A general collection of discourses of the virtuosi of France, upon questions of all sorts of philosophy, and other natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris, by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent.

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A general collection of discourses of the virtuosi of France, upon questions of all sorts of philosophy, and other natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris, by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent.
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Bureau d'adresse et de rencontre (Paris, France)
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London :: Printed for Thomas Dring and John Starkey, and are to be sold at their shops ...,
1664.
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Subject terms
Philosophy, French -- 17th century.
Science -- Early works to 1800.
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"A general collection of discourses of the virtuosi of France, upon questions of all sorts of philosophy, and other natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris, by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A70920.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 4, 2024.

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CONFERENCE XXXI.

I. Whether the Life of Man may be prolong'd by Art. II. Whether 'tis better to be without Passion then to moderate them.

I. Whether the Life of a Man may be prolong'd by Art.

THe duration of a motion or action cannot be known, unless the measure of it be known; nor can they be measur'd unless they have known bounds. Whence neither can it be

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known whether the Life may be prolong'd, without knowing before-hand how long it lasts. Now 'tis impossible to know this duration. For, not to mention the long lives of the Fathers in the two first thousand years of the world, God told Noah, that the age of Man should be no more then but sixscore years. Moses and David restrain it to seventy or eighty. And yet as there are at this day some who come near a hundred, so there are a hun∣dred times as many who do not attain thirty. And whereas no body can speak of Death by experience, because they who speak of it have not felt it, and they who have felt it cannot speak of it more; the case is the same concerning Life. Let a Man, by good order, or the use of remedies, live as long as he will, it will not be believ'd that his life ha's been prolong'd; but, on the contrary, that his hour was not yet come. Nevertheless 'tis no less consistent with reason, to say, that he who would infallibly have dy'd of a Gangrene which invaded his Legg, and thereby the rest of his Body, hath had his life prolong'd by cut∣ting off his Legg; or that he who was wounded in the crural vein, at which all his blood would have soon issu'd forth, ha's been secur'd from death by the Chirurgion, who stop'd the blood; then to believe, as we do, that a Rope-maker lengthens his rope by adding new stuff to that which was ended; that a Gold-smith makes a chain of Gold longer by fastning new links to it; that a Smith causes his fire to last more by putting fresh coals to it. And as, in all this, there is nothing which crosses our Reason; so if a sick man, who is visibly going to dye, receives help, and escapes, do's he not owe the more glory to God for having not onely cur'd him by the hands of the Physitian, or by spiritual Physick alone, but also prolong'd his Life, as he did to King Hezekias, whose Life was lengthened fifteen years, and of which our age wants not example? If it be objected that this may hold in violent deaths, whereof the causes may be avoided, but that 'tis not credible that a decrepit old man, who hath spun out his Life to the last, can continue it; the nature and Etymology of the radical moisture not admitting a possibility of restauration; I answer, that reasons taken from the original of words, are not the strongest; and that besides there are roots which endure more, and others less, according as they are well or ill cultivated. And if the reason drawn from contraries be considerable, being many poysons are so quick that they corrupt the radical moisture in an instant, ought we to conceive Nature so much a step-dame as that she hath not produc'd something proper to restore it? And that Humane Industry is so dull and little industrious in the thing which Man desires most, which is long Life, that it cannot reach to prepare some matter for the support, yea, for the restauration of that Original Humidity? Considering that we are not reduc'd to live onely by what is about us, as Plants and Plant-animals do, but all the world is open and accessible to our search of Aliments and Medicines.

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Moreover, we have examples not onely of a Nestor who liv'd three ages; of an Artephius who liv'd as many, and many more; and the Herb Moly, the Nectar and Ambrosia of the Poets, which kept their gods from growing old, may well be taken for a figure of the Tree of Life, which was design'd for separation of this Humidity, but also of compositions proper to produce that effect. Yea, were it not actually so, yet 'tis not less possible; and God hath not in vain promis'd as a Reward to such as honour their Superiors, to prolong their dayes upon the earth.

The Second said, If Medaea found Herbs, as the Poets say, to lengthen the Life of Aeson the Father of Jason, the Daughters of Aelias miscarried of their purpose. Indeed every thing that lives needs Heat for exercising its Actions, and Humidity to sustain that Heat; the duration of this Heat in the Humidity is Life, which lasts as long as the one is maintain'd by the other; like the lighted wiek in a Lamp. Now Nature dispenses to every one from the Birth as much of this Heat and Moisture as she pleases, to one for fifty, to another for sixty, seventy, eighty years or more; which ended, the stock is spent. Physick may husband it well, but cannot produce it anew; Aliments never repair it perfectly, no more then Water doth Wine, which it increases indeed, but weakens too, when mingled there∣with.

The Third back'd this Suffrage with the opinion of Pythagoras, who held that our Life is a strait line; that the accidents which disturb it, and at length bring Death, constitute another; and accordingly (saith he) as these two lines incline less or much towards one another, Life is long or short; because the Angle of their incidence, and at which they cut, which is our Death, happens sooner or later; and it would never happen, if these two lines were parallel. Now the meeting of these two lines can∣not be deferr'd or put off.

