Anicius Manlius Severinus Boetius, Of the consolation of philosophy in five books / made English and illustrated with notes by the Right Honourable Richard, Lord Viscount Preston.

ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETIUS, OF THE Consolation of Philosophy. BOOK the Fourth.

The ARGUMENT.

Philosophy teacheth Boetius, who wondered why evil things happen to the good, and good things to evil Men, that the good are powerful, and the other impotent; that Rewards are ap∣pointed for those, and Punishments for them; that impious Men are more miserable, if they do Injuries and remain unpunished. Af∣terwards she defines what Providence is, and what Fate. Then she demonstrates, that all Fortune, whether prosperous or adverse, is good.

PROSA I.

WHen Philosophy, preserving the Dig∣nity and the Gravity of her Coun∣tenance, had in soft and sweet Strains sung these things, I not having wholly forgot my Grief, and the Distemper of my Mind remaining, did thus interrupt her, being now ready to have continued her Discourse. Those things, O thou Fore-runner and Giver of the true Light! which thou hast hitherto deli∣vered, are evidently clear and unanswerable, as well from that Divine Testimony which they bear about them, as from thy irrefragable Reasons: and although I had forgotten them, through the Prevalency of Grief for the many Injuries which I have endured, yet, as thou hast said, I was not wholly ignorant of them: But this one thing, I must own, is the greatest Cause of my Sorrow, to wit, that whilst there is one good Ruler of all things, there should be any Evil at all, or at the least, that it should pass unpunished. And how worthy this is of Admiration thou mayst consider. To this also another greater Mischief is adjoined: For whilst Impiety doth bear Command and flourish, Vertue doth not only want its Re∣ward, but is also trampled upon by wicked

Men, and bears the Punishment due to its Ene∣my. No Man therefore can enough wonder and complain that Affairs should move so un∣der the Governance of a God all-knowing, al∣mighty, and willing nothing but what is the best. And it would indeed, returned she, be a thing not only of infinite Wonder, but also horribly monstrous, if in the well-regulated Fa∣mily of so great a Master, the worthless Ves∣sels, as thou imaginest, should be honoured, and the more pretious ones be despised: But thou art mistaken, it is not truly so: For if these Conclusions which I have drawn be a lit∣tle reserved entire, thou shalt well know by the Authority of God, of whose Reign and Government I now speak, that the Good are always powerful and mighty, the evil Men ever Cast-aways and weak; that Vice never passeth without its Punishment, nor Vertue without its Rewards; that Happiness always attends good Men, and Misfortunes the wick∣ed. These and many other things of this kind shall be proved to thee, which may put an end to thy Complaints, and strengthen thee with all Firmness and Solidity. And because I have lately shewn to thee, with a full Face, the Fi∣gure of true Happiness, and also in what it is placed, and all things being run through which I think necessary to be premised, I shall now chalk out to thee that direct way which will

lead thee again to thy own Habitation. I will also affix Wings to thy Mind, by which it may raise it self on high, that so all Trouble being done away, and all Obstacles remov'd, thou mayst by my Direction, by my Way, by my Conveniences of travelling, return safe into thy own Country.

METRUM I.

Sunt etenim pennae volucres mihi Quae celsa conscendant Poli, &c.

For I have nimble Wings which can Transcend the Polar Height; Which when the swifter Mind puts on, She from the hated Earth doth take her Flight: Above the(a)Globe of Air doth go, And leaves the Clouds below. Above that Region she doth fly, In which(b) perpetual Flames appear, (Which gently warm the Sky) Caus'd by the Motion of the rolling Sphere:

And till she reach those Spheres, she doth not stay, Which Stars adorn, but with the Sun's will join her way. Or else along by(c) aged Saturn's side, Or as a(d) Souldier with stern Mars she'll ride: Through every Sphere she runs, where Night Most cloudless is, and bright. And when this spatious Course is run, She to the outmost Sphere doth come, And doth its Limits pass, And then the Convex back she'll press Of the swift Aether, then she'll be Prepar'd th'(e) Empyrean Source of Light to see. Here the Great King his mighty Scepter bears, And holds the Reins of th' Ʋniverse: Here the great Judg in shining Robes doth stand, And firm his moving Chariot doth command. If wandring long, at length thou shalt arrive At this bless'd Place, thou then wilt soon perceive

The Country which thou long hast left, and say, From hence I sprung, and here I'll gladly stay. If looking then beneath the Realms of Light, Thou once again wouldst view Earth's dismal Night, Thou'lt see those Tyrants whom the People dread, Far from those shining Borders banished.

PROSA II.

Boet.

O Wonderfull thou promisest great things indeed! nor do I doubt but thou canst perform them: therefore I intreat thee, without delay, to satisfy my Expectati∣on.

Ph.

First then thou shalt know that ver∣tuous Men are always armed with Power, and that the wicked are always destitute of Strength; and these Assertions do mutually de∣monstrate each other: For since Good and E∣vil are contrary, if Good be powerful, Evil must be weak and frail; and if thou knowest the Frailness of Evil, the Firmness of Good must also be known to thee. But that the Credit and Truth of my Opinion may appear more abundantly, I will proceed in both ways, confirming what is proposed now on this, now on that part. There are two Poles upon which all humane Actions do turn, that is to say, the Will and Power; if either of these be absent, nothing can be done: For the Will being want∣ing,

no Man attempts to do that which he will not do; and if Power faileth, the Will is of no Effect. Hence it is, that if thou seest any Man desirous to obtain that which he doth not com∣pass, thou needst not doubt but he wanted the Power of obtaining that which he would have.

Bo.

That's clear, nor can it be denied.

Ph.

Whom then thou seest do that which he had a mind to do, canst thou doubt that he had a Power to do it?

Bo.

No surely.

Ph.

And in that a Man is able to do a thing, Men esteem him mighty; and in that he is not able, he is looked upon as weak.

Bo.

I confess it.

Ph.

Dost thou remember then that it was collected from former Reasons; that every Intention of Man's Will, however actuated by different Studies, doth hasten towards Happiness?

Bo.

I remem∣ber well that that was demonstrated.

Ph.

Canst thou call to mind that it hath been shewed, that Happiness is the Sovereign Good, and that when Happiness is sought for, Good is desired of all?

Bo.

I need not call it to mind, because it is al∣ways fixed in my Memory.

Ph.

All Men then, the good as well as the bad, with one and the same Intention, endeavour to arrive at Good.

Bo.

It naturally follows.

Ph.

And it is certain when Men have obtained Good, they are made good.

Bo.

It is most certain.

Ph.

Do good Men obtain then what they desire?

Bo.

It seems so.

Ph.

But if evil Men obtain

the Good which they desire, they may not still be evil?

Bo.

So it is.

Ph.

Since therefore then both Parties are in quest of Good, but these only obtain it and the other lose it, it is not at all to be doubted but that good Men are powerful, and the wicked weak and feeble.

Bo.

Whoever doubts of this, does neither rightly consider the Nature of things, nor understand the Consequences of Reasoning.

Ph.

Again, if there be two, who, according to Nature, propose to themselves the same thing, and one of them acts naturally, and performs his Intention, but the other cannot administer the natural Office, but imitates him by another Method than what is agreeable to Nature, who did accomplish his Purpose, yet this Man doth not attain his End; which of these dost thou judg to be most powerful?

Bo.

Although I guess at what thou sayst, yet I desire thou wouldst further explain thy self.

Ph.

Thou wilt not deny but the Motion of Walking is natural to Men?

Bo.

No, I cannot.

Ph.

And thou doubtest not, but to perform this Motion is the natural Office of the Feet?

Bo.

Nor will I deny it.

Ph.

If then he who is able to use his Feet walks, and if another to whom this natural Office of the Feet is wanting, creeping upon his Hands, doth endeavour to walk, which of these, by right, ought to be esteemed more able?

Bo.

Proceed with what remains; for no

one doubteth but he who is able to move natu∣rally upon his Feet, is more powerful than he who cannot.

Ph.

But the Sovereign Good, which even the Vertuous and Impious propose to themselves as their End, by the one Party is sought by the natural means of Vertue, whilst the other endeavours after it by various and dif∣fering Desires of earthly things, which is not the natural way of obtaining it; dost thou think otherwise?

Bo.

No; for the Consequence is plain, and it appears out of that which before I granted, which was, that the Good were en∣dowed with Power and Might, and that the evil Men were destitute of it.

Ph.

