A brief disquisition of the law of nature according to the principles and method laid down in the Reverend Dr. Cumberland's (now Lord Bishop of Peterboroughs) Latin treatise on that subject : as also his confutations of Mr. Hobb's principles put into another method : with the Right Reverend author's approbation.

THE HEADS OF THE SECOND PART. BEING A Confutation of Mr. H's Principles.

THE Introduction Containing the Rea∣sons why we have put these Answers to Mr. H's Principles into this Method. Sect. 1.

The Heads of the First Principle.

That Man is not a Creature born apt for Society.

His Reasons for it; That a Man is not a So∣ciable Creature by Nature, but Accident; for otherwise we should love all men alike. All So∣ciety proceeds from Self-interest; this resolved into mutual Fear, or else desire of Glory and Do∣minion over others. Sect. 2.

1. Answer, That these words, born unapt for Society, are equivocal; since who doth not know how unapt Children and Fools are to understand the force of Compacts. Mr. H. takes his whole measure of Humane Nature from those Passions that precede the use of Reason and Experience, which are also natu∣ral, as he himself confesses in another place. Sect. 3.

That is natural which every man, when of years of Discretion, either doth, or may at∣tain to. Sect. 4.

Answer to his 2d Argument concerning In∣terest; Society, though desired for a man's own good, or Interest, doth not make it for all that less natural. Sect. 5.

Answer to his Argument from Fear; not the cause of Natural, but of Civil Society, which we are not now treating of. Sect. 6.

Answer to his Instances from the Compa∣ny he had kept; which being some witty, ill-natured men, no standard can be taken from thence of the nature of all men. Sect. 7.

Answer to his Argument concerning Do∣minion: No Man able by his own single Power to force all the rest of Mankind to sub∣mit to his Will. Sect. 8.

Mr. H. himself doth not deny, but that men cannot subsist or live without Society, though to evade this, he consounds Natural

with Civil Society; the absurdity of which is exposed by shewing it to be besides the Que∣stion. Sect. 9.

The Heads of the Second Principle.

That all men are by nature equal.

His Argument proved from Mens mutual will and power of hurting each other; and chiefly from the power which all men, even the most weak, have of taking away each others lives. Sect. 1.

Answer. This equality, though granted, doth not prove that all men are by nature equal as to all things. Sect. 2.

The Heads of the Third Principle.

That there is a mutual will or desire in all men of hurting each other.

His Argument proposed, That tho some men according to a natural Equality will al∣low to other men the same things as to them∣selves; yet that the major part of men are not so modest, but will arrogate to themselves honour above others, or else will assault other mens Goods, or Persons, out of a false esteem of their own Power; from thence arises a ne∣cessity of others defending their Persons and Goods against them. This proved also from

the great Contention arising among men from strife of wit; And lastly from many desiring the same thing at once. Sect. 1.

Answer. None but Fools and wicked Men can have a desire to hurt those that have done them no injury; so that this does not reach all men, nor yet that even these have a will to hurt all men alike, but only those that stand in their way, or whose Goods they desire. Self-defence argues no desire of hurting o∣thers. Sect. 2.

Answer to his 2d Argument, from mens contention of wit; difference of Opinion, no real ground of mens destroying each other. Sect. 3.

Answer to his Argument, from mens de∣sire to think well of themselves, and to con∣temn others; viz. That this Observation doth not reach all men, but only those foolish and unreasonable men he describes. Sect. 4.

Answer to his Argument, from many men desiring the same thing at once. This, tho true, among Brutes and wicked, and unrea∣sonable Men, yet doth not reach all Mankind, since Reason dictates the contrary; God hath bestowed enough of the necessaries of life a∣mong Mankind in the state of Nature, so that they need not fight for them. Sect. 5.

Heads of the Fourth Principle.

That Nature hath given to all men a right to all things.

Mr. H's Argument proposed, That all men having a Right to preserve themselves, have also a Right to judge of the means of their own preservation; therefore whatever they think conduces thereunto, they have a Right to, let it be what it will; Profit being here the only measure of Right. Sect. 1.

Answer. Mr. H's Argument reduced into a Syllogisme, shews, That all men have not a right to all things, but only so many of them as they shall think necessary for their own preservation: Yet even here that mens false Judgment concerning the means, cannot give them a right to all things whatever, tho judging never so unreasonably. Sect. 2.

Farther proved from Mr. H's own Defi∣nition of right Reason; Right never used properly, but with respect to some Law ac∣knowledged by Mr. H. himself, in his Trea∣tise De Cive. Mr. H's Errors and Contradi∣ctions of himself about the use of the word Right Reason. Sect. 3.