The Fourth said, 'Twere a strange thing if Humane Art could repair all other defects of the Body and Mind, excepting that whereof there is most need, and all Ages have complain'd, Brevity of Life. For our Understanding hath much less need of an Art of Reasoning, our tongue of an Art of speaking, our legs of dancing, then our Life of being continu'd, since 'tis the foundation of all the rest. Besides, Physick would seem useless without this. For though it serv'd only to asswage the pains of diseases, (which is a ridiculous opinion) yet it would thereby protract the time of Death, to which pain is the way.

The Fifth said, That for the preservation of Life, 'tis requi∣site to continue the marriage of Heat and moisture, Death al∣wayes hapning immediately upon their disjunction, and leaving the contrary qualities in their room, Cold and Dryness. Now to know how Heat must be preserv'd, we must observe how 'tis destroy'd. And that is four wayes I. By Cold, which being moderate, fights with it; but violent, wholly destroyes it.

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II. By suffocation, or smothering, when the Pores are stop'd, and the issue of fuliginous vapours hindred: Thus Fire dyes for want of Air. III. By its dissipation, which is caus'd by hot medicaments, violent exercise, and immoderate heat of the Sun or Fire: Whence proceeds a Syncope or Deliquium of the Heart. IV. By want of Aliment, without which it can no more last a moment, then Fire without wood or other combustible matter. All agree that the three first Causes may be avoided, or at least remedied. And as for the Fourth, which is doubled of, I see nothing that hinders but that as the spirits of our bodies are per∣fectly repair'd by the Air we incessantly breathe; so Aliments, or some Specificks, as, as amongst others, Gold dissolv'd in some water not corrosive, may in some manner restore the fewel of our Heat. And seeing there are found burning Mountains, in which the Fire cannot consume so much matter apt for burn∣ing, but it alwayes affords it selfother new, which makes it sub∣sist for many Ages: Why may not a matter be prepar'd for our Natural Heat, which though not neer so perfect as that which it consum'd, (for were it so, an Animal would be immortal) yet may be more excellent then ordinary Aliments, and by this means prolong our Lives. And this must be sought after, not judg'd impossible.

The Sixth said, That Life consisting in the Harmony and pro∣portion of the four first qualities, and in the contemperation of the four Humours; there's no more requir'd for the prolonging of Life, but to continue this Harmony. Which may be done, not onely by a good natural temper, but also by the right use of external things; as pure Air, places healthful and exposed to the Eastern winds, Aliments of good juice, sleep sufficiently long, exercises not violent, passions well rul'd, and the other things; whose due administration must prolong Life by the same reason that their abuse or indiscreet usage diminishes it.

The Seventh said, That Life consists in the salt which con∣tains the Spirit that quickens it, and is the preservative Balsame of all compounds. The vivifying Spirit of Man is inclos'd in a very volatile Armoniack Salt, which exhales easily by Heat, and therefore needs incessant reparation by Aliments. Now to pre∣serve Life long, it is requsite to fix this volatile salt; which is done by means of another salt extracted by Chymistry, which is not onely fix'd, but also capable to fix the most volatile. For the Chymists represent this salt incorruptible in it self, and com∣municating its virtue to other bodies: Upon which account they stile it Quintessence, Aethereal Body, Elixir, and Radical Balsame, which hath a propriety to preserve not onely living bodies many Ages, but dead, from corruption.

II. Whether 'tis better to be without Passions then to moderate them.

Upon the Second Point, it was said, Tranquility of Mind, the scope and end of Moral Philosophy, is of three sorts. The I. is call'd Alaraxic, and is in the Understanding, whose judgement it

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suspends, and is not mov'd with any thing; which was the end of the Scepticks. The II. is in the Reason, which regulates the Passions of the Sensitive Appetite, and is term'd Metriopathy, or moderation of the Passions. The III. is the Apathy of the Sto∣icks, in which they constituted their supreme Good; which is an Insensibility, Indolence, and want of Passions, attributed by the envious to a Melancholy Humour, or to Ambition and Cyni∣call Hypocrisie. For the Melancholy Man seeking solitude as the Aliment of his Phancy, and the Element of his black Hu∣mour, (which is the step-dame of Virtues) by thinking to avoid external Passions, remains under the Tyranny of internal, which he dares not vent, but covers like Fire under ashes. This mask'd Sect shuts the fore-door indeed to the Passions, but opens the postern. They passionately desire to shew themselves with∣out Passion. And their vanity appears in that they affect to ap∣pear unlike the rest of Men, by casting off humane sentiments and affections, as Charity and Compassion, which they account vitious. But instead of raising themselves above Men, they degrade themselves below beasts, by depriving themselves of the indifferent actions which are common to us with them: Actions which Reason ought to regulate indeed, but not wholly reject. And as the supreme Region of the Air receives Exhalations to inflame them, and make shining Comets, but is free from Hail, Thunder, Winds, Rains, and other Meteors which are made in the Middle Region; so Reason ought to receive the notices of the Sensitive Appetite which are called Passions, to make use of them; but 'tis to moderate them, and hinder the disorder caus'd by them in the Sensitive Appetite, which is the Middle Faculty of the Soul. In fine, as Eagles and Dolphins, which are in the tempests of the Winds and Sea, are yet more to be esteem'd then Moles, Wormes, and other creeping things which live in holes; so he who is agitated with Passions much surpas∣ses him who hath none at all. Nor is there any body but desires rather to be froward then stupid and insensible. And if Insensi∣bility be a Virtue, then stocks and stones and inanimate bodies would be more happy then we.

