Golden remains of Sir George Freman, Knight of the Honourable Order of the Bath being choice discourses on select subjects.

PHYSIOLOGIA: Or the Nature of EXTERNALS briefly discuss't.

BElzebub the Lord of Flies (as his Name signifies in the He∣brew) is with his swarms of revolted spirits continually buzzing about the Souls of Men, and suggesting to our minds falsities for truths: perswading us, that not In∣ternal, but External things are the matter of true Pleasure, that so cau∣sing us to erect our hopes upon a rotten foundation, at the time of our death when that shall fail, the stru∣cture may fall to the ground, nay, much lower, even into the Abyss of despair.

The sad issues of this suggestion, are much promoted by our Essential consistency of Spirit and Body: the material, and bodily part always dis∣posing us to the pursuance of Out∣ward things, contrary to the appro∣bation of the Intellectual. But since the depravation of Mans Will by the fall of Adam, we are united to Er∣rour, and need not a Tempter to lead us out of the way; for both the Principles of our Being do now dis∣pose us to wrong Objects: therefore to lay open this grand Fallacy, it be∣ing in a matter of so great concern∣ment, as is the Eternal happiness or perdition of Men; let us examine what is requisite to the constituting of true Pleasure. To the making up then of true and real Pleasure, I shall lay down these three Conditions as requisite: First, That the Object be suitable to the Soul. Secondly, That the Soul be put into Fruition of this suitable Object. Thirdly, That the perpetuity of this Fruition be ensur'd to it. Now let us enquire, whether

External things, considered simply in themselves, and not relatively, as they have respect to greater ends, have these three Conditions in them, or no. First then: Is any External thing an Object suitable to the mind of Man? I answer, That no External thing is: because they all want two Qualifications which are requisite to make an Object suitable to the mind; the first of which is, That it be con∣geneal and of the same nature with the Soul: that is, a substance imma∣terial, or spiritual. The second, that it have in it a sufficiency to gratifie all the Appetites of the Soul. First, No outward thing is immaterial, or spiritual, for a spiritual substance comes not within the notice of our senses: and though in Scripture we read of the appearing of Angels, as three to Abraham, two to Lot, one to Cornelius, another to S^t Peter: yet this must be suppos'd to have been by the assumption of bodies, to which they were united, not essentially, but occasionally, and pro tempore: for in

other places the Scripture tells us what their natures are; calling them Spirits, Psal. 104. vers. 4. Heb. chap. 1. vers. 14. and although I find no decisive Text, for that Opinion of the Church of Rome, that there is a Tutelary, and a seducing Angel, at∣tending upon every Man and Wo∣man, and likewise Children, which was indeed held amongst the Hea∣then, under the terms of bonus, and malus Genius; yet it speaks indefi∣nitely, Heb. 1. 14. that they are all mi∣nistring Spirits for the Elect: but not∣withstanding their presence appears not to them, when they come in their own Natures. So likewise the Souls of Men are not within the no∣tice of our senses, being Spirits, and incorporeal substances, as Angels are: for which we have the testimony of Scripture; Man was made after the Image and Similitude of God. But since the sense of these words, Image and Similitude, is much controverted in the Schools, let us look into the twelfth of the Hebrews, at the ninth

verse, Furthermore, we had fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence, shall we not much rather be in subjection to the Father of Spirits, and live? where Souls are called Spirits in opposition to flesh. Besides the Testimony of Scripture, we have a demonstration of their na∣ture in the death of every Man, for though the Soul be separated from the body, yet the standers by see it not: we hear nothing but the groans of the dying person caus'd by the mo∣tion of Parts; we feel nothing but a coldness in the extremities of the bo∣dy, caused by the cessation of moti∣on; we smell nothing but a putrid savour caus'd by the corruption of humours, neither do we tast any thing: On the contrary, all out∣ward, and corporeal things are ob∣vious to some one of our senses: for instance; though we cannot hear the Light, we can see it; though we can∣not see the Air, we can feel it; and though we taste not the white of an Egg, yet we can see it, or feel it;

