Academiarum examen, or, The examination of academies wherein is discussed and examined the matter, method and customes of academick and scholastick learning, and the insufficiency thereof discovered and laid open : as also some expedients proposed for the reforming of schools, and the perfecting and promoting of all kind of science ... / by Jo. Webster.

CHAP. IV. Of Logick.

IN the next place I am to consider of that which they call ars Dialectica, or most commonly Logick, the princi∣pal ends of which they make to be discovery of Sophisms and fallacies, producing probability and opinion, a••d bring∣ing forth of certitude and Apodictical Science, the last of which being indeed its true and proper end: and so as to this end is subservient to some other Sciences, but especially to na∣tural Philosophy. I have formerly said something of the pre∣judice

that it hath done to Theology, where I treated of that subject, and therefore shall onely now speak of it as it re∣lates to humane and acquired Sciences, and so lay out some of its chief defects, irregularities and abuses.

1. As it is now used in the Schools it is meerly bellum intestinum Logicum, a civil war of words, a verbal con∣test, a combat of cunning, craftiness, violence and alter∣cation, wherein all verb••l force, by impudence, insolence, opposition, contradiction, derision, diversion, trifling, jeering, humming, hissing, brawling, quarreling, scolding, scandalizing, and the like, are equally allowed of, and ac∣counted just, and no regard had to the truth, so that by any means, per fas aut nefas, they may get the Conquest, and worst their adversary, and if they can intangle or catch one another in the Spider Webs of Sophistical or fallacious ar∣gumentations, then their rejoicing and clamour is as great as if they had obtained some signal Victory. And indeed it is the counsel of the Arch-Sophister their Master, to speak am∣bigously while they dispute, to obfuscate the light with dark∣ness, lest the truth should shine forth, nay rather to spatter and blurt out any thing that comes into the budget, rather than yield to our adversary,* 1.1 for he saith, Quare oportet re∣spondentem non graviter ferre, sed ponendo quae non utilia sunt ad positionem, significare quaecunque non videntur, Therefore it behooves the respondent not to take the business grievously, but by putting those things which are not pro∣fitable to the position, to signifie whatsoever doth not ap∣pear. O excellent and egregious advice of so profound and much-magnified a Philosopher! Is this to be a lover of veri∣ty, or indeed to play the immodest Sophister and Caviller? Now how adverse, and destructive to the investigation of truth these altercations and abjurgations are, is cleerly ma∣nifest, for as Dionysius said against Plato, sunt verba otio∣sorum senum, ad imperitos invenes, they are the words of idle old men unto unexperienced youth, and nothing but vanity and trifles can arise from this way of cavillati∣on.

2. Logick is all applied, for the discovery and finding

forth of verity, and therin proceeds very praeposterously: for seeing we know nothing in nature but à posteriore, and from the affections and properties of things must seek forth their causes, it required more powerful means, than ver∣bal and formal Syllogisms, to find out, and denudate na∣tures hidden operations. And whereas the best part of Lo∣gick for that purpose is Induction, which backt with long experience and sound observation, might be prevalent to dis∣cover the working of mother Nature; yet that hath been alto∣gether laid aside, while the glory of Syllogisms hath been highly predicated:* 1.2 But Syllogismus ad principia scientia∣rum non adhibetur, ad media axiomata frustrà adhibetur, cum sit subtilitati naturae longè impar. Assensum itaque constringit, non res. Syllogism is not applyed to the prin∣ciples of Sciences, it is applyed in vain to the middle axi∣omes, seeing it is far unequal to the subtility of nature. Therefore it binds the assent or consent, but not things. For whereas we should from particulars proceed to generals, this preposterously laies down universal axiomes without due proof of them, thereby to make good particulars.

