A general collection of discourses of the virtuosi of France, upon questions of all sorts of philosophy, and other natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris, by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent.

II. Of the End of all Things..

The Second Hour was imploy'd in discourse touching the End; concerning which it was said, First, that End may be taken as many wayes as Beginning; Improperly, for the corruption of some thing (therefore, saith Aristotle, Death is not an End, but a terme) Properly, 'tis the Good whereunto all things tend; and 'tis either first (as, to make a medicine) or last (as to cure.) Things which can tend to this End are divided into four Classes. Some are furnish'd with Reason, but not with Sense; as the Angels or Intelligences: Others have Reason and Sense, as Man: Others have Sense without Reason, as Brutes: Others have neither Sense nor Reason, as all the rest of the Creatures. Onely the two former Agents, namely, Angel and Man, act formally for some End; because they alone have the four conditions requi∣site for so doing; viz. 1. Knowledge of the End; 2. Knowledge of the Means which conduce thereunto; 3. A Will to attain it; And 4. Election or Choice of those Means. Others act indeed for it, but improperly; as the Spider and the Swallow, though they frame onely by a natural Instinct, the one its Web, the other its Neast, yet attain their End; and the Stone is carried by its own weight to its Centre, which is its Good; but with∣out the above-mention'd conditions.

The Second went about to prove that some of those Animals, which we account void of Reason, Act formally for their End. For, said he, not to mention the Elephant, recorded by Plutarch, who divided his Oates in his Master's presence, as to shew him that he had but half his allowance usually given him; or that other who carried his Kettle to the River, and fill'd it with wa∣ter, to try whether it had not a hole in it; Nor the Ox, who never went beyond the number of buckets of water which he was wont to draw; Nor the Fox, which layes his Ear to the Ice to listen whether the water moves still underneath, before he trust himself upon it; Nor the Hart of Crete, which runs to the Dittany, and, as they say, with that herb draws the Arrow out of his flesh: Is it not for the good of its young that the Swallow distills into their Eyes the juice of Celandine, with which she re∣covers their sight? From whence Men have learnt to make use of that herb against the filme of the Eye. Have we not Horses which let themselves blood? Ha's not the Dog election of all the wayes, whereof he chooses onely that which his Master went, who (with all the goodly prerogatives that he ascribes to him∣self above him) cannot do so much as his Dog? And though the Example be familiar, do we not see Domestick Animals

whom the Apprehension of beating keeps often from doing the mischief to which their natural inclination leads them: Which is, not onely to know an End, but amongst many to choose the best.

The Third reply'd, That these Examples evidence the dexte∣rity of Man's wit; who knows how to apply them to his own purposes: But, in reality, it belongs not to a Brute, what ever advantage it may get by commerce with Man, to know its End as an End: Because the End is that which measures the Means; a Mean (Medium) being not the better for that it is greater, but for that it is fitter proportion'd to its End. So when Hippocrates cures the Cramp with cold water, the Cure is not less excellent then if he did it with potable Gold. Now this Comparing and Measuring is a work of the Understanding.

The Fourth said, As all other Lights disappear at the Sun's, so all the other Ends must give place to the Last, which is the Supreme Good, or, Felicity: Which being either Natural or Su∣pernatural, and this latter inexpressible; It seems that the pre∣sent Exercise ought to terminate in the former, namely, Natu∣ral Felicity. This Beatitude, in what ever thing it is found, (for Saint Augustine reckons above eight hundred Opinions about it, and yet more may be added to the number) consists in the most excellent Action of Man, which cannot depend but upon the no∣blest Faculties, the Understanding and the Will. The Action of the former is to Ʋnderstand; That of the Latter is to Will. The Felicity then of Man consists in Ʋnderstanding well, and in Willing well, or Loving; For the pleasure of Enjoyment is but the relishing of this Felicity, not the Felicity it self, as some have thought, with Epicurus, who is to be blam'd onely in this regard: For it is neither true, nor credible, that a Philosopher could so much forget himself as the vulgar imputes to him, to place the Supreme Good in Pleasures, even the foulest and grossest.

The Fifth maintain'd, That it was unprofitable to speak of a Thing which is not; Meaning, that pretended worldly Felicity which Men onely fancy; and to that Induction which Solomon makes of all the things in which Men seek their contentment in vain, he added Authorities holy and profane; to shew that there is nothing happy on all sides; and that Solon had reason to say, That Felicity is not to be found in this Life.

The Sixth reply'd, That what is said of the Miseries of this corruptible Life, compar'd with the beatitude of the other eter∣nal, ought not to be confounded and taken absolutely. That the contentments of the one cannot be too much vilifi'd, in re∣spect to the ravishments of the other; of which the Pagans themselves had knowledge enough (though under several names) by the sole Light of Nature, to cause them to make the Fiction of the Elizian Fields; in comparison of which they held that there was nothing but unpleasantness in this world. But as the barbarousness of some Ages past is not to be compar'd with

the Politeness and Learning of this (and yet there was alwayes some or other amongst them that pass'd for an accomplish'd Man) so because there is a great Felicity in Heaven, it is not to be infer'd that there is none at all upon Earth. Besides, we might (contrary to the receiv'd Maxime) accuse Nature of ha∣ving made some thing in vain, by Imprinting in Man that de∣sire of becoming happy in this world, if he cannot be so.

