This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. Searching, reading, printing, or downloading EEBO-TCP texts is reserved for the authorized users of these project partner institutions. Permission must be granted for subsequent distribution, in print or electronically, of this text, in whole or in part. Please contact project staff at eebotcp-info@umich.edu for further information or permissions.
It may further bee demanded, whether it may bee beneficiall to a Prince or State to nourish factions, or no?
IT were too hard a taske for mee (Right Honou∣rable) to take vpon mee difinitiuely to deter∣mine this question: for I am not ignorant that amongst diuers men, and those of the wisest sort, this doubt hath beene canuased, and greatly con∣trouerted; yet seeing that I am entred into it, I thought it not fit altogether to passe it ouer in si∣lence,
without shewing your Honour my priuate opinion therein, which that I may do the better, I will rip vp the Arguments on both sides. That factions (therefore) should bee nourished of a Prince or State, many things may induce and perswade thereunto, but especially these two, Honour and Profit. For that Prince c must needes bee honoured and feared, who alwaies hath an enemy at his owne deuotion, and neuer resisting his designes and enterprises: For hee that can conquer when hee list, is not onely admired, but much feared likewise, both at home and abroad. For all men with one voyce will giue it out, that hee got the victory by his owne valour and prowesse: Which so reported and beleeued, there is no doubt but that hee shall bee much re∣nowmed therefore, though he atchieued it other∣wise; namely, by being seconded with a potent faction, ioyning with him against their owne Prince, or otherwise. Againe, that the chiefest and most potent Cities of a Kingdome, should be brought vnder the Princes subiection, it were not onely conducible and necessary, but also pro∣fitable, both to him and the common-wealth. Now to effect this, a Prince must either vse force or policy. If hee say to compasse his designes by force, hee must of necessity offer many iniuries to the people, which the more openly they are done, the more they do prouoke them to mislike the Prince: For that which the Law hath made Mine, and Thine, if it should be snatched away
from the Subiect, it would bee grieuously taken, and held for no better then an intollerable peece of iniustice. But when the f Cities of themselues are become factious, and the Citizens doe waste and cōnsume themselues by quarrels and facti∣ons, the fault shall neuer bee laid on the Prince, but on the factious, and yet by this meanes the Prince in effect, shall obtaine what hee desired. For the Cities hereby growing weake, and wea∣ried with continuall garboiles, will willingly put themselues into the Princes protection, and yeeld themselues subiect to his will. Further, for a Prince to diuert the current of the warres, or any hostile inuasions, from his owne dores, it is very necessary, behouefull and conuenient: Now it is not incredible, that euer hee shall haue any better way, or meane to bring this to passe, then by g nourishing factions, and dissentions in his enemies Countrie; for many haue put this in pra∣ctise heretofore, and greatly thriuen thereby: Moreouer diuers of the wisest sort, haue thought it very aduantageous to the Prince, that the h Sub∣iects should neuer come altogether, to consult, or agree altogether, vpon any thing which might tend to their common or particular safeties. To conclude, i that a great Prince, or Monarch, may become more wary of his enemy, and better conserue his owne estate, it hath beene thought fit, by some of the wisest heads that euer haue beene, that such a Prince should neuer bee with∣out an enemy, or be a great nourisher of facti∣ons
in a forreigne Land: Which course, if Rome had taken, and not destroyed Carthage, they should haue had their braue spirited youth better trayned vp, practised, and made ready in feates of Armes, which might haue steeded the Common-wealth for offence or defence thereof; Graue and mature counsell should haue flouri∣shed in the Senate, the Citizens should not haue wasted themselues with ciuill warres, and so the Empire should haue beene more durable and la∣sting. The reasons of those who hold it vnpro∣fitable, and euery way disaduantageous to a Prince, to nourish factions, are as follow. It is k im∣possible, say they, by reason of an inbred incon∣stancy in the nature of men, that those factions, which at this, or that present, depend vpon a Prince, should alwaies, and after one and the selfe-same manner, bee so affected towards him, for that men being wauering, doe greatly desire sometimes this Prince, sometimes that Prince, to be their chiefe Patron. Againe, l the nourshing of factions, by a Prince in a forreigne Land, is oftentimes the cause, that by little and little, dis∣cords and ciuill garboyles are brought into his owne Country, which will scarcely be thought to bee conuenient. Further, a great inconuenience, or rather an apparant losse might happen to a Prince, who should nourish factions within his owne Dominions; For m vpon any sodaine inua∣sion, such Cities of his, which should happen to bee rent asunder by factions, must of necessity
be all lost: For the n weaker part would rather submit, and apply it selfe to a stranger, then yeeld to the aduerse faction in any thing. More∣ouer this course of gouerning, by nourishing of factions, must needs o argue the weakenesse, and imbecility of the Prince, both in power and iudgement: For if hee were strong and prudent, hee would neuer indure that his Country should bee torne in peeces by factions and contentions. To conclude, seeing that euery faction consisteth of few or many, both of these must needs bee hurtfull to the Common-wealth: This latter for that p they trusting to their owne strength, would presently take Armes, and turne the quiet of the State into garboiles: The former likewise, though perhaps somewhat more secretly and slowly, would no lesse vexe and molest the Common∣wealth, by reason that q factions of the Nobility are wont to draw vnto themselues all, or the grea∣test part of the Commons, to take part with such or such of them, as they most affect. These things thus standing, they conclude, that factions are ra∣ther to bee extinguished and quenched, then nou∣rished. For mine owne part (Right Honourable) though I will determine nothing of this matter, yet thus I thinke thereof. That Factions, to the singular benefite of the Prince, and Common∣wealth, may be nourished in a forreigne gouerne∣ment: and though it were not so conuenient (perhaps) they should bee set on foote, and maintained at home, yet at no hand are they to
be neglected, especially in the time of peace. For seeing that there is no Common-wealth, which doth not breed and bring forth, yea foster and cherish some enuy and contention: these contentions may proue healthfull to the State of a Common-wealth, as Agues are sometime be∣neficiall to the state of a mans body: And it is certaine that the Romane Common-wealth, was neuer in better health and safety, then when the Tribunes of the People, and the Patricians were at variance: and the Lacedaemonian State ne∣uer in better state, then when their Ephori, and their Kings could not agree. For by this cur∣bing of one another, the publique Offi∣ces of a Common-wealth were better discharged, both at home and abroad.
Mach. Prin. cap. 20.
Mach. dis. lib. 2. cap. 25.
Herod. lib. 4. Xenoph. de Pe∣dia Cyri. lib. 3.
Tacit. Agric.
Tholoz. de Re∣pub. lib. 23.
Mach. lib. 3. dis. cap. 37.
Idem Ibidem.
Idem Prin. cap. 20.
Tholoz. lib. de Repub. 23.
Mach. Prin. cap. 20.
Liu. lib. 34.
Arist. 5. Polit. cap. 4.