Thou dost rightly run before me; and it is a good Sign, as Physicians observe, when Nature exerts her self, and resists the Malady. But because I perceive thou art quick of Apprehension, and ready to understand, I shall continue to thee my Reasons: Behold then how plainly the In∣firmity and Weakness of vitious Men lies open, who cannot even attain to that to which their natural Intention leads them, and which it al∣most compels them to seek. And what dost thou think would become of these Men, if they were deserted by this almost unconquera∣ble Bent and Help of Nature, which always goes before them? Consider with thy self how great the Impotence of wicked Men is: Nor are they slight and empty things to which they

aspire, and which they have not Power to ob∣tain: But they attempt the chief and highest of all things, and there they fail; nor can bring that to effect after which they by Day and Night endeavour; and in the obtaining of which the Might of the Vertuous is eminent. For as thou mayst deem him a good Walker, who hath been able to go so far on his Feet, that no way doth lie beyond the Place at which he is arrived; so must thou necessarily judg him to be most mighty, who hath attained that thing beyond which nothing is to be desired. True then it is, that wicked Men are wholly destitute of those Powers which the Good am∣ply possess: For why do they leave Vertue and pursue Vice? Is it because they know not Good? But what is more weak and base than the Blindness of Ignorance? or are they per∣haps acquainted with the way which they ought to follow? But Lust, or some inordinate Desires do lead them aside; so doth also Intem∣perance to weak Natures, which cannot resist Vice. But do they knowingly and willingly desert Good, and turn to Evil? But this way they do not only cease to be mighty, but also even to be. For those who neglect the com∣mon End of all Beings, do also leave off to be. Which thing perhaps to some may seem won∣derful, that the Vitious, who make up the most numerous Part of Mankind, should not

be Men; but it is most truly so. And thus it is. I do not deny but that the Wicked are wicked; but that they have any Being, pure∣ly and simply, I deny: For as thou mayst call a Carcase a dead Man, but simply thou canst not call it a Man; so will I grant that the Viti∣ous are vitious Men, but absolutely that they exist I cannot confess. That thing is or hath a Being which observeth its Order, and retains its Nature; but that which faileth in this, deserteth its natural Being. But thou mayst say, that even the Wicked have a Power to act: Nor will I deny it; but this their Power is not de∣rived from Strength but Weakness. They can do Evil, 'tis true, but they could not do that if they persevered in doing Good; which Possi∣bility doth clearly demonstrate that they can do nothing: For if, as we have before gather∣ed, Evil be nothing, it is clear that whilst fla∣gitious Men can only do ill, they can do no∣thing. And that thou mayst understand what is the Bent and Force of this Power, we have before determined that nothing is more power∣ful than the Sovereign Good.

Bo.

That's true.

Ph.

And that Sovereign Good can do no ill.

Bo.

It can do none.

Ph.

Is there then any one who thinks that Men can do all things?

Bo.

No Man surely who is not mad.

Ph.

But they may do Evil.

Bo.

I wish they could not.

Ph.

Then since he who can only do Good, can

do all things, and those who are powerful to do Evil cannot do all things, it is most evident that those who do Evil are less powerful. And yet it further assists me towards the proving of what I have shewed, that all Power is to be reckoned amongst things to be desired; and that all things are to be referr'd to the chief Good, as the Height and Eminency of their Nature: But the Power of committing Wick∣edness cannot be referred to that Good; there∣fore it is not desirable: but all Power is desira∣ble. It is therefore clear that the Power of do∣ing Evil is not Power. Upon the whole Mat∣ter, from hence the Power of good Men, and the undoubted Weakness of evil Men may well appear. Hence also is the Opinion of Plato verified, That only wise Men can at∣tain to that which they desire, whilst the Wicked, let them endeavour what they will, can never accomplish what they desire to them∣selves, that is, to aim at Happiness; for they do what they list, whilst by those Actions in which they delight, they think they shall ob∣tain the Good which they desire; but they can never be Possessors of it, for Impiety can never be crown'd with Happiness.

METRUM II.

Quos vides sedere celsos Solii Culmine Reges, &c.

Who the vain Coverings could withdraw Of Princes cloth'd in Purple, who Surrounded with their Guards do go, And from their powerful Thrones give Law: Whose sterner Looks fierce Threatnings wear, Whose boiling Breasts doth Fury breath, Shall find those mighty Men beneath Their Robes, do heavy Fetters bear. For Lust on this side doth infuse Her Poisons, on the other Ire Blows up and sets the Mind on Fire, Or Grief or Hope doth it amuse. Since then so many Tyrants have Over one single Head the Sway, His Actions can't his Will obey, Who to so many is a Slave.

PROSA III.

Phil.

DOST thou see then in what a Pud∣dle of Filth Impiety doth wallow, and with what Rays of Light Goodness doth shine out? By which it is clear, that good Men

never go without a Reward, and evil Men without Punishment; for that which causes any thing to be undertaken and done, may just∣ly be said to be the Reward of that thing which is done; as the Crown which is won is the Reward of him who runs in the Race for it. But we have already shewn that Happi∣ness is that Good for which all Matters are un∣dertaken. Therefore Happiness is the Reward propos'd to all humane Actions; and of this the Vertuous can by no means be deprived, nor can any Man by right be called Good who wanteth Goodness; therefore Vertue can never want its Reward. But however evil Men may be unquiet or rage, yet the Crown shall never fall from the Head of the wise Man, nor wi∣ther upon it. Nor can the Impiety of another Man bereave a worthy Soul of its Honour: But if a Man be carried away by the Enjoy∣ment of any foreign Good, he may be deprived even of this, either by him who gave it to him, or by any other. But because every Man's proper Good procureth to him his Reward, whosoever ceaseth to be good loseth that Re∣ward. Lastly, since a Reward is desired, be∣cause it is supposed to be a Good, who will judg him who is capable of Good to be uncapable of a Reward? But thou wilt say, of what Re∣ward is he worthy? Of the fairest, certainly, and most considerable. Call to mind that re∣markable

Corollary, which a little before ga∣thered, I gave to thee, and consider thus: Since the Sovereign Good is Happiness, it ap∣pears that all good Men, in that they are good, become happy; and those who are good, are as it were Gods. Therefore is the Reward of vertuous Men such, that no time shall impair it, no Power diminish it, nor any Impiety darken it. Since these things then are thus, a wise Man cannot at all doubt of the Punish∣ment which inseparably attends wicked Men: For since Good and Evil are Contraries, so are Rewards and Punishments: therefore as we see that Rewards follow good Actions, there must necessarily also, on the other hand, be the Pu∣nishment for Evil. Then as Vertue it self is a Reward to vertuous Men, so Vice is a Punish∣ment to the Wicked: whoever then is punished with Pain and Uneasiness, it is not to be doubt∣ed is affected with Evil. If therefore they will rightly weigh themselves, can they seem to be free from Punishments, whom Wickedness, the most extreme Evil, doth not only affect, but even vehemently infect? But now behold, on the other hand, what Punishment attends evil Doers; for thou hast learnt a little before, that every Being is one, and that that one is Good. Hence it follows, that every thing which is, or hath a Being, seems to be good: Whatso∣ever then fails to be good, fails to be: So that

it appears that evil Men cease to be what they were; but the remaining Form of the Body shews that these evil Men were before how∣ever Men; wherefore when they lose their Vertue, they also lose their humane Nature. But since only Vertue can carry Men above the common Pitch of Humanity, it is sure that those whom Vice hath deposed from the common Condition of Mankind, it must also throw be∣low the Merit of Men. Then it happens that you cannot esteem him to be a Man, whom you see thus transform'd by his Vices. Doth the violent Oppressor, and the Ravisher of other Mens Goods, burn with Avarice? Thou mayst say that he resembles the Wolf. Is he fierce; and doth he give himself over to Controversies and Chiding? Thou mayst compare him to the Dog. Is he treacherous, and one who delights to deceive? He is then like the young Foxes. Is he intemperate in his Anger? He seems to carry about with him the Fury of the Lion. Is he timorous and fearful of what ought not to be fear'd? He is like the Hart. Is he light, and doth he inconstantly change his Purposes? He differs nothing from the Birds of the Air. Doth he wallow in filthy and unclean Lusts? He rolls himself in the Mire like the nasty Sow. So that whosoever leaves off to be vertuous, ceases to be a Man; and since he cannot attain to a Divine Nature, he is turn'd into a Beast.

METRUM III.

Vela Neritii Ducis, Et vagas pelago rates Eurus appulit Insulae, &c.

