Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

LESSON IV.

Of the rest of the Predicaments.

1. THose things which relate or are compar'd to another, are either compar'd for having some Notion common to both; or for their A∣cting or Suffering; or else, by a certain third way, which participates of both these: as, when a Picture is made like the Originall, that neither acts upon the Picture, nor is the Picture (being wholy of another kind) really like it, yet in a manner, 'tis both: and this respect is call'd of the thing measu∣red to the Measure.

2. And, in this kind, there is one one∣ly relation, and that on the side of the Mea∣sured: For a Relation being the Order of one thing to another, and since, between two things, one may be so ordered to the other, that the other may either have or not have a coordination to it; it comes to passe that those things which are in the same order (such as are those two first kinds) have a relation on both sides, but those that are of different orders, so that,

notwithstanding, the one be ordered to the other, have a relation but on one side.

3. Besides, it often happens that the Understanding, through Custome or an imperfect way of knowing, expresses even things that have no ordination, by a cer∣tain relative resemblance; and then 'tis a mentall relation (by schoolmen call'd de dici) not a reall one: as also, when the Un∣derstanding has express'd the nature of a∣ny thing by a Negation, saying, a Man does not see, or has no hair; and then gives a positive being to this Notion, say∣ing, a Man is blind or bald; according to the naturall Aptitude or Ineptitude of the Subject to the denyed Quality, 'tis call'd a Mentall Negation or Privation, re∣spectively.

4. Wherefore, since, by these only ways, the Understanding can so vary any thing which it knowes, that a change may remain on the Objects side, and enter into the consideration of it, as belonging to the thing known; there can be three only kinds of Mentall Beings: For, the disputes of the Moderns concerning such entities, are but gay Trifles, and the con∣templation of an erroneous definition.

5. There is a kind of Relations, not un∣justly, call'd Intellectuall, which follows a thing in the Vnderstanding in vertue of the reall quality of mere Vnderstanding; and these relations are of a Logicall Nature, as those Terms of Universall, Predicable, Subject, Antecedent, Consequent, & the like: And these Relations as much follow out of things, in that respect, as they are in the Understanding, as Likenesse follow's a thing in as much as 'tis white, or Equality because 'tis Quantitative: This, therefore, is call'd Intellectuall, because the Under∣standing is call'd Intellect, and in no other respect.

6. An Agent and a Patient clearly ex∣presse two causes: which, yet, the Under∣standing (distinguishing, & finding parts differently respecting the effect) Logically and to serve its turn for Demonstration, di∣vides into four.

7. And finding, in the Agent, that it can and that it does Act; the Understand∣ing call's that whereby it does or can▪ act the Efficient cause, and that which moves or makes it to act, the End: Likewise, in the Patient, distinguishing what it is that suf∣fers, and what it suffers; it call's that the Form, this the Matter: satisfying, thus, these

Interrogations, From what? Why? By what or How? In what?

8. Plato adds an Idea or Exemplar: but, 'tis clear, that what wants an Exemplar cannot work without it; and consequent∣ly, there is not yet an Efficient cause. The species of these, and indeed of all the last six Predicaments, are little us'd, and there∣fore omitted.