouring Counties (as I hear) have Experience of them, I scarce know any Gentleman, or Minister of any standing, but hath seen them; and a Neighbour of mine, will shortly be at Worcester Abiding (who hath seen them often, and I will Direct some to

Acquaint you, and upon Oath, if need be,) a very Credible Aged Person; for my Part, I never saw the Candles; but those of my House have, and on a Time some two years Past, it was told me by them, that Two Candles were seen, one Little, and a Great one, Pas∣sing the Church way, under my House, my Wife was then great with Child, and near her time, and she Feared of it, and it Begat some fear in us about her, but just about a Week after, her self first came to me (as something joyed that the Fear might be over) and said (as true it was) an Old Man, and a Child of the Neighbourhood Passed that same way to be Buried.

This she and I can Depose.

Thus that Gentleman; who at that time (as Mr. B. stiles him) was a Learned Justice of Peace, and seems by his Letters to have been a very Cautious Circumspect Person, and a Person of Great Veracity, and therefore a Person who cannot be Im∣agined to go about to Deceive, or that could be Deceived himself in a matter Re∣presented to him (as this was) as of Gene∣ral observation. For it was Easie for him to know if the thing were of so General Observation or Note, (since it was but to Ask People,) and if it was, it could not be False, as having the Testimony of com∣mon

Knowledge and Experience to Avow it; and if it was not, it would be Teme∣rity in him to believe it true; since it wanted even that Evidence that was Pre∣tended to ground it; but it seems the Gen∣tleman Inquired, and found the thing Confirmed (as he says) by General Ex∣perience, and I believe him too Honest to say it, if it had not been so. Besides, what he mentions in Relation to his Wife and Family, if well Considered, Adds no little strength to the whole Story. And in Fine, he brings one Mr. Davis for his Voucher.

This Mr. Davis in a Letter that he wrote to Mr. B. at the Request of Mr. Lewis, is more particular and Full than that Gen∣tleman, in Reference to those Lights, and therefore (the Matter being Rare and Curious, and well Deserving to be made a subject of Inquiry by the Noblest Wits) I will Transcribe it at Large.

'I am to give you, says he, the Best Satisfaction I can touching these Fiery Apparitions, which do as it were mark out the way for Corpses to their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and that sometimes before the parties themselves fall Sick, and sometimes in their Sickness. Of These I could never hear in England, they are Common in these Three Coun∣ties, Cardigan, Caermarthen, and Pembrooke,

and as I hear, in some other Parts of Wales.

'These 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in our Language we call Cankwyllan Cyrth (i. e.) Corps-Candles; and Candles we call them, not that we do see any thing else besides the Light, but because that Light doth as much Resemble a Material Can∣dle Light, as Eggs do Eggs, saving that in their journey, these Candles be modò Apparentes, modò Disparentes, Es∣pecially, when one comes near them; and if one come on the way against them, unto him they vanish; but presently ap∣pear behind him, and hold on their Course. If it be a little Candle, Pale or Blewish, then follows the Corps either of an Abortive, or some Infant, if a Big one, then the Corps of some one come to Age; if there be seen two, or three, or more, some Big, some Small together, then so many, and such Corps together; if two Candles come from Divers Places, and be seen to meet, the Corpses will the like, if any of these Candles be seen to turn sometimes a little out of the way, or Path that Leadeth unto the Church, the following Corps will be found to turn in that very Place, for the Avoiding of some Dirty Lane, or Plash, &c. Now let us fall to Evidence, being about the Age of Fifteen, Dwelling at Lanylar,

late at Night, some Neighbours saw one of these Candles Hovering up and down along the River Bank until they were weary in Beholding, at last they left it so, and went to Bed, a few Weeks after came a Proper Damsel from Montgomery Shire, to see her Friends, who Dwelt on the other side of that River Istwyth, and thought to Ford the River at that very Place where the Light was seen; but being Dissuaded by some Lookers on, (some its most like of those that saw the Light) to Adventure on the Water, which was High by Reason of a Flood; she walked up and down along the River Bank, even where, and even as the foresaid Candle did, waiting for the Falling of the Water, which at last she took, but too soon for her, for she was Drown'd therein

'Of Late, my Sexton's Wife, an Aged Understanding Woman, saw from her Bed, a little Blewish Candle upon her Tables end, within two or three days after, comes a Fellow in, Enquiring for her Husband, and taking something from under his Cloak, claps it down directly upon the Tables end, where she had seen the Candle, and what was it but a Dead born Child: Another time the same Woman, saw such Another Candle upon the other end of the self

same Table, within few days after, a Weak Child, by my self newly Christ∣ned, was Brought into the Sextons House, where presently he died; and when the Sextons Wife, who was then Abroad, came home, she found the Woman Shrouding of the Child, on that other end of the Table, where she had seen the Candle. On a Time my self and a Kinsman coming from our School in England, and being three or four Hours Benighted, e're we could reach home, were first of all Saluted by such a Light or Candle, which coming from a House, which we well knew, held his Course (but not Directly) the High-way to Church; shortly after the Eldest Son in that House Deceased, and steered the same Course. My self and my Wife in an Evening, saw such a Light, or Candle, coming to the Church, from her Mid∣wifes House, and within a Month, she her self did follow; at which time my Wife did tell me a story of her own Mo∣ther, Mrs. Catharine Wyat, an Eminent Woman in the Town of Tenby, that in an Evening being in her Bed-Chamber, she saw two little Lights just upon her belly, which she Assayed to strike off with her hand, but could not; within a while they vanished of themselves. Not long

after, she was Delivered of two Dead∣born Children: Long sithence there hap∣pened the like in my own House; but to a Neighbours Wife, whom my Wife did sometimes call for, to do some work or other; and (as I Credibly heard within these three days) to some Good Gentlewoman also in this very Parish; where also not long since, a Neighbours Wife of mine, being great with Child, and coming in at her own door, met two Candles, a Little, and a Big one, and within a little after, falling in La∣bour, she and her Child both Dyed. Some Thirty four, or Thirty five years bygone, one Jane Wyat my Wives Sister; being Nurse to Baronet Rudds three Eldest Children, and (the Lady Mistress being Deceased) the Lady Controuler of that House going late into a Chamber where the Maid Servants Lay, saw there no less than five of these Lights together. It Happened a while after, the Chamber being newly Plaistred, and a Great Grate of Coal-fire therein, Kindled to Hasten the Drying up of the Plaistring; that five of the Maid-Servants went there to Bed, as they were wont; but (as it fell out) too soon, for in the Morn∣ing they were all Dead, being Suffocated (I conceive) in their Sleep with the

steam of the New Temper'd Lime, and Coal.

This was at Llangathen in Caer∣marthenshire.

'Some Thirty three or Thirty four years ago, upon a Tuesday coming towards home from Cardigan, where I had been enjoyned to Preach the Session-Sermon: In∣cipiente adhuc Crepusculo, and as light as Noon, and having as yet, Nine long Miles to Ride, there seemed twice or thrice from behind me, on my right side, and between my Shoulder and my Hat, to fly a little whitish thing about the big∣ness of a Walnut, and that per Intervalla, once in seventy or eighty pace: at first I took no notice of it, thinking it had been but the glimpsing of my little Ruff, for such then I wore, by degrees it waxed reddish, and as the night drew on, Red∣der and redder, at last not Ignis Fatuus, (for that I partly knew) but Purus putus Ignis, both for Light and Colour. At length I turned my Horse twice or thrice to see from whence it came, and whether it would flash into my face, then nothing I could see; but when I turned home∣wards it flashed as before, until I came to a Village called Llanrislid, where as yet I did not intend to Lodge, though there were four Lodgings, and one of them (save one) the next House

in my way, which when I passed by close, being just against the door, my Fire did flash again upon, or very near the Threshold, and there I think it lodged, for I saw it no more; home still I would go, but bethinking my self, that so I might tempt God, and meet a worse Companion than my former; I turned to the farthest Lodging in the Town, and there after a little rest, in a brown study (because mine Host was an understand∣ing Man, and Literate, and such as could, and had but lately read his Neck-Verse in pure Roman Language) I could not contain, but must needs tell him of the Vision, he the next day to some go∣ing to the Sessions, they to others there, at last it came to the Judges ears, inso∣much that the greatest News and Won∣der at the then Assizes was the Preachers Vision. To come at length unto the Pith or Kernel (for I have been too long a∣bout the Husk and Shell) at that very Sessions, one John William Lloyd, a Gen∣tleman who dwelt, and whose Son yet dwells within a Mile of Glasterig, fell Sick, and in his coming homewards, was taken with such a violent Paroxism, that he could Ride no farther than the House, where I left my Fire to Entertain him, and there he lighted and Lodged, died

about four days after. Ex Abundanti, you shall understand that some Candles have been seen to come to my Church within these three weeks, and the Corp∣ses not long after.

Mr. Davis seems to have been a Learned and Understanding, as well as a Pious Re∣ligious Minister, and therefore his Testi∣mony must needs carry, with Considerate and thinking Men the more Authority and Force; but now I cannot stay to press it farther. In truth, I have staid so long al∣ready on this Head of Argument, and especially on the Dead Mens Candles, that nothing can excuse it, but the Rarity and Surprizingness of the Subject. Wherefore I will only desire the Anti-pneumatist to Resolve me, how these Dead Mens Candles come to be Lighted, and how to be directed to go so right from the House of the Person whose Death they do presage, to the Church, or Church-yard where he is to be Lodged, without the influence of Spi∣rits, or some Invisible, but Knowing and Sagacious, ••ay, Fore-Knowing Beings; I now proceed to the next Argument.

SUBS. III.

The Third Argument from Apparitions. Three Stories of them from the Junior Pliny, in his Epistles. A Recent Story of an Appa∣rition.

AND the next Argument (the last I will insist upon) to prove the Ex∣istence of Spirits, shall be taken from their Apparition. By their Apparition, I mean their shewing of themselves to Men in hu∣man (or other Animal) shape, and so conversing and dealing with them; I know the word is, and may be taken more largely, but this is the sense I take it in now.

On this Occasion I must mention again the Epistle of Pliny, which he sent his Friend Sura, to have his Opinion upon this Question, Whether really there were any such things as Spirits, that have a Fi∣gure of their own, and are a kind of Nu∣mens; or else, that all are meer fancies, and effects of fear, without any substan∣tial Real Being. Pliny himself declares, that he believes their Real Subsistence, and owns he was induced to it by three Stories, which he there relates, and I will repeat.

