The darknes of atheism dispelled by the light of nature a physico-theologicall treatise / written by Walter Charleton ...

CHAP. IX. Of Fate.

SECT. I.

TIS not unknown to the meanest in the Com∣monweale of Learning, that no less then an Age can suffice to the observant lecture of that Vatican of Books composed by Philoso∣phers of all times, concerning this perplexing Theorem; there being more Discourses (a∣bating those, which the kindness of Time hath substracted) now extant thereupon, then any other subject, that ever exer∣cised the cogitations and pens of Scholars: as must be ac∣knowledged by any, who hath surveyd the singular Iatrophi∣lological Treatise of that judicious Parisian, Gabriel Naudae••••, de Fato & Vitae Termino. But yet, such hath bin the singular fortune of Fate, that it hath obtained an exemption from that general Experiment, Tot sententiae, quot Authores: there being found, upon a just audit of them all, fewer Opinions then Books concerning it; nay, what is one degree of wonder higher, a diligent scrutiny may soon explore, that they all fall under the comprehension of only Two Catholique Heads; some understanding Fate to be Aliquid Divinum; a certain power Divine, and the rest, Aliquid merè Naturale, a certain Con∣stitution merely Natural.

In the Classis of those, who have conceived Fate to be a Divine Power, the highest seat belongs to the Platonist and Stoick; according to whose doctrine, methodized and sum∣maried

by Plutarch (lib. de Fato) we may consider it in a twofold Notion.

First, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ut Substantia, as a Substance. In which sense it is accepted for God Himself, or that sempiternal Reason, or establish't method, according to whose tenor He hath praeordai∣ned and disposed All things in the World, and so connected Causes to Causes, that all Events whatever, Arbitrary and Fortuitous, individually depend upon, and indeclinably result from that subalternate Series, or Complication of Essicients. For thus Plato (in Timaeo) one while affirmes that Fate is ipsa Anima Mundi, the very Soul of the Universe; and another while, Naturae Ʋniversi aeterna ratio ac lex, the eternal reason and law of Nature: and thus also both Zeno and Chrysippus are cited by Plutarch (in 1. placit. 28.) as defining Fate to be, Vis spiritualis, ac Ratio ordinis universa gubernans, a Spiritual Power, and constitution governing All things according to an order eternally praecogitate and praedecreed. And all the rest of the Stoical Family, as well generally quoted by Diogenes Laertius, as Panaetius and Possidonius (at least, if He be the true Father of that Book, de Mundo, vulgarly conscribed to Aristotle, out of which the text is extracted) quoted by Stobae∣us (Ecl. Physic.) have unanimously held, that Fate was the same with God, Jupiter, and the Ʋniversal Mens. To whom we may justly associate Seneca also, who, (in 4. de Bene∣fic. & 2. Natural. Quaest. 45.) sayth, in downright terms; si Fatum, Jovem dixeris, non mentieris: if you please to assert that Jupiter and Fate are one and the same thing, you shall speak the truth. Hence comes it, that though Poets sometimes refer all events to the procuration of Jupiter; and sometimes again to Fate: yet may not the nicest Critick impeach them of Inconstancy or Contradiction; since those Terms differ only in the sound, not in the notion; as signifying one and the same Eternal Principle, disposing the virtues and conspirations of all second Causes to the opportune effecting of Events, de∣signed by it self, and so made indeclinable. Thus Homer, introducing Agamemnon as pleading his excuse fot being

instrumental to a misfortune, makes him incriminate upon Fate and Jupiter at once, in these words:

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,—

Non Ego Causa, Verum Jupiter & Fatum.

Secondly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ut Actus, as an Act; according to which Acceptation, we may understand Fate, partly to be ipsum D••i decretum, the very Decree or absolute Command of God, whereby He hath determined all Events to Necessity of Futu∣rition; from whence the Latin word, Fatum, importing a Decree pronounced, is by Grammarians derived: and partly, ipsum ordinem, seriem, vel concatenationem Causarum, in natu∣ra statutam; the order, series, or subalternate concatenation of Causes, according to whose praesctipt tenor all Events prae∣destined come to pass, in respect to the Decree pronounced. For thus much may be collected from that Definition of Fate ascribed to Plato by Plutarch (de Fato) viz. est lex Adrastaeae, the law of Divine Justice, consigning to every thing, what is convenient to its nature, and which no man can clude, or in∣fringe: but more perspicuously from that notorious one of Chry∣sippus, Fatum est sempiterna quaedam ac indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena volvens semetipsam, & implicans per aeternos consequentiae ordines, ex quibus adapta, connexaque est; which we have formerly introduced, and interpreted, in our Chap. concerning the Mobility of the term of mans life. To which, for more assurance, we may annex the respective signifi∣cation and importance of each of those various Appellatives, which the Stoicks have accommodated to Fate. For they have named it (1) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because 'tis a connected series, or subalternately-dependent syntax of Causes and Effects: (2) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it involves and contains All things in that definite and invariable concatenation: (3) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because all Events are the Necessary designations thereof; or, because it self is also under the same restraint of an immutable definition:

(4) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because no attempt can praevail to an alteration infringement of its tenor: (5) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it is a Constirution Eternal: (6) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it is a distribution made to every Individual: (7) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it comprehends whatever is, by Consignation, due to every man: (8) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because as the ori∣ginal, so also the Dissolution of all things is subject to its ap∣pointment: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Parca, because it is the peculiar Lot or Portion destined to every man. But as for this aequivocal De∣nominative, Parca; insomuch as it not onely determineth the state of all other things in general, but also the Life of man in special, quasi Nendo, as it were by spinning out a thread of commensurate longitude: thereupon did Hesiod (in Theogn.) dichotomize it into three distinct species; viz. (1) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in respect to the Irrevocability of time past, which exactly re∣sembleth a thread already spun, and wound upon the reel or fuze; (2) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in respect to the Decurrent, or Praesent time, which responds to a thread now in twisting, in the hand of the Spinster; (3) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in respect to the Future, or Lot yet remaining behind to every man, which holds an analogie to Flax not yet spun off the distaff. Which is the Summarie of Possidonius (de mundo) and Apuleius (10. de repub.) their Mythologie of the ingenious Figment of the Three Fatal Sisters.

SICT. II.

