The prerogative of popular government. A politicall discourse in two books. The former containing the first præliminary of Oceana, inlarged, interpreted, and vindicated from all such mistakes or slanders as have been alledged against it under the notion of objections. The second concerning ordination, against Dr. H. Hamond, Dr. L. Seaman, and the authors they follow. In which two books is contained the whole commonwealth of the Hebrews, or of Israel, senate, people, and magistracy, both as it stood in the institution by Moses, and as it came to be formed after the captivity. As also the different policies introduced into the Church of Christ, during the time of the Apostles. By James Harrington.

Chap. XII. Whether Courses or Rotation be necessary unto a well-or∣dered Common-wealth? In which is contained the courses or Pare••bole of Israel before the Captivi∣vity, together, with the Epitome of Athens and Venice.

ONe bout more, and we have done; this (as reason good) will be upon wheeles or Rotati∣on, for,

As the Agrarian answereth unto the Equali∣ty of the Foundation or Root, so doth Rotation unto the Equality of the Superstructures or branches of a Common∣wealth.

Equall Rotation is equall Vicissitude in, or Succession unto, Magistracy confer'd for equal termes, injoyning such equal vacations, as cause the Government to take in the body of the People, by parts succeeding others, through free Election, or suffrage of the whole.

The contrary whereunto is prolongation of Magistracy, which trashing the wheel of Rotation, destroyes the life, or natural motion, of a Common wealth.

The Praevaricator, what ever he hath done for himself, hath done this for me, that it will be out of doubt, whe∣ther my Principles be capable of greater Obligation, or con∣firmation, than by having Objections made against them. Nor have I been altogether ingrateful, or nice of my labour but gone farre (much farther then I needed) about, that I might return with the more valuable Present, unto him that sent me on the Errant; I shall not be short of like proceeding upon the present Subject, but rather over.

Rotation in a Common wealth, is of the Magistracy; of the Senate; of the People; of the Magistracy and the People; of the Magistracy and the Senate; or of the Ma∣gistracy of the Senate, and of the People; which in all, come unto Six kinds.

For example of Rotation in the Magistracy, you have the Judge of Israel, called in Hebrew, Shophet, the like Magi∣stracy after the Kings Ithobal and Baal came in use with the Tyrians, from these with their Posterity the Carthagi∣nians, who also called their Supreme Magistrates, being in Number two, and for their Terme Annuall, Shophetim, which the Latines by a softer pronunciation render Suffetes.

The Shophet or Judge of Israel, was a Magistrate, not that I can finde, obliged unto any certain Terme, throughout the Book of Judges; Nevertheless, it is plain, that his E∣lection was occasional, and but for a time, after the man∣ner of a Dictator.

True it is, that Eli and Samuel, ruled all their lives, but upon this, such impatience in the People followed through the corruption of their Sonnes, as was the main cause of the succeeding Monarchy.

The Magistrates in Athens (except the Areopagites be∣ing a Judicatory) were all upon rotation. The like for La∣cedemon and Rome, except the Kings in the former, who were indeed hereditary, but had no more power than the Duke in Venice, where all the rest of the Magistrates (ex∣cept the Procuratori; whose Magistracy is but meer Orna∣ment) are also upon Rotation.

For Rotation of the Senate you have Athens, the Achae∣ans, Aetolians, Lyceans, the Amphictionium, and the Se∣nate of Lacedemon reproved, in that it was for life, by Ari∣stotle: Modern Examples of like kind, are the Diet of Switz, but especially the Senate of Venice.

For the Rotation of the People, you have first Israel, where the Congregation, which the Greeks call Ecclesia, the Latines Comitia, or Concio, having a twofold capacity; first, that of an Army, in which they were the constant Guard of the Countrey; and secondly, that of a Repre∣sentative, in which they gave the Vote of the People, at the Creation of their Lawes, or election of their Magi∣strates, was monethly. Now the Children of Israel after their Number, to wit, the chief Fathers, and Captains of thousands and hundreds, and their Officers that served the King in any matter of the courses which came in and went out moneth by

moneth, throughout all the moneths of the year, every course, were twenty and four thousand.

Such a multitude there was of military age, that with∣out inconvenience, four and twenty thousand were every moneth in Arms, whose Terme expiring others succeeded, and so others, by which meanes the Rotation of the whole People came about in the space of one year. The Tribunes, or Commanders of the Tribes in Arms, or of the Preroga∣tive for the moneth, are named in the following part of the Chapter, to the sixteenth Verse; where begins the E∣numeration of the Princes, (though God and Ashur, for what reason I know not, be omitted) of the Tribes, remain∣ing in their Provinces, where they judged the People, and as they received Orders, were to bring or send such far∣ther enforcement or recruits, as occasion required unto the Army; after these, some other Officers are mentioned. There is no question to be made, but this Rotation of the People, together with their Prerogative, or Congregation, was preserved by the monethly Election of two thousand Deputies in each of the twelve Tribes, which in all, came to four and twenty thousand; or let any man shew how o∣therwise it was likely to be done, the Nature of their Of∣fice being to give the Vote of the People, who therefore sure must have chosen them. By these, the Vote of the People was given to their Lawes, and at Elections of their Magistrates.

Unto their Lawes, as where David proposeth the re∣duction of the Ark. And David consulted with the Captains of thousands and hundreds, and with every Leader. And Da∣vid said unto all the Congregation of Israel, If it seem good un∣to you, and it be of the Lord God, let us send abroad to our Bre∣thren every where (the Princes of the Tribes in their Pro∣vinces) that are left in the Land of Israel, and with them al∣so to the Priests and Levites, which are in their Cities and Su∣burbs, that they may gather themselves unto us; And let us bring again the Ark of our God to us; for we enquired not at it in the dayes of Saul. And all the Congregation (gave their suffrage in the Affirmative) said that they would do so; for the thing was right in the Eyes of the People. (Nulla lex sibi soli conscientiam Justitiae sua debet, sed et à quibus obsequium

expectat) Now that the same Congregation or representa∣tive gave the vote of the People also in the Election of Priests Officers and Magistrates, Moreover David and the Captaines of the Host separated to the service of the Sonnes of A••aph, and of Heman, and of Jeduthun, who should Prophesy with Harps with Psalteryes & with Cymballs. But upon the oc∣casion untowhich we are more especially beholding for the preservation and discovery of this admirable order (David having proposed the businesse in a long and pious speech,) the Congregation made Solomon the Sonne of David King the second time and annoynted him unto the Lord to be Chief, Governor, and Zadok to be Preist. For as to the first time that Solomon was made King, it happened, through the sedition of Adoniae to have been done in hast and tumultu∣ously by those onely of Jerusalem; and the reason why Zadoc is here made Priest is that Abiathar was put out for being of the Conspiracy with Adonia.

