Monitio logica, or, An abstract and translation of Burgersdicius his logick by a gentleman.

COMMENTARY.

1. §. For Example; This Canon, that whose Effect is more such, that it self is more such is of certain Place; because it expresses the Place, of the Effect, from whence this Argument is taken; and General, because Adaptible to all things which admit of any kind of Comparison. But now that that which agrees to the better sub∣ject, that it self is better, is, indeed of cer∣tain Place, because indicating the Argument, was fetch'd from the Place of the Subject: But not General; because only to be adapted to those things which are compared in Goodness: But this, that which is more lasting, is best, is of uncertain Place, and Special; because it neither expresses Where the Place of the Argument is: Neither can it be Adapted to all things which are compared amongst themselves, &c.

1. §. Now compared Canons from the Conju∣gates are these; and first, that to which one of the Conjugates more agrees, to that also the other; As, Caesar consulted the Republick more than Bibulus; and therefore in this respect was more a Consul than he.

Secondly, If one of the Conjugates be better than one, then the other of the Conjugates will be bet∣ter than the other; as, if Piety be before Learning, then a Pious Man will be before a Learned Man, &c.

Thirdly, From the Definition, these; and first, that to which the Definition most agrees, to that also the Defined; as, if the Definition of Whiteness be a Colour dispersing the Sight, it will follow, that that which is whitest disperses the Sight most, &c. Secondly, That which agrees to the Definition, that also to the Defined; as, if a Habit recalling the Affecti∣ous of the Mind and Actions to Mediocrity, confers more to Felicity than Riches, then Virtue confers more to Felicity than Riches, &c.

So from Genus and Species Fourthly, we have these; as, first, that which agrees most to the Ge∣nus, that also to the Species's; and that which most to the Species's, that also to the Individuals; as, if a Substance Immaterial be more perspicacious than a Corporeal, then the Soul of Man separate will be more perspicacious than it is now, when it is in the Body, &c. Secondly, that which is contain'd under the better Genus or Species, that also its self is better; and so because a living thing is better than a not; a Fly will be better than the Heavent, &c.

Fifthly, From the Whole and Part we have these; as, first, if the whole Homoge∣nous, or whole consisting of Parts of the same Name and Nature be more so than such a Whole, then its Part will be more so than such a Part; and, conrariwise; as, If Gold be heavier than Brass, then it will follow, that every Part of Gold, observing the same Proportion of Magnitude will be heavier than the like Quantity of Brass, &c. Secondly, that which

is absolutely such, or effects any thing as such, its Whole will be more such, and Effect, that any thing else be more such than its Part; and so, if Rhubarb have a Power of Purging Choler, then a Drachm will have a greater Power than has a Scruple; because it is but the third Part of a Drachm, &c. Under which general Maxim are contain'd several special; as, first, many Goods are to be preferr'd before fewer; and so Virtue with Nobility, is to be preferr'd before Virtue alone. Secondly, that which is Honest, Pleasant and Profitable, will be beyond that which is only Honest, Pleasant, or Profitable. Thirdly, that which encreases or di∣minishes Good by its Abcess or Access, is better than that which neither encreases nor diminishes Good by its Abcess or Access. Fourthly, by how much more it encreases or diminishes Good by its Ab∣sence or Access, by so much is it better than any other thing, than the which it is better in this Respect, &c.

Fifthly, from Matter and Form in the next Place, we have these; and first, that, whose Matter is more so, that also it self is more so. So because Gold is bet∣ter and more durable than Stone, it follows, that a Gol∣den Statue is better and more durable than a Stone, one, &c. Secondly, that which has a Nobler Form, that it self is also Nobler. So because the Form of Man is better than that of Beasts; because this is Imma∣terial and Immortal, and that Material and Mor∣tal, it follows, that Man is better than Beasts, &c.

Sixthly, From the Cause Efficient these; and first that which by it self, simply, and by its Na∣ture is such, is more so than that which by Accident is such, or in some respect, or by Par∣ticipation: And so Meat as Meat is wholesomer than Physick; because that of it self is so, and this only by Accident; and Light is more Profitable than Dark∣ness; because that is useful to all, this only to Thieves, and such as will abscond. Lastly, the Sun is more splen∣did than the Moon; because that shines of its own Na∣ture,

