CHAP. IX. Whether Monarchy comming up to the perfection of the kind, come not short of the perfection of Government, and have some flaw in it? In which is also treated of the ballance of France, of the Original of a landed Clergy; of Arms and their kinds.

OF Monarchy I have said, that whereas it is of two kinds, the One by Arms, the Other by a Nobility; for that by Arms, as (to take the most perfect mo∣del) in Turkey, it is not in Art, or Nature to cure it of this dangerous flaw, that the Janizaries have frequent in∣terest, and perpetual power to raise Sedition, or tear the Magistrate in Pieces. For that by a Nobility, as (to take the most perfect Model) of late in Oceana, it was not in Art or Nature to cure it of that dangerous flaw that the Nobility had frequent interest and perpetual power by their Retainers and Tenants to Raise sedition and Levy war; whence I conclude that Monarchy reaching the per∣fection of the kind, reacheth not the perfection of Go∣vernment, but must still have some dangerous flaw in it.

This place (though I did not intend by it to make work for a Tinker) could not be of lesse concernment then it proves to the Prevaricator, who as if he were obliged to Mend all; falls first to patching with a Monarchy by Arms, then with Monarchy by a Nobility; at length dispairing, throws away each, and betakes himself with egregious confidence, to make out of both a New Monarchy, which is neither. By observation of these three Flourishes, the present Chapter may be brought into some Method: The first blow of his Hammer, or that whereby he intends the flaw or hole in Monarchy by Arms, shal henceforth be men∣ded and Tite, is this. That the Guards of the Kings person be* not increased beyond Necessity of security, that they be not suffered to stagnate at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation Page  49 drawn out upon service, and chiefly that they consist not of one intire body, united under the same head, but be divided into distinct parties and Commands; as we may see in France, where though (in proportion to the: extent of their Domini∣ons) the Kings guards be more Numerous then those of the Roman or Turkish Emperours, yet being divided into di∣stinct bodies of French, Scots and Switz under their several Colonels and Captains, they have never been the Authors of any the least sedition: And in Turkey of late years they begin to learn the Art of poizing the Janizaries by the Spahy's, and so have frequently evaded the danger of their mutinies. Which fine work at the first view goes upon this false ground, that the Foundation of Monarchy by Arms is laid upon the Princes Guards or the Court Militia, whereas Monarchy by Arms consisteth in no other ballance, then the Princes being sole Landlord, which where imperfect as it was in that of the Roman Emperors, the Empire is the most troubled, and where perfect as in Turkey, the Empire is lesse seditions: For that which he saith of France, it re∣lates to Monarchy by a Nobility; and therefore is not to be confounded (according to his method) with this, but re∣fer'd unto the next branch.

As to Monarchy by Arms, though it be true that the bal∣lance of Dominion in any of the three kinds may be said to be Natural, in regard of the Effect; yet seeing God hath given the Earth unto the Sons of Men, that of a sole Landlord, as Turkey, is not so Natural in the cause or foun∣dation, as the Timars, and therefore requireth the Applica∣tion of some kind of force, as the Janizaries, who are not the root of the Government, that being planted in the Earth of the Timars or military Farmes and Colonies (for that the Janizaries are not the Foundation of this Empire, which was founded long before, is plain in that this Order was not introduced, till by Amurath the second) but the Dragon that lyeth at that root, and without which the fruit would fall into the Mouths of the Timariots by way of propriety (as when the Knights fees granted first for life, became afterwards hereditary in Oceana) which would cause such a fall from Monarchy that it would be∣come (as we have seen) the rise of Popular power (the Page  50 Lots in case this should happen, of the Timariots, little differing from those divided by Joshua unto the Children of Israel) wherefore when this happens in the Turkish Mo∣narchy, it is at an end: And that this doth not happen, though there be diverse other concurrent Policies, I would have any Man shew me, how it could be but for the Jani∣zaries: Otherwise it is plain that the Janizaries being a flying Army, on wing at all games, and upon all occasions, are not so much the guard of the Prince, as of the Empire; which ruin'd, the Prey falls unto the Timariots, as those that are in possession, except these be ruin'd too, who being all Horse, and far greater in Number then the Janizaries, that are Foot, would in case the awe of the Prince, and the policy of the Government which holds them divided, were broken, be invincible by the Janizaries, who never∣theless by these aids can easily contain them. Whence the sedition of the Janizaries, like that of a Nobility, may be dan∣gerous to the Prince, but never threatens the Throne; whereas the sedition of the Timariots like that of a people would be more against the Throne then the Prince. These things considered, and in them the Nature, Constitution, or Disease of Monarchy by Arms, we may consult the more rationally with the Considerer upon the Applications or remedies by him offer'd, which are three.

First, that the Guards of the Kings person be not increased beyond the necessity of security. But of what security, that of his Person, or of his Empire, or of both? for speaking of a Monarchy by Arms, in this later sense only it is true; and if so, then this singular Maxime of State (Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora) might have been spared (Celais'en va sans le dire come les heures de nostre curè.)

Secondly, that they be not suffered to stagnate at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation, drawn out upon service; for if there be not perpetual service (it should seem) Men might be apt to think that Government was instituted for peace as well as War. I add no more then is imply'd in his words, which as to this of Turkey have chanced well; where not the Stagnation of the Janizaries only but of the Court it self (which by the institution should always be in Page  51 exercise of Arms) is the cause of that present decay, so per∣ceivable in this Empire. But the Prince sitting still or stagnating, to what the Circulation of the Janizaries (whose alienation from the Government, or intelligence with the Timariots, must needs be of dangerous conse∣quence) could tend, should have been thought on; other∣wise to expose the Empire to danger, for the safety of the Prince, is no cure of the Government.