I may expect (by such Objections as they afford me) it should be alleadged, that to prove an order in a Com∣mon-wealth, I instance in a Monarchy; as if there were any thing in this Order Monarchiall, or that could, if it had not been so received from the Common-wealth, have been introduced by the Kings, to whom in the Judge∣ment of any sober man (the Praevaricator onely excepted, who hath been huckling about some such Councill for his Prince) no lesse could have follow'd, upon the first frown of the people, then did in Rehoboam, who, having used them roughly, was deposed by the Congregation or the Major part. It is true, that while Israel was an Army, the Congregation, as it needed not to assemble by way of Election or representative, so I believe it did not, but that by all Israel assembled to this end, should be meant the whole people after they were planted upon their lots, and not their Representative, which in a politicall sense is as properly so called, were absurd and impossible, Nor need I go upon presumption onely, be the same never so strong, seeing it is said in Scripture of the Korathites, that they were keepers of the gates of the Tabernacle, and their fa∣thers being over the Host of the Lord, were keepers of the En∣try. That is (according to the interpretation of Grotius)

the Korathites were now keepers of the gates, as it appears in the Book of Numbers, their Ancestors the Kohathites had been in Camp, or while Israel was yet an Army. But our Translation is lame of the right foot as to the true discovery of the Antient manner of this service, which according to the Septuagint and the Vulgar Latine was thus, they were keepers of the gates of the Tabernacle (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & familiae eorum per vices) and their fathers by turnes or Rotation. So that offices and services by courses turnes or Rotation are plainly more auntient then Kings in the Common-wealth of Israel; though it be true that when the courses or Rotation of the Congregation or Representative of the people were first introduced, be as hard to shew, as it would be how, after the People were once planted upon their lotts, they could be otherwise assembled. If writers argue well and lawfully from what the Sanhedrim was in the institution by Jehoshaphat unto what it had more auntiently been, to argue from what the Congregation was in the instituti∣on by David, unto what it had more auntiently been, is sufficiently warranted.

These things rightly considered, there remaines little doubt, but we have the courses of Israel for the first Ex∣ample of Rotation in a Popular Assembly. Now to come from the Hebrew unto the Grecian prudence, the same is approved by Aristotle, which he exemplifies in the Com∣mon-wealth of Thales Milesius, where the people, he saith assembled (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) by turnes or rotation. Nor is the Roman prudence with∣out some shadow of the like proceeding, where the Prero∣gative (pro tempore) with the jure-vocatae being made by Lot, gave frequently the Suffrage of the whole people. But the Gothick prudence in the policy of the Third State, runs altogether upon the collection of a Representative by the suffrage of the People, and though not so diligently regulated, by terms and vacations as to a standing assem∣bly were necessary, by Turns, Rotation, Parembole, or cour∣ses; As in the Election of the late House of Commons, and the constitutive vicissitude of the Knights and Burgeses is known by sufficient experience.

When the Rotation of a Common-wealth is both in the Magistracy and the People, I reckon it to be of a fourth kinde, as in Israel, where both the Judge and the Congre∣gation were so elected.

The fifth kinde is when the Rotation of a Common∣wealth is in the Magistracy and the Senate, as in those of Athens, of the Achaeans, of the Aetohians, of the Lycians, and of Venice; upon which examples, rather for the influ∣ence each of them, at least Athens, may have upon the fol∣lowing Book, than any great Necessity from the present occasion, I shall inlarge my self in this place.

The Common wealth of Athens was thus administred.

The Senate of the Beane being the proposing-Assembly (for that of the Areopagites, called also a Senate, was a Ju∣dicatory) consisted of four hundred Citizens chosen by Lot, which was performed with beanes, these were annually re∣moved all at once. By which meanes Athens became fru∣strated of the natural and necessary use of an Aristocracy, while neither her Senators were chosen for their parts, nor remained long enough in this function, to acquire the right understanding of their proper Office. These thus e∣lected, were subdivided by Lot into four equal parts, call∣ed Prytanys, each of which for one quarter of the year was in Office. The Prytany or Prytans in Office elected ten Presidents, called Proedri, out of which Proedri or Presidents, they weekly chose one Provost of the Council, who was called the Epistata. The Epistata and the Proedri were the more peculiar Proposers to the Prytans, and to the Prytans it belonged especially to prepare businesse (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) for the Senate: they gave also audience unto any that would propose any thing concerning the Common wealth, which if, reported by the Prytans, it were approved by the Senate, the party that pro∣posed might promulgate the business, and promulgation be∣ing made, the Congregation assembled, and determined of it. (Sic data concio Laelio est, processit ille & Graecus apud Graecos, non de culpa sua dixit, sed de paena quaestus est, por∣rexerunt manus, Psephisma natum est).

The Prytans and their Magistrates, had right to assem∣ble the Senate; and propose unto them; and what the Se∣nate determined upon such a Proposition, if forthwith to be offer'd unto the People, as in private cases, was called Proboulema; but if not to be proposed, till the People had a year's tryall of it, as was the ordinary way in order unto Lawes to be enacted, it was called Psephisma; each of which words with that difference, signifies a Decree. A De∣cree of the Senate in the latter sense had for one year, the power of a Law, after which tryall, it belonged to the Thesmothetae (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) to hang it in writing upon the Statues of the Heroes, and assemble the Congregation. These Magistrates were of the number of the Archons, which in all were nine, the chief more peculiarly so called▪ was Ar∣chon Eponymus, he by whose name the year was reckon'd or denominated (his Magistracy being of a Civil concern∣ment) the next was the King, a Magistrate of a Spirituall concernment) the third the Polemarch (whose Magistracy was of a Military concernment): the other six were the Thesmothetae, who had several functions common with the Nine, Others peculiar or proper to themselves, as (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) to give the People (by ply-carts) notice when the Judicatories were to assemble, that is, when the People were to assemble in that Capacity, and to judge according to the Law made; or when the Senate, or the People were to assemble upon an (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) a crime that was not provided against by the Law, as that of Alcibiades, (the wits about that time in Athens, being most of them Atheists) for laughing at Ceres discovering her secrets, and shaving of the Mercury's. If an Archon or Demagogue were guilty of such a Crime, it belonged unto the cogni∣zance of the Senate, otherwise unto that of the People, whom the Thesmothetae were also in like manner to warn, when they were to come unto the suffrage.

These six like the Electors in Venice, presided at all E∣lections of Magistrates, whether made by the lott as the judges, or by suffrage, as the new Archons, the Strategus or Generall, and most of the rest. They also had the hearing and introducing of all causes into the Judicatories.

But the right of assembling the Ecclesia or Congregation belonged to the Prytans, by whom the Senate proposed unto the People.

The Congregation consisted of all them that were upon the role of the Lexiarcha, that is to say, of the whole People having right unto the City▪ The Prytans seated upon a Tribunal were Presidents of this Assembly; The Assembly ha∣ving sacrificed & made Oath of fidelity unto the Common∣wealth; the Proedri or Presidents of the Prytans, proposed by Authority of the Senate unto the People in this manner. July the 16th Pol••cles being Archon, and the Tribe of Pan∣dion in the Prytaneate, Demosthenes, Peaneus, thought thus, or was of this Opinion. The same Custom whereby the first Proposer subscribes his Opinion or Parte with his name, is at this day in Venice. Proposition being made, such of the People as would speak, were called to the Pulpit; they, that were fifty years of age, or upwards, were to come first, and the younger afterwards; which Custom of prating in this manner, made excellent Orators or Demagogs, but a bad Common wealth.

From this that the People had not only the result of the Common wealth, but the debate also; Athens is called a Democracie, and this kind of Government is opposed unto that of Lacedemon, which because the People there had not the power of debate, but of result only, was called Aristo∣cracy, sometimes Oligarchy: thus the Greeks commonly are to be understood to distinguish of these two; while according to my Principles, (if you like them) debate in the People maketh Anarchy, and where they have the re∣sult, and no more, the rest being mannaged by a good Aristocracy, it maketh that which is properly and truly to be called Democracy, or Popular Government. Neither is this Opinion of mine new, but according to the Judge∣ment of some of the Athenians themselves; for saith Iso∣crates in his Oration unto the Areopagites for reformation of the Athenian Government; I know the main reason, why the Lacedemonians flourish, to be, that their Common wealth is popular. But to return. As many of the People, as would, having shewed their Eloquence, and with these the Dema∣gogues,

who were frequently bribed, concealed their kna∣very; the Epistata, or Provost of the Proedri, put the Decree or Question unto the Vote, and the People gave the result of the Common wealth by their Chirotonia, that is, by hol∣ding up their hands; the result thus given, was the Law, or Psephisma of the People.