The first is, concerning Q. Curtius Ru∣fus, to whom being in Africk, where he followed the Quaestor, that had that Pro∣vince assigned to him, there appeared as he was walking alone, a thing in the shape of a Woman of great Beauty, and of a size much larger than ordinary, which told him that he should see the City of Rome once again; should bear very ho∣nourable Charges; and in fine, return unto Africk, with Supream Command, and there die. All which could not but much surprize a Person that was very mean and obscure, (for so was Q. Curtius at that time,) and yet says Pliny, it came all to pass to a Tittle. He adds, that Cur∣tius Sailing to Carthage, as soon as he came on shoar the same Spectre appeared to him again; and that afterward falling Sick, with a Sickness which none about him thought any any danger of, he re∣membring what the Spectre had told him, and comparing past Events with future, abandon'd all hopes of recovery, and in fine, according to the Prediction of the Apparition, and to his own perswasion, dies in Africk. This Story is also in Ta∣citus.

The next is of a Magnificient House in Athens, that was Haunted, but in so ter∣rible a manner, that all that dwelt in it

died with the fright; so it lay void a long time. But at last, a Philosopher called Athenodorus, coming to Town, and want∣ing a House, and seeing an inscription upon this, that it was to be Lett, and for a very low price; he liking the House, and admiring the lowness of the price, inquires, and was fully informed of the Reason. He resolves however to take it, and the rather, for that it was said to be Haunted. Accordingly, in the Evening he orders a Bed to be made for him in the forward part of the House, next the door, and that a Writing-Table, and a Stile to write with, as also Light should be pre∣pared; which being done, he disposes all his Domesticks in the inner part of the House, and then applies himself to medi∣tation and Writing; by that means im∣ploying both his Thoughts, his Eyes, and his Hands; least otherwise his un-ingaged mind should be possessed of fear, and this impose upon him. While he was thus occupied, all was silent, still, and quiet for a while; but at last he hears at a di∣stance the clattring of Iron, and jingling of Chains, which yet did not so much di∣sturb him, but that, without looking up, he continued his Writing, and incouraged himself all he could. In the mean time, the noise increases, and comes nearer and

nearer; first without doors, afterwards within, which makes him look behind him, and then he saw a most terrible Spectre, in shape the same as had been re∣presented to him; to wit, a Lean, Meager, Deformed Old Man, with a Long Dang∣ling Beard, his Hair standing, an end upon his Head; gives upon his Feet, and Chains in his hands; this Old Gentleman stood still, and seemed to becken with his finger as if he had called to Athenodorus. Atheno∣dorus answers him the same way with his hand, intimating to him, that he should stay a while, and then goes on writing. But the Spectre ratling his Chains over the Philosophers Head, obliges him to look up the second time, when seeing the Spectre still beckning as before, he takes up the Light and follows him; who leads the way, but very softly, as one loaded with Fetters; and at last, at a certain place in the Area of the House, he Vanishes, and leaves Athenodorus alone. Athenodorus being thus left, gathers some Herbs and Leaves, and what he could scrape together, and puts them on the place as a mark; and the next day applying himself to the Chief Magistrate, acquaints him with the Story, and advises that the place should be digged, which being done, there were found the Bones of a Man, and Chains,

but the Flesh entirely Consumed; they gather the Bones together and bury them, after which the House was Haunted no Longer.

The Two former Stories, tho' they are Related by Pliny but upon Tradition, seem very Credible, But the Third, which follows, he tells of his own Knowledge. He had, he says, a Certain Freed man, whose Name was Marcus, a Learned Un∣derstanding Person. This Marcus, one Time as he was Lying in Bed with his younger Brother, thought, that he saw something sitting on the same Bed, that, with a Rasor, Shaved his Head all over; and in the Morning it was found, that Really his Head had been Shaved, the Hairs Lying all about the Place. Not Long after says Pliny, Another, the Like Acci∣dent Hapned, that Confirm'd the Former. For a Certain Youth Lying with many others in the Servants Lodgings, there came unto him through the Window, (for so the Youth Related the Story) two Persons in white Tunicks, who, as he Lay, fell to Shaving of him, and having done it, Returned the same way they came; and that this was a Reall Thing, and not a Dream only, or only a Fancy between Sleeping and Waking, was Mani∣fested (says the Author) by the Day, for

when this came, it was seen that the Youth was Shaved, and that the Hairs lay Scattered about the Bed.

These are the Instances that Convinced Pliny, a Person used to Business, Wise, and Circumspect, not Credulous, or Easie to be Imposed upon, and Abused; to which I will Add but one more, but that shall be a recent one, of our own Time, and well Attested: a Story Licen∣sed by a Person of Quality, and of Great worth; who I believe has more Honour than to suffer the World to be Palm'd upon by what He knew a Falsity; and Greater Prudence than to give such a Story a License without some Inquiry after the truth of it. The Story is This,

'The 22 of February, 1671, we (says the Master that tells it) Sailed from Graves∣end; and the 26th, by Gods Providence we Sailed over the Bar of Newcastle, and there Loaded the 2d. of March. About Nine or ten of the Clock in the Night Fol∣lowing, we having made all clear and Ready for the Furtherance of our Voyage, some time after Supper I went to Rest, when about twelve of the Clock in the Night; to the best of my Remembrance, I was Awaked out of my Sleep by a Great Noise, (but saw nothing) which to the best of my Capacity bid me Be gone,

and that I had nothing to do there, but being so hastily Disturbed, and not cer∣tain what might be the Cause, I gave it over for a Dream, and past that Accident as Uncertain of the Truth. Now after the First Day was Past, about Eight or Nine of the Clock at Night I went to rest; and about Twelve, my Mate was striking a Light to take a Pipe of Tobacco (as I suppose) and Expecting the Wherry to go up to the Town, being the Tide fell out about Two in the Morning, I desired the Candle might not be put out, and being as well Awake as now I am, to the best of my Remembrance, I was then Pulled by the hair of my head off from my Pillow, and the same words Declared unto me as before; and then I saw the Per∣fect Face and Proportion of a Man, in a Black Hat, Stuff-Coat, and Striped Neck-Cloth, with Hanging down hair, and a sowre Down-looking Countenance, and his Teeth being set in his Head, I had then time to say, Lord have Mercy upon me, What art? at which he Vanished, yet the Candle Burned very Blew, and al∣most went out: Hereupon being much Discontented, I did by the Following Post give my owners a just Account of what had Befallen me.

'The Fifth of that Instant, we set Sail: about four of the Clock in the Day, the Wind at W. S. W. fair Weather, and a Brave Gale off the Shore, which Con∣tinued until half an hour after Eleven on Wednesday night; at which time the Man at the Helm called out that he could not stir the Helm: but after I had pulled off the Whip-staff; the Ship steered as before, being still fair Weather, the Wind then coming to the N. W. and Snowing Wea∣ther, but very fair and clear. I was yet Doubtful of more Wind; and therefore caused the Men to furl the Fore Top-sail, and Lower down the Main Topsail upon the back of the Main sail, but could not with all the strength we had hale in; the Weather brake off the fore Top-sail, when this was still in my Judgment, that our Ship did hale as much, as when our sails were out, then we haled up our Main-sail, and still the Ship had the same List as with a Large Wind, which to my Judgment might be half a streak, or thereabouts.

'By This time it was Two of the Clock, then our Men tried the Pump, and found Little or no Water in her: the Man at the Helm called out, that the Candle Burned so Blew in the Lan∣thorn;

that it gave Little or no Light, and three several times went out, so that I held the Candle to the Look-out, which Candle did burn very well, and shewed a good Light, but of a sudden our Ship would not feel the Helm so kindly as before, and brought all our Sails Aback, then our Ship heeled as much to Wind∣ward, as before to Leeward: the Glass being out, we went to the Pump, and found no Water in the Ship, but she did not steer well. Neither could I find the Reason, being still so fair Weather, this unkind steerage made me Urgent to try the Pump yet more, but I could not get the upper Box to work, nor stir, but having taken that up, and try∣ing with the Pump-hook, we could not come near the Lower Box by a foot and half, which to my Judgment was Hin∣dred by something like a Bull-fish or Woolsack, that as we forced down, gave up again with the Hook: Whereupon Mistrusting that all was not well, I caused our Men to keep the Coat of our Pump up; and my self Loosned the Tack; in the mean time I ordered two Men to Loose the Boat, which they did being Lashed in three Places: yet they do not Remember to this hour, that they Loos∣ned any of them but the Middlemost;

and with three Men in her, the Boat went over the Top of the Foresheet, which lay above the stem, without Touching it, with such Violence, as even Amazed us that saw it; And they that were in the Boat, gave such loud cryes, as frighted him at the Helm, who came Running out unknown to me, but finding the Ship coming nearer the Wind then formerly, I Ran to the Stair-case, to bid him put the Helm over, but could not: and hearing one jump down at the Hatch, which was open at the half-deck, did suppose that the Helms-man came Down again; and calling him by his Name to come and help me, the word was no sooner out of my Mouth, but I Perceived the same Person that I had formerly seen before we came out of the Harbour; who came violently to me, saying, be gone, you have no more to do here. Throwing me in at the Cabbin door, clear upon the Top of the Table; When I crying out, In the Name of God what art, he Vanished away in a Flash of Fire; thinking withal that the Ship had split in a Thousand pieces, it giving such a Crack. The Men thereupon calling out, Master, if you be a Man come away, did something Re∣vive me, and striving to have got to my

Chest, being I had got some Money in it, I found that something Hindred me, but what it was I could not tell. Then Perceiving the Main Sea coming in so Fast, that I was up to the wast, before I could get out of the Cabbin, and find∣ing all our Men in the Boat but only one, I desired him to get a Compass; which he did, yet could never after know what became of it. We were no sooner in the Boat, but the Ship Sank Down, and yet having a Great Sea Fur Gown, which lay upon the Dicker, up∣on the Ships going Down, the very up∣set of the Water brought it to the Boats side, and one of our Men took it in, we Reckoned our selves to be Ten or Twelve Leagues E. S. E. from the Spern, I Per∣ceived the Fane at the Main-top-Mast-Head, when the Ship was sunk: we Continued in the Boat from three in the Morning till ten or eleven that day, when we were taken up by a Whitby Ketch, who used us very Kindly, and towed our Boat at his Stern with two Ends of a Hauser, till she brake away: She being Bound for Newcastle, and the Wind being Contrary, did on the Satur∣day Following, set us a Shore at Grimsby in Hull River, where the Mayor gave us a Pass for London. This is a True and

Perfect Relation to the best of my know∣ledge in every Respect. John Pye Master. And Attested by Nine Men more all Be∣longing to my Ship.

