Sermons preached upon several occasions by the Right Reverend Father in God, John Wilkins ...

The Thirteenth Sermon.

PHIL. IV.5.

Let your moderation be known unto all men, the Lord is at hand.

THESE Words are among several other precepts and counsels which seem to have no connexion with one ano∣ther, and therefore I shall handle them absolutely without any reference to the Context.

And there are these three parts con∣siderable in the words:

• 1. A Duty enjoined, Moderation.
• 2. The extent or manner of its being exercised, it must be known unto all men.
• 3. A reason or argument to enforce it, The Lord is at hand.

I have severed the Text into these parts for the more orderly explication

of the several Terms contained in it.

I. Concerning the virtue enjoined, your Moderation, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. In the Original 'tis an Adjective put Substan∣tively, wherein there is a peculiar ele∣gance and Emphasis. The Syriac and Arabic render it mansuetudo, meekness. The Vulgar, Arias Montanus, and others, modestia, modesty, a composedness of life and manners. The Aethiopic, Auto∣ritas vestra, your Autority; for which there seems to be very little ground in the signification of the word. Others Humanitas: Our old Translation did ren∣der it by the word Patience. And the same original word is by our present Translation so rendred, 1 Tim. 3.3. Not given to filthy lucre, but patient, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ sometimes 'tis translated cle∣mency or courtesie, Act. 24.4. sometimes gentleness, 2 Cor, 10.1. Titus 3.2. Iam. 3.17. 1 Pet. 2.18.

The Hebrews express the same notion by three words, derived from the root 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The one signifying re∣ctitude, the other readiness to pardon, the other Peace.

The Philosopher in his Ethicks, where he treats particularly of it, makes it to be a species or branch of Iustice, where∣by

we are directed and inclined to sup∣ply that by right reason, which is not provided for in the words of the writ∣ten Law. Because 'tis not possible in the making of general Rules or Laws to foresee all such particular cases and cir∣cumstances as may happen. Therefore that habit whereby a man is inabled and inclined to deal according to the equi∣table sense of the Law, and to allow for such particular circumstances as may make a real difference in several Cases, this is styled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or equity, which is a moral virtue placed betwixt the two extremes of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 rigour, or sum∣mum jus on the one hand, insisting too much upon the letter; and relaxatio nimia, remitting too much from the true sense of it, on the other hand. Now both these extremes, the excess and the defect being evidently vices, it must thence necessarily follow, that the me∣dium betwixt them must be a virtue, and have in it the obligation of a duty.

So that he who in those things which the Law-giver could not particularly provide for doth judg according to the equitable sense of the Law, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an equal Magistrate. And he who in such a case is willing to depart from his

own strict right, out of compliance with that meaning which the Legislator would in such a case have particularly determined could he have foreseen it, is homo aequus, as a private person.

But now besides this forinsecal no∣tion of the word as it refers to positive Laws, and the dispensation of justice, there may yet be another more general sense of it, with relation to all kind of differences and contests amongst men, whether in matters of Opinion or Inte∣rest; wherein they should demean them∣selves towards one another with such a kind of temper as may be mutually best for all, and may in the various changes and revolutions of things, most pro∣mote the good of mankind. And so 'tis a virtue inclining us to such a kind of benign and equitable temper in our con∣versing with one another, whereby we may endeavour to preserve concord and amity in our treating concerning those things about which we differ.

There are some virtues that go un∣der several names, and yet are of the same family and very near of kin, being differenced rather modally than specifical∣ly, from the quality and condition of the person by whom they are to be exercised.

So the same virtue which in the genera∣lity of men we call meekness and gentle∣ness, this in superiours is styled▪ clemen∣cy, which is lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem. Not that it hath any differ∣ent form or act, but is only distinguish∣ed by the object towards whom 'tis ex∣ercised, namely towards those of an in∣ferior rank. And thus it is with this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is a kind of meekness, with this peculiar difference that it re∣fers more especially to matters of con∣troversie, and doth always incline to the most amicable and gentle way in judging of and accommodating of things, and such a prudent relaxation of the utmost rigor, as right reason shall direct according to the variety of cases and circumstances.

And this I conceive to be the most proper notion of this word, according to its true scope and extent. There are several other virtues of affinity to it, be∣ing either fruits or concomitants of it, which I may have occasion to speak of afterwards.

