Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands by Sir William Temple ...

CHAP. VIII. The Causes of their FALL in 1672.

IT must be avowed, That as This State in the course and progress of its Greatness for so many years past, Has shined like a Comet; So in the Revolutions of this last Summer, It seem'd to fall like a Meteor, and has equally amazed the World by the one and the other: When we consider such a Power and Wealth as was re∣lated in the last Chapter, To have fallen in a manner prostrate within the space of one Month: So many Fron∣tier Towns, renowned in the Sieges and Actions of the Spanish Wars, En∣ter'd like open Villages by the French Troops, without defence, or almost de∣nial: Most of them without any blows at all; and all of them with so few: Their great Rivers, that were esteem∣ed an invincible security to the Pro∣vinces of Holland and Utrecht, passed with as much ease, and as small resist∣ances,

as little Fords: And in short, the very Hearts of a Nation so vali∣ant of old against Rome, so obstinate against Spain; Now subdued, and in a manner abandoning all before their Danger appeared: We may justly have our recourse to the secret and fixed pe∣riods of all Human Greatness, for the account of such a Revolution: Or ra∣ther to the unsearchable Decrees, and unresistable force of Divine Provi∣dence; Though it seems not more im∣pious to question it, than to measure it by our Scale; Or reduce the Issues and Motions of that Eternal Will and Power, to a conformity with what is esteemed Just, or Wise, or Good, by the usual Consent, or the narrow Com∣prehension of poor Mortal men.

But as in the search and considera∣tion even of things natural and com∣mon, our Talent, I fear, is to Talk rather than to Know; So we may be allowed to Enquire and Reason upon all things, while we do not pretend to Certainty, or call that Undeniable Truth, which is every day denied by Ten thousand; Nor those Opinions Unreasonable, which we know to be held by such as we allow to be Rea∣sonable

men. I shall therefore set down such Circumstances as to me seem most evidently to have conspired in this Re∣volution; leaving the Causes less dis∣cernable, to the search of more discer∣ning persons.

And first, I take their vast Trade, which was an occasion of their Great∣ness, to have been One likewise of their Fall, by having wholly diverted the Genius of their Native Subjects and Inhabitants, from Arms to Traf∣fique, and the Arts of Peace; Leaving the whole fortune of their later Wars, to be managed by Forreign and Mer∣cenary Troops; Which much abased the Courage of their Nation (as was observed in another Chapter), and made the Burghers of so little moment towards the defence of their Towns; Whereas in the famous Sieges of Har∣lem, Alemar, and Leyden, They had made such brave and fierce defences, as broke the heart of the Spanish Ar∣mies, and the fortune of their Af∣fairs.

Next was the Peace of Munster, which had left them now, for above Twenty years, too secure of all Inva∣sions or Enemies at Land; And so

turn'd their whole application to the strength of their Forces at Sea; Which have been since exercised with two En∣glish Wars in that time, and enlivened with the small yearly Expeditions into the Streights against the Algerines, and other Corsairs of the Mediterranean.

Another was their too great Parsi∣mony in reforming so many of their best Forreign Officers and Troops, up∣on the Peace of Munster; whose Va∣lour and Conduct had been so great occasions of inducing Spain to the Counsels and Conclusions of that Treaty.

But the greatest of all others that concur'd to weaken, and indeed break the strength of their Land-Milice, Was the alteration of their State, which happen'd by the Perpetual Edict of Holland and West-Friezland, upon the death of the last Prince of Orange, for exclusion of the Power of Stadt∣holder in their Province, or at least the separation of it from the Charge of Captain-General. Since that time, the main design and application of those Provinces, has been to work out by degrees all the old Officers both Native and Forreign, who had been

formerly sworn to the Prince of Orange, and were still thought affectionate to the Interest of that Family; And to fill the Commands of their Army with the Sons or Kinsmen of Burgomasters, and other Officers or Deputies in the State, Whom they esteemed sure to the Constitutions of their Popular Govern∣ment, and good enough for an Age where they saw no appearance of E∣nemy at Land to attaque them.

But the Humour of Kindness to the young Prince, both in the People and Army, was not to be dissolved or dis∣persed by any Medicines or Operati∣ons either of Rigor or Artifice; But grew up insensibly with the Age of the Prince, ever presaging some Revolu∣tion in the State, when he should come to the years of aspiring, and ma∣naging the general Affections of the people: Being a Prince, who joined to the great Qualities of his Royal Blood, the popular Virtues of his Countrey; Silent and thoughtful; Gi∣ven to hear, and to enquire; Of a sound and steddy Understanding; Much firmness in what he once resolves, or once denies; Great Industry and appli∣cation to his business; Little to his

Pleasures: Piety in the Religion of his Countrey, but with Charity to o∣thers; Temperance unusual to his youth, and to the Climate; Frugal in the common management of his For∣tune, and yet magnificent upon occa∣sion: Of great Spirit and Heart, as∣piring to the glory of Military Acti∣ons: With strong ambition to grow Great, but rather by the Service than the Servitude of his Countrey. In short, A Prince of many Virtues, with∣out any appearing mixture of Vice.