IN the other Classis of Philosophers, who have apprehended Fate to be Res purè Naturalis, a Constitution meerly Natural, devoyd of all Divinity, nor dependent upon any eter∣nal Decree; we find a subdivision of two different Sects. For,

(1) Some have proposed to themselves a Series of Natural Causes, so harmoniously adapted and linked together by mutual revinction, that the posterior being continually suspended on and moved by the praecedent, performe their operations com∣pulsively, i. e. they cannot but do, what they do: so that thereby is inferred a Necessity so absolute, that it admits of nei∣ther

Evasion, nor opposition; such a necessity, as would be no whit inferior to the Stoicks Lex Adamantina, or Adrastaea, formerly mentioned; if this only difference be allowed, that ac∣cording to that, Fate would be a Chain of Causes constituted by God; but according to this, a subalternate series of Causes, whose Constitution, reciprocal concatenation, and eternal du∣ration are made by, and dependent upon it self, and is therefore no less Necessary and Invariable then the other. And

(2) Others have, indeed, likewise allowed a Series of natu∣ral Causes mutually complicated; but yet have they reputed, that the Inferior Causes in this chain are not so dependent upon, nor commoved by the Superior, but that they may be impeded from doing those things, which by the impulse of their inhaerent Essiciency, and without the intervention of any impediment, otherwise they would have done. Impeded, we say, by things purely Contingent, or Counter Agents endowed with, and using the Arbitrary Liberty of their Will.

The Coryphaei, or Leaders of this Sect of Philosophers, were Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Parmenides, and (who took the right hand of all the others) Democritus; as we have found upon the list of Cicero (de Fato.) For, albeit the Founda∣tion of his Physiologie was the same with that of Epicurus, Fortuito factum esse mundum, that the Universe was made by Chance; which Hypothesis we have formerly explained, exa∣mined, and exploded: yet did He strenuously endevour to im∣pose thereupon this disagreeing superstructure, Fato omnia fieri, that all things are effected by Fate; confounding two most con∣trary Notions, meer Contingency, and incluctable Necessity.

If any demand, how we can justify this our Accusation of Democritus; we answer, that it may be genuinely collected from hence: that it was his opinion, that Fortune is nothing else in reality but Nature, and that Nature is bound, by her own adamantine laws, to do what she doth, in all particulars. For the First of these positions, that Nature and Fortune are Identical; we cannot much dispute: since all the Attributes of For∣tune

are bur surreptitious▪ and usurped from Nature; nor doth Fortune, in a meer philosophical Sense, import more then Mans Ignorance in the Di hoti of many Effects, which Nature produceth, or are at least produced by natural means. For the Second, that Nature is its own Fate, or, more expresly, that Nature being only a constitution of Causalities resulting from Chance, or from a fortuitous disposition and setlement of the Universal Matter, in that Figure the adspectable World now bea∣reth; doth necessitate her self to the causation of all things: this He hath conceived inferrible from this process of reason. Atoms (saith He, apud Magnenum) being the Catholique Principle, of which all things consist, have an ingenite or con∣natural Motive Faculty essentially inhaerent; by the uncessant activity whereof they are perpetually agitated or commoved: and all things, by coalescence composed of Atoms, cannot but conforme to the same motions, by which their principles are commoved. And sithence some Atoms tending one way, are by the occurse and justling of others diverted to another course; both the Diverting and Diverted from the direct line of their native tendency, cannot but observe, continue and pursue those necessary motions. By the same reason, some bodies, composed of concreted Atoms, as they are praecipitated one way, by the impulse of their own coessential Faculty, may, by the occursation and arietation of others steering a different course, be deflected from the perpendicular of their motion congenial, to some other transverse, oblique, rectilinear, &c. so that both the Deflecting and Deflected cannot but observe, continue, and pursue those compulsive motions. And this, in General, is that Fate, or Necessity, whereby Democritus would have all things effected, and by which the World was at first composed, in the same Figure, we speculate at this day; for, as the Universal Principle, Atoms, concurring, crowding, rebounding reciprocally, in an infinite space, by the agitation of their own inexistent Faculty, could not but convene, coalesce, and cohaere into any other Forme, but what they did: so now having acquired that forme by Chance, can they not either change it, or not observe and execute those motions begun, and by the mediation or intercession

whereof all Events are brought to pass. For, in Plutarch, (1. placit. 26.) He sayth plainly, Necessitatem nihil esse aliud, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quam latio∣nem, percussionem, repercussionem Materiae; that Necessity is nothing else but the Lation, Percussion, Repercussion of the ma∣terial Principle of all things, i. e. of Atoms. From hence we have an opportunity to interpret that passage in Simplicius (2. physic. comment. 59.) that some of the Ancients held an opinion, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Material Necessity was the sole Causatrix of all Effects; in respect that the Matter of Bodies is not idle and unactive, as most have dreamt, but uncessantly operative; and that, not by impression, but Inhaerency, as be∣ing to it self the Principium à quo of all its motions. And this we here touch upon, opportunely to discriminate this Doctrin from that of others, who constituted a meer Formal, or Agent Necessity, distinct from the material principle of the world; whether that Agent be simply Natural, according to the Physiology of Aristotle; or Primus Opifex, the First Ope∣rator, according to the hypothesis of Plato, and the Stoicks, who also sometimes radicated that Necessity, whereby Evils are continually existent in the world, in the Matter thereof, as Seneca (de Provid. 5.) excusing the non ablation of Evil by the Creator, sayth positively, Non potest Artifex mutare materiam, it was not in his power to Abstract it, because not to alter the Matter. But, not to leave our Explanation of Democritus Fatum Materiale imperfect; we may, from what hath prae∣ceded, perceive at what mark these words of his were directed; Necessitatem, quâ omnia fiunt, esse & Fatum, & Iustitiam, & Providentiam, & opisicem mundi (apud Plutarch. 1. placit. 45.) that the Necessity, whereby all things are effected, is both Fate, Justice, Providence, and Maker of the World: viz. this, that the Series of things, in which the reason or essence of Fate doth consist, could not have bin otherwise constituted; that upon this Series it depends, why one thing is accounted Just, and another Unjust; why the world is governed thus, and all things proceed according to the praesent method, and no other; and why the adspectable form of the Universe was made in all points

