Essays of Michael, seigneur de Montaigne in three books : with marginal notes and quotations and an account of the author's life : with a short character of the author and translator, by a person of honour / made English by Charles Cotton ...

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Title
Essays of Michael, seigneur de Montaigne in three books : with marginal notes and quotations and an account of the author's life : with a short character of the author and translator, by a person of honour / made English by Charles Cotton ...
Author
Montaigne, Michel de, 1533-1592.
Publication
London :: Printed for M. Gillyflower and W. Hensman ... and R. Wellington ... and H. Hindmarsh ...,
1700.
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Subject terms
Montaigne, Michel de, 1533-1592.
Cite this Item
"Essays of Michael, seigneur de Montaigne in three books : with marginal notes and quotations and an account of the author's life : with a short character of the author and translator, by a person of honour / made English by Charles Cotton ..." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A70610.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 3, 2024.

Pages

Page 511

CHAP. L.

Of Democritus and Heraclitus.

THE Judgment is an Utensil proper for all subjects, and will have an Oar in eve∣ry thing: Which is the reason, that in these Essays I take hold of all occasions. Where, though it happen to be a subject I do not ve∣ry well understand, I try however, sounding it at a distance, and finding it too deep for my stature, I keep me on the firm shoar: And this knowledge that a Man can proceed no further, is one effect of its Vertue, even in the most inconsidering sort of Men. One while in an idle and frivolous subject, I try to find out matter whereof to compose a Body, and then to prop, and support it. Another while I employ it in a noble subject, one that has been tost and tumbled by a Thousand Hands, wherein a Man can hardly possibly in∣troduce any thing of his own, the way being so beaten on every side, that he must of neces∣sity walk in the steps of another. In such a case, 'tis the work of the Judgment to take the way that seems best, and of a Thousand Paths, to determine that this or that, was the best chosen. I leave the choice of my Argu∣ments to Fortune, and take that she first pre∣sents me; they are all alike to me, I never de∣sign to go through any of them; for I never see all of any thing: Neither do they who so largely promise to shew it others. Of a hun∣dred

Page 510

Members and Faces that every thing has, I take one, one while to look it over only, a∣nother while to ripple up the Skin, and some∣times to pinch it to the Bones: I give a Stab, not so wide, but as deep as I can; and am for the most part, tempted to take it in hand by some absolute gracefulness I discover in it. Did I know my self less, I might prhaps ven∣ture to handle something or other to the bot∣tom, and to be deceiv'd in my own inability, but sprinkling here one word, and there ano∣ther, Patterns cut from several Pieces, and scatter'd without design, and without en∣gaging my self too far, I am not responsible for them, or oblig'd to keep close to my sub∣ject, without varying at my own liberty and pleasure, and giving up my self to doubt and incertainty, and to my own governing Me∣thod, Ignorance. All Motion discovers us. The very same Soul of Caesar, that made it self so Conspicuous in Marshalling and Com∣manding the Battle of Pharsalia, was also seen as Solicitous and Busie in the softer Affairs of Love. A man makes a Judgment of a Horse, not only by seeing his Menage in his Airs, but by his very walk, nay, and by seeing him stand in the Stable. Amongst the Functions of the Soul, there are some of a lower and meaner Form, who does not see her in those Inferiour Offices, as well as those of Nobler Note, never fully discover her; and perad∣venture, she is best discover'd, where she moves her own natural pace. The winds of Passions take most hold of her in her highest

Page 513

flights; and, the rather, by reason that she wholly applys her self to, and exercises her whole Vertue upon every particular subject, and never handles more than one thing at a time, and that not according to it, but ac∣cording to her self. Things in respect to themselves, have peradventure their Weight, Measures and Conditions; but when we once take them into us, the Soul forms them as she pleases. Death is Terrible to Cicero, Cove∣ed by Cato, and Indifferent to Socrates. Health, Conscience, Authority, Knowledge, Riches, Beauty, and their contraries, do all strip them∣selves at their entring into us, and receive a new Robe, and of another Fashion, from eve∣ry distinct Soul, and of what Colour, Brown, Bright, Green, Dark; and Quality, Sharp, Sweet, Deep, or superficial, as best pleases them, for they are not yet agreed upon any common▪ Standard of Forms, Rules, or Pro∣ceedings; evey one is a Queen in her own Dominions. Let us therefore no more excuse our selves upon the External Qualities of things, it belongs to us to give our selves an account of them. Our good or ill, has no other dependance but on our selves. 'Tis there that our Offerings and our Vows are due, and not to Fortune: She has no power over our Manners, on the contrary, they draw, and make her follow in their Train, and cast her in their own Mould. Why should not I Censure Alexander; Roaring and Drinking at the prodigious ate he sometimes us'd to do? Or, if he plaid at Chess, what string of his