this only by Participation, &c. Secondly, that which of it self and by its own Nature is more such, that effects more; and so on the Contrary. So Fire heats more than Water, when it is warm'd, be∣cause hotter. So, you know Iron to be heavier than Wood, because it more swiftly descends, &c. This Canon can be used only in Causes of them selves: For in Causes by Accident it fails often. For Iron red-hot, altho' not hotter than Flame, burns yet more vehemently, the Density of its Matter assisting it, and impressing the Heat more strongly upon the Patient; and so in other Instan∣ces of the like Nature. Thirdly, that to which the Cause agrees most, to that also the Effect; and so on the Contrary. So you may prove Old Men to be more Prudent than Young; because they have more Experience in Things. Fourthly, that by which any thing is such, that it self also must be more such. And so, because Water grows Warm by Fire, it may be collected, that the Fire is more Hot than it. But this Canon in some Cases will fail us. And first in Causes by Ac∣cident and Aequivocal: For it does not follow, that because some one is drunk by Wine, that therefore Wine should be more drunk; or be∣cause the Knife is sharpen'd by the Stone, that therefore the Stone should be sharper than the Knife. Secondly, in Effects, which receive not more or less: As, if you should prove the Father to be more a Man than his Son; because the Son is so by his Means. Thirdly, those which de∣pend not upon one Cause: For although the Scholar derive his Learning from his Master, yet it does not follow that the Master must be always Learneder than the Scholar: For it may be, that the Scholar may have more Ingeny and Industry than his Master, &c. Fifthly, those whose Operation, Work or Effect, or Use is the best, those things themselves are the best; and by

how much they are the better, by so much are they the better; And so the Mind than the Sense, because the Operation of this is the bet∣ter; and the Architectonical Art than the Shooe∣making, because a House is better than a Shooe, and Virtue than Riches; because the Use of this belongs to the Soul, and of those to the Body, &c.

Ninthly, From the End and Means these: And first that to which more agrees the End, to that more agrees the Means; and so on the Contrary. So you may prove any one has more Ingeny, Books, Leisure, Industry, because he is more Learned; or more Learned, because more Ingeny, Leisure, Industry, &c. Secondly, the End is better than its Means; as Health than Physick. Add to this another; and that is, That which for its own sake is desirable, is better than that which for another's; or also that whick for the Sake of Opini∣on or Ostentation. So you prove that Learning is ••••tter than a Library; Friends than Riches; Health than Beauty, &c. Thirdly that which approaches nearer to the End is better than that which is farther off. So the Art of Commanding is better than that of Horsemanship; because approaching nearer to the Victory. Fourthly, that which is re∣ferred to the better End, that it self is the better. So Aristotle makes good, That Wisdom is better than Virtue Moral; because leading to the speculative Feli∣licity, which, he says, is so much better than the Practical, by how much Eternal are to be pre∣ferred before Perishing Things. Book 10. Ethick. Cap. 5.

Tenthly, From the Subject and Adjunct; and first, That which is in the Nobler Subject; that, if good, is better; and if bad, worser than that which is in an Ignobler. So Virtue is better than Health, and Vices worse than Diseases; because the Mind is Nobler than the Body. Secondly, that from which the Subject is

Denominated Good, is better than that from which not. So a Good that's Honest, is better than that which is Profitable; because from that we are named Good, and from this not, &c. Thirdly, of those, both which make the Subject good, that is the best, which af∣fects it with the most Goodness. So Virtues Theo∣logical, viz. Faith, Hope and Charity, are to be pre∣ferred before Civil. Fourthly, that which is con∣versant about the best Object, that it self also is the best. So Philosophy is better than Medicine; because that's about the Mind, this only the Body. Fifthly, that is best from which follows the great∣est Good or least Evil; and upon this Account it is Cicero prefers Book 1. of his Offices, the Coun∣sel of Solon, by which the Areopagites were set up, before the Victory of Themistocles, at Sala∣mis; because that but once profited, this would be al∣ways profitable to the Common-Wealth, &c.

11. From the Disparates, this, viz. When of Two we deny the One to be in us, that so we may assume to our selves the Other, that we e∣steem to be best which we would have seem to be in us. So because for the most Part People deny them∣selves to be Laborious that they might seem Ingenious, it shews that to be Ingenious they esteem better than to be Laborious, &c.

12. From the Contraries, these, viz. First, that which recedes the farther from its Contrary, that is, more so. So that is whiter which has the least Mixture of Blackness. Secondly, that whose Con∣trary is worst, that it self is best; and so on the Contrary. As if Improbity be worse than Diseases then Probity must be better than Health. Third∣ly, that whose Absence, Decease, or Loss is worse, that it self is best; and so on the Contrary. As, if the Loss of a good Estimation be worse than that of Money, then a good Estimation is a greater Good than that of Money, &c.