But his chief remedy remains, this Court Militia must not consist of one intire body united under the same head, but be divided under several Colonels, Captains, Parties, Brigades, and distributed unto several Quarters. As if this were a Cure, there were any Army that could be mutinous; but where he saies not united under the same head, he intimates perhaps divers Generals, and divers Armies; Now such are the Turkish Beglerbegs and the Provinces under their Go∣vernments. That these therefore be kept divided, so that not any two of them can lay their heads together, without having them cut off; nor any Son succeed the Father in Government, requires that there be always a sufficient force (distinct from the interest of the Timariots and Beg∣lerbegs) united, and still ready upon occasion of this ser∣vice, and the Janizaries with the Spahi's or Court horse, being united, are no more then sufficient for this service: wherefore if these also were so divided as thereby to be weakened, they could not be sufficient for this service; and their division except such as might weaken them would be of no security to the Prince. That the Pro∣vinces, under this awe, are lesse apt to Rebel, then the Court guards to Mutiny, is no wonder; but the Court∣guards being cured by the prescription of this Physitian, of possibility of Mutiny (which without weakening them is impossible) the Provinces (if Liberty, or Riches, or Power, be desirable) would never indure the yoak of this Govern∣ment. Wherefore it being inavoidable in the Turkish Em∣pire, that either the Janizaries, or the Timariots may doe what they list (in regard that whether of them be able to give law unto the other, must at the same time be able to give law unto the Prince, and to bring them unto an equal ballance, were to make a Civil war, or at least to sow the Page  52 seed of it) the Native wound of Monarchy by Arms re∣mains uncured and uncurable. What more may be done for Monarchy, founded upon a Nobility, comes next to be tried. In this the Considerer gives his word, that there never riseth any danger unto the Crown, but when either a great part of the Soveraign power is put into the hands of the Nobility, as in Germany and Poland, (where it should* seem by him, that the Electors, and the Gentry, do not put power into the hands of the Emperor, or King, but the Emperor, or King, puts power into the hands of the Electors, or Gentry) or when some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches, Commands, and De∣pendance, as the Princes of the bloud, and Lorrain, not long since, in France; and of old the Montforts and Nevi•s in England. The first of these he declareth to be a vicious government, and a Monarchy only in Name; the second he undertakes shall easily admit of this remedy. That the great ones be reduced (decimo sexto) to a lesser volume, and levelled into an Equality with the rest of their Order.

His put-pin is pretty, the Emperor puts power into the hand of the Electors; and the King of Poland puts power into the hands of the Gentlemen; which Governments there∣fore (and all such like, as when the King of England put power into the hands of the Barons, at such time as he was no longer able to keep it out of their fingers, by which means the Antient and late Government of King, Lords, and Commons was restored) are vicious Constitutions, and Monarchies only in Name; such as he will not meddle with, and therefore let them go. Well; but where is the Patient then? if these be not Monarchies by Nobility, what do we mean by that thing? or what Government is it that we are to Cure? why such an One, where some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches, Commands, and Dependance, as the Princes of the bloud, and Lorrain, not long since, in France; and of old the Montfords and the Nevils in England. So then the same again (for these are no other) upon recollection, are those that admit of this Easie cure. Let the great Ones be re∣duced to a lesser volume, and levell'd with the rest of their Order. But how? if they be the weaker party, they are Page  53 not the great ones, and if they be the stronger party, how will he reduce them? Put the case a Man have the Gout, his Physitian does not bid him reduce his overtopping toes unto the volume of the other foot, nor to levell them unto Equality with the rest of their Order, but prescribes his remedies, and institutes the Method that should do this feat. What is the Method of our Aesculapius? (Point de Novelle,) or where are we to find it? e'en where you please. The Princes of the bloud, and of Lorrain in France; the Montforts, and the Nevils in England, overtopped not their Order, by their own riches or power, but by that of the party, which for their fidelity, courage, or conduct, intrusted them with the managing of their Arms, or affairs. So the Prince that would have levelled them, must have levelled their party; which in case the controversie be upon the right, or pretended right of the Nobility in the Government (which commonly makes them hang together) may come to the whole Order: what then? Why then,* says he, the Prince must preserve his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under, and yet not tall enough in any par∣ticular person to measure with himself: which abating, the figure is the same again; and so I have nothing to answer but the figure. Now for this, the Prince himself is no otherwise tall, then by being set upon the shoulders of the Nobility; and so if they set another upon the same shoulders, (as in Henry the 4th. or the 7th. who had no Titles unto the Crown, nor could otherwise have measured with the Prince) be he never so low, he comes to be tall enough in his particular person to measure with the Prince, and to be taller too, not only by those Old Examples, but others that are younger than our selves, though such (the Nobility having not of late, been weighty enough to keep the People under) as derive from another Principle, that of Popular ballance. A Prince therefore preserving his Nobility weighty enough to keep under the people, must pre∣serve in them the ballance of that kind of Empire; and the ballance containing the riches, which are the power, and so the Arms of the Nation; this being in the Nobility, the Nobility, when willing, must be able to dispose of the King, or of the Government. Nor under a lesse weight Page  54 is a Nobility qualified to keep down the people, as by an Argument from the contrary; Henry the 7th. having found the strength of his Nobility, that set him in a Throne to which he had no right, and fearing that the tide of their favour turning, they might do as much for another, abated the dependance of their Tenants, and cut off their Train of Retainers, which deminution of their weight, releasing by degrees the People, hath caused that Plain, or Level, into which we live to see the Mountain of that Monarchy now sunck and swallowed; wherefore the ballance of the Nobility being such as failing that kind of Monarchy comes to ruine, and not failing, the Nobility, if they joyn may give Law unto the King, the inherent disease of Monarchy by a Nobility, remains also uncured, and un∣curable.

These are points to which I had spoken before; but* something concerning France, and Forraign Guards, was mumbled by the Praevaricator in a wrong place, while he was speaking of Turkey, where there is no such thing. This least I be thought to have courted Opposition for no∣thing, shall open a New Scene; while I take the occasion in this place to speak first of the Ballance of the French Mo∣narchy, and next of the Nature and use of Forraign Guards.

The whole Territory of France, except the Crown Lands, which on this account are not considerable, consisteth of three shares, or parts, whereof the Church holdeth one, the Nobility another, and the Presidents, Advocates, other Officers of the Parliaments, Courts of Justice, the Citizens, Merchants, Tradesmen, the Treasurers, receivers of the Customes, aids, taxes, impositions, Gabells, all which toge∣ther make a vast body, hold a Third; by how equal portions I am sorry that I do not know, nor where to learn, but this is the ballance of the French Monarchy, unto which the Paisant holding nothing, but living (though in one of the best Countrys of the world) in the meanest and most miserable Condition of a Labourer, or Hiend, is of no account at all.