Whilst he on unknown Seas did widely rove, The eastern Winds at length to that Isle drove The wise(f) Neritian Captain's wandring Sail, Where(g) Circe Daughter of the Sun doth dwell;

Where, with enchanted Draughts, she entertains Her new-come Guests, & binds them with her Chains. Whilst into various Forms her Magick Hand Doth turn those Men, and doth all Herbs command; One the Resemblance of a Boar doth bear, He the(h) Marmarick Lion's Paw doth wear, And like the Wolf another doth appear, Who, when he would with Tears his Fate lament, Doth clothe in dreadful Howlings his Complaint: The Indian Tyger's Looks another shows, And round the Palace mild and calmly goes:

But the(i) Arcadian God when he had found His lov'd Ulysses in these Fetters bound, Releas'd him soon from all these poisonous Harms Which he deriv'd from the Circean Charms. Yet had the Mariners just now drunk a-cheer, And into Swine soon metamorphos'd were: They deeply tasted of th' infected Bowl, Drunk with their Fate, about they madly roll; And now they change their wonted humane Food, And range about for Acrons in the Wood; Body and Members lost, the Voice doth fail, Only the nobler Mind doth still prevail, And doth the Sadness of the Change bewail.

But O! too weak are Circe's Force and Hand, Against whose Power Vertue can bravely stand. She in her Fortress plac'd, despiseth all The strong Efforts of both. Vice doth enthral Mens strongest Powers; and where it entrance finds, (The Body safe) it wounds the strongest Minds.

PROSA IV.

Boet.

I Confess that vitious Men are not un∣justly called Beasts, for although they retain the Form and Shapes of an humane Bo∣dy, yet the Qualities of their Souls shew them to be changed into them. But I would not have it in the Power of those vitious Per∣sons, who even rage with a Desire of destroy∣ing just Men, to do so.

Ph.

Nor is it in their Power, as shall be shewed in a convenient Place; but if this Power which People think ill Men to have, were taken away from them they would be eased of the greatest part of their Punishment: For it would almost seem incredible to any one, and it is yet true, that evil Men must necessarily be more unhappy when they have compassed what they desire, than when they cannot do so: For if it be a miserable thing but to have a Will to do an ill thing, it must be much worse to have a Power to do it, without which the wretched Desire

would languish without effect. Since then each of these things hath its Unhappiness, it must of necessity be, that a threefold Misfor∣tune must urge those Men who both will, can, and do commit Wickedness.

Bo.

I grant it, but I should much desire that evil Men were soon depriv'd of this Misfortune, I mean of the Power of doing ill.

Ph.

They shall be dis∣poil'd of it sooner than perhaps thou wouldst have them, or than they think they shall: For there is nothing of so late a Beginning within the narrow Bounds of this Life, that can conti∣nue long, or expect Immutability; and the great Hopes and subtle Machinations of ill Men are by a sudden and unforeseen End ruinated and destroyed; which thing puts an End to their Wickedness. For if Vice subjects Men to Misery, the longer they are vitious, the longer they must be miserable; whom I should judg the most unhappy of all Beings, if their Unhappiness were not ended at least by Death: For if I have made a true Conclusion concern∣ing the Misfortune which attends Impiety, that Misery must be without end which certainly is Eternal.

Bo.

This is a most wonderful Con∣sequence, and difficult to be granted; yet I must acknowledg it doth but too much agree with those things which we have concluded before.

Ph.

Thou dost rightly judg: but he who thinks it hard to assent to a Conclusion, it

is fit he should demonstrate that the Premises are untrue, or that from the Collation of the Propositions a necessary Conclusion is not to be drawn; otherwise if the Premises be granted, he hath no Reason to blame the Inference from them: for this which I am now about to say will not seem less wonderful, but it necessarily follows from what hath been before proposed.

Bo.

What is that?

Ph.

That wicked Men are more happy when they are punished according to their Demerits, than if they should escape the Hand of Justice. Nor do I now offer to thee that which every Man can think, that the Manners of ill Men are corrected by Venge∣ance, and that by fear of Torment they are re∣duced to the right way, and that they are Ex∣amples to other Men to fly from things which are blame worthy: but I, after another manner, believe these Wretches if they escape Punish∣ment to be unhappy, although no Regard be had to the Correction and Example.

Bo.

And what other manner is there besides those above-mentioned?

Ph.

Have we not granted alrea∣dy that the Good are happy, and the Impious miserable?

Bo.

We have.

Ph.

If then there be any Addition of Good to any Man's Misery, is not he happier than another, whose Misery is pure and simple, without the mixture of any manner of Good?

Bo.

It seemeth so to be.

Ph.

And if to the same miserable Person, who

wants all manner of Goods to those Evils which have already made him miserable, another should be annexed, is not he to be esteemed much more unhappy than he whose Misfortune is relieved by the participation of Good?

Bo.

What will follow then?

Ph.

Evil Men then, even when they are punished, have something of Good annexed, to wit, the Pu∣nishment it self, which, as it is the Effect of Justice, is good: And there is also annexed to the same Persons, when they go unpunished; something more of Ill, that is to say, Impunity it self, which before thou hast deservedly granted to be an Evil.

Bo.

I cannot deny it.

Ph.

Much more unhappy then are impi∣ous Wretches when they meet with an unjust Impunity, than when they fall un∣der a merited Vengeance. But it is manifest, that nothing can be more just than that evil Men should be punished, and unjust than that they should escape Punishment.

Bo.

Who de∣nies it?

Ph.

Nor will any Man deny but that every thing which is just, is good; and on the other hand, whatsoever is unjust, is ill.

Bo.

These are consequential to our former Conclusions: But I pray thee tell me, dost thou believe that there are any Punishments allotted to Souls af∣ter the Death of the Bodies?

Ph.

Great ones most certainly; some of which I believe to be exercised and applied by Sharpness of Pain,

others by a kind of(k) Purga∣tive Clemency: But we will not at this time discourse of these. But our Business hitherto hath been, to let thee see that the Power which thou didst imagine to be most unworthily bestowed upon evil Men, is indeed none at all: And also that thou mightst be sa∣tisfied that evil Men, who as thou didst com∣plain went unpunished, do never indeed escape Punishment: And also that thou mightst learn that that Licence of doing Evil, which thou prayedst might soon end, is not long; and that the Enjoyers would be more unhappy if it were

longer, and most wretched of all if it were perpetual. After this I shewed that ill Men are more unhappy if they be dismiss'd with an unjust Impunity, than if punish'd with a just Revenge. From which Opinion it follows, that then they are urg'd and afflicted with the greatest Punishments when they are believed to escape free.

Bo.

When I consider intently thy Reasons, I think nothing can be said more truly. But if we look upon the Judgments of Men, who is there to whom these things seem not only not to be bel••eved, but also not to be heard?

Ph.

So it is indeed: for they who have long been accustomed to Darkness can∣not lift up their Eyes to the Light of perspi∣cuous Truth without difficulty; and they re∣semble those Birds which see well by Night, but are blind in the Day-time: For whilst they do not regard the Order of things, but only their own disordered Affections, they vainly imagine the Power of doing Evil, or Impunity after it is acted, to be an Happiness. But now, behold what the Law Eternal delivereth! Con∣form thy Mind to the best things, and then thou shalt have no need of a Judg to confer up∣on thee a Reward, since thou hast adjoined thy self to the most excellent things. But if thou art inclined to Impiety, and dost imbrace wick∣ed Practices, seek for no Avenger without, for thou hast sorfeited thy Advantages, and asso∣ciated

thy self with the worst of things: as if thou shouldst by turns sometimes behold the Heavens, sometimes the sordid Earth; and that all other things ceasing from without, thy Eye should seem to carry thee now above the Stars, and that again thou shouldst be placed upon the Earth. But the Multitude doth not consider this. What then? Shall we put our selves into the Company of those which I have before shewed to resemble Beasts? What wilt thou say, if a Man who hath quite lost his Sight, and hath also forgotten that ever he saw, and should think that he wants nothing to render him perfect, should we therefore judg those who retain their Sight to be blind also? Either will the Many acquiesce in what I shall say, al∣though it is supported by as firm Reasons, to wit, that those are more unhappy who do, than they who suffer Injuries.

Bo.

I would wil∣lingly hear those Reasons.

Ph.

Canst thou deny but that all ill Men deserve Punishment?

Bo.

No, I cannot.

Ph.