II. The Second particular observed in the words, was the extent or manner of this virtues being exercised, it must be known unto all men, which phrase may signifie three these things.

1. Those manifest and real proofs we are to give of this Virtue; which must be such as may be seen and known unto all men. It must not only be internal as to our temper and frame of mind, but external too in all our dealings and car∣riage towards others.

2. That it be signal and eminent as to the degree of it, as being one of those properties whereby Christians are to be distinguished from other Professions and Sects of men in the world. Their light must so shine before men, that others see∣ing their good works, may speak well of them. They must adorn the doctrine they profess, by such a demeanour as may win over others to a love of it.

3. That it be universal as to the ex∣tent of it, both in regard of the Acts, Objects and Occasions of it, by shewing equity and moderation in all businesses, towards all persons, as well inferiors as superiors, the unconverted Gentiles, and the contentious Iews; that neither of these may have any just ground to accuse our good conversation. 'Tis no difficult matter for men to be fair and kind, and moderate towards such as are of the same way, and agree with them in the main. This is but a common and low

attainment, and is not thank-worthy, doth not deserve any peculiar commen∣dation. The rules of Christianity do oblige to a greater extent of it, namely that it should be towards all men.

III. The Third particular observed in the words is the reason or argument to enforce this duty, The Lord is at hand, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, propè, he is near. Which phrase is capable of various senses. It may re∣fer either,

1. To his presence with us, and know∣ledg of our actions. He always looks on, and takes notice what our carriage and demeanour is; whether it be with that gentleness and equity towards others, as his is towards us. He observes all our ways, and therefore we had need to demean our selves as being under his eye.

2. Sometimes this phrase of Gods being near doth refer to approaching judgments. So the time of the destructi∣on of Ierusalem is styled the coming of the day of Christ, when he should exe∣cute temporal judgments upon his ene∣mies. Upon which account St. Iohn styles that age by the name of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the last hour, 1 Ioh. 2.18. So likewise is that place interpreted, Heb. 10.37.

Ye have need of patience, for yet a little while, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and he that shall come will come and will not tarry. The scope of it being to comfort them that were ready to fall off from Christianity, upon the persecution of the Iews, amongst whom the Hebrew Christians lived.

3. He is near in respect of his com∣ing to Judgment, and that in a twofold respect.

1. In regard of every mans particu∣lar judgment at the time of his death. 'Tis but a little while that we are to continue in this world, we must shortly die, none of these lesser things are worth our eager contention. We should so de∣mean our selves at the present, as may bring us comfort at the last.

2. In respect of the general Judg∣ment. That time cannot be far off, The end of all things is at hand, 1 Pet. 4.7. He that shall come will come and will not tarry. The Iudg is at the door, Iam. 5.9. There are several passages in the New Testament, which seem to intimate as if the Christians in the Apostles times did expect that this day should come before the end of that generation. Which St. Paul doth caution them against, 2 Thes.

2.2. Be not soon shaken in mind or trou∣bled as if the day of Christ were at hand. So near at hand it was not. The belief and expectation of that, as if this were the sense of those Prophecies concerning it, might upon the disappointment of it, prove a temptation to unbelief and Apo∣stasie from the Christian faith: And therefore the Apostle thinks fit to rectifie that mistake and prevent the further progress of it. But yet since no man knew when that day and hour would come, Christians ought always to de∣mean themselves as if it were at hand, and to live in a continual expectation of that time when Christ shall come to judg the world and to vindicate his Saints: When he shall render to every man according to his works, to them who by a moderate demeanour of themselves, amidst the various conditions of this life, and by a patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honour, eternal life. But to them that are violent and contentious, tribulation and anguish, Rom. 2.7, 8. And therefore there is upon this account very good reason why our moderation should be known unto all men.

The words thus explained will afford this Observation:

'Tis the duty of Christians to give signal testimony of their equity and moderation upon all occasions of difference and contest with one another: Not to insist upon the utmost rigour of things, but to be ready to comply with all such gentle and pru∣dent expedients, as may help to heal and accommodate the differences a∣mongst them.