responsible to what it now holds, &c. For, He referred the Causation of all things to those newly explicated congenial mo∣tions of Atoms; and so conceived that even the Soul, or Mind of man (which He also fancied to be a certain Contexture of sphaerical or orbicular Atoms) is variously agitated, not only by those internal motions of its own insensible particles, which vary according to its individval Complexion (i. e. the Atoms composing the Soul of a Melancholy man, are of one sort, at least of one contexture; those of a Cholerick, of another; those of a Phlegmatick▪ of a third, &c.) but also by those Extradvenient motions caused by Objects; by whose Species, or Images incurrent (which Atoms also constitute) the Mind cannot but be Attracted, if they be consentaneous and allective, or gratefull; nor not be Averted, if they be dissentaneous and repulsive, or ingratefull. That, if the Mind be not alwaies allected by At∣tractive Species; the reason is, because at the same instant there occur unto it the more potent sollicitations of their Contrary, Averting Species: and if it be not alwaies Averted by Repellent; the reason is equal, viz. because at the same in∣stant it is more strongly sollicited by their Contrary, Attractive Species. That therefore, the Mind cannot but be carried on toward Good, or that which is gratefull and allective, so long as it discovers no Evil admixt thereto: nor not be averted from Evil, or what is ingratefull and aversant, so long as it perceives no Good to be commixt therewith. That therefore, the Mind cannot, when two Goods are objected, but pursue the greater Good; as that which attracteth more potently: nor, when two Evils are objected, but avoyd the greater; as that where∣by it is averted more potently. That, when two objects, the one Good, the other Evil, at the same time praesent their Species; it cannot but neglect the Good, so long as the Evil averts more potently then the Good attracts: nor not be carried towards the Good, while the Evil averts more weakly, and the Good attracts more strongly. Finally, that since, by reason of the Ignorance, or Dimness of the Mind, it doth frequently not per∣ceive the Evil consequent upon its prosecution of some Good; therefore is it subject to Deception in some cases, and is often

carried on to that, from which it ought to have bin aver∣ted: nor perceive the Good that is consequent upon its prosecu∣tion of some Evil, and is therefore, as often averted from that object, to which it ought to have bin converted. But notwith∣standing, insomuch as all objects, by this and no other way, occur unto, and affect the Mind; still it cannot but Necessarily be carried whither it is carried; nor but be averted from that, from which it is averted: and consequently, that there remains to it only a Desire of Truth, i. e. that no Counterfeit Species may occur, but that all objects may appear such as in reality they are, nor Good be concealed under the disgusting vizard of Evil, nor Evil gilded o're with the splendid semblance of Good. For this is the summe of what Empiricus (2. advers. Physic.) makes Democritus to have desiderated, when He sayd; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Exoptat rerum imagines consentaneas posse nancisci. Now, by this complex Argumen∣tation, Democritus may be understood to have inferred; that though some Actions seem situate within the praecincts of our own jurisdiction, or that it is absolutely in our power to Elect, or Reject this or that object; insomuch as every mans ex∣perience doth demonstrate to him, that he doth and can con∣sult and deliberate about the Good and Evil of Objects, and actually electing the one, refuseth the other; and that, not by Compulsion, but Freely: yet notwithstanding is nothing really in our power, because not only the occasion of our Consultation, but also the Consultation it self is imposed upon us by inevita∣ble Necessity. First, that the Occasion of Consultation (or the Exhibition of many objects, which almost equally affecting the Mind, and by reason of the aequipondium of their Verisi∣mility, or moments of Good, holding it suspended in aequilibrio, of necessity ingage it to a Deliberation) cannot but be imposed upon us; we conceive it not obscure to him, who shall deduce the conducing Series of things ftom a due Epoche, or height, and analytically undoe the chain of Causes: and Secondly, that also the act of Consultation is a Necessary Effect, is mani∣fest from hence; that when two objects occur to the mind, so equally Attractive, that their Apparencies of Vtility, or

Praesentations of Good, are aequilibrated, and reciprocally coun∣terpoise each other; the mind must of necessity be agitated by a kind of Fluctuation, and detained in the suspence of Indiffe∣rency, or Indetermination, or Consultation, untill it acquiesce in its Election of that Object, whose praesentation of Vtility seems to praeponderate the others. Which, aequitably audited, amounts to no more then this; that Election is nothing but the prosecution of an Object which either really is, or at lest seems more Good; and that a spontaneous one, without all coaction or renitency: in respect that man doth both spontaneously affect, and willingly prosecute Good. And that you may not admire this bold assertion, viz. that both the Occasion and Consultation, and free, or rather libent Election of Objects, are all links in the Chain of Fate, and so comprehended under this Natural Neces∣sity, propugned by Democritus: the Stoicks intercept your wonder, by obtruding another as strange, viz. that it depends on the same Concatenation of things, that you now read this our discourse of Fate; as Manilius (lib. 2.) Hoc quoque fatale est, sic ipsum expendere Fatum. And this, because whatever Action of any man you shall suppose; it can be no difficulty, according to this Hypothesis, to find out the proxime Cause exciting him thereunto, and to refer that Cause to the permotion of another remote one, and that third to the permotion of a fourth, that fourth, to the induction of a fifth, &c. unravelling the series of Causes, so that it must at length be inferred, that that supposed action could not but follow upon those other actions subalter∣nately praecedent, and consequently, that it must be, as Demo∣critus would have it, Fatal, or Necessary. Which opinion Aristotle ardently impugneth (in lib. de Interpre. cap. 8.) when discussing the verity and necessity of Propositions, He contends to evince; that though of two opposite singular propositions, which concern a thing either Praeterite, or Praesent, one must be true, the other false: yet the Canon holds not in two Contrary sin∣gular propositions, which concern a thing Future; the Verity of the one not necessitating the Falsity of the other. For, as He there argues, if every Affirmation, or Negation concerning a thing to come, were true or false, ex Necessitate: then would

the Futurity of any thing include a Necessity of its Futurition, i. e. whatever is Future would be Necessary, and on the contrary, whatever is not Future, would be Not-necessary: and upon just inference, nothing could remain either Fortuitous, or Arbi∣trary; which to admit, is an Incongruity so manifest, that the repugnancy of every mans Experience detects it; an Incom∣modity so intolerable, that it not only disparageth, but con∣futeth it self. And this, if there be any Fidelity in the records of our Memory, is the Summary of their Theory, who have apprehended and asserted Fate to be a meer Natural Constitu∣tion of Causes, subalternately connected; as not dependent on any thing Divine, nor any Eternal Decree; so not capable of any mutation or interruption, by the intervention of any Im∣pediment, purely Fortuitous, or Counter-activity of any Arbi∣trary Agent.