Not true, that in a Commonwealth the publick Reason, or Law thereof, is always to be taken for Right, or that no man can di∣stinguish

true Reason from false, but by com∣paring it with his own. Mr. H's Argument re∣duced into a Syllogism; whereby it appears, That the major is false. Mens false Judgments, or Reasons, cannot alter the nature of things, nor can give them a right to all things. Sect. 4.

Mr. H's Error in this matter; whence it proceeds. Sect. 5.

No Rule of deciding any doubt, or diffe∣rence in the state of Nature, but the nature of things, or consent of the Parties concerned. Sect. 6.

Humane Nature will ever acknowledge a difference between Right and False Reason, and that according to Mr. H's own definition of it. Sect. 7.

But to evade this Difficulty, M. H. sup∣poses all men to be necessarily evil, or to be so by Nature. The Argument of the Author of Tractatus Theologico politicus, to the same ef∣fect; That whatever Action, though never so wicked or unreasonable any man doth, he hath a right to do it, because he could act no otherwise at that time. Sect. 8.

Those Arguments refuted: Necessity ne∣ver called a Right, that word being never used, but with respect to Men capable of Reason, and Deliberation; Men of sound Minds, and mature Age, can never plead Ig∣norance,

nor be excused if they voluntarily give themselves up to be governed wholly by their own Appetites and Passions. Sect. 9, 10.

Mr. H's Excuse; That in the state of Na∣ture, and where there is no Legislator, Mens Pas∣sions are no sins. Answered, Since there is no State either Natural, or Civil, wherein God ceases to be a Legislator, or that the Laws of Nature are not properly Laws. Sect. 10.

Mr. H's Artifice in taking away all Free∣dom from Mankind, and making all Actions necessary, whereby he destroys all the grounds of Moral Good and Evil; his contradicting himself, when he acknowledges this Right of all men to all things to be unprofitable, since himself before makes Utility to be the mea∣sure of all Right.

The Heads of the Fifth Principle.

That in the state of Nature, whatsoever any one doth to another is no injury.

Mr. H's Arguments for this; That in the state of Nature there are no Laws; where there is no Law, there is no Injustice; where there is no Injustice, there is no Injury; Iustice and In∣justice, no Faculties either of the Body, or Mind; for Injustice supposes some Propriety or Dominion, which cannot be supposed in this State. The

same Opinion held by Epicurus long ago, Sect. 1.

Answer. The Dictates of Right Reason, or the Laws of Nature, are the Laws of God, and therefore give every man a right to his Life, and all means necessary thereunto. So that whatever a man enjoys by the Right of Nature, it must be Injury and Injustice to take it away. And Mr. H. himself agrees, that to be injurious, which is repugnant to Right Reason; that is, to any known Truth, that may be collected from thence. He like∣wise acknowledges the Dictates of Right Reason to be the Laws of Nature, and there∣fore must confer a right to every man to their Lives, and all the Necessaries thereof. Sect. 2.

Yet Mr. H. when he is hard prest, cannot deny, but that there may be injury done to another, in the state of Nature; as when a Son kills his Father, but hath this Subterfuge, that a Son cannot be understood in the State of Nature to his Father. This Opinion confu∣ted: That every man owes the like gratitude to any other who should maintain and educate him, as to his Father; and it would be as much injury to hurt the one, as the other. Sect. 3.

This Argument in his Lev. false and preca∣carious. For if God, in the State of Na∣ture, is truly a Legislator, then the Laws

of Nature are truly Laws; but this is already proved. Sect. 4.

The Heads of the Sixth Principle.

That nothing is Good or Evil in the State of Nature.

Mr. H's Reason for it: That every Man in the State of Nature, makes his own Iudgment or Appetite the Rule of Good and Evil; which are ever understood with respect to the Party that uses them; and that in the State of Nature, is either every man's own self; or in a Civil, of the Persons that represent the Commonwealth. Sect. 1.

This he explains Physically in his Human Nature, from the different Motions which those Objects produce in the Brain, proceed∣ing from mens different Temperaments. Sect. 2.

Answer. Mr. H's uncertainty and loose∣ness in his Notions of Good or Evil obser∣ved. Sect. 3.

That notwithstanding the variety of Tem∣pers or Humours, or the different Genius of particular Nations in some Customs, &c. yet they for the most part agree in certain Notions necessary for the Common Good and Preservation; and consequently that of all Mankind. Sect. 4.

A more certain Account of Good and Evil, as well Natural as Moral, than what Mr. H. hath given us. Sect. 5.

Mr. H. notwithstanding all he hath said to the contrary, acknowledges a Common Good in the state of Nature. Sect. 6.

The difference between a Natural and a Moral Good, and wherein it consists. The confounding of these, the great cause of Mr. H's. Errours in this Matter. Sect. 7.

