A general collection of discourses of the virtuosi of France, upon questions of all sorts of philosophy, and other natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris, by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent.

II. Whether all Sciences may be profitably reduc'd to one.

Upon the Second Point it was said, That the desire of know∣ing is very charming; but mans life is too short to satisfie the same, unless the great number of Sciences be reduc'd into one, their multitude requiring a volumn to contain their names alone, and this with their length being the principal causes of the little fruit gather'd from them, and the distaste which they beget. The way of abridgment would be to retrench out of each all matters unprofitable, or not pertaining to the Science,

as are most Metaphysical Questions which are treated of in Lo∣gick; Natural, in Medicine; Moral, Natural, and Juridical, in Divinity, to avoid repetitions: And thus the fifth and sixth Books of Euclid might be reduc'd into one, since in the latter he demonstrates by number what before he had demonstrated by lines; yea, the 117 Propositions of his tenth Book might be demonstrated in another order, and compris'd in less then thirty; as the five following Books, the three of Candalus, the Sphericks of Theodosius, the Conicks of Apollonius, the Princi∣ples of Archimedes, and others, which make above 500 Propo∣sitions, might be reduc'd profitably to less then a hundred. But above all, 'twould be requisite to be careful of laying down good Principles, and teaching these Sciences with order; and for this purpose to retrench all unprofitable Books, whose nume∣rousness causes confusion, and is now more hurtful then their scarcity was heretofore; according to Justinian's example, who reduc'd all the Law-books of his time into two Volumns, the Di∣gests and the Code; and that of the Jews, who compris'd all things that can be known in one single Science call'd Cabbala, as the Druids did their Disciplines under certain Maximes and Aphorisms; and Raimond Lullie's Art teaches to know and speak of all things; which might be done, if instead of spending the fittest time of our Age (as we do unprofitably) in learning to speak Latine and Greek, we employ'd it, by the example of the Ancients, upon the Mathematicks, History, and all Sciences de∣pending more upon memory and phancy then solidity of Judg∣ment, which might afterwards be form'd in a short time by Lo∣gick, in order to its being exercis'd in the knowledg of things natural, supernatural, and moral; which might easily be ob∣tain'd in less then five years, if all superfluities were retrench'd.

The Second said, Because the possibility of a thing must first be understood, before the means of attaining it sought, 'tis re∣quisite first to agree whether all Sciences are reducible into one, before the ways to do it be inquir'd. And although at first sight it seem possible, because they presuppose one another, and there is such a connection in their principles that some depend upon the demonstration of others; yet I conceive this re-union of all into one would seem rather a monster, or a thing like the confusion and disorder of the ancient Chaos, then a true and legitimate Discipline. For 'tis easier to destroy the present method then to establish a better. Moreover, how is this union possible, since the foundations and principles of Sciences are controverted by the Masters who profess them? For setting aside those indemon∣strable principles which are very few, and need only be heard that they may be granted, and may be learn'd in less then an hour; if we make an induction through all the Sciences, we shall find nothing certain in them. Has Morality, whose chief object is Beatitude, found one sole point wherein to establish it? Are not part of Aristotle's opinions overthrown by Galen? who

on the other side is counter-check'd by Paracelsus and all the Chymists, who pretend to cure diseases by their likes, as the former doth by their contraries? Law, being founded upon the instability of humane will, hath as little certainty: And Divi∣nity it self, which is the Science of Verities, is divided by the Sects of the Nominals, of Scotus, and Thomas; not to speak of the Heresies which incessantly assault it. And if we compare it to other Sciences, it overthrows most of their Principles, by establishing the Mysteries of Faith. This is it which made the wisest of men, and who perfectly understood all Sciences, to say, That they were but vanity: And were this union possible, he hath so highly recommended sobriety of knowing, that 'twould be a kind of intemperance to desire to know every thing, no less presumptuous by exceeding the bounds set by God to each of our capacities, then ridiculous, by attempting to make a neces∣sary and infallible thing of many contingent and uncertain, and not yet agreed upon.

The Third said, That Unity, which is one of the Transcen∣dents, co-eternal and co-essential to Good, ought to be the at∣tribute of all good things, and consequently of Discipline, which likewise being the good of the Understanding, which is one, cannot be comprehended by it, but by their becoming con∣formable the one to the other. If any reply, That 'tis enough that things enter into it successively, and so need not be one, (which would be inconsistent with their nature); I answer, That the series and order which is found in those things belongs to one single Science; otherwise they would have no conection together, and by this means could not be made use of to pur∣pose. And since all our Notions depend one of another, our Discourse being but a continual Syllogism, whose Conclusions depend upon the Premises, it follows, That the Syllogism being the subject but of one Science, they all pertain but to one Sci∣ence; whence Philosophy is defin'd the knowledge of things divine and humane; that is to say, of every thing. Indeed, since all moral Virtues are so connected together, that 'tis im∣possible to possess one without possessing all; the Sciences (which are the intellectual virtues) must be streightly united like∣wise; and the more, for that they have but one most simple sub∣ject, to wit, the Uderstanding. And since the means of Being are the same with those of Knowing, every thing that is in the world having the same Principles of existence must also have the same principles of knowledg, and so make one sole Science; because Sciences differ only by reason of their principle; all which too depend upon one Metaphysical principle, namely, That one and the same thing cannot be and not be; which proves all others; and therefore it follows, That there must be one sole Science general, comprehending all the rest. For to say, That every several manner of handling a thing makes a distinct Science, is to imitate him who would make an Art of every

Simple. Lastly, Nature would not have given us a desire of knowing every thing, if this desire could not be accomplished: But it is impossible to be so, whilst the Sciences remain so dif∣fuse as they are at present.