Though this word Moderation do but seldom occur in Scripture, being scarce any where else used but here: yet that which is the substance and meaning of it, is frequently commanded, and the contrary thereunto prohibited, under different expressions in other places of Scripture. This some conceive to be the sense of that place, Eccles. 7.7. Be not righteous over much, neither make thy self over wise, why shouldst thou destroy thy self. (i. e.) insist not upon the utmost extre∣mity of things, as if it were wisdom to take all the advantages you could from the strict letter of the Law. This were the readiest way to destroy your self by teaching other men to do the like a∣gainst

you; there being no safety for any one, if every one must use another ac∣cording to the utmost rigour. Prov. 19.11. It is the glory of a man to pass over a transgression. Men may think to get the repute of strictness and zeal by being rigid and severe towards the failings of others: But 'tis a much more glorious thing to shew gentleness and forbear∣ance towards them; It argues a man to have a noble and generous mind, and a real sense of humanity.

There are several other expressions to this purpose in the New Testament. As Ephes. 4.1, 2. I beseech you that ye walk worthy of that vocation wherewith ye are called, in all lowliness and meekness, with long suffering, forbearing one another in love. v. 32. And be ye kind to one ano∣ther, tender hearted, forgiving one ano∣ther, even as God for Christs sake hath forgiven you.

Phil. 2.3. Let nothing be done through strife or vain glory, but in lowliness of mind let each esteem others better than themselves. v. 14.

Gentleness is reckoned as the fruit of the Spirit, Gal. 5.22. A mark of that wisdom which is from above, Iam. 3.17. an inseparable property of the servant of

the Lord, who must not strive, but be gentle, shewing all meekness to all men, 2 Tim. 2.24.

Finally Brethren, have compassion one of another, be pitiful, be courteous, not rendring evil for evil, or railing for rail∣ing, but contrarywise blessing, 1 Pet. 3.8, 9.

It were easie to back these precepts by several examples out of Scripture. That of Abraham's carriage in the con∣test betwixt him and his Nephew Lot, who for peace sake was willing to re∣cede from his own right, and give him his choice, that there might be no strife betwixt them, because they were brethren, Gen. 13.8.

That of our Saviour in his yielding ••o pay tribute for the avoiding of of∣fence, to which in strictness he was not obliged, Mat. 17.27. He was the great ••xemplar as of all others, so particular∣ly of this Christian grace. I beseech you brethren by the meekness and gentleness of Christ, 2 Cor. 10.1.

St. Paul himself was as eminent for the practice of this duty, as for the pres∣sing of it upon others: In his becoming all things to all men, 1 Cor. 9.22. and in pleasing all men in all things, not seek∣ing

his own profit, but the profit of many, that they might be saved, 1 Cor. 10.33.

Suitable to this was that carriage of the Council of the Apostles, Act. 15. in their not insisting upon the strict right of things, but accommodating those Controversies of the Primitive times about the Iewish Rites, by such a Mode∣rate expedient, as might most effectu∣ally heal and compose those diffe∣rences.

There are two kinds of Reasons by which I would confirm the necessity of this duty. In respect of God and Man.

1. In respect of God.

• 1. He is at hand.
• 2. He deals so with us.

1. He is at hand; which is the Argu∣ment in the Text, He is near, being al∣ways about our paths, and about our beds, he spies out all our goings. He observes our carriage, to animadvert upon our failings, to assist and relieve us in our necessities, so that we need not fear any prejudice from others upon this ac∣count. If they shall from our Moderati∣on be so much the more ready to injure us, He will be as ready to vindicate and reward us. Psal. 76.9. He will arise to

judgment, to save all the meek of the earth; here in this life. But besides, he is near in respect of that final judgment and ac∣count he will call us unto at the last:

Either

• 1. Particular.
• 2. General.

1. Particular at every mans death, that time cannot be far off. When a few days are come we must all go to the place whence we shall not return. Then all other things will forsake us and vanish away, and nothing will be of any real value to us, but the conscience of well-doing, which will go along with us, and abide with us for ever. Men are here apt to put the greatest estimate upon those things that concern their secular inte∣rests and advantages, whereas such mat∣ters will be of little use to us then: And 'tis usually mens being immersed in these lesser designs about some worldly selfish advantage that makes them more eager and fierce about other matters of difference.

They that are of a narrow contracted soul in respect of their possessions, have not usually any largeness or generosity of mind in reference to opinion.

