Religion and reason mutually corresponding and assisting each other first essay : a reply to the vindicative answer lately publisht against a letter, in which the sence of a bull and council concerning the duration of purgatory was discust / by Thomas White, Gent.

SECOND DIVISION. Containing an Answer from Section the twenty seventh, to Section the thirtieth.

The Identification of the Soul's affections with her self. The best corporeall plea∣sures most conducive to Beatitude. In what sence the Soul is not the same in the Body and out of it. Affections of Souls not retractable during their se∣paration. Mis-informations of that grief the Author puts in Purgatory, rectify'd. Our Saviour's sufferings not prejudic't by this Doctrin.

IN the twenty seventh Section you begin to speak like a man that aym'd at a mean∣ing and proving, and was not content with pure flashes of words as in your for∣mer Sections: Therefore I must look to my self, especially since you threaten me both with designes of your own and of a∣bler

Pens which will more largely confute my errours. And I must confess you frigh∣ten me, for I do not love to take pains. But the best remedy I can think of, is to hasten this petty answer to you, which peradventure may prevent some mistakes in others into which you are fall'n; and so shorten in part their and my labour; your first onset is to ask how ridiculous a position it is to say the affections got in the body are not distinguish't from the Soul? and your reason of doubting is because the soul was and can be without them. I give you this an∣swer; 'Tis as ridiculous, as to say, that Relati∣on is not distinguisht from its subject; That Intension and remission are not made by add∣ing one degree to another; or that Charity is increast by a greater radication in the subject; That Vnion is not distinguisht from its Terms, or Action from the Agent and term, when it consists not in motion; and twenty such other position; which as I must not doubt but you have shew'd ridicu∣lous in your Philosophy Papers; so because I have not seen them I must judge to be pro∣bable opinions in the sentiment of your eminent learned men, while so many main∣tain them in your Schools; and yet all the Arguments you bring, are commonly ur∣ged

against all these opinions. The masters whereof peradventure may be of the same Judgment with me, that the Soul is a crea∣ture in its Essence immutable, but mutable to a certain point▪ And, so, that other things may be joyn'd to, or sever'd from her, whilest she remains perfectly the same, and neither better nor worse if we respect pre∣cisely her Essence. They who have a mind to know what I think in this point, may find it at large discours'd, in the Preface before the Latin Edition of Sir Kenelm Digby's Book, de Immortalitate Ani∣mae.

Your next question is, how I can say that sinfull acts are perfections, since the Soul is more perfect when she is depriv'd of them. Sir, my unwariness in this was, because I had heard that sin consists formally in a privation or want of something, and that all the positive act is good, and from God as far as positive, and so must be perfective, and in it self some perfection. Now, to your Arguments I reply, that in create perfecti∣ons many times a greater puts out the lesser, as Science puts out Faith, Compre∣hension Hope, Innocence Repentance, &c. so doth the perfection of a vertuous act dis∣place the imperfecter perfect on which is in a bad action.

Your third Scruple is, that I say the life most full of corporall pleasure is the fittest to attain eternall Beatitude. And I cannot deny but I say so, and your self bring my reason, because the Body being made for the Soul it cannot be (regularly speaking) but what is truly best for the Body, is also best for the Soul. Peradventure you can pray better when you are sick then in health and ease, and the like is of study: My imperfection is such I cannot. And, if eating my meat with a good stomach gives me health and strength to study and pray, I think I do well to put vineger or some o∣ther sauce to my meat, which may make me eat what is fitting to perform those Actions strongly and perfectly. Neither do I understand that this is either against Saint Paul, or the Doctrin of Mortifica∣tion prescrib'd according to Saint Paul, who tells us, he chastis'd his body and kept in slavery in order to attaining Heaven, lest (saith he) I become a reprobate; to which end all that use mortification dis∣creetly, employ it. I confess this Doctrin is against them who think God is pleas'd with a kind of sacrificing their bodies to his honour, without any commensuration to their own salvation, but meerly because

they apprehend they make God beholding to them for the great honour they did him; as heathen Priests were anciently, and are yet us'd to do in some Countries.