But I am throughly satisfied that impious Men are many ways un∣happy.

Bo.

Certainly they are so.

Ph.

Then thou doubtest not that those who deserve Pu∣nishment are miserable.

Bo.

I agree.

Ph.

If therefore thou wert to be Judg, to which dost thou think thou wouldst adjudg Punishment, to him who hath done, or to him who hath suf∣fered the Injury?

Bo.

I doubt not but that I

should adjudg Satisfaction to the Sufferer, by punishing the Doer of Wrong.

Ph.

The in∣juring Person then would seem more miserable to thee than him who had receiv'd the Wrong.

Bo.

That follows.

Ph.

From this then, and from several other Reasons founded on the same bottom, it appears, that Impiety, properly and by its own Nature, makes Men miserable; and that an Injury done to any Man is the Misery of the Doer, and not of the Sufferer. But now Orators and Advocates run a Course contrary to this: For they endeavour the Pity and Com∣passion of the Judges for those who suffered any thing bitter or grievous, when the juster Pity is due to them who did the Wrong; who should be led to Judgment, as the Sick are to the Physician, not by angry but by merciful and compassionate Accusers; that so they may, by the Application of Punishment, as a fit and proper Remedy, be cured of the Malady of the Crime. By this means the Employment of this kind of Defenders would either wholly cease, or else, that it may be more to the Ad∣vantage of Mankind, it would be turned into an Habit of Accusation, and would always be forward to accuse, and not to excuse ill Men: and even those Wretches themselves, if they could through the least Hole or Chink behold that Vertue which they have forsaken, and see that they should be in some way of cleansing

themselves from their filthy Vices, by receiving the Pains and Torments which are due to them, they ought, for the Recompence of regaining the Vertue from which they have fallen, not to esteem them so, but should chearfully refuse the Defence of their Advocates, and give them∣selves up wholly to their Accusers and Judges. Hence it is that the Wise hate no Body▪ For who but the most foolish would hate good Men? and it is irrational to hate the most pro∣fligate: For if a depraved Temper be, as it were, the Sickness of the Soul, since we do not think those whose Bodies are distempered to be worthy of our Hate, but rather of our Compassion, much less are those over whom Vice, more cruel than any bodily Distemper, hath gain'd the Ascendant to be adjudged so, but are rather to be looked upon as Subjects of our Pity.

METRUM IV.

Quid tantos juvat excitare motus, Et propria fatum sollicitare manu? &c.

Why should vain Man so great Commotions raise? Why with his Hand should he his Fate convey? If Death be sought, that comes, and never stays For winged Steeds to help it on its way,

They whom the Lion and the rugged Bear, The Indian Tiger, and the foaming Boar, With eager Teeth, and with arm'd Claws do tear, Do stain their Swords in their own reeking Gore. Is it because their Manners diff'ring are, And that their many Customs disagree, That they unjustly thus engage in War, And fiercely urge each others Destiny? This Reason is not just for shedding Blood. Wouldst thou to each Man give what he deserves; Love, as by Right thou art oblig'd, the Good, And pity him who from fair Vertue swerves.

PROSA V.

Boet.

HERE I plainly see what Happiness or Misery is placed in the Deserts of good and of evil Men. But in this same com∣mon Estate of Fortune I perceive something both of Good and Evil: For no wise Man had rather be expos'd to Banishment, Poverty, and Ignominy, than excel in Riches, Honours, Pow∣er, and continue in a flourishing Estate in his own Country. For in this the more clearly and openly the Duty of Wisdom doth appear, when the Happiness of the Governours is in some measure diffused, and communicated to Subjects; whilst Imprisonment, and all legal Punishments are only due to those pernicious

and profligate Citizens, for whom they were at first instituted and appointed. Why then should things suffer so unnatural a Change? Why should Punishments due to Crimes, op∣press the Good, and the Rewards of Vertue be born only by wicked and flagitious Men? These things I much wonder at, and I desire to learn from thee what may be the Reason of so unjust a Distribution. For my Wonder would be less, did I believe all things to be governed by Chance. But now even God, the Governour of all things, doth heighten my Astonishment, who whilst he doth often distribute good things to the Good, and evil things to the Wicked, yet doth sometimes give to the Vertuous an hard Portion, and to the impious Man he grants his Heart's Desire. What Difference then is there to be found, unless Men may be acquainted with the Cause betwixt his Proceedings and the Actings of Chance?

Ph.

Nor is it at all to be admired if Men fancy something rash and con∣fus'd in these Methods of Acting, if they are ignorant of the Reason of that Order by which God proceeds. But although thou art ignorant of the Cause of this great Disposal of things, yet because the good Governour of all things doth temper and inform the World, never doubt but that all things are done rightly and as they ought to be.

METRUM V.

Siquis Arcturi sidera nescit Propinqua summo Cardine labi, &c.

Who knows not that(l) Arcturus moves Near to the Arctick Pole, nor why (m) Bootes slow passeth his Wain, Drowning i'th Sea his later Flame, When he unfolds his quicker Rise, Will wonder at the Laws of Heaven. And if he know not why the Horns Of the(n) Full-Moon grow pale, whilst they

Are dipp'd within the Bounds of Night, And how the Moon, confus'd and dark, Displays those Stars which she before Had in her brighter Glories hid. A vulgar Error is retain'd By many People, who do think To rescue Luna from Eclipse With brazen Cymbals, and with Strokes On Basins, which do rend the Air. Yet none admire when(o) Corus blows, And makes the Waves assault the Shore; Nor when the Sun's refreshing Heat, Dissolves vast Heaps of congeal'd Snow. For here the Causes open lie: But those which closely are wrapt up, Disquiet much the Thoughts and Mind. The giddy People stand amaz'd At that which rarely or by chance arrives. But if that cloudy Error would depart, Which stupid Ignorance doth raise, These things no more by Men would be admir'd.

PROSA VI.

Boet.

SO it is; but because it is thy Province to unfold the hidden Causes of things, and to lay open those Reasons which are now invelop'd in Darkness, I intreat thee to give me thy Judgment in this Matter, and to discourse upon it, for this Wonder troubles me very much. Philosophy then a little smiling, said to me, O thou call'st upon me to declare to thee the greatest thing which could be asked, and which indeed can scarce be answered: For such is the Matter of it, that one Doubt being re∣moved, innumerable others, like the Heads of (p) Hydra, grow up. Nor would there indeed be any End of them, unless they were restrain∣ed by the Quickness and lively Fire of the Mind: For in this Matter Men are wont to make Questions of the simple Actings of Pro∣vidence, of the Order and Course of Destiny, of sudden Chance, of Knowledg, of Divine Pre∣destination, and of Free-will: And of what Weight these things are, thou thy self mayst perceive. But because it is part of thy Medi∣cine,

and it will contribute much to thy Cure to know these things, although I am confined within the narrow Bounds of Time, I shall en∣deavour to give thee some Taste of them. And although the Charms and Musick of my Verse may delight thee, yet thou must defer that Pleasure a little, whilst I in order weave toge∣ther my Reasons, which may tend to the So∣lution of thy Doubts.

Bo.

Observe thy own Method as it pleaseth thee. Then taking her Beginning as from another Principle, she thus discoursed.

Ph.