'I Had forgot to Express, that one side of my Face is Burnt and Blasted sorely, which I felt within half an hour after I was gone out of the Ship; but how it came upon me in the Ship I could not tell being then in a Great Horror and Amaxement.

Thus John Pye.

This seems an Undeniable Evidence of the Reality of Apparitions.

SECT. III.

The Apparition of Spirits twofold, Real, or Visional; both ways Explained. A Con∣ceit about the Appearing of Ghosts Re∣jected. That most Apparitions of Spirits are Visional, not Real, Evinced by several Considerations. Some Phaenomena of Apparitions Salved. Of the Distri∣bution of Spirits.

THIS Last Argument for the Real Existence of Spirits taken from their Apparition. Invites me to Consider the Ways in which they use to Appear. And There are two ways in which they do, or may Appear, the one Real, the other I call Visional.

I call it Real Appearing, when they present themselves to some of the Out∣ward senses, and (particularly to the Eye,) in some thing that does Really Affect it; and so, by means of the sense, (in the same way as all Corporeal External Objects do) they Affect and stir the Imagi∣nation. I call their Appearing Visional, when by Affecting or Stiring the Imagi∣nation, they occasion such Appearances as seem External to the Eye, or other senses,

tho' indeed there is nothing that does re∣ally affect it, or them, from without. This Conception is grounded upon comon Ob∣servation. For few are ignorant that things appear as external to the sense, not only when impressions are made upon it from without, by real Objects that move it, but also when the imagination is smart∣ly stricken by something from within, for so it is in Dreams, in which all things do seem as really transacted for the time; (and not seldom, where the impression is very strong, even after that men are a∣wakened) as when the External Sense is affected by Objects.

Well then, in real Apparitions of Spi∣rits, the external sense is immediately af∣affected; but in those that are Visional, the Imagination.

The real appearing of Spirits is gene∣nerally thought to be performed, either by their assuming of Bodies that are al∣ready prepared; or by Figuring the Air, or some other Elementary Substance into the shapes in which they appear; which latter is done by the Plastic Power of the Imagination; a Power a Spirit is believed to have, because we truly experience such an one in our incorporated selves, not only upon the Spirits in the Brain, which are Figured into a Thousand shapes at our

pleasure, in the several things we do imagine; but in some cases, upon exter∣nal Bodies; as in the Signatures of the Faetus; not to mention other less certain, but strongly asserted instances.

And indeed, I take the former Thought in this Matter, for a much more probable one, than that of some others; which is, that Spirits do appear by Condensation of their Vehicles, and disappear by Attenu∣ating them; this being not a very easie Conception, for of what Matter must such Vehicles consist? ay, of what vast Exten∣sion must the Vehicle of a Spirit be, in its own proportion? if when it is Condensed and Shrunk so much, as it must to be∣come an Object of Sense, it is yet in Di∣mension Equal, and sometimes Superiour, unto that of a Man.

Some are of the Opinion, that Ghosts (by which I mean the Apparitions of Souls Departed) do for the most part by virtue of their Formative Plastic Power, frame unto themselves the Vehicles in which they appear, out of the Moisture of their own deserted Bodies; this being a Matter that is believed more Congenial to them, and more Sympathetical; and for that Reason, they say, it is, that Ghosts do often appear in Church-Yards; and that they do not appear but for some short time,

to wit, before the moisture is wholly dried up; as also, that the Ancients used to Burn not to Burie the Dead; for Cardan tells us, that during that Custom, there was no such Appearing of Ghosts as is now.

But this Opinion has very little ground; for besides, that it does account but for the Apparition of Souls, and not that of Angels, good, or bad; tho' it is very pro∣bable that Departed Souls, if at any time they appear, they do it the same way that Angels are used to do, since there is the same reason they should. I say besides this, it is certain (if any Stories of such a nature are certain) that pretended Ghosts have appeared so long after their decease from their several Bodies, that nothing could remain of these but the Dust; and it is also certain, that many Persons have been seen (to all Appearances) while alive, in their proper Shapes and Meen, and with the very Cloaths they were used to wear; and this could not be done by means of Vehicles framed of their Radical moisture. In truth, this last is a very cross Phaenomenon; a Phaenomenon that ren∣ders all Apparition of Ghosts uncertain and questionable, since it seems to infer, that it is not the Departed Soul it self that appears, whenever there is such an

Apparition, but some other Spirit that Personates it.

For my own part, I see many Difficul∣ties in the way, of the real Apparition of Spirits; for besides that of the assuming of Bodies, many times they do Eat and Drink, and perform several other Vital Actions, that seem very hard to be account∣ed for in that way; so that I am much inclined to believe, (that) their Appari∣tion is mostly, if not only Visional; not by an immediate affection of the External Sense, but by affecting and striking the Imagination in the way I have mentioned before. And herein I am confirm'd, in that it seems to have been the common Sentiment of all the Ancients; who did for this reason (as I noted before) call the Apparitions of Spirits Phantasmata, or Idola; to wit, because they were rather Imaginative, than Real, not as Mr. Hobbs would carry it, as if they thought that all Spirits were only Phantasmata, or meer Fancies, but because they thought that Spirits used not to Appear but by affecting and striking the Fancy. And this is Evi∣dent, in that they did call Apparitions not only Phantasmata, or Images, but also Pneumata or Spirits; by the latter Expres∣sion signifying the nature of the things that did appear, as by the former, the way in

which they appeared. Thus Luke, when he would intimate that the Disciples (at the time they saw our Lord after his Re∣surrection) supposed that they had seen a Spirit, does not use the word Phantasma, as the two other Evangelists, Matthew, and Mark, do, on the like occasion, but the word Pneuma, Luke 24.37. But they [the Disciples] were terified and frighted, and supposed they had seen a Spirit. [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.] I add, that from the different Expressions that these Evangelists do use, on the like occasion; Matthew and Mark expressing the supposed seeing of a Spirit, by seeing of a Phantasm, [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,] but Luke, by seeing of a Spirit; [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,] one may infer, that when they thought the Apparition to be of a Good Spirit, they called it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or a Spirit; but when of a Bad, they called it Phantasma, as who would say, a Sprite, an Hob-Goblin, an illusion of Devils; without conceive∣ing, what perhaps some others will judge as propable, that they had an Opinion (as, if I do not mis-remember, the Modern Platonists had,) that Good Spirits did use to appear really, but bad ones, by distur∣bing and troubling the Fancy.

Another Consideration that induces me to think the Apparition of Spirits to be mostly (if not always) Visional, is, that

all Appearance will be the same in this bu∣siness of Apparitions, upon the Hypothesis that they are but Visional, as upon that, that they are real; since Common Dreams, in those that sleep; and waking ones in the Melancholy, the Maniacal, and the Hyste∣rical, do seem as real to them, as any things that are most so. And as some Ap∣pearances will equally as well be salved upon one Hypothesis as upon the other, so there are others, that will be better salved upon the Visional, than on the Real Hypo∣thesis; particularly this, that Spectres are oft∣en said to be seen by one Person in a Room, that are not by others in the same Room, tho' they look where they are said to be seen. A Spirit may be easily Conceived to affect and strike the Imagination of one Person, without doing so to anothers; but that the same External Object should be seen by one, and not by another that has the same advantage, is somewhat har∣der to think, and I had almost said, can∣not be conceived without a double Mira∣cle. In short, one can better conceive how Spirits should eat, and drink, &c. in the Visional, than in the Real Hypo∣thesis.

I know it may be told me, that it is more usual for Spirits to appear by Night than by Day, and in Dark and Gloomy

places, than in open and lightsome; and those who hold the real apparition of Spi∣rits, will think that they can give a bet∣ter account of this Phaenomenon, than o∣thers can, who do believe it but Visional. For they will say; Those of them that do hold the Opinion of a Spirits appearing by Condensation of his own Vehicle, that the Cold of the Night, as also of umbragious and gloomy places, where the Sun does not enter, or of solitary uninhabited ones, where Fire is not used, does much contri∣bute to the Conspissation of the Spirits Ve∣hicle: And Those that hold the Opinion that Spirits appear by Forming to them∣selves a Body of Air, will say, that the Spissitude of the Air, which is greater by Night than by Day (when the presence of the Sun attenuates it,) and greater in gloo∣my and uninhabited, than in lightsom and inhabited places, does make the For∣mation of a Body (and by consequence their Apparition) more agreeable and easie to them. But what can be said of this appearance in the Visional Hypothesis.

I cannot foresee how very acceptable, or otherwise, such a Discourse as this will be unto others, but to me it is of an As∣pect (that is) not very Agreeable. For that the Angelical Vehicle should be obnox∣ious to the impressions of Heat and Cold,

(as is in the First Opinion,) seems some∣what a gross Conception; nor can I see how the Spissitude, or the Tenuity of the Air should signifie much, either to further or to hinder the making a body of Air by a Spirit, (as it is apprehended to do in the second Opinion,) if a Spirit be conceived (as he must) to work Magically, and not Mecannically, in it. But not to insist on this, but to answer directly. The Reason then why Spirits do appear in the Night rather than in the Day, and in dark gloo∣my solitary places rather than in others, is from the silence and vacancy that is at such times, and in such places, so that the Ima∣gination not being possessed, or diverted, by External Objects, is more attentive unto, and Consequently more susceptive of internal impressions; there being the same Reason for this Phaenomenon, as there is for some others, to wit, our bet∣ter hearing a Sound by Night than in the Day, and our seeing of the Images in a Darkned Room upon a Paper, or Wall, that Disappear as soon as a greater Light is admitted.

By these and other Considerations, I am more inclined to a belief of the Visional, than of the Real Apparition of Spirits; the Former being accompanied with fewer Difficulties, and also being a thing that is

easily conceived; for one that thinks, will more easily admit an Angel can affect and stir the imagination, (which we see both many Distempers, and more Meats and Drinks can do;) than that it should Cre∣ate a Body, or assume one Created; or in fine, be able to alter its own Vehicle, so much from its proper Dimension, that the squeezing of an Elephant into that of a Mouse, is of no Comparison with it.

I confess, I should be more inclined than I am to the Real Hypothesis, if I could believe the Spagirical Resurrection of Plants, or the Reality of Apparitions resembling Men, that are said to be seen in Distilling-Vessels, upon the Distillation of Human Blood; of which Peter Borellus (a Curi∣ous, but too Credulous Author) tells us in his Observations, Cent. 4. Obs. 62. I fear, with more presumption, than cer∣tainty. For my part, I must acknowledge my unbelief as to it.