The parties that hold the ballance in a Territory are those of whom the Government doth naturally consist, wherefore these are called Estates; so the Clergy, the No∣bility, Page  55 and the Commons, are the three Estates of France. Though the Third because the Paisant partaking not of the ballance can (in relation to Government) be of no account, is not called the Commons, but only the Third Estate: whereas the Yeomanry and Gentry in England, having weighed as well in the ballance, as the Church, and the Nobility, the three Estates of England, while the Monarchy was in vigour, were the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons. The Consent of Nations evinceth that the Function of the Clergy, or Priest, except where otherwise* determined of by Law, appertaineth unto the Magistrate. By this right Noah, Abraham, Job, with the rest of the Pa∣triarchs, instructed their Families or sacrisiced, There seem∣eth to have been a kind of Commonwealth in Canaan, while Melchisedec was both King and Priest; Such also was Moses till he consecrated Aaron, and confer'd the Priesthood upon the Levites, who are expresly said to succeed unto the first born, that is unto the Patriarchs, who till then exercised that Function. Nor was it otherwise with the Gentiles, where they who had the Soveraign power or were in eminent Magi∣stracy, did also the Priestly Office (omnino apud veteres qui rerum potiebantur, iidem Auguria tenebant: ut enim sa∣pere, sic divinare, regale ducebant, saith Cicero and Vir∣gil Rex Anius, Rex idem hominum, Phoebi{que} Sacerdos) You find the Heroes, that is, Princes in Poets sacrificing; The Ethiopian, Egyptian, Lacedemonian Kings did the like; in Athens constantly and in Rome, when they had no Kings, occasionally they elected a Rex sacrorum, or King-Priest.* So that a free People had thus far power of electing their Priests, is not deny'd by any Man. This came it should seem, to be otherwise Established by the Law in Egypt, where the Priests (whose Lands Joseph when he bought those of the People did not buy) being great Landlords* (it may be unto the Third of the whole Territory) were one of the three Estates of the Realm. And it is clear in Scripture that the People, till they Sold their Lands, be∣came not Servants unto Pharaoh. While Agesilaus was in* Egypt they deposed their King, which implies the recovery of their ballance; but so seeing they set up another, as withall shews the ballance of the Nobility to have been Page  56 predominant. These particulars seem to come near unto the account of Diodorus Siculus, by whom the ballance of Egypt should have stood thus. The whole Revenue was divided into three parts, whereof the Priests had the first, the King* had the second, and the Nobility had the Third. It seems to me that the Priests had theirs by their Antient right and title, untouched by Joseph, that the Kings had all the rest by the Purchase of Joseph, and that in time (as is usual in like cases) a Nobility came through the bounty of succee∣ding Kings to share with them in one half. But however it came about, Egypt by this means is the first Example of a Monarchy upon a Nobility, at least distributed into three Estates, by means of a Landed Clergy, which by consequence came to be the greatest Counsellors of State, and fitting Religion unto their uses, to bring the people to be the most superstitious in the whole World.

Where it not for this Example, I should have said, that the Indowment of a Clergy or Religious Order with Lands▪ and the erecting of them into an Estate of the Realm or Government, were no Antienter then the Goths and Van∣dals, who introducing a like Policy, which unto this day taketh place throughout the Christian world, have been the cause;

First, why the Clergy have been generally great Coun∣sellors unto Kings, while the People are led into super∣stition.

Secondly, by planting a Religious Order in the Earth, why Religion hath been brought to serve worldly ends;

And thirdly, by rendring the Mitre able to make War; why of later Ages we have had such a thing as War for Re∣ligion, which till the Clergy came to be a Third State or Landlords, was never known in the World: For that some Cities of Greece, taking Arms upon the usurpation or violation of some Temple, have called it the Holy war;* such disputes having been but upon matter of fact, and not of faith▪ (in which every Man was free) came not to this Account. Moses was learned in all the learning of the E∣gyptians, but a landed Clergy introduced he not in Israel: nor went the Apostles about to lay any such foundation of a Church. Abating this one Example of Egypt, till the Page  57 Goths and Vandals who brought in the Third Estate, a Government, if it were unequal, consisted but of two E∣states, as that of Rome, whether under the Kings or the Commonwealth consisted of the Patritians and Plebeians, or of the Nobility and the people. And an equal Com∣monwealth consisteth but of One, which is the people; for Example of this, you have Lacedemon and Venice, where the people being few, and having many Subjects or Ser∣vants, might also be called Nobility, as in regard of their Subjects, they are in Venice, and in regard of their Helots or Servants, they might have been in Lacedemon. That I say which introducing two Estates, causeth division, or makes a Commonwealth unequal, is not that she hath a Nobility (without which she is deprived of her most espe∣cial Ornament, and weakned in her conduct) but when only the Nobility is capable of Magistracy or of the Se∣nate, and where this is so ordered, she is unequal as Rome: But where the Nobility is no otherwise capable of Magi∣stracy nor of the Senate, then by Election of the People, the Commonwealth consisteth but of one Order, and is Equal as Lacedemon or Venice.

But for a Polititian commend me to the Considerer, He will have Rome to have been an equal Commonwealth, and Venice to be an unequal one, which must be evinced by Wyre-drawing. For having elsewhere as hath been shewn, admitted without-opposition that the ballance of Empire is* well divided into national and provincial, the humour now takes him to spin that wedge into such a thred as by intang∣ling of these two, may make them both easie to be broken. Hereunto he betaketh himself in this manner. As Mr. Harrington hath well observed (p. 5.) where there are two parties in a Republique with equal power, (as in that of Rome the people had one half and the Nobility had the other half) confusion and misery are there intayled. For remedy whereof, or to avoid this, there can be no way but to make the Commonwealth very unequal.

