Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

Peripateticall INSTITUTIONS. Fifth Book. (Book 5)

Containing that part of METAPHYSICK, which treats of SUBSTANCES ABSTRACTED from Matter, and of the Ope∣ration of Things. (Book 5)

LESSON I.

Of the Souls separation from the Body.

1.OUt of what has been said, 'tis evident, that a Humane Soul perishes not at the dissolu∣tion of its Body: For, since, whilst it exists in the Body, it has imma∣nent acts which cannot belong to a Body; it must of necessity have, of its proper self, the vertue of a Thing, or, of receiving

Existence: Since, therefore, ther's nothing farther requir'd to exist, in a thing alrea∣dy existing, but the having in it self a pow∣er of sustaining existence; and, 'tis plain, that, the body being taken away, this pow∣er is not withdrawn, (since 'tis in the Soul, apart from and besides the Body); 'tis evident that, by the dissolution of the Bo∣dy, the Soul is not dissolv'd.

2. Adde to this, that, since there is no other substantiall divisibility, but of Form and Matter; and Matter is not necessary to the Souls existence; ther's no divisi∣bility in the Subject of existence, as exi∣stence is in the Soul, by means whereof the Soul can be alienated from Being.

3. We see, too, that all mortality of Bodies either proceeds from contrariety, or from the divisibility of a quantitative Subject; whereof, since neither is to be found in the Soul separated, 'tis plain, that 'Tis not subject to corruption.

4. You'l object, if the Soul in the bo∣dy is capable of existence, 'tis capable of action or of a Motive power; as quantita∣tive parts, though they have a common existence, yet act upon one another. 'Tis answer'd, quantitative parts are accessory to and find the Substance already perfect:

but formall parts (at least essentiall ones) do not presuppose the Substance esta∣blisht; whence, the active power follows not any one, but all.

5. You'l say, that Existence, too, sup∣poses all the parts of a Thing, as 'tis a Thing: wherefore, neither will the Soul be capable of existence in the Body. 'Tis answer'd, that action belongs to the Soul in the Body as existence does: For, exi∣stence makes not the Soul, while 'tis in the Body, to be a Thing; for that's primely of the whole, and the whole Man is the Thing; but it makes the Soul to be That which may be a Thing: So, also, 'tis not absolutely a principle of acting, but 'tis a principle by which action becomes other then 'twould be without it; and conse∣quently, it has a Being, whence action may be, but not whence 'tis.

6. It appears, again, that the Soul sepa∣rated is not, truly, the same Thing with the Soul in the Body; but is substantially chang'd. For, first 'twas joyn'd substanti∣ally to the Body and was one with it: but, 'tis clear, that when, by division, more things are made of one, the Thing divided is chang'd; especially when the Unity it self was substantiall, as in the present case;

since the Soul adheres to the corporeall Substance, not by quantity, but by identi∣fication.

7. Again, the Soul, now separated, is the immediate and adequate Subject of its own existence: whereas, in the body, the Man himself was the Thing, and the Soul only a part of the Thing, or, whereby the Thing was. Yet, 'tis the same Thing, as to its notion and definition; since it consists of those predicates it had in the Body.

8. You'l object, In the Body, it had not a power of receiving existence in it self; therefore, neither will it have out of the Body: for a part and a Thing are of an intirely different kind, and vastly distinct from one another. 'Tis answer'd, that, as, in the parts of a Magnitude, 'tis manifest, that they are neither Things, nor only parts of a Thing; but something between, which is so a part, that it may be some kind of whole: So, it repugns not, that there should be something in formall parts which is, de facto, a part, and yet may be a whole; and that should be a kind of Middle thing, which has enough in it self to become a whole, yet should not actu∣ally be a whole: Whence, when the Soul is separated, there is not any thing added

to it, to make it more capable of existence, but that is withdrawn from it, which hin∣dred it from existing.

9. Now, he that desires to frame to him∣self, in some sort, a notion of a separated Soul; let him ponder with himself that object which corresponds to the words Man or Animal, as such: which when he shall see, abstracts from Place and Time, and is a Substance by the only ne∣cessity of the Terms; let him conceive the like of a separated Soul.

10. Then, let him attentively consider some self-evident and most naturall pro∣position: in which, when he shall have contemplated that the object is in the Soul with its proper existence and, as it were, by it; let him think a separated Soul is a Substance that is all other things, by the very connexion of Existences.

11. Lastly, when, in Bodies, he shall observe that Motion proceeds from the quality of the Mover & a certain impulse; and that this impulse is deriv'd again from another impulse, and so up even to that which is first mov'd, and beyond: let him imagine the Soul is a kind of principle of such impulse; whatsoever thing that must be.

12. What is said of the Substance of the Soul, undoubtedly must be understood, too, of its proper Accidents; for, since they depend only upon it, (being some∣thing of it, nay even the very Soul), and it would be more imperfect without them; they must run the same fortune with it, unlesse some speciall reason interpose.

13. Whatever things, therefore, were in the Man, according to his Soul, at the instant of his Death, remain in the Soul after separation: wherefore, all his Reso∣lutions or Iudgements, whether specula∣tive or practicall, shall remain in it; where, since they cannot be without Apprehensi∣ons, even they, too, shall remain: And, since all things, which are made to follow out of or have connexion with these, are in a separated Soul, in vertue of these, its Science must needs be extended to all those; all such, therefore, which have once been in it and are not blotted out, after death all remain.

14. Since, therefore, in a Soul ther's an infinite capacity; and ther's no oppositi∣on of apprehensions among themselves, nor any other opposition, but of contra∣diction, whereby the same is affirm'd to be and not-be: all the apprehensions, scrap'd

up together in the whole life, and judge∣ments unretracted must, of necessity, re∣main; unlesse some speciall Cause with∣stand.

15. The whole Notion, therefore, of the past life, all the particular acquaintan∣ces of Familiars and other Individuums, all Sciences and Arts, attain'd in the life time, survive after Death.

LESSON II.

Of the Science of a separated Soul, and its unity vvith the Soul.

1. BUt, all these things being so, now, in the Soul, that time was, they were not; 'tis plain, they are so conjoyn'd to it, that ther's no repugnancy it may be without them: wherefore, so there be a cause, they may be divid••d from it: some kind of divisibility, then, there is between the Soul and the things in it.

2. Not that which is between the parts of a Magnitude; since, here's an indivisi∣bility on both sides, whereas a Magnitude is not made up of indivisibles. Nor, that which is between Matter and Form; since

the Soul, which is before, is able to preex∣ist of it self; and whatever things come in∣to it supervene to a Thing already exist∣ing. Nor that which is between Substance and Quantity; since Quantity is in a Thing, as somewhat of it; but things known are in the Knower as other things which preexist out of him.

3. 'Tis, therefore, a speciall manner of divisibility which is not exactly found in bodies: For, since a body essentially in∣cludes a power or possibility, the unity of a body is by the privation of act on one side; whence follows the unity of act in the Compound: But, a separated Soul is com∣pos'd only of Act or Quiddity, as white or hot, and Existence or Being, as when we say, 'tis: whence, its unity to another a∣ctually existing must be, so, as an act can be joyn'd to an act, that is, by identification or a community of Being: and, after this manner, are in a separated Soul whatever are in it.

4. Whence, first, this is evident, that a separated Soul knows it self: For, since, to be in another, by way of knowing, is di∣stinguish't, in this, from the other man∣ners of inexisting; that, in others, what in∣exists is now no Thing in it self, but that's

in which it is; things know'n, by inexisting, lose not the being what they were, though they acquire the being of that which they were not: for, Heat, in that which is hot, is something of the Subject, nor has any pro∣per Being of its own; but, the hot Subject which is felt is, so, in him that's sensible of it, that he knows 'tis hot; therefore, this Subject to be actually hot is in the person that's sensible of it.

5. In like manner, the Soul exists sub∣stantially, because Being is made some∣thing of the Soul. Again, this, that the Soul is, is in the Soul: for, since the Soul is a certain Power of being all things that exist; and it self also exists; it cannot but, by reason of its intimate conjunction, be present to it self according to this its pow∣er, which is that it cannot but be understood.

6. Again, since all those things are in the Soul which we have, above, recounted; they must needs be, too, all known in the Soul: And, because, 'tis clear, that, in a Syllogism, the Conclusion is nothing but the very Premisses; all is known by a se∣parated Soul, which is deducible out of those things that are in the Soul.

7. And, because, such is the connexi∣on of Truths, that, out of any one, all o∣thers,

may, by links, be drawn in; it comes to passe that a Soul, which knows any whatever sensible Truth, knows intirely all cognoscible things; that is, every Soul penetrates absolutely all things.

8. For, if any Infant never knew its own Being, it is not to be esteem'd to have arriv'd at all to the nature of Man: For, since, even in us, to be sensible of or to know is by suffering from another; we know an∣other thing is, because we know we have suffered from it: but, if we know we have suffered from it, we already know we are: the first knowledge, therefore, even in the body, includes the knowledge of our selves.

9. And, since Passion is a participation of the Thing from which we suffer; it must needs be that the Thing is in us, when we are sensible of it: and, because it does not denominate according to its own pro∣per appellation, but according to the qua∣lity of that wherein it is, (for, we do not call an Eye white or wooden, but a Seeer of white or wood); it must needs be that 'tis in it, as another thing, and as of the nature of the sensitive Subject. Now, the reason why in the body, too, the Soul does not know it self, but the Man, a part of whom it

is, is because 'tis he that is and not it, as has been said.

10. You'l object, this multiplicity of knowledge is fram'd or aggregated, either of severall knots and articles, as it were, so that whatever was knowable in this world by new discourse, the same is, in some sort, a new addition in the Soul; or of one simple knowledge which, eminently and in one formality, in a manner, com∣prehends all these knowledges: but, nei∣ther of these seems possible; not the first, because 'twould be a certain infinity, ei∣ther in act, which is impossible, or in pow∣er, and then 'twould be some continuity and a principle of continuall motion; nor the later, for such an universality seems not to have any thing above it.

11. 'Tis answer'd, the manner of a se∣parated Soul, in some sort, contains both; though 'tis neither way formally: For, since, the parts in formall composition are not actually; 'tis plain, that neither can there be, in this composition of the know∣ledge of a separated Soul, formall knots and articles of discourse, & consequently, no actuall infinity: Again, since one part is not beyond another, that is, extended, as in quantity, but all, by a certain identifica∣on,

grow together; there can be no con∣tinuity between, though the parts be in power, that is, only in the possibility of the Subject.

12. Besides, that this power is not such that there should be any correspondent naturall cause to reduce it into act: but, 'tis only a certain defectibility of act, up∣on which ther's no active power but only a Logicall or a Creative one, which will never act.

13. 'Tis, therefore, a certain actuall Me∣taphysicall composition, in which there is a Logicall possibility that any of these later known things may be away, without hurt∣ing those that were known before; yet so, that it can never come to passe it should be reduc'd into act: Wherefore, 'tis nei∣ther the precise contemplation of one for∣mality precontaining infinite; nor yet any actuall infinity, or naturall divisibility.