I will only add, for the fuller clearing of the Theory of the Apparition of Spi∣rits, that what Gravity or weight is in respect of Elementary Bodies, That a strong Inclination or Habit, and Will or Passion is unto Souls; and Consequently, that we seldom hear of the Apparition of Any but of such as went out of the Body with great Reluctance; with a violent Pas∣sion

of Revenge; or with a strong Desire of having something done, that was in their will, but not in their power. And of the appearing of such we often hear; but whether the Apparition is of the De∣parted Soul it self, or of its Representative only, to wit, some Genius Personating the Deceased; and why (often times) it ap∣pears unto Persons no way concerned, and not to those that are, when it would have something revealed; as also the Laws of the Spiritual World, (for Laws there must be, which do confine and regulate the motions of Spirits;) these, and many o∣ther points in the business of Spirits are all unknown unto me, and perhaps are only known unto God.

I should now proceed to the Distribution of Spirits; but this entirely depends upon the History of them, and we know but little of that History: Besides, there is in what we are thought to know, so much of Tale, Romance, and Invention, that, upon strict inquiry, not one Relation of a hundred holds true, even of their Appari∣tions; an Observation which obliged Lu∣cian of old, and many now, to Ridicule them all. Wherefore I resolve to Omit, as a Task too hard for me, to discourse of their Kinds, and their Orders; only in

General, I will adventure to affirm (if this be to Adventure, to say, what few will deny,) that that there are se∣veral Species; Angels in Heaven, and Devils out of it; and perhaps a Lower sort of Spirits than those we commonly call Devils. But for the Celestial Hie∣rarchy, as Dionysius (the True, or the False) has set it out, and the Distinct∣ion in it, that he makes of Seraphim, of Cherubim, of Thrones, of Dominations, of Vertues, of Powers, of Principalities, of Arch-Angels, and of Angels; as also of the Politick Government of Devils, and the several Orders that are in it: One had need be a Saint, and as illu∣minated with Revelation as Dionysius himself was, to understand the For∣mer; and for the Latter, he must be a Conjurer of the Highest Class, and possibly more than a Conjurer, to have any, or any certain Account of it. One that is Curious may find many, and very strange, things upon this Sub∣ject in Cardan, in his Books, de varie∣tate, and de subtilitate; and in Corne∣lius Agrippa, in his, of Occult Philoso∣phy, L. 1. C. 11. Fernelius also has something, which he has gathered out of Plato, and others, concerning the

Kinds of Spirits, in his Treatise De Abditis rerum Causis, L. 1. C. 11. but all is but Guess and Conjecture. See Gaspar Schottus his Physica Curiosa, L. 1. C. 12. &c.

CHAP. VIII. Another Essay about the Nature of Animals and Spirits.

SECT. I.

The Subject farther Illustrated, by a Compari∣son of the Universe with a particular Ani∣mal. The Universe a whole; Particular Animals but Members of that whole. A Particular Animal is as an Organ with its faculty; the Universe, as a Body composed of several Organs, with a Soul that endues these Organs with several Faculties. A De∣monstration even to sense, of a common Prin∣ciple that penetrates throughout the Universe. In what sense a Soul is a faculty, and in what a Principle of Faculties. Two senses of the word Soul, and how in both, it may be conceived as a Principle of Faculties. The Soul in its state of separation becomes a Spirit properly. Soul is the name of a part, a Spirit the name of a whole Substance. God the Central Sun, and Fountain of all Souls and Spirits. The Emanation of Souls and Spirits from God, or from his Spirit, set out in the Comparison of Light and Co∣lours. Not only Philosophers, and Poets, but even many Christian Doctors, and par∣ticularly St. Augustin, compared God in re∣spect of his influence in and over the Ʋni∣verse, unto the Soul in a Man.

IN the Precedent Chapter, I have offer∣ed to my Reader something concern∣ing the nature of Animals, as well those that are Invisible, called Spirits, as those that are Visible; but the subject being Obscure, I think my self obliged to turn it every way, to see what further Light may be Given to it; and therefore I will now Enlarge upon one Point, in Relation unto it, that I did but touch before, whereby I hope to Illustrate it.

It is Received on all hands, except by Cartesians, that in every visible Animal, as well as in Man, there is a Body Compo∣sed of several Organs, and there are seve∣ral Faculties or Powers, according to the several Organs; and there is a Common Principle (called a Soul) that Permeat∣ing throughout the Body, doth Furnish it in its several Organs with those seve∣ral Faculties.

Now, As all the Organs of any Particu∣lar Animal, tho' being Compared one with Another, they are several, not Parts one of Another, but a kind of wholes, and have their several Faculties; yet in respect of the Body, they are but Parts, and all In∣fluenced by a Common Principle, which giveth being to its several Faculties, but is none of them it self. Why may not

all the Animals, themselves (as well the In∣visible as the Visible,) that do Exist in the Universe, be, in respect of this but as so many Parts, so many Organs, (some more Simple, others more Compound) Actuated by some Common Principle that Penetrates throughout it; and yet, in Re∣spect one of Another, be several wholes, that have their several Powers and Faculties? And then, as all the Particular Animals would, in truth, be but as so many seve∣ral Organs Endued with several Faculties, in which the Organ or System of Organs would be the Body, the Faculty or System of Faculties the Soul; so all of them taken together, would be an Entire Body [of the Universe] Actuated by an Universal Principle, (as by a Common Soul) that should Endow it with those several Powers and Faculties. In short; why may not the Universe Really be Body and Soul, and every Particular Animal (as a part thereof) be Organ and Faculty, in the same sense that in our ordinary Common way of Conceiving, every Particular Ani∣mal is Body and Soul, and the Parts of it, Organs and Faculties? But to Pro∣ceed.

This is Certain, that what in Animals, and particularly in a Man, we do Com∣monly

call a Faculty, is neither that which commonly is called the Soul, nor is it meerly the Body, or any Part of the Body, but a Result; some Third thing Arising from them both in Conjunction. For the Eye, for Example, tho' never so well Qualified, doth not see, unless the Mind or Soul do Attend; and again, the mind or Soul, tho' never so Attentive, cannot see, unless it has the use of an Eye, to see with; so that the Power of seeing neither is in the Eye barely, nor in the Soul barely, but belongs to the Animal, which is Soul and Body: as arising from the presence of the Soul in such a Particular Part, or Organ, of the Body. And the like is to be said of other Powers.

And yet if all the Faculties that are united in Man, were supposed Separated each from other, with their several Or∣gans, and so to be in the Nature of wholes, and this without the supposal of any Thing else; for Example, that the Eye could see apart, the Ear hear apart, and the Tongue taste apart from the Body; there would, to all Appearance, be so many several Ani∣mals, and Consequently so many several Souls: So that what is called a Faculty only, while it is in a part, is Denomi∣nated a Soul, in the whole; and then, where the Body is a Compage, or System

of Organs, the Soul must be a System of Faculties: and yet be one still, in the same sense as the Body is.

But here I must expect it shall be told me, that the True and commonly Receiv∣ed Notion of a Soul is, that it is the Prin∣ciple of the Faculties called Vital and Ani∣mal, and not any one of them it self, or any System of them All: To which I Answer, that this is indeed the Popular and Common Notion, but how true it is, and how much Adjusted to the Nature of the Soul, cannot be understood but by making some Distinction in the sense of word [Soul.]

The word [Soul] may be taken Two ways, the one of which I will call the Philosophical, the other the Popular sense of the Word.

First then, word [Soul] may be taken Philosophically, as a Name of all the Causes together, that are necessary for the Producing of Vital and Animal Acti∣ons, in the several Species of Animals: and so, tho' it is commonly considered as if it were some Substantial thing, that Differ'd from them All, yet indeed it is nothing but a Modification of their Acti∣on, as they are All in Conjunction. And Dicearchus, who Affirmed there was no

such thing as a Soul, if he meant but thus, was very Excusable; for in this sense, a Soul is nothing but a Result, that is, a Mode of Conceiving (for this I mean by Result) of all the Causes that must be Joyned for Animal, or Vital Actions, as they do either Qualifie, or else Aid, each others Influence. And in this sense, as a Soul, in respect of the Action, of a Particular Organ, may be called a Faculty; so in respect of the whole Body, a Soul, is a System of Faculties. Thus Life in Animals, arises from the Con∣currence of many things; which things therefore, in that Concurrence, as they are the Prince of Life, so they may be called the Soul; [for by Soul, is meant nothing, but the Principle of that, we call the Life;] if one of these is wanting (that are necessary,) the Life ceases, and we say, the Soul is gone; but then again, (supposing all the other Re∣quisites Remaining as they ought to be, and Ready to do their Parts,) if that one, which was wanting is Restored, there is again a Concurrence of all the Causes Requisite to Life, and so, with the Life, the Soul is said to Return, or come again. For Example, there is in Snakes, in Dor∣mice, in Swallows, and in other Dormi∣tive Creatures of that kind, and (if we

shall believe Guagninus, apud Schottum, Phys. Curios. l. 1. part. 2. C. 38. §. 4.) in some Men too, (for so he says of the In∣habitants of Lucomoria, a certain Country of Russia, that there is) an Actual Suspen∣sion of the Exercise of Life in all the Spe∣cies of it during Winter, while their Spi∣rits lie Congealed and un-active; so that tho' all the Organs of those Animals, in other Respects, are duly Qualified and Disposed, yet there being not, for that season, sufficient Heat Imparted to them from the Sun, to put their Spirits in Mo∣tion, These, like Mercury while Cold, are wholly un active, and so for several Months there is a Cessation of Life (for Life is a Sort of Action) in all the sensible Instances of it. But then again on the other side, nothing being wanting but a due Heat, (as unto Mercury, to put it in Actual Mo∣tion,) as soon as the Sun Returns, and with its warmth, Communicates that Motion that is Requisite to the Spirits, and other Parts, for the Invigorating, and the stir∣ring of them, there Results that Action, or Exercise of Organs, which we call Life, and which in many Places of Holy Scrip∣ture, is called the Soul, tho' commonly we call the Soul the Principle, not the Exercise of Life; but then by a Principle we must mean the Concourse of all the Requisite

Causes, and so the Soul in Effect will be but a Faculty, or rather a System of Fa∣culties. And so much for the Philosophi∣cal Sense of the Word Soul.

But besides the Former, there is Ano∣ther meaning of the word [Soul], which I call the Popular, because it is the most usual, and that is, when it is Taken not for all the Causes together, or the Result of them, as in the Former, but for the Principal and Chief Cause of Animal and Vital Actions, which in the Holy Scrip∣tures is called the Spirit; [who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth Upward, or the Spirit of a Beast that goeth Downward?] And so when a Person dies, he is said to to give up his Spirit, to Give up the Ghost.