In answer to this, there will need no more then to re∣peat the same things honestly. Mr. Harrington speaketh of the National ballance of Empire (p. 5.) unto this sense, where the Nobility holdeth half the propriety or about Page  58 that proportion, and the people the other half, (the shares of the Land may be equal; but in regard that the Nobility have much among Few, and the People little among Many; the Few will not be contented to have authority, which is all their proper share in a Commonwealth; but will be bringing the People under power, which is not their proper share in a Commonwealth; wherefore this Commonwealth must needs be unequal; and except by altering the ballance, as the Athenians did by the Sisa∣cthia, or recision of debts; or as the Romans went about to do by an Agrarian, it be brought to such equality that the whole power be in the People, and there remain no more then Authority unto the Nobility) where is no remedy but the one (with perpetual fewd) will eat out the other, as the People did the Nobility in Athens, and the Nobility the People in Rome. Where the Carkass is, there will be the Eagles also; where the Riches are, there will be the Power: So if a few be as rich as all the rest, a few will have as much power as all the rest; in which case the Commonwealth is unequal, and there can be no end of staving and tayling, till it be brought unto equality. This for the National ballance; for the provincial, there power doth not follow propriety, but to the contrary. This the Praevaricator having acknowledged, lets slip, to the end that he may take a grip of Venice; which because the three or four thousand of which originally consisted, and now consisteth that whole government, having acquired Provinces, and encrease of their City by later comers, do not admit these unto participation of power, he saith is an unequal Commonwealth. He will be a Mill-Horse, whether the Cake be dough or not; for this is to draw in a circle; and Rome, which by his former arguments should have been equal, by this again must be unequal, seeing Rome as little admitted her Provinces into the body of the Commonwealth as doth Venice. This clash is but by way of Parenthesis, to return therefore unto the businesse in present Agitation.

The estates, be they one, or two, or three, are such (as was said) by vertue of the ballance, upon which the Go∣vernment must naturally depend. Wherefore constitu∣tively Page  59 the Government of France (and all other Monar∣chies of like ballance) was administred by an Assembly of the three Estates, and thus continued, untill that Nation being vanquished by the English, Charls the 7th. was put to such shifts, as for the recovery of himself in the greatest distresse, he could make, unto which recovery while the Estates could not be legally called, he happening to attain without them, so ordered his affairs, that his Successors by adding unto his Inventions, came to rule without this Assembly; a way not suiting with the nature of their ballance, which therefore required some Assistance by force, and other concurring Policies of like nature, whereof the forraign Guards of that Monarchy are one; The great baits alluring the Nobility another; and the Emergent interest of the Church a Third.

To begin with the last of those, the Church, except it be in a War for Religion, as when they joyned with the Princes of Lorrain; and what party of the French No∣bility were made, or they could make, against the King of Navarre, are not of themselves so hot at hand, or prompt unto Arms, but the King being (to use their word) no Heretick, through their great apprehension of the third Estate, as that which is most addicted unto the Protestant Religion, may be confident, they will never side with the People: So by this Emergent interest, or accident, he hath the Church sure enough.

For the Nobility, which is exceeding gallant, this Change hath the greatest baits; for whereas the Church being not spared, the Third Estate is laden, and the Paisant overladen with taxes, the Nobility is not only at better ease in this regard, but for the greater, or more considerable part, receiveth advantage by it; the King having always, whether in peace, or war, a great Cavalry, then which there is no better in the world for the Exercise, Entertainment, and profit of the Nobility; Governments of Cities, Castles, Provinces in abundance, which he rarely distributes unto any other. The greater Nobility are Mareschals, Generals; the lesse Officers in the Armies, especially of the Horse, the Emoluments whereof they receive also in time of peace; and many of this Order Page  60 being Pensioners, taste of the Kings liberality, without taking pains, or having any Imployment at all. By which both that France is a Monarchy by a Nobility, and how she holdeth her Nobility is apparent.

Now the Church and the Nobility standing thus in∣gaged unto the King, by which means he hath two parts of the ballance to one, it is demonstrable that the Govern∣ment must be quiet. Nor seeing the Church for the reason shewn is sure enough, comes the Government (since the Protestant Cities and Holds were demolished) to be other∣wise disquieted then by the flying out of the Nobility, which whenever it happens in any party considerable, either for the Number, or the Interest, causeth the Crown to shake; for it seldome cometh to passe upon this occasion, but the Third Estate, or some part of it taketh Arms im∣mediately. In which place it is worthy to be observed, that Wealth, according unto the distribution of the ballance, hath contrary motions. The Third Estate in France having riches, and those laden with Taxes, come to have something to lose, and something to save, which keepeth them in continual fear or hope. The Nobility holding unto the King, the Third Estate hath something to lose, which withholdeth them from Arms, through fear; but the Nobility flying out, the Third Estate hath some∣thing to save, which precipitateth them into Arms through hope; whereas the Paisant having nothing to save, or to lose, to hope, or to fear, never stirs. The Case standing thus, the sufficiency of the French Politician (since the Master-piece of Cardinal Richelieu, in demolishing those walls of the Protestants, which had otherwise by this time been a refuge for the Third Estate, and perhaps overturned the Monarchy) lieth altogether in finding for the Nobility work abroad, or ballancing them in such sort at home, that if a party flie out, there may be a stronger within to reduce it, or at least to be opposed unto it. In this case, lest the Native interest of the Nobility, since the Assemblies of the three Estates were abolished, might cool the re∣maining party, or make them slower in the redresse of such disorders, or discontents, then were requisite, the King is wisely provided of Forraign Guards; which being Page  61 always in readinesse, and not obnoxious unto the Native interest, may upon like occasions be of more Expedition and trust. Being come thus unto Forraign Arms, which is the point I more especially proposed unto my self in the present discourse, One objection in relation to what hath been already said seemeth to interpose it self. Seeing France, while it is not governed by the Assembly of States, is yet of the same ballance it was, when governed by the Assembly of States; it may be said that a government of the same ballance may admit of divers Administrations.

To which I need make no other answer, then to put you in mind that while this Government was Natural, or ad∣ministred by the Assembly of States, it is celebrated by Machiavel, to have been the best order'd of any Monarchy in the world; and that what it is, or hath been of later times, you may believe your own eyes or ears.