14. But, it may be compar'd to the Me∣taphysicall composition of degrees; in which we see Peter or Bucephalus so agree with infinite Things or Animals, that it contracts thence no multiplicity, and yet we may alwaies frame some new apprehen∣sion of them in our Mind.

LESSON III.

Of the eminency of a separated Souls acts, above those it exer∣cises in the Body.

1. OUt of what has been said, it may be evidenc'd, that simple Intui∣tion or the inexistence of a thing in the Soul serv's, in stead of that composition which is found, here, in our judgements.

2. It appears, also, that an actuall uni∣versall intuition of Things supplses, abun∣dantly, any need of Discourse.

3. 'Tis plain, too, that, with that, ther's no want of Memory or Remembrance; ther's no need of ordering or framing Idea's; and lastly, whatever the Soul operates, here, by distinct acts and in time, there, together and with one only labour, (not so much, is wrought out, as) exists.

4. Again, whereas, by reslexion, those things we have, in the body, thought on, we farther know that we have thought on them; so that we can never know the last

reflection, though we had infinite: a sepa∣rated Soul, by the simple inexistence of it self in it self, necessarily see's all its know∣ledge without any reflection.

5. Again, 'tis plain, that a separated Soul, in another manner, excells Place and Time, then in the Body: since, in that, it only abstracts from them, but, out of that, it comprehends them. For, this univer∣sall and actuall knowledge places all Place and all Time within the Soul; so that it can act in every place at once and toge∣ther (as far as concerns this respect), and provide for all time; wherefore, 'tis, in a manner, a Maker and Governour of time and place.

6. It appears, moreover, that 'tis active, out of its very self: for, since it compre∣hends all things, it needs not Sense, as in the body, to perceive that infinity of In∣dividuality; but it know's, even, to the utmost divisibility of Magnitude, whate∣ver circumstances are requir'd to action: It knows, too, what is good for it self; whence, it, naturally & of it self, has both power and an actuall will, which alone are requir'd to act; for power depends on pure Science, and whoever is impotent is ignorant what is to be done, by him, to produce such an effect.

7. Hence, lastly, it follows, that the pro∣portion of Pleasure and Grief, out of the body, is infinite, to that in the body: For, since Pleasure is nothing else, but a judge∣ment concerning a good possest, out of which follows an activity to enjoy and retain it; and Grief is the same, concerning an ill, which the Soul desires to repell: Whether we contemplate the Manner of the Souls Being, to which its acts are proportion'd; 'tis of a superiour notion, that is, of an in∣finite eminency.

8. Or, the Firmnesse and Evidence of its Knowledge; since all knowledge receives strength from antecedents and conse∣quents, it must of necessity attain an infi∣nite excellency: for every knowledge of a separated Soul has infinite things con∣nected with it, out of which 'tis con∣firm'd.

9. Or, its Eminency above Time and Place; 'tis rays'd in a like degree: Or, lastly, its force of Activity; 'tis beyond all comparison. Wherefore, to the least, ei∣ther Pleasure or Grief, of the Future life, e∣ven abstracting from the Perpetuity, no∣thing can be comparable in this mortall state, or considerable in respect of it.

10. Again, 'tis collected, out of what

has been said, that all separated Souls, or, at least, the most part are improv'd in this, that whatever false judgements they have taken up in the whole course of their lives, they throw them off by Separation: For, since, the excellency of a separated Soul is immense above the powers of an imbo∣dy'd one, & the connection of all Truths is, immediately upon the Separation, im∣printed in it; it must needs be that a true judgement of all things is impress'd: since, therefore, Contradictories cannot con∣sist together in the Soul, the false judge∣ments must be expell'd; and Souls, as to this, be universally improv'd.

11. Nor, is it lesse evident that, among Souls, there will be some difference, by reason of the employments they have fol∣low'd in their life time: For, since, whilst we live in the body, one exercises his Un∣derstanding more about one thing, ano∣ther about another; and, as, the first act works a knowledge of the thing, so, the following acts cannot but encrease this knowledge and more perfectly impresse it upon the Soul: It follows, since all these must needs participate of the elevation caus'd by the Separation; the Soul must know more perfectly, too, in Separation, its

accustomed Objects and whatever depend on them, in a due proportion, then other things; whence, it comes to passe, that the Sciences here acquir'd, not only, re∣main in the future life, but, are in the same proportion, there, as they were, here.

LESSON IV.

Of the Felicity and Infelicity of sepa∣rated Souls, and their Immuta∣bility.

1. ANd, because the Affections in the Soul are nothing else but judge∣ments, upon which operation does or is apt to follow; and the stronger the judgement is, so much the apter ope∣ration is to follow out of it, if it be a judge∣ment concerning good or ill: it comes to passe, that our Affections to our Acquain∣tance and Friends, and the rest which we have cultivated in this life, shall remain in the future: wherefore, we shall both better know and more rejoyce in our Parents and Friends, then in others, (other cir∣cumstances alike).

2. And, because the Affections shall re∣main, & that, in the proportion they were

in, during life: it follows, that those who have, in this life, delighted in those things & Sciences, which the Soul is apt and fit to enjoy in Separation, (for example, in na∣turall Contemplation, or that of abstracted Spi∣rits, especially, if with great affection), will have a vast Pleasure in the State of Se∣paration, through the perfection of the knowledge they'l enjoy.

3. But, those that have given them∣selves up wholly to corporeall pleasures will be affected with vast Grief, through the im∣possibility of those pleasures, there.

4. You'l object, that separated Souls will see the unworthinesse of such plea∣sures, and consequently, will correct in themselves such erroneous and false judge∣ments, nor will have such appetites as would torment them. 'Tis answer'd, these griefs follow not out of false, but inordinate judgements; for, 'tis true, that such like pleasures are a good of the body and of the Man (whose appetite is the appetite of the Soul); again, supposing the deordina∣tion of the Soul, 'tis true, that these plea∣sures are conformable and good, even to it: but grief follows, hence, that the judgements or affections about these are greater, then in proportion to those other

desires, which ought to be preferr'd before them.

5. Whence, it comes to passe, that the Soul's seeing these objects to be unwor∣thy and not regardable, in comparison of the better, increases its pains; whilst it can neither cease to desire those it desires, through the excesse of these affections a∣bove the rest, and yet sees they are vile and unworthy.

6. Moreover, out of what has been said, 'tis deduc'd, that, in the state of separation, no variety can happen to Souls, from a bo∣dy, or the change of bodies: For, since a change passes not from any body into the Soul, but through the identification of the Soul with its own body; and this identifi∣cation ceases, by the state of Separation; it follows, that no action nor mutation can be derived from any Body, to the Soul.

7. Nor, has the Soul, of it self, a princi∣ple of changing it self: not from hence only, because an Indivisible cannot act upon it self: but also, because, since a mu∣tation of the Soul cannot be any other, then, either according to the Understand∣ing or Will; but the Understanding is suppos'd to know all things together and

for-ever, whence, by the course of nature, ther's no room left either for ignorance or new Science; and the Will is either not distinct from the Understanding or, at least, is adequately govern'd, in the state of separation: it follows, that naturally no mutation can happen to a separated Soul from within, or caus'd by it self.

8. Nor, yet, from any other Spirit, without the interposition of the body: For, since all Spirits are indivisible, their operations, too, will be such; but an in∣divisible effect, supposing all the causes, of necessity exists in the same instant: where∣fore, if any thing be to be done between Spirits, 'tis all, in one instant, so done and perfected, that, afterwards, another action cannot be begun: for if it begin, either the causes were, before, adequate∣ly put, or not; if they were, the effect was put; if they were not, some of the causes is chang'd that it may now begin to act, and not this, but the former, is the first mutation, whereof, 'tis to be urg'd, whether the causes were put before?

9. If you say, the Spirit waits a certain time: First, time is motion and not with∣out a body: Then, since, among Spirits, nothing is chang'd by time, one that acts

according to reason could not expect a time by which nothing could be chang'd. Certain, therefore, it is, that There can be no change, by the power of nature in a separa∣ted Soul.

10. From the collection of all has been said concerning the Soul, 'tis deducible, that Our life is a Mould or a March to our E∣ternity; and, according as a Man behaves himself in this life, such an Eternity he shall, hereafter, possess: since Good-deeds and Rewards, Crimes and Punishments are e∣qually eternall.

11. To conclude, He that has liv'd per∣fectly shall be perfect in the future life, he that has liv'd better shall be better, he that has liv'd well shall be well; he that has liv'd ill shall be ill, he that has liv'd worse shall be worse, they that live worst they, too, shall be worst of all for ever: so true it is that THINGS WILL NOT BE ILL GOVERN'D, that is, their very Nature exacts and forces them into a good Government.

LESSON V.

Of the nature of Existence, and its Vnity vvith the Thing.

1. OUt of what has been said, 'tis clear, that all bodies and a sepa∣rated Soul it self, sometimes, are and, time was, they were not: whence, 'tis evident, that the notion of Being or Existence is different from the notion of that Thing whereof 'tis affirm'd; since, 'tis deny'd, too, of it, and since, of all Substan∣ces that are so different, 'tis said, accor∣ding to the same notion, that they are.

2. Besides, if, for Peter or a Man not to be, were the same, with Peter not to be Peter or a Man not to be a Man; 'twere a pro∣position destructive of it self, and, conse∣quently, impossible; but now 'tis prudent and pertinent to Sciences.

3. Neither would there any one and the same thing be a Subject of contradictory enunciations, or of affirmation and nega∣tion; and consequently, the art of Logick and the foundation of all humane dis∣course would be taken away: Nothing,

therefore, is more evident then that Exi∣stence is distinguisht, mentally or by defi∣nition, from the Thing whereof 'tis spo∣ken.

4. But yet, that it should differ, really, actually and, as it were, numerically or in the Subject, from the Thing whose 'tis, 'tis equally impossible: since, so, they would either of them be Things;* 1.1 the whole,* 1.2 therefore, would not be one and a Thing, as a∣bove, in the like case, is deduc'd.

5. Notwithstanding, since a Thing re∣ally acquires and loses existence, (for, to be made is to receive, to be dissolv'd is to lose existence); 'tis evident, ther's a reall divisibility between a Thing and Exi∣stence.

6. But, this divisibility is lesse then a∣ny of those, hitherto, explicated: both because, in separation, neither part of the Compound remains; as also, because ex∣istence out of a Compound is not intelli∣gible, since 'tis its ultimate actuality or a∣ctuation. And, as 'tis commonly said, that Union cannot be understood out of Composition, nor Action without a Term; so, neither can Being without it actually be, and consequently, make those things be which are by it.

7. Lastly, 'tis evident, that existence is the perfection of every and all Things; since, the notion of all Substances (as 'tis explicated above) is nothing else but to be such a capacity of existing:* 1.3 whence, they have the notion of a power to that; or rather, the notion of an as-it-were (a quasi-) pos∣sibility, since they have a vertue termina∣tive of the understanding (that we call to be a quiddity) which a possibility has not.

8. Notwithstanding, because this noti∣on is nothing else, but a disposition and preparation to existing; Existence is not only the perfection, but, if it were perfect, it would be the whole perfection of any Thing whose it were.