And thus a Soul may be Conceived, a System of very subtle Refined Matter, such as Light, (but in some more, in others less Refined) that gives the last Dispositi∣on to a Body and its Organs for the receive∣ing of Vital Cogitative Influence, from the Original Mind; it is the Texture and Quali∣fication of the Body, and the Organs that compose it, that is the Ligament and Bond of union between this subtle Matter or Spirit, and That; but it is the Subtle Matter or Spirit that is the Vinculum or Bond of Union between the Body and the Original Mind.

In this way of Conceiving; This Sy∣stem of Subtle Matter while it is in the Body, tho' it is called a Spirit, because of its subtlety, in truth, may be but a Soul, that is, a Means only of Conveying the Vital Influence into the Body, from the Original Mind; but then again, out of the Body, as the System of it may be, it may become a Spirit properly so called; it being then no longer a Part, (as a Soul must (be), which is only a Mediate Sub∣ject,) but a whole, and so a Terminative Subject, of the Influence of the Original Mind: in short, it becomes a Suppositum or Subsistent by it self. That the Soul is but a Mediate Subject while it is in the Body, and not a Terminative, so that properly the Animal, (which is Soul and Body,) and not the Soul only, is Agent in all that Passes, seems Probable, in that all the Ordinary Actions of the Man, that commonly are said to be the Souls, are plainly Organical; nothing can be In∣stanced in, as Proceeding from the Soul while it is in the Body, that is not pro∣perly Animal: even Intellection it self, is not an Action only of the Soul, or Anima, but (as the Latins would Express it,) an Action of the Animus or Understanding; which is to be Conceived as an Animal and Organical Faculty, that is, as a thing a∣rising

Principally, but not only, from the Soul: for so does Cotta Distinguish, apud Cicerol. 3. de nat. Deor. when he says, Probabilius videtur tale quiddam esse Ani∣mum, ut sit ex Igne, atque Anima temperatum.

It is true, the Ordinary way of Con∣ceiving is much otherwise, for the Soul is Considered by the Most, as if it were an Angel or Spirit, that only dwelt in the Body as in a House; and thus the Soul is the man, the Body but as a Tabernacle, or a Gar∣ment to it: nor is this a meer Platonical No∣tion; it is Conformable to the way of speak∣ing in the Holy Scriptures; as, where St. Paul says, I Desire to be Dissolved, and to be with Christ; Also, where he tells the Corinthi∣ans, we know if our Earthly House of this Tabernacle were Dissolved, &c. And for certain, if the Theory of the Pre-existence of Souls is a True one, this Opinion is beyond dispute. However, I will not De∣termine in this matter since the Language of the Scripture is often Adapted but to the Conceptions of the Vulgar, and there∣fore cannot be the Standard of Philoso∣phical Truth; and it is certain, that even in our Saviours time a many Pythagorean and Platonical Doctrines, and this in par∣ticular of the Pre-existence of Souls, and the Souls being the Man, had obtained to be Vulgar among the Jews; As appears by

that Question of the Disciples, which they put to our Lord, was this Man Born Blind for his own; or for his Parents sin? for it supposes, that the Man might sin, and therefore also supposes that he was, before he was Born, for he could not Sin, if he was not (in Being.) Besides, the Genesis or way of Generation of Animals, seems to Favour the former opinion more than the latter; for in the latter Opinion, the Soul is conceived as an Assistant, rather than an Informing Form, and so rather as an Animal, than as a Part of one: which doth not so well consist with the Method of Generation. In fine, the Di∣stinction between Souls and Abstract Spirits, as to their Natures, cannot be set out with that Distinctness and clearness in the Lat∣ter, as in the Former Opinion.

But Take it either way; if we Distin∣guish Soul and Faculties, and do hold, that Animal Actions are the Effects of Faculties, but that the Soul is the Principal cause of those Faculties; why may it not be Affir∣med (as I Hinted before) that the Mosai∣cal Spirit is, unto all the Bodies in the Universe, (those of Invinsible, as well as of Visible Animals) what the Soul Con∣ceived of, after this manner, is in our selves unto ours? So that All particular Animals in respect of the Universe, should

be but as the several Organs in any Par∣ticular Animal; and then Particular Souls should be but as so many Portions of the subtle Matter, through which, and by means of which, the Mosaical Spirit (as a Soul of the Universe) should Radiate into the several Bodies, and give them their Faculties. In short, we may conceive particular Souls as so many Animi (for now I Distinguish, as Cotta do's, between Ani∣mus and Anima;) and that the Anima, that is the Sourse of All these Animi, is but one, throughout the Universe. Why may not this be so? And if it may, it must, since then, the being of Subordinate Anima (other than Animi) would be su∣perfluous and unnecessary; and Beings are not to be Multiplied but on Ne∣cessity.

Besides, there is Reason to think there is but one Soul Diffus'd throughout the Universe, if it be Allowable to make the same Judgment in Reference to the whole, that, upon good Considerations, may be Framed of the Parts which come Distinct∣ly within our View. For in this Ter∣restrial World, as to the several Regions of it, the Animal, the Vegetable, and the Mineral, it is as certain, that all had but one Plastic, as that the Body of a Man, or any other particular Animal, had not

more. The Evidence is the same for Both. There is a sensible Analogy and Correspondence in Fabric and Conforma∣tion, not only between the several Species of Animals, (which is very manifest in Comparative Anatomy; but also, in a good degree, between Plants and Animals, and Minerals and Plants. Again, there is a like Connexion between the Beings that fill those several Regions, as there is be∣tween the Parts that compose particular Animals; There are no Vacuities, or Gaps in Nature, in respect of Species, no Jumps or Leaps, but all in orderly Gradation: Extreams are Knit and United by Parti∣ciples that partake of Both; and all is full, without any Chasms. Thus (to touch it in an Example) Minerals and Vegetables are Joyned by Lithodendra or Stone-Plants, such as Coral and the like; Vegetables and Animals by Zoophytes or Plantanimals, such as the sensible Plant, the Scythian Lamb, and the like. And in the General Kinds of Animals, between Fowls and Beasts, the Bat; between Fishes and Fowls, the Flying Fish; between Terrestrial and Aquatic Animals, those that are called Amphibious, are Middle Uniting Species, &c. Farther, there is a Conformity in their Origination, as well as in their Structure and Fabrick; for Plants as well as Animals are Produced

by Semination; and even Minerals and Mettals have their Matrices; and tho' they have not what is properly called Seed, they have something that is Analogous in their Production. In fine, the Transmutation of things, and the Easie Transition of them from one Region unto Another, evinces it. The Transmutation of Earthly and Aqueous Bodies into Vegetables, is so Obvious, as I need not to Instance; That of Vegetables into Animal Concretes is as certain, tho' not so Obvious and Usual. The Anima∣tion of Horse-hairs that fall into Pools in the Summer time, may be an Example; but those are more Adequate, that are Given in the Generation of Barnacles; and in the Animation of the Branches of cer∣tain Trees. I Vouch not these Instances upon uncertain Report (tho' some will be∣lieve it no other,) but on the credit of a Person Grave and Unsuspected, I mean the Excellent Schottus, who in his Physica Curiosa, l. 1. C. 20. among other Examples very pertinent to this purpose, relates those I have mentioned, on his own Knowledge. Pili, (says he, è caudis equorum in aquam pluviam, fossis ac scrobibus exceptam deci∣dentes Animantur, & in graciles ac Longos vermes instar Serpentum convertuntur, ut ipsemet non semel vidi. Aves Anatum formà ex Ramis Arborum deciduis intra aquas in

Scotià & Hebridibus Insulis nasci testantur multi Scriptores; Ipsemet vidi Ramorum ex∣tremitates paulatim animà sensitiva Informatas decidisso & Avolasse.

Now, so much Uniformity even in dif∣formity; such Connexion; and so Easie Transition from one Region into Another, cannot be conceived to be in the World, without conceiving at the same time, that as it had but one Author or common Plastic at first; so still it has but one Principle, that hath the ordering, the Disposing the Framing and Actuating of it, in all its Parts.

But to make it more Conceivable, that all Particular Beings may be Animated by but One, and yet being such Diversity as they are, let us consider that Glorious thing we call Light, which as it Proceeds and Issues from the Sun, is of one Nature, but meeting with divers Objects, and Re∣ceiving Different Modifications, according to those of the Objects it meets with, is varied into a Thousand Colours, of Different Natures from the Light, as well as one from Another. And it is even thus with the Vital Energy, or Light that flows from God (the Intellectual Sun and Father of Spirits,) for This, tho' as it Proceeds and flows from him, it is but of one Nature, yet, according to the Bodies it meets with,

(it) becomes Diversified and Varied, into a Thousand shall I say? or rather into In∣finite Faculties and Powers, that, in their particular Natures, are as Different from the Original Vital Energy it self, (taken in it self,) as All are one from Another. In short, the first Subject of Vital Energy is the Mosaical Spirit; but This, as it is Received in Bodies of several Fabricks, Dispositions and Textures, (as well in Vi∣sible, as in Invisible Animals,) become Diversified into several Powers and Facul∣ties; or (which is the same in Effect,) be∣comes in Each a Principle of Actions that Differ one from Another, as much as the Bodies do that Invest it, and as the Motions, that, by means of those Bodies, do Affect and Modifie it. Modifications of the Co∣gitative Faculties, or of the Immediate Principle that makes the Being Cogitative, are called Ideas, or Images, and are the same unto the Mind, in the Sense, and the Understanding, that Sensible Species (as they commonly are called) are unto the Light in the Air: for as These are nothing but Modification of the Light, so Those are of the Mind.

SECT. II.

Several Objections against the Former Hypo∣thesis considered, First, that it makes Souls to be Faculties or Powers, whereas indeed they are Actions, or Acts. This Objection Answered, and the notion of the Souls be∣ing a Principle and Faculty, rather than an Action, cleared. The Second Objection, that in this Hypothesis the Deity is consi∣dered as an Immanent, and not (what he is) as a Transient cause of all things, Re∣moved; and how he is both the one and the other, shewed, and Confirmed by the Authori∣ty of St. Austin, and other Christian Fa∣thers; as well as of the Chiefest Philoso∣phers. The Third Objection, that hereby God and Nature are Confounded; Answer∣ed, by shewing how God and Nature are Distinguished in this Hypothesis. The Last and strongest Objection, that if there were but one Original Perceptive Principle throughout the Universe, all Animals would have the same Perceptions, which they have not. This Objection Removed, and the Rea∣son of Different Perceptions in Different Animals cleared.

