XXIX. Proposition. Of Free-will, and the strength thereof.
BEfore I come to propound the question, that it may be tru∣ly vnderstood, somethings are to be premised.
First, that there is the facultie called the will in euery reaso∣nable soule.
Secondly, that this will is a free and actiue will, in it selfe, and to anything it willeth, without enforcement.
Thirdly, that this will hath the vnderstanding, the other fa∣cultie of the soule, euer going before it, to bee the informer thereof.
Fourthly, that this will hath power to chuse, or refuse the thing obiected, and laid before it, or to pause and rest it selfe be∣tweene both.
Fifthly, that the vse of this free-will was, to compasse all those ends for which man was made, (which were as manifold as mans composition, who is microcosmus) and to doe such things as should tend to his owne good, and Gods glory: but by sinning, man hath left off this free-will, till it be repaired by grace: yet not wholly, but that in diuers things some power remaineth;
First, in all naturall actions, as to eate, sleepe, walke, sit, stand, and to vse all other bodily actions, and vse of the senses, for preseruation of life, and for auoiding things hurtfull; the gene∣rall gift in nature, common to all vnreasonable creatures. Onely whereas these moue to their end, yet are they not priuy (for want of reason) to discerne what they doe: but man, as Lord of his owne actions, doth what he doth, out of his owne choice, by knowledge, and deliberation before hand.
Secondly, in humane actions; as to speake, discourse, learne and