2. He is at hand likewise in respect

of his general judgment; when he will not only judg the world in equity, as the Psalmist speaks, Psal. 98.9. but for their equity likewise; when there shall be a particular account required of men for their works of Mercy, Kindness and Pity, and according as their carriage hath been in these respects here, so shall their condition be hereafter; when there shall be special notice taken of mens severe and rigorous demeanour in beating and insulting over their fellow-servants. How can such persons answer it then, when they shall expect mercy for themselves, and yet have not been ready to shew it to others? God hath told us that he will not forgive us here, without this readiness to forgive our brethren; and therefore we have no reason to expect it from him hereafter.

2. Which brings me to the second branch of this first Reason, we should deal so with others because God deals so with us. He is kind to the unthankful and the evil. Be ye therefore merciful as your heavenly Father is merciful: 'Tis our Sa∣viours inference, Luk. 6.36. It were not possible that the world should subsist one moment, if it were not that his mercy did moderate the rigour of his

justice. If he should be severe to mark what is done amiss, who might abide it? Every minute we deserve hell, and might expect to be cast into it. It is be∣cause his compassions fail not, that we are not consumed. He considers what we are able to do and to suffer; He knows our frame and remembers that we are but dust; He chastiseth us with the rod of a man; and doth never grieve will∣ingly or afflict the children of men: And all this he doth upon this very ground, that we might from hence learn to deal so with others. The less gentle and mo∣derate we are in our dealings with others, by so much the less sense have we of the guilt and danger of our own sins, and the less experience of Gods love and mercy in the pardon of them.

That's a remarkable Parable to this purpose, Mat. 18.23. concerning the Servant who being indebted to his Lord ten thousand Talents, was yet forgiven out of great compassion. After which he did notwithstanding rigorously ex∣act from his fellow-servant an hundred pence. You know what sentence was passed upon him for it, Serve nequam, v. 32. O thou wicked servant, I forgive thee all thy debt, shouldst thou not also have

had compassion on thy fellow servant, even as I had pity on thee? And his Lord was wroth and delivered him to the tormentors. So likewise shall my heavenly Father do unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses.

The second kind of Reasons which I proposed for the enforcing of this Duty was in respect of men, with reference to whom this virtue of Moderation will appear to be a thing,

I. Most reasonable and fitting in it self, considering the

• ...Fallibility of humane judgment.
• ...Mutability of humane affairs.

II. Most beneficial and advantageous for the good of men, both in regard of

• Our own private welfare.
• The good of humane Societies in general.

I. 'Tis a thing most reasonable and fitting in it self, because of the Fallibi∣lity of humane judgment: And that not only from the impotence of our fa∣culties, and the prejudices we are liable unto upon the account of interests, which will strangely biass a mans judg∣ment against clear evidence: But like∣wise from the difficulty and obscurity of things; there being 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 every∣where,

not only in Nature and Scripture, but likewise in Political things, and the ordinary concernments of humane af∣fairs, whether matters of Right, or of Fact: the most learned and inquisitive men many times differing in their judg∣ments concerning matters of Right: and as for matters of Story and Fact that are variously reported, if a man hath not been an eye-witness of them him∣self, it cannot be but that he must give credit to them according to that esteem and opinion which he hath of the per∣sons by whom they are related. All which put together shew how exceed∣ing difficult and next to impossible it is, that men should ever agree in the same apprehension of things. There is no considering man who hath with any se∣rious thoughts reflected upon the com∣mon state and condition of mankind in this respect but must needs own and acknowledg the truth of that Saying, Pauci res ipsas sequuntur, plures nomina rerum, plurimi nomina Magistrorum.

The generality of men being carried away by the Names of Leaders and Par∣ties, taking up opinions by the bulk and in the gross, as they are owned and professed by that Party of men amongst whom they are listed.

Many are swayed by the prejudice of the Names of things either for or against a thing. If an opinion or a design do but pretend to such a Name, they do ac∣cordingly either receive or reject it, without examining how far it doth re∣ally promote or prejudice the thing they aim at.

And as for the Nature of things in themselves, there are but few, very few, who set themselves to any serious im∣partial inquiry concerning them.

Now I say, he that considers the ma∣nifold mistakes which the judgments of men are liable unto upon these ac∣counts, he must, unless he will go out of the world (as the Apostle speaks up∣on another occasion) demean himself towards others, with this tenderness and moderation as to the things about which they differ.