Now for the functions of the Congregation, they were divers; as first, Election of Magistrates, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉); Namely, the Archons, the Strategus, or Generall, the Field-Officers, the Admiralls, with divers others, all, or the chief of them Annuall, and commonly upon Termes and Vacations, though it be true, (as Plutarch hath it) that Phocion was Strategus four years together, having that honour still put upon him by the Congregation, without his seeking. The next Office of this Assembly, was to elect Judges into five Courts or Judica∣tories, for the People being in the Bulk too unweildy a bo∣dy for the performance of this duty, they exercised the su∣preme Judicature, by way of Representative, into which E∣lection was made by Lottery, in such manner, that five hun∣dred one thousand, or 1500. of them (according to the importance of the occasion) being above thirty yeares of age, and within the rest of the qualifications in that case provided by the Law, became the Soveraign Judicatory, called the Heliaea. In all Elections, whether by lot or suf∣frage, the Thesonothetae were Presidents, and ordered the Congregation. Farthermore, if they would amend, alter, repeal, or make a Law, this also was done by a Representa∣tive, of which no man was capable, that had not been of the Heliaea, for the rest elected out of the whole People: this amounting unto one thousand, was called the Nomo∣thetae or Legislators. No Law received by the People, could be abrogated but by the Nomothetae; by these any Athenian (having obtained leave of the Senate) might abrogate a Law, provided, that withall, he put another in the place of it. These Lawes the Proedri of the Prytans, were to put unto the Suffrage.

First, the old, whether it agreed with the Athenian people, or not? then the new; and whether of these hap∣ned

to be chirotonized or voted by the Nomothetae, was ra∣tified; according to that piece of the Athenian Law cited by Demosthenes against Timocrates (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) what hath been said of the Common-wealth of Athens, in relation unto the present purpose, amounts unto thus much, that not onely the Senate and the Magistracy in this Policy was upon rotation, but even the People also, at least, as to the Nomothetae, or their Legislative power, and the Supreme Judicatory of the Heliaea, each of these being a Represen∣tative, constituted of one Thousand or fifteen hundred Cittizens.

But for what followes in the second book it is necessary that I observe in this place the proceeding of certain Di∣vines, who indeavour to make use of this Common∣wealth for ends of their own▪ as particularly Doctor Sea∣man; who in his book called Four propositions, argues after this manner.

Chirotonia (as Suidas hath it) signifies both Plebiscitum a Law made by the People, and Psephisma. Now (saith he) Pse∣phisma is the ordinary word used in the Attick lawes and in De∣mosthenes, for (Senatesconsultum) a Law made by the Senate; whence he drawes this conclusion. As, when the People make a Law, they are said to Chirotonize; so may the Rulers in like manner, in those Lawes that are made by themselves alone.

These wayes with divines are too bad. The words of Suidas are these (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) Chiroto∣nia is Election or ratification by the Many: which expresly excludeth the Few or the Senate from being otherwise con∣tained by the word Chirotonia, than a part is by the whole. Nor hath the Authour the word Psephisma, or Plebiscitum in the place. I would faine know what other word there is in Greeke for Plebiscitum but Psephisma; and yet the Doctor puts it upon Suidas that he distinguishteh between these two, and, taking that for granted where he findes Psephisma in Demosthenes and the Attick Laws, will have it to signifie no more then a decree of the Senate. It is true that some decrees of the Senate were so called, but those of the people had no other name, and when ever you find

Psephisma in Demosthenes or the Attick Laws, for a Law, there is nothing more certaine then that it is to be under∣stood of the people, for to say that a Law in a Popular Com∣monwealth can be made without the people, is a contradicti∣on.

The second passage, is a what think you of these words of Pollux (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) which the Doctor having englished in this manner; The Thesmothetae do privately prescribe when Judg∣ment is to be given, and promulge publick accusations, and suf∣frages unto the people, askes you whose Suffrages were these, if not the Ruler's? By which strange construction, where Pollux having first related in what part the function of the Thesmothetae, was common with that of the Nine Archons, comes (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) to shew you what was peculiar to them∣selves, namely to give notice when the Heliaea or other In∣dicatoryes were to assemble; the Dr. renders it, they do pri∣vately prescribe: as if the Session of a Court of Justice, and such an one as contained a thousand Judges, being the re∣presentative of the whole people, were to be privately pre∣scribed, then to this private prescribing of Justice, he addes that they do publickly promulge (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) citations upon crimes not within the written Law; as if private prescrip∣tion and publick promulgation could stand together. Next whereas promulgation in the very Nature of the word signi∣fies an Act before a Law made, he presumes the Law to be first made by the Rulers, and then promulgated by the Thes∣mothetae to the people, kim kam to the experience of all Common-wealths, the Nature of promulgation, and the sense of his Authour, whose words as I shew'd before, de∣clare it to have been the proper or peculiar office of the Thes∣mothetae to give the people notice when they were to assemble for Judicature, or when for giving their Chirotonia or suffrage, by promulgation of the cause (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) upon which they were to determine.

For the fourth passage the Dr. quoting a wrong place for these words, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) that the Nomothetae (being a Representative, as I shewd▪ of the whole people, chosen by lot, and in number one thousand) chirotonized

or gave the Legislative suffrage; thence inferrs▪ that the Rulers chirotonized, voted or made Lawes by themselves without the People: which is, as if one should say that the Prerogative Tribe in Rome, or the House of Commons in England, gave their Vote to such or such a Law, therefore it was made by the Rulers alone, and not by the People of Rome or of England.

For the fourth passage, Stevens quotes Demosthenes at large in these words, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉). This the Doctor interprets of an Officer; to which I shall say more, when he shews me where the sentence is, or what went before: for as yet I do not know of an officer in any Common wealth, whose Election was indifferently made, either by the Senate, or by the People; nor do I think the Doctor hath lookt farther for this, than Stephens, who hath not interpreted it.

The fifth passage is, That a Decree of the Senate in Athens, had the force of a Law for one year, without the People. So had the Edicts of the Praetores in Rome; But I would fain know, whence the Senate in Athens, or the Praetors in Rome, origi∣nally derived this right (which was no more then that such Lawes might be probationers, and so better understood, when they came to the Vote) but from the Chirotonia, or suffrage of the People.

The sixth passage, stops the mouths of such as having no∣thing to say unto the matter of my writing, pick quarrels with the manner or freedom of it, the liberty I take in the defence of truth, seeing the Doctor takes a greater liberty upon other termes, while he bids his Antagonist (one that desended the cause now in my hand) go and consult his Au∣thours, namely, Stephens and Budaeus again; for, saith he, you wrong those learned men, while you would have us be∣lieve that they were as ignorant of the Greek Story as your self, or that things are to be found in them, which are not. To which confidence, I have better leave to say, that the Doctor should do well to take no worse counsel than he gives.

But what is become of my Praevaricator, I have quite lost him, else I should have intreated him to compare his Notes out of my Sermon, with these out of the Doctors:

or retract that same affectation, in saying, I know not, but Mr. Harrington has conceiv'd a great unkindness for the Clergy. As if these their Stratagems, with which they make perpetual Warre against the unwary people, did not con∣cern a man that hath undertaken the cause of popular Go∣vernment.