and though we cannot smell a piece of Glass, yet we can likewise see it, or feel it; and so of all material things that are at a due distance from the organs of our sense. And here before we look into the second thing requisite, let us examine why it is ne∣cessary that the Object be of the same nature with the Soul. Thus then; the Soul of Man being immaterial, that which makes it happy by the fruition of it self, must likewise be immaterial, for as it is a fundamental in Physick, that Nutrition is made by Similaries: so likewise is this as∣sertion true in the Metaphysical com∣placency between the Soul, and the Object; it cannot receive a proper supply from any thing that doth not bear an affinity with it in its sub∣stance, and qualities. This recipro∣call delight between Parties is disco∣verable in every species of Created Beings, and in every action in Na∣tura naturata. In Physicks, flame and flame embrace one another; but a furious conflict ariseth from the

convention of fire and water: in Mo∣rals, goodness accords with goodness, but vice will not be suffered to dwell with virtue: and in the Metaphysi∣cal action of the contemplation of the Soul, we see experimentally, that she cannot content her self with in∣feriour Objects, but is still seeking to her self some more excellent matter of delight: which desires of the mind intelligent men may take notice of in themselves, if they will be self-observers. This appetite of the Soul, is the reason why Solomon was not contented with all his clusters of de∣lights; though he turn'd over the whole world, as it were, yet he ar∣rived not to the summ of his desires, but still there remained in his spirit, an appetite after something more than any exteriour thing could furnish him withall: so that at last he openly proclaims them all to be (excuse the catachresis) but full of emptiness. Se∣neca saith of Augustus Caesar, that he delighted to talk of laying down the Scepter, and of betaking himself to a

recluse life. And we read that the Emperour Charles the fifth resigned up the Low-Countries and Burgun∣dy, and afterward all the rest of his Dominions, to his Son Philip in his life-time. And of the Emperour Theo∣dosius, that he delivered up the charge of the Empire to his two Sons Arca∣dius, and Honorius, though with power to resume it, which he never did: and many other precedents of the same kind doth History present us withall, of which it is reasonable to think, that it was not only the trou∣bles which usually attend Crowns, caused this in them (others being de∣puted to bear the greatest burdens in that kind) but rather, that all their enlargements could not present them with any thing agreeable to those se∣cret appetites of their minds: and this dissatisfaction there is in all the entertainments of sense: by which it appears, that the great capacities of the Soul can never be filled up with these lean, and scanty Objects: and whiles that Capacity is unsupplyed,

there will be a coveting of those things which are the proper Objects of its nature, and so long as there is that appetite, the mind cannot be said to enjoy true pleasure. But here I expect to have it objected to me, That upon this account, the Virtu∣ous Man, as well as the Sensualist, cannot be said to enjoy true Plea∣sure, because the former as well as the latter, hath not while he is in the body his appetite satisfied: To this I answer, That when the mind is once set right, and hath made a choice of that which is intrinsecally good, and suitable to its nature; im∣mediately it begins to enjoy true Pleasure: because although it do still desire more, yet doth it not covet any thing better or of a more excel∣lent nature, than it hath already tast∣ed of, so that the desires of the mind are stopt quoad rem; because it doth not covet any thing contrary to, or desperate from what it hath already pitch't upon; but not quoad mensu∣ram rei, because it desires to be put

into a full fruition of that, which it now enjoys but in part: upon which account the Kingdom of Grace and Glory, seem not to me to differ o∣therwise than gradually; so that the Spiritual man hath something of that he desires, but not all: yet so much as he hath sufficeth to bring him true Pleasure; though not to make up the integrality of it: while the Sen∣sual Man pursuing a wrong Object, cannot possibly while he doth so, ar∣rive at true pleasure. The second thing requisite to constitute, or make an Object suitable to the mind, is, that it have wherewithal to gratifie all the appetites of the Soul: but no external thing can accommodate the mind with more than it hath in it self, that is, it cannot entertain it with spiritual delights: how far short will it prove then of satisfying the Soul with all it is capable of in spiri∣tuals? this being more than any crea∣ted Intelligence can administer to it: for though we find many excellen∣cies in Angels, and the Souls of Men,

