Christian prudence, or, Directions for the guidance and conduct of our selves in the case of judging one another being several discourses on Math. 7, 1 / by G. Bright.

Sect. XIV.

(6.) The sixth Cause I shall name is our Passions, both those of the Con∣cupiscible and Irascible appetite, as they are usually called: Or more plain∣ly, those that have good, and those that have evil for their immediate Object. Such as are the simple ones of Love, Hatred, Joy, and Grief, and Desire: And others compounded of these, as Revenge, Anger, Hope, Fear, &c. These all in every Case, cause us to

judg to the advantage, and in favour of themselves; that is, so as they may be preserved and maintained, the Instances of which are every-where, and innume∣rable. Thus for Example: Love cau∣seth us to attribute to the Object be∣loved things that are lovely, whereby the Passion is maintained or encreased; and hatred on the contrary, to attri∣bute, or ascribe, or adjudg to the Ob∣ject hated those things that are hate∣ful and evil, for its own preservation or encrease, whereby it is kept up or augmented, and made more keen and fierce: And all this without any re∣gard to the truth or falshood of what is judged. So likewise what we desire, we will think it is good Positively or Privatively. In desire properly so cal∣led, or where the good we desire, is a possession of some good thing, we most readily judg the good thing a great Good, and consequently its Possession. In Anger and Revenge, where the good thing desired is a removal of some evil or grievous thing to us, by doing evil to it (which obtains in Inanimate things, but

principally to Persons) we are extraordi∣narily prone and forc'd to judg this re∣moval a greater good, and in order there∣to the evil to be removed a mighty evil. And therefore more particularly in Per∣sons to whom we are thus affected or passionated, we judg many kinds and degrees of evil or bad things to be in them, many or all, perhaps more than indeed there are, which are seldome but very confusedly apprehended, and sig∣nified usually by some name, to which our passions of Anger, Hatred, or the like have been joyned, (as that of some Sect or Party) whereby still these our Passions are gratified; that is, sup∣ported, maintained, nay, augmented and boyled up to the greatest degree of Agitation and Violence. And those Mens judgments thus from Passions, whereby they are maintained and in∣creased, though they may happen to be true; yet it appears by Experience, that they are more generally false. Their happening to be true, sometimes makes Men oft-times justifie and think well of such passionate Judgments;

whereas the truth was not at all seen by them, nor was it the Reason or Cause therefore of their Judgments.

These Passions thus byass, and warp, and determine our Judgments three Ways among others.

1. By bringing to mind and furnish∣ing our Invention only with those things which maintain or increase them, and which are true; and keeping out the contrary, hindring those from ap∣pearing which may abate or extinguish them, which are as true too. We all may have often observed how much we have presently to say for a Person whom we love, how plentifully and readily our Invention is furnished; What long Orations we can make in his behalf and praise; How many excellent Qualities, and in what great Degree, appear to us in him, and we attribute to him. All which grant to be true. But we have nothing to say against him, nothing to his disadvantage, nothing that is bad, imperfect, or faulty in him appears, or comes to our mind; when as much might as truly there have been said too.

And so on the contrary (the worse or at least the more frequent extream) in a Person whom we hate, are revengeful∣ly and wrathfully affected to, with whom we are angry: Then how many Faults in him, or Imperfections crow'd presently into our Minds? All his past bad Actions and Qualities remembred, his present observed, nay, his future too foretold; and altogether flie about im∣mediately in our Fancies; and we could give a Catalogue sometimes of many hours long, and make large Declama∣tions against him; the Man hath been this and that, and t'other, all which we'll grant to be true too: But then, how barren are our Inventions for him, we have nothing or very little to say to commend him. This would be a ve∣ry dry Theme for us. We remember, or take notice of nothing considerable in him: Whereas it may be here is as much, and as true to be said by any other Person who is Calm and Reason∣able, not thus possessed by these Pas∣sions against him; nay, and we our selves can do it when we are out of

that Passion, when the Man is not al∣tered (except it be in that one particu∣lar for which we are angry with him) he is the same still, he is no better nor worse, when we are, and when we are not so affected to him; 'tis we only al∣ter and change. And so in particular Actions, how easily can we, by how many Arguments, commend, justifie, or excuse any Action of our Friends, and with as many discommend or aggravate that of our conceited Adversary, whom we are in hatred with, or bear grudge against, or are wrathful and angry with? Hence therefore we give false Judgments concerning Persons quali∣ties or actions; judging them much bet∣ter or worse than they are; we having only Arguments and Proofs on one side brought to our Mind, by our passions, and those on the other kept out by them. Which is like, as if corrupted or bribed Officers should permit no Witnesses to come into, or appear in the presence of the Judg, but those that shall serve for that side or the Cause that they are bribed for: And yet often our Mind

and Reason, the Judg, not attending and taking notice of this Bribery and Partiality of these Officers, the Passi∣ons (though it might and should) may think it very truly judged; at least as it ought according to the Evidence that it had; and set down, and be content, and think all was well done, and truly they were very honest and sincere in their Judgments. This is one of the most slie and close Cheats and Tricks we by our Passions put upon our Reasons. The more had we need here to be cau∣tious, and now more especially when the Deceit and Cozenage is discovered. And both on this and the two following, as well as other accounts, it is a special Maxim of Wisdom, not to trust those Judgments, where Passions have gone before Reason: But do one of these three things. Either, 1. Be calm and and have no Passions at all. Or, 2. If thou wilt for Invention-sake have any, then passionate thy self equally on both sides. Or, 3. Raise up in thy self a greater and commanding passion for Truth, which will make all the Evi∣dence

and Proof thou hast in thy keep∣ing, appear equally on all sides. But here I may prevent what is to be said in another Head.

2. And very briefly: Our Passions cause us to judg in favour of them∣selves, bringing into our Minds what is true on one side, and keeping back what is so on the other, but also by thrusting into them more than is true: And therefore we observe in our Friends and in our Enemies, (that is, to whom we are so) more vir∣tues or faults, fine or foul things, and more of them too than any Body else not alike prejudiced can see, or than in∣deed there are. And,

3. When things, on both sides do come to our Minds, as especially when suggested by another, who would dis∣course or defend the Person we are pas∣sionated for or against; I say, when this is, by thrusting them on one side away again, or turning a Man from them, or causing one wilfully not to at∣tend to them; or if that cannot be, not to the Proof and Evidence that is in them;

nay, not to be able, it confounding and agitating our Minds, and drawing their force another way: And so it is by every days Experience observed, that he that is under the passions of Ha∣tred and Anger against any thing or Person, will not attend to what can be said or proposed in their Commendati∣ons or Defence; nor will nor can oft∣times apprehend the Proof or Conse∣quence thereof. So on the other hand, Timidity, or Fear, or Scruple to judg amiss concerning Persons, especially on the bad side, may cause many not to judg according to the best probability that doth appear to them, without any prejudice from any Person, or ill dispo∣sition of Will: But this is an effect of Passions, more visible and more to be observed by the Person himself mis∣judging, than the former, and there∣fore in that respect more easie to be pre∣vented. And here we see manifestly one of the principal mischiefs of Pas∣sions, as there are also very good use of them; and how much therefore it concerns us to govern them well.