9. It follows out of what has been said, that no Thing, of those that sometime are sometime are not, is of it self; but, all re∣quire some other thing to make them ex∣ist: For, since they are sometime and sometimes are not, 'tis evident, the noti∣on in them, which is presuppos'd to Be∣ing, and whereof 'tis said it is, is, of it self, indifferent to Being and not-Being; and, which follows, this notion being put, Be∣ing is not put or the Thing is not, in force of this notion; and something else, there∣fore,

is requir'd, which being put, Being must necessarily be apply'd to that notion: 'Tis from without, therefore, that these Things exist, and not from their own in∣trinsecall nature and force.

10. And, because this notion has not its indifferency from otherwhere, but from it self; as long as it has Being, so long an ex∣trinsecall cause must make it exist: for, since its necessity of existing is from some∣thing without, that extrinsecall being ta∣ken away, it is no longer: And, because from an indifferent nothing follows, its ex∣existing is not deriv'd from any intrinse∣call; and, which follows, if, the extrinsecall being taken away, it should exist, this, its existing, would be an effect without a cause.

LESSON VI.

Of the Existence, Simplicity, and Eternity of GOD.

1. AGain, it follows, there is some Thing, for whom 'tis impossible not to exist: For, since an effect is because another is, 'tis clear, the same cannot be the cause of it self: nay, if two should be put, as, adequately, cause and effect to one another, the same would be

put as cause of it self; for, if A be because B is, and B again because A is, 'tis clear, that A is because A is, that is, 'tis cause and effect to it self.

2. Wherefore, since those things that may not-Be need an extrinsecall cause to Be; nor can all things have an extrinse∣call cause, unlesse some two be, reciprocal∣ly, causes to one another: it follows, there must be something which needs not an ex∣trinsecall cause; and consequently, must have, from its intrinsecalls, that it cannot not-Be, and for which it must be impossi∣ble not to Be.

3. Again, since an impossibility of not∣existing imports and carryes Existence a∣long with it; and this impossibility is in∣trinsecall and essentiall to the Thing in which it is; it follows, too, that Existence is essentiall to such a Thing.

4. And, since existence is equally uni∣versall with the notion of Being or Thing, that is, every Thing has an existence cor∣respondent to it, which it may actually have; and Being is the most universall pre∣dicate of that wherein 'tis; it follows, that Existence is the most universall predicate of the Thing to which 'tis essentiall.

5. But, on the other side, because Ex∣istence

being put, the Thing is compleat, as to its essence; nor can any essentiall pre∣dicate supervene to that which exists, but all are presuppos'd to existence: 'tis clear, that, to the most Genericall notion of a Thing to which Existence is essentiall, there can no essentiall Difference super∣vene; and consequently, that, between Things to which existence is essentiall, there can be no essentiall difference, that is, but One only such Thing can exist.

6. There is, therefore, some Thing es∣sentially existing of it self; from which, being but One only, all other Things must, of necessity, receive their birth and existence: Now, such a Thing we con∣ceive to be that we call GOD: There is therefore, a GOD.

7. The notion, therefore, of God's ex∣isting is, that his existence or essence is di∣ametrically and contradictorily oppos'd to not-Being: not, in the Understanding, as a Chimaera is oppos'd to a non-Chimaera; nor, in possibility, as a man to not-a-man; nor, in an irradiate act, as it were, and im∣press'd like a Seal in water, as our being and not-being, running and not-running: but, in the thing it self, by the highest and ulti∣mate actuality, substantially, by the very

essence of Being and exercising, by the very notion of existing, it self substantial∣ly and concentrally within it self and a∣bout it self and upon it self reflected, exer∣cised, and exercising.

8. This is the solidity and stability of the First thing and GOD; whilst, the sta∣bility of all the rest is no other, but to de∣pend and Be from Him.

9. Out of what has been said, is de∣duc'd the most eminent Simplicity and In∣divisibility of God. For, since existence is essentiall to him; and there can be no∣thing in a Thing, neither before nor after existence; 'tis clear, that God is so Ex∣istence, that he is nothing besides, formal∣ly.

10. Therefore, He is not corporeall or compos'd of parts excluding one another: for, a Body, since it has a Being in parts, of necessity includes something besides Ex∣istence, divisible from that.

11. The same is for composition of Matter and Form, Subject and Accidents; for these, since they include something divisible from Being, cannot be pure ex∣isters.

12. Nor is there any room for compo∣sition of Genus and Differentia; since, Dif∣ference

supervenes to a Genus, at least, with a foundation in the Object for so apprehen∣ding it. Ther's, therefore, absolutely, no composition at all in God.

13. But, whatever composition there is in our Understanding concerning God, proceeds out of the pure defect of our un∣derstanding, which cannot adequate the Simplicity of the Divine Essence. GOD, therefore, is pure Being, pure Actuality, the pure Brightnesse of eternall Light.

14. Again, hence 'tis deduc'd that God is Eternall, or, that there is not in God past and future, but only present. For, since God cannot not-Be, by reason of the essentiall exercise of his Being; and, has this essentially, that he cannot not-have-been nor not-be-to-be, but possesses his es∣sence indivisibly: it comes to passe, that 'tis the same thing to God not to-not-have-been and not not-to-be, as to Be what He is; but, there cannot be, either by imagi∣nation or in time, an instant suppos'd, in which God possesses not his Essence; in every moment, therefore, of time whether reall or imaginary, He is his not not-to-have-been and his not not-to-be hereafter, that is, his to-have-been and his to-be.

15. In every instant of time, therefore,

He is in every instant of time past and fu∣ture: not, that the time past and future are; but, that the indivisible existence of God possesses all that length, which pas∣sing times make, contracted▪ by the emi∣nency of his Simplicity, in an indivisible act; and never either loses or gains, be∣cause His repugnancy to not-Being is a∣ctuall Being, and Actually-to-Be is his Es∣sence.

LESSON VII.

Of the Perfection, Immutability, and Science of God.

1. FArther, the Perfection and Pleni∣tude of God is deduc'd, that is, whatever goodnesse and perfecti∣on is possible, all this is eminently found in God. For, since existence cannot re∣ceive existence from another, but is by its own force; 'tis plain, that whatever ex∣istence is and whatever perfection is in ex∣istence has its Being from that power▪ by which existence exists: the whole perfe∣ction, therefore, of existence is in that ex∣istence which is of it self and by its own no∣tion;

but this existence is, as has been said, the very essence of God; wherefore, in God, there is all the perfection which ist in existence or can be in it.

2. Since, therefore, whatever is in any Thing, besides Existence, is nothing else but a disposition to existence, or a capacity of it, or a compart in which and by which imperfect existence is to subsist: 'tis clear, too, that perfect existence subsisting in∣cludes, more eminently and perfectly, all this perfection, and consequently, that All the Plenitude of Being is in God.

3. Besides, since God or Being-of-it-self is but One alone; whatever is besides must, of necessity, receive Beginning, Goodnesse or perfection from Him: but, that the adequate cause contains all the per∣fection of its effect is, of it self, evident: all that ample and inexhaustible pleni∣tude, therefore, of intire Being is in God and flows from Him.

4. Out of these foresaid Attributes of God, his Immutability is demonstrated: For, from this Plenitude of Perfection, He is Immutable; because he can neither acquire nor lose any thing.

5. From his Simplicity, again, he is Im∣mutable; because all mutation includes▪

a divisibility of that which is chang'd, from that according to which it is chang'd.

6. And lastly, from His Eternity, he is Immutable; because what is chang'd has sometime and sometime has-not the same thing; but, what God has he has indivisi∣bly for ever, and, in that very respect, he cannot not-have it.

7. Out of the premisses, too, 'tis collected, that God knows & understands both Him∣self and all other things, by his one only es∣sentiall act of Being. For, since God is Ex∣istence it self & the Plenitude of Being, no∣thing can belong to existence which is not primarily in Him: since, therefore, to know, is to have the thing known, after a certain proper manner of existing, in one's self; God cannot not-be in Himself, after this manner of existing, y^t is, not-be-known by Himself.

8. Again, since all other things are in God; but, to inexist as another thing, is a perfecter manner of inexisting then sim∣ply to inexist; it appears, that all other things in God inexist after this manner, too, that is, are known.

9. Nor, does this any thing prejudice the divine Simplicity: For, since those things that are known inexist as another thing, the bounds and divisions of the

Creatures in God are as other things, and produce not their effect, viz. of distinguish∣ing, in Him; but, their being in Him has nothing whereby one should be oppos'd to another; as appears even in us, in whom two Contraries inexist together, that the one may be known by the other.

10. It appears, too, that God knows o∣ther things, in his own Essence: which, since it may doubly be understood; one way, that His essence should be the Princi∣ple of the knowledge of other things; and another way, that the knowledge of the Creatures should be, as it were, a part of the knowledge of His essence: 'tis to be taken this second way.

11. For, since the Essence of God is not from another, but by its own formall power of existing; 'tis plain, its manner of existing is opposite to the being from another: there ought not, therefore, to be put any Vertuall causality, whereby one should be from another in God; because, whatever is in Him is because it is, or by vertue of self-being.

12. You'l say, the Creatures are some∣thing distinct and another thing from God; wherefore, the knowledge of them, too, is distinct from the knowledge of

God. 'Tis answer'd, by denying the con∣sequence: for, some distinct things are of that condition, that the knowledge of one is part of the knowledge of another; and so it happens in the present case.

13. For, since God cannot know his Es∣sence, unlesse he know his Science and the, as it were-vertuall parts of his Essence; and, since the Creatures flow immediately from God, without any other help; it comes to passe, that God is a Cause actually cau∣sing by His essence: 'tis plain, therefore, that part of the knowledge of the essence of God is, to know that He actually causes such Creatures, which includes, that such Creatures exist: part, therefore, of the knowledge of the divine Essence is to know the Creatures exist, in all their diffe∣rences and circumstances.

14. Again, the universall answer is evi∣dent to all those questions, Whether God knows Future contingents? the secrets of Hearts? Infinite things? Materia prima? Negations? Mentall or imaginary things? &c.

15. For, 'tis evident, as far as these are apt to exist and to be known, so far they proceed from God; and the knowledge of them is part of the knowledge of God: but

if, on any side, they have no entity nor cog∣noscibility, so far they are not known by God: But, to enquire, of each of them, what cognoscibility they may have, belongs to their proper places, not to this of the Sci∣ence of God.

LESSON VIII.

Of the Divine Volition and Liber∣ty.

1. NOr is it lesse evident, out of what has been said, that, since God, operating by Existence, of ne∣cessity applyes himself to the particularities of the Creatures, (since Particulars only can exist); and more things cannot be in one but by Science; that, I say, He makes the Creatures by his Science: wherefore, since Science, when 'tis so perfect as to be able to proceed into action, is call'd Will; 'tis clear, that there is a Will in God.

2. And, since the Science of God is eve∣ry way perfect, it appears, by the same e∣vidence, that there is all the perfection of Will in God, or, all Morall Vertues, as far as they follow out of pure perfection. He is,

therefore, Gracious, Iust, Mercifull, Pati∣ent, and whatever other use to be pro∣nounc'd of Him; out of the eminent per∣fection of his Essence, as 'tis call'd Sci∣ence.