The Seventh said, That a Man is not happy by possessing some Excellent Thing, but by the satiating of his desire. And therefore if (which is impossible) a happy Man should desire some greater Good, he were no longer happy. As on the contrary, he who can satisfie himself with the least Good, is nevertheless happy. For 'tis the correspondence or sutableness which makes a Good to be e∣stemed such. A Good may content the Appetite without reflecti∣on; but ifthe conditions of the Enjoyment be reflected upon, it will suffice for the rendring it perfect, that the Imagination ex∣empt it from all imperfection, and attribute all the Prerogatives to it which the Will desires in it; although it deceive it self.

The Eight defined, The Supreme Good, (after Aristotle) The Action of the most perfect Virtue, (which is Wisedom and Pru∣dence) in a perfect Age and a long Life, accompani'd with the Goods of the Body and of Fortune, viz. Health, Beauty, Nobility, Riches, and Godly Children. Not that the Felicity which is call'd Formal consists in these Goods; but they serve for instruments and orna∣ments unto it, as 'tis hard for a sick Man to become Learned, and for a poor to exercise the Virtues of Liberality and Magnisicence.

The Ninth said, That in Morality the General Propositions are easier to be assented to, then the Particular; Yea, that there are many to which all the world assents in general termes; As, That Virtue ought to be Loved. For then we willingly em∣brace it wholly naked. But by reason of the difficulties which ac∣company it, Opinions become divided. The Prudent, who knows how to moderate his Passions, willeth it; The Inconti∣nent, who pleaseth to let himself be hurried by the torrent, willeth it not; And denying in the retail what he before approv'd in the gross, contradicts himself. Another willeth and willeth it not, because he willeth it too faintly, or doth not sufficiently avoid the occasions which lead to Vice. Thus all the world agrees, That it behoveth to render to every one that which belongs to him; but in the Application, the honest Man doth so, the dishonest doth the contrary. There is not the Man but confesseth, That the End ought to be prefer'd before the Means which conduce to that End; But one takes for an End that which another takes for a Means. The Covetous (and indeed most Men) take Riches for the End, and Virtue for the Means. On the contra∣ry, the Good Man takes Riches for the Means, and Virtue for his End. In my Judgement, the true Felicity of Man in this world comprehendeth the Goods of the Mind, as the End; the Goods of the Body and Fortune onely as the Means.

There was none in the Company but seem'd to have a Mind to speak something to this great Question; of which, out of this Conference, even every particular Man daily passeth Judge∣ment without speaking. For he who forgets all things else, for the acquiring of Honour or Riches, or for the taking of his Pleasure, doth he not imply that he maketh the same his Supreme Good? He that entreth into a Religious Order, doth he not seek the same in Religion? And so of others. But for that the Second Hour was slipt away, the Company proceeded to deter∣mine the matter to be treated of at the next Conference; which was, for the First Hour, Of Causes in General. And because there is observ'd in some, even the most equitable, an ardour in maintain∣ing their Judgements, though every one was sufficiently warn'd that this place is to have no disputings, and that none is oblig'd to uphold what he hath said with new Reasons, (our sentiments here being all free;) It was propos'd, for the second point, to be particularly inquir'd, Why every one desires to have his own Judge∣ment follow'd, though he have no interest therein.

The Hour design'd for Inventions began with the Report made by the Commissioners nominated at the last Conference for examining the Book containing the Method of Teaching the Liberal Disciplines by Playing; The Report was, That the Author seem'd very capable of performing it, the Discourse being written in a good stile; That he evidently prov'd that the thing is Practicable; as well in respect of the Method it self, which seemes feasable, as the Masters of the Play, and the Disciplines. But for that he discover'd his meaning onely in the Art of Teaching to read and write, and not in the other Disci∣plines, they could not give their Judgements upon more then what appear'd to them; and so much they lik'd and approv'd.

Then an Other presented a Latine Poem, Entitl'd, Fulmen in Aquilam, containing, in Twelve Books, Twelve Thousand Heroick Verses, in which was compriz'd the Life, Atchievments, and Death of the King of Sweden; Having first Remonstrated to the Company that the great reputation of these Conferences brought him from his own Country to this City, that he might correct, refine, and polish his work, by the censure of so many great Wits as met there; Conceiving there is no better way to write things for lasting, then to pass them under the Judgements of many. Whereupon Commissioners were assigned to him for that end, into whose hands he deliver'd his Work.

After which, to shew that something has a Beginning, and yet no End; Another offer'd to make appear the Experiment of a Perpetual Motion, if the matter could be kept from decaying.

A Third answer'd, That making it of Glass, the matter would be Eternal, Glass being the last Product of Nature; And that thence the Conjecture is probable that the Earth will be vitrifi'd by the last Conflagration, and by that means become diaphanous and resplendent. And thus ended this Conference.

Notes

• Nihil est ex omni parte beatum.