The Generation of all things, and every Progression of changeable Natures, and all things which are any way moved, re∣ceive their Causes, Order and Forms out of the Stability or Constancy of the Divine Mind. And this being placed in the Height of its own Purity or Simplicity, doth establish a manifold Mode or Way in doing things; which Mode or Manner of Proceeding, when Men behold it in the Purity of the Divine Understanding, is called Providence; but being apply'd and re∣ferr'd to that which it moveth, and of which it disposeth, it was called Fate or Destiny. And if any one shall throughly weigh in his Mind the Force and Energy of the one and of the other, he shall soon find them to be diffe∣rent things: For Providence is that Divine Rea∣son settled in the chief Governour of the World, by which he disposeth all things; but Fate or

Destiny is a Disposition inherent in moveable Beings, by which Providence knits them toge∣ther in their Orders. Providence embraces and comprehends all things, although divers, al∣though infinite; but Fate orders and digests all single things into Motion, and distributeth them according to Place, Form and Time: So that the Explication of this temporal Order being joined or folded up, in regard to the Divine Mind, may be called Providence; and being unfolded and digested according to Time, and the other Circumstances, it may be called Fate. And although these things be different, yet one of them depends upon the other; for the Or∣der of Fate proceeds from the pure Simplicity of Providence: For as the Artificer forming in his Mind the Shape of the thing which he is about to make, moves to effect his Work, and doth in process of time draw out that which before he had singly in his Imagination designed; so God by his Providence simply and firmly doth dispose the things which are to be done; and he doth in several Ways, and according to Time, administer by Fate those very things which he hath so disposed. So then, whether Fate be exercised and moved by some Divine Spirits which attend upon Providence, or by some Soul, or by the Ministry of the whole Body of Nature, or by the Celestial Motions of the Stars, or by Angelick Vertue, or by the ma∣nifold

Subtlety of Demons, whether good or bad, or if by any of these, or if by all of them the Series of Fate is woven: This certainly is manifest, that the immovable and simple way of doing things is Providence; and that the movable Contexture and temporal Order of those things which the Divine Purity fore-dis∣posed and ordered to be done, is Fate. Hence it is that all things which are under the Domi∣nion of Fate, are also subject to Providence, which commands even Fate it self. But some things which are placed under the Guidance and Protection of Providence, are wholly exempt from the Jurisdiction of Fate, and surmount the Series of it; and those are such things as are stably fixed near to the Divinity, and are above the Order of fatal Mobility. For even as a∣mongst several Circles turning about the same Centre, that which is innermost approacheth most to the Simplicity of the middle Point, and is as it were a Centre, round which they may turn, to those placed without it; and that which is outermost, rolling in a greater Cir∣cuit, the further it departs from the middle In∣dividuity of the Point, so much the more Space it doth fill; but yet if any thing should join and fasten it self to the Point, it is constrained to be immovable, and ceaseth to be dilated. By pa∣rity of Reason the further any thing departeth from the first Mind, that is from God, it is so

much the more embarassed, and faster bound in the Bonds of Destiny; and every thing is by so much the freer from Fate, by how much it approacheth nearer to the Centre of all things. And if it closely adheres to the Firmness of the supreme Mind, without moving, it goes beyond the Necessity and Power of Destiny. As Ratiocination then is to the Intellect, as that which is begotten is to that which hath a proper Being, as Time is to Eternity, as the Circle is to the Centre; so is the movable Order of Fate to the stable Simplicity of Providence. This Order moveth the Heavens and the Stars, tem∣pereth the Elements, and maketh them agree amongst themselves, and by an alternative Change transforms them. It reneweth all things which are born, and which die by the like Progressions of Sexes and Seeds. This binds together the Actions and Fortunes of Men by an indissoluble Connection of Causes; which, since they proceed from the Origine of immo∣vable Providence, must also themselves necessa∣rily be unchangeable: For so things are always best governed, if that pure Simplicity or Sin∣gleness, dwelling in the Divine Nature, may produce that unalterable Order of Causes; for this Order, by its own Unchangeableness and Constancy, may restrain those things which in their Nature are mutable, and which would otherwise rashly and irregularly float about.

Hence it is that although things may seem con∣fused and disturbed to Men who cannot aright consider this Order, nevertheless the proper Manner and Course of every thing directs and disposeth it to the true Good: For there is no∣thing done for the sake of Evil, no not by the most flagitious Wretches; who, as I have fully before demonstrated, are in their Researches after Good diverted by crooked Error, whilst the Order proceeding from the Centre of Sove∣reign Good doth not mislead any from its Prin∣ciples. But thou mayst say, what greater Con∣fusion can there be, that both prosperous and adverse things should by times happen to good Men, and that evil Men can enjoy what their Hearts can desire, and yet be afflicted too with things which they hate? Do People live now a-days so vertuously, and with so much Inte∣grity, that those whom Men think good or bad, must necessarily be either? But in this the Judgments of Men disagree much: For those whom some judg worthy of a Reward, others think to deserve Punishment. But let us grant, that it is possible that some one may be able to distinguish betwixt the Good and the Bad; Is it possible therefore that he should look into the inward Temperament of the Mind, and pro∣nounce of it as one may of the Body? But it is miraculous to him who knows it not, why sweet things should be agreeable to some Bo∣dies,

and bitter to others; and why some sick People are eased by Lenitives, others are helped by sharper Medicines. But it is no wonder to the Physician, who knoweth the Measure and Temperament of Health and Sickness. But what other thing is it that makes the Mind healthful and strong than Goodness? And what is its Sickness but Vice? Who is the Preserver of Good, and the Driver away of Evil, other than God the great Ruler and Physician of the Mind? who, when he looks about him from the high Observatory of his Providence, sees and knows what is convenient for every one, and then accommodates him with the Conve∣nience. Hence then proceeds that remarkable Miracle of the Order of Destiny, since the all-knowing God doth that at which the Ignorant are astonished. But now that I may glance at a few things concerning the Depth of the Di∣vine Knowledg, which humane Reason may comprehend, that Man whom thou believest to be most just, and the greatest Observer and Maintainer of Equity, of that Man, I say, the all-knowing Providence doth think otherwise. And(q) my Familiar Lucan told us, that the vanquishing Cause was pleasing to the Gods, but the vanquish'd to Cato: Know this then,

that whatsoever thou seest done contrary to thy Hope or Expectation, that notwithstanding the Order of things is preserved right and entire; but to thy perverted Opinion it seemeth Confu∣sion. But let us suppose that a Man may have behaved himself so well, that the Approbation of God and Man may both agree in him; but he is perhaps of a weak Courage: so that if any thing cross should befal him, he will forgo his Innocence, since with it he cannot retain his Fortune. The wise Dispensation of Provi∣dence then spareth him whom Adversity may make worse, lest he should be put to labour and travel, who is not able to undergo such Hard∣ship, nor to bear Afflictions. Another Man is Master of all Vertues, is holy, and one who draws nigh to God: Providence judgeth it In∣justice that that Man should be oppressed by any Adversity; so that it will not suffer him to labour even under any bodily Distemper: But as(r) one more excellent than I said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ Vertues do build up the Body of the Holy Man. But it often comes to pass that good Men have the Government of

things committed to them, that the exuberant Improbity of ill Men may be repell'd and aba∣ted. To some, according to the Qualities of their Minds, he gives a kind of Mixture of Fortune, chequered with Good and Evil: Up∣on some he lays grievous heavy Crosses, lest they should grow luxurious by too long a Course of Felicity: Upon others he sometimes lays also heavy Crosses, that their Vertues may be confirmed by the Use and Exercise of Pati∣ence: Some fear more than they ought that thing which they can bear: Others despise more than they ought that which they cannot; and those, that by the Experiment they may come to the Knowledg of themselves, he sometimes afflicts. And many there are who have pur∣chas'd a great Name in the World, at the Ex∣pence of a glorious Death. And some Men whose Courage hath not yielded to Torment, have given a noble Example to others, that Vertue is not to be overcome by Adversity. And there is no doubt but that all these things are done justly and in order, and for the Good of those to whom they happen. It also pro∣ceeds from the said Causes that sometimes Ad∣versity, sometimes Prosperity, comes to be the Lot of ill Men. And it is the Wonder of no Man, that flagitious Persons should be afflicted, because they are always thought to deserve what comes upon them; and that their

Punishment doth deter others from such Aims, and often work a Reformation in those on whom they are inflicted: But the Prosperity of such yields a great Argument to the Good, and directs them what to judg of this kind of Hap∣piness, which they so often see to fall to the share of the worst of Men. In which thing I think often there is a Dispensation, because the Nature of some Men may be so forward and importunate, that Poverty, and the want of Ne∣cessaries, would rather urge them to do ill. But this Disease Providence doth cure by ap∣plying the powerful Medicine of Money. One Man finding his Conscience deeply spotted with Crimes, and comparing himself and his For∣tune, fears perhaps that the Happiness which he enjoyed by the Use of it, should be wholly done away by its Loss; he will therefore change his Manners, and whilst he fears to lose his Estate he will leave his Impiety. Upon another Happiness is conferr'd without Desert, and that precipitates him into a merited Destruction. To some there is a Power of Punishing granted, that it may exercise the Vertues of the Good, and may be Cause of Punishment and Torment to the Evil. For as there is no Covenant or Agreement betwixt the Vertuous and the Wicked, so neither can wretched Men agree amongst themselves. And why should they? for they disagree amongst themselves by reason