The Policy of the Achaeans consisted of divers Common∣wealths under one, which was thus administred, the Cities sent their Deputies twice every year of course, and oftner if they were summoned by their Strategus, or their Demi∣urges, to the place appointed. The Strategus was the Su∣preme Magistrate, both Military and Civill, and the Demiur∣ges being ten, were his Council, all Annuall Magistrates e∣lected by the People. This Council thus constituted, was called the Synarchy, and performed like duties, in relation unto the Senate, consisting of the Deputies sent by their pe∣culiar Soveraignties or Cities, as the Prytans unto that in Athens. The Policies of the Aetolians and Lycians, are so near the same again, that in one you have all; So both the Senates and the Magistracy of these Common wealths, were upon rotation. To conclude, with Venice.

The Common wealth of Venice, consisteth of four parts, The great Council, the Senate, the Collegio, and the Signiory.

The Great Council is the aggregate body of the whole People, or Citizens of Venice, which for the paucity of their Number, and the Antiquity of their Extraction are called Gentlemen, or Noble Venetians; every one of which, at five and twenty years of Age hath right of Session and Suffrage in this Council; which right of Suffrage, because through∣out this Common-wealth, in all Debates and Elections, it is given by the ballot, is called, The right of ballotting, whereby this Council being the Soveraign power, createth all the rest of the Orders, Councils, or Magistracies; hath constitutely the Ultimate result, both in cases of Judica∣ture, and constitution of Lawes.

The Senate called also the Pregati, consisteth of Sixty Se∣nators, properly so styled, whereof the great Council e∣lecteth six on a day, beginning so long before the Moneth of October, that these being all chosen by that time, then receive their Magistracy; it consisteth also of sixty more,

called the Juncta, which are elected by the Scrutiny of the Old Senate, that is, by the Senate proposing, and the great Council resolving; the rest of their Creation, is after the same manner with the former. In the Sixty of the Senate, there cannot be above three of any one kinred, or Family, nor in the Junta so many, unless there be fewer in the for∣mer. These Magistracies are all Annuall, but without in∣tervall, so that it is at the pleasure of the great Council, whe∣ther a Senator having finished his year, they will elect him again.

The Collegio is a Council, consisting more especially of three Orders of Magistrates, called in their Language Saui as the Saui grandi, to whose cognizance or care belong the whole affaires of Sea and Land; the Saui di Terra ferma, to whose care and Cognizance belong the affaires of the Land, and the Saui di Mare, to whose Cognizance apper∣tain the affaires of the Sea, and of the Islands. These are e∣lected by the Senate, not all at once; but for the Saui Grandi, who are six, by three at a time, with the interposi∣tion of three moneths; and for the Saui di terra ferma, and the Saui di mare, who are each five, after the same man∣ner▪ save only that the first Election consisteth of three, and the second of two; Each Order of the Saui elects weekly one Provost, each of which Provosts hath right in any affair belonging unto the Cognizance of his Order, to propose unto the Collegio. Audience of Embassadors, and mat∣ters of forraign Negotiation, belong properly unto this Council.

The Signiory consisteth of the Duke, and of his Counsel∣lors. The Duke is a Magistrate created by the great Council for life, to whom the Common wealth acknowledgeth the Reverence due unto a Prince, and all her Acts run in his Name, though without the Counsellors he have no power at all while they can perform any function of the Signi∣ory without him. The Counsellors, whose Magistracy is An∣nual, are elected by the scrutiny of the Senate▪ naming one out of each Tribe, (for the City is locally divided into six Tribes) and the Great Council approving; so the Counsellors are six, whose function in part is of the Nature of Masters of Requests, having withall, power to grant certain privi∣ledges:

but their greatest preheminence is, that all, or a∣ny one of them, may propose unto any Council in the Com∣mon wealth.

The Signiory hath session and suffrage in the Collegio, the Collegio hath Session and suffrage in the Senate, and the Se∣nate hath Session and suffrage in the Great Council. The Signiory, or the Provosts of the Saui, have power to assemble the Colledge, the Colledge hath power to assemble the Senate, and the Senate hath power to assemble the Great Council; the Signiori, but more peculiarly the Provosts of the Saui, (in their own Offices and functions) have power to pro∣pose unto the Colledge, the Colledge hath power to propose unto the Senate, and the Senate hath power to propose un∣to the Great Council: what ever is thus proposed and resol∣ved, either by the Senate (for sometimes, through the secu∣rity of this Order, a Proposition goes no farther) or by the Great Council, is ratifide, or becomes the Law of the Com∣mon-wealth. Over and above these Orders▪ they have three Judicatories, two Civill, and one Criminall, in each of which, forty Gentlemen elected by the great Council, are Judges for the Terme of eight moneths; to these Judicatories, belong the Avogadori and the Auditori, who are Magi∣strates, having power to hear causes apart, and, as they judge fitting, to introduce them into the Courts.

If a man tell me, that I omit many things, he may perceive I write an Epitome, in which no more should be comprehended, then that which understood may make a man understand the rest. But of these principal parts, con∣sisteth the whole body of admirable Venice.

The Consiglio de Dieci, or Council of Ten, being that which partaketh of Dictatorian power▪ is not a limb of her, but as it were a Sword in her hand. This Council (in which the Signiory hath also Session and suffrage) consisteth more peculiarly of ten Annuall Magistrates, created by the Great Council, who afterwards elect three of their own number by Lott, which so elected are called Capi de Dieci, their Magistracy being monethly; again, out of the three Capi, one is taken by Lot, whose Magistracy is weekly, this is he, who over against the Tribunall in the Great Council, fits like another Duke, and is called, the Provost of the

Dieci. It belongs to these three Magistrates, to assemble the Councill of dele Ten which they are obliged to do weekly of course, and oftner as they see occasion. The Councill being assembled, any one of the Signiory, or two of the Capi may propose to it, the power which they now exercise, (& wherin for their assistance they create three Magistrates called the grand Inquisitors) consists in the punishment of certaine heynous crimes▪ especially that of Treason; in re∣lation whereunto they are as it were Sentinells, standing up∣on the guard of the Common-wealth: But constitutively with the Addition of a Junta, consisting of other fifteen to∣gether with some of the chiefe Magistrates, having right in cases of important speed or secrecy unto this Councill; they had the full and absolute power of the whole Com∣mon-wealth, as Dictator.

That Venice either transcribed the whole and every part of her Constitution out of Athens and Lacedemon; or hap∣peneth to be framed, as if she had so don, is most apparent. The Result of this Common-wealth is in the Great Coun∣cill, and the debate in the Senate▪ so was it in Lacedemon. A decree made by the Senate of Athens had the power of a Law for one yeare without the people, at the end whereof the people might revoke it: A decree of the Senate of Venice stands good without the great Councill, unlesse these see rea∣son to revoke it. The Prytans, were a Councill preparing businesse for the Senate; So is the Collegio in Venice; the Presidents of the Prytans were the Ten Proedri; those of the Collegio are the three Provosts of the Saui. The Ar∣chons or Princes of Athens being Nine, had a kind of Sove∣raigne inspection upon all the Orders of the Common∣wealth, so hath the Signiory of Venice consisting of Nine besides the Duke. The Quarancys in Venice are Judicato∣ryes of the nature of the Heliaea in Athens; and as the Thesmothetae heard and introduced the causes into that Ju∣dicatory, so do the Avogadori and the Auditori into these. The Consiglio de dieci in Venice is not of the body but an Appendix of the Common-wealth; so was the Court of the Ephori in Lacedemon, and as these had power to put a King a Magistrate or any Delinquent of what degree soever unto death, so hath the Consiglio de dieci. This again is

wrought up with the Capi di dieci, and the weekly Provost, as were the Prytans with the Proedri, and the weekly Epi∣stata, and the Ballot is lineally descended from the Beane; yet is Venice in the whole, and in every part, a farre more exquisite policy than either Athens or La∣cedemon.