Page 514

Soul was not touch'd by this idle and Childish Game? I hate and avoid it, because it is not Play enough, that it is too grave and serious a Diversion, and I am asham'd to lay out as much Thought and Study upon that, as would serve to much better uses. He did not more pump his Brains about his Glorious Expediti∣on into the Indies; and another that I will not name, took not more pains to unravel a pas∣sage, upon which depends the safety of all Mankind. To what a degree then does this ridiculous Diversion molest the Soul, when ll her Faculties shall be summon'd together upon this Trivial Account? And how fair an oppor∣tunity she herein gives every one to know▪ and to make a right Judgment of himself? I do not more throughly sift my self in any o∣ther posture, than this. What Passion are we eempted from in this insignificant Game Anger, Spite, Malice, Impatience, and a v∣hement desire of getting the better in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 con∣cern, wherein it were more excusable, to be Ambitious of being overcome: For to be E∣minent, and to excel above the common rate in frivolous things, is nothing graceful in a Man of Quality and Honour. What I say in this Example, may be said in all others. Eve∣ry Particle, every Employment of Man, does Exalt or Accuse him, equally with any other▪ Democritus and Heraclitus were Two Philoso∣phers, of which, the first finding Humane Condition Ridiculous and Vain, never ap∣pear'd abroad, but with a Jeering and Laugh∣ing Countenance: Whereas Heraclitus Com∣miserating

Page 515

that Condition of ours appear'd always with a Sorrowful Look, and Tears in his Eyes.

—Alter Ridebat quoties à limine moverat unum Protuleratque pedem, flebat contrarius alter.
One always, when he o'er his Threshold stept, Laugh'd at the World, the other always Wept.

I am clearly for the first Humour; not because it is more pleasant to Laugh, than to Weep; but because it is Ruder, and expresses more Contempt, than the other; because I think we can never be sufficiently despis'd to our de∣sert. Compassion and Bewailing, seem to im∣ploy some Esteem of, and Value for the thing Bemoan'd: Whereas the things we Laugh at, are by that exprest to be of no Moment or Re∣pute. I do not think that we are so Unhap∣py, as we are Vain, or have in us so much Ma∣lice, as Folly; we are not so full of Mischief, as Inanity: Nor so Miserable, as we are Vile and Mean. And therefore Diegenes, who past away his time in rowling himself in his Tub, and made nothing of the Great Alexander, esteeming us no better than Flies, or Bladders put up with Wind, was a sharper, and more penetrating, and consequently in my opinion, a Juster Judge, than Timon Sirnam'd the Man••••••ter; for what a Man Hates he lays to Heart: This last was an Enemy to all Mankind, did positively desire our Ruin, and avoided our

Page 516

Conversation as dangerous, proceeding from Wicked and Deprav'd Natures: The other valued us so little, that we could neither trou∣ble, nor infect him by our Contagion; and left us to Herd with one another, not out of Fear, but Contempt of our Society: Conclu∣ding us as incapable of doing good, as ill. Of the same strain was Sta••••lius his Answer, when Bruts Courted him into the Conspira∣cy against Caesar: He was satisfied that the E∣terprize was Iust; but he did not think Me∣kind so considerable, as to deserve a Wise Mn's Concern: According to the Doctrine of Hege∣sias; who said, That a Wise Man ought to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nothing but for himself, foramuch as he only was worthy of it: And to the saying of T••••••∣dorus, That it was not reasonable a Wise Man should hazard himself for his Country, and ••••••danger Wisdom, for a company of Fools. Ou Condition is as Ridiculous, as Risible.

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