Marcus Aurelius Antoninus the Roman emperor, his meditations concerning himselfe treating of a naturall mans happinesse; wherein it consisteth, and of the meanes to attaine unto it. Translated out of the originall Greeke; with notes: by Meric Casaubon ...

THE SEVENTH BOOKE.

What is wickednesse? It is that which ma∣ny times and often thou hast already seene and knowne [in the world.] And so, as any thing doth happen [that might otherwise trouble thee,] let this memen∣to presently come to thy mind, that it is that which thou hast already often seene and knowne. Gene∣rally, above and below, thou shalt find but the same things. The very same things whereof ancient sto∣ries, middle age stories, and fresh stories are full: whereof townes are full, and houses full. There is nothing that is new. All things that are, are both usuall and of little continuance.

II. What feare is there that thy Dogmata [or, Philosophicall resolutions, and conclusions] should be∣come dead in thee, [and lose their proper power and efficacie to make thee live happy,] as long as those

proper and correlative phancies, and representati∣ons of things on which they mutually depend (which continually to stirre up and revive is in thy power,) are still kept fresh and alive? It is in my power concerning this thing [that is happened, what∣soever it be,] to conceit that which is right and true. If it be, why then am I troubled? Those things that are without my understanding, are nothing to it at all: [and that is it only, which doth properly con∣cerne me.] Be alwayes in this minde, and thou wilt be right.

III. [That which most men would thinke themselves most happy for, and would preferre before all things, if the gods would grant it unto them after their deaths] thou mayest [whilest thou livest] grant unto thy selfe; to live againe. See the things of the world againe; as thou hast already seene them. For what is it else to live againe? Publick shewes and solemnities with much pompe and vanitie, stage playes, flocks and heards; conflicts and contentions: a bone throwne to a companie of hungry curres; a bait for greedy fishes: the painefulnesse, and continuall burden-bea∣ring of wretched ants, the running to and fro of ter∣rified myce; little puppets drawne up and downe with wyres and nerves: [these bee the objects of the World.] Among all these thou must stand stedfast, meekly affected, and free from all manner of indig∣nation; with this right ratiocination and apprehen∣sion, that as the worth is of those things which a man doth affect, so is [in very deed] every mans worth [more or lesse.]

IV. Word after word, every one by it selfe, must

the things that are spoken be conceived and under∣stood; and so the things that are done, purpose after purpose, every one by it selfe likewise. And as in matter of purposes and actions, wee must presently see what is the proper [use and] relation of every one; so of words must we be as ready, to consider of every one what is the true meaning, and significa∣tion of it [according to truth and Nature, however it be taken in common use.]

V. Is my reason, and understanding sufficient for this, or noe? If it be sufficient, [without any private applause, or publick ostentation] as of an Instrument, which by nature I am provided of, I will make use of it for the effecting of such a worke. If it be not, and that otherwise it belong not unto me particu∣larly as a private duty, I will either give it over, and leave it to some other that can better effect it: or I will endeavour it; but with the helpe of some other, who with the joynt helpe of my reason, is able to bring somewhat to passe, that will now be seasona∣ble and usefull for the common good. For whatso∣ever I doe either by my selfe, or with some other, the only thing that I must intend, is, that it be good and expedient for the publick. [For as for praise, consider] how many who once were much com∣mended, are now already quite forgotten, yea they that commended them, how even they themselves are long since dead and gone. Bee not therefore a∣shamed, whensoever thou must use the helpe of o∣thers. For whatsoever it be, that lyeth upon thee to effect, thou must propose it unto thy selfe, as the scaling of wals is unto a soldier. And what if thou

through [either] lamenesse [or some other impediment] art not able to reach unto the top of the battlements alone, which with the helpe of another thou maiest; [wilt thou therefore give it over, or goe about it with lesse courage and alacritie, because thou canst not effect it all alone?]