THO' I have Endeavoured to Antici∣pate Objections in the Discourse that I have made, all along as I made it, yet, to give them a farther clearing, and there∣by elucidate more fully the Hypothesis that I Espouse, this Section shall be Employed in proposing in express Terms, such Ob∣jections as do lye against it, and in giving them the necessary Answers.

The First Objection against this Hypo∣thesis is, that it speaks of Souls as of Facul∣ties or Powers, and not as of things that are Essentially Active; whereas a Soul is a Knowledge, a Cogitation; or at least a thing that is always Busie and Doing; in∣somuch, that even in sleep it does not all Rest, but that Men do always Dream when they sleep, tho' perhaps they are not al∣ways sensible, that they do.

I know not how truly it is said, that the Soul is always Busie, and that Men do always Dream when they sleep; but I could wish they did only Dream at that Time; for then we should not be Trou∣bled with so many Groundless Fantastick Opinions. But to come nearer the Matter, I know a person who Affirms, that, to his Knowledge, he never Dreamt in his whole Life; and certainly, since we are

always Conscious that we Dream, when ever we do, we ought to believe we have not Dreamed at all, when we are not sen∣sible we have. Besides, how do they know that the Soul is always Doing? for my part, I am much mistaken if I do not Ex∣perience in my self (what I think any o∣ther may) that I am able to suspend all Thought, or (as we commonly Express it) think of nothing. To be sure, every one who hath made the Least Reflexion must needs know, that as we have Eyes, and Ears, and other sensitive Organs, and so do see, and hear, and are Conscious of o∣ther Sentiments, in Case our Eyes and Ears and those other Organs which we have, are Impressed by External Objects; so (ordinarily) we do neither see, nor Hear, or are Conscious of any other senti∣ment of any External Objects, if these do not Affect our Organs: without the pre∣sence of Objects we are only said to have the Faculties or Powers, that is, we are said, only to be Able to see, to Hear, &c. but upon the presence of Objects, and the Application of our Faculties or Powers, we are said to have the Exercise of them, and actually to See and Hear, &c. Thus it is in the External Sense. Now, since the Mind or Understanding is an Organi∣cal thing as well as the External sense, I

see no Reason to think, but that as there is no Actual Sensation but when the Or∣gans of the sense are stirred, so there is no Actual Intellection but when that of the Understanding is; and that tho' we have always the Power of Understanding, as we have that of seeing, yet we do not actually Exercise that Power, but when it is drawn into Act, by some Impression up∣on it, either from the Will within, or from Objects without; any more than we do Actually see, &c. but when the Eye, &c. is Affected. In fine, since nothing of Co∣gitation is done within us by the Soul Im∣mediately, but only by means of the Un∣derstanding, or of the will, or of the sense, External, or Internal, and All these are rather Faculties than Actions, I believe I have Reason to Conclude, that the Soul is rather a System of the Faculties, or else a Principle of them, than that it is a Per∣petual never ceasing Exercise or Action, It is rather Actus, than Actio, in the Lan∣guage of the Schools. And tho' in the O∣pinion of these, it be Essentially an Act, Actus Corporis, an Informing form to the Body, yet, in other Respects it is but Actus Primus, not Actus Secundus; for tho' it be an Original Principle of Action, and so an Active Power, yet, in it self, it is but a Power, and not Actually Active, or

Acting, but in the Requisite Circumstan∣ces. Thus we are Obliged to speak, to wit, inadequately, in the Notions of Power and Act, or Faculties and Exercise. And thus much for the First Objection.

The Second is, that in this Hypothesis, in the last Result, God is made the Imma∣nent cause, whereas Really, and accord∣ing to the truth of Revelation, Gen. 1. he is only a Transient Cause of all things. But to this the Answer is Easie; for tho' in Gen. 1. God is Represented (as he is in Reality) to be the Almighty Creator of all, and so as a Transient Cause, yet in this sense, he is also the Immanent, that, by the Mosaical Spirit, he giveth Life and Being, and Motion unto all; and this according to the Apostle, who says, that in him we live, and move, and have our being; as well as to Common Metaphysicks, which tell us, that all Beings are either First, or second Beings; and that Second Beings are Participations of the First. And however strange it may Look now, it was certainly of Old, the Common sentiment of all the Wiser part of the World; the Jewish Doctors, as well as Gentile Philosophers, and even of many Ancient Fathers of the Christian Church; it would be Superfluous, as well as Tedious, to mention all (if I could,) and therefore to

confine my self within Fitting Bounds, I will instance two or three of the Chief for Examples. The first shall be Apuleius in his Book de Mundo (a Book ascribed to Aristotle, and by Huetius to Posidonius, and for certain it was originally Greek,) where he says, vetus opinio est, atque Cogitationes omnium hominum penitus Insedit, Deum Es∣sentiae originis haberi Auctorem, Deumque ipsum salutem esse & Perseverantiam earum quas effecerit rerum, neque ulla Res est quae viduata dei Auxilio, sui naturâ contenta sit. Hanc Opinionem vates secuti profiteri ausi sunt, omnia Jove plena esse. It is an Ancient Opinion, and imprinted on the hearts of all Mortals, &c. And afterwards he adds, Sed cum credamus Deum per omnia permeare, & ad nos, & ad ultra, potestatem sui nomi∣nis tendere, quantum abest, vel Imminet, tantum Existimandum est eum amplius minu∣sue rebus utilitatis dare.

Tho' it is true, that in conclusion he compares God to a Great King, that does many things by his Ministers.

The second shall be Seneca, who in his 65th Epistle, among many other expres∣sions to the same purpose, has this in so many words. Quem in hoc Mundo Locum Deus Obtinet, hunc in homine Animus. What God is, in reference to the World; that same the Soul is, in respect of a Man.

The third shall be the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, who in his 4th Book, Sect. 40 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, says, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Be always minding that this World is like an Animal, that hath but one Substance or one Soul. I had not cited this Emperor, after I had cited Se∣neca, seeing both were Stoicks, but that in doing so I knew I should have occasion to refer my Reader to Mr. Gataker, who, in his Annotations on this passage of Anto∣ninus, has made a large Collection of Au∣thorities to the same intendment, which saves me a farther Labour.

The last that I will mention shall be a most Celebrated Father in the Christian Church, the great St. Austin, (for I omit the Excellent Origen, tho' as Learned as he, for being more obnoxious,) and I will cite the Testimony he gives, as I find it in a Schoolman, to show, that some even of the Schoolmen were in the same Opi∣nion. Orbellis then (for he is the School∣man I intend) upon the first of the Sen∣tences, Dist. 8. Q. 2. says (just as Seneca) Sicut Deus in Majori Mundo, sic Anima in Minori; as God is in the greater World, so is the Soul in the lesser: and then by a simple Conversion of the Sentences, what the Soul is in the lesser World (of Man,)

that God must be in the greater; and this he says is according to St. Augustine, sicut enim (says he) Deus est in Majori Mundo, sic Anima in Minori, viz. in homine, secundum Augustinum.

Only here it must be observed, that when God is compared unto a Soul, it must be understood with due limitation; to wit, as a Soul is taken only for a Principle of Powers and Actions, and not as it is an informing Form, or part of the Animal; for that God should be a Soul in this lat∣ter sense, is a notion no ways agreeing to him, who, in himself is all, and only per∣fection.

Another Objection is, that God and Na∣ture are confounded in this Hypothesis, so that it is not easie to say what is the inte∣rest of God in things, and what is Natures, or how they differ; to which I Reply, that indeed in the Holy Scriptures all is ascri∣bed to God, and the Spirit of God, with∣out any mention of Nature; and yet since there are second Causes, as well as a first, and so there is a thing which we call Na∣ture, (for by this I now mean nothing but second Causes and their working;) it will be very convenient to show how God, how Nature does operate, and how they differ: and this perhaps may be done upon the proposed Hypothesis better than on any

other. For in this, God and Nature are distinguished, as the Soul of an Animal, and the System of Faculties; taking the Soul (as it is in the common Opinion) for the Principle of Faculties, and Faculties for the immediate Principles of all actions of Animals; and thus Active Nature is the System of all the Powers, all the Faculties of the Universe, and God the essential Principle of them. Or more plainly, since Faculties and Principles are notions rather than things, and some will be apt enough, without considering their grounds, to re∣gard them only as meer notions, I shall therefore set out the difference that is be∣tween them, in more Real Expressions, by saying, that the Influence of God, or his active presence in things by means of the Mosaical Spirit, is as Light, and that Nature, (the System of all the Powers in the Universe) is as a Complex of all Co∣lours; so that as Colour is the Modification of Light, and Light the essence of Colour, so particular Powers and Actions (that are but Powers in act,) are Modifications of the Divine Energy, and the Divine Energy the substance both of the Act and the Pow∣er; and thus the influence of the first and second Causes differ, as Motion, and Modi∣fication of Motion; the Motion arises from the first, the Modification from the second

Cause, either as it is an Organ, or as an Object: and so too, the Aberrations of Na∣ture in Monsters, and in other instances, are accounted for, either by the ill Tex∣ture of the Organs, the over-whelming of matter, or by some other vitiosity and de∣fect in the second Causes, without any impeachment of the first. As the scriblings of a bad mishaping Pen, are not imputed to the hand that guides it, which perhaps may be skilful enough▪ but to the Instru∣ment that depraves the motion; and this, tho' the Motion comes from the Writer. In fine, I do not see any reason why vital Energy may not be Imparted and Commu∣nicated, as well as Local, which our sense evinces to be so: one Body that is in mo∣tion, striking another that is not, thereby Communicates its Motion to it; and thus a Cogitative vital Energy may come from God, and being diffused as Light is throughout the Universe, may be catched by agreeable Organs, and Modified by Objects, in the way that I have shewed before. I only hint this by way of Anticipation, to such as will inquire, whether this Cogitative vital Energy, diffus'd throughout the World, be God himself or no, or what it is; for there I stick, and call in the assist∣ance and united force of greater under∣standings, mine beginning to be dazled

with the lustre, or the subtilty of the Ob∣ject: as yet I take it to be the Mosaical Spirit. So much for this Objection.

The last I shall propose is the Herculean one, that is insisted upon by many Great and very Judicious Men, which is, that if there is but one Original Perceptive throughout the Universe, all Animals would have the same Perceptions, so that what is known by one, could be ignored by none; ay, the same sentiments, the same Resentments, the same Pains, the same pleasures, that are in any one, would be in every one; and there could be no Numerication, no individuation of Spirits, or Souls, because no separate, particular Perceptions.