2. From the mutability of Humane affairs, which in their most secure and flourishing estate are subject to revolu∣tions: It being beyond the contrivance of humane wisdom, to establish things unto such a fixedness as shall exempt them from change; but many times those very courses which wise men take for the setling and securing of things,

and which may in themselves have a natural aptitude to that purpose, are by the Providence of God made use of as the means and occasions of trouble and change:

Ludit in humanis divina potentia rebus.

He that hath not yet learnt this lesson upon the experience of all those various revolutions we have seen in these latter Times may deserve to be taught it, as Gideon taught the men of Succoth with briars and thorns, Iudg. 8.16.

Nothing is more obvious to any ob∣serving man than this, That when re∣volutions have happened men make this their security and refuge, that they have in the former state of things de∣meaned themselves with moderation, and have by many kindnesses and civili∣ties obliged such as differed from them. And this, if any thing can, redounds to their advantage afterwards, especially if they have to do with such as have any true greatness or generosity of mind. Indeed if there were any certain way to fix the state of things unto such an im∣mutable stability as could not alter, it would upon that account be more excu∣sable

for a man to act with an uniform vigor and severity against every one that differed. But supposing the meer possibility of change, nothing can be more irrational than to demean our selves so towards others with that harsh∣ness and severity as to render our selves incapable of receiving any kindness from them. I do not speak this out of any compliance with that Machiavilian principle which directs a man to en∣gage no further in any good cause than he can safely retreat. Every worthy man should with fidelity and courage assert the cause he is well perswaded of; But it should be without all kind of fierceness and bitterness against the persons of others, with as much for∣bearance and gentleness as the nature of the thing will bear.

Considering that continual mutabili∣ty which every condition is liable unto, and which no humane wisdom can fore∣see and prevent, that kind of demeanour is most rational, which may be most beneficial and safe as to our own parti∣culars, and mutually best for all others. Which brings me to the other Branch of this second Reason.

II. This virtue is most advantageous for the good of men.

1. In regard of every mans private quiet and welfare in particular. It will help to establish a mans title to these earthly things both with reference to

• His Possession of them.
• His Fruition of them.

Psal. 37.11. The meek shall inherit the earth, and shall delight themselves in the abundance of peace. Which is afterward repeated by our Saviour, Mat. 5.5. and again in another place, Learn of me for I am meek and lowly, and ye shall find rest for your souls, Mat. 11.29. The most effectual means to attain unto a quiet state of life with others, is to carry our selves gently and kindly to them, v. 7. of this Chapter, And the peace of God which passeth all understanding shall keep your hearts and minds through Christ Iesus, 1 Pet. 3.10. The Apostle having exhor∣ted them to be pitiful and courteous, not rendring evil for evil, or railing for rail∣ing, but contrariwise blessing, he presently subjoins, he that will love life and see good days, let him keep his tongue from evil, let him seek peace and ensue it. And then presently after, Who is he that will

harm you if you be followers of that which is good? No such way to render our lives quiet, comfortable and safe, as to demean our selves with candor and in∣genuity towards those with whom we converse: And that not only in respect of the effects and consequences of such carriage, but from the nature of the thing it self; it supposeth a calm and se∣date temper of mind. Whereas on the other side, that eagerness and fierceness of disposition, whereby a man is apt to be transported with heats and severity in matters of contest, as it doth suppose such aestuations and storms as are incon∣sistent with inward serenity, so likewise will it occasion outward trouble and opposition from others. They who are always biting of others, will be in con∣tinual danger of being devoured by others, Gal. 5.15. Those two qualities of hateful and hating one another, are joined together as usual concomitants, Tit. 3.3. they who are apt to demean themselves as hating of others, will thereby be rendred hateful to them.

2. This vertue will be very advan∣tageous to the peace and welfare of hu∣mane society in the general, which doth very much depend upon the mutual

condescension and forbearance of men towards one another, in the things a∣bout which they differ: It being utterly impossible, considering the infirmity and prejudice to which our judgments are liable, that we should always agree in the same apprehension of things. If upon every difference men should think themselves obliged to prosecute matters to the utmost height and rigour, such eager persons may easily from hence be induced to have recourse to Arms ra∣ther than such precious things as truth and justice shall suffer; and being once thus engaged, it will be impossible (if they will act consistently) to end their differences by any accommodation, they must fight it out to the last till one side be wholly subdued and destroyed. And thus would men grow wild and savage, the benefits of Society would be lost, and mankind destroyed out of the world.