A Politicall is like a naturall body. Commonwealths resemble and differ, as men resemble and differ; among whom you shall not see two faces, or two dispositions, that are alike. Peter and Thomas in all their parts are e∣qually men, and yet Peter and Thomas of all men may be the most unlike; one may have his greater strength in his armes, the other in his leggs; one his greater beauty in his soule, the other in his body; one may be a fool, the o∣ther wise▪ one valiant, the other cowardly. These two which at a distance you will nor know, one from the other; when you looke nearer, or come to be better acquainted with you will never mistake. Our Considerer (who in his Epistle, would make you believe, that Oceana is but a meer Transcription out of Venice,) hath Companions like himself, and how near they look in matters of this nature, is plain, while one knoweth not Jethro from Moses, and the other takes a state of Civill Warre, to be the best modell of a Civill Government.

Let a man look near, and the shall not finde any one Or∣der in Oceana (the Ballot only excepted) that hath not as much difference from, or resemblance unto any one order in Rome or Venice, as any one Order in Rome or Venice hath from, or to, any one Order in Athens or Lacedemon: Which different temper of the parts, must of necessity in the whole, yield a result, a soul or Genius, altogether new in the World, as embracing the Arms of Rome, and the Coun∣sels of Venice; and yet neither obnoxious unto the Turbulency of the one, nor the Narrowness of the other.

But the sum of what hath been said of Venice, as to the business in hand, comes to no more, then that the Senate and the Magistracy of this Common wealth are upon Ro∣tation. No more: nay I am well, if it come to so much. For

the Praevaricator catching me up, where I say, that, for all this, the greater Magistracies in Venice are continually wheeled through a few hands, tells me, that I have confes∣sed it to be otherwise. I have indeed confessed, that albeit, the Magistracies are all confes'd for certain termes; yet those termes do not necessitate vacations, that is, the terme of a Magistracy being expired, the party that bore it, is capable upon a new Election of bearing it again without intervall or vacation; which doth not altogether trash the Rotati∣on of the Common wealth, though it render the same ve∣ry imperfect. This infirmity of Venice, deriveth from a com∣plication of causes, none of which is incident unto a Com∣mon wealth, consisting of the Many: wherefore there lies no Obligation upon me, to discover the reason in this place. But on the contrary, seeing, let me shew things ne∣ver so new, they are slighted as old; I have an Obligation in this place, to try whether I may get esteem▪ by conceal∣ing some thing. What is said, every body knew before; this is not said▪ who knowes it?

A Riddle. Riddle me, Riddle me, what is this? The Magistracies in Venice (except such as are rather of Ornament then of power) are all Annuall, or at most Biennial. No man whose terme is expired, can hold his Magistracy longer, but by a new Election. The Elections are most of them made in the Great Council, and all by the Ballot, which is the most equall and impartial way of Suffrage. And yet the greater Magistracies are perpetually wheeled, through a few hands.

If I be worthy to give advice unto a man that would study the Politickes; let him understand Venice, he that▪ understands Venice right, shall go nearest to judge (not∣withstanding the difference that is in every Policy) right of any Government in the world. Now the assault of the Considerer deriving but from some (Pique, or) Emulation, which of us should be the abler Polititian; It the Councill of State had the curiosity to know either that, or who understands Venice, this riddle would make the discove∣ry; For he that cannot easily unfold this Kiddle, doth not understand her.

The sixth kinde of Rotation is when a Common-wealth goes upon it in all her Orders, Senate, People, and Magi∣stracy. Such an one taking in the Many, and being fixed upon the foot of a steady Agrarian▪ hath attain'd un••o per∣fect Equality. But of this, Example there is none, or you must accept of Oceana.

The Rotation of Oceana is of two parts, the one of the Electors which is Annuall, and the other of the Elected which is Trienniall.

Speaking of Electors in this sense, I mean as the great Councill in Venice are Electors of all other Orders, Councills, or Magistrates. But the Common-wealth of Oceana taking in the whole People cannot, as doth the great Councill of Venice (wherein they that have right are but a few) attain unto this capacity at one step: for which cause she taketh three steps; One at the Parishes, where every fifth El∣der is annually elected by the whole people▪ (there is no doubt but there was some such Order in Israel whereby the Monethly Rotation of her Congregation or Perogative, by election of two thousand in each Tribe, was preserved). The next step she takes is at the Hundred, whereby Electi∣on of Officers and Magistrates, the Troopes, chosen at the Parishes, are well near formed. Her third step, is at the Tribe, where the whole body of her deputies are in ex∣act forme, discipline, and function, Headed by proper Officers and Magistrates, these altogether consisting of One fifth part of the whole people. This Rotation, being in it self Annuall, comes in regaurd of the body of the People to be Quinquennial or such as in the space of five years gives every Man his turn in the power of Election.

But though every Man be so capable of being an Electpr▪ that he must have his Turn, yet every man is not so capa∣ble of being elected into those Magistracies, that are Sove∣raigne or have the Leading of the whole Common-wealth, that it can be safe to lay a Necessity, that every Man must take his turn in these also; but it is enough that every Man, who in the Judgement and Conscience of his Country is fit, may take his turn. Wherefore upon the Conscience of the Electors, (so constituted as hath been shewn) it goes to determine, who shall partake of Soveraign Magistracy, or be, at the Assembly of a Tribe, elected into the Senate or Prerogative; which assemblyes are so Trienniall, That one Third part of each falling every year, and another being elected, the Parliament is thereby perpetua∣ted.

Such was the constitution of those Councills which the Praevaricator hath confessed he alwayes thought admirable: but now the toy takes him to be quite of another minde; for, saith he, That, Ancient Republicks have through a maliti∣ous jealously (let them take it among them) made it unlawful even for persons of the clearest merit to continue long in Com∣mand, but have by perpetuall vicissitude substituted new men in the Government is manifested enough; but with what successe they did this, will best appear by Veturius, Varro, and Manci∣nus. He is still admirable: One would wonder what he meanes, if it be that there were but three weak or unfor∣tunate Generals in the whole course of Rome; how strange is it to urge this as an argument against Rotation, which is as strong an one as can be urged, for Rotation? If the Ro∣mans by this way of Election, having experience of an able Generall, knew ever after, where to have him; or lighting upon one they found not so fit for their purpose, could in the Compasse of one year, be rid of him of course, without dishonor or reproach to him, taking thereby a warning to come no more there; was this a proceeding to favour malice; or such an one as removing the cause of malice, left no root for such a branch or possibility of like effect? Certainly by this Assertion the Praevaricator hath Joled his presumptuous head; not onely against the prudence of Auntient Common-wealths, but of God

himself in that of Israel. Veturius, Varro, and Mancinus (though some of them cannot be at all points excused) by this mark upon them, may be thought hardlier of, than is needfull; for which cause there being that also in their Stories, which is neither unpleasant nor unprofitable, I shall endeavour to make the Reader somewhat better acquainted with them. One of the greatest blowes Rome ever received was by Pontius, Captain Generall of the Samnites, who having drawn her Consulls, Posthumius and Veturius, by Stratagem into the fastenses of Caudium, a Valley of narrow Entrance, and shut up the mouth of it by possessing him self of the onely Passage, the rest being invironed with insuperable Rocks, the Samnite came to have both the Armyes, and so upon the matter, the whole strength (in those dayes) of Rome inevitably at his discretion. Hereupon, having leisure and being desirous (in a matter of such moment) of good advice he dispatcht a messenger unto his father Herennius the ablest Counsellor in Samnium, to know what might be his best course with the Romans now inavoydably at his mercy, who answered that he should open the Passe, and let them return untouched. The young Generall amazed at this Counsell, desired far∣ther direction; whereupon Herennius for the second time made answer that he should cut them off to a man. But the Generall upon the strange disagreement of such opinions, having his fathers age (for he was very old) in suspition took a third course, which neither (according to the first advice of wise Herennius) making friends; nor (according unto the second) destroying enemies, became as he pro∣phesyed the utter ruine of the Common-wealth of Samnium. For the Romans being dismissed safe, but ig∣nominiously, the Senate upon their Return, fell into the greatest streight and consternation, that had been known among them. On the one side to live and not revenge such an Affront was intolerable; on the other to revenge it, was against the faith of the Consulls, whose Necessity (the losse of two Armies lying upon it) had in truth forced them to accept of a dishonourable League with the Sam∣nites. Now not the Armies, but the Senate it self was in Caudium, not a man of them could find the way out