by the reason that they are intelligent Natures, yet they have not that suf∣ficiency in them which is requisite to an Object that is in all respects sui∣table to the mind; which must not only present it with something spiri∣tual and incorporeal, but likewise with whatsoever it can covet within the genus of spiritual and immaterial existencies; and this nothing can do, but that satiating Plenitude, which is only to be found in God: which appears to be true by that propensity which Men of large apprehensions have to enquire into those remote Truths which yet they cannot see clearly into: there is a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Rom. 1. 19. which hath such a Magnetick virtue in it, that it is al∣wayes drawing the Soul towards it self, neither will the Spirit of Man be ever at rest, till it be united to the Son of God, and put into a full frui∣tion of the Deity. How do we hear even young Students wrangle about the dividing of a body into so small parts, and that it is not capable of

further division? for not conceiving how it can be, that so long as there remains something in quantity, that quantity should not be capable of being separated, at least Intellectu, though not Actu, and yet not under∣standing how a body can admit infi∣nite separations, they are still search∣ing into this Abstrusity which remains with God. What Battologies have we about Free-will and respective Decrees? not being able to distin∣guish between the precognition of God, and his concurrence of voliti∣on, or necessitation? how are we prying into the mystery of the In∣carnation? into the nature of the Trinity? there are certain 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which S^t Peter speaks of to be in S^t Pauls Epistles; which although they are things hard to be understood, yet are we still coveting to comprehend them; which aspirations of the Soul do shew, that it was created for mat∣ters of a higher concernment, than any created substance can furnish it withall from themselves: for such

things are to be found only in God, inhesively, or subjectively, but they may be communicated to us by An∣gels, who know them either by ac∣quisition, or divine infusion: and these tendencies of the mind, are ar∣guments to me, that the Soul of Man is capable of apprehending those ab∣stracted Truths, which it so covets to know while it is in the body; because our pressing to know, seem's to me to be an immediate effect, of our wanting, or being ignorant of something which our minds are com∣prehensive of: and therefore Beati∣fied spirits cease to desire more, be∣cause their capacities are fill'd; which is perfect Happiness ad modum reci∣pientis. But it may be objected, That the Angels which fell desired to be equal with God, but it was impos∣sible it should be so, therefore we must not measure our capacities by our desires. To this I answer: First, that I do not believe they ever did, be∣cause, it must seem to be below the extent of their knowledge, which

reached to so vast a height, to enter∣tain with the least hopes such a chil∣dish Ambition, but rather that their Lapse did arise from a spleen, and malice to God for advancing Man∣kind so high: or if it could be so: we must distinguish between an un∣due, and vitious, and a natural, or necessary act of the will: I'le sup∣pose their's to have been an audaci∣ous, and arbitrary willing of that which was ipso facto destructive to their happiness; but these propen∣sities of our Souls, which God hath so infused into us, that we cannot suppress them, are continual willings as it were against our wills, and are therefore natural, and to be account∣ed of, as the effects of our present defective state, and these I am indu∣ced to believe, will hereafter attain to, what they have strain'd for here. But not to make any farther digres∣sion: Let us enquire into the second thing requisite to true Pleasure, which is fruition. It is not enough that there is in nature an Object sui∣table

to the mind, but there must be such an application of it to our persons, as may make us true Pos∣sessors of it: and here I cannot say exclusively, that there is no fruition in the Pleasures of sense, for were there not, the Devil would have no train at his heels, but they will be found to be very inconsiderable, and equivalent with none at all. And first let us consider the Glutton, who makes not that the end of eating which he should, namely the support of his natural life; as S^t Au∣gustine, Hoc mihi docuisti, ut quemadmodum Medica∣menta sic Alimenta sumpturus acce∣dam: How soon doth his sweet bit pass over the threshold of his tongue, and then his Pleasure is over for that morsel, consisting but in ipso transi∣tu; and although he puts in another, and another, yet it cannot be long e're his stomack will be filled, and then he must cease repeating it, till Nature or Art have disposed of the Load after a Scene of sick Qualms:

in the mean time the whole Machine is out of frame, especially the Brain which can least be spared, and he fitter to converse with the same Spe∣cies of Creatures wherewith he hath filled his paunch, than with Men to whom he bears but an outward re∣semblance in the manner of his ex∣tension, and figure of his body. How momentany is the lascivious man's de∣light! he looks on a Woman, and lusts after her: if he gain not his purpose, her face is looked upon by him, with an impetuous Lust, and discomposure at her Chastity, so that her presence is a positive torture to him: if he gains her consent; his furious lust hurries him to that be∣stial act, where his fruition like a flash of lightning, dies in its birth, even in the midst of an impatient de∣sire. Aristotle speaking of Venereal pleasure, says, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Animum non exerceri in illâ. So likewise the Miser, how narrow is his Heaven! he procures his Money with

bodily pains, hazard, and base sub∣mission; and the far greater part of his time being usually run out before he comes into his Kingdom, his reign is very short; and although the fear of not arriving to it, be vanisht, yet the fear of loss, which is greater, rises up in the place of the former, besides the apprehension that so small a part of his life remains to him, for the enjoyment of what he has procured with so much difficulty. The Ambi∣tious man what enjoyment has he? who after much busling in the world, many dangers escaped, much expence it may be of his purse, gains his Mi∣nion Honour, and then holds it in Pride, which is a great pain to him that gives entertainment to that Vice; because his Reverence seldom, or ne∣ver answers his expectation: for the Wise and Virtuous, (who are the ve∣nerable part of the world) cut off their respects to him, out of a just disesteem of his Person, or it may be out of charity to him; that the dis∣regard he meets with, may be to him

as a Julep, to allay the Feaver of his Pride; giving him only precedency, his Title, and the compellations be∣longing to it, out of Duty to the King who hath conferred them upon him. From the immorigerous Nobi∣lity and Gentry, 'tis likely he receives none at all; because their uncultiva∣ted stoutness will not stoop to any circumstances of observance; and as for the common scrapings that are made to him, he values not those sub∣missions, because of the meanness of the Honourers; it being a good Mo∣ral Thesis, that, Honor est in hono∣rante. And now for the good Fel∣lows (as they are call'd,) what Plea∣sure have they? By the raising of the Animal spirits to an undue pitch, they draw down their Souls; the Soul and the Body being in this case like a pair of Buckets in a Well; as one rises, so t'other sinks, and being fallen from the delight of a sober Speculation, to the pitifull ticklings of an imperti∣nent mirth; what with broils, ari∣sing from mistakes incident to such

fantastick converses, or else the sur∣prize of a drowzy intoxication, he hath very little time to enjoy his loss; Intemperantia desinit in nihil, saith S^t Chrysostome; Intemperance ends in nothing, or at least in no good, which in the sense of the Schools, is nothing: but those pri∣vations, or nothings, will I presume in the end, from the sad consequen∣ces that issue immediately from them be concluded to be positive, and that Mens Souls are not positively damn∣ed for doing nothing. But here it may be objected: That although there be little, or no pleasure in ex∣cess, yet in the moderate use of out∣ward things there is. To this I an∣swer: that there is indeed more, but even this will be found to be very inconsiderable: For External things considered as they stand alone, (un∣der which notion I still consider them in this discourse) and being not cho∣sen in reference to greater ends, yield but very little Fruition to their In∣cumbents. And one cause of this is,

in that they alwayes glut the mind by reason of the deficiency of their being. If a man would please the sense of seeing by looking upon a handsome Woman; when his eye by often repeated searches (since all the lineaments of Beauty were ne∣ver confined to the precincts of one face) hath discovered all the attracts, and impresses, with all the variati∣ons of Aspects occasioned by the dif∣ferent motives either from within, or from outward objects, till at last he is entertained with nothing but fre∣quent returns of what he had seen before, the disposedness of the mind to a perfect object, makes him covet to see some circumstance of Beauty, which is not comprehended within the Scene of that Womans person: from whence presently ariseth dissa∣tisfaction, namely from the objects insufficiency which is inconsistent ei∣ther with the duration or solidity of Pleasure. Therefore Conjugal fi∣delities, are restraints put upon the