3. And, since Liberty is among the Per∣fections of Will, by which the Will or the Person that knows chuses one out of ma∣ny, according to the Principles of his pro∣per nature; and, the Science of God is lar∣ger and more ample then His Operation; nor is there any thing, out of himself, by which he can be impell'd to operate this more then that; 'tis clear, that God, freely and according to his innate inclination, chuses and operates this rather then that.

4. You'l object, since God is a pure Act, there cannot be put in God a naturall inclination, according to which election may be made; because it would have the notion of a Principle in respect of the act of election: there cannot, therefore, be put Liberty in God. 'Tis answer'd, there cannot be put, in God, election in fieri, or, to-be-made, but only in facto esse, or, alrea∣dy made, that is, such a Will as is election already in act; and to this there is not re∣quir'd the notion of cause and effect.

5. Moreover, naturall inclination, as

'tis put in God, is not any active principle, but a certain common and abstracted no∣tion by which we know God; and, to which, that more particular notion is con∣formable, according to which we attribute the name of election to God: as, for exam∣ple, to this Volition, by which God will's that which is best, the volition of the World's Creation is conformable, by which is chosen the best in particular.

6. You'l object, again, since God essen∣tially has all Vertues, He alwaies does, of necessity, that which is best; and would doe against his own Essence, should he doe a∣ny thing otherwise then he does: 'Tis, therefore, determin'd to him essentially, to doe every thing as he does: but, that which proceeds out of Nature and Essence is not free: God, therefore, does nothing freely.

7. 'Tis answer'd, Even in us, after we see any thing to be better, 'tis against Na∣ture to doe the contrary: neither are we free, because we can decede from nature; for, so, Liberty would not be a perfection but an imperfection, since all perfection is according to nature: but, Liberty con∣sists in this, That, among many, which, at the beginning, seem indifferent, we can find

which is more according to nature; and em∣brace that, because 'tis conformable to Na∣ure.

8. Therefore, in God, too, Liberty is, so, to be put, that it be understood He has arriv'd, by his Science and understand∣ing, to act what is conformable to his na∣ture: and though, after He's suppos'd to have arriv'd to that, 'tis against His essence to doe another thing or not to doe this; yet, His Liberty is not, thence, diminisht: as, there is not lesse liberty in a constant Man, that changes not his judgement once establisht, then in a Fool, that, at e∣very little appearance of reason, alters his opinion, but a greater; for, a constant Man, therefore, changes not, because he alwaies exercises his wisely-made choice, that is, the better, whereas a light person exercises now the worse, now the better.

9. Again, for the most part, those things that are-not-chosen are not against the nature of the chooser, in themselves, but from some Accident or complex of circum∣stances; whence, the terms precisely con∣sider'd, the chooser may doe them accor∣ding to nature, but, because of some cir∣cumstance, he cannot: And, even thus, Liberty may be attributed to God; for,

to doe some particular thing, which he does not, is not against the nature of God precisely compar'd to this Thing; but, when the other circumstances are colle∣cted, it appears another thing is better, and then 'tis against the nature of God to doe this: yet, this prejudices not His Li∣berty; which consists in this, that He re∣jects that which, in it self, is according to His nature, because, by accident, 'tis against it; which we experience in our selves to be the track and path of Liberty.

10. You'l say, that God is determin'd by the very Being of his Essence; and, so in Him can be understood no indifferency to the utmost circumstance. 'Tis answer'd, this hinders not but that we are necessita∣ted to conceive That perfectly-determin'd Essence, by divers abstractive notions; in one of which this determination is not, so precisely and by design, exprest as in ano∣ther; and so, to us, the more particular of them becomes the determination of the more common; and of both is compoun∣ded the notion of liberty exercis'd in God.

11. You'l object, thirdly, If God were free, he could not-doe what he does; there∣fore, 'twere possible for him not to have the Volition and Science which He has;

'tis possible, therefore, there should not∣be the same God. 'Tis answer'd, by grant∣ing God can make that which He does not; but, by denying the consequence, that He could have another volition then he has: for, when we say, God can make another thing then He does, we com∣pound the Power of God or His fecundity with the Object whereof we speak; but, when we speak of his Volition, we speak of his Vnderstanding compleated to action, and This proceeds to action upon the conside∣ration of all accidents, out of which, as 'tis said, it happens that this object is not made, because 'tis not-best and against Na∣ture.

12. 'Tis, therefore, to be deny'd that there can be in God another act of voliti∣on, or, that his Will is indifferent to this and another act; though his effective power, taken abstractedly, is indifferent to more, because it respects the only notion of Being, or, Thing, in them: And thus, 'tis evident, how there is not, thence, in∣ferr'd any possible mutability in God.

13. You'l say, His Will, abstractedly taken, is indifferent, too, to more acts. 'Tis answer'd, we speak not of the Will as it means the faculty, to be abstracted in God;

but of the Will as it signifies the act or Vo∣lition; and that alwaies imports that the last determination is made, though it ex∣presses not what 'tis: whence, the notion of it is different from his Omnipotency, which, because 'tis referr'd to things with∣out, does not of necessity imply the se∣cond act.

LESSON IX.

Of the Divine Names, hovv they are improperly spoken of God.

1. OUt of what has been said, hither∣to, of God, we find farther, that the Names which we attribute to God are all imperfect, and, not one of them all has any notion whose formall ob∣ject is in God. For, since God is a most Simple Entity, precontaining in one most simple formality, the whole plenitude of Being, that is, the objects of all our noti∣ons & the significations of all our Names:

2. And is, too, Existence subsisting; but we have but one only name and noti∣on of existence, which signifies nothing besides: 'Tis clear, that our names do infi∣nitely come short of the most simple es∣sence

of God; both in their genericall no∣tion, because God is in none of our Pre∣dicaments; in their integrity, because no name of ours represents all that is in God; and in their form, because none of our ap∣prehensions have a formall likenesse in God. Whatever, therefore, we pronounce of God, must needs be apply'd to Him im∣properly and by an accommodation of the name.

3. Whence, again, 'tis clear, that all the names, which are spoken promiscuously of Created things and God, are spoken ana∣logically; and their primary signification is that in which they are spoken of the Creatures: For, 'tis evident, that men first impos'd it on created things, and of them they have, in some manner, perfect noti∣ons; and consequently, names attributed according to those notions are, in some sort, proper: but, they are infinitely far from explicating the Divinity: whence, it cannot be doubted, but they are more pro∣perly pronounc'd of the Creatures then of God.

4. You'l object, Perfections simply-simple are formally in God, and more ori∣ginally in Him then in the Creatures: names, therefore, signifying these, are

more originally spoken of God then of the Creatures. 'Tis answer'd, that, 'tis e∣vident, all names whatever are translated from the Creatures to God; whence, there can be no doubt which signification is the former: but besides, 'tis false that there are Perfections simply-simple (as Divines term them) in created things, which can be signifi'd by humane names; but those things which are simply, that is, for-them∣selves-purely, desirable by us, we call sim∣ply-simple perfections, and, through igno∣rance, think they are simply desirable by every Thing.

5. But, ther's none of these formally in God, as 'tis prov'd; and, if any were, for∣mally, then the same name would signifie God and a Creature, in the same significa∣tion, and would be univocall. Nor im∣ports it, that these perfections descend from God: for so do all others, which yet they know are metaphorically trans∣ferr'd.

6. This notwithstanding, the names which are spoken of God are truly spo∣ken, and it may be argu'd from one to an∣other in Him: For, since he that speaks knows he understands not what that is which he signifies by this name; but knows

'tis such as has effects, like those proceed from that perfection, which is call'd by this name in Creatures: 'tis clear, that this name truly, both signifies what is in God, because the speaker means to signify this; and, in some sort, makes known God to us, since it manifests God to be something, whence such like effects pro∣ceed, as from a just, a mercifull &c. Man.

7. And, since such effects contain others in them, or produce them out of themselves, or they accompany them: 'tis clear again, from the affirmation of the said names, we may proceed to the affirming others; which may signifie, that the consequent ef∣fects, too, have their root in God, or, some∣thing conformable to their root in Men.

8. You'l object, at least, There are three kinds of names, which are pronounc'd pro∣perly of God: Proper names, which agree not to any other, as, to be GOD, Omnipo∣tent, Omniscient, and the like, which suit not with any Creature, & consequently, are, of necessity, attributed properly to God: next, Relatives, as, to be a Creatour, Lord, Iudge, &c. which, being they speak onely an extrinse∣call denomination from their effect, it can∣not be doubted but they are properly pro∣nounc'd, since, doubtlesse, their effects are

from Him: lastly, Negative names, which, since they only deny something of God, cannot be counted improper; such are, to be incorporeall, immateriall, infinite, immense, &c.

9. 'Tis answer'd, Even these names, too, are improperly spoken of God. For, first, those which seem to be Properly spoken of God include something common to be the basis of what is superadded, which makes a Proper name; since, therefore, that com∣mon is improperly spoken, that proper, too, which includes that common, is im∣properly spoken: as, when God is call'd O∣mniscient, the Searcher of Hearts, &c. if Science be improperly spoken, then Omniscient, if a Searcher, Powerfull, &c. then Omnipo∣tent and Searcher of hearts are spoken im∣properly; and the same is of the notion, GOD, whether we take it for a compre∣hension of all, or whatever else.

10. Again, 'tis false that Relative names speak nothing intrinsecall, but only an ex∣trinsecall denomination: for, they signify a proportion and a community of the nature of things, which have either an unity or coordination in acting & suffering, or a na∣turall subjection; which, if they are not in the things, (as, in God, in respect of his Crea∣tures, they cannot be), at least, they are in

the Soul, since they are express'd in words; and consequently, even such Names, too, are improperly pronounc'd.

11. Lastly, Negative names, when they are simple, signifie some positive disposition; as, to be blind or lame expresse a vitious and defective disposition of the Legs or Eyes: and so likewise, to be incorporeall, immateriall, infinite &c. in God, explicate a difference of Substance distinct from corporeity and limitednesse, that is, a dif∣ference under the same genus; whence, they are improperly spoken of God.

12. But, if a purely-negative proposition were pronounc'd of God, it would not be improper: Whence, that Science which inquires into the Impropriety of the names which are spoken of God, and de∣nies all things of Him, is the most sublime and proper of all.

LESSON X.

Of the degrees of impropriety in the Divine Names.

1. OUt of what has been said, 'tis easily determin'd which names are, more or lesse improperly, pronounc'd of God.

For, there being three degrees of them, The first, of those which signifie things the most excellent in and simply desirable by men; such as are those we call the Ver∣tues, both Morall and Intellectuall: The second degree, of those Goods of the same persons, but participated in others which include imperfection; such as are the goods of Animals or the other Things be∣low Man: lastly, The third, of those which signifie directly and formally imperfecti∣on:

2.* 1.4 'Tis clear, these last are most shamefully attributed to God, and only by ignorance: but, the middle ones, by translation, that a name should be, as it were, first by a com∣mon Metaphor, used tosignify some Vertue and, then again that borrow'd significati∣on, should be transferr'd to God; for ex∣ample, when we call a Man a Lamb for be∣ing Meek, a Lion for couragious, we pre∣tend, too, to call God a Lamb and a Lion, by the same right as we, before, call'd Him meek or couragious.