of their Vices, which rend and tear the Con∣science; and they often do those things, which when they are over, they judg they ought not to have done them. From whence Providence hath often produced a signal Miracle, to wit, that evil Men have oft made other ill Men good: For when some of these find that they have suffered an Injury from others of them, urged by the Hate of those that have offended them, they have returned to the Ways of Vertue, studying nothing more than to be un∣like to those Persons whom they hate. It is on∣ly the great Power of God which can make Evil turn to Good, when by using them agree∣ably and conveniently he draws out of them the Effect of some Good: For a certain Order embraceth all Beings, so that whatsoever doth depart from the Reason and Laws of that Or∣der which is assigned to it, yet it passeth into and under the Laws of another Order; for no∣thing is left in the Power of Chance or Uncer∣tainty in the Realm of Providence. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. It is hard for me to express how God rules and disposeth all things by his Providence. Nor is it lawful for a Man (if he could) to comprehend all the Machines and Movements of the Divine Work, even in his Thought, much less to declare and describe them in Words. Let it suffice to have seen on∣ly this, that God, the Framer of all Natures,

orders and disposeth every thing towards Good; and whilst he endeavours to retain those things which he hath made in his own Likeness, he banisheth all Evil by the Course of Destiny, without the Bounds of his Commonwealth. Hence it is that if thou dost but regard the all-disposing Providence, thou mayst easily see, that there are not those Evils which Men be∣lieve do abound upon the Face of the Earth. But now I see that thou dost almost lie down under the Weight and Prolixity of my Rea∣soning; and that thou dost expect the Musick of my Verse: receive then this Draught with which when thou art refresh'd, thou mayst more strong∣ly proceed to other Matters which yet remain.

METRUM VI.

Si vis celsi jura tonantis Purâ solers cernere mente, Aspice summi culmina Coeli, &c.

If with a Mind well-clear'd thou wouldst Weigh well the Laws of the high Thunderer, Behold the Height of th' Empyrean Heaven; There by a just and certain Bound the Stars Preserve their antient Peace and Amity. The Sun being mov'd by his resplendent Flame Doth not impede pale Phoebe's colder Sphere. Nor doth the Northern Bear, which proudly round The towring Battlements of th' Ʋniverse Inclines his head long Course, ever desire

To drench his Flames in the vast Ocean, Although he sees the other Stars do so. Vesper observing Time, exactly leads The Horns of Night, and Lucifer again Brings on the Day, which cherisheth the Earth. So mutual Love doth all things ever move: And from the starry Regions cruel War Is banish'd far. This beauteous Concord so In equal Measures tempers th' Elements; That when things moist and dry begin to fight, They do attack and do retreat by turns; That Cold with Heat a lasting Peace doth make; That the aspiring Flame may mount on high, And that the Earth may tow'rds its Centre tend. By these same Causes in the warming Spring The flowring Year doth grateful Sweets breath out, The hotter Summer ripeneth the Corn: Loaden with Apples then Autumnus comes, And Winter wets the Earth with many Showers. This Temperature doth nourish and bring forth Whatever in the Ʋniverse doth breath: And this doth also take away and bide, And doth by Death efface whatever has been born, Whilst the World's Creator sits on high, And ruling mesnageth the Reins of things, The mighty King and Lord, Fountain and Source, The Law, and the wise Judg of Equity, Those things to which he did a Motion give He stops, and thus being mov'd, he doth confirm. For if their direct Motions he did not

Revoke, and forc'd them in a Round to move, Those things which now by Order do endure Would straight from their Beginning fall, and soon Would into nothing be resolv'd. This Love to every thing is common then, And all things do propose Good as their End; For otherwise they could not last, unless By Love's kind Circulation they revert To that first Cause, which gave them Being, God.

PROSA VII.

Phil.

DOST thou not see now what fol∣lows from all the things which I have spoken.

Bo.

What is the Consequence?

Ph.

That all Fortune is good.

Bo.

And how, I prithee, can that be?

Ph.

Observe then that since all Fortune is either prosperous or adverse, it is given either to reward or exercise the Good, or to punish or correct the Bad; and all For∣tune is good which appears to be either just or profitable.

Bo.

The Reason is most true, and if I consider the Doctrine either of Providence or Fate, which a little before thou taughtest me, thy Opinion is founded upon a firm Ground. But let us range it, if thou pleasest, amongst those Positions which, a little before, thou saidst were not commonly believed by the People.

Ph.

Why so?

Bo.

Because it is the common and frequent Phrase of Men, that the Fortune

of such an one is bad.

Ph.

Wilt thou then that I shall for a while draw nearer to the Peoples way of Discourse, lest we should seem too much to have receded from the Usages of Man∣kind?

Bo.

As thou pleasest.

Ph.

Thinkest thou not then that every thing which is profi∣table is good?

Bo.

Yes surely.

Ph.

But what∣soever doth either exercise or correct is profita∣ble.

Bo.

I confess it.

Ph.

Therefore 'tis good.

Bo.

Why should it not?

Ph.

But this is the Fortune of them who are either fixed in Vertue, and wage a constant War against Adversity, or of those who, abandoning Vice, take the way of Vertue.

Bo.

I cannot deny it.

Ph.

But what sayst thou of that pleasant Fortune which is given as a Reward to good Men, do the Many conceive it to be ill?

Bo.

Certainly no, but ra∣ther they believe it to be very good, as it is in∣deed.

Ph.

But what sayst thou of that other, which although it be sharp, and inflicts just Punishment upon the Wicked, do Men take it to be good?

Bo.

No sure, but rather the most wretched and tormenting thing that can be thought upon.

Ph.

Behold then, and mark well, if we, following the Opinion of the Peo∣ple, have not concluded something which is ve∣ry contrary to the common Opinion.

Bo.

What is that?

Ph.

It followeth clearly to the things before granted, that whatsoever the Fortune of all those who are either in possession of, or

growing in Vertue, or otherwise in search after her, may be, it is good; but that the Fortune of those who live in Impiety and Sin must be the worst of any thing.

Bo.

That is true, although no one dare confess it.

Ph.

Why so, for the wise Man ought not to be cast down when he is brought into the Field to wage War with Fortune, no more than the valiant Man ought to be dismayed when he hears the Trumpet sound to Battel: For Difficulty and Hardship giveth the Occasion to one that he may encrease and propagate his Glory; and to the other, that he may confirm and improve his Wisdom. From hence is Vertue denominated, because leaning upon its own Strength, and confiding in its proper Force, it is not to be overcome by Adversity: Nor thou who art so far advanced in the Course of Vertue, art not to be carried away by Delights, and to wallow in Lust; thou must engage valiantly and fiercely against every Fortune. And lest Adversity should oppress thee, or Prosperity corrupt thee, possess thy self of the Golden Mean, and retain it with all thy Strength: For whatsoever is below, or goeth beyond that, implies a Contempt of true Hap∣piness, and loseth the Reward of its Labour. It lieth in thy own Hand to choose what For∣tune thou likest; for all Fortune which seemeth sharp and grievous, unless it exercise the Ver∣tues of the Good, or chastise the Impiety of the Wicked, is a Punishment.

METRUM VII.

Bella bis quinis operatus annis Ultor Atreides Phrygiae ruinis Fratris amissos thalamos piavit, &c.

By ten Years bloody War, and(s) Phrygia's Fate (t) Atreides did revenge, and expiate

His Brother's Loss. Whilst his unquiet Mind Press'd him to sail, with Blood he buys a Wind For the Argolick Fleet, he puts off all Compassion, and vows his Daughter shall A Victim to the injur'd Goddess fall. The wise Ulysses did with Tears lament His slaughtered Friends, whom(u) Polyphemus

Devour'd by him down to the Shades; but he sent Appeas'd their Manes, putting out the Eye Of that great Monster, whilst he in his Den Did lie at Ease, buried in Sleep and Wine. His many Labours consecrate to Fame The Great(w) Alcides, and his mighty Name.

The(x) Centaurs, and the(y) Lion he o'rethrew, And took the Spoil; he the foul(z) Harpies slew: (a) Though in the Door the watchful Dragon lay, He boldly took the Golden Fruit away:

He made grim(b) Cerberus to a Chain submit; He overthrew the mighty(c) Diomede, And made his fiery Horses on him feed. He burnt the Poison, and did(d) Hydra tame, The headlong(e) Achelous he o'recame, Blushing within his Banks he hid his Head. On Libyan Sands he left(f) Antaeus dead:

He by the Death of(g) Cacus did appease Evander's Wrath: the foaming(h) Boar did seize: Those Shoulders which the(i) Spheres were soon to press, That both his last and noblest Labour was; And he did merit to be call'd a God, Who did support so glorious a Load. Go then, ye noble Souls, disdain Delay, Follow the great Example in his way: Why, O ye slothful, do ye basely fly? Who conquers Earth doth gain Eternity.