You say this Doctrine befits only Epicurus his School, and the life of Hogs. For Epicu∣rus, the Eloquent Gassendus hath taken a great deal of pains to perswade the World you are in an Errour. And for the life of Hogs, unless you be better acquainted with it then a chast religious man should, I think you no fit Judg of the Comparison. But, whatever way you go, Ile tell you mine: which is, to think we feel or (as I may so speak) see no acts of our own immediate∣ly but corporeal ones, therefore those sensi∣ble pleasures, heats, violences of charity, which we read of in many Saints lives are corporeal ones, as appears by the very nar∣rations, telling us of bones broken, those that were neer them warm'd, those that they preach'd to materially set on fire, and the like. Now, I say, there being such vari∣ety of corporeal pleasures, the understand∣ing man chuses amongst them, what are fittest to breed in him those thoughts and desires which are the most efficacious dis∣positions of the Soul to Heaven: And these I hold the best and noblest, and which

make a mans life the pleasantest. Of these (speaking in abstract) are generally those that follow or accompany Charity and Science, but in practise those which be the Instruments to increase solid Charity pro∣portion'd to the pitch of the Soul to be go∣vern'd, which possibly is not capable as yet of so great acts as the Saints we spoke of. But there is none so low but if diligence and industry be not wanting, hath higher and greater pleasures then the Hogs which were your instructers to know what corpo∣rea pleasure is. And I cannot but marvell much on what your thoughts were wan∣dring, that whereas you cannot but have read in the lives of Saints, and eminent Contemplators of the excessive and ravi∣shing delight which they felt (that is, which was even in their body too, and affected it) so as they have judg'd it to be inexpressible and above all contents and delights this world could afford; yet for∣getting all these, your thoughts could onely pitch on those which Hogs feel, as the per∣fectest. Do you think a virtuous man has not a more solid, lasting and true cor∣poreal pleasure in the calmness of his fan∣cy, and the undisturb'd temper of his passi∣ons, than a vitious man, who for a dram of

delight which his mad phrenzy of passion gave him, and scarce left him understanding enough to know he had it, has whole pounds of bitterest gall of discontent at∣tending it, both in the perpetuall fight of his fancy and appetite against reason, and the distemperature of other naturall parts which vice must needs disorder. Nay, why should we not think the Saints who liv'd mortify'd, lives felt not as much corporeal pleasure, taking the whole extent of their lives, as those enormous livers who cloy'd their senses with the surfet of them. We experience so high a difference in our plea∣sure taken in meat when we are heartily hungry, in a warm fire when we are ex∣tremely pincht with cold, that we have good ground to think their deprivement of the degrees of the thing, is recompenc't by the degrees of the perfect sence they have of what they admit of; which is by the rarity of it commended and receiv'd with as great a welcome as a necessity both naturall and rationall, that is, those pow∣ers uncheck't in that action, could give it; All which amounts but to this, that a vir∣tuous life is in all respects the pleasantest to the whole man. If this satisfy you not, what think you of Health and Sickness? Is not

the former full of corporeall pleasure, the other of corporeal displeasure or pain? Can any thing be so agreeable to the Body as that, more disagreeable or unpleasant than this? Yet I beleeve neither your self nor any understanding Christian had a scruple he was in health, but gave God thanks for it as a great benefit.

This being so laid out, what have you to except why the pleasantest life is not the fittest to attain Heaven? You add, you have a Scruple to translate this Doctrin, and you justly may to do it so raw and imper∣fectly, as to make a quite wrong apprehen∣sion in your Auditory of its being from what it is. But as you have a confidence of your Readers vertue to abhor the Doctrin as you set it down, so have I, that any hath heard of me will give no credit to your shameless calumny.

You begin your twenty eighth Section with my frivolous concluding that corporall affections remain in the Soul after Separa∣tion. And you seem to bring two Argu∣ments to shew it. First, that all these desires rise from the body, which being taken away, they remain no longer in the Soul; you may as wisely perswade a man not to seal his Letter, because the impression coming

from the seal, as soon as he puts that in his pocket, there would remain no more print in the Wax. No, sweet Sir, Our foul hath certain Prints of efficacious judgements, which though they begin from the flesh, yet sink into her, and become as it were Limbs of her. For, as beasts work by Legs and Arms, and Teeth, so our soul by her Judg∣ments.

