Academiarum examen, or, The examination of academies wherein is discussed and examined the matter, method and customes of academick and scholastick learning, and the insufficiency thereof discovered and laid open : as also some expedients proposed for the reforming of schools, and the perfecting and promoting of all kind of science ... / by Jo. Webster.

ACADEMIARUM EXAMEN, OR THE EXAMINATION OF ACADEMIES.

CHAP. I. Of the general ends of erecting publick Schools.

IT is a truth clearly evidential to all, who in a small measure have but convers'd with Hi∣story, or are not absolute Infidels against the fidelity and facts of former ages, that there have been few Nations so feral and sa∣vage, who have not honoured literature, and in some way or other have not instituted means for the propagating of Learning. Which is sufficiently witnessed by the most Nations of note; for the Indians had their Brachman's, and Gymnosophists; the Persians their Ma∣gusaei, or Magicians; the antient Gaules, and Britaines their Druides; the Iewes their Rabbies, both Cabalists and Talmudists; and the Graecians their Masters and Philo∣sophers. The Aegyptians also had their Priests, who were men of great learning, and did but account of the Grae∣cians

in point of knowledge as children, as one of them ob∣jected, Vos Graci semper estis pueri; and this was that great learning, which Moses being skilled in, is commended by S. Stephen, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Moses was instituted from a body in all the learning of the Aegyptians.

Now these had their Gymnasia or publick Schools, wherein they instructed their youth, as Apollonius Tyaneus witnesseth of the Indians, and so S^t. Paul testifieth of him∣self, that he was brought up at the feet of Gamalie. And doubtless in imitation of these Eastern Nations the Graecians erected their Schools, and Academies; for Pythagoras, Democritus, Socrates, Plato and others, having travelled into forein parts, to participate of their knowledge, and re∣turning home abundantly inriched therewith, did open their Schooles to instruct their Countrimen, and to let them in some measure tast of the sweet fruit of their far-fetched and dear-bought Science. Yet had they not (as far as I can gather) any publick salaries, but their merit was their maintenance, and their excellency in arts, and diligent industry, the only Trumpet to blow abroad their fame, and to procure them both advancement, and auscultators,

I shall not need to enlarge my self to speak of their anti∣quity, or the commendable ends of their first erection, it being manifest that the chief ends, in the institution of them amongst the Heathen, were first to inable men for their undertaking in the Commonwealth; and secondly to fit them for the ser∣vice, or worship of their Idols, and imaginary gods; which ends (though diversified in the object) were (in all pro∣bability) the same that Christians aymed at in setting up their Schools and Universities: The first of which was good, Politick, usefull and profitable, inabling men for all kind of undertakings, both military and civil, without which men do not much differ from brute animants; the perfection of which is the greatest acquisition that men in this frail life can be partakers of, and in comparison of which all other worldly treasures are but as vapours and emptiness.

But the other end, namely by these acquirements to fit

and inable men for the Ministry, and thereby to unlock the sealed Cabinet of the counsel of God (as it hath been com∣monly received in judgement, and used in practice) hath not onely failed of the principal end aimed at, but been quite contrary and opposite thereunto. For every thing stretched and elevated beyond its own proper sphear and acti∣vity, becomes not onely vain and unprofitable, but also hurtfull and dangerous: Boni oculi, & usui necessarii, sed cum sine lumine aspicere volunt, nihil eis species proficit, nihil propria vis, sed affert nocumentum, The eies are good, and necessary for use, but when they will see without light, the species of things doth not profit, their own vertue doth not profit, but bring nocument: So humane know∣ledge is good, and excellent, and is of manifold and tran∣scendent use, while moving in its own orb; but when it will see further than its own light can lead it, it then becomes blind, and destroyes it self. So if the Academies had kept within their own sphear, and onely taught humane science, and had not in pride and vain glory, mounted into the Cha∣riot of the Sun like Phaeton, they had then neither disorde∣red nor injured Theologie that is above them, nor the things of nature, which they account below them; nor had they attempted to send labourers into the Lords Vineyard, which none but he himself alone can do; nor been negligent in that burthen, and labor, that was peculiar unto them, and incumbent upon them. And to cleer this we shall only touch some few arguments, because elsewhere we have said more.

1. The chief scope and drift of the Gospel is to humble the proud, and towering imaginations of lost man, and to let him see that he is (notwithstanding the excellency of all his acquisitions) utterly blind, and knows nothing as he ought to know. And so while this vain tradition pretends to enable man to understand the mysteries of the Gospel, it makes him (through confidence in his attainments) unca∣pable of being taught them, as Iobs friend truly said, vain man would be wise, though he be born as a wild asses Colt. Tantò fit quisque vilior Deo, quantò pretiosior sibi, tantò

pretiosior deo, quantò propter eum vilior sibi, Every one becomes so much more vile unto God, by how much more he is precious unto himself, so much more precious unto God, by how much more because of him he is vile unto himself.

2. The end of the Gospel is to discover the wisdome of the world (in the height of its purity and perfection) to be meer foolishness, that so it may not be ballanced or compa∣red with those divine raies of Caelestial light that the Spirit of God reveals in and unto man. Haec tota est scientia mag∣na hominis scire, quia ipsa nihil est per se, & quoniam quicquid est, ex deo est, et propter deum est, This is the whole knowledge of man, to know that it is nothing of it self, and that whatsoever it is, it is of God, and for God. But this opinion makes man confidently walk on in the light of his own sparks, and by the fire that he hath kin∣kled unto himself, and to prize it above the glorious and gi∣ven light of the Spirit of Grace, and therefore (as saith the Prophet) to ly down in sorrow. Ad veram sapientiam pervenire non possunt, qui falsae suae sapientiae fiduciâ decipiunt, Those can never attain unto true sapience who deceive themselves in the confidence of their own false wis∣dome.

3. The teaching of spiritual and Gospel knowledge is onely and peculiarly appropriated and attributed unto the Spirit of God, It is neither of man, nor by man, flesh and blood reveals it not, but the Father which is in heaven; and every Scribe fit for the Kingdome of heaven is taught of God. Doctus autem scriba, qui Magisterium uni∣versalis scientiae adeptus, habet thesaurum, de quo proferre potest nova et vetera, For the taught Scribe, who having attained the Magistery of universal science, hath a treasu∣ry out of which he can bring new things and old. Now this tenent doth attribute it to a fleshly power, contrary to the truth of God, which denies it to be in the power of humane acquisition. The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him: nei∣ther can he know them, because they are spiritually discern∣ed.

4. The weapons and instruments of a minister of the Gospel are of a more transcendent and sublime nature, than those that one man can furnish another withall, they are not carnal, but spiritual, not mighty through us or our pow∣er, but through Christ, not for the elevating and blowing up, but for the pulling down of strong holds, casting down imaginations, & every thing that exalteth it self against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ. Now is it not manifest that all the Science that men or Schools can teach is but carnal, and tends to exalt & not pull down the imaginations of man? and therefore true of them, as one of the Antients said, Nugas tenemus, et fonte veritatis amisso, opinionum rivulos con∣sectamur, We hold trifles, and the fountain of verity being lost, we follow the rivulets of opinions.

5. The Apostles and Disciples neither taught nor practi∣sed any such matter, but bad us beware of Philosophy, which is after the rudiments of the World, and not after Christ: Nay the Apostle forbad us even to speak or de∣clare the things of Christ in the wisdome of mens words, be∣cause thereby the cross of Christ is made of none effect, and thereby mens faith doth but stand in the wisdome of man, and not in the power of God. There is a very remarkable and apposite relation recorded by Chrysostome of two men disputing, the one a Christian, the other an heathen, and the question betwixt them was, whether Paul or Plato were more eloquent, the Christian arguing for St. Paul, and the heathen for his master Plato, of whom he affirms that the Christian had the argument that belonged to the ••eathe••, and the heathen that which belonged to the Christian, and dra∣weth this conclusion. Si Platone disertior Paulus fuisset, multi non immeritò asserere potuissent, non gratiâ vicisse Paulum, sed facundiâ; ex quo satis constat, non in sapientiâ humanâ praedicationem factam esse, sed in divinâ gratiâ. If Paul had been more eloquent than Plato, many not unwor∣thily might have asserted, that Paul had been Victor, not by grace, but facundity, from whence it is sufficiently manifest that the preaching of the Gospel was not made in the wis∣dome

of man, but in divine grace. Therefore is this teach∣ing and practice contrary to the Apostles rule and canon.

6. All things that by the Spirit of Christ are revealed un∣to, or wrought in man, are for this end, to take away from the creature totally all cause and ground of boasting or glo∣rying, and to give the glory to God solely, to whom it is due. He that rejoiceth, let him rejoice in the Lord, and let no flesh glory in his presence. Non confidat praedicator, vel auditor verbi divini, de acumine ingenii, de subtili∣tate scrutinii, de sedulitate studii: sed magis considat de bonitate dei, de pietate oraculi, de humilitate cordis intimi, Let not the Preacher or hearer of the divine word, trust in the acuteness of his wit, the subtilty of his scrutiny, the se∣dulity of his study: but rather let him trust in the goodness of God, in the piety of the oracle, in the humility of his in∣ward heart. But this tenent of Schools inabling men for the Ministery, teacheth man to glory in his gotten learning, and acquired parts, and so is contrary to the truth of Christ.

Object. 1. To this I know it will be objected, That Schools teach the knowledge of tongues, without which the Scriptures (being originally written in the Hebrew and Greek) cannot be truly and rightly translated, expounded, nor interpreted: and therefore it is necessary that Schools and Academies should teach these, as properly and mainly conducible to this end. To which I shall give this free and cleer responsion.

Responsi. 1. It is not yet infallibly concluded, either which are the true original copies (especially concerning the Hebrew, and the Oriental languages) the Iewish tongue having been often altered and corrup••ed by their several in∣termixtures with, and transmigrations into other Nations; or that they have been purely and sincerely preserved unto our hands. For Languages change and alter, as fashions and garments. Multa renascentur, quae nunc cecidere, cadent∣que; Neither have we any thing to assure us in this point, but bare tradition and history, which are various, perplex, dubious, contradictory and deficient. And that it which in

it self is dubious and uncertain, should be the means of ma∣nifesting the indub••table truth to others, seems not very pro∣bable or perswasive.

2. Knowledge of tongues can but teach the Grammatical construction, signification, and interpretation of words, pro∣priety of phrases, deduction of Etymologies, and such like; all which tend no further than the instamping of a bare literal understanding, and all this may be, the mystery of the Gospel being unknown, for the letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life. And Saul before his conversion, & the rest of the Iewish Rab∣bies, understood the Hebrew and Greek tongues, and yet by them understood nothing of the saving mystery of Grace, for they stumbled at the stone of offence, and though they were Princes in humane learning and wisdome, yet did they not know God in his divine wisdome, for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of Life. And therefore is not tongues the right key to unlock the Scrip∣tures, but the Spirit of Christ, that opens, and no man shuts, and shuts, and no man opens.

3. This is built upon no surer a foundation than a tradi∣tional faith, for oportet discentem credere, every man must believe his Teacher, & therfore hath no more in this but what is taught by man, who is not able to receive the things that are of God, for they are spiritually discerned. So that in this case he that understands the original tongues, in which the text was first written, conceives no more of the mind of God thereby, than he that only can read or hear read the translation in his Mothers tongue: For the reasons are every way pareil, and parallel; for what difference is there be∣tween him that relies upon his teachers skill, and he that re∣lies upon the skill of a Translator, are they not both alike, since they are but both testimonia humana, full of errors, mi∣stakes and fallacies?

4. The errors and mistakes that still remain, and are dai∣ly discovered in all translations, do sufficiently witness mens negligence and ignorance, that in the space of sixteen hun∣dred years, have not arrived at so much perfection, as to compleat one translation, to be able to stand the hazard of

all essaies, and as the Herculean pillar with a ne plus ultra; especially if unto this be added, the uncertainty (if not de∣ceit) of all or the most Translations, men usually preten∣ding skill in the Original tongues, do draw and hale the word to that sense and meaning that be•••• suited with their opinions and tenents, which is cleer in Arrius and those others that men have branded with the name of hereticks, (how justly God knows) and in those that many do call Fathers, as Origen, Ambrose, and many such; and in these times the Papists, Socinians, Arminians (as men have given them names) and those that have appropriated unto themselves the name of being Orthodox: these all pretending exact skill in the original tongues, do all wrest the Scriptures to make good their several tenents, and tradi∣tional formes, which plainly demonstrates the uncertainty, if not vanity, in boasting of, and trusting in this fleshly weapon, of the knowledge of tongues.

5. Lastly, while men trust to their skill in the understan∣ding of the original tongues, they become utterly ignorant of the true original tongue, the language of the heavenly Ca∣naan, which no man can understand or speak, but he that is brought into that good Land that flowes with milk and honey, and there to be taught the language of the holy Ghost, for he that is from heaven is heavenly, and speaketh heavenly things, and all that are from the earth, do but speak earthly things: So that he that is most expert, and exquisi••e in the Greek and Oriental tongues, to him notwith∣standing the language of the holy Ghost, hid in the letter of the Scriptutes, is but as Hiroglyphicks, and Cryptography, which he can never uncypher, unless God bring his own key, and teach him how to use it, and otherwise the voice of Saints will but be unto him as the voice of Barbarians, even as a sounding brass, and a tinkling Cymbal, as not giving any perfect or distinct sound.

And therefore as no••hing that I have spoken is intended against the learning and use of languages simply, so I am not averse to mens endeavours about the same, not their pains in perfecting translations, but could heartily wish it

were ten times more: yet principally I would have men to know, that it is the Spirit of God onely that freely gives men to understand the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, and if any good or benefit accrew unto the truth and Church of Christ by the knowledge of tongues or translations, it ariseth not from their excellency, but solely and onely from the mer∣cifull operation of his Spirit, who worketh all and in all, and maketh all things to cooperate for the benefit of those whom he hath called according to his own purpose.

CHAP. II. Of the division of Academick learning, and first of that called School-Theology.

THere are three things concerning Academies, that do ob∣viously offer themselves to our examination; First, that Learning which is the subject of their labours. Second∣ly, their method in the teaching and delivering it unto others. Thirdly, their Constitutions and Customes, of which we shall speak in order; and first of that learning which they subjec∣tively handle; for they very proudly, and vaingloriously pretending to make men Doctors in divers Sciences, and Masters, and Batchelors in or of Arts, it will be very neces∣sary to consider what these Sciences and Arts are, in or of which men are by them made Masters, lest it prove that when men vainly boast, & imagine that they are Masters of arts, they be Masters of none, but rather ignorant of all or the most. It is no less ingenuous than true, which the learned Renatus des Cartes acknowledgeth of himself, That having been from his very young years stimulated with a mighty ardor and desire of knowledge, and having run thorough the course and Cur∣ricle of the Scholastick studies, after which by custome and order he was to be received into the number of the learned, even then (saith he) Tot medubiis totque erroribus implica∣tum esse adimadverti, ut omnes discendi conatus nihil ali∣ud mihi profecisse judicarem, quàm quod ignorantiam me∣am

magis magisque detexissem, I understood my sel•• implicated with so many doubts and so many errors, that I did judge all my desires of learning to have profitted me no more, than that more and more I had detected mine own ignorance. Memorable, faithfull, and vastly modest is that free confession of that miracle of learning Baptist a van-H••l∣mont, who when he had accomplished his course in Philoso∣phy, and was to receive his degree of a Master of Arts, ••e begun to examine what a great Philosopher he was, and what science he had gained, saith, Comperi me literâ infla∣tum, et veluti manducato pomo vetito planè nudum, prae∣terquam quod artificiose altercari didiceram. Tum prius enotui mihi quod nihil scirem, et scirem quod nihili, I found my self puffed up with the letter, and plainly naked, as though I had eaten of the forbidden apple, except that I had learned artificially to chide. Then first it was known to me, that I knew nothing, and what I knew was of no value. And therefore modestly makes this conclusion; Peracto ergo cursu, cum nil solidi, nil veri scirem, titulum magistri artium recusavi; nolens, ut mecum morionem professores agerent, magistrum sep∣tem artium declararent, qui nondum essem discipulus, Therefore the course of my studies being finished, seeing I knew nothing of solidity, nothing of truth, I refus••d the title of Master of Arts, unwilling the professors should play the fool with me, that they should declare me Master of the seve•• Ar••s, w••o as yet was not a disciple, or taught. And I cou••d wish that all those that boast of being Mas∣ters of Arts had the true insight of their own self••insufficiency, then would they be more willing to learn, than to undertake to teach.

The first usual div••sion of Scholastick learning is into Di∣vine and Humane; the first of which they commonly stile by that improper and high-flown title of School-Divinity: and sometimes more modestly and aptly, School-Theology, and by some Metaphysicks, or Natural Theology, the Va∣nity, Vselessenesse, and Hurtfulnesse of which we shall shew in some few clear arguments.

First, the Vanity of it appeareth in this, that men and A∣cademies

have undertaken to teach that which none but the Spirit of Christ is the true Doctor of, and so contrary to the truth call men teachers and masters upon earth, when we have but one father (to teach these things) which is in heaven, and one true Master (who only can disciple us in these things) even Christ, and so ought not vainly (because of mans pretending to teach us those things in the ordinary way of humane teaching) to be called, or to call one another Rabbies; for every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above, and commeth down from the father of lights, with whom is no variablenesse, neither shadow of turning. I do not deny nor envy men the titles of being called Doctors and Masters for their knowledge in natural and civil things, and for to have a civil reverence and honour, but to have these titles given them as able, or taking upon them to teach spiri∣tual things, is vanity and pride, if not blasphemy: For I must conclude with Chrysostome, Omnis ars suis terminis non contenta, stultitia est, Every art not content with it own bounds, is foolishnesse. And therefore sober and Christian-like is that conclusion of Cartesius speaking of Theology, Sed cum pro certo et explorato accepissem, iter quod ad illam ducit doctis non magis patere quam indoctis, veritatosque à deo revelatas humani ingenii captum excedere, verebar ne in temeritatis crimen inciderem, si illas imbecilae rationis meae examini subijcerem, et quicunque iis recognoscendis, atque interpretandis vacare audent, peculiari ad hoc dei gratia indigere, ac supra vulgarium hominum sortem posi∣ti esse debere, mihi videbantur, But when I had received it for certain, and indubitable, that the path which leads unto it, is not more open to the learned than to the unlearned, and that the truths revealed of God do exceed the capacity of humane wit, I did fear lest I should fall into the crime of temerity, if I should subject them to the examination of my weak reason, and whosoever did attend the handling and in∣terpreting of those things, did seem to me to stand in need of the peculiar grace of God for that work, and ought to be pla∣ced above the condition of vulgar men. So that it is the pro∣per and peculiar science and art of the holy Ghost, which

none can teach but God onely, vid. Cusan, in Apol. doctae ignorantiae, Bapt. van Helm. in promis. stud. author. et de venatione scientiarum, Paracels. lib. de fundamento scientiarum et sapientiae, et in lib. de inventione artium, et alios.

Secondly, from this putrid and muddy fountain doth arise all those hellish and dark foggs and vapours that like locusts crawling from this bottomlesse pit have overspread the face of the whole earth, filling men with pride, insolency, and self-confidence, to aver and maintain that none are fit to speak, and preach the spiritual, & deep things of God, but such as are indued with this Scholastick, & mans idol-made-learning, and so become fighters against God, and his truth, and persecutors of all those that speak from the principle of that wisedome, that is from above, and is pnre and peace∣able: not consessing the nothingnesse of creaturely wisedom, but magnifying, and boasting in that which is earthly, sensual, and devillish. Frustra enim cordis oculum erigit ad viden∣dum deum, qui nondum idoneus est ad videndum seipsum, For in vain doth he lift the eye of his heart to see God, who is not yet fit to see himself. And therefore these thinking themselves wise, they become fools, and proudly taking up∣on them to teach others the things of God in the way of worldly wisdome, are not onely untaught of God, but are enemies to his heavenly wisdome. Excellent is that of the Cardinal, in his discourse between the Doctor and the Idiot, for the Idiot saith, Haec est fortassis inter te & me diffe∣rentia, tu, te scientem putas, cum non sis, hinc superbis; ego verò idiotam me esse cognosco, hinc humilior, in hoc fortè doctior existo, This perhaps is the difference be∣twixt me and thee, thou thinkest thy self knowing, when thou art not, from hence thou art proud; I truly know my self to be an Idiot, from hence I am humbled, in this per∣haps I am more learned.

3. From this ariseth the dividing and renting of the seam∣less Coat of Christ, which is indivisible, and admits no schism, but must pass all one way, according to the lot of the Father. But how have they attomized the unity and simpli∣city

of that truth? when there is but one Body, and one Spi∣rit, and one hope in the calling of all Saints: one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all and in all. For first they have proudly under taken to define Theologie, as they have done other arts and sciences, and so make it habitus acquisitus, and attainable by the wit, power and industry of man, when it is peculiarly and onely donum altissimi, and meerly the fruit of grace, and that also gratis datum: and yet some∣times they divide Sciences into two sorts, Infusive, and Ac∣quisitive, and number this as that which is infused, and yet not remembring their own Dichotomy, do vainly pretend to teach men that which is onely instilled and infused by the Spirit of God: and therefore might more exactly keep their own division, to have left that inspired knowledge, which is onely infused and given from above, to the teaching of the holy Ghost. And if they would have considered Theologie as natural, which is such a spark of knowledge as can be had of God by the light of nature, and the contemplation of created things, which in regard of the object may be called Divine, in respect of the information, natural, and so kept it within its own bounds, it were tolerable; for, Hujus scientiae limites ita verè signantur, ut ad Atheis∣mum confutandum, & convincendum, & ad legem naturae informandam, se extendant; ad religionem autem astruendā non proferantur, The limits of this science may be so truly assigned or set out, that they may extend themselves to the confuting and convincing if Atheism, and to teach the law or order of nature; but should not be brought forth to assert or build up Religion.

Secondly, they have laid down positive definitions of God, who cannot be defined but by his own Logick, for with him is the fountain of life, and it is in his light that we see light: and their own rules teach them that there cannot be a perfect definition, where there is not a proxime genus; but he doth supereminently transcend all their whole praedica∣mental skale, nay the heaven of heavens cannot contain him, how much less the narrow vessell of mans intellect, or the

weak and shallow rules of Logical skill? and therefore if they had but humbly and modestly attempted no more, but what is attainable by the poor scintillary glimpse of natural light, and have confessed the same constantly and freely, and that all their best descriptions of the immense and imcom∣prehensible one, were but infinitely weak and short to make out his ineffable wisdome, power, and glory, and so have used it but to convince Atheists, or to make manifest the Cause of Causes, and Being of Beings, and not thereby to have reared up an high-towring Babell of confused, notional, fruitless and vain religion, it might have passed without re∣proof, and the Schoolmen without condemnation. For if we could handle these high and deep mysteries of God, and his Spirit, then ought we to have not the spirit of the world (which is carnal wisdome and reason) but that Spirit which is of God, which searcheth all things, even the deep things of God, that we might know the things that are freely gi∣ven to us of God: and so to go out of our selves, and out of the weak and rotten vessel of humane reason, into that ark of Noah, which guided by the divine magnetick needle of Gods Spirit, can onely direct us to rest upon the mountains of Ararat, even upon himself in Christ Jesus, who is the rock of ages, and the stone cut out without hands, that crusheth and breaketh in pieces all the strong images of mans wisdome, power, strength and righteousness.

4. They have drawn Theologie into a close and strict Lo∣gical method, and thereby hedged in the free workings and manifestations of the Holy one of Israel, who by his Spirit bloweth where he listeth, like the wind, and men may hear the sound thereof, but cannot tell from whence it cometh, nor whither it goeth: as though the holy Ghost had not had an higher and more heavenly method and way to teach divine things in and by, than the art of Logick (which is meerly humane, and mans invention) seeing the foolishness of God is wiser than the wisdome of men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men, when indeed the Spirit of God hath a secre••, divine and heavenly method of its own, and onely proper to it self, which none can know but those that are

taught it of God, and therefore they onely understand it, and speak out the things of God, but not in the words which mans wisdome teacheth, but which the holy Ghost teacheth, comparing spiritual things with spiritual. But these men accumulating a farraginous heap of divisions, subdivisions, distinctions, limitations, axioms, positions and rules, do chanel & bottle up the water of life (as they think) in and by these, and again powre it forth as they please, and this is spiritual sorcery or inchantment, like Saul, when God had left him, to seek for Baal Oboth, the Lord in a bottle, or the Lord bottled up, and not to look for his truth as a fountain of life, or as a wel springing up to eternal life; and so forsook the Lord the fountain of living waters, to draw water out of their own broken cisterns that will hold no water; these think A∣banah and Pharpar rivers of Damascus, better than all the waters of Israel, and that they may wash in them and be clean; and are not willing to draw water with joy out of the wels of salvation, and know not that there is but one River the streams whereof make glad the City of God, the holy place of the tabernacle of the most high: when he that drinketh at any other fountain, shall thirst again, but this shall be and ever is a well-spring unto eternal life.