of this Vale invironed with Rocks, but he only that could not finde it out of the other, Posthumius, who having first shewed, that neither Warre nor Peace could be so made, as to ingage the Common wealth (injussu Populi) without the Command of the People, declared that the Senate re∣turning the Consuls, with such other as had consented unto so wicked and dishonourable a peace, naked, and bound unto the Samnites, were free, nor ceased till the Senate (thereunto prest by the Necessity of the Common wealth) resolving accordingly, Hee, Veturius, and some of the Tri∣bunes, were delivered unto the Samnites; who neverthe∣less, to hold the Romans unto their League, dismissed them with safety. The disputes on either side that arose hereup∣on, and comming to Arms, ended with the destruction of Samnium, I omit: that which as to the present Occasion, is material, is, the reputation of the Consuls, and Veturius, though he were not the leading man, being for the rest, as deep in the Action as Posthumius; the People were so farre from thinking themselves deceived in this choice, that the Consuls were more honour'd in Rome, for having lost, then Pontius in Samnium for having won the day at Caudium.

I do not rob Graves, nor steal Winding-sheets; my Controversies are not but with the Living, with none of these that have not shewed themselves best able for their own defence; nor yet with such, but in the prosecution of truths opposed by them unto the dammage of mankind; yet the Praevaricator accuseth me of rude charges, what are his then in defence of falshood, and against such as cannot bite? or whether of these is the more noble?

For Varro, who being Consul of Rome, lost the battail of Cannae unto Hanibal Captain General for the Carthag ni∣ans, though without Cowardize, yet by rashness, he is not so excusable.

But for Mancinus, brought (as was Posthumous, by the Samnites) unto dishonourable condition▪ by Megera▪ Cap∣tain General of the Numantines, there be excuses: As first the Numantines, for their number not exceeding four thousand fighting men, were the gallantest of so ma∣ny, on which the Sun ever shone.

Fourteen years had their Common-wealth held tacke with the Romans, in courage, conduct, and virtue, having worsted Pompey the Great, and made a League with him, when she might have made an end of him, ere ever Man∣cinus (of whom Cicero gives a fair Character) came in Play: So his misfortunes having great Examples, can∣not want some excuse, but suppose ner' One of them de∣served any Excuse, what is it at which these Examples drive, against a Common-wealth? Sure the Samnites, the Carthaginians, the Numantines were as well Common∣wealths as the Romans; and so where-ever the advantage go, it must stay upon a Common-wealth; Or if it be Ro∣tation that he would be at (for we must guesse) granting Pontius the Samnite, and Megera the Numantine, to have been no more upon Rotation, then Hannibal the Carthagi∣nian; yet is it plain that Rome upon her Rotation overcame not onely, Pontius, Hannibal and Megera; but Samnium Carthage, and Numantia. So much for Rome, but, sayes he, No lesse appeares by the rabble of Generalls often made use of by the Athenians, while men of Valour and Conduct have layn by the walls.

A Rabble of Generals did I never hear of before; but not to meddle with his Rhetorick, whereas each of his Objecti∣ons hath at least some one Contradiction in it, this hath two (one à Priore, another à Posteriore) One in the Snoute, another in the taile of it. For had there been formerly no Rotation in Athens, how should there have been Men of valour and conduct to lye by the walls? and if Rotation thenceforth should have ceased, how could those men of valour and conduct have done other than lye by the walls? so this inavoydably confesseth, that Rotation was the meanes whereby Athens came to be stored with per∣sons of valour and Conduct, they to be capable of Imploy∣ment, and the Common-wealth to imploy the whole vir∣tue of her Citizens; And it being (in his own words) an Argument of much imperfection in a Government not to dare to employ the whole virtue of the Cittizens; This wholly Routes a standing Generall, for the Government that dares imploy but the virtue of One, dares not employ the virtue of all. Yet he jogs on.

Those Orders must needs be against Nature, which exclu∣ding persons of the best qualifications give admission unto o∣thers, who have nothing to commend them but thier Art in Canvasing for the suffrage of the People. He never takes notice that the Ballot barrs Canvasing beyond all possibi∣lity of any such thing; but we will let that go; Canva∣sing, it is confest, was more frequent in Rome and A∣thens then is laudable, where neverthelesse it is the stronger Argument for the integrity of Popular Suffrage, which being free from any aid of art, produced▪ in those Common-wealths more illustrious Examples, (if a Man go no farther than Plutarchs lives) then are to be found in all the rest of Story.

Yet (saith he) this Law hath been as often broken as a Com∣mon-wealth hath been brought into any exigence, for the ha∣zard of trusting affaires in weak hands then appearing, no scruple hath been made to trample upon this Order, for giving the power to some able man at that time rendered uncapable by the Vacation, this Law requires. The continuation of the Consulship of Marius is sufficient to be alleadged for the proofe of this, though if occasion were it might be backed by plenty of Examples. His choice confutes his pretended variety, who jests with edged tooles, this Example above all will cutt his fingers, for by this prolongation of Magistracy, or to speak more properly of Empire (for the Magistracy of the Consul was civill and conferd by the people Centuriatis co∣mitiis, but his Empire was Military and conferrd Curiatis) Rome began to drive those wheels of her rotation heavily in Marius, which were quite taken off in Caesar.

I have heretofore in vaine, perswaded them upon this occasion, to take notice of a Chapter in Machiavill, so wor∣thy of regard, that I have now inserted it at length▪ as fol∣loweth.

The proceedings of the Roman Common-wealth, being well considered, two things will be found to have been the causes of her dissolution. The Contention that hapned through the in∣deavour of the people, (alwaies oppos'd or eluded by the Nobili∣ty) to introduce an Agrarian; and the dammage that accrued from the prolongation of Empire: Mischiefs which had they leen foreseen in due time, the Government by application of fit

