Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

LESSON XVIII.

Of the manner of Action, on the Subject's side.

1. THe solution, also, of that old Que∣stion is evident, Why God made not the World before? For, if we consider, that ther's no beginning of an Infinite, and that, where ther's no beginning, there can be no determi∣nate distance from the beginning; it will appear, that 'tis impossible there should be any eternall flux of Time or instants, (even by imagination), where∣in there can be taken a now and then, and any constant difference of duration, or, something to be before, something after, determin'd.

2. Wherefore, such a Question proceeds from the weaknesse and infirmity of our

understanding, and signifies nothing; and consequently, bears no answer: For, for God to make this world before, in time, that he made it, would be to have made a world before a world; since, the time of the be∣ginning of the world is nothing else but the very motion, with which the world be∣gan to be mov'd.

3. In like manner, evident is the soluti∣on of that question, Whether God could make a permanent Thing (that is, whose es∣sence includes not succession) from all e∣ternity? For, if there be no quiddity or pos∣sibility of an infinite in succession; 'tis clear, that God could not so make a Crea∣ture, that it should have Eternity, by rela∣tion to infinite succession: Therefore, not otherwise then by some positive eminence confer'd on it: Since, therefore, Duration consists in the connection of existence to a Thing, He could no otherwise make a Creature from Eternity, then by giving it such a connection by which, simply, it could not not-be, wherein consists the very Eternity it self of God. Clearly, therefore, 'tis impossible that even a permanent Thing could have been from Eternity.

4. But, as for the not-immediate action of God, or (which is all one) as 'tis

the same with the action of the Creature, 'tis plain, the same account is to be given as of the action of the Creature. And, of these, Philosophers have pronounc'd, that Action is something between the Agent and effect: as, in the change of Place, be∣tween the Rest in the term whence and the term whether, there interven's motion; which they falsely imagine to be more be∣ings-in-place successively, since, as Aristotle has demonstrated, all that time the mova∣ble happens not to be in a place equall to it, whereas, yet, equality is of the very notion of Place.

5. So, too, in other mutations, especi∣ally that which is call'd Substantiall gene∣ration, the Subject, by the precedent mo∣tion, which properly is the very action, is not, neither actually nor in part, in the term it self; but is chang'd only in its Quality.

6. So, too, it falls out in Rarefaction, which is immediately from an Intelli∣gence: for, since the proportion of an In∣telligence to a Body is finite; It cannot, instantaneously, reduce a body to any how-little-soever-a degree of rarity: where∣fore, there must of necessity, between It prepar'd for action and the term, inter∣vene

some motion; during which, the bo∣dy rarify'd is neither in any determinate degree of rarity, nor in any determinate Place.

7. Out of all which, this, at length, is concluded, what a kind of being Passion or mutation has in the Subject: for, since 'tis repugnant, the Formall parts in a Compound should be actuall; they must be only in possibility or power, and some other third thing, resolvable into parts, a∣ctually exist.

8. This third thing, therefore, has a certain resolvable and changeable nature; wherefore, 'tis clear, there is some cause which has the power of changing it: Let B, therefore, be the changeable nature, A the changing cause; if A be apply'd to B, must not B, of necessity, become ano∣ther thing then it was, that is, be chang'd?

9. This is, therefore, for B to have suf∣fered by means of A, viz. to become ano∣ther thing then it was: another thing, I say, or altered; for, if nothing perceivable remain, 'tis become another thing; but, if there remain whereby it may be mark'd to be this same as was before, 'tis only al∣tered, because the foundation, or, that which is the sustainer still remaines,

but 'tis innovated in some respect.

10. For example, Let there be a Gallon of water in a Cubicall vessell, and (to avoid dispute about a thing that concerns us not) let's suppose the Figure to be nothing else, but that that very quantity, accor∣ding to its three dimensions, be no farther extended then, actually, 'tis; (which con∣ceit, being purely negative, can adde no∣thing to the quantity): let the same water, then, be suppos'd in a vessell of another fi∣gure; and consequently, it self, too, to have put on other limits: Since the for∣mer terms were nothing but the very Quantity of the water, neither can the la∣ter differ from it.

11. 'Tis evident, therefore, that this Quantity, remaining a Gallon, (which is its difference, whereby, as quan-tity, 'tis limited), has a possibility to be, now Pyramidall, now Cubicall; and conse∣quently, is changeable, no Thing being chang'd: To this possibility, therefore, if the power of two such vessells be sup∣pos'd successively apply'd; 'tis clear, pure∣ly upon the water's and their conjunction, there follows a change in the Quantity of the water, by little and little, and, at length, what in one vessell was of one fi∣gure,

in another becomes of another, chang'd according to the manner, un∣chang'd according to the notion of Quan∣tity.

12. Thus, Substances become altered, ac∣cording to Qualities, the Quantity un∣chang'd; according to Quantity, the Sub∣stance unchang'd; according to Substance, the Matter remaining: for no other cause, but that the Subject or that which suffers is so mutable, and an Efficient, which has the power of changing, is apply'd.