5. If we narrowly take a survey of the whole body of their Scholastick Theologie, what is it else but a confused Chaos, of needless, frivolous, fruitless, triviall, vain, curi∣ous, impertinent, knotty, ungodly, irreligious, thorny, and hel-hatc'ht disputes, altercations, doubts, questions and endless janglings, multiplied and spawned forth even to monstrosity and naus••ousness? Like a curious spiders web cunningly interwoven with many various and subtil intertex∣tures, and yet fit for nothing but the insnaring, manacling and intricating of rash, forward, unwary and incircumspect men, who neither see nor know the danger of that Cobweb-Net untill they be taken in it, and so held fast and inchained. And while they pretend to make all things plain and perspicu∣ous, (by the assistance of their too much magnified Logick) puffing men up, by making them think themselves able to argue and dispute of the high and deep mysteries of Christ,

and to conclude as certainly and Apodictically as of any other Science whatsoever; they do but lead and precipitate men into the caliginous pit of meer putation, and doubtfull opination; making the word of God nothing else but as a Magazine of carnal weapons, from whence they may draw instruments to fight with and wound one another; or like a tennis ball to be tossed and reverberated by their petulant wits and perverse reasons, from one to another, untill truth be lost, or they utterly wearied; while in the mean time the power and simplicity of faith lies lost in the dust of disputati∣ons, and they like Masters of Fence seem to play many doubt∣full and dangerous prizes, seemingly in good earnest, and to the hazard of their lives, when in verity it is but to inhance their own reputations, and to suck money out of the purses of the spectators; so that their fit motto and impress may be, Disputandi prurigo, fit ecclesiarum scabies. Now how vain this is in it self, how pernicious, injurious, deadly and destructive to the truth of the Gospel, the Apostle sufficiently admonisheth us, warning Timothy to keep that which is committed to his trust, and to avoid, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, profanos illos, de rebus inanibus clamores, & oppositiones falso nominatae notitiae; prophane, vain bablings and oppositions of science falsly so called; and also exhorteth to eschew foolish and unlearned questions, which do engender strife, and to Titus, that he should avoid foolish questions, and genealogies, and conten∣tions, and strivings about the law, because they are un∣profitable and vain: and therefore Chrysostone said well in the person of St. Paul, Non veni syllogismorum captiones, non sophismata, non aliud quiddam hujusmodi vobis affe∣rens praeter Christum crucifixum; I came not unto you bringing the subtilties of Syllogisms, nor Sophisms, nor any other thing of like sort, except Christ Crucified.

6. The whole Scripture is given that man might be brought to the full, and absolute abnegation of all his wit, reason, will, desires, strength, wisdome, righteousness, and all humane glory and excellencies whatsoever, and that ••elf∣hood might be totally annihilated, that he might live,

yet not he, but that Christ might live in him, and that the life which he liveth in the flesh might be by the faith of the Son of God, who loved him, and gave himself for him. But if man gave his assent unto, or believed the things of Christ, either because, and as as they are taught of and by men, or because they appear p••obable and consentaneous to his rea∣son, then would his faith be statuminated upon the rotten basis of humane authority, or else he might be said to assent unto and believe the things, because of their appearing pro∣bable, and because of the verisimilitude of them, but not solely and onely to believe in and upon the author and pro∣miser of them, for his faithfulness and truths sake, and no∣thing else; and so his faith should stand in the wisdome of man, but not in the power of God, and so the cross of Christ should become of none effect. But Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness, though the things promised seemed neither probable nor possible; and therefore Sarah, who is the type of carnal reason, laughed at the promise, conceiving it impossible in reason that she should have a child; and therefore it is not that assent nor con∣sent that reason gives unto the things of God, as they ap∣pear semblable and like, that is the faith of Abraham, but a simple and naked believing and relying upon the bare and sole word of the Lord, though reason & mans wisdom can see no way how possibly it can cowe to pass, but with Mary and Nicodemus question how can these things be; for reason is a monster, and the very root and ground of all infidelity; for the carnal mind is emnity against God, and is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be: but faith is that pure and divine gift and work of God that leads the heart of man in the light and power of the Spirit of Christ, with faith∣full Abraham even against hope to believe in hope, and not to stagger at the promise of God through unbelief; but to be strong in faith, and to give glory to God. Concludamus igitur (saith learned Verulam) Theologiam sacram ex verbo, & oraculis Dei, non ex lumine naturae, aut ratio∣nis dictamime hanriri debere; Therefore we conclude that sacred Theologie ought to be drawn from the word and O∣racles

of God, not from the light of nature, or the dictate of reason.

CHAP. III. Of the Division of that which the Schools call Humane Learning, and first of Tongues or Languages.

THose Sciences that the Schools usually comprehend un∣der the title of Humane, are by them divided divers and sundry waies, according to several fancies or Authors; but most usually into two sorts, Speculative and Practick: wherein their greatest crime lies in making some meerly Spe∣culative, that are of no use or benefit to mankind unless they be reduced into practice, and then of all other most profita∣ble, excellent and usefull; and these are natural Philosophy and Mathematicks, both of which will clearly appear to be practical, and that in a few reasons.

1. Can the Science of natural things, whose subject they hold to be corpus naturale mobile, be only speculative, and not practical? is there no further end nor consideration in Physicks but onely to search, discuss, understand, and dispute of a natural movable body, with all the affections, accidents and cir••umstances thereto belonging? Is he onely to be ac∣counted —Faelix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas? Then surely we may justly conclude with Seneca, Nostra quae erat Philosophia, facta Philologia est, ex qua disputare docemus, non vivere! That which was our Philosophy is made Philologie, from whence we teach to dispute, not to live. Surely natural Philosophy hath a more noble, sublime, and ultimate end, than to rest in speculation, abstractive no∣tions, mental operations, and verball disputes: for as it should lead us to know and understand the causes, proper∣ties, operations and affections of nature; so not onely to rest

there and proceed no further; But first therein and thereby to see and behold the eternal power and God-head of him, who hath set all these things as so many significant and lively characters, or Hieroglyphicks of his invisible power, provi∣dence, and divine wisdome, so legible, that those which will not read them, and him by them, are without excuse; and not to rest there, but to be drawn to trust in and to adore him, who is the Causa causans, ens entium, and God of nature; and not to become like the Heathen, when we know God, not to glorifie him as God, neither to be thankfull; but to become vain in our imaginations, and to have our foolish hearts darkned. And secondly, not onely to know natures power in the causes and effects, but further to make use of them for the general good and benefit of mankind, especially for the conservation and restauration of the health of man, and of those creatures that are usefull for him; for ubi desinit Phi∣losophus incipit medicus, and is practicably applicable to many other things; as we shall shew when we speak of Ma∣gick.

2. Can the Mathematical Sciences, the most noble, use∣ful, and of the greatest certitude of all the rest, serve for no more profitable end, than speculatively and abstractively to be considered of? How could the life of man be happily led, nay how could men in a manner consist without it? Truly I may justly say of it as Cicero of Philosophy, it hath taught men to build houses, to live in Cities and walled Towns; it hath taught men to measure and divide the Earth; more fa∣cilely to negotiate and trade one with another: From whence was found out and ordered the art of Navigation, the art of War, E••gins, Fortifications, all mechanick operations, were not all these and innumerable others the progeny of this never sufficiently praised Science? O sublime, transcendent, beautifull and most noble Mistress! who would not court such a Celestial Pallas? who would not be inamoured up∣on thy Seraphick pulchritude? surely thy divine and Har∣moniacal musick were powerfull enough to draw all after thee, if men were not more insensible than stones or trees. Is the admirable knowledge that Arethmetick afords worthy

of nothing but a supine and silent speculation? Let the Merchant, Astronomer, Mariner, Mechanick and all speak whether its greatest glory stand not principally in the practick part? what shall I say of Geometry, Astronomy, Op∣ticks, Geography, and all those other contained under them, as they are reconed up by that myrror of manifold learning Dr. Iohn Dee in his Preface before Euclide? it were but to hold a candle to give the Sun light, to deny that they are practical. Nay are not all the rest also practical? what is Grammar, Lodgick, Rhetorick, Poesie, Politicks, Ethicks, Oeconomicks, nay Metaphysicks? if they serve to no o∣ther use than bare and fruitless speculation? I will onely conclude in this case as they do in that maxim of Philosophy, frustra est potentia, si non reducitur in actum, In vain is pow∣er to speculate, if it be not reduced into action and practice.

Therefore omitting the division of humane sciences, as either the Academies or others have ordered them; I shall proceed to divide them according to that way which I con∣ceive most convenient and commodious for mine intended purpose, and so shall put them under a threefold consideration.

• 1. Those Arts or Sciences, that though they seem to confer some knowledge, yet is it in order to a further end, and so are instrumental, subordinate, and subservient to other Sciences. In the number of which I first reckon Grammar, or the knowledge of tongues, which in some sort and measure is instrumental, and subservient to all the rest. Se∣condly, Logick which I account instrumental, and helpfull to Mathematicks, natural Philosophy, Po∣liticks, Ethicks, Oeconomicks, Oratory, Poesie, and all the rest as it especially teacheth a Synthetical, and Ana∣lytical method. Thirdly Mathematicks, which are not onely subordinate amongst themselves, but especially instrumental, and very usefull to Physicks.
• 2. Those Sciences that confer knowledge of themselves, and are not instrumental or subservient to others, as natural Philosophy, Metaphysicks, Politicks, Ethicks, and Oecono∣micks.
• 3. Those that though they conferre some knowledg, and

• have some peculiar uses, so they seem necessary as ornamental, and such I account Oratory and Poesie. Which divisions I put not so much because they agree in this order in their proper subjects, and ends, as to accommodate them to my present disquisition. And I shall speak in the order as I have put these, and first of the Grammar.

1. The knowledge of Tongues beareth a great noise in the world, and much of our precious time is spent in attain∣ing some smartering and small skill in them, and so we do all servire duram servitutem before we arrive at any compe∣tent perfection in them, and yet that doth scarcely compensate our great pains; nor when obtained, do they answer our longing, and vast expectations For there is not much profit or emolument by them, besides those two great and necessa∣ry uses, to inable to read, understand, and interpret or trans∣late the works and writings of other men, who have written in several languages; so that in this regard they are as a key to unlock the rich cabinet of divers Authors, that there by we may gather some of their hidden treasure; and also to inable men to converse with people of other nations, and so fit men for forein negotiations, trade, and the like, which indeed are very useful and extremely beneficial to all man∣kind. Yet besides what I have formerly spoken of Tongues in relation to the interpretation of the Scripture, thus much also is evident, that if a man had the perfect knowledge of many, nay all languages, that he could give unto man, beast, bird, fish, plant, mineral, or any other numerical crea∣ture or thing, their distinct and proper names in twenty se∣veral Idioms, or Dialects, yet knows he no more thereby, than he that can onely name them in his mother tongue, for the intellect receives no other nor further notion thereby, for the senses receive but one numerical species or Ideal-shape from every individual thing, though by institution and im∣position, twenty, or one hundred names be given unto it, ac∣cording to the Idiome of several nations. Now for a Carpen∣ter to spend seven years time about the sharpning and prepa∣ring of his instruments, and then had no further skill how to imploy them, were ridiculous and wearisome; so for Scholars

to spend divers years for some small scantling and smattering in the tongues, having for the most part got no further knowledge, but like Parrats to babble and prattle, that whereby the intellect is no way inriched, is but toylsome, and almost lost labour. Excellent and worthy was that at∣tempt of the renowned and learned Comenius in his Ianna linguarum (if it had been as well understood, and seconded by others) to lay down a platform and seminary of all lear∣ning and knowable things, that youth might as well in their tender years receive the impression of the knowing of matter, and things, as of words, and that with as much ease, brevity and facility.

2. For Grammar which hath been invented for the more certain and facile teaching, and obtaining of languages, it is very controvertible whether it perform the same in the su∣rest, easiest and shortest way or not; since hundreds speak their mother tongue and other languages very perfectly, use them readily, and understand them excellent well, and yet never knew nor were taught any Grammatical rules, nor followed the wayes of Conjugations, and Declensions, N••un, or Verb. And it is sufficiently known, that many men by their own industry, without the method or rules of Grammar, have gotten a competent understanding in divers languages: and many unletter'd persons will by use and exer∣cize without Grammatical rules learn to speak, and under∣stand some languages in far shorter time than any do learn them by method and rule, as is clearly manifest by those that travel, and live in divers Countries, who will learn two or three by use and exercize, while we are hard tugging to gain one by rule and method. And again, if we conceive that languages learned by use and exercize, render men ready, and expert in the understanding and speaking of them, without any aggravating or pusling the intellect and memory, when that which gotten by rule and method, when we come to use and speak it, doth exceedingly rack and excruciate the intellect and memory; which are forced at the same time, not onely to find fit words agreeable to the present matter dis∣coursed of, and to put them into a good Rhetorical order,

but must at the same instant of speaking collect all the nu∣merous rules, of number, case, gender, declension, conjugation, & the like, as into one center, where so many rayes are united, and yet not confounded, which must needs be very perplex¦ive & gravaminous to Memorative faculty; and therfore none that attains languages by Grammatical rules do ever come to speak and understand them perfectly and readily, until they come to a perfect habit in the exercitation of them, and so thereby come both to lose and leave the use of those many and intricate rules, which have cost us so much pains to attain to them, and so to justifie the saying, that we do but discere dediscenda, learn things, which afterwards we must learn to forget, or learn otherwise: when those that get them by use and exercitation, attain them in shorter time, have a more perfect and ready way in speaking of them, and are freed from all these tedious pains and fruitlesse labour. Much to be commended therefore was the enterprise of Doctor Web, who found out a more short, certain and easie way to teach the Latine tongue in, than the tedious, painful, intricate and hard way of Grammar, and that by a brief and easie Clausulary method, in farre shorter time to attain perfection therein, and if it had been well followed and improved, would have produced an on incredible advantage to the whole nation; but we are in this like tradesmen, who all bandy and confederate together to suppresse any new invention though never so commodious to the Commonwealth, lest thereby their own privare gain should be obstructed or taken away.

3. If the way to attain to languages by Grammatical method and rule were the best and most certain, (which yet we have made appear not to be so) yet the rules comonly used are guilty both of confusion and perplexity. How darkly and confusedly do they go to work? leading youth on in an in∣tricate laborinth, wherein he is continually toyling like an horse in a mil, and yet makes no great progress, and all because the method is perplex and obscure, void of evidential perspi∣cuity, rightly co-aptated to the tender capacities of young years, which is the cause of the other, namely its prolixity, as

we can all witnesse by wofull experienc••; and little hath been endeavoured for a remedy herein, that hath not been worse than the disease, except the elaborate pains of our Countreyman Mr. Brinsley, who therein deserves exceeding commendation.

4. I shall also touch some of its material defects: How probable, pleasant and useful is the Hieroglyphical, Em∣blematical, Symbolical and Crytographical learning, and all relative unto Grammar, and yet therein nothing at all touched of any of them? Was not the expressions of things by Emblems, and Hieroglyphicks, not onely antient, but in and by them what great mysteries have been preserved and holden out to the world? And who can be ignorant of the admirable, easie and compendious use of all sorts of Sym∣bolisms, that have but any insight into Algebraick Arith∣metick, or have but slenderly consulted with the learned pieces of our never sufficiently praised Countreyman Mr. Oughtrede, or the elaborate tracts of the laborious Harri∣gon? Or are the wonderful and stupendious effects that Po∣lygraphy, or Steganography produce to be omitted or neglec∣ted? which are of such high concernment in the most ardu∣ous occurrents of humane affairs, of what price and value these are, let that monopoly of all learning, the Abbot of Spanheim speak, let Porta, let Cornelius Agrippa, let Claramuel, let Gustavus Silenus, Frier Bacon, and many others speak, who have written so learnedly and ac∣curately therein, even to wonder and amazement. Vid. Lib. Polygrap. Steganog. Trithem. Hen. Cor. Agrip. de occult. Philos. lib. Io. Claram. in lib. Trithem. expositio. Gustav. Silen. Crytoman••ices lib. Frat. Rog. Bacon. de mirabili potestate artis et naturae lib. et alios.

5. What a vast advancement had it been to the Re-pub∣lick of Learning, and hugely profi••able to all mankind, if the discovery of the universal Character (hinted at by some judicious Authors) had been wisely and laboriously pursu∣ed and b••ought to perfection? that thereby Nations of divers Languages might have been able to have read it and under∣stood it, and so have more easily had commerce and trafick

one with another, and thereby the sciences and skill of one Nation, might with more facility have been communicated to others, though not speaking or understanding that language in which they were first written. This would have been a potent means (in some measure) to have repaired the ruines of Babell, and have been almost a Catholick Cure for the confusion of tongues: for do we not plainly see that those which are deaf and dumb have most pregnant and notable waies by signes and gestures to express their minds, which those that do much converse with them can easily under∣stand and unriddle, and answer them with the like? that doubtlesly compleat waies might be found out to convey out notions and intentions one to another, without vocal and ar∣ticular prolation, as some have all ready invented and practi∣sed by Dactylogy, and doubtlesly might be brought to pass by the eies and motions of the face onely. Sir Kenelm Digby hath an apposite, though almost incredible story of one in Spain, which being deaf and dumb, was notwithstanding taught to speak and understand others, which cerrainly was performed chiefly by the eye; and though it may seem a Romance to some, yet whosoever shall seriously consider the vast knowledge, cautiousness, curiosity, sincerity, and pun∣ctual account of the relator therein, will be convinced of the possibility hereof. And it is recorded, and believed with Authors of repute and credit, that in China, and some o∣ther Oriental Regions, they have certain characters, which are real, not nominal, expressing neither letters nor words, but things, and notions: so that many nations differing alto∣gether in languages, yet consenting in learning these Catho∣like characters, do communicate in their writings, so far that every nation can read and translate a book written in these common characters, in and into their own Countrey language. Which is more manifest, if we do but consider that the numeral notes, which we call figures and cyphers, the Planetary Characters, the marks for minerals, and many other things in Chymistry, though they be alwaies the same and vary not, yet are understood by all nations in Europe, and when they are read, every one pronounces them in their own Countreys language and Dialect. And to make it

more evident, let a character denoting man be appointed, as suppose this *, and though to persons of divers languages, it would receive various denominations according to their se∣veral vocal prolations, yet would they all but understand one and the self same thing by it: For though an Hebrew or Iew would call it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Graecian 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, one that speaks the Latine Homo, a Frenchman Vn home, an High German Der Mann, a Spaniard Vn Hombre, and the English, Man, yet would the intellect receive but only the single and numerical species of that which it represen∣ted, and so one note serve for one notion to all nations.

6. I cannot (howsoever fabulous, impossible, or ridicu∣lous it may be accounted of some) passe over with silence, or neglect that signal and wonderful secret (so often mentiond by the mysterious and divinely-inspired Teutonick, and in some manner acknowledged and owned by the highly-illu∣minated fraternity of the Rosie Crosse) of the language of nature: but out of profound and deep consideration, must ad∣umbrate some of those reasons, which perswasively draw my judgement to credit the possibility thereof.

1. For when I look upon the Protoplast Adam, created in the image, or according to the image of the g••eat Arche∣type his father and maker, Creavit deus hominem ad ima∣ginem suam, God created man in his own image, and also find the never-erring oracle of truth declaring evidently what that image is, namly the only begotten son of the father, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who being the effulgence or brightnesse of glory, and the Character and image of his subsistence: And this image of his subsistence, being that out-flown, and serviceable word by which he made the worlds, and that in the begin∣ning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God; from this is manifest that Adam made in this image of God which is his eternal word, was made in the out-spoken word, and so lived in, understood, and spoke the language of the father. For the divine e••sence living in its own infinit, glorious, and central being, having this eternal word, or character of his subsistence, in and with himself, and

was himself, did by the motion of its own incomprehensible love, expand and breath forth this characteristical word, in which man stood, and so spoke in from, and through this out∣flown language of the father, which is the procedure of the all-working and eternal fiat, in which all things live stand, operate, and speak out the immense and unsearchable wis∣dome, power and glory of the fountain and Abysse from whence they came, the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handy work, and every thing that hath breath prayseth the Lord, and so every creature understands and speaks the language of nature, but sinfull man who hath now lost, defac't and forgotten it. And therefore it is not without a deep and abstruse mystery, that the Seraphical Apostle speaks that he knew a man caught up into the third heaven, into Paradise, and heard 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ineffable words, which are not lawfull or possible to be spoken, for this was the Paradisical language of the out∣flown word which Adam understood while he was unfaln in Eden, and lost after, and therefore the same illuminated vessel in another place mentions the tongues of men and An∣gels, which would profit nothing, if they were not spoken in, and from the eternal word, which is the love-essence, or essence of love. For this Angelical and Paradisical language speaks and breaths forth those central mysteries that l••y hid in the heavenly magick, which was in that ineffable word that was with God, and lay wrapped up in the bosome of the eternal essence, wherein were hidden and involved in the way of a wonderful and inscrutable mystery, all the treasury of those ideal signatures, which were manifest and brought to light by the Peripherial expansion and evolution of the ser∣viceable word, or outflowing fiat, and so became existent in the matrix or womb of that generative and faetiferous word, from whence sprung up the wonderfull, numerous and vari∣ous seminal natures, bearing forth the vive and true signatures of the divine and characteristical impressions: like so many Harmoniacal and Symphoniacal voices, or tones, all melodi∣ously singing, and sounding forth in an heavenly consort, the wisdome, power, glory, and might of the transcendent central

Abysse of unity, from whence they did arise, and all speaking one language in expressing significantly in that mystical Idi∣ome, the hidden vertues, natures and properties of those vari∣ous sounds, which though one in the center, become infinitely numerous in the manifested, existence and circumference, as saith the oracle of mysteries, there are, it may be so many kinds of voices in the world, and none of them 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 mute, or without signification. Many do superficially and by way of Analogy (as they term it) acknowledge the Macrocosm to be the great unsealed book of God, and every creature as a Capital letter or character, and all put to∣gether make up that one word or sentence of his immense wisdome, glory and power; but alas! who spells them a right, or conjoyns them so together that they may perfectly read all that is therein contained? Alas! we all study, and read too much upon the dead paper idolls of creaturely-invented letters, but do not, nor cannot read the legible cha∣racters that are onely written and impressed by the finger of the Almighty; and yet we can verbally acknowledge, praesentemque refert quaelibet herba deum, but alas! who truely reads it and experiences it to be so? And yet indeed they ever remain legible and indelible letters speaking and sounding forth his glory, wisdome and power, and all the mysteries of their own secret and internal vertues and qualities, and are not as mute statues, but as living and speaking pic∣tures, not as dead letters, but as preaching Symbols. And the not understanding and right reading of these starry cha∣racters, therein to behold the light of Abyssal glory and immortality, is the condemnation of all the sons of lost A∣dam; For the invisible things of him from the foundation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and divinity, so that they are without excuse. But if we look more narrowly in to the great fabrick or machine, we shall find that it is a•• a Pamphoniacal and musical instrument, and every individual creature is as a several cord or string indued with a distinct and various tone, all concurring to make up a catholick melody, and every one of these understanding the sound and

cure of each other, otherwise the Harmony would be dis∣cordant, and man himself makes up one string of this great instrument, though in his faln condition he neither under∣stands the sound of his fellow-strings, neither knows how he concords with his musick, neither by his own will or knowledge would concur in this heavenly consort, for to him the pipe is not understood, neither distinguisheth he the tunes, and so knoweth not what is piped or harped.