SECT. III.

IN the other Division of Philosophers, who also conceded Fate to be a meer Natural Constitution of Causes subalter∣nately dependent, &c. but yet denied the inevitable or ne∣cessary insequution of all Effects upon that concatenation; allowing the possibility of its mutation, or interruption by either Chance, or mans Free will: the Principal are Aristotle and Epicurus.

First, as for Aristotle; that He held Fate, or fatal Necessity to be nothing but very Nature, or (if you like it better) every particular Cause acting secundum suam naturam, naturalémve ductum, according to its proper or natural Virtue; is manifest from his own words, in sundry places of his Writings. To particular; (1) He sayth (in 2. phys. cap. 6.) Eas generationes, acoretiones, & alterationes, quae violentae sunt (ut dum ex arte, & ob delicias, cogimus plantas aliquas praematurè

pubescere, adolesceréque) esse 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, non Fatales, hoc est non Naturales; making Fatal Effects to be mee••ly Natural. And (2) He sayth (1 Meteorol. cap. ultim.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Fatalibus temporibus magnas quasdam hyemes, imbriúmque excessus, quibus creentur diluvia, contingere; eo modo, quo & contingit hyems statis anni temporibus: which rightly paraphra∣sed, imports thus much; that as Winter, the Sun receding from our climate, at some certain period of the yeer, according to the Ecliptick progress consigned unto it by Nature, is the regular effect of the Suns remove to larger distance; even so are hard Winters, and immoderate rains, the regular effects of some pe∣riodal Conjunctions of the Planets, proceeding in their motions according to the setled Constitutions of Nature. From whence we have an advantage to observe, that though Stobaeus (Ecl. Phys.) tells us; Aristotelem non tam existimasse Fatum esse Causam, quàm modum Causae advenientem rebus ex necessitate statutis; that Arist. conceived not Fate to be so much a Cause, as the manner of a Cause, advenient to things determined by Necessity: yet nevertheless are we so to comment upon this his nice descant, as that we understand, Fate not to be any new kind of Cause, but Nature her self, which, in respect to her Agency, is called a Cause, and in respect to the certain, proper, and ne∣cessary manner or way of her acting, is called Fate. And, that He impugned the former Error, viz. that all Agents, included in this Universal Subalternation, act ex inevitabili necessitate, or cannot but doe, what they doe; is not obscurely intimated in this, that He defined Fate to be pure Nature. Since the Works of Nature are not effected of inoppugnable necessity; as may be boldly concluded from the frequent Experiments not only in Generation, which is commonly impeded, by the intervention of any indisposition or impatibility of Matter, and other resisting Accidents; but also in Generous and virtuous Minds, which easily subdue and countermand those strong inclinations, or pro∣pensities to Avarice, Luxury, Audacity, Incontinency &c. which may not unjustly be esteemed the genuine Effects of their very constitutive Principles, and branches that shoot up from the root of their Corporeal Temperament. Upon which reason,

we may conjecture, that Arist. reflected, when He sayd of So∣crates, praeter naturam, ac fatum suum, continens evasit: He acquired an Habit of Continency, even in spite of the contrary sollicitation of his individual Nature, and particular Fate.

Secondly, as for Epicurus; that his thoughts made an Unison with those of Aristotle, in the key of a Non-ineluctable Fate, is sufficiently constant from hence; that having admitted a certain Necessity Natural in this sentence, Naturam à rebus, ipsarúm∣ve serie, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) doceri, cogique, sive necessitate agi (in Epist. ad Herodotum:) He yet denied the Inevitability, or Absoluteness thereof, in another Fragment of his revived by Stobaetis (in Ecl. Phys.) where He delivers as a general Canon, Omnia sieri trium modorum aliquo, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) Necessitate, Consilio, Fortuna. For, in that he makes Fortune, and Consultation, or mans Free will equal competitors in the empire of the world with Necessi∣ty Natural, He manifestly excludes it from being 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sole Despot or Monarch, and reserves to the two others an equal dominion. Which assurance may duely be augmented by the superaddition of this also; that Cicero (de Fato) intro∣ducing Epicurus disputing about the verity of Future Events, makes him deny, with Aristotle, that of two contrary singular Enunciations about a thing to come, the one must be true, and the other false: subnecting this reason; Nulla est in natura talis Necessitas.

And, certainly, as He stood equal with Aristotle, in the deni∣al; so hath He outdone him, by many degrees, in his ende∣vours for the Refutation of this unsound opinion of an Absolute Necessity: insomuch as he excogitated his Hypothesis of the Declination of Atoms (illustrated in the incomparable Com∣mentary of Gassendus) as a motion, which once conceded, doth totally infringe the indispensable rigor of Fate, and conserve an Evasory or Declining Liberty for the Mind of man. This Plutarch taught us, in two perspicuous texts: (1) when He sayth (de Anim. Solert.) that the motion of the Declination

of Atoms in the Human Soul, was subtilly invented by Epicurus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that Fortune might be brought on the theatre of the world, there to act her part, and the Arbitrary power of man might not be abrogated: (2) when He declares (de Stoic. repub.) that the same Epicurus (sese in omnem partem versare, ingeni∣úmque contendere, in id incumbendo, ut quomodocunque à motione sempiterna liberum tueatur Arbitrium, ac pravitatem esse in∣culpabilem non patiatur;) rack't all the nerves of his wit, to find out a way for the protection of mans Free will; and so that evil might not praetend to inculpability.

