A general collection of discourses of the virtuosi of France, upon questions of all sorts of philosophy, and other natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris, by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent.

I. Of Causes in General.

HE who spoke first, said, That the word Cause must not be confounded with that of Reason, though it seemes so in our manner of Speech; because an Effect serves sometime for a Reason to prove its Cause. As when I am ask'd the reason by which I know that Fire is Light; I Answer, By its ascending upwards; which is the Effect of Fire, and the proof but not the Cause of its lightness. Cause also differs from Principle, because every Cause is real, and imparts a being different from its own; which Pri∣vation (being a Principle) hath not: And so every Cause is a Principle, but every Principle is not a Cause. Now a Cause is That which produceth an Effect. There are Four; Matter, Form, the Agent, and its End. Which Number is not drawn from any real distinction between them; Seeing many times one and the same Thing is Form, Agent, and End, in several respects. So the Rational Soul is the Form of Man, the Efficient Cause of his Ratiocination, and the next End of the Creation. But it is drawn from the four wayes of being a Cause, which are call'd Causalities; whereof one susteineth the Forms, to wit, the Matter, An Other informeth that Matter, and is the Form; A Third produceth that Form, and uniteth it to the Matter, and is the Agent, or Efficient Cause; The Fourth by its goodness exciteth the Agent to act, and is the Final Cause.

The Second said, That the Causes are handled diversly, ac∣cording to the diversity of Sciences. The Logician speaks of them so far as he draws from them his Demonstrations, Definitions, and Probable Arguments: The Natural Philosopher, inasmuch as they are the Principles of all kind of Alterations hapning in na∣tural bodies: The Metaphysitian, as Cause is a Species of Entity, which is generally divided into Cause and Effect: In which consi∣deration Supernatural Things have also some Causes, but not all. Wherefore, in my Judgement, said he, Cause taken in general cannot be divided into the Four Species above men∣tion'd; because Spirits have no Material Cause: but it ought to be first divided, in reference to Immaterial things, into Efficient and Final; and into the four abovesaid, in respect of Material. That Efficient Cause is the first principle of Motion and Rest, and is of two sorts; viz. Ʋniversal or Equivocal, and Particular or Ʋnivocal. The former can produce several effects of different Species, whether it depend not on any other, as God, and is then call'd the First Cause; or depend on some other, and is call'd a Second Cause; As the Sun, which together with Man generates

Man. The Particular (otherwise, Univocal) Cause is that which produceth one sort of effect alone; As Man generateth Man. The Material Cause is that of which something is made. The Formal Cause is that which causeth the Thing to be that which it is, whether Essentially, as the Soul makes the Man; or Accidentally, as a round form makes a Bowle. The Final is that which incites the Agent to act: as Gain doth the Merchant to Traffick.

The Third said, Matter and Form being parts of the whole cannot be Causes thereof; because then they would be Causes of themselves; which is absurd. Neither is the End a Cause, but onely the term and rest of the Cause; Besides, there are some Ends which are impossible to obtain, and are nothing of reality, such as a Cause ought to be; as when Heliogabalus propounded to himself to become a Woman, others to fly, to become invi∣sible, and the like absurdities. So that there is but the Efficient Sole Cause of all Things, which is the Internal Idea in God, which is nothing else but that Fiat which created the World. 'Tis that very Cause which produceth all things in all different times and places, and acts upon Art, Nature, and Nothing; whence it is that All Entity, conformable to that Increated Exemplar, beareth those three Characters, Truth, Goodness, and Ʋnity, which all things are bound to represent, under the Penalty of be∣coming Nothing, out of which they were produced. 'Tis a Circle (according to Trismegist) whose Centre is every where, and Circumference no where; which possibly mov'd Galen to term Man the Centre of Mixt Bodies; and all Antiquity, a Little World; and made Saint Thomas say, that Man hath been united hypostatically to God the Son, who is the Idea of the Father, for the rejoyning of all the productions of the world to their first Principle. Here he fell into Divinity, but he was admonish'd to observe the Rules appointed by this Assembly, to keep as far off as possible from such Matters; and so he ended, when he had mention'd the order that is observ'd in the actions of that Idea, (which said he) acteth first upon the Intelligences as nearest approaching to its pure Nature; they upon the Heavens, these upon the Elements, and these upon mixt bodies.