VI. Let not things future trouble thee. For if necessity so require that they come to passe, thou shalt (whensoever that is:) be provided for them with the same reason, by which whatsoever is now present, is made both tolerable and acceptable unto thee. All things are linked and knitted together, and the knot is sacred, neither is there any thing in the world, that is not kinde and naturall in regard of any other thing, [or, that hath not some kinde of re∣ference, and naturall correspondence with whatsoever is in the world besides.] For all things are ranked toge∣ther, and by that decencie of its due place and or∣der that each particular doth observe, they all con∣curre together to the making of one and the same 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 [or, World: as if you said, a comely peece, or an orderly composition.] For all things through∣out, there is but one and the same order; and through all things, one and the same god the same substance and the same Law. There is one common Reason, and one common Truth, that belongs unto all rea∣sonable creatures, for neither is there save one per∣fection of all creatures that are of the same kinde, and partakers of the same reason.

VII. Whatsoever is materiall, doth soone vanish away into the common substance of the whole, and whatsoever is formall, [or, whatsoever doth animate

that which is materiall] is soone resumed into the common Reason of the Whole, and the fame and memorie of any thing, is soone swallowed up by the generall Age and duration of the whole.

VIII. To a reasonable creature, the same action is both according to nature, and according to reason.

IX. Straight [of it selfe] not made straight.

X. As severall members in one body united, so are reasonable creatures in a body divided and dis∣persed, all made and prepared for one common o∣peration. And this thou shalt apprehend the bet∣ter, if thou shalt use thy selfe often to say to thy selfe, I am 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or, a member of the masse and body of reasonable substances. But if thou shalt say I am 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or, a part, thou doest not yet love men from thy heart. The joy that thou takest in the exercise of bountie, is not yet grounded upon a due ratioci∣nation, and right apprehension of the nature of things. Thou doest exercise it as yet upon this ground barely, as a thing convenient and sitting; not, as doing good to thy selfe, [when thou doest good unto others.]

XI. Of things that are externall happen what will to that which can suffer by externall accidents. Those things that suffer let them complaine them∣selves, if they will; as for me, as long as I conceive no such thing, that that which is happened is evill; I have no hurt, and it is in my power not to con∣ceive any such thing.

XII. Whatsoever any man either doth or saith, thou must be good; [not for any mans sake, but for thine owne natures sake;] as if either gold, or the Em∣rald,

or purple, should ever be saying to themselves, Whatsoever any man either doth, or saith, I must still be an Emrald, and I must keepe my colour.

XIII. [This may ever be my comfort and securitie:] my understanding, that ruleth over all, will not of it selfe bring trouble and vexation upon it selfe. This I say; it will not put it selfe in any feare, it will not lead it selfe into any concupiscence. If it bee in the power of any other to compell it to feare, or to grieve, it is free for him to use his power. But sure if it selfe doe not of it selfe, through some [false] o∣pinion or supposition incline it selfe to any such dis∣position; [there is no feare.] For as for the body, why should I make the griefe of my body, to be the grief of my minde? If that it selfe can either feare or complaine, let it. But as for the soule, which in∣deed, can only be truly sensible of either feare or griefe; to which only it belongs according to its different imaginations and opinions, to admit of ei∣ther of these, or of their contraries; [thou mayest look to that thy selfe, that] it suffer nothing. Induce her not to any such opinion or perswasion. The under∣standing is of it selfe sufficient unto it selfe, and needs not (if it selfe doth not bring it selfe to need) any other thing besides it selfe, and by consequent as it needs nothing, so neither can it be troubled or hindered by any thing, if it selfe doth not trouble and hinder it selfe.

XIV. What is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 [or, happinesse:] but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, [or, a good Daemon, or, Spirit?] What then doest thou doe here, O opinion? By the gods I ad∣jure thee, that thou get thee gone, as thou camest:

for I need thee not. Thou camest indeed [unto me] according to thy ancient wonted manner. [It is that, that all men have ever beene subject unto. That thou camest therefore] I am not angry with thee; only be gone, [now that I have found thee what thou art.]

XV. Is any man so foolish as to feare change, to which all things [that once were not] owe their be∣ing? And what is it, that is more pleasing and more familiar to the nature of the Universe? How couldst thou thy selfe use thy ordinary hot bathes, should not the wood [that heateth them] first bee changed? How couldest thou receive any nourishment from those things that thou hast eaten, if they should not be changed? Can any thing else almost (that is use∣full and profitable) bee brought to passe without change? How then doest not thou perceive, that for thee also [by death] to come to change, is a thing of the very same nature, and as necessary for the na∣ture of the Universe?