mind, whereby a man resolving to comply with the Divine Will, re∣scinds the irregularities of his own. If we run through the whole series of outward things we shall find them so: whereas on the contrary, as Se∣neca tells us, Magis Veri∣tas elucet, quo saepius ad manum venit: The more we converse with Truth, the more we are delighted with it. Again, Outward things have an∣other great perplexity in them, which the Sensua∣list often meets with, a∣rising from the Multiplicity of them: and that is, many of them present themselves to him at once, and though they all differ from one an∣other in their kinds, yet many times they are equal in their attractiveness, and influence upon him; so that many times he is put to a stand con∣cerning his Election, which is a pain to him because it detains him from Union; for where there is a love of any thing, there is a desire of being

united to it: but after a troublesom pause, the mind fixeth upon one: not because there is a decision made of the question, and that the debate is ended, which of them deserves most; but because it is better to en∣joy one than none: so that all the rest of them, being equally approved of, he carries the Idea's of them all in his fancy, though he do actually enjoy but one: which Impresses and Images in the Phansie, being many in number, and likewise fresh, and lively, draw him as forcibly to those which he hath left (their number, and the lively traces of them which remain in the Memory, being oppo∣sed to this one, though present) and thus is he set upon a Rack in the midst of his fruition, and so much the more, because the present enjoy∣ment falls short of expectation: which is another evil in outward things, that they never give so much as they promise: for which there are two reasons: The first is, à parte Animae,

because the preliminary, and fore∣going apprehensions, which the Soul hath before enjoyment, do ever an∣ticipate more excellency and solidity than is to be found in the object. The second reason is à parte Rei, be∣cause all outward things are more in appearance, than they are in experi∣ment, and acutual probation: the rea∣son is, because the Soul looking on them in their approach, and doting on the gains which is coming to∣wards her, concludes they are as thick in substance, as ravishing in their anterior fairness; but after they have met, and embraced, she finds, that they are both in haste to be gone, and are but a bare frontispiece of Beauty; like the Portraictures of Kings and Queens, painted upon a flat, which behind, are nothing but dusty canvase. Another thing which doth much lessen the pleasure of them, is, that the Soul in her reflex actions, is still accusing her self, and thus expostulating with her

self: Why am I thus conversant a∣bout transient things? how long have I sought for true pleasure, and satis∣faction in them but cannot find it? certainly I was design'd for matters of a higher concernment; since I find I can look above them, and be∣yond them: how do I dishonour those noble Objects, and injure my self in descending to these mean en∣tertainments? These and the like contrariant thoughts, are a great al∣lay to those imaginary pleasures, and being mixt with the enjoyments, give them a very disgustfull relish. These circumstances well considered, will I suppose very much shrink up that bulk of delight, which to the abu∣sed fancy seems to be united to out∣ward things before enjoyment: even within the limits of Moderation, when it is distinct from Virtue. Let us now look into the third Postula∣tum, or circumstance required to make up true pleasure, which is the certainty of its Duration. The death of all men is so confirmed to us by

Arguments à parte ante, besides the Physical reasons which are produced for the necessity of it, that he that should question the continuation of it à Parte post, may carry about him his Phantastick head, to dispute it by himself, till it be laid at rest in its own Grave, to receive conviction. Here then the question is, Whether the Sensualist hath any firm ground of hope for a reversion of his plea∣sures after Death. The Alchoran makes fair promises to Mahomet's dis∣ciples, that they shall meet with sen∣sual Pleasures again in the next world, and if any Voluptuous man shall presume to urge the authority of it, he is but that in profession now, which he was before in Pra∣ctice: But I do assert the contrary, that it is impossible, that the Sensua∣list should be re-estated in the same Species of delight, in which he so∣laced himself during his temporal life, or in any other, from reasons Physi∣cal, Moral and Theological. First then; the body will most certainly