Mr. H. sometimes blames this narrow Hu∣mour in some men, that desire nothing but their own private advantage; and likewise confesses that that is a greater good which be∣nefits more persons, than what doth good but to a few. Sect. 8.

That notwithstanding all what Mr. H. hath said to the contrary, all rational and good men must acknowledge, that to be good, which tends to the happiness and preservati∣on of Mankind, and which likewise may any ways contribute to effect it: That if we do not make the Common Good of Rational Agents, the End of all our Actions; all our Notions about Moral, as well as Natural Good, will be various and uncertain. Sect. 9.

The Heads of the Seventh Principle.

That the State of Nature is a State of War.

That all Mr. H's precedent Principles, tend only to prove this darling one: If therefore, those are well answered, this Principle must fall. His New Reasons in his Leviathan pro∣posed: He deduces this state of War from Three Causes in the Nature of Man.

1st, Competition. 2dly, Diffidence. 3ly, Glo∣ry. Each of which do in their turns make men fall together by the ears. A state of War, not only that of actual fighting, but all that time wherein mens Inclination to it may be certainly known; illustrated by a Si∣mile of rainy Weather. Sect. 1.

Answer to this Argument: 'Tis first obser∣ved, that Mr. H. differs in his manner of pro∣ving the necessity of this state of War; dif∣fers in his Leviathan, from that in his De Ci∣ve: Since he here only supposes such a War to be lawful, without any other proof. Sect. 2.

2d. Observation, That this Author in his Argument here proposed, doth still take the Natural state of Man only from his Passions, without any consideration of Reason or Ex∣perience; which is contrary to what he had before laid down, when he made Experience

any of the Faculties of the Mind. Yet that none of these Passions do necessarily and un∣inevitably hurry men into a State of War. Sect. 3.

That none of these Persons, if governed by Reason, ought to incite men to War; and that Reason can never perswade men to fall together by the ears, out of Competition. Sect. 4.

That Diffidence of others, can never, if duly considered, be any Motive to make War with all men; since such a War is not only destructive in its own nature, but also im∣practicable. Sect. 5.

Mr. H. appeals to experience of what men do for their own security, answered; as also his Simile from the Weather. Sect. 6

He himself grants that there was never actu∣ally throughout the World, such a state of War, as he describes. His instances from the Savage People of America make rather a∣gainst, than for him; proved by Authorities of Travellers. Sect. 7.

His Instance from the practice of Sovereign Powers, proved to be of no force. Sect. 8.

Answer to his Argument from the Passion of Glory, which doth not inevitably hurry men to War, since it is more often mastered by other greater Passions; as Fear of Death,

Desire of things necessary, &c. Observation; That the same Passions which excite men to War, do also, with him, at other times per∣swade them to Peace; and that those Passi∣ons are really the more strong, that do so. Sect 9.

Mr. H's Argument from certain Peculiari∣ties in Humane Nature; why men cannot live as sociably with each other as Brutes? The 1st. Competition for Honours, &c. Answer, No Argument to be drawn from this, in the state of Nature. Sect. 10.

His 2d Reason answered; That the Com∣mon Good, among Brutes, differs not from the Private, as it does among Men. Sect 11.

Answer to his 3d. Instance; That Crea∣tures not having the use of Reason, do not find fault with the Administration of the Commonwealth; That this can be no Argu∣ment in the state of Nature, before Common∣wealths are instituted, &c. Sect. 12.

Answer to his 4th Reason; That Brutes have not the use of Speech, and so cannót make Good seem Evil, and Evil Good: Men not in a worse condition than Brutes, by reason of Speech, but rather in a better. Sect. 13.

Answer to his 5th Reason; That Brutes do not distinguish between Injury and Da∣mage, whereas it is otherwise in men. Sect. 14.

Answer to his last Reason; That the agree∣ment of Brutes is natural; but in Men artifici∣al. Sect. 15.

So much granted Mr. H. That men are tormented with divers Passions, which Beasts are not: And so on the other side, men are endued with other Passions, which move them more strongly to Concord. Sect. 16.

A farther Consideration of the absurdity and Inconsistency of this Hypothesis, of a Na∣tural state of War. Sect. 17.

The Heads of the Eighth Principle.

That mutual Compacts of Fidelity are void in the state of Nature; but not so in a Common∣wealth.

His Reason for it: Because where Covenants are made upon a mutual trust of future Perfor∣mances, either Party may chuse whether he will perform, or not; because he is not sure that the other will perform his Part also: And of this he is the sole judge: But that it is otherwise in a Civil State, where there is a Common Power to compel either of them that refuse. Sect. 1.

The reason apparent why he supposes Ci∣vil Sovereigns always in a state of War. Sect. 2.