Now, though we may not train along the thoughts of our Reader, out of the direct tract of our praesent Theme, into a wide Digression concerning Epicurus his whole Romance of the De∣clination of Atoms in the Soul; especially having lately remitted him to Gassendus his accomplisht Comment thereupon: yet can we not impede his progress along the streight line of method, here to arrest him, while we informe him briefly, How he ac∣commodated that fiction to the vindication of mans Liberty from the inexorable Coaction of Fate. We conceive, that Epi∣curus, having observed 3 kinds of Motion in Animals, but prin∣cipally in Man, viz. Natural, Violent, and Voluntary; took it for granted, that the primary Cause of each was to be deduced from Atoms, the Principium à quo of all motion: and here∣upon concluded, that the spring of all Natural motion, was the primary motion congenial or inhaerent to Atoms, viz. that whi••h physiology calls the motion of Gravity, whereby an Atom is praecipitated ad lineam rectam, to a perpendicular; that the spring of all Violent motion, was the motion of Reflexion, or that which ariseth from occursation, arietation, or repercussion of one Atom by another, whereby the Atom reflected, is carried ad lineam obliquam; and lastly, that the spring of all Voluntary motion was the motion of Declination, to which no region is determined, nor time praefixt.

But might not Democritus, and other Defendants of Absolute Necessity natural, have excepted against this, as insufficient to the protection of mans Evasory Freedome, by returning; that because this motion of Declination is no less Natural (for it is derived from no other principle, but Atoms themselves) then that of Gravity; therefore doth it still remain, that All things are effected by Fate, as well when Epicurus his Hypothesis is conceded, as before. Insomuch as all things, which were to come to pass, by reason of those various motions of Arietation, Repuls, Declination &c. by an eternal series, and kind of subalternate Concatenation, are consequent one upon the heels of another; and particularly that event of Cognition and Appetition, to which mans Liberty appertains; and so are brought to pass by an equal Necessity. For, that the Mind of man may display, or execute that Liberty Elective, whereby it affects and prosecutes any object, conceive it to be an Apple; necessary it is, that the Image or Species of that Apple be first emitted from it, and being transmitted through the mediatory organs of sight, invade, percell, and commove the Mind to know, or apprehend it. Necessary to the Apple, before it can transfuse its visible Species to the eye, that it be put in some place convenient for adspect, by him, who gathered it from the tree or received it elsewhere. Necessa∣ry, that the Tree, which bore that apple, be first generated by a seed, and nourished by the moisture of the earth, concocted by the heat of the Sun. Necessary, that that Seed be derived from a former apple, and that from a former tree, planted in this or that determinate place, at this or that determinate time: and so by retrogression to the beginning of the world, when both the Earth, and all its Vegetable seeds had their origination from the Con∣cursions and Complexions of Atoms; which could not (being agitated by the impulse of their own inhaerent Faculty Motive) but convene and coalesce, and acquiesce in those Figures, those situations, at that time. Again, if the Soul, or Mind be also a Contexture of orbicular Atoms; those Atoms must have bin contained in the Sperm of the Parents; must have consluxed thither from certain meats and drinks, as also from the Aer and

beams of the Sun; those me ats must have bin such and no other: and so subalternately successive from eternity, the Event will be found to come to pass by the same Adamantine Necessity, what∣ever of the Causes, lateral or concurrent (which must run up to an account beyond all Logarithms) you shall please to begin at. Because from Eternity Causes have so cohaered to Causes, that the last causes could not but concurr; which being deduced in∣to act, the Mind could not but know, and knowing affect, or desire that particular object, viz. the Apple. And what is here said of Causes, the same in all points is to be understood also of Atoms, which constitute those causes, and from whose congenial motions the Causes derive those their Motions, by which they attain to be Causes.

To this Exception, that we may compose some Response, such as may seem Consentaneous to the Doctrine of Epicurus, and to contain somewhat of Probability, at least; we must usurp the liberty to assume: that such is the Contexture of Atoms in the Soul, or Mind, its Declinant Atoms can break that Rigidity arising from other Atoms, and so make its nature Flexile to any part; in which Flexility, the root of Liberty doth consist. And therefore, the mind, being allected by the Species of any object, is indeed carried towards that object; but so, that if another object shall instantly occurr, whose Attraction is aequi∣valent, it may again be invited by, and carried towards that ob∣ject also: so that, deflecting from the first, it may become aequi∣librated or indifferent to either part; which, doubtless, is to be Free, or Arbitrary. And that the Mind, being thus constituted Flexile and Indifferent, doth at length determine it self rather to one then the other part; this ariseth from hence: that the impression of one Species is more violent then of the other; and consequently that the Election succeeds, upon the Apprehension of that object, whose species appears either positively good, or comparatively more good. Finally, that the Mind, when it e∣lecteth or willeth any object, is as it were the principal Machine, or main Spring, by whose motions all the Faculties, and the members destinate to execution are excited, and carried thither,

whither the Mind tendeth: and this by mediation of the Spirits discurrent, or rather transmitted through all parts of the body. All which Lucretius fully expresseth in these Verses:

Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo, Necregione loci certa; sed ubi ipsa tulit Mens: Nam dubio-procul his rebus sua quoique voluntas Principium dat; & hinc motus per membra vagantur.

Again, perhaps Epicurus will not gainsay, but that the motion of Declination is as much Natural as the motion of Gravity; But yet will He by no perswasions yeeld, that the Mind, being contemperate of Declinatory Atoms, is so affected and attracted by Necessity toward one object, that it cannot instantly be de∣flected to another. For, as a mixt Nature is made, so is the Mobility of its insensible parts varied: and from various Natu∣ral motions retused or refracted, ariseth a Third Nature, accor∣ding to which its motions may be sayd to be Voluntary and Na∣tural both; insomuch as they proceed à Natura libera, from Nature free and uncoacted. Nor will He deny, supposing the Occursation and Arietation of Atoms, that it is pure Necessity, that Percussions, Repulses, and either Reflexions or Cohaesions should succeed among them: but yet may He refuse to allow a Necessity of such Occursations, as if they could not be impeded, nor their Consequents be diverted. Hence, concerning that eternal series of the Causes of the Apple, and the Mind; Epi∣curus will grant, that when things are already effected, a kind of Necessity may be attributed thereunto, such in respect whereof those things cannot be uneffected; since, non datur jus in praeteri∣ta, there is no countermanding things Praeterite: but before those things were peracted, there was no such Necessity; since both Fortune, or Contingency, and the opposing Liberty of mans Will might have interrupted, inverted, and changed it. For few are ignorant of the wide disparity between these two Assirma∣tions, viz. What is once done, cannot be not done: and what is done, might not have bin done. Since, in the Former, a thing is considered as already past; and in the Later, as yet to

