Christian prudence, or, Directions for the guidance and conduct of our selves in the case of judging one another being several discourses on Math. 7, 1 / by G. Bright.

Sect. I.

THe Fifth is the mischievous Effects or Consequences, which are so many Reasons, and should be so many Motives to beware and to abstain there∣from. We shall observe some of these in each particular prohibited Judgment distinctly.

I. Of too great a proneness to judg others in general, the ill effects are these:

1. The first is, That too great a Proneness, and Practice accordingly, to observe and judg others, causeth us to neglect our own Affairs. The more our Eyes are abroad, the less at home; for they cannot be in two places. We

cannot mind two things at once so different and distant. And it is every where by Experience seen, that those who little take notice of what others are and do, are usually more attentive to their own Business, and what imme∣diately belongs to themselves. The time that is spent in Reflection upon others Actions and Principles, would otherwise most-what (if we are not very dull for want of Variety) have been converted to the observation of our own. Such shamefully neglect oft∣times to purpose, or set apart their own Actions, what they will, what they will not do; and their own Principles, out of what End, and for what Reason, and the execution of their purposed Actions, that they even forget to do what they themselves had purposed and designed, because they are busie and employed in gazing at others. Wisdom is before him that hath understanding, but the eyes of a Fool are in the ends of the Earth, Prov. 17. 24. The sense may be, That a Man of understanding re∣gards and looks at more often his own

wisdome, to see where he acts wisely, out of foresight of, and in order to good Ends; but a Fool's thoughts are ro∣ving, and employed about things far from him, the most remote and imper∣tinent; that is, of Persons and Acti∣ons (among others) which he can lit∣tle make use of in comparison. As the Man that looks at his own next steps, employs himself generally to better Purpose, than he that gazes at the Horizon, or bounds of the Heavens. Now the further ill Consequences of thus doing, is this, that we transfer our Observation and Judgment there, where we can make less good Use, if any; and from thence, where we could have used it to much better purpose for the most part.

For, 1. Thou canst not so well know that, concerning which thou judgest in another Man, as in thy self, thy Judg∣ment will be the less certain, and con∣sequently the Effects of it less certainly good. All our Judgments concerning others, are concerning their Qualities or Actions, and of their Actions some∣times

whether they have been at all, sometimes out of what Principle, some∣times to what effect or good purpose, whether they should have been done. Now, no Man can tell so well what Qualities are in another Man, as what are in himself: No man can so well tell the Principles of another Mans acti∣ons, his end, intention, and design, as those of himself; every Man may know his own Heart better than ano∣ther Mans. No Man can be so sure of what is done by any Man, as the Per∣son himself. And lastly, It is but rare that any Man of these great Talkers or Judgers, know the Circumstances of any Mans condition, and consequently what can or ought to be done by such a Person, so well as he himself; and surely he doth or may (unless it is be∣cause he is an idle Busie-body, or worse) know the circumstances of his own Acti∣ons, better than he can those of another Man, and consequently what is fittest to be done in his owne Case, better than in another Mans. Why then doth he not busie himself there? viz. At Home.

(I speak not universally, but for the most part:) For sometimes in some Cases a Man may know other Mens Affairs better than they themselves, and than their own Affairs, and give their Judgment with Modesty, and out of Friendship. Yet how frequent is it for Men, and the most Ignorant and Sottish, most peremptorily and confi∣dently to judg what others who are tru∣ly Wise ought to do, what would be fittest and of best effect for them to do, to direct or find fault; where it is apparent they know little of the Cir∣cumstances of their Condition or Af∣fairs, and these cannot reasonably be thought to be such strangers to their own Business and Affairs as not to know more, and to know better what they have to do, and ought to do; yea, and are as good to do it too. But that's an∣other Consideration.