XVI. Through the Substance of the Universe, as through a torrent passe all particular bodies, being all of the same nature, and all joynt workers with the Universe it selfe, as in one of our bodies so ma∣ny members among themselves. How many such as Chrysippus, how many such as Socrates, how many such as Epictetus, hath the Age of the world long since swallowed up and devoured? Let this, bee it either men or businesses, that thou hast occasion to thinke of, to the end that thy thoughts be not distracted and thy minde too earnestly set upon any thing,] upon every such occasion presently come to thy minde. Of all my thoughts & cares, one only thing shall be

the object, that I my selfe doe nothing which to the proper constitution of man, (either in regard of the thing it selfe, or in regard of the manner, or of the time of doing,) is contrarie. The time whē thou shalt have forgottē all things, is at hand. And that time al∣so is at hand, when thou thy selfe shalt be forgotten by all. Whilest thou art, apply thy selfe to that especially] which unto man as he is a man, is most proper and agreeable, and that is, for a man even to love them that transgresse [against him.] This shall be if at the same time [that any such thing doth happen:] thou call to minde, that they are thy Kinsmen; that it is through ignorance and against their wills that they sinne; and that within a very short while after, both thou and he shall be no more. But above all things, that he hath not done thee any hurt; for that by him thy minde and understanding is not made worse or more vile then it was before.

XVII. The nature of the Universe, of the com∣mon substance of all things as it were of so much waxe hath now perchance formed a horse; and then destroying that figure, hath new tempered and fa∣shioned the matter of it into the form and substance of a tree: then that againe into the forme and sub∣stance of a man: and then that againe into some o∣ther. Now every one of these doth subsist but for a very little while. As for dissolution, if it be no grievous thing to the chest or trunck, to be joyned together; why should it be more grievous to be put asunder?

XVIII. An angry countenance is much against nature, and it is oftentimes the proper countenance

of them that are at the point of death. But were it so, that all anger and passion were so throughly quenched in thee, that it were altogether impossi∣ble to kindle it any more [yet herein must not thou rest satisfied,] but further endeavour by good con∣sequence of true ratiocination, perfectly to conceive and understand, that all anger and passion is against reason. For if thou shalt not be sensible of thine in∣nocencie; if that also shall be gone from thee [the comfort of a good conscience, that thou doest all things ac∣cording to reason:] what shouldest thou live any lon∣ger for? All things that now thou seest, are but for a moment. That nature, by which all things in the world are administred, will soone bring change and alteration upon them, and then of their substances make other things [like unto them:] and then soone after others againe of the matter and substance of these: that so by these meanes, the world may still appeare fresh and new.

XIX. Whensoever any man doth trespasse against thee, presently consider with thy selfe what it was that he did suppose to be good, what to be evill, when he did trespasse. For this when thou know∣est, thou wilt pitty him thou wilt have no occasion either to wonder, or to be angry. For either thou thy selfe doest yet [live in that error and ignorance, as that thou doest] suppose either that very thing that he doth, or some other like [wordly] thing, to bee good: and so thou art bound to pardon him [if hee have done that which thou in the like case wouldest have done thy selfe.] Or if so be that thou doest not any more suppose the same things to be good or evill,

that he doth; how canst thou but be gentle unto him that is in an error?

XX. Phancie not to thy selfe things, future, as though they were present: but of those that are pre∣sent, take some aside, that thou takest most benefit of, and consider of them particularly, how wonder∣fully thou wouldest want them, if they were not present. But take heed withall, least that whilest thou doest settle thy contentment in things pre∣sent, thou grow in time so to overprize them, as that the want of them (whensoever it shall so fall out) should be a trouble and a vexation unto thee. Winde up thy selfe into thy selfe. Such is the Na∣ture of thy reasonable commanding part, as that if it exercise justice, and have by that meanes tran∣quillitie within it selfe, it doth rest fully satisfied with it selfe [without any other thing.]