There be yet, before I can come unto Forraign Guards,* some praevious considerations; All government as is im∣plied by what hath been already shewn, is of these three kinds. A government of Servants. A government of Subjects; Or a government of Citizens. The first is absolute Monarchy, as that of Turkey: The second Aristocratical Monarchy, as that of France: The third a Commonwealth, as those of Israel, of Rome, of Holland. Now (to follow Machiavel in part) of these, The Government of Servants is the harder to be conquer'd, and the Easier to be held. The Government of Subjects is the easier to be conquer'd, and the harder to be held. To which I shall presume to add, That the Government of Citizens is both the hardest to be conquer'd, and the hardest to be held.

My Authors reasons why a Government of Servants is the hardest to be conquerd, come to this, that they are under perpetual discipline and command, void of such interests and factions, as have hands or power to lay hold upon advantages or innovation, whence he that invades the Turk must trust unto his own strength, and not rely upon disorders in the Government, or forces which he shall be sure enough to find united.

His reason why this Government, being once broken, is easily held, are, That the Armies once past hope of Page  62 rallying, there being no such thing as Families hanging together, or Nobility to stir up their Dependants, unto far∣ther reluctancy for the present, or to preserve themselves by complacence with the Conquerors, for future discontents or advantages, he that hath won the Garland, hath no more to doe but to extinguish the Royal line, and were it ever after in security. For the People having been always slaves, are such whose Condition he may better, in which case they are gainers by their Conquerer, but can never make worse, and therefore they loose nothing by him. Hence Alexander having conquer'd the Persian Empire, he and his Captains after him could hold it without the least dispute, except it arose among themselves. Hence Maho∣met the second having taken Constantinople, and put Paleo∣logus the Greek Emperor (whose Government was of like Nature with the Persian) together with his whole Family unto the Sword, the Turk hath held that Empire without reluctancy.

On the other side, reasons why a Government of Sub∣jects is easilier conquer'd, are these. That it is supported by a Nobility so Antient, so powerful, and of such hold and influence upon the People, that the King without dan∣ger, if not ruine to himself or the Throne (an Example whereof was given in Hen. 7th of England) can neither invade their Priviledges, nor level their Estates, which re∣maining, they have power upon every discontent to call in an Enemy, as Robert Count of Artois did the English, and the Duke of Guise the Spaniard into France.

The Reasons why a Government of Subjects being so easily conquer'd, is neverthelesse the harder to be held, are these. That the Nobility being soon out of counte∣nance in such a case, and repenting themselves of such a bargain, have the same means in their hands whereby they brought in the Enemy, to drive him out, as those of France did both the English and the Spaniard.

For the Government of Citizens, as it is of two kinds, an Equal or an unequal Commonwealth, the Reasons why it is the hardest to be conquer'd, are also of two kinds; As first the Reasons why a Government of Citi∣zens where the Commonwealth is equal, is hardest to be Page  63 conquer'd, are, that the Invader of such a Society must not only trust unto his own strength, in as much as the Commonwealth being equal, he must needs find them united, but in regard that such Citizens, being all Soul∣diers or trained up unto their Arms, which they use not for the defence of Slavery but of Liberty (a Condition not in this world to be better'd) they have more especially upon this occasion the highest Soul of Courage, and (if their Territory be of any Extent,) the vastest Body of a well disciplin'd Militia, that is possible in Nature; where∣fore an Example of such an One overcome by the Arms of a Monarch, is not to be found in the World: And if some small City of this Frame have happen'd to be vanquisht by a potent Commonwealth, this is her Prerogative, her Towers are her Funeral Pile, and she expireth in her own Flame, leaving nothing unto Conquest but her Ashes, as Sag•ntum overwhelmed by Carthage, and Numantia by Rome.

The Reasons why a Government of Citizens, where the Commonwealth is unequal, is next the former, the hardest to be conquer'd are the same, with this difference, that al∣beit her Peace be not perfect within, her Condition is not to be better'd by any thing that is without; Wherefore Rome in all her strife never call'd in an Enemy; and if an Enemy upon occasion of her strife, and hopes of advantage by it, came without calling, he presented her with her most Soveraign Cure, who had no leisure to destroy her self, till having no Enemy to find her work, she became her own.

Nor is there any Example that a Government of this kind was ever subdued by the Arms of a Monarch; though some indeed may be found that have called or suffer'd Forraign Princes or Force to come in, as Holland by Marriages of their Princes, and Genoa through her Facti∣ons, as those of the Fiesci and Adorni.

To conclude this part for the Reasons why a Govern∣ment* of Citizens so acquir'd or possest as through Marri∣age, Page  64 or faction is the hardest to be held, there needs no more then that Men accustomed unto their Arms and their Libertys will never endure the yoak; Wherefore the Spaniard, though a mighty King, no sooner began in Hol∣land, a small Commonwealth, to innovate or break her Orders, then she threw him off with such Courage and Disdain, as is Admirable unto the World. And somewhat of the like kind did Genoa by the help of her Doria in the vindication of her liberty from France.

To come by this farthest way about as I think the near∣est way home. Arms are of two sorts, Proper or Improper;* that is, Native or Forraign.

Proper and Native Arms, are according unto the triple nature of Government, of three kinds; Servants in Arms, as the Helots in Lacedemon, the Timariots and Janizaries in Turkey: Subjects in Arms, as the Horse in France, and the Sea-guards or Forces in Venice: or Citizens in Arms, as those upon the Lexiarcha in Athens, of the Morae in La∣cedemon, and the Legions in Rome.

Auxiliaries are such as are supply'd by vertue of some League, as were those of the Latines and Italians unto the Romans; and those of the Cantons of Suisse (except Zurick) unto the King of France; or they may be such as are oc∣casionally lent freely, or let forth for money by one State unto another, the later whereof differ not much from Mercenaries.

Mercenaries are Souldiers of Fortune that have no other Trade then their Arms, and let out themselves for money; of such consisted the greatest part of the Carthaginian strength, such is the land Force of Venice, and notwith∣standing the Antient League of France with those Nations, such at this day are the Suisse and Scottish Guards (and sometimes a good part of the Foot) in France.