2. Further, when I find the great and eternal being, spea∣king and conversing with Adam, I cannot but believe that the language which he uttered, was the living and the ser∣viceable word, and that it was infinitely high, deep and glo∣rious like himself, and that which was radically and essen∣tially one with him, and proceeded from him, and was indeed the language of the divine nature, and not extrinsecal∣ly adventitious unto him: and when I find Adam under∣standing this heavenly Dialect (which had been uttered in vain if he had not understood it) I cannot but believe that this was the language of nature infused into him in his Creation, and so innate and implantate in him, and not inventive or acquisitive, but meerly dative from the father of light, from whom every good and perfect gift doth come and de∣scend.

3. Again, when I find the Almighty presenting all the Creatures before Adam to see what he would call them, and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that is the name thereof, I cannot but conceive that Adam did un∣derstand both their internal and external signatures, and that the imposition of their names was adaequately agreeing with their natures: otherwise it could not univocally and truely be said to be their names, whereby he distinguished them; for names are but representations of notions, and if they do not exactly agree in all things, then there is a difference and disparity between them, and in that incongruity lies error and falshood: and notions also are but the images or ideas of things themselves reflected, in the mind, as the outward face in a looking-glasse, and therefore if they do not to an hair correspond with, and be Identical one to the other, as punctu∣ally

and truly as the impression in the wax agrees with the seal that instamped it, and as face answers face in a glass, then there is not absolute congruency betwixt the no∣tion and the thing, the intellect and the thing understood, and so it is no longer verity, but a ly, and falsity. And therefore if Adam did not truly see into, and understand their intrinsecall natures, then had his intellect false notions of them, and so he imposed lying names upon them, and then the text would be false too, which avers that what he cal∣led them was their names. Also Adam was in a deep sleep when Eve was framed of his bone, and yet when she was brought before him being awaked, he could tell that she was bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh, and therefore he called her woman, because she was taken out of man. Now if it be denyed that he understood by his intrinsick and in∣nate light, what she was, and from whence she was taken (which I hold altogether untrue) and that God by extrin∣sick information told Adam from whence she was taken, yet did he immediately give unto her an adaequate name, suiting her original, which most significantly did manifest what was her nature, and from whence it came, and doubt∣less the name being exactly conformable, and configurate to the Idaea in his mind, the very prolation, and sound of the word, contained in it the vive expression of the thing, and so in verity was nothing else but that pure language of nature, which he then spake, and understood, and afterwards so miserably lost and defaced. And if it be objected, that if Adam did understand the internal natures, vertues, effects, operations, and qualities of the creatures, then he would have known that the effect of eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, would have made him wretched, and discovered his nakedness, and then he would not have been so mad as to have tasted thereof: To this I answer, first, that God had plainly told him, that if he did eat thereof he should surely dy, and yet notwithstanding he did eat thereof, rather believing the Serpent and Eve, than the words of the Al∣mighty. But if it be supposed, that if he had known the operation, and effect of that fruit, he would not have cre∣dited

the word of the Serpent, more than his own evidential knowledge: To this, it is cleer, that though the Serpent denyed that the effect, or eating of it, would procure death, so likewise he cunningly affirmed and insinuated, that the eating of it would open their eyes, and that thereby they should be like Gods, knowing good and evil: and therefore it was the promise of Deifying them, that did in∣flame their desires, for it seemed to the woman good for food, and pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, and therefore this made her put forth her hand, and eat of the fruit, and give also unto her hus∣band, and he did eat. But to answer this fully it is a deep mystery, and for man to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, was to judge of God or his works, and creatures, by the creaturely, womanish, earthly, and Serpentine wisdome, and so to feed it self, and find both good and evil, and not to abide in the union, and to know all things in the light and image of God, and so to have seen them ex∣ceeding good, and to this the Apostle alludeth, saying, A∣dam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression.

3. When I consider that the voices of birds, and beasts (though we account them inarticulate) are significative one to another, and that by the altering, and varying of those sounds, they express their passions, affections and noti∣ons, as well as men, and are thereby understood of one a∣nother, I cannot but believe that this is a part of the lan∣guage of nature; for the Lamb knoweth the individual bleating of the Ewe that is the Dam, from all the rest of the Ewes; and the young Chickens will all run under the Hens wings, at a certain sound of the Cocks voice, and all the Hens will run unto him at a certain call, and therefore doubt∣less there is something more in that which Cornelius Agrip∣pa relates of Apollonius Tyaneus, than every one takes no∣tice of, that he understood the language of birds and beasts: And I cannot but admire how when we hear one laugh, and another howl and weep, though the sounds be not articu∣late, we can readily tell the one is the expression of sorrow,

and grief, and the other of mirth and joy: now from whence do we know this? this is not acquired by us, or taught us by others, for even Children cry immediately after they be born, and though it be said to be by reason of the sensation of cold which they felt not in the womb, it is true, but then what is the cause that crying or weeping is in all creatures the sign of sorrow, pain or grief, might not some other kind of sound be the sign of it, or might it not in several creatures be expressed by different and various tones? No truly, the mind receiveth but one single and simple image of every thing, which is expressed in all by the same motions of the spirits, and doubtlessly in every creature hath radically, and naturally the same sympathy in voice, and sound, but men not understanding these immediate sounds of the soul, and the true Schematism of the inter∣nal notions impressed, and delineated in the several sounds, have instituted, and imposed others, that do not altogether concord, and agree to the innate notions, and so no care is taken for the recovery and restauration of the Catholique language in which lies hid all the rich treasury of natures ad∣mirable and excellent secrets.

CHAP. IV. Of Logick.

IN the next place I am to consider of that which they call ars Dialectica, or most commonly Logick, the princi∣pal ends of which they make to be discovery of Sophisms and fallacies, producing probability and opinion, a••d bring∣ing forth of certitude and Apodictical Science, the last of which being indeed its true and proper end: and so as to this end is subservient to some other Sciences, but especially to na∣tural Philosophy. I have formerly said something of the pre∣judice

that it hath done to Theology, where I treated of that subject, and therefore shall onely now speak of it as it re∣lates to humane and acquired Sciences, and so lay out some of its chief defects, irregularities and abuses.

1. As it is now used in the Schools it is meerly bellum intestinum Logicum, a civil war of words, a verbal con∣test, a combat of cunning, craftiness, violence and alter∣cation, wherein all verb••l force, by impudence, insolence, opposition, contradiction, derision, diversion, trifling, jeering, humming, hissing, brawling, quarreling, scolding, scandalizing, and the like, are equally allowed of, and ac∣counted just, and no regard had to the truth, so that by any means, per fas aut nefas, they may get the Conquest, and worst their adversary, and if they can intangle or catch one another in the Spider Webs of Sophistical or fallacious ar∣gumentations, then their rejoicing and clamour is as great as if they had obtained some signal Victory. And indeed it is the counsel of the Arch-Sophister their Master, to speak am∣bigously while they dispute, to obfuscate the light with dark∣ness, lest the truth should shine forth, nay rather to spatter and blurt out any thing that comes into the budget, rather than yield to our adversary, for he saith, Quare oportet re∣spondentem non graviter ferre, sed ponendo quae non utilia sunt ad positionem, significare quaecunque non videntur, Therefore it behooves the respondent not to take the business grievously, but by putting those things which are not pro∣fitable to the position, to signifie whatsoever doth not ap∣pear. O excellent and egregious advice of so profound and much-magnified a Philosopher! Is this to be a lover of veri∣ty, or indeed to play the immodest Sophister and Caviller? Now how adverse, and destructive to the investigation of truth these altercations and abjurgations are, is cleerly ma∣nifest, for as Dionysius said against Plato, sunt verba otio∣sorum senum, ad imperitos invenes, they are the words of idle old men unto unexperienced youth, and nothing but vanity and trifles can arise from this way of cavillati∣on.

2. Logick is all applied, for the discovery and finding

forth of verity, and therin proceeds very praeposterously: for seeing we know nothing in nature but à posteriore, and from the affections and properties of things must seek forth their causes, it required more powerful means, than ver∣bal and formal Syllogisms, to find out, and denudate na∣tures hidden operations. And whereas the best part of Lo∣gick for that purpose is Induction, which backt with long experience and sound observation, might be prevalent to dis∣cover the working of mother Nature; yet that hath been alto∣gether laid aside, while the glory of Syllogisms hath been highly predicated: But Syllogismus ad principia scientia∣rum non adhibetur, ad media axiomata frustrà adhibetur, cum sit subtilitati naturae longè impar. Assensum itaque constringit, non res. Syllogism is not applyed to the prin∣ciples of Sciences, it is applyed in vain to the middle axi∣omes, seeing it is far unequal to the subtility of nature. Therefore it binds the assent or consent, but not things. For whereas we should from particulars proceed to generals, this preposterously laies down universal axiomes without due proof of them, thereby to make good particulars.

3. The main defect of Logick is, that it teacheth no cer∣tain rules, by which either notions may be truly abstracted and gathered from things, nor that due and fit words may be appropriated to notions, without which it fails in the very fundamentals, and falls as an house built upon sand. For, Syllogismus ex propositionibus constat, prepositiones ex verbis, verba notionum testerae sunt: Itaque si notiones ips••e (id quod basis rei est) consusae sint, & temerè à rebus abstractae, nihil in iis, quae superstruuntur, est firmitu∣dinis. Syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, words are the special signs of notions: Therefore if notions themselves (which is the very bottom of the mat∣ter) be confused, or rashly abstracted from things, there is nothing of firmitude in those things that are superstructed. So that untill a certain way and infallible rules be found out for the adaequation of notions and things, and fitting of ge∣nuine Denominations to notions, all the force and use of Syllogisms, as it should demonstrate, and bring forth science,

are but fruitless and vain. Haud leve quiddam nominis im∣positionem esse, nec imperitorum, & quorumvis hominum esse opus. Plato saith, That the imposition of names is no such light matter, nor that it is the work of the unskilfull and of any sort of men.

4. Though Logick be as it were Organ••n Organorum, an instrumental science, they seem in some sort to make it a part of Physicks, and so intricate it with an innumerable commixture of the most difficult disputations, as any Philo∣sophy hath: as though the unskilful and tender wits of young men were to be overwhelmed with those thorny questions of universal, and Metaphysical things. And as though Logick (if it were necessary and useful) were not to be con∣tained in a few plain and easie precepts, and that it which pretends to teach a short, cleer, and easie methode applica∣ble to all other sciences, should be so intricate and perplex in it self, as not to be able to resolve of it self whether it be as art, or a science? Practical or Speculative? whether e••s rationis, or something else be the subjectum of it? So that they do not see that they act as foolishly, while they dispute of the very art of disputing, as he that endeavours to see the proper vision of his own eye. Moreover, that which might be concluded in a plain, and short proposition, must be drawn into mood, and figure, and after the framing, repea∣ting and answering some scores of Syllogisms, the matter is further off from a certain and Apodictical conclusion than in the beginning, and so most extremely becomes guilty of Battology, and Tautologie, which it pretends to eschew and condemn. The grave Seneca said well, speaking of these nugations. Idem de istis captionibus dico: quo enim nomi∣ne potius Sophismata appellem? nec ignoranti nocent, nec scientem juvant. I say the same of these Insnarements: for by what name may I rather call them than Sophisms? they neither hurt those that know them not, nor help those that know them.

5. If we examine the Logick of the Stagyrite, who pre∣tends himself the master of methode, and prince of perfecti∣on, we shall first find his Organon, which should be his

great instrument, and Master-piece, to be a confused, and headless piece, wanting those lights wherewith all legitimate tractation (even Plato, Cicero, and other great men bearing testimony) is made out, and illustrated; for it wants a defi∣nition of Logick, it wants the proposition of the subject, it wants the distribution and partition of the matter: and what should it want more necessary than these? And though some may say that these things are added by his interpreters; that nevertheless argues his defect, and besides the additions are not so very compleat as might be desired. And secondly, in his book de Categoriis, definitions are usually wanting, for he defines not what a Category is, not what Substance is, nor what Quantity is: but if any reply, and say he could not define these because they are the summa genera, how could he define a Relative, or Quality, which are like∣wise summa genera? Or to what end do the Aristotelians define all the Categories? Thirdly, in his book de Interpre∣tatione, what a noise doth he keep about his modal propo∣sitions, which he will needs limit neither to more nor fewer than four, that which is necessary, impossible, possible, contingent? But I pray you, why may there not be more? For if that be a Mood, which doth modificate the propositi∣on, that is to say, indicates how the praedicate is in the sub∣ject, may not all Adjectives by the like right be Moods? For if this be a modal proposition, It is a necessary thing that man is a living Creature; These also are modal, It is an honest thing that man should be studious of vertue, It is a just thing that a Son should obey his Father, It is a gallant thing to die for ones Countrey; but what shall I say more of many other defects, that may be seen even of a blind man? These as instances are enough, seeing they are but pleasant deceits, and cunning trifles; Freesilaus the Philosopher us'd to say, Dialecticos similes praestigiatoribus calculariis, qui jucunde decipiunt, That Logicians are like to cunning jugglers, who do deceive pleasantly. So I leave many other petty absurdities, superfluities, defects, and mistakes, and pass to things more material.

6. Lastly I shall sum up all in few words to eschew te∣diousness.

And first of that principal part concerning De∣finitions as to matter and subject (for we have said somthing of it formally as to methode and tractation) which is the basis of all, wherein if there be a defect, the whole edifice falls to the ground; for whereas it determines all perfect De∣finitions to consist of the next genus, and a Constitutive Diffe∣rence, and since there is scarcely any other difference known, except rational, and irrational, that is specifical, and pro∣xim to the individuals, the one of which is negative, and so can positively prove nothing, and the other not only is, and may justly be controverted, but also made apparent, that Brutes have reason gradually as well as man, how lame and dilacerate this member is, needs no further demonstra∣tion.

2. To say nothing of Division, how defective, and im∣perfect it is, but to come to Argumentation, of all the 19 several sorts of Syllogisms, seven onely conclude affirma∣tively, the other twelve negatively, and it is sufficiently known, that de negativis non datur scientia, and therefore there is but narrow and straight room left for the certainty of demonstration: And it is undeniably true, that the know∣ledge of the Premisses is more certain than the knowledge of the Conclusion, and therefore undoubtedly certain that the knowledge of the conformity betwixt the Premisses and the Conclusion doth preexist in us, and is onely excited by Syllogising, and therefore, quid te torques, & macer as in ea quaestione, quam subtilius est contempsisse, quam sol∣vere? why dost thou torment and macerate thy self in that question, which is more subtill to despise than to dissolve.

3. Aristotle forbids dispute, unless with those that do admit his principles, which he first thinketh to be true, and yet notwithstanding from unlike principles, doth sometimes follow a strong Conclusion: as from false premisses: Nul∣lum adorabile est Creator: Omne simulachrum est adora∣bile. Ergo, Nullum simulachrum est Creator: Which is a true Conclusion. From whence it cannot be judged that the Conclusion of Syllogisms doth of necessity compel assent, nor that the Conclusion doth necessarily depend upon the Pre∣misses.

Itaque prout in mendacio non continetur, aut la∣tet veritas, ejusque cognitio: ita consequens est, quod in praemissis non claudatur necessariò conclusionis cognitio. Therefore as the truth is not contained or hid in a ly, nor the knowledge of it: So the consequent is, that the know∣ledge of the Conclusion is not necessarily included in the Pre∣misses.

4. It is cleer, that Syllogizing, and Logical invention are but a resumption of that which was known before, and that which we know not, Logick cannot find out: For De∣monstration, and the knowledge of it, is in the Teacher, not in the Learner, and therefore it serves not so much to find out Science, as to make ostentation of it being found out; not to invent it, but being invented to demonstrate and to shew it others. A Chymist when he shews me the preparation of the sulphur of Antimony, the salt of Tar∣tar, the spirit of Vitriol, and the uses of them, he teach∣eth me that knowledge which I was ignorant of before, the like of which no Logick ever performed: For, Accurata Syllogismi forma, argumentoso, et luxurianti ingenio in∣congrua, inventioni adversissima, & res per se satis mani∣fest as simplici verborum texturâ, praeceptorum imperti∣nentium multitudine involuit. The accurate form of Syl∣logism is incongruous to an argumentative, and luxuriant wit, most adverse to invention, and doth involve things manifest enough among themselves in the simple contexture of words, with the multitude of impertinent precepts.

5. It is true that Syllogistical disputations do bring forth Conclusions, but these conclusions beget but bare opinati∣ons, and putations, no infallible Science, and so all things remain but as probable and conjectural, not as firm and certain. And yet men are puft up with this vaporous, and airy sound of words, growing insolent and confident in the vain glory of Syllogizing Sophistry, and so are taken off from seeking any other more solid knowledge, Causa verò & radix ferè omnium malorum in scientiis ea una est; quod dum ment is hum nae vires falso miramur, & extollimus, v••r•• ••j••s ••uxilia non quaeramus. The cause truly, and

root almost of all evils in Sciences, is this one, that while we falsly wonder at, and extol the force of humane under∣standing, we do not seek its true helps. So that as Cardan said of his Countreymen, I may say of our Logicians, One may find three gods amongst them sooner than one man, so highly confident are they through these Dialectical delusions. Cum quis illa quae nescit, scire se putat, ab hac nimirùm omnes quaecunque nos fallunt opiniones, profiscuntur. When any one thinketh he knoweth those things of which he is nescient, from this verily doth spring up all those opinions whatsoever that do deceive us. Neither is there any thing in the Universe that is more deadly and destructive to the progress and proficiency of Science, than the opinion and conceit of self-sufficiency, and with Socrates the more that we are sensible of the shallowness and nothingness of our knowledge, the more it will stir us up to inquire and seek after it, and therefore precious was that advice of the divine Plato his Schollar: Decet sanè eum qui magnus vir futurus est, neque seipsum, ne{que} sua diligere, sed justa semper, sivè à seipso, seu ab alio quovis gerantur. Ex hoc ipso delicto accidit omnibus, ut ignorantiam suam esse sapien∣tiam opinenter. Hinc fit, ut quamvis nihil (ut ita di∣cam) sciamus, seire tamen omnia arbitremur. Verily it becomes him who should be great, neither to love himself, nor humane things, but to love alwaies things that are just, whether they be done of himself or any other; from this very fault, it hapneth unto all, that they opinionate their ignorance to be sapience. From hence it comes to pass, that although (as I may so say) we know nothing, yet notwithstanding we think we know all things.

6. And whereas Raymund Lully invented an Alphabe∣tical way for Syllogizing, improved and opened by A∣grippa, Paulus Schalichius, and others, in which Picus Mirandula and some did far excel, even to wonder and astonishment, which indeed is a far more certain, copious, easie, and compendious way for argumentation, especially to overcome all opponents, to be amply furnished to dispute de omni scibili, to answer all objections, and to confirm

the mind in those opinions that it holds, and so deserves wondrous great praise and commendation: yet for all that it leaves the intellect nude and unsatisfyed, because it produces no certitude, nor evidential demonstration, and so fills the mind full of opinions, but not of Apodictical Science, and makes men Parrat-like to babble, argue, and say very much, but still to remain nescious, and ignorant, so vast is the difference betwixt putation and true knowledge. Huma∣nam scientiam in negatione quodam falsi, potiùs quàm in veri affirmatione consistere. It is true, That humane science doth consist in a certain negation of falsity, rather than in the affirmation of verity. I will only conclude with that remarkable saying of the Lord Bacon, Logica, quae in abusu est, ad errores (qui in notionibus vulgaribus fundantur) pabiliendos, et figendos valet, potius quam ad inquisitionem veritatis, ut magis damnosa sit, quam utilis. Logick which is abused, doth conduce to esta∣blish and fix errors (which are founded in vulgar notions) rather than to the inquisition of verity, that it is more hurt∣ful than profitable.

CHAP. V. Of the Mathematical Sciences.

FOr the Mathematical Sciences, the superlative excel∣lency of which transcends the most of all other Sciences, in their perspicuity, veritude and certitude, and also in their uses and manifold benefits; yet in the general they are but either sleightly and superficially handled in definitions, divisions, axiomes, and argumentations, without any solid practice, or true demonstrations, either artificial or mecha∣nical; or else the most abstruse, beneficial, and noble parts are altogether passed by, and neglected, which we

shall discover in tracing over some of the several parts there∣of.

1. For the prime and main stone in the building upon which all the rest of the Fabrick is erected, the noble Art of Arithmetick, so highly esteemed (and that not without cause) in the Schools of Pythagoras, Plato, Euclide, nay and of Aristotle himself, is quite rejected of our Acade∣mick Masters, who notwithstanding would be esteemed the great and most expert Master-builders, though they throw away the chief corner stone: And is not only sleighted and neglected as useless, and of no value, but transmitted over to the hands of Merchants and Mechanicks, as though it were not a liberal Science, or not worthy the study and pains of an ingenuous & noble spirit: And but that some private spirits have made some progreis therein, as Napier, Briggs, Mr. Oughtredge, and some others, it had lain as a fair garden unweeded or cultivated, so little have the Schools done to advance learning, or promote Sciences.

2. And for the noble, and most necessary Art of Geome∣try, their handling of it hath been with the same superficial sleightness, and supine negligence, never bringing into per∣fect practice, nor clear demonstration, that which many years ago Euclide compiled with so much pains and exact∣ness: and therefore are far from making any further disco∣veries therein, contenting themselves with the sole verbal disputes of magnitude, quantity, and the affections there∣of, leaving the practice and application thereof to Masons, Carpenters▪ Surveyors, and such like manual operators, as though they were too good to serve so divine and noble a mistres.

3. There hath been no more progress made in the Optical Art, which though it affords many, and wonderful secrets, both for profit and pleasure, for by it things far off are seen as at hand, minute and small things magnified, the wonder∣ful intersection of various species, without confounding one another, demonstrated, the sight of men thereby succoured, the Systeme of the world thereby more perfectly viewed, and innumerable other rarities both of Art and Nature there∣by

discovered; yet have the Schooles proceeded no further therein, than to verbal disputes, and some Axiomatical institutions and doctrines; and but for the noble attempts of some few gallant men, such as Galalaeus, Scheiner, Aguil∣lonius, Hevelius, and the like, the grand mysteries of it had lain buried in oblivion, and this age never seen those s••upendious effects that through their industry in this Art hath been brought forth.

4. As for Musick it hath had some little better fortune, for that vulgar and practical part, which serves as a spur to sensuality and voluptuousness, and seems to be the Compa∣nion of Melancholicks, Fantasticks, Courtiers, Ladies, Taverns, and Tap-houses, that hath had some pains taken about it, and some honour done unto it, that the professors thereof might become Graduats: yet for the mysterious part thereof, which consists in the discovering the nature, quality, distinction, sympathy, dyspathy, significancy, and effects of all sounds, voices, and tones that are in na∣ture, these are altogether unknown and neglected; as also how far it might be serviceable to Natural Philosophy, and the laying open of the universal Harmony of the whole Mundane Fabrick, that remains untried and unattemp∣ted.

5. The Astronomy that the Schools teach being accor∣ding to the Peripatetick, and Ptolemaick Systeme, which they maintain with much rigor, severity, and earnestness, is by ••hem extolled to the heavens, as an Harmoniacal, regu∣lar, and stately Fabrick, which without any demonstration, or punctual observation they obtrude upon the tender under∣standings of unwary youth: holding it forth with that Magi∣sterial confidence, as though it would cleerly salve all the Phaenomena, and render the true causes, grounds, and rea∣sons of the motions, and effects of all the Caelestial Bodies, and as though no fault, exorbitancy, or defect could be found in this so compleat, beautiful, and orderly structure. Yet I must confess, that in all the Scholastick learning there is not found any piece (to my apprehension) so rotten, ruinous, absurd and deformed as this appears to be, and which

may from most evident principles be everted, and cast down, and therefore I shall take the more time in enervating the same, and that from undeniable principles both of Phy∣sicks and Mathematicks.

1. They take that for granted, or at least unproved, which is not onely controvertible and indemonstrable, but untrue, namely that the Earth is the Center of the Universe, and that the Heavenly Bodies do in their motions so observe it, and from thence deduce the causes of gravity and levity; the contrary or uncertainty of which appears thus. First, it is manifest that ••he Earth is not the Center of the most of the Planetary O••bs, because by their own confession, some of them, as ☉ and ♂, are sometimes in their Apogaeum, and sometimes in their Perigaeum, that is sometimes neerer and sometimes further off from the earth; which they could not be if the Earth were their true and proper Center, because according to the definition of Euclide, the Circumference of a circle is every where equidistant from the Center, and all lines drawn from the Center to the Circumference are equal, otherwise it would cease to be a Circle, and one Circle can have no more than one Center; and therefore the Earth is not the Center of the Planetary Orbs. Secondly, if the Earth were the Center of the Orbs of the Planets, the dissection of the Orbs would be needless into Excentricks and Con∣centricks▪ which being their own tenent, manifests that the earth is not their true, and proper Center.