3. You'l ask, since both the names of couragious and a Lion are improperly spo∣ken of God, why this should be esteem'd spoken symbolically and metaphorically,

and that properly? 'Tis answer'd, that, in the Creatures we see both the terms, and, therefore, we easily discern when a name is spoken metaphorically and not properly; for we see a Lion to be another thing then Courage: but, when names are transferr'd to God, one of the extremes is obscure to us, and consequently, the tran∣slation, too.

4. Moreover, in a Lamb, a Lion, &c. be∣sides meeknesse and courage, there are ma∣ny other things, which 'tis not the intenti∣on of the speaker to transferre: but, in meeknesse and fortitude, ther's nothing but their own particular notions; where∣fore, it seems that, of necessity, either they must be in God to whom they are apply'd, or else the name cannot be at all pro∣nounc'd of him: and, therefore, many think these are formally in the Divinity; though they mistake.

5. Out of what has been said, 'tis de∣duc'd, that some things cannot be attribu∣ted to God, which yet are commonly spo∣ken of Him. First, a Distinction, whether formall or vertuall, between his Predicates: for, they that affirm these things observe not that Distinction is a name of negation and imperfection; whence, for these to be

in Him, either vertually or eminently, is as much as that He can be nothing or defect.

6. Worse, yet, is the notion of Cause and Effect, in respect of Himself, attribu∣ted to God; for example, that his Attri∣butes flow vertually from his Essence, that He understands other things because He understands himself, that He wills the means because He wills the end, and the like: for, 'tis clear, that the notion of an ef∣fect, likewise, speaks imperfection; whence, 'tis no eminency to precontain it.

7. Like this 'tis, to put Instants either of nature or Intellectuall, in one of which some thing should be and another thing not-be in God, till the next instant: for, by this, there is put a posteriority in God, which is imperfection.

8. But, foulest of all, God is put to sup∣pose Creatures, or to depend on them, whe∣ther possible or actuall; as, when 'tis said, the Intuitive Vision of God suppo∣ses the futurition of Creatures; that God knows not a free act but in its ex∣istence; that a conditionate futuriti∣on is presuppos'd, before the dispositi∣on of the divine Providence; and such like: which, since they make the Divine essence,

really, both posteriour to and depending upon Creatures, are intolerable and ab∣surd.

9. The Imperfections, too, either of the Things God has made or of our Under∣standing, they unwarily cast upon God: as, when God wills the Means should be for the End, they weakly suspect that He wills the Means because He wills the End; when any one act of God is conceiv'd by us, we not conceiving another, they be∣lieve that there is something in God, too, whence one notion may be, though ano∣ther be suppos'd not-to-be.

10. It appears, out of what has hitherto been said, that, of all the names attributed to God, the name of BEING sounds least imperfection: for, both it stands in the highest degree of Actuality, whereas the rest speak Act only; and 'tis most Uni∣versall, whence it has this, both to contain all things and not to be bound to differen∣ces, and therefore, to include the pleni∣tude of perfection: and lastly, Being or Existence is perfecter then Essence, which is nothing but a capacity to that; but, all other things are in the order of Essences and more imperfect.

LESSON XI.

Of the Existence, Nature, and Science of INTELLI∣GENCES.

1. OUt of the premisses, 'tis easily collected, that there is some Substance, by its nature and o∣riginally, incorporeall: For, since God a∣lone is Being of himself, and whatever is produc'd participates existence from Him, and Existence, among those things which integrate a Thing, is the least unlike God, and is the most perfect and supreme; it appears, that all other things which are in a Thing are caus'd by God, by the means of Existence, and that alone immediately flows from God; and, by consequence, nothing is immediately made by God, which is not in the Creature in vertue of Existence.

2. Again, 'tis clear, that, supposing whatever Bodies to exist, they, because they are many, must be in a determinate place: and because, the same things being put and none chang'd, there alwaies re¦mains

the same; all Bodies, in vertue of Exi∣stence alone, if nothing be chang'd in them, will alwaies remain in the same place; and consequently, in vertue of God alone and Bodies, there will not any Motion follow.

3. Since, therefore, it appears in bodies, that there is motion; 'tis evident, there is some incorporeall Creature: which, be∣cause 'tis requir'd to give the first motion to Bodies, cannot be a separated Soul, whose birth presupposes the motion of Bodies.

4. 'Tis plain, again, that, since this Creature receiv's its Being from God, of it self it may not-be; & consequently, includes in it self a divisibility of Existence from its Essence.

5.* 1.5 Again, out of what has been said concerning a Body, 'tis evident, that 'tis not com∣pounded of Matter and Form; and a com∣position of Existence with any thing above it is impossible, since Existence is the most formall Form of a Thing, and consequent∣ly, there can be nothing more formall or superiour to it in the Thing whose 'tis.

6. Counting, therefore, those things which integrate a Thing or Being, there are three kinds of Things: GOD, filling the highest degree of Existence; Bodies, by their latitude immensly expanding the in∣finity of Matter; and This middle kind of

Act, neither essentially actualiz'd, nor flow∣ing into matter, possessing and filling a kind of middle order of subsisting.

7. 'Tis, therefore, a pure Act, because 'tis not mingled with a substantiall power or possibility: 'tis not the purest, because 'tis compounded with Existence, which is a Substantiall composition &, as is manifest, common to all but that One Thing of-it-self.

8. Again, 'tis evident, that an incorpore∣all Creature is Intellective; &, so, actually, Understanding: for, since the necessity of its existence is collected from the motion of Bodies, 'tis evident, it has some power to alter Bodies, that their motion may follow; wherefore, since action proceeds from an A∣gent as it actually is, that motion of Bodies must, of necessity, be actually in this Crea∣ture, & consequently, the Bodies chang'd.

9. Since, therefore, ther's no Matter in this Creature, nor, consequently, any de∣termination of matter, as its motion or quality; it comes to passe, that Bodies are in It as existing in themselves, that is, as ano∣ther thing: since, therefore, to be known is, to be, as another thing, in another, this our Creature is Cognoscitive; and since, to be known by the notion of Being, or as existing, is to be understood; and mo∣vable things are known to exist; the

Creature we are in search of is an IN∣TELLIGENCE.

10. It follows, too, that an Intelligence, in its own essence known, knows God and all other things that exist: For, since an Intelligence has whereto an existing thing may be conjoyn'd, retaining the property of its being another; &, its own Essence ex∣isting is intimately conjoyn'd to this pow∣er; 'tis clear, that It primarily and for∣mally so inexists.

11. And, since, knowing that its own Es∣sence exists, it must needs see that It exists accidentally; it sees evidently, that It has a Cause of existing, and that such an One as we have been in search of a∣bove: It sees,* 1.6 therefore, in its own Essence, that God is, and is such as we have been enquiring after, and far perfecter then we can decypher.

12. It sees, therefore, that nature actu∣ally emanes and flows out from Him; and, because it sees what is the End of nature, viz. that so many kinds and subdivisions of Animals should shoot-out and ripen in∣to Spirits of eternall Being; It sees what is necessary for this; and consequently, the whole Plot of the World, and wherein It self will be usefull for it.

LESSON XII.

Of the comparison of Intelligences to Souls and Bodies.

1. TIs clear, too, that an Intelligence has a reall divisibility of Essence from knowledge: for, since, 'tis of the notion of the knowledge of its Es∣sence, that it exists, and its existing is di∣visible from Its essence; much more the knowing its existence, which is posteriour to and supposes its existence;

2. Since, too, its Essen̄ce is limited to a certain degree of existence whereof 'tis capable; 'tis clear, the plenitude of Being is not essentiall to It: Since, therefore, by Its knowledge, It has the plenitude of Be∣ing, knowledge is not essentiall to It: There is, therefore, a non-repugnancy in Its essence to the not-having such know∣ledge; and consequently, a reall divisi∣bility of its Essence against its know∣ledge.

3. You'l say, that power is in vain which is never reduc'd to act; but, this divisibi∣lity is not reduc'd to act; therefore, 'tis

in vain, & ther's none. 'Tis answer'd, 'tis not a power, but a non-repugnancy, which was in act whilst the Intelligence existed not.

4. Out of what has been said, we are ar∣riv'd to the comparison of an Intelligence to a separated Soul: for, as they agree, in that they are both immateriall Things, ex∣isting by their own existence; so, they dis∣agree, in that an Intelligence is adequate to its existence, but a separated Soul exists by an existence which is, by na∣ture, common to the Body, and conse∣quently, 'tis not adequate to its exist∣ence.

5. Again, though both understand their own Essence and, by that, other things; yet 'tis with this difference, that an Intelligence has this knowledge of it self from its manner of existing, but, a se∣parated Soul,* 1.7 from its Body: for, when, as 'tis above said, something strikes a man, it makes him know that is, because it strikes him; but, his being struck includes that he is; there∣fore, in all knowledge, a man must needs know that himself is: The Soul, there∣fore, has, in its first knowledge, the no∣tice of its own existence and, from the bo∣dy,

receiv's the knowledge of its Be∣ing; which unlesse it carry'd along with it, it could not reflect upon it self whilst 'tis separated, because 'tis a power or possibility; for a power is indifferent to an act and non-act, and has neither but by force of an Agent distinct from it.

6. This, therefore, is the universall dif∣ference of separated Souls from Intelli∣gences, and proper to them as they are in∣compleat Spirits: that a Soul, out of the pure notion of its identity with its Intel∣lect, does not inform its Understanding; for, otherwise, it would not be a power: but an Intelligence has this, out of the ve∣ry genericall manner of its nature, by the force of identity To be present to its in∣tellective vertue.

7. Hence, again, it follows, that a Soul, in vertue of those things which are in it by the communion of the body, is car∣ry'd to all other things: but, an Intelli∣gence, in vertue of its own Essence exist∣ing.

8. A Soul, therefore, even in separati∣on, uses these common notions it findes, impress'd in it; and consequently, too, by other such like, attains to the pleni∣tude

of Being: but an Intelligence, by the pure degrees of Things, at sight of one Thing, transcends to another, nor needs incomplete notions.

9. Lastly, a Soul, because 'tis naturally the compart of a certain Body, is deter∣min'd to that, nor can act upon another but by means of the motion and affection of its own Body: and, it affects its proper body by identification; because the im∣pression or alteration of one is, of necessi∣ty, the alteration of the other, according to its manner, by reason of their iden∣tity.

10. But, an Intelligence is not deter∣min'd to any Body, but indifferent, and is determin'd only by choice to this rather then that; and changes that, because, be∣ing of it self in act and exercise, the exer∣cise, according as the corporeall nature is subject to It, passes into the Body, by rea∣son the Intelligence is in such a determina∣tion.

11. Again, since an Intelligence and a Body are call'd, univocally, Things, and the notion of existence is found the same in both; and all existence which is a com∣part with essence is, of necessity, proporti∣on'd to a part of Being, and limited: but,

between two limited Things under the same univocall notion, there must needs be a proportion: 'tis evident, that Bodies are not infinitely inferiour to Intelligences, in the notion of Substance; and conse∣quently, that the action, too, of an Intel∣ligence upon a Body is not but in propor∣tion.

