The darknes of atheism dispelled by the light of nature a physico-theologicall treatise / written by Walter Charleton ...

SECT. I.

IN our enumeration of the Venenate Absurdities, which naturaly grow upon that inflexible stock of Absolute Fatality, or, more expresly, upon that execrable Hypothesis of the Stoicks (that we may be charitable in forgetting there are any Christians of that irreligious perswasion) that all the Actions of every individual man are praedestined, and the whole order and manner of their Fu∣turition praecisely praeordained by the invariable decrees of that Supreme Power, against which the coacted and limited Will of man can make no effectual resistance; we well remember, we specified the total sublation of all Virtue and Vice; the abnegation of Justice either Divine or Human, in the com∣pensation of Piety and Impiety; the adnihilation of the use and efficacy of Lawes to coerce from Evil, of Precepts and Ad∣hortations to elect and prosecute good, in a word, the subver∣sion of all Religion and Morality, and consequently the ne∣cessary resignation and rendition of the minde of man to receive all the destructive Impressions of Hell. And no less, nor fewer Absurdities may the reason of every man discover emer∣gent from the Antithesis or contrary Assertion, that all the Actions of man, and their particular Events or Successes, are

neither the praedeterminations of Fate, nor the occasional desig∣nations of Providence Divine, nor fully the arbitrary elections of mans will, but the meer unpraemeditate, and temerarious Hits of Chance: since, in pure Justice, those actions onely are Lau∣dable, or Vituperable, which are done D••libera••ò & liberè ratione Agentis, upon a deliberation of the Intellect, and an arbitrary election of the Will subsequent to that deliberation; and not those which are meerly Fortuitous, and result from the indeliberate or blind activity of Fortune.

When first I tasted the odious bitterness of these two streams, whereof most of the ancient Greeks, many of the noblest Ro∣mans, and (I fear at least) not a few of the professors of Chri∣stianity have drank too liberally, even to the infatuation of their reason; I must confess, I conceived them to have bin derived from two different fountains, or interests as irreconcileable as Light to Darkness: but when I had, by the continued travail of my thoughts, traced them up to their original, I found them to be effused from one and the same vein; viz. the propensity of Hu∣man nature depraved, to attempt by all means imaginable the Excusation or Extenuation of the Guilt of its defections from its proper object real good, by charging it wholly, or in part, up∣on some external influence praevalent over mans Will. For man, having from the Light of Nature learned this as an Axiome; that the Justice of Reprehension and Punition is radically con∣sistent in the intire Freedome of the Delinquents Will; or, more plainly, in this, that the Delinquent chose to do ill, when 'twas absolutely in his power to have done well; not in this, that either his Will was enforced by a Necessity that admits of no repugnancy, first to the Volition and after to the actual pro∣secution of that ill; or that he was onely a meer illiberal, in∣cogitant, & fortuitous Agent: 'twas obvious for him to con∣clude, that if he could incriminate either upon an ineluctable Necessity, o•• simple and meer Chance, then he might with aequal facility, discharge himself of the Culpability, or Guilt, and consequently of the punishment due thereunto.

Now, though our pen hath drop't, on the praecedent leaves, frequent and cursary Detections of the gross and ruinous Absur∣dities of both these subterfuges, so that a rational consideration may, from those transient glances or hints, collect Arguments more then enough for the total Demolition of them: yet, since those notions of Fate, Fortune and Free-will are subject to Aequivocation, some men understanding them as positive Cau∣ses, others as Modi agendi Causarum, certain manners of Causes operating, and others as Vana Nomina, meer Terms, which in Logical verity respond by way of adaequation to no real Entities; and since the difficulty of the subject encouraged us to promise a full Reconciliation of all their apparent Antipa∣thies, or Inconsistencies, and also a perfect Accommodation of them all to the Special Providence of God (the onely cause of their continuity and connexion to the present clue of our thoughts) we esteemed it not onely a pardonable, but a lau∣dable design to attempt by a singular discourse the manifestation of their particular Natures, or, more plainly, what we are to understand by Fate, what by Fortune, and what by Free Will. Which that we may atchieve with the more familiarity to com∣mon Apprehension, both method and perspicuity command us to consider the last in the first place.

By the Liberty or Freedome of mans Will (that we may maturely praevent all Logomachy or Sophistical contention impendent from the ambiguous sense of that term) we intend not that Freedome, which being called by the Graecian 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, defined by Cicero, Potestas vivendi ut velit quilibet, and by the Civil Law 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Power of leading the life of a Freeman, is the contrary to Servitude; since that con∣cernes onely the Civil or Political state of Man; but that which by a proper elegancy the Graecian defines 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Latines Id quod in nobis seu penes nos, nostróve in arbitrio, potestatéque situm est, and the Divines commonly name Liberum Arbitrium an Absolute power of electing what objects we please, Good or Evil, whereon to fix our Affections;

since that concernes only the natural state of man, and is that alone which can justify the Equity of the reward of Piety or Virtue, and the punishment of Impiety or Vice, by God, or Man.

