Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

Peripateticall INSTITUTIONS. First Book.

Containing that part of LOGICK vvhich is necessary to SCIENCES.

LESSON I.

Of Propositions as they are the parts of a Syllogisme.

1. LOgick is the Art of Discour∣sing. Discourse is the Progresse of the Vnderstanding, out of one thought or judgement into another: but in a more speciall ac∣ceptation of the word, 'tis A Motion whereby the Understanding, out of a fit and orderly disposure of some judge∣ments already possessed by it, deduces and leads it self into the knowledge of some∣thing it was ignorant of. And this Dis∣course,

when 'tis close and exactly perfect, is, by a Greek term, called a Syllogism.

2. A Syllogism is compos'd of three Propositions: A Proposition is a speech whereby something is affirmed or denied concerning another: Whence, to its per∣fection, three parts are necessary; That which is affirm'd, That of which 'tis af∣firm'd, and That which expresses the affir∣mation, or the Term which connects them together.

3. These three are called Notions, or apprehensions, or things as they are in the Understanding, that is, according to what is common to them in themselves and in the Understanding: For, as the Statue of Caesar in something agrees with, in some∣thing differs from Caesar; so the Under∣standing actually possessed of any know∣ledge, has something wherein it resembles and agrees with the Object, other things wherein 'tis unlike and differs from it.

4. 'Tis already said that Propositions are, some Affirmative, some Negative. Now, sometimes it falls out, that an Affirma∣tion is applied to one thing alone; some∣times to divers indifferently, as many agree in some one and the same Notion: This last is called an Vniversall Proposi∣tion;

as when we say, Every man is a li∣ving Creature.

5. When the affirmation is applied to one thing alone, that is taken either de∣terminately, as Socrates, Bucephalus, &c. and then the proposition is called Singular: or else indeterminately, as when we say, some Man, or Horse, &c. and then 'tis call'd a Par∣ticular proposition.

6. Again: since a proposition is either affirmative or negative; and the same thing cannot▪ at once, both be & not-be: if, at any time, one proposition affirms what another denies, such cannot be both true together; and therefore they are called Opposites or Incompossibles.

7. When the affirmation and negation falls upon the same thing in all respects, such propositions are called Contradictories; as, Socrates, here and now, runs; Socrates, here and now, runs not: But when the pro∣position is universall on both sides, they are called Contraries; as, All men are wise, None are wise.

8. Farther: as 'tis evident, the same thing cannot both be and not-be, at once; so 'tis as clear that every thing is, whilst it is: whence, if at any time a proposition pro∣nounces the same thing concerning the

same, 'tis called self-evident; as when we say, The whole is greater then a part of it self, for 'tis as much as to say, A part and more is more then a part.

9. Wherefore, if it be once known, that the same Notion is identify'd with two others; it will presently be evident, that those two are identify'd betwixt them∣selves: for otherwise, that Notion which is the same with them would not be the same with it self.

10. Two propositions, therefore, being put, which discover the identification of some one Notion with two others; a third proposition evidently emerges, whereby the identification of those two Notions betwixt themselves is declared: And these three compose a Syllogism.

LESSON II.

Of a Syllogism and its Conclusion.

1. A Proposition being a speech which pronounces one thing of ano∣ther; and since, betwixt three, there can be but three Variations, viz. that one be pronounced of two, or two of one,

or one of another, and that again of the third; there are onely three sorts or Fi∣gures of Syllogisms.

2. And, a Syllogism consisting of such speeches as connect one Term to ano∣ther; since, this third way, the Term which joyns the rest falls into the midst be∣tween them, becoming under or Subject to one, and above or Predicate to the other; it truly and properly connects them: whence, that Figure whose Terms are thus order'd, is call'd the First; and 'tis the chief of all others, for all the Propositions and their Terms or Notions have a con∣stant and determinate place and order in the Syllogism:

3. Whereas, in the other Figures it im∣ports not whether of the two Antecedents be preferr'd; and, in the Conclusion, either of the Terms may, indifferently, be the Sub∣ject or Predicate, And, if we look more narrowly into it, the other two Figures will, indeed, appear but distorsions of the first; whereby the Notion, which, really, is the Middle one of the three, is made one of the Extremes, because all the three are identify'd. The first Figure, therefore, a∣lone is according to Nature, and Neces∣sary.

