Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

LESSON XVII.

Of the Conservation of Creatures, and the Durations of Things.

1. TIs clear, too, out of what has been said, that this action of God is the conservation of things, both as to their Substance, and as to their intrinse∣call Accidents: For, since the essence of created things has not, of it self, a necessary conjunction with Being, but such an one

as may, of its own nature, be lost; 'tis plain, they are not conjoyn'd, by force of their own notions, for that time during which they may be not-conjoyn'd; and, by consequence, as long as they are con∣joyn'd, they have this, to be conjoyn'd, from an extrinsecall; they, therefore, re∣main conjoyn'd by an Extrinsecall pow∣er.

2. But, 'tis of the same nature, to be conjoyn'd and to remain conjoyn'd, or, to be for any duration conjoyn'd; they have, therefore, this from the same cause and vertue: and, since 'tis not any change, but, on the contrary, the effect is that no∣thing should be chang'd; by the very same action, too, they keep their being, which is, to be conserv'd. The same action of God, therefore, is Conservation, in re∣spect of Substances: And, since 'tis declar'd above, that intrinsecall Accidents are nothing else but manners of Substance; the Substance being conserv'd, 'tis clear, that they also are conserv'd in their Be∣ing.

3. Out of what has been said, too, we may know, what Action signifies in the ef∣fect it self: And, if the question be of the

Divine action, as it immediately flows from God, 'tis plain, that 'Tis the very Substance it self; not only, because it can∣not be subjected in a Substance, which sub∣sists no otherwise then by it; nor, because the existence of Things form'd out of our conceits is universally rejected; but also, because any intermediate action (such as the Moderns feign the Making) which should be put, serves to no purpose.

4. For, either God, before this action, is determin'd in himself to act, that is, that this action should follow from Him, or, He is not; if not, this action will not fol∣low, for, from an indifferent nothing fol∣lows; but, if He be determin'd, this action has not the power of determining Him, for which the Opponent requires it as ne∣cessary: but, the effect can, as immediate∣ly, follow out of Himself, as this action. And, this same discourse holds against the like fictitious action, too, of Creatures.

5. Again, in as much as the action of God is Conservation, 'tis nothing but the very Being of the thing conserv'd. For, first, the Duration of an Incorporeall thing cannot be divisible; for, if it were divisi∣ble, 'twould be continuate and divisible without end: either, therefore, some part,

together and at once, in an incorporeall, that is, indivisible thing, or not: if toge∣ther, that part will not include succession; if not, no part can ever be.

6. And, this Argument has not lesse force in a Corporeall Creature; for, though it be divisible in extension, yet, 'tis indivisible in succession, and conse∣quently, it cannot sustain together more parts of successive duration.

7. Again, if, to endure be, for the same thing to be the same it was; is it not clear, ther's nothing requir'd but a non-mutation? and, on the other side, that, of two things which exist, if one perish, that's said to be chang'd; that which endures remaining still unchang'd? There is, therefore, no novelty in permanency.

8. Moreover, to change the existence, the Essence, too, must needs be chang'd, since, 'tis the aptest capacity of existence: the notion, therefore, of Substance will be in perpetuall change and instable, and con∣sequently, out of God, nothing stable.

9. You'l object, Since 'tis often said, that a Creature may not-be, and yet, whilst it is, it cannot not-be; 'tis ma∣nifest, that its cannot not-be, or, to be whilest it is, successively super∣venes

to a Creature: Since, therefore, ther's a greater necessity of indivisibility, on God's part, then on a Creature's; the succession is to be concluded on the Crea∣tures side.

10. 'Tis answer'd, 'Tis just contrary: for, as, if the action of God were put (by way of imagination) to be successive, no man would require any other succession, to understand the duration of a Creature; so, if the action of God be put equivalent to continually successive, no man can complain of the unintelligibility of Dura∣tion.

11. Because, therefore, the action of God is conformable to His existence, and His existence indivisibly comprehends the past and future; it must needs be that the action, as it is the internall determination of God, in the same manner comprehends succession. This action, therefore, actu∣ates the Creature, with a certain indivisi∣bility that eminentially contains divisibi∣lity; and, without any divisibility, makes the existence of a Creature, by contradi∣ction, impossible to be taken away succes∣sively; yet, without any more then a ver∣tuall succession intervening in the Crea∣ture.

12. For, what has formally the vertue which is in succession, can as well perform this as succession it self: but, such, we have said, is the action of God: whence, 'tis plain, that, even from this effect, the no∣tion of Gods Eternity is demonstrated à posteriori.

13. Hence, 'tis deduc'd, that the dura∣tion of corporeall and spirituall Substan∣ces is, intrinsecally different: Since, cor∣poreall Substances have, from the notion of Matter, an intrinsecall possibility to not-be; and consequently, a weaker con∣nection to Being, intrinsecally, out of their own nature; but duration consists in the connection of existence and essence, as to the effect of permanence.

14. Adde to this, that there are, in na∣ture, causes which destroy Bodies, but, there are none which are able to infest Spi∣rituall Substances: whence, since God de∣stroyes nothing, of Himself, Intelligences are absolutely immortall, as also, separa∣ted Souls; and Bodies, when motion cea∣ses, will be immortall accidentally, in the mean time they are simply mortall, unlesse perhaps there are some exempt from the generall order.

15. Out of what has been said, too,

both the notion and difference of three Durations is evident: of Time explicated at the be∣ginning: of Eternity, when we treated of God: lastly, of Evi∣ternity in Intelligences.

Notes

• B. 1. Les. 5. N. 8, 9.
• B. 2. Les. 3. N. 3.
• Les. 6. N. 14, 15.