Scepsis scientifica, or, Confest ignorance, the way to science in an essay of The vanity of dogmatizing, and confident opinion : with a reply to the exceptions of the learned Thomas Albius / by Joseph Glanvill ...

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Title
Scepsis scientifica, or, Confest ignorance, the way to science in an essay of The vanity of dogmatizing, and confident opinion : with a reply to the exceptions of the learned Thomas Albius / by Joseph Glanvill ...
Author
Glanvill, Joseph, 1636-1680.
Publication
London :: Printed by E. Cotes, for Henry Eversden ...,
1665.
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Subject terms
White, Thomas, 1593-1676.
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800.
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800.
Cite this Item
"Scepsis scientifica, or, Confest ignorance, the way to science in an essay of The vanity of dogmatizing, and confident opinion : with a reply to the exceptions of the learned Thomas Albius / by Joseph Glanvill ..." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A70185.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 1, 2024.

Pages

[A.] Aliud offendiculum est complurium Modernorum effraenis impudentia, qui Aristotelem—pag. 7.

[G.] I Am glad to find my learned Assailant justifying all my censures of the Modern Aristotelians; only he accuseth them of one fault which I seldom find among them, viz. modesty in proposing their opinions; which our Authour inveighs against as a criminal diffidence. But for my part I think the greatest number of that spirit can plead Not guilty to the accusation. And for those of them that are less assured in their sentiments, I should not reckon it among their crimes, to be wary and sparing of assent in notions so lubricous and uncertain, as are those they deal in. Though I confess, to keep such voluminous ado about acknowledg'd uncertainties, is a very reprehensible vanity. And doubt∣less the unprofitable toyes of these later Peripateticks, have offended many against that Philosophy. But whether most of them are not the genuine derivations of the Hypothesis they claim to, may without difficulty be determin'd by any that will consider the natural flatulency of that aery scheam of notions. And I think they have no great reason to pretend to ingenuity or judgement, that accuse Aristotle for the faults of his Sectators. But from this last period of sence, I desire chiefly it may be noted, that our learned Author pleads not for the Modern Aristotelianism, which yet obtains in most of the Schools of Christendom: All the advantage I shall make of which at present is to question, Whether the reseuing men from an over fond value of such small wares, and the preventing the expence of time and

Page 7

pains upon such solemn trifles, as our Philosopher deserved∣ly calls them, be like to be a prejudice to their persuits of more useful Knowledge, and the Furtherance of Science?

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