3. The main defect of Logick is, that it teacheth no cer∣tain rules, by which either notions may be truly abstracted and gathered from things, nor that due and fit words may be appropriated to notions, without which it fails in the very fundamentals, and falls as an house built upon sand. For, Syllogismus ex propositionibus constat,* 1.3 prepositiones ex verbis, verba notionum testerae sunt: Itaque si notiones ips••e (id quod basis rei est) consusae sint, & temerè à rebus abstractae, nihil in iis, quae superstruuntur, est firmitu∣dinis. Syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, words are the special signs of notions: Therefore if notions themselves (which is the very bottom of the mat∣ter) be confused, or rashly abstracted from things, there is nothing of firmitude in those things that are superstructed. So that untill a certain way and infallible rules be found out for the adaequation of notions and things, and fitting of ge∣nuine Denominations to notions, all the force and use of Syllogisms, as it should demonstrate, and bring forth science,

are but fruitless and vain. Haud leve quiddam nominis im∣positionem esse,* 1.4 nec imperitorum, & quorumvis hominum esse opus. Plato saith, That the imposition of names is no such light matter, nor that it is the work of the unskilfull and of any sort of men.

4. Though Logick be as it were Organ••n Organorum, an instrumental science, they seem in some sort to make it a part of Physicks, and so intricate it with an innumerable commixture of the most difficult disputations, as any Philo∣sophy hath: as though the unskilful and tender wits of young men were to be overwhelmed with those thorny questions of universal, and Metaphysical things. And as though Logick (if it were necessary and useful) were not to be con∣tained in a few plain and easie precepts,* 1.5 and that it which pretends to teach a short, cleer, and easie methode applica∣ble to all other sciences, should be so intricate and perplex in it self, as not to be able to resolve of it self whether it be as art, or a science? Practical or Speculative? whether e••s rationis, or something else be the subjectum of it? So that they do not see that they act as foolishly, while they dispute of the very art of disputing,* 1.6 as he that endeavours to see the proper vision of his own eye. Moreover, that which might be concluded in a plain, and short proposition, must be drawn into mood, and figure, and after the framing, repea∣ting and answering some scores of Syllogisms, the matter is further off from a certain and Apodictical conclusion than in the beginning, and so most extremely becomes guilty of Battology, and Tautologie, which it pretends to eschew and condemn. The grave Seneca said well, speaking of these nugations.* 1.7 Idem de istis captionibus dico: quo enim nomi∣ne potius Sophismata appellem? nec ignoranti nocent, nec scientem juvant. I say the same of these Insnarements: for by what name may I rather call them than Sophisms? they neither hurt those that know them not, nor help those that know them.

5. If we examine the Logick of the Stagyrite, who pre∣tends himself the master of methode, and prince of perfecti∣on, we shall first find his Organon, which should be his

great instrument, and Master-piece, to be a confused, and headless piece, wanting those lights wherewith all legitimate tractation (even Plato, Cicero, and other great men bearing testimony) is made out, and illustrated; for it wants a defi∣nition of Logick, it wants the proposition of the subject, it wants the distribution and partition of the matter: and what should it want more necessary than these? And though some may say that these things are added by his interpreters; that nevertheless argues his defect, and besides the additions are not so very compleat as might be desired. And secondly, in his book de Categoriis, definitions are usually wanting, for he defines not what a Category is, not what Substance is, nor what Quantity is: but if any reply, and say he could not define these because they are the summa genera, how could he define a Relative, or Quality, which are like∣wise summa genera? Or to what end do the Aristotelians define all the Categories? Thirdly, in his book de Interpre∣tatione, what a noise doth he keep about his modal propo∣sitions, which he will needs limit neither to more nor fewer than four, that which is necessary, impossible, possible, contingent? But I pray you, why may there not be more? For if that be a Mood, which doth modificate the propositi∣on, that is to say, indicates how the praedicate is in the sub∣ject, may not all Adjectives by the like right be Moods? For if this be a modal proposition, It is a necessary thing that man is a living Creature; These also are modal, It is an honest thing that man should be studious of vertue, It is a just thing that a Son should obey his Father, It is a gallant thing to die for ones Countrey; but what shall I say more of many other defects, that may be seen even of a blind man? These as instances are enough, seeing they are but pleasant deceits,* 1.8 and cunning trifles; Freesilaus the Philosopher us'd to say, Dialecticos similes praestigiatoribus calculariis, qui jucunde decipiunt, That Logicians are like to cunning jugglers, who do deceive pleasantly. So I leave many other petty absurdities, superfluities, defects, and mistakes, and pass to things more material.

