Certain general reasons, prouing the lawfulnesse of the Oath of allegiance, written by R.S. priest, to his priuat friend. Whereunto is added, the treatise of that learned man, M. William Barclay, concerning the temporall power of the pope. And with these is ioyned the sermon of M. Theophilus Higgons, preached at Pauls Crosse the third of March last, because it containeth something of like argument

CHAP. XXXIIII.

NOw therefore I returne to the argument, which is propounded in the beginning of the 32. Chapter: and J answere, that it nothing belongs to the taking away of any temporall goods whatsoeuer, much lesse of a kingdome. For it is as certaine as certaine may be, that Excommunication, by which only froward & stubborn Christians are separated & excluded from the fellowship of the faithfull, and communion of the Church, doth take from no body their inheritance, and temporall goods. Vnlesse it proceed from such a cause, which the Prince hath by his lawes, especially ordained to be pu∣nished with the publication or losse of goods. In which case, not the Pope, but the Prince, not the excommu∣nication, but the constitution of the ciuil law, doth take goods away from the person excommunicate. The Pope surely cannot take any Patrimoniall right, no not from a Clergy man, though hee bee excommunicated and deposed, or degraded by himselfe. a And indeede the case were very hard of Christian people, if so be that a person excommunicate should forfeite his estate of all his lands and goods, by excommunication alone, being once passed against him, either by the law, or by any man, seeing that his goods being once seased into the Kings hands, doe scarse euer returne againe to the true owner. And so excommunication, which was appointed for a remedie and a medicine to helpe, should proue a mischieuous disease to ouerthrow. For that the per∣son excommunicate, although hee shall bee restored a∣gaine into his former estate of Grace, by washing his

fault away with due repentance, should neuer or very hardly recouer his goods againe, being once returned into the Fiske or Exchequer, & peraduenture wasted or giuen away to some body, &c.

Therefore the censures Ecclesiastical, amongst which Excommunication is the most grieuous, doe worke vp∣pon the soules, not vpon the goods and estates of the Laitie: as on the contrary, the bodies of men, and not their soules are afflicted with temporall punishments. Seeing therefore that offenders are punished with the losse of their goods by the auhority, not of the Pope, but of the Prince: Seeing I say, it is not the Pope, that taketh temporall goods from any priuate person, by the power of his Ecclesiasticall iurisdiction, and by the force and vertue of excommunication, or other censure, al∣though the same bee iust and grieuous; but the ciuill Prince onely, who to pleasure the Church, and to pro∣secute the wrong done vnto her, is accustomed by lawes enacted of himselfe, to ordaine sometime one punish∣ment, sometime an other, at his owne pleasure, vpon the contemners of the Church; how then can it be, that the Pope can by his sole Pontificiall, and Ecclesiasticke authority take away from the Prince himselfe, kingdom, principality, iurisdiction, authority, and all dominion; who hath no iudge ouer him in temporall matters, and is not subiect to any ciuil pains? Is it so sure and certaine, that the Pope hath giuen him by the law of God more authority ouer Princes, then ouer priuate persons? or are Princes tied to liue in harder tearmes in the world, then priuate persons, so as the Church may practise that vpon a Prince, which shee cannot doe vpon a priuate man?

But that the truth of this matter may as yet appeare more plainely by an other meane, I demaund of these men, if the Pope haue greater authority ouer Kings and Emperours at this day, then hee had in times past, before that he was aduanced to a temporall honour by

the bounty of Constantine and other Princes? or that his authority at this present is onely like equal altogether: I mean that which Christ conferred vpon Peter, & which no mortall man can either straighten or enlarge, and which he shall retaine neuer the lesse, although he should lose all temporall principality and gouernment? And if he haue greater authority, whence I pray you should he haue it: from God or from men? surely, neither of both can be affirmed without a manifest vs truth. For will any man euer say, that is in his right wits, that any new authority was giuen of God to the Pope ouer Christian Kings and Princes, from the time that he be∣ganne to raigne, and to exercise a ciuill gouernment in certaine places, and to shew himselfe in mens eyes both with a Crowne and Miter on his head? or if he should say it, were he able to make it good by any reason or au∣thority? much lesse hath any such authority accre••ed to him from men, because as it is commonly said, Actus agentium non operantur vltra ipsorum voluntatem b.

