Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

LESSON III.

Of the Vnity and distinction of Bo∣dies in common.

1. IT follows, from what has been said, that there is some plurality of Forms in nature, before all Division: For, since Division is made, by the interposition of one body, between the sides or parts of another, there must necessarily be, before division, a body to be the Divider and an∣other that may be Divided; which, being they are not more then one, through any former division, (since, this is suppos'd to be the first,) this plurality must of neces∣sity proceed out of the very nature and notion of the Things.

2. And, since Essence is nothing but that whereby a Thing is; such Things must be, essentially, distinct: Since, there∣fore, to divide belongs to dense, to be di∣vided to rare; those things that are natu∣rally rare and dense must be essentially di∣stinct.

3. Since, therefore, such things are transmutable among themselves, and ade∣quately divide the Universe; the Matter of rare and dense things must be the same, and consequently, that of the whole Uni∣verse.

4. The same is deduc'd out of the very notion of Matter; which, being a power to the notion of a Thing, is also a power or possibility to the notion of One: since, therefore, a Multitude consists but of U∣nities; before unity, neither distinction nor multitude can be understood: There can, therefore, be no multiplicity of mat∣ter; wherefore, that of all nature is but One.

5. Hence, then, those Questions are superfluous, Whether one Form can be the same in divers Matters? and again, Whether many Forms in one Matter? Since, if it be ask'd, of the proper unity of Matter, that of all Forms is the same; if,

of the individuall unity, that the matter attains by its conjunction with a Form, as it does its very Being.

6. From what has been said, 'tis clear, that every body, that is, every Compound of act and power is a Magnitude: For, since ther's but one possible First matter, and that subject to Quantity; the Com∣pounds of it, too, must of necessity be sub∣ject to Quantity.

7. Hence, again, it follows, that no bo∣dy moves, unlesse, in some manner, it be chang'd first: For since a Bulk excludes another out of its place, by this, that it intrudes it self into the other's place, be∣cause two cannot be together in the same place; unlesse it become greater then its own place or leave it, it cannot exclude an∣other: 'Tis manifest, therefore, that it must be altered first, according to one of these mutations, if it become a Mover of another.

8. Hence, again, 'tis collected that a Body is, essentially, an Instrument: For, since a Body has two properties, to be mov'd and to move; and, to be mov'd apper∣tains to it, out of its power and the noti∣on of Matter; 'tis clear, the essentiall no∣tion of it is to be taken from its vertue of

moving, by which it expresses act, and which follows the nature of a body in respect as it actually is: Since, therefore▪ a body does not move, but in as much as 'tis mov'd; clearly, according to its essentiall notion, 'tis an Instrument of its mover or applyer.

9. A BODY, therefore, is a Thing in Na∣ture, or, A certain part of the Vniverse; provi∣ded by the Authour of Nature, to produce a cer∣tain determinate Motion, when 'tis apply'd.

10. Whence, three notions, or man∣ners of defining a naturall Ens or Thing, are discover'd: A Metaphysicall one, which is deduc'd adequately under the notion of Being, and 'tis, A thing which has an existence spread into many potentiall parts, that is, a Thing in or of such parts: A Naturall or Physicall one, which, by Sen∣sible Qualities, expounds the notion of those parts and, consequently, of the Thing: And lastly, a Morall one, as it were, which collects the same from the End, that is, from the quality of its Moti∣on; for, the Metaphysicall notion, pro∣perly, regards only its capacity of Exi∣stence.

11. And, he that has any one of these three notions, even by that, has all: for, the Sensible Qualities impart both a

capacity of Existence and a power for A∣ction.

12. Whence, too, it appears, that one Body can have but one primary Operati∣on: for, since the sensible qualities give both the power of working and the capaci∣ty of existence, and they, in the same part of Matter, are the same; either they con∣spire to one operation, or not: if not, neither will it be one body, but many: if they conspire, there is, then, one primary operation of such a body; which could not be produc'd, either by another dispo∣sition, nor together with any other dispo∣sition then that. A naturall Body, there∣fore, is that One Thing whose Operation is One.