come: and as according to the Former it is Necessary; so ac∣cording to the Later, it, may be or Contingent, or Voluntary. By which reason, was it possible, that the Apple might not have bin praesented to the eye; possible, that the Tree which bare it might first have withered; that the Seed, of which that tree was generated, might either have proved abortive and steril, or else have bin sowed in some other place; that other of its Causes might have bin divers ways praepeded: which also may be affirmed of the Mind, and its Causes; and consequently none of the many Causes, which did antecede the Appetition of the Apple, can be conceived to have bin Necessary, as they might if the Causes were of themselves uncapable of Impediment, or if there were one Cause Paramont to all others in the Concate∣nation, which by an absolute soveraignty, or despotique power, had directed and coacted them. Allbeit we concede, that the Appetition of the Apple by the mind, is the Conse∣quent of the Minds Cognition thereof, and that Cognition the consequent of its Occursation to the eye, and that the Conse∣quent of its Position in a place convenient for sight, and that the consequent of its Existence, and so from link to link retro∣grade up to eternity: yet notwithstanding can no man justify this Inference, that therefore the Mind is Necessitated to that Appetition; because still there remains a Posse to the Mind of being Averted from the Affectation and Prosecution thereof, in case either the Species of a better object, or a suspicion of poyson therein concealed, shall intervene, or a refrigeration of the Stomach by the dyspeptical and slatulent juice thereof be fea∣red, or any other Cause of moment sufficient to perswade the mind to abstain from the use thereof, shall be interposed,

Nor is this Rejoynder disswasive; that, when the Mind is aver∣ted from the Appetition of the Apple, the Causes Antecedent were not such as might induce the mind to an Appetition, but such as induced it to an Aversation; and that these Averting, not those Attracting Causes were so connected to the series of Fate, that the mind could not but be averted from it.

well as of those, which Attract it to an object, to the eternal Series of Fate to overbalance Epicurus his defence of mans Liberty.

For, though the Mind be contemperate of such a Contexture of Atoms, as that it may be Commoved by the irruent Species of external Objects; yet is the nature of its contexture such also, as that it can derive from it self some motions distinct from, nay contrary to those motions excited by Extradvenient Images; which motions being instituted by no other Principle but it self, are ma∣nifestly Spontaneous and Voluntary, and by which it is em∣power'd to resist External motions, and therefore may not so be carried to one Object, as not to be, upon advantage, deflected to another. And hence we may Conclude, that the Mind is not obliged to a necessity of any one Object; but stands Free to refuse that, and elect another: and that the Reason of a thing to come, is not a little different from that of a thing already past; since, in respect to a thing Future, there remains an Indifferency to the Mind of electing either of two Objects, but in respect to a thing Praeterite, there is a Necessity of its election of one. If this Solution be thought too light, we can superadd another of weight sufficient to counterpoyse the Doubt; viz. that which Carneades in Cicero insinuated, when he taught, that the Epicureans might have defended the Liberty of mans Mind, without their commentitious Declination of Atoms. For having once declared, that the Mind hath Voluntary motions of its own institution, they needed no other Argument to confute Chrysippus: to whom when they had conceded, that no motion can be without a Cause Movent; there remained no reason why they should have granted, that all Effects have their Antecedent Causes; since to the will of man no Causes are Antecedent, it being to it self the Principium à quo of all its motions Voluntary.

And this is the faithfull Abridgement of Epicurus his Doctrin concerning Fate, as a Constitution meerly Natural, and capable of interruption, alteration, opposition, by either of the Two other in his Triumvirate, viz. Fortune or pure Contingency, and the Liberty of mans mind, which He conceived Copartners in the Empire of the World. ¶.

SECT. IV.

THere is yet another Species of Fate, retaining to our Second Genus (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) whose exceeding vanity and inconsi∣derableness had well-nigh occasioned our total Inconsideration thereof, in this place; and that is Fatum Mathematicum sive Astrologicum, the Mathematicians and Astrologers Fate; being a certain imaginary Necessity Natural, imposed upon all Sublunary Agents, and more especially upon Man, as the most analogous Recipient, by the inoppugnable Influence of Cele∣stial Bodies, respective to their Motions, Positions, Con∣nexions, Aspects.

Tis no wonder, we confess, that the Chaldaeans, a Mercurial and volatile Nation generally infatuated with Astral Idolatry, were the Inventors of this Planetary Destiny; since they Dei∣fied all they understood not, and advanced their observations of the circumvolutions of the Sphears, together with their Orbs of light, to such a height of insolence, that they fancied the Hebrew Alphabet represented in the Figures of the Asterisms, and praetending to the skill of reading the Celestial Ephime∣rides, by spelling those Characters, which the Planets in their Conjunctions, Oppositions, and other Apparitions seemed to make, into words and sentences perfectly signifying, to the exact and intelligent observer, the intent of God concerning not only the subversion of Monarchies, mutation of States, religi∣ons, &c. general Events, but also the prosperity or adversity, the health or sickness, life or death of particular persons: as Rabbiben Ezra, and out of him Gassarel (without the conceal∣ment of his strong inclination to the same superstitious Arro∣gance) hath observed, and by several experiments alleaged endevour'd to patronize, in the 13. Chap. of his Ʋnheard of

Curiosities. Nor is it a wonder, that the Hebrew, and after them the Graecian Astrologers, with great ostentation of tran∣scendent knowledge, and no less then privacy with the three Fatal Sisters, sedulously promoted the same splendid Error, of ascribing the Empire of the world to a Heptarchy of Erratique Starrs: since, upon the testimony of the greatest Antiquaries, we may justly assirme, that the Hebrews added to the vani∣ties and absurdities of the Chaldaean, and the Graecians to the wild Romances of the Hebrew Astrology; the stream thereof, by long running in the channel of time, contracting more and greater Impurities. Which is a chief reason, why we inhaerite so dark and imperfect a knowledge of the great Astronomical Sagacity of the more simple and upright times of Abraham and Moses. Though this be no wonder, we say, yet tis a considera∣ble one, that even many Physiologists, who praetended the inda∣gation and tradition of nothing but Verity, of verisimility at least, have liberally contributed towards the diffusion and propagation of the same Delusion. Witness that peremptory speech of Pliny (1 nat. Histor.) singulis sydera tributa sunt, clara divitibus, minora pauperibus, obscura defunctis, & procujusque sorte lu∣centia ad munera mortalibus. Nor can we conjecture, what should occasion the Deception of so many and so great judge∣ments, in this easy particular; unless that grand Cause of Po∣pular mistakes, viz. Transcriptive Adhaerence to all, that seems praesented in the reverend habit of Antiquity, especially if guilded over with the Estimation of Rare and Sublime: the Wit of man being naturally prone to Affect and Admire, rather then Indubitate and Examine those Transmissions, which con∣cern the remotest Difficulties in Nature, and above all, the Ener∣gy and Configurations of Celestial Bodies. Prodigia cum nar∣rantur, excipi solent favore mirantium, & quanquam non ad verum exacti sint, postquam semel Scriptorem invenerunt, plu∣ribus placent, veneratione crescunt, vetustate commendantur; was Nicopompus his saying, in Joh. Barclaii Argenis, lib. 2. For, had they devested their minds of all traditional Praejudice, and but reflected their thoughts, either upon the Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter, or Subject, whereon the Starrs are