And although Christian Kings and Emperours, who haue and doe submit their neckes in spirituall causes to the Vicar of Christ, (such as only professe the orthodo∣xall faith) yet none of them all passed into the temporall iurisdiction and authoritie of the Pope; none of them, but reserued to himselfe free and vntouched his secular iurisdiction. But if peraduenture it bee found that any hath done otherwise, the same is to be reckoned as an ex∣ception, by which the rule in non exceptis, is more strong∣lie confirmed. Out of this foundation, which is laid vp∣on most certaine reason, a very good argument may bee framed in this manner:

• The Pope hath no greater authoritie ouer Christi∣an Princes temporall, then hee had before hee was a temporall Prince himselfe.
• But before he was a ten porall Prince, he had no temporall authoritie ouer them any way.
• Ergo, Neither hath he now any ouer them.

The truth of the Proposition is so plaine, that I neede not vnderset it with other arguments: but the Aslump∣tion is proued thus:

• No inferiour and subiect hath authority ouer his su∣periour and Lord, that he may iudge him in that wherein he is subiect.
• But the Pope before he was a temporall Prince, was inferiour and subiect to Kings and Emperours, as concerning temporall matters.
• Ergo, hee had no temporall authority ouer them, that hee might iudge them in temporalties.

The proposition also of this Svllogisme is out of all question, seeing no man can be iudged but by his supe∣riour: a superiour I meane in that very point, whereof the iudgement is made. For as we haue often said, Par in parem non habet imperium. And in nature it cannot be, that one and the same person should be both inferiour & superiour; in the same kind of authority, in respect of one and the same matter, no more then that the same man should be Father and Son in respect of one and the same. And the same reason doth Bellarmine vse to proue that the Pope cannot submit himselfe to the coactiue sen∣tence of Councels c. The Assumption is confessed by the aduersaries, when as they affirme, and clearely con∣firme by reasons, That the exception, (vnlesse you wil say, exemption) of Cleriques in ciuill causes, aswell concerning their persons, as Gods, was brought or by the law of man d. For, (as Augustine witnesseth) humane lawes be the lawes of Emperours, because God hath distributed to mankind the humane lawes themselues by the Emperours and Kings of the world. Therefore the Clergy haue from Emperours and Kings whatsoeuer exemption and immunity it is, which now they enioy all the world ouer in ciuil causes, as we shewed in the last Chapter before. And that euen of their meere and free bounty; for they could not bee enforced in any sort by the Church, to grant the Clergy those priuiledges, seeing it is not found to be expressed &

prouided by no law of God. And the law of Christ de∣priueth no man of his proper right & interest, as thēselus confesse, & we haue often signified. And therfore as their owne learning carieth; Bishops ought to be subiect to Kings in temporalties, and Kings to Bishops in spiritualties. By all this discourse it followeth, that Clergie men were bound by the common law of other Citizens in ciuill and temporall matters, and were alike subiect to the au∣thoritie of secular Iudges, as well as the other inhabi∣tants of the Cities, before that they were by godly Prin∣ces endewed with these Priuiledges, of exemptions: and many holy Popes haue honestly confessed, that in this case there is no difference betweene the Bishop of Rome or the Pope, and other Clergie persons. Therefore that which might be done, let vs suppose it was done, that is, that the Pope being as yet inuested in no temporall principalitie, or priuiledge, doth liue vnder the go∣uernement of an other prince, as his fellow Bishops, and Brethren in France, Spaine and Britanie, and in o∣ther kingdomes doe. Would it not be euinced by the necessity of the former argument, that he cannot iudge and punish Princes in temporalties, to whome hee is temporally subiect? Therefore he hath either purcha∣sed a greater authority ouer Kinges and Emperours, then he had before, through the exemptions and pri∣uiledges granted euen by them; or else he cannot as yet iudge them in temporalties.

But if any bee so fond perhaps to say, that the Pope hath alwaies had this authority from the first beginning of the Church, viz. to iudge and depose euill princes, but through the iniurie of the times hee hath by acci∣dent been hindered, that he could not exercise it: so long as hee was subiect to them touching the temporal∣ties: But now, after that hee hath withdrawne his necke from the temporall yoake of princes, & made himselfe a temporall princes, there is nothing to hin∣der, but that hee may freely put in vre that iurisdicti∣on.

