Monitio logica, or, An abstract and translation of Burgersdicius his logick by a gentleman.

COMMENTARY.

1. §. But in this Place is to be understood not E∣thical, but Logical Falshood and Truth, which we have said to be the Convenience and Discrepance of the Speech, with those things that are signified in Af∣firming or Denying. A true Enunciation conjoyns those things which are conjoyned; that is, declares those things to be which are; as, that Man is an Animal, or the like; or divides those things which are divided; that is, declares those things to be which are not; as, Man is not a Beast, &c. A False joyns those that are to be divided; that is, Enounces those things to be which are not; as. Man is a Stone; or divides those things which are to be conjoyned, that is, Enounces those things not to be which are; as that a Plant does not live, &c.

Ax. 3. An Enunciation true, is either Necessary or Contingent.

Ax. 4. A Necessary is that which cannot,

Ax. 5. Contingent, which may be false.

1. §. That is said to be Necessary in the General, which cannot but be, or be otherwise than it is: Con∣tingent, which may. To be Necessary may be said of a Thing two Ways, viz. either Absolutely, or Secundum quid, or in some Respect. Absolutely, that which with∣out a Centradiction, cannot be said not to be, or to be o∣therwise than it is; according to something; which some Condition supposed, indeed, or respect, is Ne∣cessary; but that Condition or Respect being taken away, or altered, without such Contradiction, may be said not to be, or to be otherwise than it is. Both these, together with Contingency, are considered ei∣ther in Existence, Causes, or Enunciation. And that a∣lone is of this Place: Which is no other than an

Indissoluble Connection of Parts; whilst Contingency is a Dissoluble and Mutable. For Example: This E∣nunciation, Man is an Animal, is a Necessary; be∣cause it cannot be otherwise, but that a Man must be an Animal. And this Necessity is absolute. This Enunciation also; A Crow is black is necessary, but not absolutely, but according to some Respect; be∣cause altho' Naturally a Crow cannot be otherwise than black, yet by the Supernatural Power of God it may. But this Enunciation, Crassus is rich, is Contingent; because it may so be, that Crassus may not be rich.

Ax. 6. Necessity of Enunciation is distinguished by three Degrees. The first of these is of every one: the Second by it self: The Third universally first.

Ax. 7. That of every one, is that in which the Predicate agrees with every Subject and always.

1. §. These two Conditions are always necessary: For Example: This Enunciation, Man is just, is not of every one; because to be just does not a∣gree with every Man: Neither this; A living Crea∣ture grows; because it does not always grow: But this, A Crow is black, is of every one; because every Crow is black, and that always.

Ax. 8. An Enunciation by it self is only that whose Subject and Predicate are cohering together by an Essential Tye.

Ax. 9. And is either of the First or Second Mood.

Ax. 10. And the First is when the Predicate is contained in the Definition of the Subject.

Ax 11. The other, when the Subject in the Defi∣nition of the Predicate.

Ax. 12. To which is opposed Enunciation by Accident.

Ax. 13. That is, that in which neither the Pre∣dicate is contained in the Definition of the Sub∣ject, nor the Subject in the Definition of the Predicate.

1. §. To the First Mood, viz. that by it self, belong Five Genus's of Enunciations; First, when the

next Genus is predicated of the Species; as, Man is an Animal. Secondly, the Remote; as, Man is a Sub∣stance: Thirdly, the next Difference; as, Man is Ra∣tional: Fourthly, the Remote; as, Man has the Faculty of Feeling: Fifthly, and Lastly, the Definition of the Defined; as, Man is a Rational Animal. To the Se∣cond belong those Enunciations in which the Propri∣eties are Predicated of their Subject, and that either singly and separately, as, Man is Risible; or Two Disjunctively, as, Number is either even or odd. But this Enunciati∣on a Crow is black; altho' nec ssary, yet is it by Accident; because neither the Crow in the Mention of Blackness, nor Blackness in the Mention of the Crow, is defined.

Ax. 14. The Enunciation Universally first, is only that in which the Predicate agrees or convenes with the Subject, as it is its self that which it is.

Ax. 15. And, therefore, consists of Reciprocal Terms.

1. §. For Example: This Enunciation, Man is Risible, is from hence known to be Universally first; because it may be said that Man as Man is Risible; and also that all Men and only Men are Risible, &c.

Ax. 16. Of these Degrees, the Second includes the First, and the Third the Second, viz. of those having an Universal Subject, but not on the contrary.

Ax. 17. Of Enunciations Contingent, some are for the most Part true, some seldom, some of a doubt∣ful Nature; that is, now true, now false.

1. §. As for Example: For the most Part, it is true, that Parents love their Children; seldom, that a Man is born with two Heads: Of a Doubtful Nature, viz. now true, now false; that a Player at Dice wins, &c. Now

Ax. 18. A false Enunciation is, either Possible or Impossible.

Ax. 19. Possible, that when false, may be true

Ax. 20. Impossible, which, when false, cannot be true.

1. §. A thing is said to be impossible also two Ways; to wit, either Absolutely or according to some∣thing. An Absolute is that which implies a Con∣tradiction; as, that a Man should be a Stone. Accord∣ing to something, which when not, may be done indeed by God, but not natural Causes; as, for the Sun to stand still; the Fire not to burn; a Virgin to bring forth: So likewise a thing may be said possible two Ways. For one thing it is to be possible to God; another, to Natural Causes: And this in Reality differs not from that which is Contingent, but only in Reason: For that is said to be possible, which is not, but can be. Contingent, which is and yet may not be: And this of Absolute Affections.