supposed to discharge and six their uncontrollable influence; or upon the extremely different Fortunes of Twins, conceived and borne under the same Constellation; or upon the double Impiety of ascribing to remote, weak, and perhaps unconcerned Causes, those Effects, which proclaim their designment by an Infinite Wisedome, and their Praeordination to Ends above the sagacity of Human Providence; and of charging all the most nefarious Villanies of sinfull man upon the innocuous and exceeding both usefull and comfortable Creatures of God: had they, we say, but pondered any one of these Reasons, that sufficiently demon∣strate the Absurdity of Planetary Necessity; doubtless, they had soon reclaimed their belief from this dishonorable seduction, and would no longer have abused themselves with an opinion, that all the Occurrences of every Individuall mans life, together with the time and manner of his death, are the inevitable Effects of those Starrs, which were Lords of the Horoscope, either at his Conception, or Nativity, or both.

The First Reason, whereby this Chaldaean Fate may be de∣monstratively redargued of extreme vanity, we desumed from the Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter, whereon the Planets exercise their power. For, according to their own Concession, Omnis receptio est ad modum recipientis, All bodies ought to be Analogous, i. e. praedisposed to admit either the benigne, or maligne influences of the Heavens; for Alteration is of necessity praevious to Production, and before a body be configurate, ne∣cessary it is that the Matter, whereof it is composed, be altered and variously praepared; and praepared it is by Second Causes, but perfected by First. Thus the Geniture of the Male, though perfect and prolisical in its self, must yet be frustrated of its end, unless it meet with convenient and patible Materials whereon to actuate its Plastick virtue, viz. the Blood and se∣minal infusion of the Femal, proportioned both in quantity and quality to its Efficiency. Thus the Aer of Aegypt, because Nilus (being 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) doth yeeld no Evaporations sufficient to the generation of Clouds, continues still serene and unobnu∣bilated; notwithstanding the potent Attraction of the Sun,

Moon, and other Sydereal Magnets: and though all the Planets should convene in the watery signe of Pisces, as before the catholique Deluge , and threaten an Apertio portarum to that Climate; yet, because the material Cause of rain, Evapo∣rations, is there wanting, must their conspiracies be defeated, and their Influences become languid and ineffectual. And there∣sore, by equal reason, unless the Planet, which is Lord of the Geniture, shall find a Subject qualified in all points for the ad∣mission and promotion of this Celestial Fate, which our effron∣ted Genethliacks have conceived it to immit into Embryons and Births, all its magnified Influx must miscarry, and be lost in an invalidity as absolute, as the labour of that Statuary, who should attempt to melt Marble with Fire, or mould sand into an Image, without a convenient Cement. If this be, as it must be true; that the Praeparation of the Matter, on which the Im∣pressions of Superlunary Bodies are to operate, doth depend upon Sublunary and determinate Causes: then may we, with more honour, recurr to that excellent sentence of the Poet;

Libera stat nobis mens, nulli subdita coelo.

The Second praegnant Argument, wherewith the more sober sort of Book-men usually deride the Arrogance of our Ge∣nethliacks? (who blush not to promise to the world exact Copies of the Rolls of Destiny, and divine as considently as if they had bin of the Cabal with all the Asterisms) we derived from the common Experiment of Twinns: who, though procreated of the same Seminalities, faecundate in the same Ovarie or bed of na∣ture, and (for ought even our most perspicacious Harvey knows to the contrary) conceived in the same moment, and so under the same Ascendent; are notwithstanding many times observed to differ in Sex, physiognomy, genius, condition of life, and most∣ly in the manner and time of their death. Thus Esan and Jacob, who may, without the dispensation of a Figure, be sayd to have bin but one and the same Birth, the younger Midwising himself into the world by holding fast his brothers heel, and so if not indubitating the right of Primogeniture, yet at least portending his future purchase and usurpation thereof; were yet so disparate

n their Complexions, Dispositions, Fortunes, course of life, Age, and dissolution; that our Secretaries of Heaven must either demonstrate that the face of the Heavens was varied in that short moment that intervened betwixt neer Nativities; or confess it to be the hand of Providence Divine, which di∣stributed to each his peculiar Lot, not the irrational Starrs that caused that vast disproportion. And thus Proclus and Euristhenes, Gemini not only in their production, but in the Crown of Lacedaemonia, and so aequally disposed by their For∣tunes also to the promotion of that Influence, which the then paramont Conjunction of the Pianets had impressed upon them: did neither live in equal glory, nor perish by equal and syn∣chronical Fates. On the Reverse; how many Myriads have proved Twinns, in their Decease, who were utter Aliens in their blood, nativity, constitutions, professions, inclinations, fortunes? Dare our Judicial Astrologers assirme, that All, who fall in battle at once, had one and the same sydereal Fate, which necessitated that their Copartnership in the grave? un∣sainedly, nothing acquainted with letters can be so contradicto∣rily impudent. What excuse have they then left them, for stop∣ping their ears against that grave Admonition of the oraculous Zoroaster; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Ne tu augeas fatum, Beware thou dost not aggravate thy Fate. which signifies no less then this; in thy power it is, either to promote, or frustrate the virtues of Celestial Influxes: to promote them by Coope∣ration, to infirme and defeat them by Counter-inclination or repugnancy. To which we may accommodate also that me∣morable Aphorisme of the Prince of Astrologers, Ptolemy; Potest is, qui sciens est, multos stellarum effectus avertere, quando naturam earum noverit, ac seipsum ante illorum even∣tum praeparaveril.