remedies might have been of longer life and better health. The diseases which this Common-wealth, from contention about the Agrarian, contracted, were acute, and tumultuous, but those being slower, and without tumult, which she got by prolongation of Empire were Chronicall, and went home with her, giving a warning by her Example, how dangerous it is unto States that would enjoy their liberty, to suffer Magistracy, how deserved∣ly soever conferd, to remaine long in the possession of the same man. Certainly if the rest of the Romans, whose Empire hap∣ned to be prolonged, had been as virtuous and provident as L. Quinctius, they had never run into this inconvenience. Of such wholsome Example was the goodnesse of this man, that the Senate and the people, after one of their ordinary disputes, being come to some accord, whereas the people had prolonged the Magistracy of their present Tribunes, in regard they were persons more fitly opposed unto the Ambition of the Nobility, then by a New Election they could readily have found, and hereupon the Senate (to shew they needed not be worse at this game) would have prolouged the Consulate unto Quinctius, he refused his consent, saying that ill Examples were to be cor∣rected by good ones, and not encouraged by others like them∣selves; nor could they stirre his resolution, by which meanes they were necessitated to make new Consuls. Had this wisdom and virtue (I say) been duly regarded, or rightly understood, it might have saved Rome, which through this neglect came to ruine. The first whose Empire happned to be prolonged was Pub∣lilius Philo, his consulate expiring at the Campe before Palepo∣lis, while it seemed unto the Senate that he had the Victory in his hand (Actum cum Tribunis Plebis est ad Populum, ferrent ut cum Philo Consulatu abijsset, Proconsule rem gereret) they sent him no successor, but prolonged his Empire, by which meanes he came to be the first Pro-Consul. An Expedient (though introduced for the Publick good) that came in time to be the publick bane: For by how much the Roman Armyes marched farther off, by so much the like course seeming to be the more necessary, became the more customary; whence ensued two pernicious consequences, the one that there being fewer Ge∣neralls, and Men of known ability for conduct, the Art with the reputation of the same, came to be more ingrossed, and obnox∣ious unto ambition: the other, that a Generall standing long,

got such hold upon his Army; as could take them off from the Senate, and hang them on himselfe. Thus Marius and Sylla could be followed by the Souldiery to the detriment of the Com∣mon-wealth, and Caesar to her perdition. Whereas had Rome never prolonged Empire she might perhaps not so soon have ar∣rived at Greatnesse, or acquisition, but would have made lesse hast to destruction.

All the Dilemma that Machiavil observes in these words is, that if a Common-wealth wilt not be so slow in her ac∣quisition as is required by Rotation, she will be lesse sure then is requisite unto her preservation: But the Praevarica∣tor (not deigning to shew us, upon what reasons or experience, he grounds his Maxime) is positive.

That the Dilemma into which a Common-wealth is in this case brought is very dangerous, for either she must give her self a mortall blow by gaining the habit of infringing such orders as are necessary for her preservation, or receive one from with∣out.

This same is an other Parakeetisme: these words are spoken by me after Machiavill in relation unto Dictatori∣an power, in which they are so far from concluding against Rotation, that this in case of a Dictator is more especially necessary (Maxima libertatis custodia est, ut magna imperia diuturna non sint, & temporis modus imponatur, quibus juris imponi dele non potest) which could not be more confirmed then by him, who in the example of Marius shew's that the contrary course spoild all.

The Romans if they had sent a successor unto Publilius Philo at Palepolis, it may be might have let the Victory slip out of his hands, it may be not; However this had been no greater wound unto the Common-wealth, then that her Acquisition would have been slower, which ought not to come in Competition with the safety of a Government, and therefore amounts not unto a Dilemma, this being a kind of argument that should not be stubb'd of one horne, but have each of equall length and danger. Nor is it so certain that encrease is slower for Rotation, seeing neither was this interrupted by that, nor that by this, as the great∣est Actions of Rome, the Conquest of Carthage by Scipio

Africanus, of Macedon by Flaminius, and of Antiochus by Asiaticus, are irrefragable Testimonyes.

I would be loath to spoil the Considerers preferment, but he is not a safe Counsellour for a Prince; whose provi∣dence not supplying the defect of Rotation whether in ci∣vill or military affaires, with some thing of like nature, ex∣poseth himselfe if not his Empire as much unto danger as a Common-wealth. Thus the Sons of Zeruiah, Joab Cap∣taine of the Hoast and Abishai his brother, were too strong for David; thus the Kings of Israel and of Juda fell most of them by their Captaines or Favourites, as I have else∣where observed more particularly. Thus Brutus being standing Captaine of the Guards could cast out Tarquine: Thus Sejanus had meanes to attempt against Tiberius, Otho to be the Rivall of Galba, Casperius Aelianus, of Nerva; Cassius, of Antoninus; Perennis, of Commodus; Maximinus, of Alexander; Philippus, of Gordian; Aemilianus of Gal∣lus, Ingebus, Lollianus, Aureolus, of Gallienus; Magnesius of Constantius; Maximus, of Gratian; Arbogastes of Va∣lentinian; Ruffinus of Arcadius; Stilico of Honorius. Goe from the West into the East, upon the death of Marcianus, Asparis alone, having the command of the Armes, could prefer Leo to the Empire: Phocas deprive Mauritius of the same, Heraclius depose Phocas, Leo Isaurius do as much to Theodosius Adramyttenus; Necephorus, to Irenes; Leo Armenius, to Michael Curopalates; Romanus Lagape∣nus, to Constantine, Nicephorus Phocas to Romanus Puer; Johannes Zismisces to Nicephorus Phocas; Isaac Comnenus, to Michael Stratioticus; Botoniates to Michael the Sonne of Ducas, Alexius Comnenus to Botoniates; which work continued in such manner till the destruction of that Em∣pire. Goe from the East unto the North. Gustavus at∣tained unto the Kingdom of Sweden, by his power and command of an Army, and thus Secechus came neer to supplant Bolessaus the third of Poland. If Wallesteine had lived, what had become of his Master? In France, the race of Pharamond was extinguished by Pipin, and that of Pipin in like mannner, each by the Major of the Palace, a standing Magistracy of Exorbitant trust. Goe to the Indies: You shall find a King of Pegu to have been thrust out of the

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Realme of Tangue by his Captaine Generall. Nay goe where you will, though this be pretty well, you shall adde more than one Example. But as to the Praevaricator, if he were not given to make such mouths as eate up nothing else, but his own words, I needed not have brought any other Testimony to absolve a Common-wealth of malice in this order than his own, where he saith, that when some person over-tops the rest in commands, it is a disease of Monar∣chy which easily admitts of this cure, that he be reduced unto a lesse volume, and levelled unto an equality with the rest of his Order. Now a Prince can no otherwise Levell a Noble Man, that excells the rest through Command, unto equality with his order, then by causing those of the same Order to take their turnes in like command. Good witts have ill Memoryes. But, saith he, I know not what advantage Mr. Harrington may foresee from the orders of this Rotation, for my part I can discover no other effect of it then this, that in a Common-wealth like that of Oceana, taking in the Many (for in Venice he confesseth it to be otherwise) where every man will presse forward toward Magistracy, this Law by tak∣ing off at the end of one year some Officers, and all at the end of three will keep the Republick in a perpetuall Minority. No man having time allow'd him to gain that Experience; which may serve to lead the Common-wealth to the understanding of her true interest either at home or abroad.

What I have confessed to be otherwise in Venice, I have shewn already at least so far as concerneth the present Occasion, the causes of that defect being incompatible with a Common-wealth consisting of the many; otherwise why was not the like found in Athens or Rome, where though eve∣ry man pressed forward towards Magistracy, yet the Magi∣strates were, for illustrious Examples, more in weight and Number, than are to be found in all the rest of the world.