13. From Major, Minor, and Equal, these, viz. First, that which is more so than the greater, that is more so than the less. And Secondly, likewise if the less be more so, then so will the greater. So if Health is a greater Good than Riches, and Virtue be better than Health, then will it also be better than Riches. Thirdly, if one of the Equals be more so, then also will the other be more so. Fourthly, and also that that which is more so than one of the Equals, that also will be more so than the other. For Exam∣ple; If of two Weights equal, one be heavier or lighter than a Third, then also the other will be so, or if that third be heavier or light∣er than one of them, it will be also heavier or lighter than the other, &c. Fifthly, if one Genus be more so than another, that which is in the most excellent will be more so than that which is in the less. As, if Science be better than Art, then the most Noble Science will be better than the most Noble Art. Sixthly, if an absolute Predicate agree with an absolute Subject of its own Nature, the Increase or Increment of the Predicate will agree with the Increase or Increment of the Sub∣ject. As, if what is honest be good, that which is more so will be better, and most, best. I said of its own Nature; because if the Predicate agree not to the Subject in this manner, the Canon will deceive us: For it does not follow; because the Exercitation of the Body is good, that therefore the more the better, and most, best; because Exercitation is not of it self, and in its own Nature good, but so far as it is mo∣derate, &c.

14. From like and unlike, this, viz. that which is most like to that which is such; or more such, that, also, it self is more such, and so on the Con∣trary. So Ajax is esteemed to be more valiant than U∣lysses; because more like to Achilles, the most valiant of the Grecians. But here observe that the Simili∣tude

be instituted in its proper Genus: For it does not follow if any one be more like to Achilles in Au∣ger, that therefore he should be more valiant; but only more wrathful, &c.

15. By Testimonies Problemes Comparate are to be confirmed after the same manner as are the Absolute. For as by Aristotle's Testimony it may be proved, that Covetousness is an Evil, so may it also that it is worse than Prodigality, &c. So that for Ca∣nons Comparate here in this Place there is no need, unless perchance for the Discernment of Authority of Testimonies this Canon should be observed, viz. That what God says, is more credible than what Man; the Wise, than the Vulgar; more, than few; Skilful, than Unskilful; and what any one testifies a∣gainst himself, than what for himself, &c.

16. And these are the Comparate Canons, which contain the Designation of a certain Place, ei∣ther Apertly or Hiddenly. In all which the same Li∣mitations are to be understood, which are added to the Absolute Canons to which they answer. For Example; The first Canon Comparate from the Conjugates, answers to the first Absolute Canon of the same Place, which is this. That to which one of the Conjugates agrees, to that also agrees the o∣ther. To this Canon is added this Caution, viz. that there should not be adhibited Conjugates joyned only in Affinity of Word, net Nature. This same Caution is to be added to the Com∣parate, which was thus declared. That to which agrees one of the Conjugates more, to that al∣so agrees the other: And therefore as it does not follow, that this Man is Drunk; and therefore a Drunkard; so neither this, that this Man is more Drunk, and therefore more a Drunkard, &c.

17. There remain of Comparate Canons, which contain no Designation of any certain Place; of which many are extant Book 3. Top. Of which

we have here selected the Principal: As, first, the more lasting and constant Goods are, the more to be chosen; As, the Goods of the Mind than those of the Body. Secondly, any thing's then the more to be wish'd for, when more opportune and useful; As, fear in Youth, Prudence in older Age. Thirdly, that which always or often's of use, is better than that which seldom; As, Temperance than For∣titude. Fourthly, those things which content one in themselves, are more to be chosen than those which need other things; As, Abundance of things than Money: For he that abounds in the last, viz. Money may want other things; But he that abounds in things, cannot want Money, &c. Fifthly, that which is the more splendid, is the more to be wish'd for: So Glory, than Riches. Sixthly, difficult things are bet∣ter than those that are more facile. And Seventhly, Proper than Common. By Common here is not to be understood Publick, but only those things which many have; by Proper, which we have alone, or in Common with but very few; For these are the things which we most love. Eightly, those things which cannot be communicated to others, are more precious than those which can; As, Knowledge than Riches. Ninthly, things not necessary are to be pre∣ferr'd before those that are. So we chuse rather to live Commodiously than to live. Which Canon is is not everted by Cicero, when in his Topicks he says, Things necessary are to be preferr'd before Un∣necessary: For by Unnecessary he understands Su∣perfluous. But to Aristotle Unnecessaries signifie no more than those which belong to the bene esse; Ne∣cessaries, the esse. Tenthly, those things which cannot be given by others, are better than those which may; As, Virtue and Learning than Riches, &c. Eleventhly, that which one would have others leave one; As, Friends than Wealth: For Friends we would get to our selves; but Riches we had rather that others should leave us, &c.

18. And these are the Principal Canons by which Problemes compared are to be confirmed; which were to be drawn either from the Absolute Canons or Aristotle's three Books of Topicks. In all of which, especially those which contain a Comparison of things in Goodness, this Caution is to be used, viz. That those things which are compared, be in other things equal. For Example; The more lasting Goods are then to be preferr'd before the less, when in other things they are equal, &c. And thus much of the Dialectical Syllo∣gism.