'Tis this moderation and calmness of spirit which takes men off from their natural wildness and ferity, which tames and fits them for society. The less any man hath of it, the more doth he dege∣nerate and draw near to the nature of brute creatures. The true notion of

Gentileness and Nobility consisting in these kind of qualifications, whereby a man is fitted for a sociable condition.

Now the design of Christianity be∣ing to promote the good of mankind and the peace of Societies, therefore doth the Doctrine of it so frequently insist upon those kind of virtues and graces which are most conducible to this end. And therefore upon all these accounts the truth of the Doctrine will appear very evident, viz. That 'tis the duty of Christians to give signal testi∣mony of their equity and moderation upon all occasions of difference and con∣tests with one another.

There remains only one Objection to be briefly answered, and I shall proceed to Application. 'Tis this,

How may this consist with that zeal and strictness of duty which we are obli∣ged unto?

To this it may be answered: 1. That zeal doth properly consist in an intenti∣on of mind, and earnestness of affe∣ction in the prosecuting of such things as are our duty, and in opposing such things whereby we are hindred in the

performance of our duty. Now suppo∣sing moderation to be a duty, a man ought to be zealous for this grace, and against all such persons and things as are enemies and hindrances of it. So that these things are not opposite, but consistent with, and subservient to one another.

And as for that other Branch of the Objection concerning strictness and ex∣actness of duty, from which a man ought not to deviate out of compliance with others. To this it may be said, That strictness is properly a keeping close to the Law. Now 'tis not the na∣ked letter, but the sense and meaning that is the Law. And that man may be said to be most strict in his obedience, who doth most exactly comply with this. A man may violate the Law by ob∣serving the Letter, and he may keep the Law by going against the letter.

Now Divine Laws themselves are capable of relaxation, which is the mean∣ing of that Proverbial saying so frequent in Scripture, That God will have mercy and not sacrifice. And therefore much more will humane Laws admit of it.

There are these three things I would insist upon in the Application of this Point.

1. First, To enquire whether we our selves are such as the Apostle doth here require Christians to be.

2. And then secondly, if not, that we would endeavour to be convinced of that deformity and mischief which there is in the want of this Grace.

3. Lastly that we would be perswa∣ded to be more careful in the attaining, improving, and exercising of this Grace for the future.

1. To enquire whether we our selves are such as the Apostle doth here require Christians to be; such as upon all occa∣sions of difference are ready to give sig∣nal testimony of our gentleness and mo∣deration. There are these two ways whereby this may be discovered, name∣ly by the

• Fruits and Concomitants.
• Vniversality and extent of it.

1. By the fruits and concomitants of this virtue. Some have questioned whe∣ther this word do denote any single vir∣tue, and not rather a complexion of many together. 'Tis certain that there are several other virtues of near affinity to this, such as are either the effects or concomitants of this virtue, by which

the reality of it may be known. Of these I shall mention six.

1. Mutual forbearance towards one another, not taking all the advantages we may have of vindicating our selves, making allowance for the infirmity of those by whom we are injured. We that are strong ought to bear with the in∣firmities of the weak, and not to please our selves, but our neighbour for his good: For even Christ pleased not himself. Rom. 15.1. We are to comfort the feeble-minded, and to support the weak, 1 Thes. 5 14; not to be harsh and rigorous towards them.

2. A readiness to forgive and conceal the manifest injuries of others, when either the glory of God or the good of men either publick or private shall re∣quire it of us. That very expression which is translated ready to forgive, Psal. 89.5. is by the Septuagint rendred by the same word in the Text, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

3. Long-suffering, both with respect to Patience and Hope; not easily provo∣ked to passions, being slow to anger; not suddenly tired or discouraged by the continuance of the things we suffer, or the delay of the things we hope for. 1 Cor. 13.4. Charity suffereth long, and

is kind. vers. 7. It beareth all things, hopeth all things.