Thirdly, if the Earth were their Center, the Aequinoctial line dividing both the Earth and Heavens into 2 equal parts, the Sun in his annual motion could not be longer time in the one half circle than in the other, unless he did not pass over equal intervals, or spaces of the line, in equal times, and so should intend and remit his motion, which is denyed of all: and therefore it being found by certain, and yearly ob∣servation, that he staies some daies longer on the Northside the Aequator, than on the South, it is manifest that the Earth is not the Center of his Orb.

Fourthly, there are divers Planetary Bodies that move cir∣cularly, that observe not the Earth as their Center at all, as

those Medicaeal, and Iovial Planets about Iupiter, and those about Saturn, Mercury, and Venus about ••he Sun, and the Sun about his own Center, and none of these respect the Earth, and therefore cannot be their Center, and so not the Center of the Universe.

Fiftly, for the eighth Sphere, no certain rules of Art can demonstrate that the Earth is its center, because it bears no sensible magnitude unto it, so that no angle can be assigned to know the distance, and the eye cannot be a certain, and proper judge, because it judges not of distance as its proper and immediate object, but to do that is the office of the com∣mon sense, and where the distance is great and vast, though the eye be far distant from the Center, yet the things seen will seem to stand in a Circle about it, though they be not truly and exactly so, and therefore this is rather a postulate than a proof, and may justly be denyed, because it cannot be proved: and that all the Stars that we call or account fixt (though we cannot prove that any of them are so) stand all in one Circle or Orb, cannot be true, for doubtless the diffe∣rence of their apparent magnitude is a certain argument that they are not all equidistant from the Earth, and therefore is not the Earth the Center of the Universe.

Sixtly, for their arguments taken from gravity and levity, they do but therein usually petere principium, beg the que∣stion, and thereby commit a most palpable Paralogism, for they define gravity to be that quod tendit deorsum, which tends downwards, and if the cause is demanded why bodyes severed from the Earth do tend downwards thither again, they answer quia gravia sunt, which in effect is this, They tend to the Earth, because they do tend to the Earth, which is idem per idem: And if it were granted that the Earth were the Center of the Universe, how could a Center any way understood be the cause of any motion at all, or loca∣lity which is defined to be a space void of bodies, and capa∣ble of them, have any power to give or cause motion in a body? These are the groundless Chymaera's of the Schools, not knowing that bodies separate from the Earth do move thither again from an intrinsick magnetick quality, which in

the Earth is by way of attraction, and in the part separate by motion of Coition, besides some other clear reasons that may be given from Statical principles, which for brevities sake I am forced ••o omit: For from this is cleerly evident, that the Earth not being the Center of the Universe, the whole order and frame of the Scholastick Systeme is dissipa∣ated, and out of course.

2. And as they have mistaken the mark in making the Earth the Center of the Universe, they are as far wide in their determinations of the Circumference or Orbs, which they make to be of a Quintessential nature (as they term it) and so to be incorruptible, and free from change, and mu∣tarlon: and it is believed that this opinion is chiefly groun∣ded upon this, That the heavenly bodies remain still in the same state wherein they have been observed to be many ages before, and no sensible alteration could ever be perceiv••d in them.

To which I answer, That this concludes nothing, because it argues from knowing to being, when being hath no de∣pendance of, nor connexion with our knowing, for our knowledge is not the cause, nor measure of the Universe, nor of the things therein contained. Falso enim asseritur, sen∣sum humanum esse mensuram rerum; Quin contra, omnes perceptiones, tam sensus, quam mentis, sunt ex Analo∣gia hominis, non ex Analogia Vniversi. It is falsely asserted that mans sense is the measure of the Vniverse; but on the contrary, all perceptions, as well of the sense as of the intellect, are from the Analogy of man, and not from the Analogy of the Vniverse.

Again, there may be many alterations in the Caelestial bo∣dies, which by reason of their vast distance, we do not, nor can perceive, especially if we consider, that mutation is understood either as it relates ad totum, or ad partes, there∣fore there may be (and without doubt are) many alterations in the parts of the Heavenly bodies, though no change at all as to the whole of any of them: for the Earth is as immuta∣ble, and incorruptible, in relation to the whole, as any other of the Starry or Planetary bodies are, for the change

that appeareth in it, is but in the external and superficial parts, and though sensible to us, yet is not perceiveab••e at a great distance, for we can discern diverse mountains, and parts of the Earth, far remote from us, yet cannot discern the alterations that are in the parts thereof: and so if ones eye were placed in the Moon, Mars, Iupiter, or any of those Stars which we call fixt, we should perceive as little change then here on the earth, as we being placed here see in those Starry bodies.

Neither is it true that there appears no mutation in the Heavenly Bodies or Orbs, because many men of great note, experience and skill, have observed that Comets have been above the Sublunary Orb, and evidently demonstrated the same by there Paralax, as Tycho Br••he, Copernicus, Kepler, Galalaeus, and others, which clearly demonstrates (beyond the refutation of Logick) that there are changes and mutations in the heavens, and so they are not incorruptible bodies as is falsely asserted: And the evidence that appears to the eye in the use of the Telescope doth plainly evince that there is an Atmosphere about the body of the Moon, which could not be if the Heavens were unchangeable.

3. Another thing that they grossly maintain is, that the heavens or Orbs are as hard as Steel, and as transparent as glass, and yet have so many several sorts of solid Orbs, Ecc••ntricks, and Concentricks, Epicycles, and the like, which are all concamerated one within another, the absurdi∣ties and impossibilities of which I shall demonstrate in some cleer arguments.

For first, if they were solid bodies, and that every Star were but densior pars sui Orbis, then either the convex su∣perficies of the contained Orb, must ex••ctly touch the con∣cave superficies of the circumambient Orb, or else not, but some space to intercede between, which must either be im∣plete with some other body, or else be a meer inanity and vacuity; neither of which can possibly be according to their own tenents, not indeed according to the truth it self. For if the convex superficies touch the concave exactly in all parts and there be neither vacuity, nor body interjacent, then as

the Mathematicians truly say, they must touch in infinite points, and so there could be no motion at all, because there could be no appulsion, nor retrocession, and where there is neither of those, it is impossible there should be local moti∣on, or lation; ••or two exact smooth, and equal superficiesses of hard and solid bodies joined together, the uppe••most will if it be taken up, list up the lower also, if the force of ele∣vation be in the center of the solid bodies so fitted, as may be seen in Brass, Marble, and the like, so that consequently there could be no motion at all. And if there were any mo∣tion at all it must needs be with confrication, and attrition, and so without plenty of some oily substance, would not cause Pythagoras his spherical musick but an unheard-of rum∣bling noise, such surely as possessed the brains of those that were the fi••st Authors of this mad and extravagant opinion. And if they say there is a vacuity interjacent, then there could be no motion neither, because according to the Schools Motus in vacuo non datur; and if they say there is some other body between, then what is it? for if it be any Ele∣mental body, that cannot be, because they have incarce∣rated them all within the concave superficies of the Moon; and if there were some other body included between, then seeing according to Aristotle that Motus est causa caloris, how could it be but that body would be heated even to igni∣tion? seeing that all heat doth continually rarifie, and the Orbs continually moving with such an incredible swiftness, and no place for evaporation, but it close pent in by the Su∣perior Orb, how could all not be of a flame, or forcibly torn, and rent assunder? unless we must have all solved with that frivolous shift, that they are eternal, and ingenerable bodies, and are but Analogously like ours, and so suffer none of these things that Elemental bodies do: when they have cleerly shewed what that Analogy is, and wherein they are neither absolutely like our Sublunary bodies, nor abso∣lutely different from them, then it will be time enough to return them a more plenary responsion, until then let this suffice.

Secondly, if the Orbs were solid, how could it possibly

be that there could be Eccentricks, and Concentricks, the one having a more dense or thick part in one side of the Cir∣cle or Orb, and the other having so likewise on the parts op∣posite? now how these should have motions of their own, if they be solid, to me seems impossible; or how or which way Epicycles should be affixed to these extending onely from the concave Superficies, to the convex, how this should be in Spherical solids, or Orbs, without either penetration of dimensions, admitting of vacuity, or some other fluid body to be interjacent, to me seems more difficult to unloose, than the Gordian knot was to Alex∣ander, and will never be untyed unless Aristotle have learned of his great Patron to cut that asunder which he can∣not unty?

Thirdly, if the Orbs were solid, and impenetrable, then could not possibly any Comets be above the superficies of the Moons Orb, or if it be certain that they have been ob∣served above (which is true) then of necessity the Orbs are not solid, but fluid bodies: neither could any new Star ever appear if they were solid, but such have been known un∣doubtedly to be seen sometimes, and yet were no Comets, therefore of necessity they are fluid, and not solid bodies. And it is undeniably true, that if the Orbs were hard as Steel, and of such solidity as is alleged, then they could not pos∣sibly intersect or enter into the Orbs of one another; but it is certainly known by exact observation, and Mathemati∣cal demonstration, that when Mars is in the lowest part of his Epicycle, or in Perigaeo, he is then within the Orb of the Sun, which he could not penetrate if it were solid, and therefore unquestionably they are not hard, but fluid bodies; and so the Scholastick Systeme is ruinous, and ground∣less.

Fourthly, I shall urge one Optical argument, which is this, That if the Heavens were all solid, and divided into so many Orbs, and they again subdivided into others, then it must follow necessarily that according to the multitude of Superfic••••sses, so must the multiplicity of refractions be, which in this case would be very numerous, and so none of

the Stars or Planets would ever be seen in their true places, but either confounded, or numerously multiplyed, which how absurd, let the abbetters of this opinion themselves judge.

4. From these they ground the motion of the tenth, ninth, and eighth Sphere, making the tenth Sphere move most rapidly from East to West in that space which we call 24. hours, and so snatcheth, and forceably whirleth about with it, all the inferior Orbs, which innately, and properly have a reluctancy, and contranitency against it. The absur∣dity of which appears thus.

First, that the Diurnal motions of all the Orbs in 24. houres, except the tenth Sphere, are meerly violent, and compulsive, and only the motion of it natural, and proper. Now how could they conceive, who hold that nullum vio∣lentum est perpetuvem, that a motion that is violent could be perpetual in nature, especially to these pure bodies which they hold to be eternal and immutable? or how can it be that the first Sphere should communicate its velocity to all the inferiours, and the second should communicate none at all? Why is not Iupiter carried with the motion of Saturn? or the Sun with Mars? Hoc mihi si solvas Oedipus alter eris.

Secondly, if the extreme and incredible velocity of the tenth Sphere, be seriously considered, it will exceed all possibility of belief, nay even swifter than thought or ima∣gination: for of diverse Orbs moved about in the same space of time, the least moves the most slowly, and the greatest most swiftly, for if it be computed according to the least Diametre given unto it, and how it moves more swiftly than the Orb of the Moon, by so many times as it exceeds the greatness of its Circumference, it will be past all humane sense, and understanding to imagine the extreme velocity of it, so that no Creature can believe it to be so, but also be compelled to confess, that it is most likely either to be set on fire, or else by the most vehement swiftness to be whirled into Attomes.

Thirdly, if the eight Sphere be conceived to move, wher∣in

as they fancy to themselves that all the Stars are fixt, like so many nayls in a wheel, or bowl, considering the im∣mensity of its compass, the exceeding velocity of its motion, and that the earth (which they suppose the Center of it) to bear proportion unto it, but as an insensible point or prick, then it could not possibly be but that it would appear all as an inflamed light, or a concave globe of fire, because at one and the self same instant the multitude of raies would all be u∣nited in this small Center, the Earth (or eye of the beholder) and infinite rayes strike the eye successively in a manner, ere the others passed from it, and so must of necessity appear all intirely as fiery and luminous; so as we behold a piece of wood whose end is fired being quickly whirled about in the air in a circular manner, doth appear to the eye as a true Circle of fire or brightness: so that this would of necessity follow upon the structure of their Systeme. By all which ar∣guments may evidently appear, the impossibility of the truth of that Astronomical composure which the Schools cry up for so certain, neat, and beautiful, so that I may conclude with a learned Author, Non enim quae de Arthuro et ipsius Equitibus finguntur, vel Homericas fabulas persuasu magis difficiles opinor, quam illam Caelorum Compositionem, quam proxima nos saecula erudierunt. For I think the things that are feigned of Arthur, and his Knig••ts of the round table, or the fables of Homer, are not more difficult to be perswaded, than that composure of the heavens, which the age preceding us hath taught.

5. For the other parts of Mathematicks, some of them are utterly unknown and unpractised in the Schools, and some of them are taught there, but so fleightly, and superfi∣cially, that small or no profit doth redound from thence. For they usually teach Cosmography, and the several species thereof, as Geography, Hydrography, Chorography, and Topography, yet whereas Cosmography is the whole, and perfect description of the Heavenly and also Elemental part of the world, and their Homologal application, and mutual collation together, and so is no small or simple art, but high and of manifold use, there hath little or nothing been done to

the perfection thereof, especially in the mutual correspon∣dence and application of the heavens, and earth: neither are the other brought into practice, especially the Theo∣remes of Hydrography, whereby men might be made able and fit for Navigation, one of the most necessary imployments and advantages of our Nation.

6. What shall I say of the Science, or art of Astrology, shall the blind fury of Misotechnists, and malicious spirits, de∣ter me from giving it the commendations tha•• it deserves? shall the Academies who have not only sleighted and neg∣lected it, but also scoffed at it, terrifie me from expressing my thoughts of so noble and beneficial a Science? shall the arguments of Picus Mirandula, and others, who have bitterly inveighed against it, fright me from owning the truth? shall the thundering Pulpit men, who would have all mens faith pinned upon their sleeves, and usually con∣demn all things they understand not, make me be silent in so just a cause? No truly, I must needs defend that which my judgement evidences to me to be laudable, and profitable; not but that I utterly condemn the ignorance, knavery, and impostorage of many pretending Sciolists, that abuse the same; but shall the art of medicine or Chymistry be con∣demned, and rejected, because many ignorant Empericks, and false Alcumists do profess them? Surely no, let the blame be upon the professors, not upon the profession it self. For the art it self is high, noble, excellent, and useful to all mankind, and is a study not unbeseeming the best wits, and greatest Scholars, and no way offensive to God or true Religion. And therefore I cannot without detract∣ing from worth and vertue, pass without a due Elogy in the commendation of my learned, and industrious Country∣men Mr. Ashmole, Mr. William Lilly, Mr. Booker, Mr. Sanders, Mr. Culpepper, and others, who have taken un∣wearied pains for the resuscitation, and promotion of this noble Science, and with much patience against many un∣worthy scandals have laboured to propagate it to posterity, and if it were not beyond the present scope I have in hand I should have given sufficient reasons in the vindication of A∣stroloy.

7. What shall I say of Staticks, Architecture, Pneu∣matithmie, Stratarithmetrie, and the rest enumerated by that expert and learned man, Dr. Iohn Dee in his Preface before Euclide? What excellent, admirable and profitable experiments do every one of these afford? truly innumerable, the least of which is of more use, benefit and profit to the life of man, than almost all that learning that the Universities boast of and glory in, and yet by them utterly neglected, and never lookt into: but what huge, stupendious effects these can bring to pass, let our learned Countreyman Roger Bacon, let Cardinal Cusan, let Galalaeus, let Vbaldus, let Mar∣cus Marci, let Baptista Benedictus, and many others speak, who remain as a Cloud of Witnesses against the su∣pine negligence of the Schools, who for so many Centuryes have done nothing therein: Is this to be the fountains of Learning, and wellspring of Sciences? let all rational men judge and determine.

CHAP. VI. Of Scholastick Philosophy.

FOr the Philosophy which the Schools use and teach, be∣ing meerly Aristotelical, let us examine the ground and reasons why it should be imbraced and cryed up more than all other, or why he should be accounted the Prince of Philosophers, the Master-piece of Nature, the Secretary of the Universe, and such an one beyond whose knowledge there is no progression. Which however applauded to the hea∣vens by his Scholars, who are jurati in verba Magistri, will upon exact and due test prove, both weak, groundless, false, unsatisfactory, and sterile, which we shall labour to eluci∣date in some clear Arguments.

1. It will evidently appear that there is no reason why the Aristotelical Philosophy as it stands now received, ac∣cording to the comments, glosses, expositions & interpretations of the Schools, should be preferred before any, or all others. Because Aristotle was but a man, and so might err ar soon as others, neither was he more than other men any way privile∣ged from human imperfections; nay considering him as an hea∣then, who did not know nor acknowledge the fountain of life, which is God, and therefore by so much less was able to teach the truth, by how much he was distant from the knowledge of the true God, who is the primary verity: so that what he hath written was rather by a Diabolical than a Divine instinct, for Philoponus recordeth that he begun to Philosophize by the command of the Oracle of Apollo, which the most acknowledge to have been uttered from the Devils advice and afflation.

2. Neither were his principles and tenents any whit dif∣fering from such Diabolical directions, for he makes God an animal in his Metaphysicks, and chained him to the exte∣riour supe••ficies of the highest heaven, and made him bound to the laws and necessity of Fate, which his most obsequious and sworn Interpreters cannot deny. He denies in the twelfth of his Metaphysicks that God takes care of minute, and small things; in his books de Coelo he makes the world eternal and increate; in his Physicks he teacheth that no∣thing can be made ex nihilo; in his books de anima, and of Ethicks, he denies the possibility of the resurrection of the dead, and in many places doth deny the immortality of the soul, so that Lactantius said truely of him, Aristo∣teles Deum nec coluit, nec curavit, and yet this is the man that is onely thought worthy to be the father of Christian Philosophy.

3. If the qualities and conditions of the man be lookt in∣to, there will be found no such integrity in him▪ as may be any just cause of much confidence, nor such manners as may ex••oll him above the rest, for doth not Eusebius and others relate that he betrayed his Countrey to the Macedonians, and to blot out the infamy thereof that he prevailed with A∣lexander

to restore it again? And doth not Pliny relate, speaking of the poison, Cum id dandum Alexandro magno Antipater mitterit, magnâ est Aristotelis infamiâ ex∣cogitatum, that he was guilty of administring the same? was he not accused for being guilty of immolation to his me∣retricious mistris? was he not guilty of ingratitude (the worst of vices) against his divine Master Plato, who therefore did justly and fitly call him his Mule, because he kickt against the dugs from whence he suckt his knowledge? what shall I recount his avarice, which makes Lucian so nippingly feign Alexander in hell upbraiding him, that he had consti∣tuted riches a part of the chief good, that by that specious pretext he might obtain of him greater store of riches? Shall I recount his intemperance, voluptuousness, and obscaene manner of living? or his impious, doubtful or wicked end? no, let them be buried with his ashes. But these things do sufficiently declare, that there is no just cause so much to esteem and applaud him above others, seeing it is impossi∣ble to congest so many things against Plato, Zeno, or Epi∣curus.

4. But I know they will say, They respect not his life so much, as his most excellent wit, great judgement, and laudable diligence; well, I easily grant that he was such an one, but to prefer him notwithstanding before all others, cannot be done without too much temerity. And when arguments are comparative, between the abilities of one per∣son and another, it behooves him that will judge, and deter∣mine rightly, thorowly to understand and preponderate what there is of value and price in either of them. So when there is a question made of Phythagoras, Thales, Democritus, Zeno, Plato, Phyrrho, Epicurus, and others, it is fitting he should understand whatsoever they all knew, or else he cannot discern wherein Aristotle doth exceed them all: un∣less he will give his sentence before the one party be heard speak. For how can any boast to be more wise than all the other Philosophers, without being guilty of intollerable pride and arrogance? and truly I believe that Socrates who confessed that he knew nothing, understood far more than the

Stagyrite, who would hardly acknowledge himself ignorant of any thing.

5. But perhaps it will be said that he hath been received, and approved of by Thomistius, Abenrois, Thomas Aqui∣nas, Scotus and other men of great and vast learning, and knowledge; well, it is truth he hath been so; but who hath ever been the builder, or rayser of any Sect that hath not had multitudes to cry him up, to follow him, and earnestly to defend him? have not the Academicks as much applauded Plato, as the Peripateticks have done A∣ristotle?

And have not the Sceptists as much extolled Phyrrho? and the Epicureans, their Master Epicurus? of whom it is said,

Qui genus humanum ingenio superavit, et omnes Praestrinx it, stellas exortus ut aethereus sol.

Nay is it not common to all, extremely and Hyperbollically to applaud the authors, and builders of their Sect? nei∣ther hath he been, or is so generally received, and commen∣ded, but many men of as greatnote as any that have stood for him, have disceded from him, or opposed him; for in his own times the whole Schools of the Academicks and Stoicks did oppugn him, Epicurus in many things did con∣tradict him, and Pyrrho in all, nay his famous disciple Theophrastus (as Themistius relateth) did tax his master in many things: neither in all succeeding ages hath there wan∣ted able and learned men who have strenuously opposed him, in many things if not in all, as Thomas himself, Albertus Magnus, Scotus, Gregorius, Durandus, Harvaeus, Maronaeus, Alliacensis, Nicolaus Cusanus, and many others; neither ought we therefore to follow or extoll him because multitudes have esteemed and adhered to him, for as Cicero well said, Philosophia multitudinem consultò devitat, paucis{que} est contentae judicibus. Philosophy con∣sultively escheweth the multitude, and is content with a few judges. And as Seneca witnesseth, Haec pars major esse videtur; ideò enim pejor est. Non tam bene cum re∣bus

humanis agitur, ut meliora pluribus placeant. Ar∣gumenti pessimi turba est. This part seemeth the greater, therefore it is the worse. It goes not so well with humane affairs, that the better things should please the most. The multitude is an argument of the worst. Neither if his Philosophie had been sound and perfect, need his Sectators appeal to authority, and compliance of others, because truth is able to stand of it self, without the authority of others: what is the cause that since the time that Euclide writ his Elements of Geometry, there is not any one found that hath rejected them? or who hath not followed them? Truly because the indubitable verity is in them, and it is impossible the intellect should not assent unto them when they are known. And would not the same thing have hap∣pened to the tenents of Aristotle if they had been true, and indubious?

6. But they will urge further and say, that he is praised, and extolled of other famous men that were not of his Sect, as Cicero, Plinius, and Quintilian, and that he hath the testimony of Phil••p and Alexander that were great, aud knowing men. It is true, and no way to be denyed, for Cicero sa••th of him, Quis doctior? quis acutior? quis in rebus vel inveniendis vel ••udicandis acrior Aristotele unquàm fuit? who hath been more learned? who hath been more acute at any time than Aristotle either in the invention, or judging of things? And Pliny one while calls him Summum in om∣ni doctrinà virum! the chief man in all learning! some∣times he calls him Virum immensae subtilitatis, a man of immense subtil••y. And Quintilian saith, Quid Aristo∣telem? quem dubito scien••iâ rerum, an scriptorum Copiâ, an eloquendi suavitate, an inventionum acumine, an va∣rietate operum clariorem putem. What shall I say of Ari∣stotle? whom I doubt whether I might think more famous by his knowledge of things, or by his copiousness of writings, or by his suavity of eloquence, or by the acuteness of his inventions, or by the variety of his works. Well, admit all this to be true (as who would deprive him of his due ho∣nour) yet these are but the judgements of men that might err

as well as he; and what if others have thought otherwise? must we altogether stand to these mens judgements? or hath nature appointed them to be final and infallible determiners, from whose judgement there is no appeal? might not Ari∣stotle and these men err in something? or were they privile∣ged from the common frailty of all men? no, I believe not but that the proverb is true in them, and all men besides, humanum est errare. But shall we not find that the self∣same men have given as great, or greater commendation to others? yes truely, for being Oratours they had all the liber∣ty of a profuse and Hyperbolical stile, and often bringing in a commendatory catalogue of learned and worthy men, there was no cause why they should omit the noble Stagyrite.