Your second Argument presses, that as it will not concern the soul to see or hear, so neither to have corporeal pleasures when she hath all fulness of knowledge, so that you would make the unpurg'd souls follow reason, and desire nothing but what is fit for them; that is, to be totally purged, and by consequence go immediately to Heaven, and all to be Saints, and that their works follow them not. At least, you think a Schollar could endure no punishment, who had no other irregular desires but of knowledge. Qui est hic? & laudabimus eum: but, put∣ting the case (how impossible soever in the judgment of Christians, who hold grace necessary,) we must remember, he that hath much science, hath a better know∣ledge of his last end, how great it is, and seeing himself deprived of that, hath a lar∣ger share in the high part of damnation,

which is in the poena damni then any other. But this you knew nothing of, nor care to consider, diverted by reflecting upon an ad∣mirable non-sence of mine. And, truly I do not wonder, that you who cannot under∣stand that a thing may be changed in rela∣tion, or that water powr'd out of a square vessel into a round one, can change its fi∣gure, without taking away one company of little Jacks of the Box, and adding as many more, should conceive how a thing can be substantially chang'd, and yet re∣main the same thing. Neither do I intend to perswade you, onely I presume to open how the one case is consequent to the o∣ther. Which consists in this; that if a sub∣stance be divisible in the formal ingredients which make it a substance, then also is it mutable according to its substance. Now the Ingredients of substance in this pitiful way of Philosophizing, which Aristotle and St. Thomas have taught me, are called Mat∣ter and Form, and Existence. Whereof Matter and Form constitute the essence of the individuum, and if either be chang'd, the Individuum is chang'd: But it is not so of Existence. For some of your great Di∣vines will tell you, that Christ's Humani∣ty were the same individual Humanity

whether it had a proper human Existence or the Divine. Now, that which we speak of the soul is somewhat less then this. For, we put the soul to continue the same ex∣istence, but to have it sometimes joyntly with the body, sometimes in her sole self; and, because Existence belongs to her sub∣stance, we say she is substantially chang'd, and yet remains the same. But to answer your difficulty formally, I pray remember that the notion of ens or a thing is habens Existentiam, or that which hath being. Now habens Existentiam may be under∣stood two wayes; for one that hath actu∣ally Being; or, for one that hath an apti∣tude to Being. Now, if you take it in this latter sense, the soul is still the same, for in the body it is capable to have its existence without the body, and out of the body 'tis capable to have it with the body. But, in the former sence, in the body it hath it commonly with the body; when the Whole, not She, is that which hath Being; whereas out of the Body, She, not the Whole, is that which hath being, and so in this sence, she is another thing out of the body then she was in it. There is your distinction, sweet Sir, with which I must intreat you to be content, since you will easily see your

arguments or inconvenients, drawn from your mistake of the opinion, have no force against it, for we speak not of higher and lower degrees of Ens or Anima ut sic, but onely of composition in the individual de∣gree.

In your 29 Section you fall upon a kind of rational question, whether an under∣standing creature can wish what's impossi∣ble, and you handle it as if you had never seen a man do against reason. Let my first question be, whether in all the explications you have heard of the fall of Angels, you find any but of some impossible object? some say they desir'd to be God; some the sight of God without due means; some a supreme Government of this World; some an hypostatical Union; none any thing but what depended of God, without whose pleasure they affected it. Therefore all put an absolute impossibility in the object, which made in the Angel a damned will. Are you better acquainted with human affairs? Did you never hear of Niggards that hang'd themselves because of some great loss they had receiv'd? Never of an ambitious Courtier, that took a grief and dy'd upon a disgrace offer'd him from his Prince? Did you never hear of a Lover

that made himself away, because he could not compass the enjoying of his Mistress? Our life is so full of such instances, that 'tis a wonder you could not reflect on them. Are not all these griefs for what men can∣not help? And doth not a grief include a desire of the contrary?

But you reply these are phrenetick men, our disputation goes of soul's perfect in knowledg, whose understandings represent unto them the lowness, vileness, baseness, unworthiness, &c. of these objects, and above all the impossibility which (as you say) at one blow cuts off all the will's pursuit: Thus you; but give me leave to tell you, all vi∣tious desires are a kind of Phrensy's, there is no difference but of degrees in them; one hinders reason, the other masters it: and, besides, Wilfulness is as great or greater phrenzy then Passion. So that, though Pas∣sion be not in souls, Wilfulness is. And as Passion hinders all those fine considerati∣ons which you mention of the baseness and foulness, &c. so much more doth Wilful∣ness.