XXI. Wipe off all opinion: stay the force and vi∣olence of unreasonable lusts and affections: Cir∣cumscribe the present time: Examine whatsoever it be that is happened; either to thy selfe or to ano∣ther: Divide all present objects, either in that which is formall or materiall: thinke of the last hower. That which thy neighbour hath committed, where the guilt of it lyeth, there let it rest. Extend thy minde to [or, Examine in order] whatsoever is spo∣ken. Let thy minde penetrate, both into the effects, and into the causes. Rejoyce thy selfe with true simplicitie, and modestie, and that all middle things betweene vertue and vice are indifferent unto thee. [Finally,] Love mankinde; obey God.

XXII. All things (saith he) are by certaine order

and appointment. And what if the Elements onely ❀❀❀. It will suffice to remember, that all things in generall are by certaine order and appointment: or if it be but few. ❀❀ And as concerning death, that either Dispersion, or the Atomes, or Annihilation, or Extinction, or Translation [will insue.] And as concerning paine, that that which is intolerable is soone ended by death; and that which holds long must needs be tolerable; and that the minde in the meane time [which is all in all may by way of inter∣clusion, or interception [by stopping all manner of com∣merce and sympathie with the bodie,] still retaine its owne tranquillitie. Thy understanding is not made worse by it. As for those parts that suffer, let them, if they can, declare their griefe themselves. As for praise and commendation, view their minde and understanding, what estate they are in; what kinde of things they flie, and what things they seeke after and that as in the sea-side, whatsoever was before to be seene, is by the continuall succession of new heapes of sand cast up one upon another, soone hid and covered; so in this life, all former things by those which immediately succeed.

XXIII. Out of Plato. Hee then whose minde is en∣dowed with true magnanimitie, who hath accustomed himselfe to the contemplation both of all times, and of all things in generall; can this mortall life (thinkest thou) seeme any great matter unto him? It is not possible; an∣swered hee. Then neither will such a one account death a grievous thing? By no meanes.

XXIV. Out of Antisthenes. It is a princely thing to doe well, and to be ill spoken of. It is a shamefull thing

that the face should be subject unto the minde, to bee put into what shape it will, and to be dressed by it as it will; and that the minde should not bestow so much care upon her selfe, as to fashion her selfe, and to dresse her selfe as best becommeth her.

XXV. [Out of severall poets and Comicks] It will but little availe thee, to turne thine anger and indignation upon the things themselves [that have fallen crosse unto thee.] For as for them, they are not sensible of it, &c. Thou shalt but make thy selfe a laughing slock; both unto the gods and men, &c. To reape ones life, as a ripe eare, &c. And that this is, and that this is not, &c. But if so be that I and my children be neglected by the gods, there is some reason even for that, &c. As long as right and equitie is of my side, &c. Not to lament with them, Not to tremble, &c.

XXVI. Out of Plato. My answer, full of justice and equitie, should be this: Thy speech is not right, O man! if thou supposest that he that is of any worth at all, should apprehend either life or death, as a matter of great hazard and danger; and should not make this rather his only care, to examine his owne actions, whether just or unjust: whether actions of a good, or of a wicked man, &c. For thus in very truth, stands the case, O yee men of Athens. What place or station soever a man either hath chosen to himselfe, judging it best for himselfe; or is by lawfull authoritie put & setled in, therein doe I thinke (all appearance of danger notwithstanding:) that hee should continue as one who feareth neither death, nor a∣ny thing else so much as he feareth to commmit any thing that is vicious and shamefull, &c. But, O noble Sir, consider I pray, whether true generositie and true happi∣nesse,

doe not consist in somewhat else rather, then in the preservation either of ours, or other mens lives. For it is not the part of a man that is a man indeed, to desire to live long [or to make much of his life whilest he liveth:] But rather (he that is such) will in these things wholly referre himselfe unto the gods, and beleeving that which every woman can tell him, that, no man can escape death; the only thing that he takes thought and care for is this, that what time he liveth, he may live as well and as ver∣tuously as he can possibly, &c. To looke about, and with the eyes to follow the course of the starres and planets, as though thou wouldest runne with them; and to minde perpetually the severall changes of the Elements one into another. For such phancies and imaginations, help much to purge away, the drosse and filth of this our earthly life, &c. That also is a fine passage of Plato's, where he speaketh of worldly things in these words: Thou must also as from some higher place looke downe, as it were upon the things of this world, as flocks, armies, hus∣band-mens labours, mariages, divorces, generations, deaths: the tumults of Courts and places of judicatures; desert places; the severall nations of Barbares, publick festivals, mournings, faires, markets. How all things [upon Earth] are pesse messe; and how [miracu∣lously things contrary one to another, concurre to the beautie and perfection of this Universe.