4. And in this first, because the middle notion is once affirm'd or made the Predi∣cate, and once the Subject, the Conclusi∣on cannot be varied, except it be in re∣spect of the Universality and Particulari∣ty, or Affirmation and Negation; whence the Conclusion becomes either an Uni∣versall or Particular Affirmative or Nega∣tive; as uses to be cyphred by these words, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio: in which the Vowells shew the Nature of the Propo∣sition; A standing for an Universall Affir∣mative, E, an Universall Negative, I, a Particular Affirmative, O, a Particular Ne∣gative.

5. And, because these four Differences contein all manner of Propositions, in which Truth may be look'd for; there are onely four Moods or forms of Syllogisms profitable, and they sufficient to deduce it: the rest are all provided rather for cu∣riosity and abundance then benefit.

6. There is another kind of Syllogism which some call Expository, consisting pure∣ly of Singulars: And because a singular proposition comprehends its Notion as well as an universall, 'tis a perfect Syllo∣gism, though little used in Sciences, and therefore little treated of.

7. Again; since those things which are Circumstantiall to any other thing either belong to it, or not; and if they belong to it, then either to it alone, or to many other things as well as it: the propositions, too, which are deduc'd out of these, must be some Proper, some Common, some wholly Accidentall and Unconcerning.

8. Amongst which, since Proper ones alwayes expresse something which has the Nature of a Cause or Effect, and an Effect cannot exist without an actuall Cause, nor an actuall Cause without an Effect; such propositions are fit to conclude upon any Subject, about which we are making in∣quiry, that It is, and cannot possibly but be; to do which we call framing a Science, and the Syllogism whereby we work thus, a Demonstration, and its Conclusion, Sci∣ence: which, if we know why a thing is, that is, if the Demonstration be made from the Cause, both the knowledge and Demonstration are call'd à Priori, or from something going before; if otherwise, à Posteriori, or from something follow∣ing.

9. Common and Vnconcerning Proposi∣tions are both of this Nature, Not to be applied to the Conclusion but by the Con∣voy

and Mediation of some other closer re∣lations; which yet, lying hid and being undiscernable, are onely capable of af∣fording an apparent knowledge call'd O∣pinion.

10. From which rule, such propositi∣ons are to be excepted which assume for proof the knowledge of another person: for, since Knowledge is adequate to the Thing it self; 'tis, as it were, a proper Ac∣cident: and the knowledge of a thing at∣tain'd by these propositions is call'd Faith. Which kind of knowledge may arrive to a certainty, if the Authority assum'd be out of all question: yet it is not Science, be∣cause not evident; since the thing appears but in the knowledge of another, and is undiscernable in it self, being it moves not the Understanding by it self and things naturally connected with it.

LESSON III.

Of the Predicaments in Common, and the three first in particular.

1. WE have said that Propositions are compos'd of Notions; and that a Notion is the thing, ac∣cording

to the being it has in the Vnder∣standing: There are, therefore, so many kinds of Notions as there are severall com∣mon habitudes of any thing without or within the Understanding, whereby it may be referr'd to any other thing, that is, Predicated of a Subject.

2. Now any thing may be considered both according to what it has in it self or is in its own Nature, and according to other things which, by consideration, are drawn in and applied to it. And, as to its intrinsecalls, a thing is consider'd either absolutely and in its very self; and so 'tis call'd a Substance, and that which is pro∣nounced of it a Substantiall Predicate: Or, as 'tis compar'd to all other things, in that respect wherein all things agree; and thus we ask, how big a thing is? and what we answer concerning it is call'd its Quantity: Thirdly, 'tis compar'd to those things which are of the same kind with it▪ or to its own particular nature; and so we ask, what manner of thing is it, that is, how perfect is it in its own nature? and what we answer is call'd its Quality: Lastly, 'tis compar'd to other particular things; and we ask, what 'tis in respect to another? and the answer is call'd Related or Relation.

'Tis plain that, under these four heads, are comprehended all things considerable in the Nature of any Subject, that is, which are in it self.