6. Lastly I shall sum up all in few words to eschew te∣diousness.

And first of that principal part concerning De∣finitions as to matter and subject (for we have said somthing of it formally as to methode and tractation) which is the basis of all, wherein if there be a defect, the whole edifice falls to the ground; for whereas it determines all perfect De∣finitions to consist of the next genus, and a Constitutive Diffe∣rence, and since there is scarcely any other difference known, except rational, and irrational, that is specifical, and pro∣xim to the individuals, the one of which is negative, and so can positively prove nothing, and the other not only is, and may justly be controverted, but also made apparent, that Brutes have reason gradually as well as man, how lame and dilacerate this member is, needs no further demonstra∣tion.

2. To say nothing of Division, how defective, and im∣perfect it is, but to come to Argumentation, of all the 19 several sorts of Syllogisms, seven onely conclude affirma∣tively, the other twelve negatively,* 1.9 and it is sufficiently known, that de negativis non datur scientia, and therefore there is but narrow and straight room left for the certainty of demonstration: And it is undeniably true, that the know∣ledge of the Premisses is more certain than the knowledge of the Conclusion,* 1.10 and therefore undoubtedly certain that the knowledge of the conformity betwixt the Premisses and the Conclusion doth preexist in us, and is onely excited by Syllogising, and therefore, quid te torques, & macer as in ea quaestione, quam subtilius est contempsisse, quam sol∣vere? why dost thou torment and macerate thy self in that question, which is more subtill to despise than to dissolve.

3. Aristotle forbids dispute, unless with those that do admit his principles, which he first thinketh to be true, and yet notwithstanding from unlike principles, doth sometimes follow a strong Conclusion: as from false premisses: Nul∣lum adorabile est Creator: Omne simulachrum est adora∣bile. Ergo, Nullum simulachrum est Creator: Which is a true Conclusion. From whence it cannot be judged that the Conclusion of Syllogisms doth of necessity compel assent, nor that the Conclusion doth necessarily depend upon the Pre∣misses.

Itaque prout in mendacio non continetur, aut la∣tet veritas,* 1.11 ejusque cognitio: ita consequens est, quod in praemissis non claudatur necessariò conclusionis cognitio. Therefore as the truth is not contained or hid in a ly, nor the knowledge of it: So the consequent is, that the know∣ledge of the Conclusion is not necessarily included in the Pre∣misses.

4. It is cleer, that Syllogizing, and Logical invention are but a resumption of that which was known before, and that which we know not, Logick cannot find out: For De∣monstration, and the knowledge of it, is in the Teacher, not in the Learner, and therefore it serves not so much to find out Science, as to make ostentation of it being found out; not to invent it, but being invented to demonstrate and to shew it others. A Chymist when he shews me the preparation of the sulphur of Antimony, the salt of Tar∣tar, the spirit of Vitriol, and the uses of them, he teach∣eth me that knowledge which I was ignorant of before, the like of which no Logick ever performed:* 1.12 For, Accurata Syllogismi forma, argumentoso, et luxurianti ingenio in∣congrua, inventioni adversissima, & res per se satis mani∣fest as simplici verborum texturâ, praeceptorum imperti∣nentium multitudine involuit. The accurate form of Syl∣logism is incongruous to an argumentative, and luxuriant wit, most adverse to invention, and doth involve things manifest enough among themselves in the simple contexture of words, with the multitude of impertinent precepts.

5. It is true that Syllogistical disputations do bring forth Conclusions, but these conclusions beget but bare opinati∣ons, and putations, no infallible Science, and so all things remain but as probable and conjectural, not as firm and certain. And yet men are puft up with this vaporous, and airy sound of words, growing insolent and confident in the vain glory of Syllogizing Sophistry, and so are taken off from seeking any other more solid knowledge,* 1.13 Causa verò & radix ferè omnium malorum in scientiis ea una est; quod dum ment is hum nae vires falso miramur, & extollimus, v••r•• ••j••s ••uxilia non quaeramus. The cause truly, and