But this Objection as it is greater in ap∣pearance than in reality, so it can have little effect, if we consider, that it does equally destroy the diversity of Perceptions in the several Organs and Parts of one Ani∣mal, which yet our own Experience at∣tests unto, as that of the perceptions of se∣veral Animals in the Universe; since, as there is but one Original Perceptive throughout the Universe, in the proposed Opinion; so in the common, there is but one in every Animal; and yet, tho' the Soul is but one, the Faculties are many, and the exercises of them several. For if but

one Eye is inflamed, the sense of Pain is not in both; and when but one Arm, or one Hand is wounded, the smart thereof is only in one; ay, the pains and ailments of the Superior Parts, are not felt in the Inferior, nor the sufferances of these in those; so that though the Animal it self may be said to have the Perception of all those of its several parts, yet these cannot be truly said to have one anothers. I ac∣knowledge, that as the Soul may be said to have a common sense of all perceptions, but the several Members, each to have but a private sense for it self; so answer∣ably, tho' the Original Perceptive is sensible of all, (and needs must, for he that made the Eye must needs see, and he that plan∣ted the Ear, must needs hear; and he that gave an heart unto man must needs under∣stand,) yet Particular Percipients, particu∣lar Animals, as so many particular Or∣gans must have but their share: one Ani∣mal can no more pretend to have the per∣ceptions of another, (tho' the Original per∣ceptive is the same in both, and is consci∣ous to the perceptions of both) than in the same Animal the Eye can pretend to Hear, or the Ear to See, or either of them to Smell.

Hence it is evident, that the Individua∣tion and Numerication of Perceptions, and conse∣quently

of Perceptive Powers, arises from the Bodies, or Organs, by means of which such perceptions are made; for where the Bodies are separated, or the Organs distinct, there the Perceptions made in those Bodies, and by means of such Organs are likewise so. In short, as I hinted before, percep∣tions and perceptive powers are individua∣ted by Bodies, in the same ways as Images are by Looking-Glasses, or Eccho's by the contrivance of Objects.

But to demonstrate it in Experience, as well as by discourse, I will add a History or two of Monsters, that will do it plainly. The first shall be out of Trivet, and in his own Terms, (as I read them in an Ancient Manuscript) who reports the Accident just as Sigebert also does in his Chronicle add, An. 396.

'In the time of this Valentinian says he (but it should be as others say, in the time of Theodosius) at the Town of Emaus in Jewry, there was a Child bore, the which from the Navel upward, had double Body, that is to say double Breast, and double Head, and proper feeling of all parts; and sometimes the one sleepeth, and eateth, and drinketh, when the o∣ther doth nought, and otherwise they eat, and drink, and sleeep together; and sometimes they weep and smile together, and sometimes strived and chid together,

and when they were almost of two year Age, the one of them died four days be∣fore the other.

Schenckius the Son, Reports another, but resembling story, and with more Par∣ticularity and Circumstance, and Conse∣quently more to our purpose, out of Bu∣chanan his Scottish History; Monstrum novi generis (says he) in Scotiâ natum est, infe∣riore quidem corporis parte specie Maris, nec quicquam à communi hominum formâ discre∣pans, Umbilicum vero supra, trunco corporis ac reliquis omnibus membris geminis & ad usum atque speciem discretis; id Rex dili∣genter & Educandum, & erudiendum curavit, ac maxime in musicis, quâ in re mirabiliter profecit, quin & varias Linguas edidicit, & variis voluntatibus due Corpora secum discor∣dìa dissentiebant, ac interim Litigabant, cum aliud alii placeret, interim veluti in communi consultabant. Illud etiam in eo memorabile fuit, quod cum inferna crura lumbive offende∣rentur, commune Corpus utrumque dolorem sentiret, cum vero supernè Pungeretur, aut alioqui Laederetur, ad Alterum corpus tan∣tum doloris sensus perveniret. Quod discri∣men in morte fuit magis Conspicuum. Nam cum alternum corpus complures ante alterum dies extinctum fuisset, quod superstes fuit, dimidio sui Computrescente paulatim contabuit. Vixit id monstrum Annos Viginti Octo, ac de∣cessit,

Administrante rem Scoticam Joanne Prorege. Hac de re scribimus eo Confiden∣tius, quod adhuc supersint homines honesti Complures, qui haec viderint. So Buchanan, and Schenkius from him.

I will not give my self the trouble to translate the Relation, because I find it in Mr. Ross his continuation of Sir Walter Rawleigh's History of the World, who thus tells the Story, ad An. 1490. About this time (says he) a strange Monster was born in Scotland, which beneath the Navel was one Body, but above, two distinct Bo∣dies, having different Senses, Souls, and Wills; any hurt beneath the Navel is equally felt by Both Bodies above, but if any of the upper Members were hurt, one of the Bodies only felt the pain. This Mon∣ster the King caused to be instructed in Musick, and divers Languages. One of the Bodies died some days before the other, which also shortly after pined and consu∣med away. It lived Eight and Twenty years.

I might instance in many other Stories of this kind, but these suffice to evince what I induce them for, that the numerica∣tion of Souls, and consequently of other Spirits, depends upon that of Bodies; for in the alledged Examples, especially the lat∣ter, it is plain, that where the Bodies

were divided and separated, the Powers of Perception likewise were; so that the of∣fences of but one, were not felt by both, but by one only; and yet again, in the parts beneath the Navel, common unto both the Bodies, any hurts in these were equally perceived by both. I take the Theodosian and Scottish Monsters to be evi∣dent illustrations of my Hypothesis. And so much for Substance, Harmonically con∣sidered.

CHAP. IX.

Of Substance in the Scholastical Consideration of it. Substance what, that it is First or Second. Second Substance is called a sin∣gular, a suppositum, or a subsistent. Of the Principle of Individuation, or that which makes a singular to be so. Dr. Sherlock's Notion of the Individuation of Spirits. Of a Person. The true Idea of it. Lauren∣tius Valla his notion of a Person, the unuse∣fulness of it to the salving of the Holy Tri∣nity shewed. The Trinity a Mystery, and Doctrine of Faith; not a Point of Philoso∣phy; and so the Idea of it to be derived only from Revelation in the Holy Scriptures, and not from bare Discourses of Reason.

I Have Discoursed of Substance after the Harmonical way, in the Precedent Chapters. It now remaineth that I add something concerning it in the Scholastical; and thus, Substance is defined to be a thing that is by it self, or that is under others called Accidents; and is divided in∣to First, and Second. The Second Sub∣stance is that which is not in a Subject, but may be Praedicated of it, and such are Generical and Specifical Substances; as

for example, Living Creature, and Man; neither of which is in a subject, as an Accident is, but both are Praedicated of it; for Living Creature is Praedicated of Man, and Man of Peter, James, John, &c.

As for first Substance (which is the sub∣stance I design to speak of more particular∣ly,) it is defined to be that which neither is in a Subject (as an Accident is,) nor is Praedicated of it, as the second substance is; it is also called a Suppositum, a subsist∣ent, or a singular, in which is wont to be distingushed Nature and Subsistence; Subsistence is a mode of Existence, to which it adds Perseity, and Existence is Essence in Act; the Nature is the Idea or Defini∣tive Conception of a Substance. Or thus, the Nature is the Thing or Substance as it is defined; a Suppositum, is the Thing or Substance that hath that Nature or Defini∣tion. Nature and Subsistence differ but as Essence and Existence; Subsistence being but the Existence of a substantial Nature. But Nature and a Suppositum Differ, as Essentia and Ens, the Former signifying (as the Schools speak) ut Quâ, the latter ut Quod.

In a singular Substance or Suppositum, that which comes particularly into Consi∣deration, is the Principle (as Schollars call it) of Individuation; or that which makes

a singular to become a singular, for the Nature is supposed to belong to one parti∣cular no more than to another, but to be a thing abstracted from all Particulars, and thence the question arises, what that is that singularizes the Nature; (for exam∣ple, that of Man,) and makes it to belong to Peter, or to John, or to James in parti∣cular. This Principle of Individuation, (be it what it will,) may (as is thought by some,) be called the individuating dif∣ference; as well as that which does divide the Genius and constitute the Species, is called the specifical, since this indiuidua∣ting Principle doth as much divide the Species, and constitute the individual, as the specifical difference divides the Genius, and constitutes the species. Much ado there is what this Principle should be; but after all, they seem to me to come nearest to the Truth, who do affirm, that a singular or individual becomes so, not by any distinct Principle of individuation, but immediately and per se, and in that, that it is in being; just as Quantity is Ter∣minated by self, and not by mediation of another Thing, that should confine and bound it; and in like manner is Figured, not by any thing superadded to it, but barely in that it is thus and thus Termi∣nated.

I am already almost tired with this idle fruitless way of talking, and should not overcome my self to proceed any farther in it, but that the Notion a Learned Person has of late delivered to the World, about the Individuation of Spirits, will oblige me to Consider it, and by affording matter of more intelligible Discourse, make some a∣mends for the dryness and barrenness of the former. It is Dr. Sherlock I mean, who in his vindication of the Trinity, S. 4. p. 48. tells us,

'that in Created Finite Spirits their numerical oneness can be nothing but every Spirits Unity, within it self, and distinct and separate subsistence from all other Created Spirits; now this self-unity of the Spirit can be nothing else but self-Consciousness; that it is Conscious to its own Thoughts, Reaso∣nings, Passions, which no other Spirit is Conscious 〈◊〉〈◊〉 but it self. This makes a Finite Spirit ••umerically one, and sepa∣rates it from all other Spirits, that every Spirit feels only its own Thoughts and Pas∣sions, but is not Conscious to the Thoughts and Passions of any other Spirit; and therefore if there were three Created Spi∣rits so United as to be Conscious each to others Thoughts, I cannot see any Rea∣son why we might not say that three such Persons were not numerically one.

He adds, let any Man, who can give me any other notion of the numerical One∣ness of an Infinite Mind but self-conscious∣ness.

Thus this Learned Person.