3. But, those things, which are circum∣stantiall to another and may be referr'd to it, are either apply'd with Motion or in Rest. If in Rest, the Predicate is neither constantly fixt to the Subject, nor the Subject to the Predicate; and then we ask, where a thing is? and the answer is call'd it's Place: Or else the Subject is fixt to the Predicate; as a Statue to its Basis, Liquour to a Vessell, one that sits to his Chair, &c. and, as before, we ask, where a thing is? whereto the Predicate we answer is call'd its Site or Situation: Or lastly, the Predicate is fixt to the Subject, and we ask, what it has? to which that we answer is call'd its Habit, as Garments, Arms, In∣struments.

4. In Motion, if the Subject be mov'd, the Agent alwaies accompanies it; if it move, the Patient: and, in both cases, Time or the Motion of the Heavens goes a∣long with them, from which no Motion can be exempt. Of this last, we ask, When was the Motion? and what we answer is call'd the Time of the Motion.

5. When the Subject is mov'd, we ask, by what? and that we answer is said to Act, and the Subject to Suffer from it: when the Subject moves, we ask, what it moves? and that we answer is said to Suffer, and it self to Act. Thus, the reason is evident, why there are just ten Orders or Classes of Predicates, or Notions, or Beings in the Understan∣ding, which are call'd Predicaments.

6. Substance is immediately distinguisht into Spirit and Body. The differences of Spirits are unknown. Bodies are either Living, that is, moving themselves, or Dead, that is, not moving, but mov'd by others. Living bodies are either Sensitive, or with∣out Senses. Sensitive are either Intellectuall, viz. Man, or Brutall, Beasts. Man is either Socrates, or Plato, or Xenophon, &c. and these are no farther divisible; whence they are call'd Individualls; the rest Vniversalls, because they are predicated universally of all that are under them, that is, of every one.

7. Quantity is either Discrete, as Num∣ber; or Continu'd: and this, either Per∣manent, or Successive. Permanent is twofold; Extensive, whose perfection consists in three degrees including one another, Longi∣tude, Latitude, Profundity; and Inten∣sive,

which is Weight. Successive Quanti∣ty is contein'd in Action, Passion, Speak∣ing, and, generally, in Motion.

8. Concerning the proper nature of Body, because 'tis Finite, we ask, of what Figure 'tis? because 'tis Alterable by o∣thers, we ask, how 'tis, in respect to those Qualities according to which 'tis variable? as Heat, cold, colour, savour, &c. and this either constantly or in Motion; and we an∣swer, accordingly, either by the Passible Quality or by the Passion: as, in a Feaver to be hot, or to blush for Bashfulnesse, is a Passion; but to be of a hot complexion, or ruddy countenance, is a Passible quality. Again, because a Body is ordered naturally to Act and to Suffer, we ask, what it can or cannot do? and that which is answer'd is call'd its Power or Impotency. Lastly, be∣cause every nature consists in a kind of Temperature, we ask, whether it be well or ill in respect to that; that is, whether it exactly or disproportionately possesses those things which are requisite to that; and this, either constantly or for a time? to which the answer is call'd, respectively, a Habit or Disposition.

LESSON IV.

Of the rest of the Predicaments.

1. THose things which relate or are compar'd to another, are either compar'd for having some Notion common to both; or for their A∣cting or Suffering; or else, by a certain third way, which participates of both these: as, when a Picture is made like the Originall, that neither acts upon the Picture, nor is the Picture (being wholy of another kind) really like it, yet in a manner, 'tis both: and this respect is call'd of the thing measu∣red to the Measure.

2. And, in this kind, there is one one∣ly relation, and that on the side of the Mea∣sured: For a Relation being the Order of one thing to another, and since, between two things, one may be so ordered to the other, that the other may either have or not have a coordination to it; it comes to passe that those things which are in the same order (such as are those two first kinds) have a relation on both sides, but those that are of different orders, so that,

notwithstanding, the one be ordered to the other, have a relation but on one side.

