Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

LESSON X.

Of the Proficiency and Deficiency of Man, and of his Essence.

1. THis, therefore, is out of Contro∣versie, that Man, as to his Soul, suffers from Corporeall Agents: For, since the Soul it self is a certain Af∣fection or Qualification of a divisible Sub∣stance, which is introduc'd and expell'd by corporeall actions; 'tis clear, that those actions, which reach to the very Sub∣stance, must, of necessity, affect and be re∣ceiv'd in it, after its manner.

2. Consequently, it acquires Science: For, since, 'tis nothing but a certain Possi∣bility to Science, as to its perfection; 'tis ma∣nifest, that all its change is towards Sci∣ence, viz. to be some kind of Knowledge, either perfect or imperfect.

3. Whence, even they, that deny the Soul acquires Science, say that 'tis excited and admonish't by the presence of the bo∣dy: but, to be excited and admonish't is to receive knowledge: the Soul, there∣fore, acquires knowledge from the Body.

4. Nor makes against this Socrates's ex∣periment of a Boy, orderly ask'd and an∣swering right to Geometricall propositi∣ons: for, this questioning was a producti∣on of Science, not a renovation; for 'twas an application of the notion of the same Being, which is between the Terms, to the understanding of the Boy; whereby it came to passe that the Truth to be known was by the notion of Thing, knit to the Soul of the Boy, and made, as it were, a part of it, in which the vertue of know∣ledge and Science consists.

5. Yet, the Soul has not, by this Sci∣ence, a power to move the body: For, we see, Science is often overcome by Passion; but, if it had any proper activity, it could not be resisted by any power of its own body: Moreover, it would no longer be a part of a Man, but something grafted in him of a superiour nature, according to that vertue.

6. It follows, therefore, that, by vertue of the Soul, more motives of goods or ills are conjoynd to the singular objects; by whose conjunction the Heart and the body is affe∣cted otherwise to those goods or ills, then it would be had they not that conjunction: So that, the force of Pain and Pleasure is that

which moves a Man, even then when he seems to follow the firmest Reason; name∣ly, because to be Reasonable to follow this and to fly that, is nothing else but that more of delightfull is conjoynd with this and more of painfull with that.

7. In vertue of these, therefore, a Man is chang'd, and acts otherwise then if he had not understanding. Nor, is he carry'd, from the very beginning, by reason or any proper power, to this connection of goods with ills; but is prevented by some chance or obvious disposition of objects & corpo∣reall causes, either intrinsecall or extrinsecall.

8. Now, this disposition in the Soul, upon which Operation follows, we call the WILL, and the first beginning Volition; which, 'tis apparent, is left by precedent judgements, chiefly those that are about good or ill, since, by such judgements, 'tis plain, a Man is determin'd to action.

9. Hence, it appears, how the Soul fails in Opining: For, seeing Objects occurre to the Soul, not deduc'd and drawn-in, by its own force and nerves, as it were, but, by the agitation of bodies; if the affection to any thing so presses a Man to action, that it leaves not room for the objects to run in that order which is necessary for de∣monstration;

the Man must needs fall to acting, before he has any absolute evidence what's to be done.

10. If this be done by reflection, a Man see's that he's mov'd uncertainly; but, he see's, too, that nature requires he should move upon apparences; whence, he does no unbeseeming incongruous thing: But, if it be done without reflection, a Man takes an uncertainfor a certain; which is, to Opine; for he says, this is, which he has no determinate cause to say.

11. From this precipitation of action, it happens, that one Man operates better, ano∣ther worse; according as one, more frequent∣ly or more grievously, precipitates his action, then another. And, those that come nearest to evidence, as far as nature will bear, doe the uttermost of their power; which is to ope∣rate vertuously: but, those that very much recede from it, are call'd vitious: between which, a certain middle state of Men in∣clines notoriously to neither part.

12. 'Tis clear, therefore, whence the defectibility of Vice rises in Man-kind: to wit, because, by too much precipitation of bodily motion, false or the worse opini∣ons are generated. Whence, it follows, that man is not only changeable from

imperfect to perfect, but also from good to evil, and contrariwise: For, if he has o∣pin'd a falsity, upon farther light, he may be led to the Truth, and if, invited by apparences, he has follow'd the Truth, by others he may be averted again.

13. Whence, 'tis evident, ther's some opposition in the Soul, that is, some acts incompossible at once in it: for, since those things which are in the Soul inhere in it, in vertue of Being; 'tis plain, it must be ga∣ther'd, out of the very notion of Being, what things consist together in the Soul and what not. Now, 'tis clear, that 'tis against the notion of Being, that the same should Be and not-Be: but, of those things that are, all agree in the notion of Being, nor does any thing hinder that white and black, light and darknesse, hot and cold should co∣exist; wherefore, neither does any thing forbid their being together in the Soul: but, for the same to Be and not-Be, which is, to be affirm'd and deny'd, 'tis wholy re∣pugnant.

14. Since, therefore, Man suffers no re∣pugnancy in himself to have whatever o∣ther things together in his Mind; it comes to passe, that he is capable and cognosci∣tive of all Things: He can, therefore,

know what's best for himself, or, in what State he may most perfectly enjoy himself: Nor, will he doubt that he is to strain to∣wards this by all his actions; wherefore, he will be govern'd against nature, if he be employ'd otherwise then is convenient to attain This last End.

15. Whether, therefore, one Man rules another, or whether some superiour Power governs him; he govern'd against nature, if he withdraw him from This chiefest Good: And because Nature is the Principle of acting; a Man, as far as he is able, will reduce himself to a rectitude and straight course towards his ULTI∣MATE GOOD, and will resist all con∣trary operation.

16. Though Man, therefore, be an In∣strument, fram'd to be mov'd by another, as all other Animals: yet, 'twill be with this difference, that other Animals are or∣dain'd to be mov'd to the End of the Mo∣ver, without any respect to their proper good; but, Man is govern'd to the Mo∣ver's End, no farther then as the same is a Motion towards the proper Good of Man.

17. MAN, therefore, is an Instrument, fram'd by nature apt for universality of A∣ction,

that is, to do any thing whatever, so it be in order to his proper good: or, a Thing, of connected parts, in a passive and active order, that is, which can order themselves: or, lastly, Consisting of a RATIO∣NALL SOUL and an ANIMAL BODY.