For morethen one respect did the Ancients select and fix on this word Arbitrium; For, whether we would intimate that Action of the Rational Faculty, whereby man gives judgement in any matter that seemed dubious; as we use to say, that for the Decision of any case, whose obscure aequity either our own imprudence, or interest makes us unfit to determine, we ought to referre our selves to the Arbitration of some judicious and im∣partial person, who is thence most accommodately called an Arbiter: or the Rational Faculty it self existent within us, from which the action of Judication or Arbitration it selfe doth proceed, the word signifying the Action being transferred upon the Agent; we can hardly be furnished with a more ad∣aequate and significant Appellation. But, to trace the thoughts of the first Imponents up to the original, in respect the rational faculty, being the same with the Mind or Intellect, is conver∣sant and exercised about not onely things that belong meerly to speculation, but also such as are reducible into Action or Pra∣ctise; therefore doth the term Arbitrium seem to be appro∣priated to the Faculty, chiefly in respect of things to be done, inasmuch as it is occupied in the expension or dijudication of the consequent good of those actions, and sits as it were an abso∣lute Arbiter to determine, whether they shall be done, or no.

And hence is it that when the rational faculty having perpen∣ded the convenience and inconvenience, or good and evil of its objects, and ended its act of Deliberation, adhaeres unto, or fixes upon one as more convenient then the others; this second act or Adhaesion may be in the general (i. e. in respect of things both speculable and practical) called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Assent or Approbation; but in particular (i. e. in respect only to those things that fall under action) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Election or Choice: since it supposeth the praelation of that particular thing to be put in execution, to all others objected. And in this

distinct relation was it that Aristotle (Ethicor. 3. cap. 3. in fine) styles the object elected, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, id quod caeteris propositis, & postpositis, amplectendum nobis proponimus, or, id quod sub de∣lectum cadit. This the Latines most frequently render. Consi∣lium, as in those phrases, capere consilium, sequi rationis consi∣lium, nescire quid sit alicujus consilium, &c. and Propositum, as in those, adhaerere, stare, manere in proposito, à proposito revo∣care, propositi esse tenacem, &c. and we translate into Resoluti∣on, or Determination.

Again, so soon as the Mind, its act of Consultation or Delibe∣ration being finished, hath praeferred one thing to all others, in the praesent, and determined it for the greater good, or more convenient; then immediately supervenoth the function of the Appetite, whereby the mind is carried on towards the Am∣plectence, or fruition of the Good apparent therein: and this third action the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Latines Voluntas and Volitio indifferently, and the English the Will or Act of Volition. Which we glance at per transennam, because vulgar∣ly, by the word Voluntas, men understand rather the Appetite (rational and proper only to Man) it self, then the Function or operation thereof: for which consideration, we shall in all our subsequent discourse conforme to custome, in using the terms Will and Appetit indiscriminatim, as Synonymas implying one and the same thing.

Moreover, in regard, that upon the Appetition of the Will, which is properly the actual prosecution of the good apparent in the object, there immediately succeeds the action of the Motive Faculty, therefore is the action consequent to that ap∣petition justly called Voluntary, as having bin deliberated and undertaken ex consilio, upon consultation and election, and respondent to that which the Graecian calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For that is it, whose beginning Aristotle hath decreed to be Election, in his Aphorisme, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which was the ground of Ciceros Parados, non esse actionem in rebus ina∣nimis, that there could be no action in Inanimate things, since they are devoid of the power of Election, Assent, or Approbation: and of Aristotles also, when he contended that this kind of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

or action, could not rightly, and in distinct truth, be attributed to Brute Animals, nay higher yet, not to children, for the same reason, though he willingly conceded to both 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sponta∣neous motion. Not but that by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he sometimes signifies motionem appetitus spontaneam, the spontaneous motion of the Appetite Rational, or the Will it self, as (in 3. Ethic. cap. 4.) where he constitutes this difference betwixt Volition and Election; that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Voluntas, is chiefly the end, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Election of the means conducing to that end, as in this instance, We will health, and then elect the means which in probability may ossiciate either to the conservation or restitution thereof. But when he draws his thoughts into a sharper angle, and speaks more praecisely, he allowes not every appetition, to be the Will, but only that which follows a serious deliberation, approbation and election, and is grounded upon reason, which therefore he most judiciously defines to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, boni cum ratione appetitio, an Appetition of Good with Reason.

Nor doth he always restrain the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to that Action which proceeds from the Will, or election of the Rational Appetite: but many times lets it loose to the expression of those inconsiderate actions, which result from the impulse of the Sensual; as in these words (1. Rhetor. cap. 10.) Omnia quae homines agunt, aut per se agunt, aut non per se•• ac per se quidem, aut consuetudine, aut appetitione, & ipsa quidem aut rationali, quae sit Voluntas, aut irrationali, quae sit Cupiditas & Ira; non verò per se trifariam, quatenus aut natura, aut vi, aut ex necessitate agunt. And thus much by way of Introduction concerning the several Terms, by which both ancient and mo∣dern Philosophers have most properly denoted the several succes∣sive or subordinate actions of the Mind exercised about its ob∣jects. We now convert our thoughts to explore the Quiddity or Essence of that we call Liberum Arbitrium, and wherein it doth r••dically and principally consist.

Notes

• Article 1, The Parity of Absurdities re∣sulting from those two An∣tagonistical Hypotheses, of Absolute Fa∣tality, and meer Contingency; as to the Actions of man.
• Article 2. Those 2 con∣trarie streams found to have bin derived from one and the same poyso∣nous Fountain; viz. a subter∣suge of man to evade Culpa∣bility.
• Article 3. The Authors In••i••ments, here to enquire profoundly in∣to the Natures of Free-will, Fortune, and Fate
• Article 4. What is inten∣ded properly by the Liberty of mans Will.
• Article 5. The several subordinate Actions of the Mind, exercised about its ob∣jects: and the respective scholastick Terms, by which Philoso∣phers have ad∣aequately ex∣pressed them.