In the English War begun the year 65, the States disbanded all the English Troops that were then left in their Ser∣vice, dispersing the Officers and Soldi∣ers of our Nation who staid with them, into other Companies or Regiments of their own. After the French Invasion of Flanders, and the strict Alliance between England and Holland in 68: They did the same by all the French that were remaining in their Service. So as the several Bodies of these two Nations, which had ever the greatest part in the Honour and Fortune of their Wars, were now wholly dissolved, and their standing-Milice composed in a manner all of their own Natives,

enervated by the long uses and arts of Traffique and of Peace.

But they were too great a Match for any of the smaller Princes their Neighbours in Germany; And too se∣cure of any danger from Spain, by the knowledg of their Forces, as well as Dispositions; And being strictly allied both with England and Sweden, in two several Defensive Leagues, and in one common Tripple Alliance; They could not foresee any danger from France, who they thought would ne∣ver have the Courage or Force to en∣ter the Lists with so mighty Confede∣rates; and who were sure of a Con∣junction, whenever they pleased, both with the Emperor and Spain.

Besides, They knew that France could not attaque them without pas∣sing through Flanders, or Germany: They were sure Spain would not suffer it through the first, if they were backt in opposing it, As foreseeing the in∣evitable loss of Flanders upon that of Holland: And they could hardly be∣lieve the passage should be yeilded by a German Prince, contrary to the ex∣press Will and Intentions of the Em∣peror, as well as the common Interests

of the Empire: So that they hoped the War would at least open in their Neighbours Provinces, For whose de∣fence they resolved to employ the whole Force of their State. And would have made a mighty resistance, if the Quarrel had begun at any other doors but their own.

They could not imagine a Conjun∣ction between England and France for the ruin of their State; For, being unacquainted with our Constitutions, they did not foresee how we should find our Interest in it, and measured all States by that which They esteemed to be their Interest. Nor could they believe that other Princes and States of Europe would suffer such an addi∣tion to be made to the Power of France, as a Conquest of Holland.

Besides these publique Considerati∣ons, there were others particular to the Factions among them; And some of their Ministers were neither forward nor supple enough to endeavour the early breaking or diverting such Con∣junctures as threatned them; Because they were not without hopes, they might end in renewing their broken Measures with France; Which those of

the Commonwealth-Party were more enclin'd to, by foreseeing the influence that their Alliances with England must needs have in time towards the resto∣ring of the Prince of Orange's Autho∣rity: And they thought at the worst, that whenever a pinch came, they could not fail of a safe bargain in one Mar∣ket or other, having so vast a Trea∣sure ready to employ upon any good occasion.

These Considerations made them com∣mit three fatal Oversights in their For∣reign Negotiations: For they made an Alliance with England, without en∣gaging a Confidence and Friendship: They broke their Measures with France, without closing new ones with Spain: And they reckon'd upon the Assistan∣ces of Sweden, and their Neighbour-Princes of Germany, without making them sure by Subsidiary Advances, be∣fore a War began.

Lastly, The Prince of Orange was approaching the Two and twentieth year of his age, which the States of Holland had, since their Alliance with His Majesty in 68, ever pretended, should be the time of advancing him to the Charge of Captain-General, and

Admiral of their Forces, Though with∣out that of Stadtholder. But the nearer they drew to this period, which was like to make a new Figure in their Government; the more desirous some of their Ministers seemed either to de∣cline, or to restrain it. On the other side, the Prince grew confident upon the former Promises, or at least Inti∣mations of Holland, and the concur∣ring dispositions of the other Six Pro∣vinces to his advancement: And his Party, spirited by their hopes, and the great Qualities of this young Prince (now grown ripe for Action, and for Enterprise), resolved to bring this point to a sudden decision; Against which, the other Party prepared and united all their Defences; So as this strong Disease that had been so long working in the very Bowels of the State, seem'd just upon its Crisis, When a Conjun∣ction of two Mighty Kings brought upon them a sudden and furious Inva∣sion by Land and Sea, at the same time, By a Royal Fleet of above Fourscore Ships, and an Army of as many thou∣sand men.

When the States saw this Cloud rea∣dy to break upon them (after a long be∣lief

that it would blow over), They began not only to provide shelter at home, with their usual vigor; but to look out for it abroad, though both too late. Of the Princes that were their Allies, or concern'd in their danger, Such as were far off, could not be in time; The nearer, were unwilling to share in a danger they were not enough prepar'd for; Most were content to see the Pride of this State humbled; Some, the Injuries they had received from them, revenged; Many would have them mortified, that would not have them destroyed; And so all resolved to leave them to weather the storm as they could for one Campania; Which they did not believe could go far to∣wards their ruin, considering the great∣ness of their Riches, number of their Forces, and strength of their Places.