Machiavil discourseth upon these particulars in his Art of War, unto Admiration: by whom I shall therefore steer.

Where the Arms in bulk are proper, and consisting of Citizens, they have other Trades; and therefore are no Page  65 Souldiers of Fortune; and yet because the Commonwealth hath Arms for her▪ Trade (in regard she is a Magistrate given for the good of Mankind, and beareth not her Sword in vain) they are all educated as well in Military as Civil discipline, taking their turns in service of either Nature according unto the Occasion, and the Orders of the Com∣monwealth, as in Israel, Athens, Lacedemon and Rome, which had if their Territories permitted, and sometimes (as I may say) whether their Territories permitted or no, as in Israel, the vastest the highest temper'd & the best disciplin'd Militia, that is to be found in the whole compass of Story. Some Armies of Israel have consisted of three or four hundred thousand Men: Rome upon the rumour of a Gal∣lick tumult, armed in Italy only, without Forraign aid,* seventy thousand Horse and seven hundred thousand Foot; things in our days (when the Turk can hardly Arm half so many) not to be credited.

Hence that a Commonwealth, which had not first broken her self, or been broken by some other Common∣wealth, should not be found to have been conquer'd by the Armes of any Monarch, is not miraculous but a natural effect of an apparent Cause. In this place, or upon this text, Divines whom I would desire not to be Enemies of Popular power, but to give Machiavil his due, shall, if they please, hear him make a goodly Sermon, in these words. If Antient Commonwealths and Governments used diligence* in any other Order to make their people Lovers of peace, faithfully unto their Countrey, and having the fear of God before their eyes, they doubled it in this of their Militia: for of whom should your Countrey expect greater faith, then of such as have offer'd themselves to die for her? whom should she endeavour to make greater Lovers of peace, then them who only can enslave her by force? In whom should there be grea∣ter Fear of God, then in such as carry their lives in their hands? This when Lawgivers and Captains rightly con∣sidered, was the Cause why Souldiers were esteemed honour'd, followed and imitated above all men in the world, whereas since such Orders are broken, and Custome is altogether de∣viated from the course of Antient prudence; men are come to detest the iniquity of the Campe, and fly the conversation of Page  66 such as are in Arms, as the Pestilence. Where the Arms in bulk are proper, but consist of Subjects, they are the best next; and but the best next as appears by all Examples, Antient, or Modern. The Arms with which Pyrrhus Prince of Epyrus invaded the Romans were of Subjects, yet that Prince though he were not vanquished by the Romans, confessed their advantage, and gave them over. The Spaniard, being a far more potent King then was Pyrrhus, hath acknowledged as much unto the Hollanders, though a far less Commonwealth then Rome: So have the Princes of Austria, and of Burgundy, unto the Switz. That the Arms of Subjects are nevertheless as much superior to the Arms of Servants, as inferior to the Armes of Citizens, is as plaine; Seeing as Alexander, with Thirty thousand Sub∣jects, vanquished Darius having innumerable slaves; so Thirty thousand Christians are at this day a Match for any Army of Turks; and we see Venice, whose force by Sea consists of Subjects, to have made him quit that Element near as fully unto her Dominion or Empire, as did the Persian to Athens.

To Arms, that are proper, but consist of Servants, all the preheminence that can be given, is that they are better then forraign Arms; a proof whereof we have in those of Selimus, whereby he conquered the Mamalucks; who being but a forraign Force that held Egypt in subjection, the Countrey was irrecoverably lost, and (for the reasons al∣ready shewn) as easily kept.

Improper Arms, whether Auxiliary or Mercenary, where the Force of a Prince or of a Commonwealth consisteth, for the bulk or greater part, of no other, are the least effe∣ctual, and the most dangerous of all. For Auxiliaries, or what effect hath been found of them by Princes or Com∣monwealths, it was seen in France, during the League by the Spaniard; and in Holland during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, by the English; but especially in the Goths and Vandals, who having been Auxiliaries or Mercenaries rely'd upon by the later Emperors, came thereby to ruine the Roman Empire.

Mercenaries, who make their Arms their Trade, must of all other be the most pernicious; for what can we expect Page  67 lesse of such whose Art is not otherwise so profitable, then that they should (as Machiavil shews) be breakers of their faith, given up unto rapine, Enemies of peace and Govern∣ment?

To instance in some Commonwealths, that of Carthage after her first war with the Romans, fell through the Re∣bellion of Spendius, and Matho, Ring-leaders of her Mercenaries, into another that was far more dangerous. Of such a Dilemma were the Arms of this State, that if Hannibal had conquered Rome, he must have been King of Carthage; and not conquering Rome, Carthage was ruin'd. The Commonwealth of Milan, trusting her self unto F. Sforza, and his mercenaries, became the Subject of her Servant, and he her Duke. Nor is Venice, whose Land forces are of the same kind, otherwise in safety, as to these, then by her situation. To give some instances of the same nature in Princes. The father of F. Sforza, being Captain of a like Mercenary Army, forced Joan Queen of Naples, whom he left disarm'd in the midst of her enemies, to lay her self at the feet of the King of Aragon; and Braccio by such another treachery had plainly possessed himself of the Kingdome of Naples, had he not been broken at Aquila, where death intercepted his design. From what hath been said, first of Government and then of Arms; if a Government of servants be harder to be conquer'd, and easier to be held, then in this Forraign Arms must needs be least necessary, and most dan∣gerous.

If a Government of Subjects be easier to be conquered, and harder to be held, then in this Forraign Arms may be more necessary, but must be lesse dangerous.

But though a Government of Citizens be both hardest to be conquered, and hardest to be held, yet as it is, again in this regard, of two kinds, this cannot be said of each kind alike, wherefore I must distinguish.

In a Government of Citizens, if the Commonwealth be not for encrease, but preservation only, as Lacedemon, Carthage, Venice, Forraign Arms are both necessary and dangerous; but in a Government of Citizens, where the Commonwealth is both for increase and preservation, as Page  68 Rome, Forraign Arms are neither necessary, nor dan∣gerous.