The Fourth added, That that Idea is a Cause not onely in Na∣tural Things, but also in Artificial. As in the building of a House, the Idea which the Architect hath in his Mind excited his Will, and this commands the Motive-faculty of the Members, or those of his Laborours, to dispose the Stones, Timber, and Morter; which entring into the Composition of the Building, cannot (for the Reason above-mention'd) be Causes of it, as neither can the proportion and form.

An Other said, That if the Idea be a Cause, (which cannot be but in Artificial Things) it must be the Formal, and not the Effi∣cient; since it is nothing else but an Original, in imitation of which the Artificer labours; and since the work derives its form from that Idea which is the Copy.

It was added by a Sixth, That the Idea is not Cause, but the true Essence of Things, and the first objective Verity which precedes all Knowledge Humane, but not Divine; and is onely hereby distinct from Nothing, in that it is known by God: which suteth not with Nothing, from which any thing cannot be distin∣guish'd; but it must be, if not in Act, at least in Power.

The Seventh, amplifying touching Ideas, said, That upon the Knowledge of them depend all Sciences and Arts, but especially all what Men call Inventions, which are nothing less then such; because 'tis no more possible to invent some thing new, then to create some substance, and make some thing of nothing. But as all things are made by Transmutation, so no Novelty is produc'd by Imitation, either of things which are really existent, or which our Mind frames and connects; as of a Mountain and Gold, it makes a Golden Mountain. Thus the four most Excellent Inventions of the Modern Ages; The Compass, the Gun, Printing, and Perspective-glasses; the two former were de∣riv'd from Experiments of the Load-stone, from the effect of shooting Trunks and Fire. As for Printing, what is the Matrice wherein the Founders cast their Characters, or those Characters compos'd in a flat Form, as also Copper-cuts, but a perfect Ex∣emplar and Idea, which is communicated fully to all its in∣dividuals? And Perspective-glasses are nothing but ordinary ones multiply'd.

Another said, That Causes cannot be known at all; whence it comes to pass that we have no certain Knowledge; Now to know, is to know a thing by its Causes. For the Ʋniversal Efficient Cause is above us, and surpasseth the capacity of our Under∣standing; and hence all the other inferiour and subordinate ones are unknown, because their Cause is not known. The Final is not in our power, and being not so cannot be known, because knowing presupposeth being. Formes and Specifical Differences are hidden to us. The Matter is so unknown, and so little a thing, that even Aristotle could not define it, saving by what it is not, or by Analogy and Proportion to other things; But since Propor∣tion cannot be but between two things equally known, and the First Matter being not so, (so much as the Wax, to which, for Example, it is compar'd) our Mind cannot comprehend that Analogy.

The Ninth said, That the Elements (which he held to be the First Matter) are ingenerable and incorruptible; Mixt Bodies be∣ing nothing else but those Elements united in sundry fashions. That this Harmonical Ʋnion and Symmetry is the form of Mixts, which is nothing but a certain Mode or Fashion of Being: Whence in all kind of Generation, there being no Substantial Mutation, but onely a Conjunction and Separation of the Elements, there is no other Cause but their Matter. Which is thus prov'd to be the First; because if there be a second granted, then as Brass, being the Matter of a Statue, that Brass must have another

Matter, and this is a Third, and so to Infinity; unless one First be acknowledg'd.

The Tenth said, That if a Material Cause be admitted, the Three other must be admitted also. For Matter naturally desir∣ing Formes, it is alter'd from one into another, and that Altera∣tion cannot arise from it self: For Nothing is altered by it self but by an other. It comes then from some Agent which moves that Matter, and which is the Efficient Cause; which cannot do any thing in vain, but for some End, and this is the Final Cause. This End is in Natural Things the same with the Form, and dif∣fers not from it but according to our manner of Understanding. For the End of Generation is the Form of the Thing generated; and that very Formis the End of Generation. Wherefore, admit∣ting the Matter, the other Three cannot be excluded.