4. Benignity, kindness, courtesie; a readiness to do good, to help and shew favour to those by whom we have been injured; such an affable, amiable carri∣age as may win upon them; not harsh, scornful, churlish; over-coming evil with good; a forwardness to promote love and peace with them, though it be by receding from somewhat of our own right. Being favourable in our in∣terpretation of the words and actions of others. Approving what is good in them; not aggravating what is evil; taking doubtful matters in the best sense; chusing rather to offend by too much mildness than by too much severity.

5. Aequanimity, meekness, gentleness; such a sedateness of mind, whereby a man is not easily transported to any high passions; not difficultly appeased, espe∣cially upon submission and repentance. Such an evenness and smoothness of disposition, as doth not only serve to attemper anger, but to add a sweetness and placidness to our carriage. An equal state of mind under the variety of out∣ward conditions, without being elated or dejected by them, Knowing how to

want, and how to abound. When our hearts are not immersed in any of these earthly things, beyond their real worth and usefulness.

6. And lastly, Easiness to be intreated, when a man is exorable without the violence of importunity; Not stiff and tenacious in matters of opinion beyond what the great evidence and impor∣tance of things doth require. Manage∣ing the business of our converse with others, without murmurings and dispu∣tings, Phil. 2.14. This same disputaci∣ty, or aptness to contend for victory, is no small occasion of discord amongst men. And on the contrary, this willing∣ness to condescend, not leaning too much to our own understanding, is a special means to promote amity and peace amongst them. This very word in the Text being used by the Apostle, 1 Tim. 3.3. is there by Beza interpre∣ted to be of the same sense with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, apt to yield and submit, non facilè contentiosus, not easily provoked to con∣tentious disputes nor pertinacious in them.

Let a man look over the whole Do∣ctrine of the Gospel in the New Testa∣ment, and he shall find that there is not

any other virtue or duty whatsoever so often and so earnestly inculcated as those of this nature; as if our Saviour had de∣signed to fix upon these, as being the grand Criteria whereby his Followers should be distinguished from all other Sects and Professions of men in the world.

Now if we desire to make enquiry concerning our own conditions in this respect, these are some of those Conco∣mitants, effects, properties whereby this moderation is to be discerned.

2. Another Rule whereby we may examine our conformity to this precept in the Text is the Vniversality and ex∣tent of it; whether we exercise it to∣wards all men, in all times, upon all occasions. They that are for moderati∣on in the managing of affairs at one time, and yet perhaps at another will look upon it as an argument of disaf∣fection and style it by the name of lukewarmness and detestable neutrality, such persons cannot be said to love the virtue of Moderation but the blessing and happiness of it. They are only for the passive not the active part, to re∣ceive it from others not to shew it to them. And to how narrow a compass

an enquiry by this Rule will confine this Grace, amidst the several pretenders to it, I need not say.

2. In the next place we may hence be convinced of that deformity and mis∣chief which there is in the want of this Grace. It renders a man,

• 1. Vnlike to God.
• 2. Vnacceptable to men.
• 3. Pernicious to himself.

1. It renders a man unlike to God; in conformity to whom all our excellen∣cy and happiness doth consist. He is the Father of Mercies, the God of all consola∣tion. His appearance was in the soft and still voice, 1 King. 19.10, 11; not in whirlwinds and Hurricanes: where there is spiritus procellae, it proceeds from another principle. Christ is the Prince of peace, the great Exemplar of meekness. 'Tis prophesied of him that he shall come down like dew on a fleece of wool, like rain on the mowen grass, Psal. 72.6. He shall not cry, nor his voice be heard in the street, Isa. 42.2. The Holy Ghost was pleased to appear in the shape of a Dove, the emblem of Meekness. Simplex animal & laetum, non felle ama∣rum, non morsibus saevum, non unguium laceratione violentum. The true Church

is styled by the name of the Lilly amongst thorns: the Lilly doth not scratch and tear, that's the property of thorns and briars. Christians are the Sheep and Lambs. Quid facit in pectore Christiano luporum feritas, Canum rabies? saith the same Father.