If where Elections were the most exposed to the ambi∣tion of the Competitor, and the humours of the People they yet failed not to excell all others that were not Popu∣lar, what greater vindication can there be of the Naturall integrity of Popular suffrage even at the worst? But this, where it is given by the Ballot, is at the best, and free

from all that pressing for Magistracy in the Competitor, or faction of the People that can any wayes be layd unto the former; or let the Considerer consider again, and tell me by what meanes either of these in such a State can be dan∣gerous or troublesome, or if at worst the orders for Ele∣ction in Oceana must not perform that part, better then a Crowd and a Sheriff. Well but putting the case the Ele∣ctions which were not quarrell'd much withall be rightly Stated; yet this Law for Terms and Vacations by taking off at the End of One year some Officers, and all at the end of Three, will keep the Republick in perpetuall Minority, no man having time allowed him to gain that Experience, which may serve to lead the Common-wealth to the understanding of her true interest at home or abroad. Because every Man will presse forward for Magistracy, therefore there ought not to be Termes and vacations, least these should keep the Com∣mon-wealth in perpetuall Minority. I would once see an Argument that might be reduced to Mood and Figure. The next Objection is, that these Orders take off at the end of One year some Officers, which is true, and that at the end of Three years, they take off all, which is false; for whereas the Leaders of the Common-wealth are all Tri∣enniall, the Orders every year take off no more then such onely as have finished their three yeares terme, which is not all but a Third part. Wherefore let him speak out; three years is too short a Term for acquiring that knowledge, which is necessary unto the leading of a Com∣mon-wealth. To let the courses of Israel which were Monethly, the Annuall Magistracyes of Athens and Rome go. If three years be too short a Term for this purpose, what was three moneths? A Parliament in the late Go∣vernment was rarely longer liv'd then three moneths, nor more frequent then once in a year, so that a Man having been twelve years a Parliament man in England, could not have born his Magistracy above three years, though he were not necessarily subject unto any Vacation. Where∣as a Parliament-man in Oceana may in twelve years have born his Magistracy. fix, Notwwithstanding the Necessity of his Vacations, which of these two are most streightned in the time necessary unto the gaining of due experience or

knowledge for the leading of a Common-wealth? Neverthe∣lesse the Parliament of England was seldome or never without Men of Sufficient skill and ability; though the Orders there were more in Number, lesse in Method, not written and of greater difficulty then they be in Oce∣ana: There, if not the Parliament man, the Parliament it self was upon Termes and Vacations, which unto a Council of such Nature is the most dangerous thing in the world, seeing dissolution, whether unto a body Naturall or Po∣liticall is death. For if Parliaments happened to rise again & again, this was not so much coming unto themselves, (see∣ing a Council of so different Genius hath not been known) as a New birth and a Councill that is every year New∣borne indeed must keep a common-wealth in perpetnall Minority or rather Infancy; alwayes in danger of being overlaid by her Nurse, or strangled by her Guardian: whereas an Assembly continued by Succession or due Rotation regu∣lated by Terms giving sufficient time for digestion, growes up, and is like a Man, who though he change his flesh neither changeth his body, nor his soul. Thus the Senate of Venice changing flesh, though not so often as in a Com∣mon-wealth consisting of the Many were requisite, yet of∣tenest of any other in the world, is, both in Body and Soul or Genius, the most unchangeable Councill under Heaven. Flesh must be changed or it will stink of it self; there is a Terme necessary to make a man able to lead the Common-wealth unto her interest, and there is a Terme that may inable a Man to lead the Common-wealth unto his interest. In this regaurd it is, that (according to Mamerous) the Vacations are (mazima libertatis custo∣dia) the Keepers of the Libertyes of Oceana.

The three Regions into which each of the leading Coun¦cills, is divided, are three formes (as I may say) in the Schoole of State, for them of the Third (though there be care in the choice) it is no such great matter what be their skill: The Ballot which they practised in the Tribe being that in the performance whereof no Man can be out, and this is all that is Necessary unto their Novitiate or first year, during which time they may be Auditors: by the Second, they will have seen all the Scenes, or the whole

rotation of the Orders, so facile, and so intelligible, that at one reading a Man understands them as a Book, but at once Acting as a Play, and so Methodicall, that he will remember them better. Tell me then what it is that can hinder him for the second year from being a Speaker; or why for the third, should he not be a very able Lead∣er.

The Senate and the Prerogative, or representative of the people, being each of like constitution, drop annually four hundred, which in a matter of ten yeares, amount to four thousand experienced Leaders, ready upon new electi∣ons to resume their leading.

Another thing which I would have considered, is, whe∣ther our most Eminent Men found their parts in Parlia∣ment, or brought them thither. For if they brought them, think you not the Military Orders of the youth, the Disci∣pline of the Tribes, the eight years Orb of the Embassa∣dors, the Provincial Armies of Oceana, likely to breed Men of as good parts, as no such matter? Nor have Astro∣nomers that familiarity with the Starrs, which Men with∣out these Orbs will have with such as are in them. He is very heavy, who cannot perceive that in a Government of this frame, the Education must be Universal, or diffused throughout the whole Body. Another thing which is as certain, as comfortable, is that the pretended depth and difficulty in matter of State, is a meer cheat. From the be∣ginning of the World unto this day, you never found a Common wealth, where the Leaders having honesty e∣nough, wanted skill enough to lead her unto her true interest at home or abroad: that which is necessary unto this end, is not so much skill as honesty, and let the Leaders of Oceana be dishonest if they can. In the leading of a Common∣wealth aright; this is certain, wisdom and honesty are all one, and though you shall finde defects in their vertue, those that have had the fewest, have ever been, and for ever shall be the wisest.

Rome never ruin'd, till her ballance being broken, the Nobility forsaking their ancient vertue, abandoned them∣selves unto their lusts; and the Senators, who as in the Case of Jugurtha, were all bribed, turned knaves; at which

turn, all their skill in Government, (and in this never men had bin better skilled) could not keep the Common wealth from over-rurning. Cicero (an honest man) labour'd might and main. Pomponius Atticus ano∣ther, despaired: Cato tore out his own bowels, the Poig∣niards of Brutus and Cassius, neither considered Prince nor Father. But the Common wealth had sprung her Planks, and spilt her ballast, the World could not save her.

For the Close, the Praevaricator, who had judged before, that There was much reason to expect, some of the Clergy (a∣gainst all of whom, Mr. Harrington hath declared Warre) will undertake the quarrel: tells me in the last line, that There be unto whom he hath recommended the disquisition of the Jewish Common wealth.

It is a miserable thing, to be condemned unto the per∣petual Budget; once turn an honest man to me. In the mean time, that it may be farther seen, how much I am delighted in fair play, it being, so belike, that some Di∣vines are already at work with me, and I have not so fully explained my self upon that point, which with them is of the greatest concernment, that they can yet say, they have peept into my Hand, or seen my Game; as I have won this trick, Gentlemen, or speak, so I play them out the last card in the next Book for up.

Notes

• Ocean. p. 22.
• Grot.
• Pol. l. 2. c. 7.
• 1 Chron. 27.
• Grot. ad locum.
• 1 Chron. 13.
• Gror. è. Tertul.
• 1 Chron. 25.
• 1 Chron. 28. 2.
• 1 Chron. 29. 22.
• Kings 1. 23.
• 1 Kings 12.
• 1 Chr. 9. 29.
• Num. 4.
• Poll. L. 4. C. 14.
• Epitome of the Athenian Com∣mon wealth.
• Petit. de Leg. Att.
• Cic. pro Flac.
• Ulpian ad Phil. 1.
• Pollux. L. 8. C. 8.
• L. 8. C. 16.
• Dem. Phil. 1.
• Pollux, l. 8. c▪ 9.
• Epitome of the Common∣wealth of Venice. The great Council.
• The Senate.
• The Colledge.
• The Signiory.
• Certain Rights of the Councils.
• Consid. p. 93.
• Rotation, of Oceana.
• Consid. p. 90.
• Liv. l. 9.
• Florus. l. 2. c. 18.
• Consid. p. 91.
• Consid. p. 91.
• Consid. p. 91.
• Match. Discor. B. 3. Ch. 24.
• Liv. b. 9.
• Consid. p. 92.
• Mamercus apud. Liv. l. 4.
• 2 Sam. 3. 39.
• Arnisi.
• Consid. p. 47. 48.
• Consid. p. 93.
• Oceana, p. 213.
• B. 2. 9.
• Consid. p. 36. p. 94.