The End of the Fourth Book.

Notes

• (a)

  The Globe of Air.] The Air is defined by its own Bounds; and because it is so diffused that it surrounds the Globe of Earth on all its Parts, it is called by our Philosopher Aeris Globus.
• (b)

  Perpetual Flames.] Here, it is supposed, is meant no other thing than that part of the Aether which is called by Cicero, in his Book de Nat. Deor. Ardor ultimus, est{que} tenuis, ac perlucens, & aequa∣bili calore suffusus: where the Vertex or top of the Aether being con∣sidered, the Mind being carried higher, doth contemplate first the Planets which are placed below the Sun, as Venus, Mercury, and the Moon; then the Sun it self, then those which move in Orbs higher than the Sun, as Saturn, Jupiter and Mars; then the Fixed Stars, and then God himself.
• (c)

  Saturnus.] He is here called Gelidus Senex, the cold old Man: Senex, because the Poets feigned him to be the most antient of the Gods, and because his Motion is slow, like that of an old Man. He is said also to be gelidus, because he being the highest of all the Planets, doth give the least Heat and Refreshment to the Earth.
• (d)

  A Souldier.] Miles Corusci Sideris. The Mind then con∣templates Mars, another Planet below Saturn and above the Sun, and is here called his Souldier, because Mars was by the Antients called the God of War; and those who accompanied him were called his Souldiers. He is called Coruscum Sidus, the bright or shining Star, because he shines more bright than Saturn.
• (e)

  Empyrean.] This is the Coelum Empyraeum sive Beatorum, the highest Heaven, where is supposed to be the Presence of God, Angels, and of blessed Spirits departed.
• (f)

  Neritian Captain.] Ʋlysses, he was the Son of Laertes and Anticlea, an eloquent and wise Captain of the Grecians, who, af∣ter the Siege of Troy was ended, was driven into many Dangers at Sea, during the Time of ten Years, before he could arrive at Ithaca, of which Island he was King, as also of Dulichium, both in the Ionian Sea:

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Homer. lib. 1. Odyss.

  Ithaca is situated betwixt Zephalonia to the West, and the Echina∣des to the East, which Islands are now called by the Italians Le Curzolari, and by the French Les Cursolaires. The modern Name of Ithaca is now, by the Italians, Valle di Compare, and its Circuit is not of above twenty Miles. Dulichium is one of the Echinades Islands, it is very small, and is rather to be called a Rock, and lies betwixt the Coast of Aetolia and Zephalonia. It is now by the Italians called Dolichio. He is here called the Neritian Captain, from the Mountain Neritus, which is a Mountain in Ithaca, with which Title he went to the Trojan War.
• (g)

  Circe.] She is said to have been the Daughter of the Sun and of Perse a Nymph, and to have been very skilful in Magick and Sorcery: She was married to the King of the Sarmatians, and having poisoned her Husband, she fled to Italy, and inhabited a Mountain there, where she led a vitious Life, and entertained her Guests with all sorts of Debaucheries; therefore she is fabled to have turned Men into Wolves, Tigers, and other sorts of Beasts.

  — Accipimus sacrâ data pocula dextrâ, Quae fimul arenti sitientes hausimus ore, Et tetigit virgâ summos Dea dira capillos, Et pudet, & referam, setis horrescere coepi; Nec jam posse queri; pro verbis edere raucum Murmur, & in terram toto procumbere vultu, Osque meum sensi pando occallescere rostro; Colla tumere toris; & qua modo pocula parte Sumpta mihi fuerant, illâ vestigia seci. Ovid. Metam. l. 14.
• (h)

  Marmarick.] Marmarica is a Country of Africa, lying towards Egypt, where the greatest and strongest Lions are found, as India is the Place where the fiercest Tigers are.

  Mille Lupi, mistique Lupis Ʋrsique Leaeque, Occursu fecêre metum: sed nulla timenda, Nullaque erat nostro factura in corpore vulnus; Quinetiam blandas movere per acra caudas, Nostraque adulantes comitant vestigia, donec Excipiunt Famulae. Ovid. Metam. lib. 14. ver. 260.
• (i)

  The Arcadian God.] Our Philosopher stiles Mercury, Numen Arcadis alitis: Numen because he was feigned to be the Son of Apollo and Maia; and also the God of Eloquence. Ales, because he was feigned to have Wings upon his Head and Feet, because Eloquence, over which he was said to preside, takes its Course swiftly through the Air, and diffuseth it self through the World: and Arcas, because he was born in Arcadia. Hence Virgil. Ae∣neid. lib. 8.

  Vobis Mercurius pater est, quem candida Maia Cyllenes gelido conceptum vertice fudit.

  Mercury was said to have given an Herb to Ʋlysses, after he had run through so many Hazards, and been toss'd upon so many Seas, by the Help of which he was freed from the Charms of Circe.

  Pacifer huic dederat florem Cyllenius album, Moly vocant Superi; nigrâ radice tenetur. Tutus eo, monitisque simul coelestibus, intrat Ille domum Circes, & ad insidiosa vocatus Pocula, conantem virgâ mulcere capillos Reppulit, & stricto pavidam deterruit ense. Ovid. Metam. lib. 14.
• (k)

  Purgative Clemency.] Here (saith Vallinus) Boetius acknow∣ledgeth not only as a Christian, but as a Catholick one also, that some evil Men are condemned to eternal Punishments; and others, by long Pains and Torments for their Sins, are cleansed and purged by Fire. The French Commentator, the Sieur Cally, the Royal Professor of Eloquence and of Philosophy in the University of Caen in Normandy, and Principal of the College of the Arts there, saith, that Philosophy would here perhaps express the Opinion of the Platonists, or of the Pythagoreans, which was, that some Souls, whose Impieties had been so great that they could not be effaced by any Purgations, were condemned to eternal Punish∣ments; and that others, whose Crimes were not so great, did either enjoy the eternal Pleasures of Elysium without any Purgati∣on, or being partly purged, were transmuted and put into the Bo∣dies of Beasts.

  Ergo exercentur poenis; veterumque malorum Supplicia expendunt: aliae panduntur inanes Suspensae ad ventos: aliis sub gurgite vasto Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni: Quisque suos patimur manes: Exinde per amplum Mittimur Elysium, & pauci laeta arva tenemus. Virg. lib. 6. Aeneid.
• Purgatoria Clementia.
• (l)

  Arcturus.] Videsis Annotat. in l. 1.
• (m)

  Bootes.] Or Bubulcus, is called so because it is a Constella∣tion framed of Stars, which resemble the Form of a Cart and Ox∣en. This Constellation is very near to the North Pole; and be∣ing placed so high, it always appears in our Hemisphere. It is said also to drown its Flames late in the Sea, because it never de∣scends below our Horizon.
• (n)

  Full-Moon.] It often happens that the Earth is so interposed betwixt the Sun and the Full-Moon, that the Moon being obscured by the terrestrial Shadows, doth lose the round Splendor which it borrowed from the Sun; and that the Stars, whose Light was before obscured by the greater Brightness of the Moon, begin to shine out: From whence the Antients, whose Superstition made them believe that that Decrease was occasioned by Charms, did think they might deliver her from it by the tinkling of brazen Vessels or Cymbals: From whence Tibullus,

  Cantus & è curru Lunam deducere tentat Et faceret, si non aera repulsa sonent. Tot pariiter pelves, tot tintinnabula dicas Pulsari: jam nemo tubas at{que} aera fatiget, Ʋna laboranti poterit succurrere Lunae. Carmina vel Coelo possunt deducere Lunam.