3. Besides, it often happens that the Understanding, through Custome or an imperfect way of knowing, expresses even things that have no ordination, by a cer∣tain relative resemblance; and then 'tis a mentall relation (by schoolmen call'd de dici) not a reall one: as also, when the Un∣derstanding has express'd the nature of a∣ny thing by a Negation, saying, a Man does not see, or has no hair; and then gives a positive being to this Notion, say∣ing, a Man is blind or bald; according to the naturall Aptitude or Ineptitude of the Subject to the denyed Quality, 'tis call'd a Mentall Negation or Privation, re∣spectively.

4. Wherefore, since, by these only ways, the Understanding can so vary any thing which it knowes, that a change may remain on the Objects side, and enter into the consideration of it, as belonging to the thing known; there can be three only kinds of Mentall Beings: For, the disputes of the Moderns concerning such entities, are but gay Trifles, and the con∣templation of an erroneous definition.

5. There is a kind of Relations, not un∣justly, call'd Intellectuall, which follows a thing in the Vnderstanding in vertue of the reall quality of mere Vnderstanding; and these relations are of a Logicall Nature, as those Terms of Universall, Predicable, Subject, Antecedent, Consequent, & the like: And these Relations as much follow out of things, in that respect, as they are in the Understanding, as Likenesse follow's a thing in as much as 'tis white, or Equality because 'tis Quantitative: This, therefore, is call'd Intellectuall, because the Under∣standing is call'd Intellect, and in no other respect.

6. An Agent and a Patient clearly ex∣presse two causes: which, yet, the Under∣standing (distinguishing, & finding parts differently respecting the effect) Logically and to serve its turn for Demonstration, di∣vides into four.

7. And finding, in the Agent, that it can and that it does Act; the Understand∣ing call's that whereby it does or can▪ act the Efficient cause, and that which moves or makes it to act, the End: Likewise, in the Patient, distinguishing what it is that suf∣fers, and what it suffers; it call's that the Form, this the Matter: satisfying, thus, these

Interrogations, From what? Why? By what or How? In what?

8. Plato adds an Idea or Exemplar: but, 'tis clear, that what wants an Exemplar cannot work without it; and consequent∣ly, there is not yet an Efficient cause. The species of these, and indeed of all the last six Predicaments, are little us'd, and there∣fore omitted.

LESSON V.

Of the five Predicables, and the sig∣nification of Words.

1. HEnce 'tis evident, there are two kinds or differences of Predications: For some Pre∣dicates of the same line or Predica∣ment comprehend others, and are pre∣dicated of them as an Universall of a Par∣ticular: But Predicates of distinct lines are predicated of one another, as a thing superadded is predicated of that to which 'tis apply'd.

2. Predicates of the first kind are said

to be predicated in quid or as the what; being such as answer to the question, what a thing is? And, if the predicate compre∣hends the full answer to that question, 'tis call'd a Species: but, if it only contains a part, so that other common considerati∣ons are comprehended under it, 'tis call'd a Genus; whose compart or partner, e∣quall to the Species, answers not directly to the question What? but, with the addi∣tion of what kind or what in particular? supposing the answer to the question What already made by the Genus: and this is call'd a Difference.

3. The other kind of Predication is apply'd to some things necessarily conne∣cted with the Subject, which are call'd Properties: and are strictly such, if they appertain to it alone and alwaies; but, more at large, if they be deficient in these conditions. Sometimes 'tis apply'd to things, which may be both joyn'd to and separated from the Subject, without de∣stroying it; and such are call'd Accidents. Thus are there five, commonly call'd, Predicables, or Porphyries five Terms.

4. But, since Notions are not commu∣nicated, but by the means of Words; and the same word sometimes is apply'd to se∣verall

Notions, sometimes to one only: as oft as the same word, in the same significa∣tion, that is, meaning the same Notion, is apply'd to more, 'tis said to signifie or be spoken Vnivocally.

5. A word which serves for severall No∣tions has this property either by chance, as when in one Language it signifies one thing, in others another; and then 'tis call'd purely Equivocall: or else, of set pur∣pose, 'tis transferr'd from one Notion to another; and then 'tis Equivocall by de∣sign.