But have they not often celebrated and preferred others before him? yes verily there is hardly any thing more vulgar∣ly known, than that iterated saying of Cicero, when he was commending any of the Philosophers, alwaies added sem∣per excipio Platonem, which manifested the high esteem that he had of him, accounting no other worthy to be com∣pared with him, whom he judged superlative to all: and for Pliny we shall find him giving the precedence of wit and knowledge to Homer above all others, and calling Plato Sapientiae An••istitem, than which Elogy I know not what can be given more illustrious, and also openly professing his repugnancy to Aristotle, and that he had added many things which that great man was ignorant of. And for Quintilian you may hear him preferring Plato, Philosopho∣rum quis dubitet Platonem esse praecipuum, sive acumine disserendi, sive loquendi facultate divina quadam, et Ho∣merica? ut mihi non hominis ingenio, sed quodam Del∣phico videatur oraculo instructus. Who doubteth that Plato is the chief of Philosophers, whether in the acuteness of disputing, or in a certain divine and Homerical faculty of speaking? That he seems to me instructed not with the wit of man, but with a certain Delphical Oracle: And in a word, if thou wilt credit Quintilian thou shall find him extolling Cicero beyond Aristotle, Plato, or any other of the foregoing ages; so that the same mouths that com∣mend

him, do also prefer others before him.

But if the authority of men, the credit of the best estee∣med, and the number of voices could certainly decide the truth, then what store of witnesses might be brought against him, and those also men of the greatest esteem and repute of any in the Christian world? For is not the whole Peripate∣tick Philosophy rejected of all the antient Fathers? what need is there to memorate Tertullian, Irenaeus, and the more Antient? what need is there to mention Lactan••ius who so often carpeth at Aristotle, tanquam secum dissid••n∣tem, et repugnantia dicentem, et sentientem, as one disa∣greeing with himself, and speaking, and thinking repugnant things? Why should I name Iustin Martyr, who so often reprehendeth h••m? or Hierome, who with so open, and tart a word taxeth versutias ejus, his subtilties? why should I recite Ambrose, Augustine, Theodoret, and the rest? who impugning humane Philosophy in general, have not intended to spare Aristotle alone. But in the name of them all hear Gregory Nazianzen who saith so elegantly, and truly, Abjice Aristotelis minutiloquam sagacitatem, abjicite mortiferos illos super anima sermones, et universe humana illa dogmata. Throw away the minutiloquious sagacity of Aristotle; throw away those mortiferous Ser∣mons of his upon the soul: and universally all those human opinions of his. So that if the judgement of the Fathers be of any weight, the Philosophy of Aristotle is not much to be regarded.

As for that which is alleged concerning Philip chusing Aristotle for a Tutor to his Son Alexander, it merits but a slight confutation: for admit that Philip was a very wise and prudent Prince (as no doubt but he was) yet did the ex∣cellency of his skill principally consist in Political, and Mi∣litary prudence, and knowing Arms better than Arts, was not adaequately fit to judge of the abilities of Aristotle, except by vulgar rumour, and common fame. And it is not to be denyed that in his time the fame of Aristotle was exceedingly blown abroad; but who is ignorant of the inconstancy and levity of the popular croud in propagating,

and spreading of rumours? But let it be granted that Ari∣stotle did excell not only all the learned men in Greece that lived in his time, but all the men of the whole world that lived in the time of Philip; yet what is this to the number and abilities of those that have lived both before and since? or how comes the Judgement of Philip to oblige us who are not under his Empire, and who could not compel the minds of men, under the tyranny of one mind? for it is easier to inslave bodies than to captivate minds. And for Alex∣ander, though he had Aristotle in singular esteem, yet did he much value other learned men, as Xenocrates, whose aemu∣lator Aristotle was, and also Pyrrho; so that both these received for gifts many Talents.

But this is not to be denyed, that the splendor of Alexan∣ders name did bring much credit, and authority to Aristo∣tle, both living and dead: but this notwithstanding amongst the vulgar and those of vulgar wits, who as they are onely moved with external showes, so they think that a great Prince cannot but have a great Master: when for the most part Princes chuse not Tutors for Princes, either for their abilities in judging of the solidity of literature, or for the love they have to vertue, truth, or sincery, but rather for worldly or Politick ends; that their sons may be instructed, and fitted both to keep and acquire large Dominions, and Territories; and for the most part true Science scorns the bondage, flattery, and vanity of Courtly splendor.

2. Again, there is no reason why the Peripatetick Phi∣losophy should have the palm and preheminence above all other, because there is a great uncertainty both of the books and doctrine of Aristotle, as we shall evince in some few reasons.

1. It is uncertain whether any book of Aristotle, or which owns him for author, be extant or no; for if it were not dubious to what end do his interpreters, as Simplicius, Themistius, and almost all the rest, which write in this age, prepose this question at the beginning of every book that they expound, Sitne hujusmodi liber Aristotelis an non? is this book Aristotles or not? Certainly if this thing

were not dubious, there were no cause for propounding this question; for we use not to scruple about things that are certain, but about things that are doubful. For it is in∣quired concerning his book de interpretatione, whether it be his or no, the later men do affirm it, but long ago An∣dronicus Rhodius ha••h denyed it, whether therefore shall we give our suffrage to these modern men, or to him that is more antient? who by the verdict of Boetius, and Porphyrius, is said to have brought Aristotles writings out of Greece, and to have digested them into order; who shall loose this knot? who shall resolve this doubt?

2. Another argument ariseth from hence; that Laertius hath drawn the order and Catalogue of Aristotles books, and yet many are wanting which he enumerates, and we have many as 12. or 14. of Metaphysicks, 8. of Physicks, 4. de Coelo, 2. de generatione, 4. of Meteors, and 3. of the Soul, which are not mentioned in his Catalogue, and therefore who need doubt but these are Supposititious? For if they had been extant in the daies of Laertius, would he have concealed them? or could he have had no suspition of them, who was so diligent to know, and commit to poste∣rity both the lives and books of the Philosophers? And it appears that when Ptolomaus Philadelphus did erect that huge Library at Alexandria, using the help and pains of Demetrius Phalereus, who was a Peripatetick, This man, as he did promise great rewards in the Kings name to those that brought books from any where, so he hath not thought those to be neglected which were said to be Aristo∣tles; And therefore Ammonius writeth, that many books were brought under the hope of gain bearing the title of A∣ristotle, that notwithstanding were spurious and none of his: and therefore who can be certain in such a caliginous Labirynth, to know whether these that we have be truly his, or but false and adulterate? seeing many of them are suspected rather to belong to Architas than to Aristo∣tle.

3. Seeing according to Laertius, and some others, that there were many that bore the name of Aristotle, might

not easily all their works be ascribed to this one Stagyrite? as in other things it often falls out: for there were many Iupiters, yet all things were ascribed to one son of Saturn, and there were many called by the name of Hercules, yet all their labours made onely one son of Al••mena famous. And did not Theophrastus and others (who are said to have imitated the stile of Aristotle) compose many books under the same title with those of his (as many be gathered from Laertius Catalogues) & so might not they in continuance of time have the inscription creep in, one instead of the other? And is it not controverted whether the beginning of the Metaphy∣sicks, and the books of plants, and others belong to Theo∣phrastus, or to Aristotle? And doth not Cicero in his books de finibus witness that those books Moralium Ni∣chomachiorum, which are commonly ascribed to Aristotle, are to be attributed to Nichomachus his son? And lest any should object (as they usually do) that they are written in his stile and methode, doth he not conclude, Non video, cur non potuerit patri similis est filius, I do not see why the son might not be like the Father? And are there not some books amongst those vulgarly accounted the works of Ari∣stotle, as the book of plants, that of the world to Alex∣ander, and others, that none dare positively assert to be Aristotles? Neither is this any new thing in him, for the same suppositition of books hath happened to Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Origen, Cyprian, Hierom, Augustine, and other great men.

4. Let it be concluded, that we have the books which may justly and legitimately be ascribed to Aristotle, yet notwithstanding how dubious is it to know in these books what is properly and truly his, and what is not? For Strabo, Plutarch, and others, do memorate that when Theophra∣stus had left Neleus Scepsius heir to his own, and Aristotles Library, their books lay long hidden in the ground and that many years after, when they were corroded with worms, and moths, and almost consumed, and wasted, they were dig∣ged up and sold to Apellicon Teius, who took care to ex∣port them to Athens, and took upon him to amend and

correct the defects according to his own mind: And 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not long after Lucius Sylla had carried them to Rome forth of Greece, he committed them to Tyrannion the Grammarian, that he might correct and alter them; and so that he added detracted or changed what he judged Appellicon had de∣praved, or might better agree to the mind of Aristotle. And that afterwards succeeded Andronicus Rhodius who again turned all upside down and altered as he thought fit. There∣fore how shall we believe that the pure text of Aristotle, passing the hands of so many Correctors (that I may not more truly say Corruptors come to our hands without being viciated in innumerable places? first suffering by the injury of time, and then by the conjectures of so many Censurers. Especially if to this we shall add, the variety, oscitancy, and unskilfulness of transcribers, we shall find that in this author, which is common to almost all, that of one and the self-same place there will be vari∣ous lections, that it will be hardly possible to divine, which are the primary and proper footsteps of the author.

5. But let this also be given, that there is nothing con∣tained in his works but what is his own, yet the style and manner of Aristotles writing doth render his doctrine so un∣certain, and obscure, that to fish out his meaning there is need of a Delian Urinator. For though he might be copi∣ous and elegant in easie matters, yet in things that are more difficult, and which require more perspicuous explication, he is so ambiguous, brief, lame, and intricate, that he seems from thence to have raised plenty of matter, and occa∣sion to make his Sectators wrangle and conjecture. Therefore Atticus did worthily, and appositely compare him, and his writings, to that black humour poured forth by the Cuttle fish, under which lying hid she escapeth catching; for he seems to have spoken so on purpose, as though he be taken in some sense, yet in another he makes an escape, and so eludes the Catchers. And some of his followers do acknowledge that he hath used this kind of equivocal spea∣king of purpose; but what need we any further witness, be∣hold Aristotle himself openly declaring that he used this

affected obscurity in his Physicks, for labouring to conso∣late Alexander complaining that he had divulged them, he saith, Scripsisti ad me de libris Auscultatoriis, existimans in arcano custodiendos fuisse. Seito igitur ipsos editos, et non editos esse. Cognosci enim, percipique ab iis tantum poterunt, qui nos audierint. Thou hast written to me touching my books of Auscultation, thinking that they were to have been kept in secret. Therefore know that they are published, and not published. For they can onely be un∣derstood, and perceived of those who have heard us. Which things being thus, we may marvail to what end they have called and accounted him as a Daemon? for verily he hath imitated the cunning of a Cacodaemon, who is said to speak by his Prophets and Sibylls after such a manner, that his words may be used in divers and contrary senses: is this the honour of Aristotle, or the glory of the Schools?

6. But further let it be conceded that Aristotle hath spo∣ken, and written perspicuously, yet nevertheless his doctrine is left very uncertain: For he for the most part still useth a Rhapsodie, and is a great Compiler of other mens works, and that without taking time to digest or censure all things in them, so that it is difficult to discern when he produceth any thing of his own, when of another mans. And therefore who is there, who when he perceives himself to be urged and pressed with any place in Aristotle, may not oppose, and say, that it is not he that speaks there, but some of the antients under his person, and so never be without a subter∣fuge, and way for evasion? Again, it is not seldome that he doth openly declare the fallaciousness, and uncertainty of his doctrine by inserting of Adverbs of doubting, as in his book of the Categories speaking of Relatives he saith, For∣tassis autem difficile sit de rebus hujusmodi vehementer asserere: Perhaps it is difficult to affirm any thing vehement∣ly of such like matters. And further where he hath reckon'd up the four species of quality, he addeth, Fortassis quidem igitur alius quispiam apparuerit qualitatis modus, sed ferè qui maxi••è dicuntur, hi sunt. For perhaps truly some other mood of quality may appear, but these are almost all

that are especially spoken of. There are many such like places which I omit, these being sufficient to manifest the man to be no other but such an one as the author of the censure commonly prefixt before his works, who after many com∣mendations given him, saith, Accedebat ad haec, ingenium viri tectum et callidum, et metuens reprehensionis, quod inhibebat eum, ne proferret interdum apertè quae sentiret. Inde tam multa per ejus opera obscura, et ambigua. There happened to these things, the closs wit of the man, and crafty, and fearing reprehension, which did inhibit him, that sometimes he durst not utter openly those things which he thought. From whence it is that so many things, throughout his works, are obscure and ambiguous.

7. But let us omit these, and give it for granted that A∣ristotle hath uttered his opinion plainly, and doth speak al∣together Dogmatically, and without haesitation; will it not still remain of necessity that his doctrine is uncertain and ob∣scure, seeing it is beset with continual altercations amongst the Peripateticks themselves, differing about the interpreta∣tion of his text? neither is there any possible hope of their reconciliation, but that we may sooner see a conjunction of the poles of heaven, one holding this, and another that, and yet all affirming that their meaning was Aristotles mind: for when they make the question, whether, and what kind of matter he did ascribe to the heavens, some af∣firm that he did attribute matter to the heavens, and some deny that he did attribute any: some hold that he appro∣priated the same matter to the heavens, that he did to the elements, and other some affirm that he gave them a divers matter. Wherefore suppose any one not preoccupated de∣sired to be instructed in the Peripatetick doctrine, what should he do, or whither should he turn himself, when he should see about some one difficulty propounded, divers and sundry opinions differing one from another, and Aristotle wrested against himself? would he think it possible that Aristotle at one and the self-same time, did hold things absolutely contrary one to another?

8. And if all this were granted that the Aristotelians

did not disagree amongst themselves, and had a genuine in∣terpretation of Aristotles mind, yet would there remain much doubt and uncertainty in his doctrine: because in it there are many things omitted, and insufficient, many things Tautological▪ and superfluous, many things false, impious, and calumnious, and many things repugnant, and contradi∣ctory, which we shall make out hereafter, and so pass them in this place.

3. Neither ought the throne be yielded to Aristotle alone, nor his Philosophy onely adored, and admitted, be∣cause in his writings innumerable things are wanting, and defective, that are essentially necessary to the compleating of Physical knowledge, which we shall something at large demonstrate.

1. I shall pass by the defects in his Organical learning, as having been touched before when we handled Logick, and onely come to open his defects in Physicks: And here first is required a definition of Physick, the declaration of the sub∣ject matter is wanting, a general partition, and distributi∣on is required: neither is it shewn to what end, how or in what order he will proceed to speak of the heavens, the me∣teors, the animants, and the like, which all belong to Physical speculation, this is all the order of this great Me∣thode-monger. And when he had laid it was to be proceeded ex notioribus nobis ad notiora naturâ, and that even by common sense singulars are better known to us, and univer∣salls more known in nature, yet presently after he prepo∣sterously concludes, ab universalibus ad singularia proce∣dendum.

2. What a brave definition doth he give of Nature, to wit, Natura est principium, & causa motus, & quietis ejus, in quo inest primò et per se, et non secundum accidens, in which there are more defects and errours than words? For hereby nature is not distinguished from the efficient cause, art may be a principle as well as nature, and many more which I shall not stand to recite, seeing the most acute, and learned Helmont hath demonstrated no fewer than thirteen errors, or defects, in this so short a definition, and so conclu∣deth,

Atque tandem valdè anxius, nescit quid vocet, aut vo∣care debeat naturam, naturalis auscultationis scriptor. And at the length being very anxious, the writer of natural au∣scultation is ignorant what he should or ought to call nature. And also confutes some other descriptions of Aristotle with many pregnant and undeniable arguments: and in the most of all his divisions and definitions, as may be seen in his definition of motion, and of alterarion, and divers others, which were tedious and fruitless to reckon up.

3. His proofs and demonstrations for the most part have the same lameness with the rest, ex uno disce omnes. He goes about to prove the world to be perfect, because it doth contain bodies, and that a bodie is perfect because it con∣taineth trinal dimension, and that trinal dimension is per∣fect, because three are all things: but three are all things, because if they be either one, or two, yet we have not named all things; but as soon as there are three, we may call them all things. O how egregious! O how super-sufficient is this proof! O how wonderfully beseeming so great a Phi∣losopher! O how fit is he to be the Prince of Learning, and the Dictator in the Academies! And the same absurdi∣ties may be seen every where in his writings.

4. The like appears in his argumentations against the antient Philosophers, whom he seems every where to con∣fute, calumniate and contradict, but with the same imper∣fections and defects, as to instance in two or three. He taxeth Democritus, Leucippus, and others very insufficiently, who did hold that generation was by congregation, and that no continuum was compounded of indivisible things, which they speaking of Physical impartibilitie, he impugns as of Mathematical. Doth he not unworthily tax Plato, that besides matter and Idaea, he had put no efficient cause of gene∣ration? when he himself besides matter and form, rather hath put privation, which is a non ens, than any efficient cause: Quapropter cum Aristoteles nesciat naturam, proprietates, itemque generationum causas, ac quidditatem; quis non judicaverit, ex aridis cisternis Scholorum aquas Philoso∣phiae haustas hactenus? Octo enim libri ausultationum

Physicarum, somnia et privationes, pro naturae cognitione exponunt. Wherefore seeing Aristotle is ignorant of nature, proprieties, and also the causes, and quiddity of generati∣ons; who shall not judicate the waters of Philosophy hither∣to drawn from the drie Cisterns of the Schools? For the eight books of Physical auscultations, do expound dreams, and privations, instead of the knowledge of nature.

5. This Philosophy is meerly verbal, speculative, ab∣stractive, formal and notional, fit to fill the brains with monstrous and airy Chymaeras, speculative, and fruitless conceits, but not to replenish the intellect with sound know∣ledge, and demonstrative verity, nor to lead man practical∣ly to dive into the internal center of natures abstruse, and occult operations: But is only conversant about the shell, and husk, handling the accidental, external and recollacious qualities of things, confusedly, and continually tumbling over obscure, ambiguous, general and equivocal terms, which are onely fit to captivate young Sciolists, and raw wits, but not to satisfy a discreet and wary understanding, that expects Apodictical, and experimental manuduction in∣to the more interiour clossets of nature. Here in the Schools is found no such thing, but objurgations, and clamours, fighting and contending Andabatarum more, like blind, or madmen, not knowing where they wound others, nor where they are hurt or offended themselves.

6. And whereas names should truely express notions, and they be co••gruous to things themselves, the Aristotelian Philosophy leads us into an endless Labyrinth, having no∣thing in manner but Syllogisms, or rather Paralogisms to statuminate and uphold the Fabrick thereof: for they have altogether laid aside Induction as too mechanical and pain∣ful, which onely can be serviceable to Physical Science, and have invented and introduced words, terms, definitions, distinctions, and limitations consonant enough amongst them∣selves, but no way consorting or sympathizing with nature it self. Scientiae enim, quas nunc habemus, nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam concinnationes rerum ante à inventa∣rum; non modi inveniendi aut designationes novorum ope∣rum.

For those Sciences that we have now, are nothing else but certain concinnations of things formerly found out; not the wayes, or designations of inventing new works. And one thing more, instead of establishing the mind in Physical truths, most usually they confound the judgement with Ma∣thematical terms, which in Aristotles writings is no small error: for though the Mathematicks be exceedingly helpful to Natural Philosophy, yet is confusion of terms very hurtful; for if a Mathematical point or superficies be urged in a Physicall argument it will conclude nothing, but onely ob∣fuscate, and disorder the intellect.

7. This School Philosophy is altogether void of true, and infallible demonstration, observation, and experiment, the only certain means, and instruments to discover, and ana∣tomize natures occult and central operations; which are found out by laborious tryals, manual operations, assiduous observations, and the like, and not by poring continually upon a few paper Idols, and unexperienced Authors: As though we could fathome the Universe by our shallow ima∣ginations, or comprize the mysteries of mother nature in the narrow compass of our weak brains; or as though she would follow us into our Chambers, and there in idlenesse communicate her secrets unto us; no verily, Dii bona sua laboribus vendunt, ease and idleness are not the way to get knowledge. Therefore here I shall shew what noble parts of Physical knowledge have been, and are neglected by the Schools, onely because they abhor taking of pains, and think they can argue Dame Na••ure out of her secrets, and that they need no other key but Syllogisms to unlock her Cabinet.

1. Therefore that noble, and almost divine Science of natural Magick, is by them not only repudiated, abomi∣nated, and prosecuted with fire and sword, but also the very name s••ems nauseous and execrable unto them; so little have they done either to advance learning, or to vindicate truth. A great wonder that men that profess themselves almost ignorant of nothing, and think themselves the most skilful wordmen or Logodaedalists in the world, should either not

understand or be unwilling to acknowledge that the word Magick was in its primary and proper acceptation, taken in a good and honourable sense, and appropriated to those that the world accounted most wise and learned: and never was abusively taken, until many Impostors, and knaves did abuse and pervert that so noble a science, as though the name of Doctor were dishonourable, or unworthy to be an epithite for the able and learned, who have justly merited and taken that degree, because every Montebank Emperick and Quacksalver, have usually that title attributed unto them. Was not Magick amongst the Persians accepted for a sublime Sapience, and the science of the universal con∣sent of things? And were not those men (supposed Kings) that came from the East styled by that honourable name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 M••gi, or Wisemen, which the Holy Ghost gives unto them, thereby to denote out that glorious mystery of which they were made partakers by the revelation of that spirit of life and light. Neither do I here Apologize for that impious and execrable Magick, that either is used for the hurt and destruction of mankind, or pretends to gain knowledge from him who is the grand enemy of all the sons of Adam, no, that I truly abominate, Quia (as learned Mirandula saith) pendet ex manu hostium primae veri∣tatis, potestatum harum tenebrarum, quae tenebras fal∣sitatis malè dispositis intellectibus obfundunt. Because it dependeth upon the hand of the enemies of the primitive verity, of the powers of these darknesses, which do infuse the tenebrosities of falsity into evilly disposed intellects.

But that which I defend is that noble and laudable Sci∣ence, Quae cognitionem formarum abditarum ad opera miranda deducat, at que activa passivis conjungendo, mag∣nalia naturae manifestet; which leadeth cognition of occult forms unto wonderful works, and by conjoining actives to passives, doth manifest the grand secrets of nature. And indeed is that worthy, and wonderful science, not unbe∣seeming the noblest person, or greatest Scholar, and is that sublime knowledge whereby the wondetful works of the Creator are discovered, and innumerable benefits produced

to the poor Creatures. Mirabilia artis Magicae non sunt nisi per unionem & actuationem eorum, quae seminalitèr, & separatae sunt in natura. The wonderful things of Art Magick are not brought to pass, except by the union, and actuation of those things that are seminally, and separately in nature: So that indeed, Magicam operari, non est a∣liud nisi maritare mundum. To operate by Magick is no∣thing else but to marry the world, that is, fitly and duly to join and connex agents to their patients, masculines to fae∣minines, superious to inferiours, Caelestials to Terrestrials, that thereby nature may act out her hidden and latent power. And this is that which the greatest Doctor need not be asha∣med of, whether Physician or Philosopher, but that which is commendable both before God and man, and that wher∣in if the Schools had been exercised, their works and fruits would have been more manifest, and they then owned not as the disseminators of vain controversies, and frivolous disputes, but as the true interpreters of nature, Patriots of true learning, and benefactors to mankind. But I pray God they may repent and amend, and imbrace the truth, and also practise it.