To Repeat the parts of this Conclusion, which being brief, is obscure, more fully and particularly.

The Empire of Turkey is of the harder kind to be con∣quer'd, wherefore the Turk needeth not forraign guards, to defend him, but it is of the easier to be held, wherefore let him take heed of intrusting his person with Forraign Guards, who having a forraign interest, may have a forraign Nation to assist them; and so the person of the Prince being in their hands, they have no more to do then to Extinguish the Royal Line, and the Empire, being easily held, is their own thenceforth with security. Thus the Mamalucks which were at first Forraign Guards, extinguishing the Royal line of the Kings of Aegypt, came to possesse, and hold that Realm without opposition. Who well considers this point, will never enough admire the policy of the Turk, in the creation (as it were) of his Janizaries, free from any National interest that might make them dream of, or desire liberty, and yet soevoid of all forraign interest, or knowledge, that they know not what, or who were their Country or Parents. Hence though they have interest to murther the Turk, and some∣times do accordingly, they have no farther interest in the world, but what depends upon the Government; and so the Empire is safe, though the Prince be in danger; whereas if they were Forraign Guards, or had any Native interest, not only the Prince, but the Empire too would be in danger, the rest being servants, and such whose con∣dition might be bettered by a Change, but could be no worse. Wherefore a Government of Servants must by no means admit of Forraign Guards, or Mamalucks.

But the Empire of France, where the Nobility are not only subject to flie out, but to call in strangers, may have use of Forraign Guards, which not obnoxious to Native interest, and factions, as those of the Nobility, are the readiest and best help at this lift, yet not dangerous, though having the Prince in their power, because by him they are safe from the Nobility, who, were it not for the Prince, would be so far from bearing or brooking Forraign Page  69 Guards, that in case a Forraigner came in upon their call, having the same means to help themselves, whereby they brought him in, they would shake the yoak, and the Ends why they called him in being satisfied or repented of, drive him out again, as they did the Spaniard, and the English; but if this Government being invaded or con∣quered, be so hard to be kept, how much harder being surprized? Wherefore in a Government by Subjects Forraign Arms may be more necessary, but must be lesse dangerous.

In a Commonwealth for preservation, as Lacedemon, Carthage, Venice, Forreign Arms are necessary: So Lace∣mon, though able to defend her self by her proper forces against any one City; yet the wars in Greece going much upon leagues and Confederates, was forced also to make use of her Confederates, and sometimes of her Helots.

But as anciently to Carthage, so now to Venice, Forreign or Mercenary Forces are essential, because for Land-service such a Constitution can have no other: Yet is this course extreamly dangerous, as appeared by Lacedemon, who (being ever in fear of her Helots) when she had acquir'd upon the matter the whole Empire of Greece, came by the rebellion of her Confederates, not only to lose all, but to ruine. For Carthage upon the Mutiny of Spendius & Ma∣tho, she escaped as at other times upon like occasions, very narowly. That such an accident neither hath befallen Venice nor can befall her, is to be attributed unto her situation, by which, in this regard, she is secure: Neverthelesse, her progresse, or increase, which by this means either cannot be great, or being great, must render her but the more infirm, is full bard.

To a Commonwealth for increase, which always taketh in the whole body of the People, Forraign Arms (seeing she aboundeth above all other kinds of policy, with such as are proper) must needs be the least necessary; and they are the most safe, because never admitting them, but for her meer convenience, and frugality in expense of Native bloud, she receiveth no such charge of them as can recoyl, but must carry point blank, and as vigorously at her proper interest, very neer as her proper Arms. Thus did the Latine and Italian Auxiliaries, of which joyned with Page  70 the Roman Legions, consisted a Consular Army.

By thus much it seemeth that an inference from the success of Arms unto the perfection of Government, and from the perfection of Government, to the successe of Arms, should be no fallacious way of disputing.

But this hath been sweaty work with▪ the Considerer; (who loves his ease) it is enough to argue thus. The Switz, Scottish, and French guards, have never been the Authors of any sedition, therefore the seditiousnesse of a Nobility may be mended by Forraign Guards; which is, as if one should say, such a Physitian hath never been the cause of the Gout; therefore the Gout may be cured by such a Physitian. That Forraign Arms may be well enough applied in the case of a seditious Nobility, and have some good effects, is not denied, but is France therefore cured of her sedition, or remains she notwithstanding her Forraign Guards, the most sedious example in the world? If thus she have not been, nor be, what hath he read of the Princes of the bloud in former times, or heard of late from them? But if thus she have been, and be, is it not a fine way of cure to give us an example of the disease for the remedy? Nor are her Guards so void of sedition neither; but the Switz, if he want his pay, dares threaten Paris; the Scot (at least of late years) hath not been so bold; but if a Prince flie out, the Ensigns of the French Guards will one way or other be Captains, while Souldier and Officer too follows his affections or interests, which way soever they frame. I should be glad to know when a Dragon fell from that Court, that did not bear down stars with his train. But the Prevaricator is set upon it, whereas of late years, the Janizaries are known to have been far more imbrued in the bloud of their Princes then ever: he gives us his honest word, that of late years in Turkey, they begin to learn the art of poising the Janizaries (who are the foot of the Princes Guard) by the Spahyes, (who are the horse of the same) and so have frequently evaded the danger of their mutinies. At which rate, seeing every Army consisteth of Horse and Foot, no Army could be mutinous. If these had not been meer slights, and so intended, he might have done well to have shewn us One Mutiny of the Janizaries appeased by the Spahyes. But all the parts of his Politicks (as was Page  71 said of those in Rhetorick) consist of Pronunciation.

Thus the wounds of Monarchy, notwithstanding the former, or this last remedy of Forraign Guards, are still bleeding, or festering.

But his courage is undaunted, (aut viam inveniat aut faciat) he will either mend a Government, or make one, by asserting without any example, but with egregious* confidence, That the perfection of Monarchy is free from those flaws, which are charged upon it, and that it consists in go∣verning by a Nobility, weighty enough to keep the People under, yet not tall enough in any particular person to measure with the Prince; and by a Moderate Army kept under the Notion of Guards, and Garrisons, which may be sufficient to strangle all sedition in the Cradle, from which mixture, or Counterpoise of a Nobility and an Army, ariseth the most excellent form of Monarchical Government.