2. Vnacceptable to men; as being a∣gainst that common peace and quiet which 'tis every mans interest to pro∣mote. It seems very obvious for men to reflect what thoughts they have had concerning such persons as have been the chief drivers on of several interests, in those wild revolutions we have seen of late; how we have looked upon them as Incendiaries and enemies to publick peace. If it be said that the case is now altered, and we have a right side, and a good cause; This ought to be most free∣ly owned, and acknowledged with all thankfulness: But yet 'tis farther consi∣derable, that this virtue of Moderation, doth suppose a matter of right and ju∣stice. And then besides, the better the cause is, the less need is there of any immoderate rigorous course in the asser∣ting of it. We shall hereby rather pre∣judice than promote it; by inducing a suspicion, that 'tis not so much truth or

justice as something else that drives us on. And then besides where would this principle end? if one man may be se∣vere and rigorous because he is in the right; why then another who doth but think himself so, will be so too. And according to this, what would become of peace and society?

Such blustering boisterous tempers as are all for the great river Euphrates which runs with a torrent and a mighty noise, and refuse the still waters of Shiloah which run soft and gently, as the Prophet speaks, Isa. 8.6. such are no friends to peace, because 'tis the latter which is the river whose streams must make glad the City of God, Psal. 46.4. that is, must promote the quiet and flourishing state of the Church, as a Reverend Prelate hath elegantly exprest it: 'Tis the advice of Seneca, that men would consider Vtrum mundi status gratior sit, sereno & puro die, an cum fragoribus crebris omnia quatiuntur, & ignes hinc at{que} illinc micant. What difference there is betwixt a serene and clear day, and another full of thunder and flashes, and storms; Such differ∣ence there is, saith he, betwixt a calm moderate temper, and the passionate severity of others.

3. It will prove pernicious to a mans self. For which I shall only give that one instance, Luk. 9.55. the two Disciples there, Iames and Iohn, those Sons of thunder, being much offended with the Samaritans, who refused to receive our Saviour, would needs in their immo∣derate zeal have fire from Heaven to destroy them; For which they had a Scripture example in the story of Elias. But what must have been the conse∣quence of this? Why a while after our Saviour went up to Ierusalem, where he was Crucified, and therefore very good reason why fire should come up∣on that likewise. Nay these very per∣sons themselves, Iames and Iohn, de∣sert and renounce him, and therefore there ought to be fire upon them also; And so they make good that saying of the wise man, and by being righteous overmuch destroy themselves, Eccles. 7.7. Nay one of these Disciples tells us, Ioh. 1.10, 11. That the world knew him not, nor received him. Therefore why should not that likewise be destroyed by fire? Of such a large and comprehensive mis∣chief is this sin, according to the natu∣ral consequences of it.

3. Lastly, we should hence be per∣swaded to be more careful in the attain∣ing, improving, exercising of this grace for the future. 'Tis a duty this, where∣in all sorts of persons are concerned, not only those of a private condition, in their dealings with one another, but likewise such as are publick Magistrates, both as to their making and executing of Laws. They who are to consult publick settle∣ment should have special regard to this equity and moderation, thereby to heal the minds of men and to com∣pose their differences. They should look upon past sufferings as happening to them, eo modo quo grandines ac diluvia accidere solent, and so bury them in ob∣livion.

I might to the many arguments al∣ready mentioned, add divers other con∣siderations to excite men unto this vir∣tue (would the time permit it). I cannot omit that passage out of Seneca, so pro∣per to this purpose, Quod si dii placabiles & aequi delicta potentium non statim ful∣minibus prosequuntur, quanto aequius est, homines hominibus praepositos miti animo exercere imperium. If God doth not pre∣sently take vengeance of our faults with thunder from heaven, why should not men

by his example become gentle and mild to∣wards one another. 'Tis a thought this, very proper for a man to revolve in his mind when he is by his passion provo∣ked to deal with rigour and extremity towards others. Let him then consider, am not I more under Gods power than this offending person is under mine; more obnoxious to his wrath and justice than he is to me? Had he dealt with me according to my desert, I had long ago been cast into hell: Yet I live and am spared, and do every day receive many testimonies of his kindness. Is he thus favourable to me for this end, that I may be severe and cruel to others? Hath he forgiven my Talents, that I may rigorously exact the pence from my brother? That man who hath but any sparks of Religion or ingenuity, cannot chuse but be either overwhelm∣ed with confusion, or melted into com∣passion by such thoughts as these.

Notes

• Aristot. Ethic. lib. 5. cap. 10.
• Rev. 1.3. & 22.10.
• 1. Reas.
• 2. Reas.
• St. Cypr. de unit. Ec∣cles.
• Bishop Andrews Serm.