2. The next thing I shall mind them of, as one of their greatest defects, is that sublime, and never-sufficiently praised Science of Pyrotechny or Chymistry; which though it hath suffered much through the corruption of time, and the wic∣kednesse of cov••tous Impostors, and ravenous Harpies, who gaping after mountains of Gold, do either suck the purses of others as greedy as themselves, or else do willingly suffer themselves to be deluded, and circumvented by these broilers and smoak ••ellers, and so bring an injust infamy up∣on this so profitable and laudable an art. And though in former times it was had in honour by Trismegist, Geber, Raymund Lully, Arnoldus de villâ novâ, Roger Bacon, and many others, yet was it for many ages in a manner buri∣ed in oblivion, or banished to the Monastick cells, until Basilius Valentinus, Isaac Hollandus, and Paracelsus that singular ornament of Germany, did revive and restore the same, and since more cleerly manifested by him, who is

justly stiled Philosophus per ignem, and many other famous men. The benefits of which are now so openly known, es∣specially the common and vulgar part of it (though the grand mysteries are hid in the brests of those who are truly called Adepti) and so much written by the elaborate pens of many learned and industrious men therein, that it would be needless to relate its transcendent uses, and excellencies: it being in a word that Art that doth help more truly and radically to denudate, and discover the secret principles and operations of nature, than any other in the world, and I dare truly and boldly say, that one years exercise therein to inge∣nious spirits, under able Masters, will produce more real and true fruit, than the studying Aristotelian Philosophy hath brought forth in many centuries. O that the Schools there∣fore would leave their idle, and fruitless speculations, and not be too proud to put their hands to the coals and furnace, where they might find ocular experiments to confute their fopperies, and produce effects that would be beneficial to all posterities. I will onely mind them of this one rule. Discendae primum ergo digestiones, distillationes, sublimationes, reverberationes, extractiones, solutiones, coagulationes, fermentationes, fixationes, & omne quod ad opus hoc in∣strumentum requiritur, cognoscendum est usu, prout vi∣tra, cucurbitae, circulatoria, gallinarum ova, terrea vasa, balnea, furni ventales, reverberatorii similes{que}, nec non carbones atque tenacula: sic in Alchimia medici∣naque proficere poteris. Neither despise this counsel because the author is no friend to Aristotle, nor be ashamed to cast off thy fine clothes to work in a laboratory, for without this thou mayest wax old in ignorance, and dy with guilt, because thou hast served thy generations with no better stuff than Aristotles dreames, and Scholastick fables. Nam utut naturale ingenium, & acumen judicii, Philosophus habeat, nunquam tamen ad rerum naturalium radicem, aut r••dical••m scientiam admittitur, sine igne. For how∣soever a Philosopher may h••v•• a natural wit, and acuteness of Iudgement, notwithstanding he is never admitted to the root, or radical Science of natural things, without the fire.

3. Another thing of no less weight than the former I shall denote unto them, which is that part of natural Philosophy, that concerns medicine, which of all other is most necessa∣ry, and behooful for conserving and restoring the health of man; and yet is no less imperfect, and defective than any of the rest.

For first it is turned into a way of meer formality, flattery, cunning, craft and covetousness, nothing being so much sought after by its professors as popular applause, repute, and esteem with rich and mighty men, that thereby the larger fees may be drawn from them, while in the mean time, the poor are neglected and despised. Is this the office of a Phy∣sician? is only riches got by hook or crook, whether the Patient reeeive benefit or none, live or dy, the sole end of their profession? and must these things have the countenance of Law, and confirmation by Charters? must these things be applauded and cryed up, while the sincere and faithful en∣deavors of simple and honest-meaning men, are disdained and trampled upon? But the world hath alwaies loved deceivers, and therefore must be deceived.

Secondly, the rule being most sure, that ubi desinit Phi∣losophus, incipit medicus, it must of necessity follow, that if Philosophy be false, uncertain, and ill bottomed of it self, then the medicinal knowledge that is built thereon▪ and drawn from thence, must needs be faulty and ruinous. Now how false the Aristotelian Philosophy is in it self is in part made cleer, and more is to be said of it hereafter, and ther∣fore truth and experience will declare the imperfection of that medicinal knowledge that stands upon no better a basis. For Galen their great Coryphaeus and Antesignanus hath laid down no other principles to build medicinal skill upon, than the doctrine of Aristotle, as that all bodies mixt are compounded of the four Elements, and that the total pa∣rity or disparity, temperament, complexion, and constitu∣tion of all bodies do arise from the equal or unequal conflux and commixture of these four: and that from these do result four prime qualities, and four humours, and that the a∣bounding, defect, repugnancy, or alteration of he••e are

the causes of all diseases. Mirum sanè, quantum in his rixatum, et scriptum sit: ac miserandum, quantum baec laxa nugarum somnia, mundum hactenus circumvene∣rint. Truly it is a wonder how much hath been disputed and written in these things: and it is to be commiserated, how much these loose dreams of trifles, have hitherto cir∣cumvented the world.

For this same author makes it good by undeniable argu∣ments and experiments, that there are not four Elements, nor humours, in rerum natura, and hath said enough, suffi∣ciently to confute and overthrow the whole Fabrick of the Galenical learning, which here I forbear to insert. And therefore it is very strange that the Schools, nay in a manner the whole world, should be inchanted and infatuated to admire, and own this ignorant Pagan, who being ambitious of erecting his own fame, did traduce, and darken the writings of those that preceded him, and preten∣ding to interpret and open the doctrine of learned Hippocra∣tes, he altogether obscured and perverted the same: And yet can the Schools be so wilfully mad to adore this Idol▪ and follow this blind guide.

Thirdly, if the ground of Galenical Physick had been sound and firm, and that it were the true and certain way both to find out the causes, and to cure diseases, yet not∣withstanding hath it been but loosly prosecuted, and smally promoted, seeing for the space of so many hundred years, there is not by the Schools found out any more certain, safe, or easie way to cure diseases than was in the daies of Hippo∣crates, and Galen: It is very strange that it should grow up and flourish with them, and never since come to any more perfection, when it is usually observed that nothing is simnl & semel invented and perfected. For it is plain that in Bo∣tanical knowledge nothing of value is found out or discover∣ed since the daies of Dioscorides; for though some plants be now found out that were not then known, and many species of others also, and their cuts and figures more perfected, as beside much confusedly heaped up concerning their qualities of heat and cold, driness and moisture; yet is nothing more

added by real experience, and diligent observation of their specifick vertues, and intrinsick properties, so that in regard of the vegetable Kingdom the art of medicine hath got little advance.

Fourthly, though medicinal knowledge have received some melioration especially in the Anatomical part, wherein men have laboured with much acuteness, diligence, and observation, so that this part seems to be growing, and a∣rising towards the Zenith of perfection, especially since our never-sufficiently honoured Countryman Doctor Harvey discovered that wonderful secret of the bloods circulary mo∣tion: yet for all this there comes small advantage by it in practice, and application, for the more certain, safe, and ea∣sie curing of diseases: for though it bring great satisfaction to a speculative understanding, and help to cleer many intri∣cate doubts, yet doth it little to remove dolor, danger, or death.

And moreover though it be grown to a mighty height of exactness, in vulgar Anatomy and dissection of the dead bodies of men, or the living ones of beasts, birds, and fi∣shes; yet is it defective as to that vive and Mystical Ana∣tomy that discovers the true Schematism or signature of that invisible Archeus or spiritus mechanicus, that is the true opifex, and dispositor of all the salutary, and morbifick li∣neaments, both in the seminal guttula, the tender Embrio, and the formed Creature, of which Paracelsus, Helmont, and our learned Countryman Dr. Pludd, have written most excellently.

Fiftly, the most excellent art of Chirurgery, though much advanced by the help of Anatomy in all that belongs to ma∣nual operation, or the use of instruments; yet in the curing of great and dangerous sores, as the Lupus, Cancer, Fistula, Carcinoma, Elephantiasis, Strumaes, virulent and malign Ulcers, and the like, it is much defective, and can perform little, without mineral and Chymical medicaments. Not because nature and providence have ordained no remedies for them, but because of the sloathfulness and negligence of professors and artists, who sit down contented with Galeni∣cal

medicaments, thinking there is nothing of greater virtue, and operation than they; and so become slaves and captives to some few Authors, whom they think it not lawful to relinguish, or that natures whole mysteries were comprized in their paper Monuments, and no search further to be made: Not knowing that their scrutiny should be through the whole Theatre of nature, and that their only study and labour ought to be to acquire and find out salves for every sore, and medicines for every malady, and not to be in∣chained with the formal prescriptions of Schools, Halls, Colleges, or Masters, but to seek continually that these things might be made known unto them, and not to imagine it is sufficient to have served an appenticeship to it as to a trade, except they arrive at higher attainments. Quia me∣dicus ad imaginem dei agere ac laborare jussus est, constat ipsum non nugacibus rebus, sed secretioribus Magiae ac Ca∣balae studiis operam suam locare debere: non enim ut Iu∣risconsultorum vel Physicorum scientia, sic et Medicina hu∣manis speculationibus comprehendi potest, cum ipsa supra omnes artes admirabilis ac occulta existat. Because the Physician is commanded to act, and labour according to the image of God, it is manifest that he ought not to place his pains in trifling things, but in the more secret studies of Magick, and Cabalistick Science: for not as the know∣ledge of Lawyers and Naturalists, so also can Medicinal skill be comprehended by human speculations, seeing it is admirable and occult above all arts. Therefore what great error, and how haynous a crime is it to leave the great book of the Macracosm, nay and the writings of others, only to adhere to the doctrine of ignorant, wicked, malicious, and blind Pagans? I shall onely add this, Adeoque cum omne donum bonum, nedum virtutum, sed & cognitio∣num, descendat à patre luminum; quis poterit à Scholis Gentilitiis scientiae medicae tesseram ediscere? Dominus enim creavit medicum, non Scholae. Therefore seeing every good gift, not onely of vertues, but also of Sciences, doth descend from the Father of lights; who can perfect∣ly learn the sum of Medicinal knowledge from the heathenish

Schools? For the Lord hath created the Physician, not the Schools.

4. There remaineth diverse excellent discoveries of many mysterious things in nature that do properly belong to Phy∣sicks, which yet the Schools take small or no notice of, and as little pains in, either to know, teach, or improve them; and so are a witness against them of their sluggishness, and de∣ficiency of their too-much-magnified Peripatetick Philoso∣phy.

As first, they pass over with a dry foot that laudable, excel∣lent, and profitable science of Physiognomy, which hath been admired, and studyed of the gravest and wisest Sages that have been in many generations: which is that Science which from and by certain external signs, signatures, and lineaments, doth explicate the internal nature and quality of natural bodies either generally or specifically. And this so necessary a knowledge both in the genus and species of it is altogether omitted by the School; they understand and teach nothing of Caelestial signatures, which are in some measure made known by the quantity, light, colour, motion, and other affections of those bodies: They teach nothing of Sub-caelestial Physiognomy, whether Elementary, Meteorolo∣gical, or Mineralogical, but are utterly ignorant in all these, as also in Botanical, and Anthropological Physiognomy, contenting themselves with a few frivilous, false and formal definitions, and notions, and so never seek to penetrate into the more interiour nature of things, by which it comes to pass that they know little in the vegetable, and animal king∣domes, and least of all in the subterranean, or mineral; and but that Paracelsus, Crollius, Quercetan, Baptista Porta, and some others had taken pains in it, there had no foot∣steps of it almost been visible. And my Lord Bacon doth reckon also as defective the interpretation of natural dreams; for though Aristotle himself hath said something of this, yet those that pretend most to admire and honour him, have taken as little pains in this as the rest, to improve it to the glory of their great Master.

Secondly, they are as ignorant in the most admirable,

and soul-ravishing knowledge of the three great Hypostatical principles of nature, Salt, Sulphur, and Mercury, first mentioned by Basilius Valentinus, and afterwards clearly and evidently manifested by that miracle of industry and pains Theophrastus Paracelsus. Which however the Schools (as hating any liquor that is not drawn out of their own Cask, and despising all things that come by toyl and labor) may sleight and contemn it, and please themselves with their ayery Chimaera of an abstracted and scarce intelligible materia prima, or Hyle, which is neither planè ens, nec non ens, and think to make fools believe their Masters descri∣ption of it, that it is neque quantum, neque quale, neque quid, neque quicquid eorum quae cernuntur, and so the Delphick devil cannot expound it, nor Sphinx nor O••dipus be able to unriddle it; Is notwithstanding so cleer, certain, and A∣podictical a truth, that all the Academies in the Universe will never be able to eradicate, and whose verity is made so evident by Pyrotechny, that he must needs distrust his own senses that will not credit it; but what avails it to sing to a deaf man? And though Helmont with the experiments of his Gehennal fire, and some other solid arguments labour the labefactation of this truth, yet doth he not prove that they are not Hypostatical principles, but onely that they are not the ultimate reduction that the possibility of art can pro∣duce, which he truly proves to be water; yet are the most compound bodies in the universe to be reduced into them, and by that introversion is the secrets of nature more laid open than by all the Peripatetitk Philosophy in the world, and if this be not so, let experience speak.

Thirdly, what shall I say of that wonderful and most beneficial discovery of the Magnetical Philosophy, by our worthy, learned, and industrious Countreyman Doctor Gil∣bert? what rare and unheard-of mysteries doth it disclose? what huge light, and advantage doth it bring to Natural Philosophy, and the Mathematicks? What helps to Navi∣gation, and almost all other arts, and trades? How vastly is it improved, inlarged, and adorned by those great wits, and unwearied persons, such as Ridley, Carpenter, Barlow,

Cabaeus, and the grand gatherer of all kind of learning A∣thanasius Kercherus? Can the Schools say, or make it good, that in the space of fifteen hundred years they ever in∣vented any such like thing? nay it were well if they had not been, and still were the opposers, contemners, and condem∣ners of all new discoveries, how transcendent, useful, or pro∣fitable soever they were.

Fourthly, what shall I say of the Atomical learning revived by that noble, and indefatigable person Renatus des Cartes, and since illustrated and improved by Magnenus R••gius, White, Digby, Phocyllides, Holwarda, and divers others? Hath the Schools any thing of like firmness, do they demonstrate after Euclides most certain and undenia∣ble way, as Democritus reviviscens doth? no surely, all theirs is but like dross and chaff in comparison of this. What shall I say of that notable conceit of the most happy genius these latter ages have had, Iohn Kepler, of the Continued Emis∣sion of raies from the body of the Sun, that causeth all the rest of the Planets to move? Deserves this no further investi∣gation? What shall I say of the Epicuraean Philosophy, brought to light, illustrated and compleated by the labour of that general Scholar Petrus Gassendus? Surely if it be rightly examined, it will prove a more perfect, and sound piece, than any the Schools ever had, or followed.

4. The Philosophy of Aristotle maintained by the Schools ought not to be prised so much above others, because in it there are many things superflu••us, Tautological, frivo∣lous, and needless▪ as we shall in a few instances make cleerly evident.

For first, omitting many superabundant reiterations, and repetitions in his Organicks and Animasticks, I shall only touch some few contained in his Physicks: as in that much celebrated definition wherein nature is said to be Principium, & causa motus, & quietis ejus, in quo inest primò, & per se, & non secundùm accidens. 1. This particle causa seems to be put superfluously; seeing every cause is a principle. 2. That of quietis; seeing the faculty of Contraries are the same, for that which is the faculty of speaking, and holding

ones peace, is the same. 3. That ejus, in quo est, seeing also art is the principle of the motion of the artificer, in whom it is. 4. That primò. 5. And that per se; for also art is the cause of artificial motion, primarily, and by it self, qua∣tenus as far as it is of this sort. 6. That particle, & non secundùm accidens, is needless; for wherefore was that necessary seeing before he had put per se? I shall omit the rest of his nauseous Tautologies in the 3, 5, and 7. chapters of the forcited book, and in the most of the books of Physicks following, as obvious to every one that will take pains to ex∣amine and consider them.

Secondly, in his book de Coelo he reiterates this, Sim∣plicis corporis simplex est motus, & simplex est motus simplicis corporis, as though these two were much different: and there twice or thrice is repeated the probation, that Circu∣lar motion doth agree to some body according to nature. The like to which may be seen in the 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12. chapters of the same book, and in all the books following of the same subject. I shall onely name one other, and so pass this point, in lib. 1. De or••u, et interitu, cap. 6. He propounds the question of the Elements, whether they be, or they be not? and whether they be sempiternal, or not? As though they had not been agitated in his third book de Coelo, and at last brings in that vain repetition, est igitur tan∣gens ut plurimùm id, quod tangit tangens: apparet tan∣gens tangere quod tangit, necesse videtur esse quod tangitur tangere, &c. O how egregiously is this disputed of him who must needs be accounted the Prince of Philosophers! O how excellent needs must those disciples be that are taught by so worthy a Master!

5. This Philosophy ought not so much to be magnified above other, because in it are very many things that are ap∣parently, and absolutely false, to make which appear, I shall onely name two or three manifest particulars.

First he affirms that nothing is contrary to substance, which he again asserts in his Logick, and repeats elsewhere, which to me seems absolutely false: for certainly the substance of the fire is contrary to the substance of the water. But thou

wilt say the contrariety is solely in the qualities. But see∣ing these qualities are every one proper to their substances, and do arise out of them, and accept their esse from them: and therefore doth not this also argue contrariety in them? For let the substance be of the same nature on both sides; from whence is it that these qualities do arise rather than o∣thers which are contrary unto them? And again in the same chapter it is false that he teacheth that contraries can∣not suffer of themselves: For do not cold things strive with hot, and moist things with dry? And do not these qualities mutually beat back, and expel one another.

Secondly, it is false which he affirms lib. 2. Phys. cap. 7. That the formal, final, and efficient causes are coincident, to wit in respect of the same effect: for how can the father be the same with the essential form of the Son? And it is also false which he defends in the eighth chapter, That art doth not deliberate; otherwise artists do all things rashly. But although the Mason do not deliberate, whether he ought to prepare a foundation rather than an house, Therefore doth ••e not consult, whether he shall build it now rather than at another time? or whether of this matter, rather than of o∣ther? or whether in this manner, rather than in ano∣ther?

Thirdly, how false is that which he laies down in the 6, and 7. chapters of the third book of Physicks, that no num∣ber can be given, than which a greater may not be exco∣gitated: but that a magnitude may be given, to wit the world, than which no greater can be excogitated? I pray you why may it not be lawful and possible to conceive a magnitude greater than this world? nay ten thousand times greater, wherein lies the impossibilitie? He also defines there infinitum to be that beyond which something alwaies may be taken; but how is that possible to be infinite that hath something extrase? or that it can be made infinite by some∣thing without it self? These are brave sancies, and fine dreams.

Fourthly, in the 8. book, besides innumerable falsityes that may be observed in the 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. chapters, that

is a most signal one, which in the first chapter he labours to build up, of the eternity of motion: that thereby he may make out the ingeniture, and eternity of the world. Let us therefore see with what reasons he can evince, and perswade it. 1. Is this, Motion is the act of a movable thing: Therefore that which is movable hath preceded Motion. I pray you doth he not wound himself with his own weapon, and strangle himself by his own consequence? For if any thing hath preceded Motion: Therefore motion is not eter∣nal. 2. He argues, The thing moving, and the thing mo∣ved are either made, or are eternal; But neither can be said to be so. But wherefore cannot the one or both be eternal, and nevertheless without motion? He adds, because this is absurd. An egregious instance truly, and indeed Philoso∣phical! for where appears this absurdity? He further urges: If the thing movable had preceded motion, then it had rested: and so another motion had been necessary before, of which that rest had been a privation. Verily as though he who is born blind, ought to have seen in the womb, that blindless might be accounted the privation thereof. 3. He proceeds, Power ought to be neer to the Act. As though stones that have lain hid from the framing of the world under the earth, had not as well power to be framed into an house which is made to day, as they have a few daies before they be digged up. 4. He saith, Time is eternal, therefore Mo∣tion also: He confirms the Antecedent, 1. Because all Philosophers, except Plato, do affirm it. As though the matter were pleaded in the Court, where voices are numbred? yet some have accounted Plato's judgement more than a thou∣sand; but this were to try things by authority, not by truth. 2. Because time is not sine nunc: but every nunc is the be∣ginning of the sequent, and the end of the praecedent time. As though there could not be a nunc first, and last; if either the motion of heaven hath begun, or also if we believe that motion is not measured by time, which were not hard to demonstrate.

5. I shall onely instance in one place more, and that is lib. 1. de Coelo cap. 3, cap. 4. There he assumes, and endea∣vours

to prove, that Circulary motion hath nothing contrary un••o it: what if of two wheels or orbs, the one were moved towards the Orient, and the other towards the Occident, were they not to be said to be moved towards contrary parts? and is not this to have something contrary unto it? nay may not the motion of something in a straight line, be contrary to motion that is circular, seeing all motion is considered in relation unto the term, or point from whence, and unto which it moves? and how this cannot be possible, to me seems neither probable nor possible. And though I have but taken these few things to instance in, yet were it no hard mat∣ter (but that it belongs not to my present purpose) to evert the whole ground and fabrick of his Philosophy, and that with arguments unanswerable, and infallible, but these are suffici∣ent for this place and purpose.

6. Aristotle's ipse dixit, or the School's sic habet A∣ristoteles, ought no longer to pass for oracles, nor his tenents for truths before others: because innumerable things in his Philosophy do contradict, and are diametrically contrary; and that I may make out what I say, I shall call in for witness his own words, and instance in some few particular places, that it may be manifest how in constant and wave∣ring he was in his own opinions.

First, in his book of Categories there is plain contradicti∣on, seeing he makes ten: and notwithstanding elsewhere sometimes three, sometimes six, sometimes eight. He saith the first substance is rather substance than the second, and not long after he affirmeth that the property of substance is to receive more and less. He makes Time a species of Continued quantity: and notwithstanding in the 4 book of Physicks, he will have it to be Number, which is Discrete quantity. He also indeavours in the 1 book Priorum Analyticorum, to demonstrate the definition of the figures, and in the 2 af∣ter teacheth that definition cannot be demonstrated. In the 1 book Posteriorum he will have us in Demonstration to proceed from things more known to us: and for all that he defines demonstration to be that which proceeds from Causes, but causes are more unknown to us than effects; and in the

same books he hath many such like, which for brevity I omit.

Secondly, in his first book of Physicks he impugneth that immovable principle of Parmenides, and Melissus: and after in the 8 book he proveth that there is one immovable principle of motion. He teacheth in the fifth chapter, that Contraries are not made, by course, of themselves, and not long after he holdeth, that whatsoever is generated, is gene∣rated of its contrary, and that whatsoever is corrupted goes into its contrary. In the second book, and seventh chapter, he disputeth against Empedocles affirming that the works of nature are made by chance; And yet confesses that Monsters are the misses and lapses of nature: And in the seventh book of Metaphysicks the seventh chapter, he holdeth that those things that do grow withou•• seed are made casually, from whence also in the 3 de Animâ the 12. chapter, he saith, Quae naturâ sunt, propter aliquid sunt, aut casus eorum, quae sunt propter aliquid. And many other of the like sort, from which I purposely supersede, these being sufficient to make good the assertion.

Thirdly, one more may be joined to these out of his book de Coelo the 2 chapter, where he saith, that every natural body is movable: And yet for all that in the third chapter, and more expresly in the fourteenth of the second book, he contendeth that the earth doth rest immovable in the center of the world. In the seventh chapter in the words cited not long before he altogether supposeth the heaven not to be animated: and notwithstanding he expressely saith it is animated in the second book, and second chapter; and al∣so the first de anima the third chapter, and elsewhere. In the second book, and second chapter, he holdeth that a sem∣piternal motion is in God: and in the eighth of the Physicks he maintaineth the primum movens to be immovable which is God: In the eight he saith the heaven is not an Organical body, and notwithstanding (as it is already seen) he hath made it to be indued with a Soul: For the soul, as he de∣fines it, is the act of an organical body: as also in the twelf he saith, Actionem astrorum talem esse, qualis est plan∣tarum, & animalium.

But of these things enough; by all which (I conceive) it is cleerly manifest that the Peripatetick Philosophy ought not to be preferred before all other, nay rather to be utterly exterminated, and some better introduced in the place therof, and that is the thing was attempted to be proved.

CHAP. VII. Of Metaphysicks, Ethicks, Politicks, Oeco∣nomicks, Poesie, and Oratory.

THough there be something in the most of these, that might tollerably pass, yet are many things in them so useless, false, uncertain, superfluous, wicked and defective, that they stand in need of reformation, melioration, or era∣dication, as we shall shew of every one of them in their or∣der.

1. For the Metaphysicks, which they call their Philoso∣phia prima, and do usually define it to be Scientia entis, quatenus ens est, the abuse and vanity of it appears in this. That it being nothing else but an abstract consideration of things by way of prescision, or cutting off from all other co∣comitant cogitations, and so to weigh and examine the things nudely and barely under the respect of their being, all other notions there about being separate from it, doth bring no better instruments, nor effective means for the dis∣covery of truth, than the weak and bare operation of the In∣tellect, or indeed of Phantasie, or the Imaginative faculty, and therefore no marvail that it hath spider-like weaved forth so many slie and cunning Cobweb-contextures of slender conceits, and curious niceties, fit for nothing but to insnare and intangle: and hath been so luxuriously petulant in the faetiferous production of so many monstrous, fruitless, and

vain Chimaeras. For they holding the soul to be tabula ra∣sa, in which nothing is insculpt, and that Science comes not by reminiscence, or resuscitation, but meerly acquisi∣tively de novo, and that there is nothing in the Intellect that hath not first some way or other been in the Senses, then must it needs follow that the operations of the Intellect are but weak means to produce Scientifical certitude, and so Me∣taphysical learning but barren and fruitless.

