Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

LESSON IX.

Of the Soul of the Chief Animal, or, of the MIND.

1. OUt of what has been hitherto ex∣plicated, 'tis easily deduc'd that Man, according to this princi∣ple, is rais'd above the notions of Matter and Quantity. For, since Matter is a cer∣tain capacity of Quantity, Quantity of Figure, Figure is determin'd by Place, and all these in Time: but, 'tis clear, that the intention and thought of Man, in an uni∣versall conception, is entertained about something indifferent to infinite Figures, Places, Times, and Magnitudes; and this, not out of the nature of the thing, but be∣cause 'tis in the Mind of Man: 'Tis most evident that the Mind is something of ano∣ther kind then Matter and Quantity; and

consequently, nobler, since 'tis an additi∣on to the perfectest bodies.

2. Again, since Thing and Existence is that which first and primely fixes the Mind, and to which it seems to be a cer∣tain capacity: but Thing (out of what has been said) abstracts from and is before great and little,* 1.1 both in rarefy'd and augmented things: it follows, that the notion of the Mind is before and nobler then Quantity and, its com-part, Matter.

3. Again, since all the negotiation of our Mind reduces divisibles to indivisibi∣lity; as appears in Numbers, Figures, Points, Lines, Superficies, Instants, Com∣parisons, Denominations, Relations, Ne∣gations &c. but, nothing is so different as an indivisible from a divisible: 'tis clear, on all sides, that the nature of the Mind is wholy opposite to the nature of Quanti∣ty; and Quantity implying a kind of un∣determinatenesse and confusion, that the Mind is still the nobler part.

4. Nor, with lesse evidence, is it prov'd that the Mind is a Substantiall principle of Man: For, since his operations are ma∣nifestly indivisible; but, what is receiv'd in a divisible, ipso facto becomes divisible

upon the division of the subject; 'tis clear, his operations are not receiv'd in a Magni∣tude, and, consequently, that his Mind is an indivisible Substance.

5. Again, if the Substance of Man be wholy materiall and divisible, his Mind it self and all its affections can be nothing but certain Manners and determinations of divisibility (as, 'tis plain, of the other qualities which are accessory to bodies): but, 'tis plain, out of what has been said, that 'tis no such thing: wherefore, neither that the whole Substance of Man is ma∣teriall, but, in part, Spirituall and indivisi∣ble.

6. 'Tis clear, too, that the Mind is not another, but the same Substance with the Man: For, since an Instrument to all things includes the being an Instrument to some; wherein consists the notion of an Animal: 'tis clear, that a Man is a certain Species of Animal; and consequently, that his Mind, by which he is a Man, is formally one and the same Thing with the rest of the Sub∣stance of Man.

7. And indeed, were it suppos'd a di∣stinct Thing from the Substance of the Man, it would not suffer from the body, nor could it acquire any thing through its

conjunction to the body, nor be at all conjoyned to it: for, it must be either en∣titatively, and this cannot be otherwise then by unity of Substance, for a Thing speaks Substance; or, some other acciden∣tall way, whereof ther's nothing common to a body and a Spirit.

8. You'l say, Since a Spirit is a Thing of another order then a body, how can it concurre into the same Thing? then, how will it be cemented? and, what neighbour∣hood of one to the other? 'Tis answered, that, as, in a Magnitude, one part is fast∣ned to another, and has the power of a Sub∣sister without division, that is, the propri∣ety of a sever'd Thing without separation: so, the Soul also, may be the same with the body, without confusion of properties.

9. And, because, in a corporeall Sub∣stance, ther's admitted a certain negative∣ly indivisible vertue antecedent to divisibili∣ty, viz. a not-yet divisibility of the Sub∣stance before the Quantity: such as is the connexion and gradation from the divisi∣bility to the negative indivisibility; ano∣ther like that will be apt to unite, without a Paradox, the Mind positively indivisible, to the Substance negatively indivisible.

10. And, how will it unite? but, accor∣ding

to those parts, in which the Sub∣stance primarily and principally resides: which, as 'tis principally in the Heart, that being a certain Fountain of the whole Thing; so, specially, as to the notion of Animality, 'tis in the Brain, whence Sense and Motion is deriv'd to the whole Ani∣mal, which are those operations from which 'tis denominated an Animal.

11. Since, therefore, the other actions, which do not affect the Heart nor the Brain, strike not home to the inmost Sub∣stance; so, neither do they reach Mentall Knowledge or the integrity of the Soul: but, the changes that strike upon these Principles affect the Soul, too; and, it comes to passe that not-the-same ordination of bodily parts, especially of the Spirits and Heart, follows in Man from the Brain's being affected, which would follow in ano∣ther Animal; but one, from the propriety of the affected Substance, conformable to the whole, not to the body alone.

12. But, any other unity, then that the Soul should intimely be comprehended in the definition of Man, and consequent∣ly, should consist of the same notion and indistinct predicates, is not to be look'd for in Substance.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Les. 7. n. 11. 16.