6. And, of this kind are those words which, by necessity or upon occasion, are transferr'd from one Notion to another, by reason of the Connection of the two Notions or things, or in consideration of their being Cause and Effect to one ano∣ther: As, when healthfull, which signifies the quality of that temper which is just fit and convenient to a sensitive Creature, is transferr'd to signifie the quality of Vrine, because such a quality in it is the effect of a due temper in the Creature; or to Meat, because it preserves and produces that fit temper: Or else for Proportion sake: so the expression, to stand at the Helm, is transferr'd from a Ship to the Governour of a City; be∣cause,

according to proportion, he does that in the City which a Pilot does in a Ship.

7. And, in such kind of words, the la∣ter signification includes the former: as, if you would explicate Urine as health∣full, you must say, 'tis such an Urine as is the sign of health in the sensitive Crea∣ture; if, the Governour of a City as stan∣ding at the Helm you must say, 'tis he that does that in a City which a Pilot does in a Ship. These words are said Analogically, or by Analogy, to signifie more things.

8. And thus the word Thing or Being is extended to those ten lines or Predica∣ments before explicated: For, since a Thing is that which has a being, the first Predica∣ment alone justly challenges to it self the title of a Thing in this signification; that is, as Thing signifies An individual substance, which Aristotle call's the first Substance, Suppo∣situm or Hypostasis, &, in rationall Substances, the Person; for these names signify the same.

9. Whereas the rest have no being, but are only Affections and certain determinati∣ons of what has a being: for example, Socra∣tes or Callias to be Men, is to have a being & to be Substances; but Callias's being of the same Nature with Socrates, which we call a relation of identity, is not at all distinct from them, &

consequently can have no being but in them, and that their being; yet, 'tis not according to this Notion that They have their being: This Identity, therefore, has a being, not because it, according to its own notion, gives a being, or is that whereby a thing has a being; but, because 'tis a Notion which explicates a thing, that, according to another Notion, has a being.

10. Hence it appears why a consequence holds negatively, from a Substance to all o∣ther things; but positively, from other things to a Substance: For, that which is not, can neither be the whole nor part of a Thing; and, if it be a part or a whole, if fitted to its Own Nature, if apply'd to o∣thers, certainly it is.

11. Tis as evident, if any never so lit∣tle mutation be made in the Substance, the whole is chang'd: for, the Substance being that Notion whereby the thing is what it is; and every mutation in Sub∣stance changing that Notion; by every change made in the Substance, that is chang'd whereby this thing is, and conse∣quently, this very thing.

LESSON VI.

Of Definition, Division, and Dis∣putation.

1. TO know whether a word be spoken univocally of more things, we must look whether it be predicated, still, according to the same Notion: now, a Notion is evidenc'd by a Definition. A Definition, therefore, is a speech compos'd of more Notions, which, taken together, make up that one Notion which before was not known.

2. Since, therefore, a Definition is the very Notion defin'd, resolved, as it were, into parts: 'tis clear, it can neither be more ample nor narrower then that which is de∣fin'd.

3. Again; 'tis plain, that, to ask a Defi∣nition is nothing but asking what they mean, who understandingly use a word: wherefore, since some words expresse No∣tions that are common to all mankind (as, those of the ten Predicaments) 'tis evident

that, in these and such like, we must ob∣serve, what the common-People, who make up mankind, mean by such a word.

4. But, of Proper Names and Terms ap∣propriated to any Discipline, to ask the Definition is to ask, what the Masters of that Discipline mean by such a word? for these are, as it were, the Creatours and Causes of the words.

5. Again, 'tis evident, he that asks a Definition ought to collect the usuall say∣ings of the intelligent users of this word, that concern the thing as 'tis expressed by this word: which, if they be all gather'd, 'tis as demonstrable the Definition is made right, as any cause can be demonstrated from its effects; since, 'tis plain, those sayings depend from the notion of the word as from their cause, and consequent∣ly, the Notion of necessity appears in them.

6. But, if it happen to appear out of such sayings, that the word has more sig∣nifications then one; amongst those that are made by design, it will easily be seen which is the principall, because that signifi∣cation will be included in all the rest: as, the soundnesse of Meat or Urine include the soundnesse of an Animal.