There's for your learning now, A Model which is a short horse, and a Legislator that hath soon curried him. To the parts of it, consisting of a Nobility, and in force, I have already spoken severally. I shall now speak unto the whole together; that is, unto the imagined mixture or Counterpoise of a Nobility and an Army; and because there is nothing in Nature, that hath not had a natural effect by some example.

The scale of Arms, or of Iron, continued in the Line of William the Conqueror, and the scale of Propiety, or gold, continued in the Barons of England, and their Successors. But in this, before the Barons wars consisted not the perfection of the Monarchy, because it preponde∣rated too much on the side of Arms; nor after the Barons wars, because the King, putting power (which he could not keep out of their fingers) into the hands of the Nobility, it became a vicious constitution, and a Monarchy only in Name, (so saith the Considerer) therefore the ballance being then only even, when neither the King could over-ballance, or get the better of the Barons, nor the Barons over-ballance, or get the better of the King; the perfection of Monarchy consisted in the Barons wars! Lycurgus the Second!

Mark; the King by all means must have a Nobility weighty enough to keep down the people; and then he must Page  72 have an Army to hold gold weight with his Nobility; as if the Nobility in that case would keep down the People, and not fetch them up (as did the Barons) into their scale, that so together they might weigh down the Army; which sooner or later is the infallible consequence of this phantasie; or let it be shewn where it was ever otherwise; to instance in France is quite contrary, where all the con∣siderable offices, and commands being in the Nobility, or the richer sort of that Nation, the ballance of Arms, and of propriety are not two, but one and the same. There is no way for Monarchy, but to have no Army, or no other then the Nobility, which maketh the regulated Monarchy, as in France, Spain, &c. or to have an Army that may weigh down Nobility and People too; that is, destroy them both, which maketh the absolute way of Monarchy, as in Turkey; the wit of man never found, nor shall find a third, there being no such thing in Nature.

This Chapter is already with the longest, and yet I must give you a (corollary pouce de roy, or) Piece above mea∣sure; upon a question which the greenest Politician that ever brought his Verjuce to the Presse, hath spurr'd me.

Where he desires to know my opinion of the way of go∣verning by Councils, which he confesseth he hath always thought admirable; he doth not mean such as are co-ordinate with the Prince (which have been seen in the world) but such* as those of Spain, purely of advice and dispatch, with power only to inform and perswade, not limit the Princes will. For almost all the weaknesses which have been thought incident to Monarchy, are by this course prevented, and if there be any steadinesse and maturity in the Senate of a Commonwealth, this takes it all in.

To give my Counsel without a fee, and deal sincerely with a Prevaricator: Let the Prince (that is, such an one as his) hold himself contented with his Divan, or Cabinet. If this be that he means, we are agreed; but if he would have more, I can make no lesse of his words, then an han∣kering after such Councils as I have proposed, and that these are such as he always thought admirable, such as pre∣vent almost all the weaknesses incident to Monarchy, and take in the steadinesse and maturity of a Commonwealth.

How may we make this agree with that other place? Page  73 where he saith that there is no frame of laws, or constitution of government, which will not decay and come to ruine, unlesse repaired by the prudence and dexterity of them that govern. Now that this may not be expected from a Monarch, as well as* from a Senate, or assembly of men, he hath not yet met with any conviction, but rather finds it reasonable to think that where debates are cleerest, the result of them most secret, and the execution suddain, (which are the advantages of Mo∣narchy) there the disorders of a State will soonest be disco∣vered, and the necessary remedies best applied. In that former place he bethought himself, that the debates of Rome were as clear as those of Antiochus, that her results were as secret as those of Philip, or Perseus, and of more suddain execution then either of theirs. He doubted it might be true, which is affirmed by good Authors, and commonly enough known, that for the clearnesse of debate, and se∣crecy of result, the world never saw any thing like the Senate of Venice, and that in all apparence they are for execution, as quick with the Divan, as the Divan can be with them. Now when all this is done, to banish so ge∣nerous thoughts without shewing us for what cause, and knock under the table, is sad news. But he shall find me, in any thing that is reasonable, most ready to serve him. To the question then, how such Councils as I have pro∣posed would do with a Prince? I answer, truly the best of them, I doubt, but untowardly. One, that is the Po∣pular Assembly, hath no mean, but is either the wisest in Nature, or hath no brains at all. When affairs go upon no other then the Publick interest, this having no other interest to follow, nor eyes to see withal, is the wisest Council: but such ways are destructive to a Prince, and they will have no nay: The Congregation of Israel, when Rehoboam would not hearken to their advice, deposed him: and we know what Popular Councils, so soon as they came to sufficient power, did in England. If a Prince put a Po∣pular Council from this ward, He does a great matter, and to little purpose, for they understand nothing else but themselves. Wherefore the Kings of France and of Spain, have dissolved all such Assemblies. It is true, where a Prince is not strong enough to get money out of them, but by their cocsent, they are necessary, but then they are not Page  74 purely of advice and dispatch, but share in the Government, and he cannot be meddling with their Purses, but they will be meddling with his Laws. The Senate is of fitter use for a Prince, and yet except he have the way of Tiberius, but a ticklish piece, as appears by Maximinus, who was destroyed by Pupienus and Balbinus, Captains set up against him by this Order. To go unto the Root. These things are not otherwise in prudence or choice then by direction of the ballance; where this is Popular no remedy, the Prince must be advised by the People, which if the late King would have endured, the Monarchy might have subsisted somewhat longer, but while the ballance was Aristocrati∣cal, as during the great Estates of the Nobility and the Clergy, we find not the People to have been great or wise Counsellors. In sum, if a King govern by a Popular Council, or an house of Commons, the Throne will not stand long. If he governs by a Senate, or an house of Lords, let him never fear the Throne, but have a care of himself: there is no third as I have said often enough but the Divan.