  All these things, saith Boetius, make the Admiration of the Vul∣gar, because they know not the Causes of them.
• And Juven. Sat. 6.
• And Virg. Eclog. 8.
• (o)

  Corus] Or Caurus, the North-west Wind. Philosophy having shewed that Men wonder at many things because they know not the Causes of them, doth now shew that they wonder not at things of which they know the Causes: As why Corus doth beat the Waves fiercely against the Sea-Coasts, they knowing that Wind is a moved Body, and that any Body which hath Motion doth naturally strike against any other Body which meets it in its way. As also Men do not admire why an Heap of Snow hardened and congealed by Cold, should be melted by the Heat of the Sun, because they know that the quiet Parts of the hardened Snow may be dissolved by the moved Particles of the warm Sun.
• (p)

  Hydra.] This was a Monster feigned by the Poets to have fifty, or, as others will, an hundred Heads; one of which being cut off, two did arise in its Place, till Hercules having cut off one of the Heads, did sear the Wound with hot Iron.
• (q)

  My Familiar Lucan.] Lucan is here stiled by Philosophy Fami∣liaris noster Lucanus, because he was a Philosopher, and a Vein of Phi∣losophy seems to run through the whole Work of his Pharsalia.
• (r)

  One more excellent than I.] It is supposed that our Philoso∣pher meaneth here Hermes Trismegistus: He was an Egyptian Phi∣losopher, and called Trismegistus, that is, ter maximus, because he is said to have spoken of a Trinity in the Godhead, by Suidas; or because he was both a King, a Priest, and a Philosopher: He first distinguished Time into Hours; he lived in the time of Moses, about the Year of the World 2440.
• (s)

  Phrygia.] It is a Region of the Lesser Asia, situated to∣wards the West, according to Ptolomy and Strabo.
• (t)

  Atreides] Agamemnon. Paris the Son of Priam King of Troy having equipped a Fleet, went into Greece to visit Menelaus King of Sparta, and against the Laws of Hospitality stole away his Wife; which Agamemnon the Son of Atreus, and Brother of the aforesaid Menelaus, very much resenting, he did call together the Grecian Chieftains, and sailing into Phrygia, besieged Troy; and having ta∣ken it, after a Siege of ten Years, destroyed it with Fire and Sword. The same Agamemnon when he was going upon this Expe∣dition, when he arrived at Aulis a Port of Boeotia, and had made a Review of his Army, did ignorantly kill an Hart which had been consecrated to Diana; with which the Goddess being offended, did send a Pestilence, and suppressed the Winds, so that he laid Wind-bound in the Haven. He consulted in this Exigence the O∣racle, which gave for Answer, that the Gods would not be ap∣peased till he had sacrificed Iphigenia his Daughter; Agamemnon obeyed, and himself performed the Office of the Priest, by sacri∣ficing his Daughter; so that after many Labours and Perils he ac∣complished his Enterprize. Hence Virgil. Aeneid. lib. 2.

  Saepe fugam Danai Troja cupiere relictâ Moliri, & longo fessi discedere bello, Fecissent{que} utinam! saepe illos aspera Ponti Interclusit byems, & terruit Auster •…•…untes. Praecipuè cum jam hic trabibus contextus acernis Staret equus, toto fonuerunt aethere nimbi: Suspensi Eurypylum scitatum Oracula Phoebi Mittimus; is{que} adytis haec tristia dicta reportat: Sanguine placastis ventos, & virgine caesâ. Cum primum Iliacas Danai venistis ad oras, &c.
• (u)

  Polyphemus.] Feigned to be one of the Cyclops, and the Son of Neptune, a huge Giant, who had but one Eye, and that feigned to be in his Forehead: He took Ʋlysses and four of his Company, and kept them in his Den; he devoured his Companions, but Ʋlysses having a Bottle of strong Wine, he gave it to him to drink, which cast him into a deep Sleep; so that Ʋlysses with his Staff put out his Eye, and made his Escape.
• (w)

  Alcides.] Philosophy proveth by the Example of Hercu∣les, that Heaven and Immortality are not to be attained to but by the undergoing of many afflicting Labours upon Earth. He was feigned to be the Son of Jupiter and Alcmena, and therefore hated by Juno, who exercised him still with new Toils and Adven∣tures.
• (x)

  The Centaurs.] This was the first Labour of Hercules. The Centaurs were People of Thessaly, inhabiting the Country joining upon the Mountain Pelion, who first attempted to make Horses tame, and to fight upon them: For this Reason they were looked upon by their Neighbours to be Monsters, and to have the Parts both of Men and Horses. Hercules setting upon these People, over∣came and slew many of them.
• (y)

  The Lion.] In the Nemaean Wood, which was a wild Part of the Country of Achaia, there was a Lion of an extraordinary Greatness, which was invulnerable by any Weapon made either of Iron or Brass: but Hercules attacking him, kill'd him with his Hands, and clothed himself with his Skin. This was his second Labour.
• (z)

  The Harpies.] They were feigned to be Birds of so great Dimension, hovering always about a Town called Stymphalus in Arcadia, that they darkned the Sun; and so ravenous, that they spoiled the whole Country about. Hercules is said to have invented a Timbrel or sounding Instrument of Brass, and to have driven them all away: which was his third Labour.

  —Ʋncisque timendae Ʋnguibus Arcadiae volucres Stymphâla colentes. Lucret. lib. 5.
• (a)

  Though in the Door, &c.] His fourth Labour was this: The Hesperides, Daughters of Hesperus, who was Brother of Atlas, viz. Egle, Arethusa and Hesperethusa, were feigned to have possessed Gar∣dius, lying near to Lixa, called now by the Europeans L'arache, a Town of Mauritania Tingitana, which takes its Denomination from Tingis, now Tangier, which were planted with Trees which pro∣duced Golden Fruit, and which were guarded by a waking Dra∣gon; which Dragon Hercules slew, and carried the Fruit to Eu∣ristheus his Father-in-law.
• (b)

  Cerberus.] Pirithous, the Son of Ixion: his Wife Hippodame being dead, made an Agreement with Theseus, that they should marry none who were not descended from Jupiter. Upon this Theseus stole away Helena; and Pirithous designing to take away Proserpina the Wife of Pluto, went down to Hell, Theseus and Hercu∣les accompanying him; but Pirithous upon his first Attempt was kill'd by Cerberus, whom Theseus endeavouring to help, was taken alive by Pluto, and was bound by him till Hercules bound Cerberus in a threefold Chain. This was his fifth Labour.
• (c)

  Diomedes.] He was King of Thracia, and fed his Horses with Man's Flesh; Hercules slew him, and gave him to his Horses to be eaten. This was his sixth Labour. From whence Ovid,

  Non tibi succurrit crudi Diomedis imago Efferus humanâ qui dape pavit equos.
• (d)

  The seventh Labour of Hercules was the killing of Hydra. Videsis Litt. (p) supra.
• (e)

  Achelous.] The eighth Labour of Hercules was this: Ache∣lous, feigned to be the Son of Oceanus and Tethys, fought with Her∣cules for Deianira the Daughter of Oeneus King of Caledonia; but Achelous being unequal in Strength to him, turned himself first in∣to a Serpent, then into a Bull, but Hercules cut of his Horn, which became the Cornu copiae, or Horn of Plenty, which made Achelous, being ashamed to appear with one Horn, to hide himself in a Ri∣ver of his Name.
• (f)

  Antaeus.] He was feigned to be the Son of Neptune and the Earth, and to be of so large Dimensions that he was said to be of the Height of sixty four Cubits: He engaging in Fight with Hercu∣les, so often as his Strength failed him touched the Earth, and re∣covered Strength, which when Hercules perceived, he lifted him up into the Air, and so killed him, which was his ninth Labour.
• (g)

  Cacus.] The tenth Labour which Hercules did accomplish was killing of Cacus, feigned to be the Son of Vulcan, and who in∣fested all Italy with his Robberies, and did not spare Hercules him∣self; for he stole his Oxen; and that he might not be discovered by their Footsteps, he drew them by the Tails into his Cave: but Hercules discovering them by their Lowing, recovered his Cattel, and killed Cacus, revenging an Injury which Cacus had done to Evander, whose Guest or Servant he had been.
• (h)

  The Boar.] The Erymanthian Boar in Arcadia, which was so large and fierce that it almost had depopulated the whole Coun∣try: Hercules brought this Boar to Eurystheus King of Micene in Greece, which was his eleventh Labour.
• (i)

  The Spheres.] Atlas is an high Hill of Mauritania, which stretcheth it self through a great Part of Africa, from the Atlantick Ocean, called so from this Mountain, as far Eastward as the Con∣fines of the Desarts of Barca: It is called now by the Spaniards Los Montes Claros; by other Europeans the Mountain Atlas. It received its Name from Atlas a King of Mauritania, who because he was a great Astronomer, and, as it is said, Inventor of Astro∣logy, was feigned to bear the Heavens upon his Shoulders, by maintaining and propagating the Science of it. Hercules is fabled for one Day to have eased Atlas of that Weight, for which he merited an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and to be admitted into the Society of the Gods. From whence therefore this is called his last and noblest Labour.