7. Again, since those things which are demonstrated concerning another are, ei∣ther in the thing it self, or else are effects or causes of it; both which appear in the thing it self, and are conformable and pro∣per to it: now, a Definition explicates the thing it self: 'tis clear, that whatsoever is demonstrable of the thing is rooted in the very Definition: Whence, a Definition is a certain principall Instrument of Science; and all the solutions of difficulties de∣pend chiefly upon Definitions.

8. To make a Definition right, the Art of Distinguishing must be learnt. For, a Term being propos'd to be defin'd, out of what has been said, 'tis easie to find in what Predicament 'tis: which once known, all that remains is, by dividing the Genus, to descend by degrees, till you come to the particular in question; when, presently, you have the Definition. And if, as it some∣times happens, many severall Genus's have a share in the thing to be defin'd; this same course is to be pursu'd through them all.

9. But care must be taken, to divide by proper differences, that is, such as include in them the thing to be divided; seeing they are nothing else but more or lesse of

the very Genericall Notion: for accidentall differences are infinite, and besides the in∣tention of him that asks for a Definition.

10. Have a care, also, the Division be made by Contradiction, that is, into parts contradictory one to another; for so the Divider may be sure he comprehends the whole Genus. Lastly, these rules being ob∣serv'd, the fewer Members there are, that is, parts into which the Genus is divided, the more exactly you proceed. That Di∣vision, too, whereby Accidents are distin∣guisht from their Subject, is very usefull to Sciences: for, when it appears that a Con∣crete, that is, a thing which comprehends severall parts or Notions, is the Cause of any effect, by this Division you come to that Notion, according to which, precisely, 'tis the cause; which must necessarily be connected with the effect, simply speaking, and consequently, the effect may be de∣monstrated out of it à priori: For exam∣ple, if it be known that Policletus made a Statue; separating the Accidents, 'twill ap∣pear that he made it, not as White, nor as Musicall, nor as Policletus, but as one skill'd in such an Art; and hence you'l collect, that All skilfull in that Art can make a Statue.

11. Out of a Division and Definition made aright, there arise two sorts or Spe∣cies of self-evident propositions: For, as oft as one of the Terms is a direct part of the definition of another Term, the Pro∣position is clear; as, if a Man be a Reasona∣ble Creature, he is a Creature: Again, in a Division truly made, 'tis plain, the parts may divisively be pronounc'd of the whole; as, when we say, a Number is ei∣ther Even or Odd. Whoever aspires to Sci∣ences must be assiduous in these; but, a∣bove all, in the practice of Defining; for, all the connection of Notions is found in Definitions, and the connection of Terms is that which makes Science.

12. These, too, chiefly detect the snares of Equivocall terms, which are the very Bane of Science; especially those which are caus'd by Analogy. Now, Equivocati∣on is display'd, by looking into words what way soever connected; as, into Cau∣ses, effects, contraries, superiours, inferi∣ours, &c. wherein, if once any thing be found, which agrees to one and not to the other, the Equivocation is discover'd: As, if a Voice and a Saw be both said to be sharp, but the Contrary to the Voice is flat, to the Saw, blunt; 'tis plain that sharp is

not predicated of them both in the same signification, and therefore 'tis equivocall.

13. As for our modern Disputes, 'tis to be observ'd, that the Defendant either puts a false Conclusion; or, if it be true, he holds another incoherent with it; or, at least, if there be no opposition among his Tenets, yet he is ignorant of the Antece∣dents and Consequents to his Thesis; or, lastly, he is perfect only at this Thesis. In the two first cases, he may be convinc'd, if the Disputant behave himself well: in the third, too, if the Disputant can bring him about to yield to some falsity in those things he is ignorant of, he may easily convince him.

14. In the fourth case, one must dispute Critically, that is, either something afarre off must be sought for, and forreign to the Question, which the Defendant is not ob∣lig'd to be skilfull in; and clapping Au∣thority on the back on't, to fright him in∣to the admission of a falsity; which is the trick of most of those that dispute out of Medium's from Theology and the Divine Omnipotence: or else, one must argue out of common and logicall Notions, in which both the terms are ambiguous, and Equi∣vocation easily hides it self.