root almost of all evils in Sciences, is this one, that while we falsly wonder at, and extol the force of humane under∣standing, we do not seek its true helps. So that as Cardan said of his Countreymen, I may say of our Logicians, One may find three gods amongst them sooner than one man, so highly confident are they through these Dialectical delusions. Cum quis illa quae nescit,* 1.14 scire se putat, ab hac nimirùm omnes quaecunque nos fallunt opiniones, profiscuntur. When any one thinketh he knoweth those things of which he is nescient, from this verily doth spring up all those opinions whatsoever that do deceive us. Neither is there any thing in the Universe that is more deadly and destructive to the progress and proficiency of Science, than the opinion and conceit of self-sufficiency, and with Socrates the more that we are sensible of the shallowness and nothingness of our knowledge, the more it will stir us up to inquire and seek after it, and therefore precious was that advice of the divine Plato his Schollar:* 1.15 Decet sanè eum qui magnus vir futurus est, neque seipsum, ne{que} sua diligere, sed justa semper, sivè à seipso, seu ab alio quovis gerantur. Ex hoc ipso delicto accidit omnibus, ut ignorantiam suam esse sapien∣tiam opinenter. Hinc fit, ut quamvis nihil (ut ita di∣cam) sciamus, seire tamen omnia arbitremur. Verily it becomes him who should be great, neither to love himself, nor humane things, but to love alwaies things that are just, whether they be done of himself or any other; from this very fault, it hapneth unto all, that they opinionate their ignorance to be sapience. From hence it comes to pass, that although (as I may so say) we know nothing, yet notwithstanding we think we know all things.

6. And whereas Raymund Lully invented an Alphabe∣tical way for Syllogizing,* 1.16 improved and opened by A∣grippa, Paulus Schalichius, and others, in which Picus Mirandula and some did far excel, even to wonder and astonishment, which indeed is a far more certain, copious, easie, and compendious way for argumentation, especially to overcome all opponents, to be amply furnished to dispute de omni scibili, to answer all objections, and to confirm

the mind in those opinions that it holds, and so deserves wondrous great praise and commendation: yet for all that it leaves the intellect nude and unsatisfyed, because it produces no certitude, nor evidential demonstration, and so fills the mind full of opinions, but not of Apodictical Science, and makes men Parrat-like to babble, argue, and say very much, but still to remain nescious, and ignorant, so vast is the difference betwixt putation and true knowledge.* 1.17 Huma∣nam scientiam in negatione quodam falsi, potiùs quàm in veri affirmatione consistere. It is true, That humane science doth consist in a certain negation of falsity, rather than in the affirmation of verity. I will only conclude with that remarkable saying of the Lord Bacon,* 1.18 Logica, quae in abusu est, ad errores (qui in notionibus vulgaribus fundantur) pabiliendos, et figendos valet, potius quam ad inquisitionem veritatis, ut magis damnosa sit, quam utilis. Logick which is abused, doth conduce to esta∣blish and fix errors (which are founded in vulgar notions) rather than to the inquisition of verity, that it is more hurt∣ful than profitable.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Aristot. lib. Topic. 2.
• * 1.2

  Verulam. Nov. Org. Aph. 13.
• * 1.3

  Verulam Nov. Org. Aph. 14.
• * 1.4

  Plat. in Cratyl.
• * 1.5

  Petr. Gassend. exer. Per. con. Arist. exer. 1.
• * 1.6

  Cor. Agrip. li. de van. Scie. c. 7. & 8. de Dial. et Sophist.
• * 1.7

  Sen. Ep. 45.
• * 1.8

  Lip. in Epist. Sen. 45.
• * 1.9

  Helm. li. Log. inutilis dio.
• * 1.10

  Sen•• Ep. 49.
• * 1.11

  Joh. Bap. van Hel. li. antecit.
• * 1.12

  Nic. Hil. l. de Phil. E••icur.
• * 1.13

  Vernlam. Nov Org. Aph. 9.
• * 1.14

  Pla l. de Soph.
• * 1.15

  Plat. Dialog. 5. de Leg.
• * 1.16

  Cor. Agrip. li. in Art. brev. Lul. Paul. Sch. de Li. me••h.
• * 1.17

  Mars. Ficin in Dia•• 1. de Rep.
• * 1.18

  Verulam. Nov. O••g. Aph. 12.