Monitio logica, or, An abstract and translation of Burgersdicius his logick by a gentleman.

CHAP. XVIII. Of End.

Ax. 1. ENd is defin'd to be that, for the sake of which a thing is.

1. §. Being that which moves the Efficient to A∣ction by superinducing its Love upon it, and beget∣ting an Appetite on, and Desire of it self.

Ax. 2. End is three ways divided; and first in∣to that of which, and for which.

Ax. 3. The End of which, is that which the Ef∣ficient desires.

Ax. 4. For which, for whose sake, or for which, the Efficient desires such an End.

1. §. As for Instance, The of which, of Medicine is Health; for which, the Sick.

Ax. 5. Secondly, End is divided into Principal and Secondary.

Ax. 6. The Principal End is that which the A∣gent first, or also, principally intends.

Ax. 7. The Secondary, which the Agent so intends as that it may enjoy it with the Principal; or else attain it, if the first and principal End should fail.

1. §. For Example: The principal End of Clothes, is, that our Bodies should be defended against the Inclemency of the Heavens; the Secondary Conjoyned with that Principal, is that they should adorn it. So the Principal End for which God was pleas'd to mani∣fest himself in the Creation of the World, was, that Man should be endued with the Knowledge of God and Piety: The Secondary and Succedaneous, that he might render them inexcusable, who holding the Truth in Unrighteousness, go on still in Iniquity.

Ax. 8. Thirdly and Lastly, End is divided into Subordinate and Last.

Ax. 9. A Subordinate End is that which is refer∣red to some farther End.

Ax. 10. The Last, to which all other Ends are re∣ferred; that it self to no farther.

1. §. There is often a long Series of Subordinate Ends, in which the Subordinate is a Means in Respect of the Sequent End. For Example: One digging in the Earth, to fetch out Iron: Iron is drawn out, that of it may be made some Instrument, which may be ser∣viceable for our Use: As, suppose a Penknife, or a Lancet; the Lancet inserves the Physician for the Cutting of the Vein; the Cutting of the Vein to trans∣mit the Superfluous Blood, or take away the Vitious. The Loss of Blood conduces to the Conservation or Recuperation of Health. Our Health indeed of it self is to be desired; but referred notwithstanding to this End, that our Actions may be free and Expedite. A∣ctions again are referred either to Pleasure, or Glory, or Honesty, or something else; in which Subordination of Ends there is no going to Infinity as we have taught before. For otherwise vain and fruitless, would be that Appetition which Nature has planted in all things; as the Philosopher argues Book 1. of the Ethicks,

Cap. 1. There is therefore some chief End in which the Appetite must terminate and acquiesce.

2. §. An End is said to be two ways last; either in its own Genus or absolutely. That is said to be so in its own Genus, which is the last amongst those Ends which are intended by the same Agent. So in that Series which I have brought, there are many Ends which are last in their own Genus: For to fetch forth Iron is the last End of such who dig in the Mines; the Penknife of the Smith, Health of the Physician: But there is but one absolutely last, and that is Feli∣city.

3. §. That End which is subordinated in its own Genus, is referr'd to a farther End by it self: But that which is last, by Accident. For Example: The Smith softens Iron in the Fire, puts it upon the Anvil, strikes it, hammers it, polishes it, whets it, till of it he makes a Lancet. All these by themselves, and in respect of the same Agent, viz. the Smith, are subordinated: For the Lancet is the whole Endeavour of the Smith. But that it should be serviceable to the Physician in letting of Blood is no Care of the Smith's; and there∣fore all those things which the Smith does in Order to the making the Lancet, are subordinated to this End of the Pysician's by Accident.

Ax. 11. When the End is good, by how much the farther off it is, by so much the better it must needs be; the last End therefore must be the best, and the chief Good it self.

1. §. This Theorem is extant Book 1. of the Eth. Cap. 5. That the End is good, is abovesaid; Otherwise it would not move the Efficient: Nor is it yet sufficient that it be good; but it ought also to be good of it self; since the Means are no otherwise good than as they are serviceable to the obtaining of the End; from whence follows that the End is better than the Means. But the sub∣ordinate is a Means in respect of the Sequent, that is, the subordinate End. The last End therefore is

something which is best; because in no respect a means by which it should become worse: Nor is it material whether this End be real or imaginary, as is said Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 2. Since the End no other∣ways moves the Efficient, than as it seems to be good, and so we come to the next Axiom, which is,

Ax. 12. By how much an End is the last in the Execution, by so much the earlier is it in the Intension. And so on the contrary.

1. §. End also is divided into Internal and External; but this Division has not Place in all things, but only Faculties and Arts Conjectural, in which that is said to be Internal, which the Artificer attains to as often as he pleases; External, which he does not always at∣tain to: So the Internal of Oratory is to speak Ornately, and Accommodately to persuade; the External to per∣suade.

2. §. The Division of End into End by it self, and End by Accident, as vulgarly understood is not with∣out its Fault: For an End by Accident is not a Final Cause: For a Final Cause is not a Cause any farther than it is intended. But an End by Accident is not intended, but evenes besides the Intention. Wherefore when an End is said to be by Accident, the Event or Effect by Accident is to be understood: For if any one digging in the Field, that he may make it more Fertile, should by Accident find a Treasure, the finding that Treasure will not be the End, but Effect, or Event of it by Accident.