Upon these Principles it is altogether in vain for Princes or States, to make any Leagues or Treaties of Peace with each other. This Notion gives them also a Right of putting to death, or making Slaves of Embassadors, and all others that come into their Dominions. Sect. 3.

That upon this Principle of Mr. H's. if Compacts do not bind in the state of Nature; neither will they be of any force in a Civil State, if either all, or the major part of the Contractors, should have all at once a mind to break them; upon pretence, that either others do not perform their Parts, or that they fear they will not do it. Sect. 4.

Mr. H. far exceeds his Master Epicurus in this Evil Principle. Sect. 5.

The Heads of the Ninth Principle.

The Law of Nature is not truly a Law, unless as it is delivered in the Holy Scripture.

His Reasons for it: That though they are Di∣ctates of Reason, yet that for want of a Legisla∣tor, and of sufficient security for those that shall observe them; they are not Laws, but as de∣livered in Scripture. Sect. 1.

That it hath been already proved, that this Law of endeavouring the Common Good, is the sum of all the Laws of Nature, and that

proceeding from God, and established by suf∣ficient Rewards and Punishments; it hath all the Conditions required to a Law. That the defect of other Writers, in not taking the like Method, hath been the cause of Mr. H's▪ and others falling into this Error. This Law not being given in any S••t form of Words, no Objection against its certainty, or plainness. Sect. 2.

This Law of Nature being to be colle∣cted from our own Natures, and that of things, is capable of being known even by persons born deaf and dumb. Mr. H. acknowledges▪ these Laws to be properly so, as proceeding from God. His allowing that those Laws o∣blige only to a desire or endeavour of the Mind, that they should be observed, a meer Evasion. Answer to his Objection, of the want of Rewards and Punishments, he himself having obviated this, by confessing in his Lev. that they are established by natural Rewards and Punishments: If the Law of Nature is not properly a Law, then there are no natural Rights properly so call'd. Sect. 3.

Answer to his main Reason; That we are not obliged to external Acts, for want of suf∣ficient security; That if this were a sufficient Objection; then neither Civil Laws would oblige. Divine Punishments, as certain as Hu∣mane. Sect. 4.

That mens greatest Security consists in a strict observation of all the Laws of Nature▪ Mr. H. in some places acknowledges, That if we do not observe the Laws of Nature, we shall fall into other Evils, besides those that proceed from the violence of Men. Sect. 5.

Two Reasons proposed; shewing the false∣ness of this Argument of Mr. H. The one, the Declaration of all Civil Sovereigns concern∣ing mens Innocency till accused; The other from Mr. H's own Concession of a much greater Insecurity that will follow from their non-observation; (viz.) a War of all men against all, which is the most miserable State of all others. Sect. 6, 7.

The Heads of the Tenth Principle.

That the Laws of Nature are alterable at the will of the Civil Sovereign.

That this is but a consequence of his former Principle, That nothing is good or evil in the state of Nature; his Arguments for this Prin∣ciple, Because it proceeds from Civil Laws, that every man should have distinct Rights to himself, as also should not invade those of others; it fol∣lows that these Precepts, Thou shalt honour thy Parents; Thou shalt not kill, &c. are Civil Laws, and that the Laws of Nature prescribe the same things, yet implicitely; for the same

Law commands all Compacts to be observed; and that to yield obedience, when obedience is due, was covenanted at the Institution of the Commonwealth; and therefore whatever Civil Sovereigns command concerning these things, must be obeyed, since they alone can appoint what shall be yours, or anothers, or what shall be Murther, Theft, &c. Sect. 1.

Nothing written by Mr. H. more wicked∣ly or loosely, nor wherein he more contradicts himself, than in this Principle. The main foundations of which are already destroyed. No Compacts made at the Institution of any Commonwealth, which can be of greater force than the Law of Nature. The dread∣ful Consequences that will follow from the contrary Principle; Mr. H. allowing even Idolatry it self to be lawful, if commanded by the Supream Powers.

That the Secondary Laws of Nature can never contradict, or alter those that are prior to them, as more conducing to the Common Good; though Civil Laws may restrain, or enlarge several particular Instances. His Ex∣ample of the Lacedemonian Boys answered. Sect. 2.

A Concluding Instance in answer to this, from that Law of ours, against relieving wandring Beggars. Sect. 3.

Uncertain, whether Mr. H. broached this dangerous Doctrine out of ignorance, or de∣sign of flattering Civil Sovereigns; yet that by this he endeavours to destroy all Vertue and Goodness in Princes, and all obligation of Obedience in Subjects, whenever they are strong enough to rebel. Sect. 4.

The Conclusion; containing an Apology for the length of these Confutations. Sect. 5.