12. And indeed, if the operation of an Intelligence, viz. motion, were suppos'd un∣limited in respect of a Body: it would not be connaturall for an Intelligence to move a Body, but to change it instantly, nor for a Body to be mov'd by It: That na∣ture, therefore, might grow up by conti∣nu'd degrees, there would need a kind of Thing of a middle nature, between Bodies and separated Souls, on one side, as the Summe and fruit of Bodies; and an Intelli∣gence on the other; to which middle Crea∣ture it should be connaturall to move Bo∣dies.

13. Be it, therefore, certain that an In∣telligence's power of moving is limited; but yet, rais'd, too, above the motive pow∣er of a Soul: and immediately 'tis de∣duc'd, that, because there are many prima∣rily-mov'd Bodies and, as it were, Suns; nor is it likely that one Intelligence can

move them all; many Intelligences, too, viz. a severall, to the severall Suns, must be assign'd.

LESSON XIII.

Of the Distinction, Subordination, and Number of Intelligences.

ANd, because To be another thing, as another, is the notion of Knowledge, and, out of that, fol∣lows the comparative power, or, that many may inexist together; it appears, that the perfection of Understanding is argu'd from hence, that more may be together in one Understander then in another: but, since, in Intelligences, as also in a separated Soul, all things inexist together; this together∣nesse must not be referr'd to the time but to the way of Knowledge, that they should be accounted together which are contain'd under one Step or divisibility.

2. Intelligences, therefore, will be es∣sentially distinguisht, in that One com∣prehends the Universe, by fewer links and knots, as it were, then another: so that, the Supreme, by one divisibility, knows

whatever is and what, according to the order of nature, can follow out of these; and this capacity follows out of the am∣plitude and eminency of its Substance: the lowest is that which has, for the severall Substances, severall divisibilities.

3. 'Tis manifest, out of what has been said, that there is a perfect Subordination a∣mongst the Intelligences: for, the Supe∣riours comprehend the adequate perfecti∣on of the Inferiours, and not in part only, as 'tis in Bodies.

4. Moreover, a Superiour is active upon a greater body, or more active upon an equall body, then an Inferiour: whence, if each be suppos'd willing to act diversly upon the same body, the Superiour will prevail, and the Inferiour will not be able to act.

5. It appears, notwithstanding, that this Subordination extends not, to this, that a Superiour Intelligence can act upon an Inferiour, or contrariwise: for, since there is not in an Intelligence any notion of power or possibility, conse∣quently, neither is there any mutability; but, as Its existence once infus'd, by reason of the connection with its Form which has not an indifference to more, remains

unchangeable as long as its Form; so al∣so, the knowledges of an Intelligence can∣not, like Accidents, be present and absent, but, once infus'd by the power of the Gi∣ver, they are subject to no mutation but from Him. Since, therefore, there is no o∣ther divisibility of an Intelligence, but ei∣ther in Its being or its knowing; 'tis evi∣dent, It can receive no change from ano∣ther Intelligence.

6. 'Tis apparent, too, that, because an Intelligence embraces whole nature, by necessary deduction; It has, of necessity, in its very birth, all the good which 'tis or∣dain'd to have: since, the good of every thing is that which is according to its nature, and, the whole possible good which can belong to a Creature, whose entire nature is to be intellectuall, is to understand: whence, since an Intelligence understands all things by force of its nativity; by the same gift that gives It being, it arrives to the possession of all connaturall good.

7. Every Intelligence, therefore, is blessed, in respect of the good it possesses; nor can it lose this Beatitude, more then Its essence with which 'tis conjoyn'd.

8. Lastly, 'tis evident, there are three things chiefly to be consider'd in Intelli∣gences,

Understanding, Will, and Action: among which, Action is the meanest, as being about inferiour things; & though, by it, they rule over Bodies as Instru∣ments, yet those things must needs be no∣bler by which themselves are perfected, which things belong to the Vnderstand∣ing.

9. And, the Will differs no otherwise from the Understanding, then the imper∣fect Understanding from the perfect: for, when the things that are understood are appropriated to the nature of the under∣stander, and are made something of it, then the Understanding begins to be Will. 'Tis evident, therefore, that the Will is of those intelligible things, the understanding whereof most of all perfects the understand∣er.

10. Wherefore, the greatest nobility of Intelligences is, to excell according to Will; the middle, according to Under∣standing; the lowest, according to Acti∣on: though, 'tis clear, that these notions are so correspondent to one another in In∣telligences, that, as much as the Will of one excells that of another, so much, too, must both its Understanding and power of Acting.

11. Now, that the multitude of Intelli∣gences is but finite, 'tis evident from hence, because all Multitude (since it rises and is encreas'd from One by Unities, and Uni∣ty cannot be a step from a finite to an infi∣nity) of necessity, is finite.

12. But, since they are not made for the good of another thing, as their End; nor have any thing common, whereby they should naturally respect one ano∣ther; nor any order of cause and effect; and there is no term, no limits of Under∣standing: limitation, among them, cannot depend on any other, then the occult pro∣portion of their Natures, by which they in∣tegrate the compleat order of being with∣out matter.

LESSON XIV.

Of the Action of GOD, Intelli∣gences, and Bodies, severally.

1. FRom the knowledge of the A∣gents, by the same steps we are led to the knowledge of their Actions. First, therefore, 'tis evident, out of what has been said, that, since God alone exists of himself and essentially, something flows

immediately from Him; and consequently▪ is created, and that God creates: for, 'tis evident, what is made is made out of no presuppos'd matter; since God himself is mutable, and no Thing, besides, preex∣ists.

2. 'Tis plain, too, this Action is in an instant: for, were it in Time, since, in the intermediate Time, there is no Substance wherein it should be subjected, it would nei∣ther subsist nor be in another: wherefore, of necessity, some Substance flows instanta∣neously from God.

3. 'Tis manifest, therefore, that both the Intelligences and the first Bodies pro∣ceed from God, by such Action.

4. Nor must it be ask'd, by what extrin∣secall power they receive birth from God: for, since God is essentially Being it self, 'tis plain, that whatever is requir'd, intrin∣secally, for God to be a cause actually cau∣sing, is essentially found in God; and, since nothing besides himself exists, that which is in Him is of such vertue that the effect follows; wherefore, 'tis a necessary consequence, because the subsistent Being is Being it self, Creatures are, or, if Being be, the Creature is; as if you should say, if the Sun be not capable of its own

light, the things about it are illuminated, or, if the Fountain overflows, the neigh∣bourhood is watred.

5.* 1.8 Again, since an Intelligence can neither act upon God, be∣cause He is immutable, nor upon another Intelligence, nor upon a separated Soul, which, as to that, is of the same na∣ture with an Intelligence; its action is whol∣ly about Bodies: And, Action about a Bo∣dy, if it be compounded of more, is known by the simples whereof 'tis compounded; now, that there are only three simple Acti∣ons has been evidenc'd, (by shewing how all Actions are perform'd) in our Physicks, viz. locall Motion, Condensation, and Rarefaction.

6. And, for Locall Motion, 'tis manifest that 'tis, really, nothing but the division of a Magnitude: and the division of a Magnitude consists both of the conjun∣ction of the dividing body to the divided, and its separation from the body with which 'twas formerly one: to conjunction there's nothing else requir'd, but that no Quantity keep off the Place from what is plac'd in it,* 1.9 since Magnitudes between which no other in∣terposes, even by that, are

one together; now, that there should not be another between them is a certain ne∣gative notion and, by consequence, is not made by an Agent on set purpose, but fol∣lows out of the Action of a Body intend∣ing another thing, viz. from a body impel∣ling.

7. But, the body impelling either it self changes place, without any other mu∣tation, and then, it self, too, is impell'd; or else, from some other mutation only it receiv's the being impell'd, or, without im∣pulse, to impell: Since, therefore, besides division, there are but two simple mutati∣ons, Rarefaction and Condensation, and condensation is both a negative action, as being the less'ning of Quantity, nor makes it the body aspire to anothers place; 'tis plain, there's no simple, properly call'd, action in bodies, but Rarefaction.

8. Since, therefore, 'tis clear, that the Action of an Intelligence is a simple and properly an Action, as, that which begins and causes the action of all other bodies; it comes to passe, that the proper Action of an Intelligence upon Bodies is Rarefa∣ction: And, since ther's no other action, properly, upon a body, nor has an Intelli∣gence any action upon any other thing

but a body; it follows, that Rarefaction alone is the action of an Intelligence.

9. You'l ask, wherein consists this acti∣on of an Intelligence upon a body? or, what consequence is this, An Angel wills, therefore a Body is rarefy'd? 'Tis answer'd, out of what has been said, 'tis clear, that an Intelligence, by love or desire, ingrafts the thing to be done into Its own Essence and existence, in a particular manner, as if it were something of It self: whence, 'tis plain, that the Intelligence, by the act of its own being stands bent to the Body up∣on which 'tis to act, according to all the circumstances necessary, out of its own knowledge to the Effect.

10. On the other side, 'tis plain, both that the Body is susceptible of the desired effect, and that the effect follows out of, or rather, is but the eminency and excesse of its own act, or Form, that is, Quantity, upon matter, nay, of its commonest act or corporeity; as also, that the Body is, in some sort, continu'd to the Intelligence, by its Form or Substantiall act.

11. And, though the act of the Intelli∣gence is of another kind, yet, because the notion of existence, to which both dispose, is the same; the act of the Body must

needs, from the assistance of the Intelli∣gence, grow, as it were, and be chear'd; and consequently, more overmaster its possibility; and, which follows, the Sub∣stance be made rarer, either to the transmu∣tation of the Substantiall Form, or within the same nature.

12. We answer, again, 'Tis evident, that, precisely out of the notion of Under∣standing, ther's a connection between the understander and that which is under∣stood: In such an one as receiv's his Sci∣ence from the Objects, the Object is the cause of Understanding; in one whose Understanding is His being, the being of the thing understood is from the under∣standing; lastly, in one whose Under∣standing is neither his being, nor from the object, but concreated and naturall to him, the changes in that which is understood (if it admit of any without the change of ex∣istence) may be from him.

13. Next, from hence is understood the operation of a Body, wherein that con∣sists, viz. in nothing else but in the formall power of existing what it is. For, let there be three bodies, A, B, C. following one another between the parallell sides of three places, or of one place equall to all the three; and

let an Intelligence rarify A: since that can∣not encrease, unlesse either B be diminish't or driven on, so long as 'tis easier for B to be condens'd then to drive on C, so long B will be condens'd; when 'tis arriv'd to the term of condensation, by little and lit∣tle it encroaches into the place of C, and forces C to enter into the place of ano∣ther; till 'tis come into so ample or con∣densable a field, that the rarefaction of A operates nothing else but condensing the farthest body, and then the motion ceases.

14. The operation, therefore, of A is, to be greater, whence follows A 's being u∣nited, according to some part of it, to the place of B: Again, the operation of B is, either to be made lesse and so only to quit its place, or else, keeping it self in its Quantity, to unite it self with the place of C: Since, therefore, to be united to the place of C is nothing else, but to be a Magnitude between which and the place of C ther's nothing interpos'd; the whole operation of B and A is no other, then to be what they are, by a kind of formall con∣sistence.