at its re-union with the Soul, exist after a manner as much different from this which is temporal, as to be eternally durable, differs from being dissoluble, or in a state of corrupti∣on: for eternal duration being that Divine Boon which shall be confer∣red upon the Totum Compositum, the entire person of man both Soul and Body; the Body which is the mate∣rial part, and which will be the In∣strumental or intermediate cause, un∣der God the Efficient, of its own du∣ration, being by the wisdom of God fitted with those affections, and pro∣perties, which shall be requisite to that great end of Eternal duration, will in degrees proportionate to those future consequences, differ from it self, as it is now under a state of corruption. For take any two dif∣ferent Effects in Nature, and it will be found, that the proximate, and immediate causes of them, do differ between themselves in the same de∣gree that the Effects do: Ex. Gra. Take a piece of Wood and a piece

of Iron; both of them smooth, and of the same figure, and bigness; the Wood swims, the Iron sinks: pro∣portionably to the speediness of the Irons sinking, it must differ in so∣lidity, or closeness of parts, from the Wood which swims. This simili∣tude is very Analogical, and by the same reason the consistency of the Body in the state of Glory will as much differ from its consistency here, as the consequences of dura∣tion, and dissolution do, these be∣ing likewise two Effects of two im∣mediate causes. Now then to come to the thing that is to be proved: therefore the objects of Pleasure must be likewise disparate from, if not adverse to what we meet with∣all here, because these here are ter∣minable, of which nature there will be nothing after Death: For the Body and the Soul being made du∣rable to all Eternity, it is most rea∣sonable to think that all their Cele∣stial Accommodations must be du∣rable too; for else there would not

be a completion of happiness, there being a discrepancy between the re∣cipient, and the object. But to go a step farther: That a Sensual man should meet with his old ones, or any other sort of Pleasures after death, is oppugnant to the precepts of Morality. By a Sensual man I mean, such a one, as makes the at∣tainment of corruptible things his ultimate end, whether under a No∣tion of moderation, or of excess: and the word excess is to be taken in a double consideration; either excess as to the quantity of the thing, or excess as to the propriety of the thing. First, let us consider the person exceeding as to Quantity: The Miser never hath pelf enough to satisfie his avaritious mind; for he is alwayes coveting more, while his thoughts, and appetite do ter∣minate in Gold, and Silver as the ultimate object they aspire to: there∣fore he loves nothing beyond that, or above it; for if he did, the de∣sire

of that would in process of ••ime cease, and he would desire some∣thing beyond it, or above it, since desire is a necessary effect of Love, issuing immediately from it, as from its proximate, and contiguous cause: if then he loves nothing beyond it, or above it, he sins against his natu∣ral Conscience, which still presents the Deity to him, as an object which only merits the whole stream of his affections; for ignorance of which he hath no plea, since the universal voice of nature proclaims a Divine power; and in this every man is a Plato to himself. Here then is a Moral Trespass, or the Commission of an Act against the secret impresses of Nature. Now the mind present∣ly enters into consideration, whether it ought to run counter to these in∣fused habits, or not: if a thought propounds to it that it may; it pre∣sently asks, why then these Notions were Imprinted in it? either they were given in vain, or else that they should be practised: If in vain; that

clashes with a Moral Axiome, Natu∣ra semper agit propter finem; if to be practised, then an accusation of Guilt ensues: and from thence naturally arises, not an expectation of Plea∣sure, but of Mulct, from the Origi∣nal Justice of that first Cause which fixed these Principles in the Mind. So much then for excess in Quantity that I may avoid the surplusage of Argument. In the next place, I must take a view of the Person who ex∣ceeds as to Propriety. Every Soul not obstructed by some bodily De∣fect, is created with apprehensions and faculties able to discriminate be∣tween common right, and common wrong. For instance: To take any thing from another man which he holds by just right either of Dona∣tion, or of Legal descent; this can∣not but be apprehended by any clear mind to be Morally Evil, that is, an Action of such a nature, that he can∣not justifie the doing it by right Reason. So is it in all cases of force,

where men intrench upon that to which they have not this Natural Right: for I cannot trace Right or Propriety farther than the first Pos∣session: whence, I see yet no reason so valid to the contrary, as this is, to make me conclude that the Pro∣toplast was Lord and Monarch of the Universe, he being not only actually seized of it, but having likewise re∣ceived an unlimited Commission from God to exercise Authority over all things as we may read G. C. 1. from vers. 26. to the end: from whence it appears, that absolute Monarchy was the first Power that overlooked the earth, and that it was afterwards propagated in the world, (though not individually, or under one per∣son for the whole) as we may col∣lect from the Prerogatives which the Kings of the Nations had in the time of Samuel, (a place ci∣ted by Salmatius in his Defensio Regia) whereas there are no forms of stipulated Government but appear to be accidental, and super∣induced