2. But then, Secondly, If thy Judg∣ment be as certain, and if another did indeed such a bad Action, or out of such a bad Principle, or hath any bad Quality; it may be you can contribute

little to the preventing the like for the future, or to his amendment or help, it may be none at all, if distant, though thou would'st, he is out of thy reach, thou canst not let him know thy Judg∣ment, or he'll not care for it if he do; but in thy self thou mayst do much, prevent the next time, otherwise dis∣pose thy self, nor do, nor be so any more, mind thy own Faults or Infirmi∣ties. Thou art without Comparison, more in thine own power to direct, alter, or change thy self, than ano∣ther Man is, and yet thou art very busie about him, and negligent of thy self. Which is like as if one should be very sollicitous concerning another Travel∣ling-ma•• ••way, and diligently observe whether he went right, or in a bad way (it may be to direct him too if he went wrong, it may be only to gratifie Curiosity, or to laugh at him) when he could not, or would not come at him to direct him; and in the mean time he never minded his own, and so perchance falls into a Slough, or Ditch, or wanders into a wrong one: Or as

if thou shouldst be careful of another Mans Health, or Legs, or Eyes, which it is little in thy power to use when they are never so perfect, and neglect thy own which thou canst use at thy pleasure, and it may be have more need of being looked after, and are worse than thy Neighbours. Or to use part of our Saviours own Comparison here, to be peering into thy Neighbours Eye, and taking notice of a Mote there, when thy own Eye hath the same, if not a Beam: When (as our Saviour al∣so Himself intimates here) if thou pul∣ledst out thy own mote or beam first, thou might'st use thy own sight to help thy Neighbour; but if thou should'st pull out that of thy Neig••••••urs, it may be thou canst not assure he shall so well use his clearness.

2. Another evil consequence of too great a Proneness, and too frequent Judgment of others, (or it then is so) is most-what an Usurpation of anothers right, (or of that which for another to have, would do most good) a taking from another what is his due, it is a

piece of Injustice. For generally those who give Judgment concerning others, would oblige them both to judg as they judg, and do so too, to do accordingly. They are apt to impose their Judg∣ments; and this by all the power they have, and therefore will Inflict what evil lies in their power if they do not; which may be at least Ill-opinion, disgrace, or Ill-speaking-of, even in the meanest Person. They are seldom content themselves to pass their Judgment, but they would have Persons of whom they judg, to Judg as they do, and do as they would have them, or think sit they should; and are Angry, or Ill∣pleased if they do not: And here they would take away their Liberty of judg∣ing in their own Affairs, in acting accord∣ing to their own Judgment; they would deprive them of making use of their own Examination and Prudence, and then of determining themselves. But is not this every Mans Right in respect of private Persons? Is it not better the Judgment and Determination of a Man's own Actions for Example should

rest in himself? It is true, I may give my Judgment when desired, or asked, or where the defect of Ignorance or In∣firmity is manifest out of Friendship; but then with deferrence to the Persons own Judgment and Determination at last. And this not carelesly and as be∣ing displeased, because he follows not me; but with an acknowledgment of his Right, and an Acquiescence there∣in. Every Man is a Prince and su∣pream Moderatour to himself under God, in abundance of his Actions, most of his External, such as Dome∣stick ones, and Personal especially; and of his Internal, as his willing, designing, Intentions, Opinions, and Judgments; and it is most for the Publick, or Uni∣versal good, it should be so. And Men should be left to the exercise and use of their own Prudence and Liberty in many things, though they should not so well use it altogether as they might: The one may be a greater good, than the other an evil. Besides, It is most likely, every Person should best know the Circumstances of his own, especi∣ally

more private Actions, and conse∣quently what's fittest to be done, or not done: Or if any did better know some∣times, and were better and more virtu∣ous to direct; yet, How should it be known when? And who would not pre∣tend to it? So that there would be no∣thing but Confusion, and every one would be every ones Lord and Master. And yet, I dare say, it is to be ob∣serv'd, a most frequent piece of Inju∣stice and Tyranny, and running through all sorts of Men, and lodged even in the Beggars brest. Men are not con∣tent Men should be Judges in any of their own affairs, even Private and Per∣sonal; but they will be judging, di∣recting, reproving, urging, and for∣cing as much as they can, them to be, and do as they would have them, lord∣ing and domineering over others; not seasonably, modestly, and friendly ad∣vising only. This gratifies and increa∣seth Pride in us also, and this is that in part which the Apostle reproves, in Rom. 14. 4. Who art thou that judgest another Man's servant? Why wouldst

thou be Governour of another Man, and needs have and force him, compel him to judg and do as thou judgest; or else would'st hate him, despise and blame him in words too, (I suppose) if he did not, when-as in this case, he is only subject to God?