The State, in the mean time, had en∣creased their Troops to Seventy thou∣sand men, and had begun to repair the Fortifications of their Frontier-Towns: But so great a length of their Coun∣trey lay open to the French Invasion by the Territories of Colen and Liege; And to the Bishop of Munster (their inveterate Enemy) by Westphalia, that

they knew not where to expect or provide against the first danger: And while they divided their Forces and Endeavours towards the securing of so many Garrisons, They provided for none to any purpose but Maestricht; Which the French left behind them, and fell in upon the Towns of the Rhine, and the heart of their Pro∣vinces.

Besides, Those Ministers who had still the direction of Affairs, bent their chief application to the strength and order of their Fleet, rather than of their Army: Whether more peckt at England than France, upon the War, and manner of entering into it; Or be∣lieving that a Victory at Sea would be the way to a Peace with this Crown; Or hoping their Towns would not fall so fast, but that before three or four were lost, the business at Sea would be decided; Or perhaps content that some ill Successes should attend the Prince of Orange at his first entrance upon the Command of their Armies, and thereby contribute to their Designs of restraining the Authority, while they were forced to leave him the Name of Captain-General. This indeed was not

likely to fail, considering the ill con∣stitution of their old Army, the hasty Levies of their new, and the heighth of the Factions now broken out in the State; Which left both the Towns and the Troops in suspence, under whose Banners they fought, and by whose Orders they were to be govern'd, the Prince's, or the States.

There happen'd at the same time, an accident unusual to their Climate, Which was a mighty Drowth in the begin∣ing of the Summer, that left their wa∣ters fordable in places where they used to be navigable for Boats of greatest burthen. And this gave them more trouble and distraction in the defence, as their Enemies more facility in the passage of those great Rivers, which were esteemed no small security of their Countrey.

And in this posture were the Affairs of this Commonwealth when the War broke out, with those fatal Events, that must needs attend any Kingdom or State, where the violence of a Forreign Invasion happens to meet with the di∣straction of a Domestique Sedition or Discontent, Which, like ill Humours in a Body, make any small wound dan∣gerous,

and a great one mortal. They were still a great Body, but without their usual Soul; They were a State, but it was of the Disunited Provinces. Their Towns were without Order; Their Burgers without Obedience; Their Soldiers without Discipline; And all without heart: Whereas in all Sieges, The Hearts of Men defend the Walls, and not Walls the Men: And indeed, it was the Name of England joining in the War against them, that broke their hearts, and contributed more to the loss of so many Towns, and so much Countrey, than the Armies of Munster, or of France. So that upon all circumstances consider'd, it seems easier to give an account, what it was that lost them so much, than what sav'd them the rest.

No man at play sees a very great Game either in his own, or another's hand, unexpectedly lost, but He is apt to consider, whether it could have been saved, and how it ought to have been play'd. The same Enquiry will be na∣tural upon the fall of this State, and very difficult to resolve.

After the mighty growth of the French, and decay of the Spanish Power,

which drew on the Invasion of Flan∣ders in 1667, This State had a very hard Game to play; Either they must see Flanders wholly lost, and France grown to confine upon them (whom they liked as an Ally, but dreaded as a Neighbour); Or else they must join with France to divide Flanders between them; But they knew what it was to share with the Lion: Or they must join with Spain to defend Flanders against France; That is, with their old Enemy, against their old Friend: Or lastly, They must join with England for the defence of Flanders, Neither breaking with France, nor closing with Spain; and frame an Arbitrage, but of something a rough nature; Rather pre∣scribing than mediating a Peace, And threatning a War upon that Crown that refused it.

They chose the last, and wisely, as all men thought; But though this Al∣liance was happily planted, yet it was unhappily cultivated, and so the Fruit came to fall, and the Root to wither upon the first change of seasons, in such a manner, and to such a degree, as we have lately seen. Whether they could have prevented a Conjunction

of England with France, shall be no part of my Subject; For I pretend not to know, or to tell Secrets of State; and intend these, not for the Observa∣tions of an Ambassador, but of a pri∣vate man as I am, and such as any Gen∣tleman might easily have made, who had resided above two years as I did in Holland; and had been, as I was, a little enclined to observe. I shall only say, That the Conjunction of England with France, was to this State like one of those Diseases which the Physicians say, are hard to discern, while they are easie to cure; but when once they come to be plainly discovered, they are past remedy.