2. It hath neither laid down, nor assumed any certain principles, that are necessary or helpful to promote Sci∣ence; for whereas it obtends this for a maxim, That not any thing can be, and not be at the same instant of time; what fruitful products was there ever yet drawn from this un∣profitable fundamental? neither ever hath it proceeded so far as to find a sure, and ultimate resting place, which not∣withstanding the learned Renatus des Chartes hath happily performed, having gone back to the very basis of all, which is, that there is mens cogitans, which can no way feign, or ex∣cogitate it self not to be, which is a more certain and unde∣niable principle than ever the Schools invented, or built up∣on.

3. It is of no use nor advantage to other Sciences, nor ever hath brought any good or profit unto the sons of men, but onely seduced them into strange labyrinths of notional Chymaeras, and speculations, like idle and vain dreams, filling and feeding the fansie, but yielding nothing of soli∣dity to inrich the Intellect, nor any thing of use or profit to accomodate mankind: except that may be accounted an advantage, to obscure the truth, and lead the phantasies of men into the crooked Meanders of conceit, and nutation, and so with the assistance of its Twin Logick (both sisters of the same mother Nox) bring men to imagine and argue much, but in truth and verity to know little.

4. If it had been able (as it proudly pretends) to have taught any thing truly and certainly of those things that are Metaphysical, or supernatural, that either are not corporeal or materiate, or else much transcend the nature of Physical bodies both Caelestial and Elementary, then might it justly

be received, and have its due commendation. But alas! what weak, frivolous and groundless opinions hath it pro∣duced concerning God, Angells, separate substances, and the like? not seeing so much in these things as the Ethnicks, who, in the fable of the Golden Chain, did affirm, that nei∣ther men, nor the Gods could draw Iupiter from heaven to the earth, but that Iupiter could easily draw men from the earth to heaven. Quare frustra sudaverit, qui Caelestia religionis arcana, nostrae rationi adaptare conabitur. Therefore he in vain sweats, who indevours to fit the hea∣venly mysteries of religion to our reason.

5. What shall I say of those strange, vain, and poisonous Cockatrice eggs that it hath hatched, full of nothing but useless questions and altercations, to as little purpose as the disputes de Lanâ caprinâ, or Moonshine in the Water? What shall I say of it, is it not altogether defective of all solid, and fruit-bearing knowledge? doth it not superflu∣ously abound with vanities and follies? was ever any made either wise or happy by it? and yet this is the Schools prime Philosophy or Metaphysical learning, which is nothing but vain opination, void of Scientifical demonstration, and cleer verity. Fa••eamur, rerum divinarum paucissimarum de∣monstrationes habemus, omnia ferè opinionibus definentes. We must confess, we have the demonstrations of very few divine things, defining all things by opinions.

In the next place comes the Ethicks to be considered of, which how fruitless and vain they are may appear in a few reasons.

For 1. how can he be supposed to be the fittest teacher of that art, who was himself an heathen, and neither knew nor acknowledged God, who indeed is the summum bo∣num, and so placed felicity in fading, and momentary things, as riches, and honour: or at the best made but Ver∣tue the chief good, which cannot however be happiness it self, but at the most but the way and means to attain it? And it must necessarily follow that he that understands not the real, and true end, cannot teach the indubitate means that leads to that end, and therefore must needs be a blind guide,

especially to Christians, as Lambertus Danaeus hath suffi∣ciently manifested; and yet the Schools must needs follow, and prefer the dark Lamp of a blind Pagan, before the bright-shining Sun of the Prophets▪ and Apostles.

2. Though the Schools have disputed much of the Chief good, of vertues, and of vices, yet have they either taught nothing at all that is practicable, whereby vertue might be obtained, and vice eschewed, or felicity enjoyed, or but touched it very slenderly, perfunctorily, and unprofitably: as though it were sufficient to teach a Pilot the many dangers of his voyage in respect of tempests, storms, winds, sands, shelves, rocks, and the like, and to make a large commen∣dation of the peace, plenty, fruitfulness, and happiness of the place to which his journey were intended; yet leave him altogether ignorant and untaught how to escape those dan∣gers, and unfurnished with means to attain to the harbour unto which his navigation is purposed.

3. They have chosen to themselves such a way, whereby the mass of Ethical knowledge might be set forth as a splen∣did and beautiful thing, bearing forth the brightness of wit, and vigour of eloquence, rather than any truth in the mat∣ter, or benefit to the readers and hearers, and so have made it facilely disputable, but difficultly practicable, seeking themselves, more than truth, or the benefit of others; as Se••eca truly saith, Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non re∣rum facit cupiditatem, sed sui: Eloquence hurteth those, to whom it causeth not the desire of things, but of them∣selves: for water is better in an Earthen vessel, than poison in a golden cup, and he that speaks truly and to profi•• others is to be preferred before him that speaks Rhetorically, and elegantly to small profit or purpose.

4. It cannot but be matter of much wonder to all inge∣nuous men that shall more seriously perp••nd, and weigh the business, why not onely the Moral Philosophy of Ari∣stotle should take place above that which is deduced from principles of Christianity; but also why he should have therein the preheminence above Socrates, Plato, Zeno, and many others, who truly taught many divine and pretious

things for the eradicating of vice, the planting of vertue, and the establishing of mental tranquillity, and moral felici∣ty, which Aristotle and all his Sectators never either under∣stood, or had fruition of. What shall I say of that man of men the severe Seneca? are not his writings about vertue, tranquillity, and curing the minds diseases, infinitely beyond all those needless, fruitless, vain and impertinent discourses of the proud Stagyrite? Let all that ever loved vertue and tranquillity, and have perused the one, and the other, speak, and declare their judgements: nay doth not that one little Enchiridion of Epictetus contain more pretious treasure, than all the great volumes of Aristotle? let vertue speak, and truth determine.

Now for the Political and Oeconomical learning taught by the Schools out of Aristotle, as it hath many things of singular use, and commoditie in it, so is it not without its chaff, and tares, deserving rather purging, and refining, than the estimation of being compleat and perfect: For as there are many things in it frivolous, obscure, immethodical, superfluous, and false, so also is it very defective, and im∣perfect; for if we look upon what Plato hath written de le∣gibus, and de Republica, though there may be found ma∣ny things unpracticable, and incompleat, yet compared with the other, it is no way inferiour, but deserves as great, if not an higher commendation; and so the writings of Bodin, nay Macchiavel and divers other modern authors may duly challenge as much praise in this point, as that of Aristotle, which the Schools do so much adhere to and magnifie, yea even our own Countreyman master Hobbs hath pieces of more exquisiteness, and profundity in that subject, than ever the Graecian with was able to reach unto, or attain; so that there is no reason why he should be so applauded, and universally received, while more able pieces are rejected, and past by.

Lastly, for Rhetorick, or Oratory, Poesie, and the like, which serve for adornation, and are as it were the outward dress, and attire of more solid sciences; first they might tollerably pass, if there were not too much affectation

towards them, and too much pretious time spent about them, while more excellent and necessary learning lies neg∣lected and passed by: For we do in these ornamental arts, as people usually do in the world, who take more care often time about the goods of fortune, than about the good of the body, and more nice and precise sollicitousness about fashi∣ons and garbs, than either about the body it self or the goods of the mind, regarding ••he shell more than the kernel, and the shadow more than the Substance. And therefore it was not without just cause that Plato (though by some censured for it) did reckon Rhetorick amongst the voluptuary arts, for we most commonly use it either for the priding and plea∣sing of our selves that we may appear eloquent, and learned to others, or else use it cunningly and sophistically to capti∣vate, and draw over the judgements of others to serve our ends and interests: and thereby make false things appear true, old things new, crooked things straight, and commodious things unprofitable, as Augustine saith, Imperitior mul∣titude, quod ornatè dicitur, etiam verè dici arbitratur, The more unskilful multitude thinketh that what is spoken elegantly, is also spoken truly. And therefore Seneca saith, Seest thou a man neat and compt in his language, then is his mind occupied in minute things.

2. Both Eloquence and Poesie seem rather to be num∣bred amongst the gifts of nature, than amongst the disci∣plines, for those which excell much in reason, and do dis∣pose those things which they excogitate in a most easie me∣thod, that they may be cleerly, and distinctly understood, are most apt to perswade, although they did use the lan∣guage of the Goths, and had never learned Rhetorick: and those that are born to invent most ingenious figments, and to express them with the greatest elegance and suavity, are to be accounted the best Poets, although they are ignorant of all the precepts of the Poetical art; for nascitur, non fit poeta, and therefore Plato most truly concludeth, Omnes itaque carminum poetae insignes, non arte, sed divino af∣flatu, mente capti omnia ista praeclar a poemata canunt. Therefore all the famous makers of verses, do not sing all

these excellent Poems by art, but by a divine afflation, being carried above themselves.

3. Though Aristotle were a great Master in Oratory, and a very eloquent man, yet in that point might justly give the palm to his Master Plato, unto whom all the attributes of honour in that particular are worthily accumulated, of whom it is said, That if Iupiter would speak in mans language, he would speak in that of Plato.

Thus have I briefly run over some of the faults, and de∣fects of Academick learning, but am far from having touch∣ed all, for to have done that would have reached beyond both my time, and purpose, and also mine abilities; for Benardus non videt omnia: yet if the Lion may be known by his paw, and Hercules by his foot, then I hope there is enough said to make it cleer, that the Aristotelian, and Scholastick learning, deserves not the preheminence above all other, nor those great commendations that the corrupti∣on of times, and sloathful ignorance of the most have ascri∣bed unto it, but that a great part of it doth deserve eradica∣tion, some of it reformation, and all of it melioration, and so I proceed.

CHAP. VIII. Of their Customes, and Methode.

HAving hitherto spoken of the subjective learning that the Schools handle, it follows in order to examine their customes and methode, not that I mean to meddle either with their manners, or maintenance, but leave that to the judgement of others, lest it happen to me, as Erasmus said of Luther, that it was dangerous to meddle with the Popes Crown, and Monks bellies: but only to note some

things in the way, and methode of their teaching, which are obvious to my weak observation, and so shall lay them down as they present themselves to my low apprehensi∣on.

1. Though in one Academy there be usually divers Col∣leges, or houses, yet must all the Scholars in those several places be tyed to one methode, and carried on in one way, nay even bound to the same authors and hardly allowed so much liberty, and difference, as is between Aristotle, and Ramus Logick: As though they in the way of their teaching had arrived at the highest point of perfection, which could no way be improved, or no other as profitable could be discovered and found out, and so are all forced like carriers horses, to follow one another in the accustomed path, though it be never so uneven or impassable.

2. Their Scholastick exercises are but slenderly, negli∣gently, and sloathfully performed, their publike acts (as they call them though but verbal digladiations) being but kept four times in the year, that is in the terms, which if one should tell them in plain terms, are but usually idle termes: as though time of all other things here below, were not to be accounted most pretious, and that there can be no such detriment done unto youth, as to lose or mispend it.

3. Their Custome is injurious, and prejudicial to all those that desire to make a speedy progress in learning, nay unequal, and disproportionable in it self, namely to ty men to a set time of years, or acts, before they can receive their Laureation, or take their degrees: as though all were of one capacity or industry, or all equally able at their matri∣culation, and so the sloathful, and painful, the most capa∣ble, and most blockish, should both in the same equal time have an equal honour, which is both disproportionable and unjust. For some will attain to more in one year than some in three, and therefore why should they not be respected ac∣cording to their merits and proficiency, and not bound to draw in an unequal yoak? and what matter were it whe∣ther a man had been there one moneth or seven years, so he had the qualification required, and did subire examen,

and perform the duties of the place, surely it is known that gradus non confert scientiam, nec cucullus facit mona∣chum.

4. Their custome is no less ridiculous, and vicious, in their histrionical personations in the performance of their exer∣cises, being full of childishness, and scurrility, far from the gravity, and severity of the Pythagorean School where a five years silence was enjoined: using so much lightness as more befits stage-players than diligent searchers of Science, by scoffing and jeering, humming and hiffing, which shewes them like those animals they imitate, nay rather hur••ful Geese, than labourious Bees, that seek to gather into their Hives, the sweet Honey of Learning, and Know∣ledge.

5. What is there in all their exercises, but meer notions, and quarrelsome disputations, accustoming themselves to no better helps for searching into natures abstruse secrets than the Chymaeras of their own brains, and converse with a few paper Idols? as though these alone were sufficient keyes to open the Cabinet of Natures rich ••••easurie, without labour and pains, experiments and operations, tryals and observa∣tions: Surely if he that intends to prove a proficient in the knowledge of Agriculture, should onely give himself over to contemplation, and reading the books of such as have written in that Subject, and never put his hand to the plough, nor practise the way of tilling and sowing, would he ever be a good husbandman, or understand thorowly what pertains thereunto? Surely not, and no more can they be good Na∣turalists that do but onely make a mold and Idaea in their heads, and never go out by industrious searches, and obser∣vant experiments, to find out the mysteries contained in na∣ture.

6. Their custome is no less worthy of reprehension that in all their exercises they make use of the Latine tongue, which though it may have custome, and long continuance to plead its justification, and that it is used to bring youth to the ready exercise of it, being of general reception almost through the whole world: yet it is as cleerly answered, that custome,

without reason and benefit, becomes injurious, and though it make them ready in speaking the Latine while they treat of such subjects as are usually handled in the Schools, yet are they less apt to speak it with facility in negotiations of far grea∣ter importance. And in the mean time, the way to attain knowledge is made more difficult, and the time more tedi∣ous, and so we almost become strangers to our own mother tongue, loving and liking forein languages, as we do their fashions, better than our own, so that while we improve theirs, our own lies altogether uncultivated, which doubt∣less would yield as plentiful an harvest as others, if we did as much labour to advance it: Neque hodiè ferè ulla est natio, quae de idiomatis sui praestantia non glorietur, aut contendat. And therefore were the Romans so careful to propagate their language in other nations, and to prohibit the Greek language or any other to be spoken in their pub∣like contentions: And so likewise Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle did teach in their own mother tongues, and Hip∣pocrates, Galen, Euclide, and others writ in the vulgar language of their own nation, and yet we neglecting our own, do foolishly admire and entertain that of strangers, which is no lesse a ridiculous than prejudicial custome.

7. Another is no less faulty and hurtful than the prece∣dent, and that is their too much admiring of, and adhering to antiquity, or the judgement of men that lived in ages far removed from us, as though they had known all things, and left nothing for the discovery of those that came after in sub∣sequent ages; It was appositely said of Seneca, In re max∣imâ, & involutissimâ, in quâ cum etiam multum actum erit, omnis tamen aetas quod agat inveniet. In the grea∣test, and most intricate thing, in which when also much is done, notwitstanding every age shall find what it may fur∣ther do; and so profoundly censures those great men that went before us, to be as our leaders, but not our masters, and so most excellently concludeth, Multùm restat operis, mul∣tumque restabit: nec ulli nato post mille saecula praeclude∣tur occasio aliquid ad••uc adjiciendi. Much work doth remain, and much will remain: neither will the occasion

be cut off to any born after a thousand ages, still of adding something. And indeed we usually attribute knowledge and experience to men of the most years, and therefore these being the latter ages of the world should kn••w more, for the grandaevity of the world ought to be accounted for anti∣quity, and so to be ascribed to our times, and not to the Junior age of the world, wherein those that we call the antients, did live, so that antiquitas saeculi, juventus mundi.

8. They usually follow another hurtful Custome not un∣like to this preceding, which is too much to bind in themselves with the universality of opinions, and multiplicity of voices, as though it were not better to stand single and alone with truth, than with error to have the company of the multitude, or as though the multitude could not err, or that the greater number must necessarily be in the truth, when as the wise∣man saith the number of fools are infinite, and Aristotle himself tells us, that though we speak as the most, yet we should think as the fewest, and Cicero informs us that Phi∣losophy is content with a few judges, and Seneca most egre∣giously saith, Nihil magìs praestandum est, quàm ne pe∣corum ritu sequamur antec••dentium gregem, pergentes non quò eundum est, sed quò ••tur: Nothing is more to be per∣formed, than that we may not, according to the manner of cattel, follow the s••ock of those that went before, not fol∣lowing whither it ought to be gone, but whither it is gone. And again, Nulla res nos Majoribus malis implicat, quàm quod ad rumorem componimur, optima ra••i ea, quae magno assen••u recepta sunt: Nothing doth insuare us with greater evils, than that we compose our selves to rumours, supposing those things the best, which are received with great assent.

9. Consonant to this is that other of their adhering to au∣thority, especially of one man, namely Aristotle, and so do jurare in verbi Magistri, when according to their own te∣nents, arguments drawn from authority, are numbred a∣mongst the weakest, and what could Aristotle know more than all other, that his opinions should be received as oracles? he

both might and did err, as well as other mortals: And may not we as justly recede from him as he from his Master Pla∣to, and the rest of the antient Philosophers? Is it any thing but a just liberty that we ought to maintain, and pursue, thereby to be admitted into the Court of Lady Verity? for which all chains ought to be broken, and all fetters fyled off.

10▪ Neither is their methode, and order in teaching any whit less vicious than the rest, for whereas Aristotle himself presupposeth his Auscultator or Scholar in Physicks to have been already trained up in the Mathematical Sciences (which are indeed instrumently subordinate to natural Phi∣losophy as introductive thereunto) the Schools immethodi∣cally, and preposterously teach youth Logick, and natural Philosophy, not having at all tasted the very rudiments of Mathematical knowledge, which how much out of due or∣der and methode, nay contrary unto it, I leave to all judicious persons to judge and consider.

CHAP. IX. Of some expedients, or remedies in Theolo∣gie, Grammar, Logick, and Mathema∣ticks.

I Know it will be objected, that facile est reprehendere, it is an easie thing to find fault, but difficult and arduous to repair and amend, and that one fool may mar, and spoil that in an hour, which many wise men cannot make right again in many ages: and the most ignorant may easily disorder, and deface the master-piece of the most curious ar∣tist,

when he is not able to repair the least part of it. And therefore that it is not sufficient to demolish an antient, and goodly Fabrick, upon pretence that it is either unprofitable in the site, and figure, or that the materials are ruinous, and decayed; unless we bring better in their room, have laid a better platform, and know certainly how to erect a better Fabrick.

To which I answer, by a cleer confession, that before we throw down we should know wherewithal, and how to build, and that it is far more easie to demolish, than to erect a sufficient and compleat Structure, and especially for a single person (and he also of the lowest, and least abilities) which is & ought to be the work of many, nay all persons and ages: for as I verily believe that what I have produced for demon∣strating the groundlesness, ruinousness, and ill composure of the Scholastick Fabrick of learning is not far from the truth, so also am I confident of mine insufficiency to erect a better in the place thereof, yet in magnis voluisse sat est, I shall do mine endeavour, hoping that those that are more able will put to their hands to help to supply my defects, and so shall offer the best materials and art that I have to erect a new, and better building, and in the same order that I have handled the several parts.

1. Therefore for Theology which is a speaking of God, or a speaking forth the things of God, it is expedient that men should lay aside the suffering of themselves to be styled by that blasphemous t••••le of Divines, which is such an impropriety of language as all their learning will never be able to justify, it being an attribute that doth onely predi∣cate essentially of the being of God, and is indeed incom∣municable to the Creature, who hath nothing that is divine or spiritual but by participation; for though the text saith that Saints are partakers of the divine nature, yet will it not follow that because they are said to be partakers of di∣vine things that therefore they are divine, because partici∣pations do not truly predicate of those essences to which they are communicated, but of that being from whence they flow: for men participate of the light and heat of the Sun,

but it cannot be truly predicated of men that either they are the Sun, nor truly and univocally that they are of a Solary nature, but onely that participating of its influences and operations, they may be truly said to be heatned, and inlight∣ned: for though it be in the English translated Iohn the Di∣vine, whereby those that understand not the Greek are mis∣led, and thereby drawn to give that title to their Priests, who blasphemously assume it to themselves, yet I hope there is much difference betwixt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, one that speaks of God or divine things, and one that is divine, the Scots therefore have a more apposite and warrantable Epi∣thite, who seldome or never call their Ministers Divines but Theologues, and we have many could cry out against the Bishops for having the title of Lord, or Grace given them, and yet they themselves can swallow this title of being Divines, which is more unseemly, unfit, and unwarran∣table.

2. Another expedient that I shall offer in this case is, That the Scriptures which are as the seamless Coat of Christ may not be rent and torn with the carnal instruments of mans wit and reason, nor modell'd, or methodiz'd as an humane art or science, but laid aside in Scholastick exer∣cises, as a sacred and sealed book, lest they offering strange fire upon Gods altar, perish as others have done: for in the day of mans light the Tabernacle of the Lord will be covered with a cloud, and in the night of his darkness there will be fire; therefore let not men journey until the cloud be taken up, or the fire appear, otherwise they must know the Lord doth not lead them nor go before them. And indeed, what∣soever the proud and deceitful heart of man may imagine, the Scriptures are a sealed book, for so the prophet saith, The vision of all is become as the words of a book that is sealed, which men deliver to one that is learned, saying, Read this I pray thee: and he saith, I cannot, for it is sealed. And the book is delivered to him that is not learned, saying, Read this I pray thee, and he saith, I am not learned. What can be more plain than this, that it is as a sealed book both to the learned, and unlearned? and this is it that is sealed

with seven seals, and no man in heaven, nor earth, nor in the Sea, that is found worthy to open this book, and to un∣close the seaven seals thereof, but only the strong Lion of the Tribe of Iuda, and therefore let Schools not touch it, lest it be their destruction. For unless they leave the Lords own work to himself, and cease to sit in the seat of the scornful, The Lord will laugh them to scorn, and vex them in his sore displeasure, neither will he bless them in their labours, nor prosper them in their exercises: Nay, until all the Magi∣strates, and Elderships of the earth that profess his name, take off their Crowns, and lay them at the feet of the Lamb, and learn to practise, and put in execution our Saviors coun∣sel, To give unto God the things that are Gods, and to Caesar the things that are Caesars, and not at all to intermed∣dle with the things of God, misery and destruction will fol∣low them to the grave, and of them shall be required the blood of all the Saints. O therefore that they would Kisse the Sonne lest he be angry, and so they perish from the way of everlasting truth: for when his wrath is kin∣dled but a little, blessed are all they that put their trust in him.

3. The last expedient I shall present in this subject is, That what can be discovered of God, and supernatural things, by the power of Reason, and the light of Nature, may be handled as a part of natural Philosophy (unto which it doth belong) because it is found out by the same means and instruments that other natural Sciences are: and what may from thence cleerly be demonstrated, and deducted, may be holden forth as a means to overthrow Atheism, Gentilism, and the like, but not to statuminate, or build up any thing in religion, nor like a wild bore to enter into the Lords vine∣yard to root up and destroy it.

In the next place are languages, and Grammar, which is the means or instrument by which they are taught, unto which I shall offer these few helps.

1. That care may be had of improving, and advancing our own language, and that arts and sciences may be taught in it, that thereby a more easie and short way may be

had to the attaining of all sorts of knowledge: and that thereby after the example of the Romans we may labour to propagate it amongst other nations, that they may rather be induced to learn ours, than we theirs, which would be of vast advantage to the Commonwealth, in forrein Negotia∣tions, Trading, Conquest and Acquisitions, and also of much domestick advantage within our own territories. For if we should arrive at any extraordinary height of learning, and knowledge, though we should but speak and write in our own mother tongue, then would other nations be as earnest in learning it, and translating our books, as for∣mer ages have been in labouring to attain the language, and translate the books of the Graecians, and Romans, and we at this day of the French, and Germans.

2. That some compendious way for both teaching and learning forein languages, may be established by use and ex∣ercise, without the tedious way of rule, or Grammar, which doubtless upon diligent, skilful, and exact tryal, would prove more short, easie, certain, and beneficial, as is manifest by ordinary people that never knew any thing of Grammatical order, being kept in families that speak another language, and having none to converse with that speaks their own, will in a wonderful short time learn to speak, and understand it; for when necessity is joined with industry, it produceth great and stupendious effects.