Our last Argument to confound Chaldaean Fate, is the Double Impiety inferrible thereupon. (1) If the Infelicity of every man be the indeclinable Effect of that malicious Tincture, which the unfriendly Complexion of the Heavens at his Nativi∣ty infused into his nature; as our aethereal Mercuries assirme:

then must it follow, that those glorious orbs were created by God more for the harme and ruine, then benefit and comfort of mankind; for whose sake only, subordinate to his own Glo∣ry, the whole Creation was intended. And (2) if all the re∣gicides, parricides, homicides, incests, rapes, rapines, blasphe∣mies, sacrilegies, rebellions, proditions, &c. nefarious acts of Miscreants (the very naming whereof will blister the most in∣nocent lips) be the executions of those designes, which the ma∣levolent starrs in their Confoederations have determined to ac∣complish by such and such unhappy Instruments: then must it be conceded, that no Malefactor ought to be accountable to justice, because he can plead, Non equidem vellem, sed me mea Fata trahebant; as also, that God is the Author of Evil, by giving to the starrs such noxious power, and such unlimited Commissions, as doe autorize them to operate to the Destructi∣on of his Masterpiece.

To these 3 Redargutions of Astrological Necessity, we might have annexed as many score, borrowed from Picus Mi∣randulanus, Bradwardine B. of Canterbury, Sixtus Senensis, Mersennus, Gassendus, All which heroical Champions of truth and Providence Divine, have drawn their victorious swords, in this quarrel, against the Host of Heaven: but, re∣membring that proverbial axiome, Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri possit per pauciora, we found our selves obliged to decline supererogation, and referr the unsatisfied to these incomparable Authors. However, we ask leave to insert the memorable and not commonly quoted Confession of Hillarius Altobellus Senior (in praefatione ad Tabulas Regias Divisionum 12. partium Coeli) in these words. Cum igitur per tot secula fluctuarit Astrono∣mia & mendax tanto tempore peragrarit totum orbem, quot modis, quot locis, quot viribus, quot cum temerariis vel ignavis aucto∣ribus, inverecunda, fronte perfricta, fornicata est? nunquam, nullibi, nullis (ante Tychonem, & à Ptolemaeo post aliqua saecula) annuam veracem revolutionem dedit, neque eventuum verum tempus consignavit, non ipsa, non dilectissima silia Astrologia. Ʋtraque enim pavit curiosos mendaciis & adulationibus. Si autem interdummendaces non fuere, sors favit, vel casus, vel

per accidens congruentia syderum ad illa puncta, & non docta ac naturalis conjectatio. By which ingenuous Confession of a Person, whose assiduous inquest into the most recondite myste∣ries of Astronomy, non only by indefatigate lecture of the choy∣cest of Urania's Secretaries, but also by the most exact use of Instruments and Tables, and frequent tempestive Experiments, had enabled him to detect all those pernicious Frauds, which either the Ignorance, or ostentation of succeeding Ages had foisted in upon the simple and demonstrable Ʋranometrical observations and Axioms of Antiquity; not only to the Corruption, but eternal Defamation and contempt of that noble Science: how much of just Disparagement is inferred upon Judicial Astrology, which the Avarice of Divining Impostors, on one hand, and the superstitious Curiosity of abject minds, on the other, have exalted to the height of Destiny; we should rudely derogate from our Readers Capacity, not wholly to entrust to his own immediate judgement. To ratifie and terminate this our repro∣bation of our Genethliacal Schematists, we have the like censure of them from S••. Ambrose (in Hexaemero) Nonnulli tentave∣runt exprimere Nativitatum qualitates, qualis futurus u∣nusquisque, qui natus sit, esset; cum hoc non solum vanum sit▪ & inutile quaerentibus, sed impossibile pollicentibus.

Notes

• Article 1. The conveni∣ent reduction of all opinions, concerning the essence of Fate, to 2. General Heads.
• Article 2, What the Pla∣tonist and Stoick meant by Fate, considered (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) as a substance.
• Article 3. And, what (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) as an Energy or Act: together with the e••y∣mological rea∣sons of those sundry Appel∣lations, the Stoicks have imposed upon it.
• Article 1. The second Classis of Phi∣losophers, who understood Fate to be a Constitution meerly Natural subdivided into 2 distinct Sects: viz. (1) those who assert the Immutability & Inevitability of Fate; (2) those who de∣fend the possi∣bility of its Al∣teration & Eva∣sion.
• Article 2. The Leaders of the First S••ct, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Par∣menides, and chiefly Demo∣••••itus.
• Article 3. Democritus just∣ly charged with the patron••ge of Inevitable Fate: and his doctrine con∣cerning it▪ con∣cisely rehearsed.
• Article 1. The Principal of the Second Sect, Aristotle and Epicurus.
• Article 2. The Grounds of the Authors imputing the opinion both of Fates Iden∣tity with Na∣ture, and the possibility of its Mutation & Declination, by either Fortuitous or Arbitrary Antagonists, to Aristotle.
• Article 3. Epicurus una∣nimous to Arist. in the point of Physical and Eluctable Ne∣cessity.
• Article 4. The scope of Epicurus his Figment of the Declination of Atoms in the human Soul: and his Accom∣modation thereof to the tuition of mans Liberty, epito∣mized.
• Article 5. An Exception, in the name of Democritus, a∣gainst Epicurus Inference.
• Article 6. The justifica∣tion thereof, by a Respons con∣forme to the Physiology of Epicurus.
• lib. 2.
• Article 7. The most weighty Re∣joynder, (of the oonnexion of those Causes, which Avert the Mind from, so found too light.
• Article 1. Mathematical Fate briefly described.
• Article 2. The gross Va∣nity thereof concealed from many Philoso∣phers, only by the cloud of Transcriptive Adbaesion to Antique Tra∣ditions.
• Rabbi ben Ezra, in ductore dubiorum.
• Article 3. The Absurdity of Sydereal Ne∣cessity evicted (1) by an Ar∣gument desu∣med from the Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter on which Celestial Impressions are to operate.
• Respice pag. 143.
• Article 4. (2) By the common Ex∣periment of the unaequal For∣tunes of Twins.
• Article 5. (3) By the dou••le Impiety, Inseparable from the belief thereof.