15. Because, therefore, a body has no operation but division, 'tis plain, that the

whole action of a body is reduc'd to Be∣ing what it is, or a formall consistency in its proportion of Quantity to Matter and its continuity to place; and, that its true power of acting is infus'd by Intelligen∣ces.

16. 'Tis plain, too, that an Intelli∣gence, by that one rarefactive Vertue, can operate whatever is to be done by Bodies: For, since all corporeall action is perfected by division, and division is arriv'd to by this vertue, all action of a Body is attain'd to by this vertue.

LESSON XV.

Of the cooperation of the Agents, to the making of Substances, a rationall Soul, and to all other effects.

1. HEnce, we are arriv'd to the pro∣duction of Substances: For, since some are produc'd out of nothing, some out of others preexisting; the former must, of necessity, have flow'd immediately from God: The Agent,

therefore, which produces out of nothing, makes all the other qualities and conditi∣ons of the Thing, by the notion of exi∣stence: Existence, therefore, is first in execu∣tion; and, since the greater is not made for the lesse, it must be first, too, in intention.

2. Wherefore, since every Agent, by a∣cting, endeavours to expresse its own es∣sence upon the effect; the Essence of him that produces out of nothing must be Ex∣istence it self.

3. Nor is it to be expected, that ano∣ther Creature should be made use of, as to preparing the matter; both because Ex∣istence is nobler then all the rest in a Thing, whence it admits not of any prepa∣ration for the rest, since preparations are only in the baser in order to a better: as also, because, existence being put, the Thing is already put: whence, the operati∣on upon nothing is compleat by the very putting of existence, and consequently, of that cause alone which puts existence.

4. Supposing, then, that God has crea∣ted certain Substances; and that, because, of themselves, they are defectible, they al∣waies have that being from God; 'tis infer'd, that God perpetually poures out the power of being, as the Sun Light. Imagine,

now, an accidentall transmutation on Bo∣dy's part, (such as is explicated in our Physicall discourse), and, (as 'tis decla∣red above) through certain changes, an arrivall to a constancy of being in another degree.

5. It must needs be, that, As, when the Earth is turn'd to the Sun or Wood laid on the Fire, from the perpetuall and mi∣nutable action of the Sun or Fire, joyn'd with the mutability of the Earth and Wood, sometimes one sometimes another part of the Earth will be enlightned, and sometimes one sometimes another part of the Wood will burn: So, supposing that naturall motions make Matter, in severall Sites, sometimes capable of a perfecter ex∣istence, sometimes of a more imperfect; from the same constant effusion of exi∣stence on Gods side, the Substance must needs be sometimes nobler, sometimes more ignoble, respectively.

6. Suppose, farther, an existent body so chang'd, that the matter may be capable of a Form which, in its essence, includes some notion, that exceeds the power of matter: is it not plain, that, out of the very same constant effusion of existence from God, a Substance will exist which will be, so, cor∣poreall,

that 'twill be, in some respect, Spi∣rituall?

7. For, since the putting of existence puts a Thing; purely at the second causes determinating God to the position of such an existence, not that alone is put, but whatever follows out of it, though it ex∣ceed the power of second causes: And so, it appears, how, putting the generation of a Man, a rationall Soul is put; and how the power of nature so concurres to it, that yet the notion of Creation, or rather of con-creation, supervenes, and is necessa∣ry.

8. Lastly, how it both is and is-not ex traduce, and, at once, by Generation and Creation; and how, in this case, an Instru∣ment, in some sort, is made use of for Creation.

9. And, because the internall Dispositi∣ons of a Soul, as, to know and to will, even they are indivisible, and follow out of the materiall impressions made upon the Bo∣dy: it must needs be that, as the Soul it self follows out of the generation of Man, by the help of the universall Action of God; so these Dispositions, too, from the impression made upon the man, and from the nature of the Soul, must indivisibly al∣ter the Soul.

10. And, whoever would see an evi∣dent example of these things, let him con∣ceive how, by cutting, a piece of wood is made more; for, all the time of the cut∣ting, the figure is chang'd, yet the wood remains, by the same unity, one; but, in∣divisibly, the cutting being finisht, they are, now, two pieces of wood; without the dualities beginning at all, before, or any thing of its nature, but only some va∣riation about the Figure.

11. Out of what has been said, we are deduc'd to see, how God performs all the works of the Creatures in them. For, first, if we speak of Intelligences, Since their internall operations are nothing else, but to be all other things after a cer∣tain manner; 'tis manifest, they are, actu∣ally, even to the uttermost positive cir∣cumstances, by force of their Creation.

12. For, by force of that, their essence is conjoyn'd to it self, as 'tis a cognosci∣tive vertue; and, out of this conjunction, the next divisibility, which is, of God to the same cognoscitive vertue, since all the causes are put, is, of necessity, in them.

13. And, what is said of this divisibility is, with the same facilnesse, discover'd of all the rest whatever; since they are all con∣nected:

their externall action, too, Mat∣ter, which is its subject, being put, follows, by force of their internall, without any o∣ther change in them.

LESSON XVI.

Of the government of God, and the locality of Incorporeall Things.

1. AS for the rest, the same way leads to the discovery that God is not the cause of any imperfection and not-being, or ill, which is in created things and their action: For, since the acti∣on of God is only to infuse Being, and this as much as the Creature is capable; 'tis plain, what there is of Being is to be attri∣buted to God, but what ther's wanting of Being is to be refunded into the incapaci∣ty of the Subject.

2. And, since the defect of action pro∣ceeds out of the defect of the Principle, that is, out of some not-being in the princi∣ple; in the same manner, all defect in a∣cting is to be reduc'd, likewise, into some defect in being of the Creature, and not into God, as its cause. Wherefore, God is the Authour of all Good, because all good

is from being; but, of no ill, since ill is from not-being.

3. Consequently, 'tis evident, that God cannot annihilate any thing, or withdraw his concourse from the action of any Creature: For, to be able to annihilate is to be able to make a no-Thing; and, to withdraw his concourse is not to give Be∣ing to things created; either of which cannot happen, but from a defect of Good∣nesse and of the overflowing, as it were, of Being in God.

4. You'l say, Therefore, God does not act freely ad extra, that is, upon the Crea∣tures: But,* 1.10 this Consequence is to be deny'd; as 'tis said above, when we treated of the Liberty of God.

5. You'l say again, In the same man∣ner, therefore, it must be said, that God cannot make any thing which He will not make. But, this Consequence, also, is de∣ny'd; for, his Power is refer'd to possible things, or, which have entity and intelligi∣bility; and therefore 'tis not to be deny'd that he can doe any thing that's possible; though, in another respect, it be impossible it should happen that He should, actually, make this.

6. But, the Power of God, which is

the very notion of Being and Thing, has not, for its act, the not-being of any thing and not-acting; and therefore, 'tis not to be said, that He can give not-being, or can not-act.

7. Let us remember, now, that God understands all and every thing done by the Creatures, and wills all things which follow out of his operation; and, we have it, that God is Governour of the World, and that there can be no resistance against his Will.

8. For, since whatever is has its birth from his will, nor can there be any thing which is not effected by Him and His works; 'tis clear, whatever He wills not is not, nor can be so long as he wills not that it be.

9. Nor is it lesse evident, that neither the Contingency of naturall causes, nor the Liberty of rationall Creatures is infring'd, by this government of God. For, since Contingency is nothing else, but that the nature of the cause is such that it may and uses to be hindered, by other causes; and Liberty, that a Creature, upon the consi∣deration of more proceeds to action: and, 'tis so manifest, that both these are in na∣ture, and no waies touched by the operati∣on of God (as that operation is explica∣ted)

that it needs only the remembring: 'tis clear, that the government of God is sweet, and offers no violence to the natures of naturall causes.

10. You'l object, that Propositions, concerning a future, whether contingent or free, Subject, are determinately true; e∣specially, since they are known by God and are predefin'd: wherefore, the effect cannot not-be: there is, therefore, no ei∣ther contingency or liberty; whether this happens out of the force of Contradicti∣on, or of the irrefragable will of God.

11. 'Tis answer'd, 'tis false that Propo∣sitions concerning a future contingent have a determinate truth: for, since a man speaks out of consideration of causes, the Sense of his proposition is What the causes may bear: Nor imports it, whether it be pronounc'd actively or passively; as if you should say, what the causes will act, or what effect will be made by them; for, it signifies still the same.

12. If it be, therefore, ask'd, what men mean by such propositions, 'twill rain, 'twill be hot, Socrates will be angry or go to Sea, &c? 'tis clear, they mean to explicate ef∣fects, as in defectible causes, and conse∣quently, they have no determinate truth.

But, if it be ask'd, what the proposition will signify, if it be referr'd immediately to the effect, as it sounds? 'tis answer'd, no sensible man uses to speak so or make such propositions; and so it belongs not to the present question. But, if there be suppos'd such a power of Contradiction in the Objects, as to determine the truth of propositions; all things must fall out by the necessity of Fate and be from themselves,* 1.11 which is, a∣bove, sufficiently demonstrated impossible.

13. 'Tis plain, lastly, that this action of God, by which He moves a Creature, is miscall'd a Concourse; since such a word leads the hearer into an apprehension of a certain equality in acting, between God and a Creature: 'Tis, therefore, more pro∣perly call'd premotion or predetermination; since God makes us doe even to every the least positive circumstance of action.

14. 'Tis collected, too, out of what has been said, how God is said to act in all things, both by the immediation of his Suppositum or Substance and of his Vertue; but, an Intelligence upon one body only by the immediation of Its Substance, up∣on the rest by the immediation only of Its vertue.

15. For, since the action of God is the influx of Being it self, and nothing can act without Being, nor Being flow from any but God; God must needs immediately act upon all Substances by Creating and Conserving them: and consequently, in such his acting, no third Substance inter∣venes between Him and the Creature. A∣gain, the action of all bodies proceeding from Intelligences, and They being made act by God; the vertue of God makes every thing act, and so is more immediate to the effect then the vertue of the nearest cause: whence also, God is, by the immediation of his vertue, more immediate, then the next cause which produces the action.

16. But, an Intelligence, which imme∣diately rarifies A, moves not B, but by the mediation of A; the Suppositum A, there∣fore, is between the Intelligence and B; wherefore, the Intelligence acts not, by the immediation of Its Suppositum, upon B: But, because A's being rarify'd is the cause that A moves B; and A is rarify'd by the vertue of the Intelligence; the vertue of the Intelligence makes B be mov'd by A; the vertue, therefore, of the Intelli∣gence, not the Suppositum, is immediate to B.

17. And, hence it follows, that God is said to be Immense; but, an Intelligence to be definitively in Place: For, since no∣thing either is or can be without Existence, 'tis clear, neither can there be any Place, upon which God does not, immediately, act: but, an Intelligence, having a determinate proportion to a body, so acts upon a cer∣tain quantity, that it cannot, together and at once, immediately act upon another. Since, therefore, incorporeall Things are not in Place circumscriptively; an Intelli∣gence must be definitively, but God, with∣out end, in all Place, by immediate opera∣tion.