The Second said, Since Passion is an irregular motion of the Sensitive Appetite, call'd therefore Perturbation, it alters the state of the Soul: Whence Anger and Fear hinder us from per∣ceiving what is visible, and Hatred or Love pervert the Judge∣ment; for which reason we desire that a good Judge be without Passion. What a disease is to the Body, whose actions it hurt∣eth, that are the Passions to the Soul. Wherefore to ask whe∣ther the Soul is happiest without Passion, is to question whether the Body is most at ease without sickness; and, to moderate in∣stead of extirpating them, is to palliate a disease instead of cu∣ring it; and to inquire of a Pilot whether a Tempest be more proper for Navigation then a Calm. Moreover, the happiest condition of Man is that which comes nearest Eternal Bliss, in

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which we shall have no Passions; the superior and rational part having subdu'd the inferior or sensitive. And Aristotle holds, that the Heroes or Demi-gods are exempted from them.

The Third said, 'Tis to derogate from our Senses, to say, with the Stoicks, that the Passions which we feele proceed onely from the depravation of our judgements. For what they call diseases of the Mind, is meant of those which are inordi∣nate, and not of those which are moderate and fram'd by the level of Reason. 'Tis therefore expedient to moderate, them, but not wholly extinguish them, though it were possible. Now that it is impossible, appears, because they are appurtenances of our Nature, and the actions of the Sensitive Faculty, which is part of our selves. And our Lord not having renounc'd these appendances of our Humanity, hath thereby manifested that they are not vicious. Besides, the first motions are not in our power, and therefore 'tis impossible totally to extirpate them. But though we could, we ought not, because they are altogether necessary; as appears in that, I. Without the Passions there would be no Virtues, for the Passions are the Objects of Virtues; Thus Temperance moderates Pleasure and Pain, Fortitude re∣gulates Boldness and Fear. II. They sharpen them. Thus Anger serves to heighten Courage, and Fear augments Pru∣dence. III. They preserve an Animal. Thus Pleasure incites Animals to feed and generate, and Grief makes them avoid what is noxious, and recur to remedies, even in spiritual di∣stempers; in which to be insensible of Grief is to be desperate.

The Fourth said, If Men were void of Passions, they might be lead to Virtue with much more success and less trouble. For they would not be averted from it by the contrary motions of their Passions, which hurry them with so great violence, that all that the most virtuous endeavour to do, is, to swim against the Torrent, and repress its impetuous course: Upon which they unfruitfully spend their time, which might be farr better employ'd in performing virtuous actions, when the rebated Passions (introducing an agreeable evenness in their Humours, with a firm Constancy in their Manners, accompany'd with a laud∣able indifference in their Desires) would allow reason more means to incite them to the exercise of Virtues. For Men having their Eyes unvail'd of the sundry affections which blind them, would more perfectly know the True Good, and consequently pursue it by a shorter and surer way. And though they were not lead to Sensible Good with so much ardour, nor decline Evil with so much horrour, yet they would do both with more reason. So that, what Men do now by a motion of the Sensitive Appetite, they would do then by a principle of Virtue. For the difficulty found in attaining a total privation of Passions seemes indeed to surpass our strength, yet thereby sets forth the excellence of the Atchievement.

The Fifth said, He that were exempt from all Passions, would

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be as unhappy as he that should always endeavour to bridle them. But the former is impossible, and the latter no less diffi∣cult then to walk upon a rope, where the least false step pro∣cures a dangerous fall. For we quit our passions, but they quit not us; as the thought of young maidens follow'd a good fa∣ther even into his Hermitage. And he that goes about to tame them, is the true Sisyphus, upon whom the stone which he thrusts away incessantly revolves. The first would be without joy, without which nevertheless a man cannot be happy. The second would be without rest, because he would be in perpetu∣al combat and inquietude, wherewith felicity cannot consist. I conceive therefore (morally speaking) there's more felicity in gently giving the bridle to one's passions, and following his in∣clinations: although this opinion may well consist with Christi∣an Philosophy in good-natur'd persons, or such as have acquir'd a good temper by good examples, who may innocently follow their inclination, because it will lead them only to vertuous, or, at least, indifferent things. And for the vicious, 'tis cer∣tain the evil which they do not by reason of the repugnance which they have to it, and the fear of punishment, cannot be imputed to them for vertue, nor consequently make them happy.

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