You reply again, that according to my Doctrin, the affections remain in the soul in the same proportion which they have in the body, out of which your adversary will ga∣ther,

that as they in the body conquer all good considerations, so they will in wicked souls out of the body. But you subsume that in this World they make no vast or considerable griefs, instancing that the most gluttonous or luxurious man, when he is sa∣tiated, desires no more the same pleasure till his Body be fit again. I wonder to hear one that lives (as the French call it) an grand mond, in all companies, talk so unexperien∣cedly of human affairs. Look upon Lovers, look upon those that seek after monies, see whether their whole employments be not to think on their Mistresses, and gathering of Wealth? Remember how many have held envy and malice a greater torture then Artificers could invent. How doth Tully seem to compassionat himself for the torment of ambition? How pitiful a man was he when Clodius prevail'd against him? But the great melancholies and disastrous ends I spake of, make all this too plain to need many words. You conceit that in this Doctrin he that goes out of the World in a great thirst, shall be tormented with the de∣sire of drinking. No Sir, but he that is ne∣ver well but when his nose is at the tap, shall have that torment. For he loves drink and makes it his last end, The other

desires it out of need, not out of love, and so the need being past, desires it no longer. At last you take notice of the sordidness of Souls in separation, if they be troubled with such desires, I confess it Sir. I do conceive damned Souls in the next world, and viti∣ous ones in this to be baser far then beasts. I confess, all you say of the contempt of drunkenness and carnality (which you seem to take for the onely corporall plea∣sures) to be perfectly true; save onely your opinion of Avicena, who kill'd himself by the excess of lust.

Then you go on and teach me what I should have settled for the griefs of Purga∣tory. And to shew how apt a Scholar I am, and how ready to follow your ad∣monitions, I present you with two short lines out of Institutiones Sacrae, where ha∣ving concluded that those who dy'd in ve∣niall affections towards corporall objects, were not worthy the sight of God, pre∣sently add & per consequens cum illum (Deum) pro ultimo fine habeant, ex deside∣rio Ejus & paenitentia negligentiae suae gra∣vissimas paenas sustinere, Tomi 2. lib. 3. Lect. 10. which is exactly your full sence, and not very different from your words: wherefore I hope since I have prov'd an

obedient Scholar to my power, you will inform those your friends who intend to write against me, that we are agreed in this point, and that it is a wrong to report I say of Purgatory that the Souls are tormented with the desires of corporall pleasures, much less that I place the whole misery of Purgatory in the deprivement of those. And likewise that a farther design was cause that this would not content me, for you see I put no other but in Hell.

You charge me farther to say that all external torments in Purgatory would be pure pleasures, because they were suffered out of an extreme desire to come to Hea∣ven by a courage that yeelded nothing to the force of the torments which the suffe∣rers see to be their onely way to felicity. I do not see any great difficulty in this to a sober Interpreter, that what an external Agent inflicts is not the grief▪ but breeds it; nor will it reach so far as to breed grief, if prevented still with a strong apprehension of an over-ballancing advantage to be gain'd by it; which yet does not hinder, but that such outward punishments are, in their nature, properly torments; and 'tis the extraordinary considerations of the benefits they bring, that can sweeten them

into pleasures; and, however, the want of Heaven must needs be cause of an excessive grief. You go on to object that this Doctrin changes all your pious Meditati∣ons on our SAVIOVRS Passion. Be of good courage man, and let no other pretence divert you, but proceed constant∣ly and faithfully every day in those holy Exercises, and I fear not, God will assist you to satisfy all those scruples and diffi∣culty's, which seldom become unanswerable till we grow cold and negligent in per∣forming our Meditations. Thus then you argue, Christ sufferd with invincible cou∣rage; therefore all pains were pleasures to Him: I think you know there was in Christ two parts of his Soul, the Rational and the Animal. I do not know so much of the Souls of Purgatory. When you say then he sufferd with an invincible courage, do you mean of both parts, or onely of the rational? If you ask him, he will tell you, Spiritus promptus est, Caro autem infirma. If you reflect on his prayer in the Garden, you shall see when he speaks out of the motion of his inferiour part, how earnest he is against his passion, you shall see he did pavere, and taedere; I pray put these points into your Meditations, and you

will find room enough for pains, though the rational part was still fixt upon a fiat Voluntas tua. And this our Saviour suf∣ferd because he would. For the strength of his Soul was so great, that he could have had pure pleasures, but would not; that He might give us example, how to fix our upper Souls when we are not strong enough to confirm the lower part.