LESSON XVII.

Of the Conservation of Creatures, and the Durations of Things.

1. TIs clear, too, out of what has been said, that this action of God is the conservation of things, both as to their Substance, and as to their intrinse∣call Accidents: For, since the essence of created things has not, of it self, a necessary conjunction with Being, but such an one

as may, of its own nature, be lost; 'tis plain, they are not conjoyn'd, by force of their own notions, for that time during which they may be not-conjoyn'd; and, by consequence, as long as they are con∣joyn'd, they have this, to be conjoyn'd, from an extrinsecall; they, therefore, re∣main conjoyn'd by an Extrinsecall pow∣er.

2. But, 'tis of the same nature, to be conjoyn'd and to remain conjoyn'd, or, to be for any duration conjoyn'd; they have, therefore, this from the same cause and vertue: and, since 'tis not any change, but, on the contrary, the effect is that no∣thing should be chang'd; by the very same action, too, they keep their being, which is, to be conserv'd. The same action of God, therefore, is Conservation, in re∣spect of Substances:* 1.12 And, since 'tis declar'd above, that intrinsecall Accidents are nothing else but manners of Substance; the Substance being conserv'd, 'tis clear, that they also are conserv'd in their Be∣ing.

3. Out of what has been said, too, we may know, what Action signifies in the ef∣fect it self: And, if the question be of the

Divine action, as it immediately flows from God, 'tis plain, that 'Tis the very Substance it self; not only, because it can∣not be subjected in a Substance, which sub∣sists no otherwise then by it; nor, because the existence of Things form'd out of our conceits is universally rejected; but also, because any intermediate action (such as the Moderns feign the Making) which should be put, serves to no purpose.

4. For, either God, before this action, is determin'd in himself to act, that is, that this action should follow from Him, or, He is not; if not, this action will not fol∣low, for, from an indifferent nothing fol∣lows; but, if He be determin'd, this action has not the power of determining Him, for which the Opponent requires it as ne∣cessary: but, the effect can, as immediate∣ly, follow out of Himself, as this action. And, this same discourse holds against the like fictitious action, too, of Creatures.

5. Again, in as much as the action of God is Conservation, 'tis nothing but the very Being of the thing conserv'd. For, first, the Duration of an Incorporeall thing cannot be divisible; for, if it were divisi∣ble, 'twould be continuate and divisible without end: either, therefore, some part,

together and at once, in an incorporeall, that is, indivisible thing, or not: if toge∣ther, that part will not include succession; if not, no part can ever be.

6. And, this Argument has not lesse force in a Corporeall Creature; for, though it be divisible in extension, yet, 'tis indivisible in succession, and conse∣quently, it cannot sustain together more parts of successive duration.

7. Again, if, to endure be, for the same thing to be the same it was; is it not clear, ther's nothing requir'd but a non-mutation? and, on the other side, that, of two things which exist, if one perish, that's said to be chang'd; that which endures remaining still unchang'd? There is, therefore, no novelty in permanency.

8. Moreover, to change the existence, the Essence, too, must needs be chang'd, since, 'tis the aptest capacity of existence: the notion, therefore, of Substance will be in perpetuall change and instable, and con∣sequently, out of God, nothing stable.

9. You'l object, Since 'tis often said, that a Creature may not-be, and yet, whilst it is, it cannot not-be; 'tis ma∣nifest, that its cannot not-be, or, to be whilest it is, successively super∣venes

to a Creature: Since, therefore, ther's a greater necessity of indivisibility, on God's part, then on a Creature's; the succession is to be concluded on the Crea∣tures side.

10. 'Tis answer'd, 'Tis just contrary: for, as, if the action of God were put (by way of imagination) to be successive, no man would require any other succession, to understand the duration of a Creature; so, if the action of God be put equivalent to continually successive, no man can complain of the unintelligibility of Dura∣tion.

11. Because, therefore, the action of God is conformable to His existence, and His existence indivisibly comprehends the past and future; it must needs be that the action, as it is the internall determination of God, in the same manner comprehends succession. This action, therefore, actu∣ates the Creature, with a certain indivisi∣bility that eminentially contains divisibi∣lity; and, without any divisibility, makes the existence of a Creature, by contradi∣ction, impossible to be taken away succes∣sively; yet, without any more then a ver∣tuall succession intervening in the Crea∣ture.

12. For, what has formally the vertue which is in succession, can as well perform this as succession it self: but, such, we have said, is the action of God: whence, 'tis plain, that, even from this effect, the no∣tion of Gods Eternity is demonstrated à posteriori.

13. Hence, 'tis deduc'd, that the dura∣tion of corporeall and spirituall Substan∣ces is, intrinsecally different: Since, cor∣poreall Substances have, from the notion of Matter, an intrinsecall possibility to not-be; and consequently, a weaker con∣nection to Being, intrinsecally, out of their own nature; but duration consists in the connection of existence and essence, as to the effect of permanence.

14. Adde to this, that there are, in na∣ture, causes which destroy Bodies, but, there are none which are able to infest Spi∣rituall Substances: whence, since God de∣stroyes nothing, of Himself, Intelligences are absolutely immortall, as also, separa∣ted Souls; and Bodies, when motion cea∣ses, will be immortall accidentally, in the mean time they are simply mortall, unlesse perhaps there are some exempt from the generall order.

15. Out of what has been said, too,

both the notion and difference of three Durations is evident:* 1.13 of Time explicated at the be∣ginning: of Eternity, when we treated of God:* 1.14 lastly, of Evi∣ternity in Intelligences.

LESSON XVIII.

Of the manner of Action, on the Subject's side.

1. THe solution, also, of that old Que∣stion is evident, Why God made not the World before? For, if we consider, that ther's no beginning of an Infinite, and that, where ther's no beginning, there can be no determi∣nate distance from the beginning; it will appear, that 'tis impossible there should be any eternall flux of Time or instants, (even by imagination), where∣in there can be taken a now and then, and any constant difference of duration, or, something to be before, something after, determin'd.

2. Wherefore, such a Question proceeds from the weaknesse and infirmity of our

understanding, and signifies nothing; and consequently, bears no answer: For, for God to make this world before, in time, that he made it, would be to have made a world before a world; since, the time of the be∣ginning of the world is nothing else but the very motion, with which the world be∣gan to be mov'd.

3. In like manner, evident is the soluti∣on of that question, Whether God could make a permanent Thing (that is, whose es∣sence includes not succession) from all e∣ternity? For, if there be no quiddity or pos∣sibility of an infinite in succession; 'tis clear, that God could not so make a Crea∣ture, that it should have Eternity, by rela∣tion to infinite succession: Therefore, not otherwise then by some positive eminence confer'd on it: Since, therefore, Duration consists in the connection of existence to a Thing, He could no otherwise make a Creature from Eternity, then by giving it such a connection by which, simply, it could not not-be, wherein consists the very Eternity it self of God. Clearly, therefore, 'tis impossible that even a permanent Thing could have been from Eternity.

4. But, as for the not-immediate action of God, or (which is all one) as 'tis

the same with the action of the Creature, 'tis plain, the same account is to be given as of the action of the Creature. And, of these, Philosophers have pronounc'd, that Action is something between the Agent and effect: as, in the change of Place, be∣tween the Rest in the term whence and the term whether, there interven's motion; which they falsely imagine to be more be∣ings-in-place successively, since, as Aristotle has demonstrated, all that time the mova∣ble happens not to be in a place equall to it, whereas, yet, equality is of the very notion of Place.

5. So, too, in other mutations, especi∣ally that which is call'd Substantiall gene∣ration, the Subject, by the precedent mo∣tion, which properly is the very action, is not, neither actually nor in part, in the term it self; but is chang'd only in its Quality.

6. So, too, it falls out in Rarefaction, which is immediately from an Intelli∣gence: for, since the proportion of an In∣telligence to a Body is finite; It cannot, instantaneously, reduce a body to any how-little-soever-a degree of rarity: where∣fore, there must of necessity, between It prepar'd for action and the term, inter∣vene

some motion; during which, the bo∣dy rarify'd is neither in any determinate degree of rarity, nor in any determinate Place.

7. Out of all which, this, at length, is concluded, what a kind of being Passion or mutation has in the Subject: for, since 'tis repugnant, the Formall parts in a Compound should be actuall; they must be only in possibility or power, and some other third thing, resolvable into parts, a∣ctually exist.

8. This third thing, therefore, has a certain resolvable and changeable nature; wherefore, 'tis clear, there is some cause which has the power of changing it: Let B, therefore, be the changeable nature, A the changing cause; if A be apply'd to B, must not B, of necessity, become ano∣ther thing then it was, that is, be chang'd?

9. This is, therefore, for B to have suf∣fered by means of A, viz. to become ano∣ther thing then it was: another thing, I say, or altered; for, if nothing perceivable remain, 'tis become another thing; but, if there remain whereby it may be mark'd to be this same as was before, 'tis only al∣tered, because the foundation, or, that which is the sustainer still remaines,

but 'tis innovated in some respect.

10. For example, Let there be a Gallon of water in a Cubicall vessell, and (to avoid dispute about a thing that concerns us not) let's suppose the Figure to be nothing else, but that that very quantity, accor∣ding to its three dimensions, be no farther extended then, actually, 'tis; (which con∣ceit, being purely negative, can adde no∣thing to the quantity): let the same water, then, be suppos'd in a vessell of another fi∣gure; and consequently, it self, too, to have put on other limits: Since the for∣mer terms were nothing but the very Quantity of the water, neither can the la∣ter differ from it.

11. 'Tis evident, therefore, that this Quantity, remaining a Gallon, (which is its difference, whereby, as quan-tity, 'tis limited), has a possibility to be, now Pyramidall, now Cubicall; and conse∣quently, is changeable, no Thing being chang'd: To this possibility, therefore, if the power of two such vessells be sup∣pos'd successively apply'd; 'tis clear, pure∣ly upon the water's and their conjunction, there follows a change in the Quantity of the water, by little and little, and, at length, what in one vessell was of one fi∣gure,

in another becomes of another, chang'd according to the manner, un∣chang'd according to the notion of Quan∣tity.

12. Thus, Substances become altered, ac∣cording to Qualities, the Quantity un∣chang'd; according to Quantity, the Sub∣stance unchang'd; according to Substance, the Matter remaining: for no other cause, but that the Subject or that which suffers is so mutable, and an Efficient, which has the power of changing, is apply'd.

Notes

• * 1.1

  B. 4. Les. 2.
• * 1.2

  n. 1.
• * 1.3

  B. 4. Les. 2. n. 1.
• * 1.4

  N. 5, 6, &c.
• * 1.5

  B. 4. Les. 3. N. 6.
• * 1.6

  Les. 6, 7, &c.
• * 1.7

  Les. 2. N. 8.
• * 1.8

  Less. 13. n. 5.
• * 1.9

  B. 2. Les. 2. N. 7.
• * 1.10

  Les. 8.
• * 1.11

  Les. 5. n. 9, 10.
• * 1.12

  B. 1. Les. 5. N. 8, 9.
• * 1.13

  B. 2. Les. 3. N. 3.
• * 1.14

  Les. 6. N. 14, 15.