But as Holland had ever defended it self against Spain, by England and France; So it ought to have done against France, by England and Spain, and provided early against their own danger, as well as▪ that of Flanders, by improving and advancing their Con∣federate-League with England and Swe∣den, into a strict Defensive-Alliance with Spain, as a Principal in the League; And by agreeing with that Crown, to furnish between them some constant Subsidiary Payments to Sweden, for the

support of their standing-Forces, even in time of Peace. This was the desire of Spain, The Interest of all that meant to secure the Peace of Christendom; And the opinion of some of the Dutch Ministers, Though not of the Chiefest, till it was too late; And the omission of This, was the greatest fault ever committed in their Politicks; And pro∣ceeded in a great measure from their ancient animosity to Spain; Which as it was the beginning, so, by this effect, it almost prov'd the end of their State.

When the War began in the midst of the Conjunctures related, 'Tis hard to say what could have defended them; But as men in a Town, threatned with a mighty Siege, abandon their Suburbs, and slight those Out-works which are either weak of themselves, or not well defensible for want of men; And re∣solve only to make good those Posts which they are able fully to man, and easily to relieve; Because the loss of every small Outwork does not only weaken the Number, but sink the Cou∣rage of the Garrison within.

So this State, which came to be in a manner besieged by the mighty and

numerous Armies of France and of Munster; Ought, in my opinion, to have left themselves but three Out-works to maintain (I mean, three Posts standing without the Lines, that enclo∣sed the main Body of their Provinces); These should have been, Mastricht, We∣sel, and Coeverden. They should have slighted all the rest of their places that lay without these upon the Rhyne, or in Overyssel; And drawn the men into these Towns, so as to have left them rather like Camps, than Garrisons; That is, Eight thousand Foot, and Two thou∣sand Horse in Maestricht, as many in Wesel, and half the number in Coever∣den, if the place would contain them; If not, they might have formed and fortified a Camp with something a greater number, upon the next Pass into Friezland and Groninguen.

Of the rest of their Horse (which were I suppose about Five thousand), with at least Fifteen thousand Foot, they should have formed a great stand∣ing Camp, within their Rivers, some∣where near Arnhem; Fortifi'd it with Canon, and all the Art that could be; Furnisht it with the greatest care, and plenty of Provisions. The remainder

of their Infantry would have been enough for the rest of their Garrisons; Of which the Towns upon the Yssel, Doesburgh, Zutphen, Doventer, and Swoll, would have been in a manner flankt (though at some distance) by the strong Garrisons of Wesel and Coeverden; And breasted by the main Camp.

If with this disposition of their For∣ces, They had provided well for the strength and defence of Skinksconce, Nimmeguen, and Grave (which would likewise have lien all within the cover of these out-posts); They might, for ought I know, have expected the War, without losing the heart and steddiness of their Counsels, and not without pro∣bability of making a defence worthy the former Greatness and Atchievements of their State.

For a Siege of Maestricht or Wesel (so garrison'd and resolutely defended) might not only have amused, but en∣danger'd the French Armies; As Coever∣den might have done that of Munster. The resistance of one of these Towns, would have encreased the strength of all the rest: For the Fortune of Bat∣tels and Sieges, turns upon the hearts of men, as they are more or less capa∣ble

of general Confidences or Fears, which are very much raised by Acci∣dents and Opinions. It would not have been within any common Rules, to march so far into the Countrey, as to attaque the Burse or Breda, Nimme∣guen or Grave, leaving such Camps be∣hind as those at Wesel and Maestricht, and having so much a greater before them, as that about Arnhem. If any of these three Posts had been lost, Yet it could not have happen'd without good Conditions, and so retiring the men to strengthen either the more in∣ward Garrisons, or the main Camp, Which would have lien ready to de∣fend the Passes of their Rivers. And if at the worst they had fail'd in this, yet the French Army must afterwards, either have attaqued a fortifi'd Camp of Twenty thousand men, or left such an Army behind them when they marcht towards Utrecht, and into the heart of the Provinces; Both of which would have been Attempts, that I think have hardly been enterprised with success upon any Invasion.

There seems at least some appear∣ance of Order and Conduct in this Scheam of Defence; Whereas there

was none in theirs: But perhaps the greatness of the Tempest from abroad, and of the Factions at home, either broke the heart, or distracted the course of their Counsels. And besides, such old Sea-men in so strong a Ship that had weathered so many storms without loss, could not but think it hard to throw over-board so much of their Lading before This began. After all, I know very well, That nothing is so hard, as to give wise Counsel before Events; And nothing so easie, as after them, to make Wise Reflections. Many things seem true in Reason, and prove false in Experience: Many that are weakly consulted, are executed with Success. Therefore, to conclude, We must all acknowledg, That Wisdom and Happiness dwell with God alone; And among mortal men (both of their Persons and their States), Those are the wisest that commit the fewest Fol∣lies; and those the happiest that meet with the fewest Misfortunes.

FINIS.

Notes

• Crevit occulto velut ar∣bor ••aevo, Fama Marcelli.