3. That in the way of teaching languages the order pre∣scribed by Comenius in his Ianua linguarum may be practi∣sed, and means used to improve it, that both words and matter, names and things, may be learned together, which may be done both with the same facility, and in the same shortness of time; that so the tender intellects of young children may not onely inbibe the names, but also the na∣tures and qualities of things.

4. That in the methode of teaching Grammar, master Brinsleys way laid down in his Grammar School may be put into practice, that children may be taught in their mo∣ther tongue to know perfectly the several parts of Speech, de∣clinable,

and indeclinable, and punctually to vary the de∣clinable parts, especially Noun, and Verb, and to con∣strue and parse in their own tougue, that so they may be ready to make use, and to apply it when they learn the La∣tine, or any other language, without which they shall ne∣ver have any sure foundation, nor proceed in any way of ease and certainty, nor arrive at any height of perfection, for none learns more than what the intellect clearly compre∣••ends, and what it knows how to practise, and make use of.

5. In the Grammatical way of teaching it is a most certain axiom, that what is one part of speech in one lan∣guage, is so in all, and four parts being indeclineable, it is manifest that they are learned by no rules, but only by use and exercise, as the memory can congest and record them: so that there remains but other four to be obtained by rule, and two of them, which is Pronoun and Participle, either are but very few, as the Pronoun, and so are easily known wherein they agree or differ from the Noun & Verb; or the Participle, which hath nothing but what agrees either with the Noun, or Verb, or with both: So that the whole difficulty is in the Noun and the Verb, of both which some are regulars, and some are irregulars, Anomala, defectives, or Heteroclytes. Now for the irregulars, the best, easiest, and shortest way were to learn them by use and exercise, without rule, which for the most part is done, and the rules usually are but superflu∣ous, and render the way more perplex and tedious; and this being observed, the way of regulars would be facile and brief, as being but one rule for all. And this I suppose being observed would render the way of Grammar teaching of more bevity, facility, and certainty, but greater experien∣ces may know better waies.

It may be imagined that I should proffer some auxiliary means for the promoting of Symbolical, and Cryptographi∣cal learning, as being a part of Grammar, but therein I must rather acknowledge mine inability, and onely wish that so much of it as is discovered, and made clear by others, might be put in practice, then would the benefit of it be better

understood by use, than I can demonstrate in words. And for the universal Character that would require a peculiar Tract, not a cursory touch: and for the language of na∣ture, I fear it is not acquisitive but dative, and therefore shall not be so weak in that particular, to prescribe a rule, which none hath power to follow, or strength to per∣form.

Next in order followeth Logick, which being that art or Science that should administer expedients and helps for the promoting and finding out of all other Sciences, doth not∣withstanding stand in need it self: from whence then should it have it? truly it is hard to determine, for it is such a groundlesse, intricate, and perplex piece, that it is very doubtful from whence it had its original, and therefore most difficult to know how to find its remedies; yet shall offer my best assistance to its regulation and amend∣ment.

1. It is necessary that its radical ground be found forth in nature, and likewise its extent, without which it is not possible to lay open its nature and efficacy; for though it undertake to reason and argue of all things, yet bears it forth but little light and evidence of its own power and strength. And therefore in the first place it is requisite to inquire, what reason and ratiocination are in their intrin∣sick nature, and what they can operate, and effect, both solely by themselves, and conjunctively with the senses, be∣cause it is clear that the work of Reason is posterior to that of Sense, and doth but compound, divide, and compare the several species that are received by the senses, and make Deduction, and draw Conclusions from them, and this is necessary that its distinct power and efficacy may be known. Also it is expedient to examine wherein man in reason exceeds other animants; for though man to maintain his unjust tyranny over the other fellow creatures (excuse the phrase it is no ranting term, for Iob confesseth, I have said to corruption thou art my father, to the worm thou

art my mother and my sister) hath assumed to himself the title of being Rational, and excluding all other living Crea∣tures from that prerogative, when it is certain that many o∣ther Creatures excell man in the acuteness of some Senses, and it is questionable that some exceed him in Reason too, though therein he be to be preferred before the most, so that if it be diligently searched into, it will be found that there is no specifical but a gradual difference.

2. Before any great good can be effected with Logick, especially with the Syllogistical part, it will be very expedi∣ent that its principles be demonstratively cleared and proved, either in some other Science from whence they are taken, or be briefly and compendiously laid down, and defined, that they may more certainly be assented to, and the grounds known, as in the Mathematicks, where a few Definiti∣ons, Petitions, and Axioms, serve to demonstrate the whole operations by, with such certitude, that none since the daies of Euclide have denyed, or rejected them, that so by this means the Conclusions in Logick may be certain and profitable.

3. That some prevalent way might be found out, for dis∣covering and rectifying the delusions and fallacies of the senses, and for drawing adaequate▪ and congruous notions from things, and giving ••pposite and significant denomina∣tions to notions, that so the fountain may be made cleer at the head, and rise of it, that all the several rivulets, and streams that run from thence may be lympid and pure, with∣out which it will be but as a muddy puddle, whose streams cast forth dirt and myre.

4. That the chiefest and most beneficial part, which is Induction, may be improved, that it may be serviceable and helpful for the discovering of Science, which can∣not be unless some carefull, diligent, and exact means be brought into practice, for the making, trying, and

observing of all sorts of experiments, both frugiferous, and luciferous, that time may not be vainly spent in needlesse altercations, disputations, speculations, and no∣tions, but in reall, and profitable experiments, and ob∣servations; That so the end of Logical labour may not be to bring forth opinion, and errour, but certainty of Sci∣ence, and solidity of truth.

The Mathematicks should now come in order, but of them I need say little, as to their advance, because they contain sufficient expedients in themselves for the progresse of their promotion, and indeed do want no∣thing but diligent and faithful prosecution, and pra∣ctice, that they may arrive at a compleat period. And therefore the onely help I shall offer in this case, is, to desire that this so noble, and excellent a Science, with all the parts of it, both general, and special, vulgar, and mystical, might be brought into use and practice in the Schools, that men might not idlely lose their time in groundlesse notions, and vain Chymaeras, but in those reall exercises of learning that would both profit themselves, succeeding generations, and other Sci∣ences.

And I could also wish that the sound, and Apodi∣ctical learning of Copernicus, Kepler, Ticho Brahe, Galilaeus, Ballialdus, and such like, might be introduced, and the rotten and ruinous Fabrick of Aristotle and Ptolomy rejected and laid aside.

CHAP. X. Of some helps in Natural Philosophy.

NOw when I come to lay down some expedients for the reformation and promotion of Physical knowledge, two things (I know) will be questioned, and inquired of.

And first, Whether all the whole body of the Ari∣stotelian Philosophy should be eliminated, and thrown a∣way.

To which I answer, No; for there are many things in his History of Animals, and some things in his Politicks, Ethicks, Logick, Metaphysicks, and Rhetorick, that are commodious and useful, yet do they all stand in need of reformation and amendment: But for his Natural Philoso∣phy, and his Astronomy depending thereon, it admits of no reformation, but eradication, that some better may be introduced in the place thereof. And for his Expositors, and Commentators, they instead of reforming what was amisse in his writings, carried with a blind zeal to make him the onely oracle of truth, have increased the corrup∣tion, and not supplyed the defects, nor removed the er∣routs.

Secondly, it will be urged, That if the Peripate∣tick Philosophy which the Schools maintain, should be taken away, where would any such perfect, compleat, and methodical piece be found to supply the place there∣of.

To which it is answered, That I have already demon∣strated, and laid open the faults and defects thereof, that there is no such perfection in it at all as is supposed, and therefore no inconvenience to remove it. And admit there

were no such compleat piece, as were requisite to substi∣tute instead of the Aristotelian learning being taken away, the greater were the shame of Academies, that within the compass of so many Centuries have done no more for the ad∣vancement of learning, for the greater the defect is, the more it ought to stir up all mens endeavours to repair, and make good the same. And also there are some pieces of Philoso∣phy more compleat than Aristotles, as I shall shew in the following expedients.

1. It cannot be expected that Physical Science will arrive at any wished perfection, unlesse the way and means, so judiciously laid down by our learned Countreym••n the Lo••d Bacon, be observed, and introduced into exact practice; And therefore I shall humbly desire, and earnestly presse, that his way and method may be imbraced, and set up for a rule and pattern: that no Axioms may be received but what are evidently proved and made good by diligent observation, and luciferou•• experiments; that such may be recorded in a general history of natural things, that so eve∣ry age and generation, proceeding in the same way, and upon the same principles, may dayly go on with the work, to the building up of a well-grounded and lasting Fabrick, which indeed is the only true way for the instauration and ad∣vance of learning and knowledge.

2. How unfit, and unsuitable is it, for people professing the Christian Religion to adhere unto that Philosophy which is altogether built upon Ethnical principles, and indeed contrary and destructive to their tene••ts? so that I shall offer as a most fit expedient, that some Physical learning might be introduced into the Schools, that is grounded upon sensible, rational, experimental, and Scripture principles: and such a compleat piece in the most parti∣culars of all human learning (though many vainly and falsely imagine there is no such perfect work to be found) is the elaborate writings of that profoundly learned man Dr. Fludd, than which for all the particulars before men∣tioned (notwithstanding the ignorance and envy of all oppo∣sers•• the world never had a more rare, experimental and per∣fect piece.

3. That the Philosophy of Plato, revived and metho∣dized by Franciscus Patritius, Marsillius Ficinus, and others; That of Democritus, cleared, and in some mea∣sure demonstrated, by Renatus des Cartes, Regius, Pho∣cylides Holwarda, and some others; That of Epicurus, illustrated by Petrus Gassendus; That of Philolaus, Em∣pedocles, & Parmenides, resuscitated by Telesius, Campa∣nella, and some besides; and that excellent Magnetical Philosophy found out by Doctor Gilbert; That of Her∣mes, revived by the Paracelsian School, may be brought into examination and practice, that whatsoever in any of them, or others of what sort soever, may be found agreeable to truth and demonstration, may be imbraced, and received; for there are none of them but have excellent, and profitable things, and few of them but may justly be equallized with Aristotle, and the Scholastick learning, nay, I am confident upon due and serious perusal and tryal, would be found far to excel them.

4. That youth may not be idlely trained up in notions, speculations, and verbal disputes, but may learn to inure their hands to labour, and put their fingers to the furnaces, that the mysteries discovered by Pyrotechny, and the won∣ders brought to light by Chymistry, may be rendered fami∣liar unto them: that so they may not grow proud with the brood of their own brains, but truly to be taught by manu∣al operation, and ocular experiment, that so they may not be sayers, but doers, not idle speculators, but painful o∣perators; that so they may not be Sophisters, and Phi∣losophers, but Sophists indeed, true Natural Magicians, that walk not in the external circumference, but in the cen∣ter of natures hidden secre••s, which can never come to pass, unless they have Laboratories as well as Libraries, and work in the fire, better than build Castles in the air.

5. That the Galenical way of the medicinal part of Phy∣sick (a path that hath been long enough trodden to yield so little fruit) may not be the prison that all men must be in∣chained in, and ignorance, cheating and impostorage main∣tained by Lawes and Charters; but that the more sure, cleer

and exquisit way of finding the true causes, and certain cures of diseases, brought to light by those two most emi∣nent and laborious persons, Paracelsus, and Helmont, may be entertained, prosecuted and promoted; that it may no longer be disputable whether medicine (as it stands in the common road of use and form) be more helpful than hurtful, or kill more than it cures; and whether the Republique of Rome were more happy in the health of her Subjects which wanted Physicians for five hundred years, than we that have them in more abundance than Caterpillers, or Horseleaches. And unless these few expedients be put in practice, we may wax old in ignorance, and never see Physical knowledge ar∣rive at any height of perfection; and so I pass to the others following.

The next is Metaphysicks, to help which I shall only offer this expedient, that it might be reduced to some certain grounds and principles, from whence demonstrations might be drawn, that men might proceed with some certainty, and not wander in the dark they know not whither, and so that the most sure way of Rena••us des Cartes may be brought into use, and exercise, who hath traced it unto the head of the Spring, and shaken off the loose and super∣fluous questions, notions, and frivolous Chimaeras thereof: That so it might become useful and beneficial, which as it now stands, and is used (or rather abused) serves for little else but o••ly to amuse, and amaze the understanding, to blow up the Phantasie with ayrie and empty notions, and to make men vainly and fruitlessly wast their most pretious time, which should be bestowed in things of more necessary use, and of greater concernment.

As for Ethical knowledge, I suppose it better taught by president and practice, than by words and precepts, for seeing vertue doth consist in action, it must of necessity be far more laudable, that men be brought up to live vertuously, than to talk and dispute of vertue, and therefore could wish it more practical and less speculative. And yet could desire that the nature of passions and affections, vertues and vices, might be more radically demonstrated, and sought into, than they

are in the Scholastick way, and therefore shall onely propose that what Melancthon and Cartesius have discovered of them, might be made documental, and practicable, and that the doctrine of them might be made more consonant to that Christian Religion which men so much profess, and glo∣ry of, and that Seneca and Epictetus might not be sleight∣ed, and neglected, while Aristotle is only applauded and imbraced, betwixt whom there is no small difference.

Lastly for Rhetorick and Poesie, I shall prescribe nothing, but leave every man to the freedome of his genius, only to add this, that Emperours and Kings can make and create Dukes, Marquesses, and Earls, but cannot make one O∣rator or Poet, and so shall conclude with the Lyrick Poet, Tu nihil invitâ facies, dicesve, Minervâ.

CHAP. XI. Some Expedients concerning their Custome, and Method.

IN order to the prescription of remedies concerning their Customes and Method, though (as in the rest) I cannot do what should or ought to be done in so weighty a matter, yet shall I contribute what lies in my weak power, and at least expresse my good will, if not my skill.

1. And so shall first desire that men may no•• be tyed up all to one method or way, lest as it may keep them in a good path, so it may hinder them from imbracing, or following a better: and it is cleer that there may be many waies to one place, and divers methods for the attaining the same end of knowledge, so as we would not exclude men from tryals that they may find out the best, so we would not ty them to any one, lest it prove the worst.

2. That above all other things care may be had that time be not mispent, or trifled away, which is an irreparable loss, and utterly irrevocable, and therefore I could wish that Apelles motto might be had in everlasting remembrance, Nulla dies sine linea; and therefore long vacations, relaxa∣tions and intermissions are to be looked upon as Scylla and Charibdis, the rocks and shelves whereon youngmen may easily suffer Shipwrack.

3. I shall tender this, that all should not be tyed to one term or time, but every one have his honour according to his industry and proficiency, that therby those that are pain∣ful may be incouraged, and those that are idle and sluggish may be ashamed: And that none may be debarred of his degree or grace, how short a time soever he hath been there, if he be but able to perform the requisites and exercises in∣joined, by which means merit, not years, sufficiency, not for∣mality, shall take place and be rewarded.

4. That their exercises may not only be verbal and dispu∣tative, but practical and operative, that they may not onely be tryed what they can say, but what they can do, not on∣ly what they opinionate, but what they can perform, that as nature hath given them two hands, and but one tongue, so they may learn to work more and speak less.

5. That their exercises may be in the English as well as other tongues, that while they labour to make other lan∣guages familiar unto them, they become not altogether strangers unto their own: and that scurrility, and childish∣nesse may be laid aside, and all things performed with more sobriety and gravity.

6. That neither antiquity nor novelty may take place above verity, lest it debarre us from a more diligent search after truth and Science: Neither that universality of opinion be any president or rule to sway our judgements from the in∣vestigation of knowledge; for what matter is it whether we follow many or few, so the truth be our guide? for we should not follow a multitude to do evil, and it is better to accompany verity single, than falsity and errour with never so great a number. Neither is it fit that Authority (whe∣ther

of Aristotle or any other) should inchain us, but that there may be a general freedome to try all things, and to hold fast that which is good, that so there might be a Philo∣sophical liberty to be bound to the authority of none, but truth it self, then will men take pains, and arts will flou••ish.

7. As to the order to be observed in teaching the Arts, and Sciences, doubtless there can be no better method, than leading them into the fair fields of Mathematical learning, which by reason of its perspicuity and certitude would so settle and season the understanding, that it would ever after be sufficiently armed to discern betwixt truth and opinion, demonstration and probability: and render it more fit and able to proceed in Natural Philosophy, and other Sciences, and so to proceed to the Tongues, then to Physicks, and so to Logick, Metaphysicks, and the like, which order with∣out question, would prove more advantagious, than that which the Schools have pursued for so many years with so little fruit. And these are the Expedients that for the present I have to present, hoping they may be acceptable until bet∣ter be found out; and if any thing herein may appear to be erroneous, let it be but candidly made manifest, and he will be willing either to give further satisfaction, or to re∣claim his mistakes, who in these things judgeth himself but as the meanest of men, and so no way privileged from frailty and infirmity.

FINIS.

Notes

• Act. 7.22.
• Philostrat. in vilâ Apoll. Tyan.
• Act. 22.3.
• Chrysostome in epist ad Cor. 1. cap. 2. Hom. 6.7.
• Mat. 9.38.
• Ioh. 11.12. Gregor. li. 28 Moral.
• 1 Cor. 1.19, 20
• August. sup. Psal. 70.
• Isa. 50.11.
• Greg. lib. 9. Moral.
• Gal. 1.1.1••. Mat. 16.17. Job 6.45.
• Nich. de cusa. de filiatione dei.
• 1 Cor. 2.14.
• 2 Cor. 10▪ 4, 5.
• Vid. Chrysost. Sup. loc.
• Hieronim. in epist. de du∣obus filiis.
• Col. 2.8.
• 1 Cor. 1.17.
• 1 Cor. 2.4, 5.
• Chry. Hom. 3. in 1 ad Cor. cap. 1. v. 17.
• 1 Cor. 1.29, 31.
• Hug. de sanct. Victor. in Di∣da••calic.
• 2 Cor. 3 6.
• 1 Cor. 2.8.
• Rev. 3 7.
• Jo. 3.31, 32.
• Rom 8.28.
• Disserta. de Methodo. lib. pag. 3.
• Lib. Stud. Author. pag. 16.
• Matth. 23.9. James 3.1.
• Jam. 1.13.
• Chrysost. in Ep. ad Cor. 1. cap. 2. Hom. 7.
• Renat. des Cartes in Me∣thod.
• Iam. 3.15.17.
• Hug. lib. 3 de Anima. cap. 6.
• Nic. de Cusa. lib. idiotae.
• Eph 3.4 5 6.
• Francis. Ba∣con. de Veru∣lam. lib. de aug scient. cap. 2.
• Psal. 36.9.
• 1 King 8.27.
• 1 Cor. 2.10, 12.
• Gen. 8.4. Dan. ••.34.
• Ioh. 3.8
• 1 Cor. 1.25.
• 1 Cor. 2.13.
• 1 Sam. 28.7.
• Io. 4.14. Ier. 2.13.
• 2 Kings 5.12.
• Isai. 12.13. Psal. 40 4.
• 1 Tim. 6.20.
• 2 Tim. 2.23. Tit. 3 9.
• Chrysost. in ep ad Cor. 1. cap. 2.
• Gal. 2.20.
• 1 Cor. 1.17. 1 Cor. 2.5. Gen. 15.6.
• Gen. 18.13.
• Rom. 4.18.19, 20.
• Lib. de Aug. Scient 9. cap.
• Rom. 1.20, 21.
• Harrigon. lib. Curs. Mathem.
• C••st. S••len. ••••tograph. lib. 7.
• Sir Kenelm Digbies Book of bodies and spirits.
• Fr. Bacon de Au. Sci. l. 6. c 1.
• Jac. E••hem Book of the 3 ••old life of man, and in other places of his works.
• Gen. 1.27.
• Heb. 1.3.
• Jo. 1.1.
• Psa. 19.1, 2, 3, 4
• Psa. 150.6.
• 2 Cor. 12.4.
• 1 Cor. 13.1.
• 1 Cor. 14.10
• Rom. 1.20.
• i Cor 14.7, 8.
• Jam. i. 17.
• Gen 2 19, 20.
• Gen. 2.23.
• Gen. 3.5.6.
• 1 Tim 2.14.
• Aristot. lib. Topic. 2.
• Verulam. Nov. Org. Aph. 13.
• Verulam Nov. Org. Aph. 14.
• Plat. in Cratyl.
• Petr. Gassend. exer. Per. con. Arist. exer. 1.
• Cor. Agrip. li. de van. Scie. c. 7. & 8. de Dial. et Sophist.
• Sen. Ep. 45.
• Lip. in Epist. Sen. 45.
• Helm. li. Log. inutilis dio.
• Sen•• Ep. 49.
• Joh. Bap. van Hel. li. antecit.
• Nic. Hil. l. de Phil. E••icur.
• Vernlam. Nov Org. Aph. 9.
• Pla l. de Soph.
• Plat. Dialog. 5. de Leg.
• Cor. Agrip. li. in Art. brev. Lul. Paul. Sch. de Li. me••h.
• Mars. Ficin in Dia•• 1. de Rep.
• Verulam. Nov. O••g. Aph. 12.
• Verul. lib. de Augm. Scient. 3. cap. 6.
• Gal. Galal. lib. de Syst. mund.
• Gil. l. de mag. ••t lib. de ••••il. nov.
• Verulam. Nov. O••g. Aph. 14.
• White Dial. de mundo.
• Kepler. Astro. Ep••••.
• Philolai de Syst. mund. liber.
• White Dial. de mund. fol. 84.
• Kepler▪ de Stella martis lib.
• White Dial. de mundo fol. 45.
• Nath. Carpen. Geograph.
• Jo. Dee in his Preface be∣fore Euclide.
• Arist. li. Phys. 8 prior. de Coel. et de mund.
• Arist. l. 2. Phy.
• Hel. lib. Phys. Arist et Gal. ign.
• Pet. Gas. exer. 5 contr. Arist.
• Arist. l. 3 Phy. cap. 3.
• Arist. lib. de Coel. et Mun. ca. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10. prim. lib.
• Arist lib 1. de Gen. et Cor. cap. 2, 9.
• Helm. lib. an∣te citato.
• Verulam. Nov. Org. Aphor. 8.
• Jo. Bapt. Port. mag. natu. l. 1. cap. 1.
• Matth. 2.1, 7.
• Jo. Pic. Miran. Con. m••g. nu. 26.
• Verul. l 3. de Aug. Sci. c••. 5.
• Jo. Pic. Miran. loco. citato.
• Paracel. li. de. Tinct. Phys.
• Helm li. Phys. Arist. et Gal. ign.
• Jo. Bapt. Van Hel••li. Elem.
• Rob. de Fluct. lib de Anato. mia mystica.
• Paracel. lib 4. de caus. Luis Gal. Cap. 9.
• Hel de prom. Author.
• Verul. lib. 4. de Aug. Sci. ca. 1.
• Arist. lib. de Som. et vig. cap. 3.
• Beguin. Tyr. Chy. c. 2.
• Par. de Trib. princ.
• Gilb. de mag••
• Kercher. de Arte magn.
• Reg. de Fun∣dam. Phys.
• Kepler Epit. Astron.
• Arist. lib. 2. Phys. cap. 1.
• Arist. l. 1. de Coel. et Mun. cap. 2.
• Arist. lib. 1. Phys. cap. 6.
• Renat. des Cha••••. de me••hod.
• Verul. de Au. Scient. lib. 3 cap. 2.
• Vid. Meta∣phys. Campa∣nel. et Pet. Gasl••nd. con∣tra Arist.
• Aug. Alst••m∣de nobil. in∣stitut. lib.
• Lamb. D••nae. de E••hick. Christ. lib.
• Verulam. d•• Aug. Scien••. lib. 7.1.
• Arist. Nich. l. 1. cap. 5.
• Pet. Gassend. con. Arist ex. 7.
• Verul. de Au. Sci. l. 6 c. 3.
• Sen. Epist. 115.
• Aug. Alst. de nobil. institut.
• Ren. de Char. de method.
• Aug. Alst. de nobil▪ institut.
• Verul. de Au. Scient. l. 1. ••t Nov. O g. lib. Aphor. 84.
• Lev. 10.1, 2.
• Exod. 40.36, 37, 38.
• Isa. 29.11, 12.
• Rev. 5.1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
• Psalm 1.7.
• Psal. 2.12.
• Job 17.14.