XXVII. To looke backe upon things of former ages, as upon the manifold changes and conversi∣ons of severall Monarchies and common-wealths. We may also foresee things future, for they shall all be of the same kinde; neither is it possible that they should leave the tune, or breake the consort that is

now begunne as it were, by these things that are now done and brought to passe in the World. It comes all to one therefore, whether a man be a spe∣ctatour of the things of this life but fortie yeares, or whether he see them ten thousand yeares together: for what shall he see more? And as for those parts that came from the Earth, they shall returne unto the Earth againe; and those that came from Heaven, they also shall returne unto those heavenly places. Whether it be a meere dissolution and unbinding of the ma∣nifold intricacies and intanglements of the confused atomes; or some such dispersion of the simple and incorruptible Elements ❀❀❀. With meates and drinkes and divers charmes, they seeke to divert the cha∣nell, that they might not die. Yet must we needs endure that blast of winde that commeth from above, though we bewaile our toile and misery.

XXVIII. He hath a stronger body, and is a bet∣ter wrastler then I: [What then?] Is he more boun∣tifull? is he more modest? Doth he beare all ad∣verse chances with more equanimitie: Or with his neighbours offences with more meeknesse and gen∣tlenesse then I?

XXIX. Where the matter may be effected agree∣ably to that Reason, which both unto the gods, and men is common, there can be no just cause of griefe or sorrow. For where the fruit and benefit of an a∣ction well begunne and prosecuted according to the proper constitution of man may be reaped and ob∣tained, [or, is sure and certaine,] it is against reason that any dammage should there be suspected. In all places, and at all times, it is in thy power religiously

to embrace whatsoever [by Gods appointment] is hap∣pened unto thee, and justly to converse with those men, whom thou hast to doe with; and accurately to examine every phancie that presents it selfe, that nothing may slippe and steale in, before thou hast rightly apprehended the true Nature of it.

XXX. Looke not about upon other mens mindes and understandings; but looke right on forwards whither Nature, both that of the Vniverse, in those things that happen unto thee; and thine in parti∣cular, in those things that are done by thee, doth leade, and direct thee. Now every one is bound to doe that, which is consequent and agreeable to that end which by his true naturall constitution hee was ordained unto. As for all other things, they are or∣dained for the use of reasonable creatures: as in all things wee see that that which is worse and inferi∣our, is made for that which is better. Reasonable creatures, they are ordained one for another. That therefore which is chiefe in every mans constituti∣on, is, that he intend the common good. The second is, that he yeeld not to any lusts and motions of the flesh. For it is the part and priviledge of the reaso∣nable and intellective facultie, that she can so bound her selfe, as that neither the sensitive, nor the appe∣titive faculties, may not any wayes prevaile upon her. For both these are brutish. And [therefore] over both she challengeth masterie, and cannot any waies indure [if in her right temper,] to be subject unto ei∣ther. And this indeed most justly. For by nature shee was ordained to command all in the body. The third thing proper to man by his constitution, is, to avoid

all rashnesse, and precipitancie; and not to be subject to error. To these things then, let the mind apply her selfe and goe straight on [without any distraction about other things] and shee hath her end, [and by con∣sequent her happinesse.]