It must be confessed, that the Numerical Oneness of Spirits can be nothing else but (as this Learned Author says it is) every Spirits Unity (he might as well have said Oneness) with it self, and its distinct and separate subsistence from all other Created Spirits. But this is not the oneness of Spi∣rits only, but of every thing else that is one; for as omne ens est unum, so unum est, quod est indivisum in se, & Divisum a quoli∣bet Alio; and therefore it doth hold in Bo∣dies as well as in Spirits, and perhaps in the Infinite first Being, as well as in all Created Finite Beings. But to confine my self, (as this Learned Author does) to the Numerical Oneness of Spiri•…•… I cannot say farther of it, as he has, that it can be no∣thing else but self-Consciousness, in the sense of the word as he unfolds it, I say as he Unfolds it; for else, taking self-conscious∣ness for a Spirits self-being, so I take it the numerical oneness of a Spirit is nothing but its self-consciousness, for then the meaning is, that a Spirit (which is a Co∣gitative Being) is it self, and not any other thing; but taking Consciousness as he

does, for a Spirits Being sensible of its own Actions and Passions, so its numerical one∣ness cannot be its self-consciousness. For as a Being (and even a Cogitative Being as a Being) must be conceived to be, before it can be conceived to Act; so again, it must be conceived to act, that is to Think to Reason, to Love, to Hate, (for these are the Actions he instances in) for some moment of Reason before it can be conceived to be Conscious of these its actings. Now for that Moment of Reason, in which a Spirit is conceived in Being, without being concei∣ved to be acting, and in which it is concei∣ved Acting before it becomes Conscious of its actings, in that precedent moment, (which speaks order, not duration,) it must be conceived to be one with it self, and nu∣merically different from every thing be∣sides; and therefore that it is so, cannot a∣rise from self-consciousness, or its being conscious of its own actings. So that if there were (as in the Authors supposal) three created Spirits, that were as conscious to each others Thoughts and Passions, as each of them unto his own, there would yet be no reason, that we should say (as he says we must) that three such persons would be numerically one; for if they were, how could they be Three? since the number Three, is not the number One, and they

cannot be Three in number, if they are but one in number; to be Three is to be more than One; to be but One is not to be more than one. All that could be said of them is, that upon that supposal they would be intimate with one another, but with nu∣merical distinction; for still one of them would not be the other, and so they would remain Three Persons still, not one Per∣son. Self-Unity is before Self-Consciousness, and may consist with Consciousness of o∣thers. Again, in Dr. Sherlock's way of Dis∣coursing, which is, that Three Persons so intimate to one another as he supposes, would become numerically one, I do not see but that instead of the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, (which doubtless he will own to be really as intimate to one another, as he supposes his Three Finite ones to be,) we shall have but one Person (in number.) In fine, if Persons by being so intimate to one another do become numerically one, I do not see but that, by this reasoning, God who is as conscious to all the Actions, Pas∣sions, and Thoughts, of all Finite Created Spirits, as these are to their own, and as the Doctors Imaginary Persons are to one anothers, he must be numerically one with them all. But perhaps the Doctor will tell me, that he affirms the Three Eternal Minds (for so he calls them) are numeri∣cally

one God, not one Person, [Three Per∣sons, one God;] but then it will be de∣manded of him, since Three are thrice one, what that is that makes each Person one in it self, and distinguishes it from both the others? for it must be something that is not Common, which self-consciousness is, (in his sense of the word,) all being as conscious to one anothers Thoughts and Actings, as each unto its own: whereas, that which makes a thing numerically one, must be Differencing and Particular. Not to insist, that to be an Eternal Mind is the true Idea or notion of God, and then if there be (as he owns there be) Three Eternal Minds (really distinct,) it will I confess, be no great difficulty to evince them Thee Per∣sons, but I doubt it will, intelligibly to make it out, that these Three (Three E∣ternal Minds, really distinct from one ano∣ther,) are not Three Gods, as well as Three Persons. So that methinks the knot re∣mains untied. For my own part, I believe as the Scriptures instruct me, that there is but one God, tho' Three Persons; each of which is God; which I say only to prevent Mistakes. But I resolve to Discourse more fully of Unity or Oneness, when I come to treat of the notions of Whole and Part.

As for the name [Person] it properly belongs to Men; we do not commonly ap∣ply

it to Beasts, or unto Angels, or other Spirits, but by Translation and Metaphor, when they do appear in the Figure or shape of Men. Nor is [Person] a name of Na∣ture, taking nature in the sense of the School∣men; for Nature is Common unto all of the kind, but that only is Personal which is di∣stinguishing and peculiar among those in the same kind. Thus, Man is a name of the kind; or specifical Nature, the Nature in common; A Man an expression of the Nature as singularized; but Person properly is the name of that which differences Men from one another. When we speak of the Person of a Man, we mean by it that Cumble of Accidents, External, Internal, of Body, of Mind, Adventitious and Ex∣trinsical, Absolute or Relative, whereby he is distinguished, and known from others. Hence Persona in Latin, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Greek, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies the Counte∣nance or Face, in the first place; and from thence, a Person, in the second (place,) be∣cause the Countenance or Face is that by which we do chiefly distinguish Men. In conformity to this Idea or notion of Person, I understand Levit. 19.15. Thou shalt not favour the Person of the Poor, nor honour the Person of the Mighty; the word for Person is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the Septuagint Translation, and the meaning of the Text is plainly

This, thou shalt not in giving Judgment have regard to the Poverty of the one, or to the Riches of another; for these concern the Person, not the Cause. In this sense also is God said to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 no Ac∣cepter of Mens Persons, for that he in judge∣ment respects not (as Men too often do) the foreign Qualities and Accidents that do distinguish them from one another, as, their wit, or their weakness; their comeli∣ness, or their deformity; their riches, or their Poverty; their Grandeur or their Littleness of Figure in the World. But all is as one to him, when he enters into Judge∣ment; for he judges uprightly, according to the merits of the Cause, without regard to the Person, save where the Consideration of the Person is of moment (as sometimes it is) in the merits of the Cause. But as the Person of a Man is that bundle of Qua∣lities that do distinguish him from others; so A Person is a Man with those Qualities; that is, a Person is a Distinguished Man; and so the word comes to be taken, not only for the Qualities that do distinguish, but for the Man that is distinguished, by those qualities; in which sense the word is used, not only by the Schoolmen, who after Boetius, define a Person to be a ratio∣nal subsistent, Rationalis Naturae Individua substantia; but by the Apostle, when he

speaks, 2 Cor. 1.11. of Thanks being given by many Persons for him.

By what I have said (and I have said the more for that the cause of late has had a fresh Rehearing) we may judge of the justice of Lau∣rentius Valla, who in his Elegance, l. VI. c. 34. severely, (or rather insolently) reflects upon Boetius for asserting that a Person was not a Quality, or in any other Predicament but that of Substance; he shows in many instances, that [Person] signifies Quality, and thence infers, that the same man may sustain a hundred Per∣sons; [Quo sit, says he, ut Assit mihi Multiplex Persona ac Diversa, sed una tantum substantia;] and to give an Example, he fancies himself a Hector, and says [ad Priamum sum Personâ Filii, ad Astianacta personâ Patris, ad Andromacham personâ Viri; ad Paridem personâ Fratris; ad Sar∣pedonem personâ Amici; ad Achillem personâ Ini∣mici.] In fine, making application of what he says unto the Deity, he thinks that he has carried the Prize, by demonstrating how God may be but one Substance, and yet be Three Persons; But 'tis in a way in which his Hector may be a Hun∣dred, and God as many, and more. So that I had not believed it worth my while to mention this Opinion, but that an Excellent Person of our own has given it fresh reputation, by going the same way; for the Learned Author of the Three Sermons concerning the Sacred Triny, shews, as Laurentius Valla does, that the word [Person] was used of old to signifie the State, Quality, or Condition of a Man, as he stands related to other Men, either as a King, or a Subject, or as Father, or a Son, &c. Thus he observes the Latin Phrase is Personam Imponere when a Man is

put into Office or a Dignity Conferred upon him; Induere personam, when he takes upon him the Office; Sustinere personam, when one bears, or Executes an Office, &c. In short, he tells us, (as Laurentius Valla has) that 'tis nothing strange for the same man to sustain Divers Persons, in∣stancing in Tully, who says; sustineo unus Tres Personas, Meam, Adversarii, Judicis, I being but one, do yet sustain Three Persons, my own, that of an Adversary, and that of a Judge. In fine, he makes the same application of it to the Divine Trin-unity that Laurentius Valla doth, for (says he) if Three Persons may be one man, what hinders but that Three Divers Persons may be one God? and that the same God as Ma∣ker of the World, or God the Creator may be God the Father; and as Author of our Redemp∣tion be God the Redeemer, or God the Son; and as working effectually in the hearts of his Elect, be God the Sanctifier or God the Holy Ghost.

I confess if this is all that is in the Mystery, it is very Conceiveable, and (which will be an unvaluable happiness to the Christian World) there will need to be no more dispute about it: but as the Received Doctrine of the Divine Trin-unity is quite another thing, so must it have a very different Exposition. Besides, Laurentius Valla seems to suppose that the difficulty is only about the word [Person,] But this is his mistake; for the word [Person] as applied to the Trini∣ty is but of a later use, and of the Schoolmen, ra∣ther than of the Fathers, whose word is Hyposta∣sis, which is also the Apostles word: So that un∣less it can be found, that one Man can be three Hypostases, or Subsistents, and that for God to be a Creator, a Redeemer, and a Sanctifier, is,

to be three Hypostases in the Fathers sense, as well as Three Persons in Cicero's, the Difficulty is not removed, but only avoided. In fine, it is not the same thing to say that one sustains Three Persons, as to say that one is Three Per∣sons: For he that only sustains a Person, doth but Act the part of that Person which he is said to sustain; and thus Cicero sustained Three Persons, when he acted as if he had been Three several Men under different Characters: To Personate a Judge is not to be one: And in this sense of the word Person Seneca says, Ep. 24. non hominibus tantum, sed & Rebus PERSONA Demenda est, & reddenda facies sua.

I say not this with any intention to enter into a Discourse of the Divine Trin-unity, the doing of which would be im∣proper, in a Treatise that pretends but to Metaphysicks: I have only mention'd it on occasion, as an inquiry after the Idea and notion of a Suppositum, and that of a Person, obliged me. The Doctrine of the Trinity is a point of pure Revelation, not of Philosophy or Science; all Discouases and explications of it, not derived from the Holy Scriptures, and grounded upon them, but on Analogies and Resemblances in nature, or on Principles of Human Discourse and meer Reason, are as Foreign unto it, as Earth is to Heaven. It is an Article of Faith, and a Fundamental one too; indeed the chief of all those of which the Apostle says, they are such as neither Eye saw, nor Ear heard of, nor entred into the heart of man to conceive, before they were brought to light in the Gospel. Where∣fore, 'tis there only that we are obliged to seek it, and there only, in the Analogy of Faith, that we can hope to discover it, in its true Idea and Notion. And so much for Substance as Scholastically Consider'd.

FINIS.