by reason of succeeding dis∣sentions, arising from great Commu∣nities of men. But to return to my purpose: If then there are such pri∣mitive Aphorisms, and simple Impres∣ses of Truth, fixed in the Soul from its first Creation, that man cannot but rationally conclude himself an of∣fender against that Eternal Truth from whence these communicable no∣tions were at first derived, who goes contrary to them doth ill: for, as I said before, either these Principles are implanted in us in vain, or else that we would conform our selves to them: to say it was in vain, is pro∣phanely to impute to God the weak∣ness of Ideots and Children, who do Actions insignificant, and to no de∣terminate end or purpose; if then they were given to be put into pra∣ctice, a mans natural Conscience must of necessity bring him in guilty up∣on his deviation from these rules; but Guilt cannot expect a reversion of the same, or an accession of any o∣ther kind of Pleasures after death;

but on the contrary, consigns the De∣linquent to a certainty of future pu∣nishment: and if in the third place any man shall say, that these Notions were infused into us purposely to de∣ceive us, his objection deserves no answer, it being so horrid and impi∣ous. Having spoken of excess I am now to examine what attends upon the moderate use of outward things; and in short, the moderate and de∣cent Sensualist will miss of future happiness, because his love doth ac∣quiesce in the thing: for 'tis not the extravagancy of the Action, but the proposed end, which separates it from being good; therefore the same Ar∣gument serves for both, since these two persons differ between them∣selves no otherwise than gradually, for no specifick difference doth re∣sult from the inequality of bad and worse.••. And now to come to my third Argument; If the Disciples of Nature cannot but expect correction, then by an argument à minore ad majus, such as have been brought up

in the School of Christ, and have known Gods revealed will, cannot but expect confusion for their de∣faults, instead of the return of the former, or of any other kind of Plea∣sure: for as the Scripture saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ And that servant that knew, &c. Thus have I made a short inspection into the Nature of Externals, shewing that they have none of those three conditions in them which are requi∣red to the constituting of true Plea∣sure. First, that they are not Ob∣jects suitable in their Natures, much less adequate to the mind, since to make an Object adequate it is not only requisite, that it be immaterial, but likewise that it be Divine. Se∣condly, that although there be some fruition of them, yet it is so often re∣scinded, and so much complicated,

that it is not to be reckoned of: and thirdly, that it is but temporary and ends in Death: and after death, the result of sensuality is inevitable mise∣ry, when we look at outward things as our ultimate end, not using them rightly, as instrumental to the great designs of Religion: much more will they prove destructive to such as are vicious to so great a degree, as that they run into intemperances, and make these outward things become noxious to them by offending in the manner as well as in the measure, of using them, and so go on sporting to everlasting ruine: but if we be carefull in both respects to make a right use of Outward things, they will prove Salutary to us, since every thing is delivered out good to us, by the hand and verbal approba∣tion of the Creator; but our abuses of them poison them, and make them destructive both to our Tem∣poral

and Spiritual Life, whereas they were prepared by God to usher in the solid joyes of an Eternal world.

FINIS.

Notes

• Confes. Lib. 10. Cap. 13.
• Arist. Eth. lib. 7. cap 12.
• The first rea∣son taken from the deficiency of their being.
• Sen. Tract. de Irâ l. 2. c. 29.
• A second rea∣son drawn from their multiplicity.
• A third reason, their false Ap∣pearance.
• A fourth rea∣son drawn from the minds self-accusation.
• Excess as to the quantity.
• Excess as to Propriety.
• 1 Sam. Cap. 8.
• Luk. 12. v. 47.
• Ens unum ve∣rum & bonum.
• Miser qui lae∣tus ad miseri∣am descendit si∣cut stultus ad crucem. Theo∣phylact.
• Gen. 1. v. 13.