XXXI. As one who had lived, and were now to die by right, whatsoever is yet remaining, bestow that wholly as [a gracious] overplus upon a vertuous life. Love and affect that onely, whatsoever it be that happeneth, and is by the Fates appointed unto thee. For what can be more reasonable? And as any thing doth happen unto thee [by way of crosse, or calamity,] call to mind presently and set before thine eyes, the examples of some other men, to whom the selfe same thing did once happen likewise. Well, what did they? They grieved; they wondred, they com∣plained. And where are they now? All dead and gone. Wilt thou also be like one of them? Or rather leaving to men of the world (whose life both in re∣gard of themselves, and them that they converse with, is nothing but meere mutabilitie; or men of as fickle minds, as fickle bodyes; ever changing and soone changed themselves:) their owne fickle dispositions; let it be thine onely care and study, how to make a right use of all such accidents. For there is good use to be made of them, and they will prove fit matter for thee to worke upon, if it shall bee both thy care and thy desire, that whatsoever thou doest, thou thy selfe mayst like and approve thy selfe for it. And both these, see, that thou remember well, according as the diversity of the matter of the action that thou art about; shall require. Looke within; within is the

fountaine of all good. Such a fountaine, where springing waters can never faile, so thou digge still deeper and deeper.

XXXII. Thou must use thy selfe also to keepe thy body fixed and steady; free from all loose fluctu∣ant, either motion, or posture. And as upon thy face and lookes, thy minde hath easily power over them to keepe them to that which is grave and decent; so let it challenge the same power over the whole body also. But so observe all things in this kinde, as that it be without any manner of affectation.

XXXIII. The art of true living in this world, is more like a wrastlers, then a dancers practise. For in this they both agree [to teach] a man whatsoever falls upon him, that he may be ready for it, and that nothing may cast him downe.

XXXIV. Thou must continually ponder & consi∣der with thy selfe, what manner of men they bee, and for their mindes and understandings what is their present estate, whose good word and testimo∣nie thou doest desire. For then neither wilt thou see cause to complaine of them that offend against their wills; or finde any want of their applause, if once thou doest but penetrate into the true force, and ground both of their opinions; and of their de∣sires. No soule (saith he:) is willingly bereaved of the Truth, and by consequent, neither of justice, or tem∣perance, or kindnesse, and mildnesse; nor of any thing that is of the same kinde. It is most needfull that thou shouldest alwayes remember this. For so shalt thou be farre more gentle and moderate to∣wards all men.

XXXV. What paine soever thou art in, let this presently come to thy minde, that it is not a thing whereof thou needest to be ashamed, neither is it a thing, whereby thy understanding, that hath the go∣vernment of all, can be made worse. For neither in regard of the substance of it, nor in regard of the end of it (which is, to intend the common good;) can it alter and corrupt it. This also of Epicurus maist thou in most paines finde some helpe of, that it is: neither intolerable, nor eternall; so thou keepe thy selfe to the true bounds and limits [of reason] and give not way to opinion. This also thou must con∣sider, that many things there be, which oftentimes unsensibly trouble & vexe thee [as not armed against them with patience, because they goe not ordinarily un∣der the name of paines] which in very deed, are of the same nature as paine; as to slumber unquietly: to suffer heat, to want appetite, when therefore any of these things make thee discontented, check thy selfe with these words. Now hath paine given thee the foile. Thy courage hath failed thee.

XXXVI. Take heed least at any time thou stand so affected, though towards unnaturall evill men, as ordinary men are commonly one towards another.

XXXVII. How know we whether Socrates were so Eminent indeed, and of so extraordinary a dispo∣sition? For that he dyed more gloriously, that hee disputed with the Sophists more subtilly; that hee watched in the Pagus more affiduously; that being commanded to fetch [innocent] Salaminius, hee re∣fused to doe it more generously; all this will not serve. Nor that he walked in the streets, with much

gravitie and majestie as was objected unto him by his adversaries, which neverthelesse a man may we doubt of whether it were so or no, [or, which aboue all the rest, if so be that it were true, a man would well consider of, whether commendable, or discommendable.] The thing therefore that we must inquire into, is this; what manner of soule Socrates had whether his disposition was such; as that all that he stood up∣on; and sought after in this world, was barely this; That he night ever carry himselfe justly towards men, and holily towards the gods. Whether with∣out indignation, when it would doe no good, hee could beare with other mens wickednesse, and yet never condescend to any mans evill fact, or evill in∣tentions; [through either feare, or ingagement of friend∣ship.] Whether of those things that happened unto him by Gods appointment, he neither did wonder at any when it did happen, or thought it intolerable in the triall of it. And lastly, whether he never did suffer his minde to sympathize with the senses, and affections of the body. For we must not think that Nature hath so mixed and rempered it with the bo∣dy, as that she hath not power to circumscribe her selfe, and by her selfe to intend her owne ends and occasions.