I say if any shall vse this vaine ostentation, I must answere him nothing else, but that the things he spea∣keth are not onely false, but also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, vnpossible: setting those things downe which the aduersaries con∣fesse, and which is most true, that is to say, that the Popes before such time, as they were by godly Princes clearely exempted from temporal iurisdiction, were sub∣iect to them both de iure and de facto. For it is impossible that at that time they should haue that power; for that it is not competent, but by right of superiority. Now it implieth a contradiction, that the Pope was by right superiour, and by right inferiour, at the same time, & in the same kind of authority, in respect of one and the same; and the naturall order of things doth not permit that the inferiour, or subiect should commaund his superiour and Ruler. Seeing therefore it is both absurd and impious to imagine that our Sauiour Christ, qui non venit soluere legem sed adimplere; should constitute and appoint any thing against the law of nature, and the most holy rule of life, they must needes bee in a great error, who affirme that this soueraigne authority, wher∣of we speake, was by Christ conferred on Peter, and in his persō on the rest of the Bishops who succeeded him, when as they bring nothing to proue the same but cer∣taine farre fetched reasons, and full weake, patched vp together; of similitudes, comparisons, allegories, and such like stuffe, as you may see by that which wee haue refuted. All which are to be reiected and little esteemed, when as by the position and granting of them, some ab∣surditie doth follow, as in this point, or when as more probable and strong reasons grounded vpon the au∣thority of Scriptures and Fathers do maintain the con∣trary opinion.

The last argument of Bellarmine is behinde, in the re∣futation whereof we shall not neede to take much paines. The third argument (saith he) is this: A Shepheard may and ought so to feede his sheepe, as is conuenient for them. Ergo,

the Pope may, and ought, command Christians those things, and inforce them to these things, to which euery one of them in his condition is bound: that is, constraine euery one to serue God in that manner, wherein they ought according to their state and condition. But Kings ought to serue God by defen∣ding of the Church, and by punishing heretickes and schisma∣tickes. Therefore he may and ought to command Kings that they doe it, and vnlesse they doe it, to enforce them by excom∣munication, and other conuenient meanes.

Surely I see not what is contained in this argument, which either confirmes or infirmes the temporall autho∣ritie of the Pope. For the beginning thereof is necessari∣lie to be vnderstood of spirituall foode. Now the Popes reuenewes, although they be great, would not suffice to feede all sheepe with corporall pasture; and so the end also and conclusion must be vnderstood of spitituall co∣ercion and compulsion: for hee saith, to enforce by Ex∣communication, and other conuenient meanes, (meaning) Ecclesiasticall For the Pope is an Ecclesiasticke, not a temporall Shepheard, but only so farre as at this day hee hath temporall rule in certaine places. Therefore wee grant the whole argument and freely confesse and pro∣fesse, that the Pope by his spirituall authoritie may com∣mand all Princes, and enioine them to doe those things which appertaine to their safetie and theirs; and vnlesse they doe it, also to enforce by excommunication, and other conuenient meanes. But the conuenient meanes are all spi∣rituall meanes, and not temporall, vnlesse they bee pra∣ctised by a temporall Magistrate. The which point Iohn Driedo obseruing in his bookes of Christian libertie, after that he had declared that these two authorities and iuris∣dictions were by the Law of God distinct in the Church, and that all secular authoritie in spirituall matters was sub∣iect to the Popes authoritie, so as the Pope, in regard of his pastorall charge, hath authoritie ouer a Christian Emperour, euen as a spirituall Father ouer a sonne, and as a Shepheard ouer his sheepe; that he may iudge and correct him, if he should

fall into heresie, or denie publike iustice to the poore and oppres∣sed, or should enact Lawes to the preiudice of the Christian faith. (all which things we also affirme) he setteth downe no other paine or punishment against Emperours so of∣fending, but excommunication alone, because he knew that the Popes authoritie and iurisdiction was content with spirituall punishments, and could goe no further, vnlesse shee would runne out in the borders of temporall authoritie, and inuade a forraine iurisdiction, which by the Law of God is distinct and separate from his. Now this is no conuenient meane, which the aduersaries vse, of deposing ill Princes from their gouernment; but ra∣ther of all other meanes inconuenient: both for that it hath scarce euer succeeded happily to the Popes them∣selues, or the Church, but is accustomed to bring into the Church and Christian Common wealth, infinite ca∣lamities, by intestine discords, schismes, and ciuill warres: as also, because in respect of the Pope, to whom spiritu∣all matters onely are committed, such a meane must needes seeme very strange, and to proceede from an v∣surped authoritie. And therefore it is to be iudged i nei∣ther conuenient, nor iust, nor possible. Hitherto haue I weighed in the ballance of naked and open truth, accor∣ding to the slendernesse of my wit, all the reasons, and from those reasons the arguments, whereby Bellarmine endeuoureth to prooue that the Pope hath supreme au∣thority ouer secular Princes, indirecte, indirectly.

Notes

• a

  Cap. cum •• non ab homi∣ne. de iudic.
• b

  L. non omnis 19 D••de reb. ••••ed
• c

  Lib. 1. de Conciljs c••. 18.
• d

  Bell. b. 1. de Cler. cap. vlt.
• i

  L. Fitius 15. D de cond in∣stit. l. 4. §. con∣demnatum. D. dereiudic.