XXXVIII. For it is a thing very possible, that a man should be a very divine man, and yet bee altogether un∣knowne. This thou must ever be mindfull of, as of this also, that a mans true happinesse doth consist in very few things. And that although thou doest despaire, that thou shalt ever be a good either Logician, or Naturalist, yet thou art never the further off by it

from being either liberall, or modest, or charitable, or obedient unto God.

XXXIX. Free from all compulsion in all cheere∣fulnesse and alacritie thou maist runne out thy time, though men should exclame against thee ne∣ver so much, and the wilde beasts should pull in sun∣der the poore members of thy pampered masse of flesh. For what in either of these or the like cases, should hinder the minde to retaine her owne rest and tranquillitle, consisting both in the right judge∣ment of chose things that happen unto her, and in the ready use of all present matters and occasions? So that her judgement may say, to that which is be∣falne her by way of crosse: This thou art in very deed, and according to thy true nature; notwithstanding that in the judgement of opinion thou doest ap∣peare otherwise: and her Discretion to the present ob∣ject; Thou art that, which I sought for. For what∣soever it be, that is now present, shall ever be em∣braced by me as a fit and seasonable object, both for my reasonable facultie, and for my sociable, or charitable inclination to worke upon. And that which is principall in this matter, is, that it may bee referred either unto [the praise of] God, or to [the good of] men. For either unto God or man, what∣soever it is that ••oth happen in the world hath in the ordinary course of nature its proper reference; neither is there any thing, that [in regard of nature] is either new, or reluctant and intractable, but all things both usuall and easie.

XL. Then hath a man attained to the estate of perfection in his life and conversation, when hee so

spends every day, as if it were his last day: never hot and vehement in his affections, nor yet so cold and stupid as one that had no sense; and free from all manner of dissimulation.

XLI. Can the gods, who are immortall, for the continuance of so many ages beare without indig∣nation with such and so many sinners, as have ever beene, yea not only so, but also take such care for them, that they want nothing; and doest thou so grievously take on, as one that could beare with them no longer; thou that art but for a moment of time? yea thou that art one of those sinners thy selfe? A very ridiculous thing it is, that any man should dispense with vice and wickednes in himself, which is in his power to restraine, and should goe a∣bout to suppresse it in others, which is altogether impossible.

XLII. What object soever, our reasonable and so∣ciable facultie doth meet with, that affords nothing either for the satisfaction of reason, or for the pra∣ctise of charitie, shee worthily doth thinke unwor∣thy of her selfe.

XLIII. When thou hast done well, and another is benefited by thy action, must thou like a very foole looke for a third thing besides, as that it may appeare unto others also that thou hast done well, or that thou maiest in time, receive one good turne for another? No man useth to be wearie of that which is beneficiall unto him. But every action ac∣cording to Nature, is beneficiall. Bee not wearie then of doing that which is beneficiall unto thee, whilest it is so unto others.

XLIV. The nature of the Universe did once cer∣tainely [before it was created, whatsoever it hath done since] deliberate and so resolve upon the creation of the World. Now since that time, whatsoever it is, that is and happens in the world, is either but a consequent of that one and first deliberation: or if so be that this ruling rationall part of the world, takes any thought and care of things particular, they are surely his reasonable and principal creatures, that are the proper object of his particular care and pro∣vidence. This often thought upon, will much con∣duce to thy tranquillitie.

Notes

• See B IV. N. 39. B V.N. 27.
• See B. III. N. XVI. B. IV. N. XXIV.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 See B. V. N. 20. B. IX. N. 41
• See Note 6. upon B. II. and B. VII. 34.
• See B. X 29. B. X.I 18.
• See B. IV N. 22.
• G••: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. See pref.
• See B. VIII. N. 13.
• Gr: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• See B. VI Num. XXXIII XX XIX. B. IX.XXVI.