A brief disquisition of the law of nature according to the principles and method laid down in the Reverend Dr. Cumberland's (now Lord Bishop of Peterboroughs) Latin treatise on that subject : as also his confutations of Mr. Hobb's principles put into another method : with the Right Reverend author's approbation.

OF THE Law of NATURE, And its OBLIGATION.

CHAP. I.

Of the first Means of discovering the Law of Nature; (viz.) the Nature of Things.

§ 1. HAving, in the Introduction to this Discourse, shewn you those several Methods, by which divers Authors have endeavoured to prove a Law of Nature; and having also given my Reasons, (tho' in short) why I cannot acquiesce in any of them, as laying too weak Foundations whereon to raise so great and weighty a Building; and having likewise given you the only true Grounds, by which it can, as I suppose, be made out, (viz.) from the

Existence of a GOD declaring his Will to us; from the Frame of the World, or by the Nature of all Things without us; as also from our own Natures, or that of Man∣kind in general, we, by the Power of our natural Faculties, or Reasons, drawing true Conclusions from all these. This being pre∣mised, I shall now proceed particularly to declare, in the first place, what I understand by the Frame of the World, or Nature of Things, in order to the proving the Existence and Obligation of the Law of Nature, and that it is really and truly a Law obliging all Persons of Years of Discretion and sound Minds, to its Observation: Which being per∣formed, I shall then proceed to our own Nature, as included in that of all Man∣kind.

§. 2. But though the ancient, as well as modern Scepticks and Epicureans, have of old, and do still at this day, deny the Exi∣stence of any Law of Nature, properly so called; yet, I suppose, that we are both suffi∣ciently agreed what we understand by this Term, since we both thereby mean certain Principles of immutable Truth and Certain∣ty, which direct our voluntary Actions con∣cerning the election of good, and the avoi∣ding of evil Things, and so lay an Obliga∣tion, as to our external Actions, even in the

state of Nature, and out of a Civil Society, or Common-weal. That such eternal Truths are necessarily and unavoidably presented to, and perceived by Men's Minds, and retained in their Memories, for the due ordering or governing of their Actions, is what is here by us affirmed, and by them as confidently denied. And I farther conceive, That the Actions so directed and chosen, are first known to be naturally good, as productive of the greatest publick Benefits; and after∣wards are called morally Good, because they agree with those Dictates of Reason, which are here proved to be the Laws, or Rules, of our Manners, or voluntary Actions: So also the Evil to be avoided, is first the greatest natural Evil, which afterwards for the like Reason is called Moral.

§. 3. Therefore that the Existence of such Propositions may more plainly appear, and be demonstrated to the Understandings of all indifferent Readers, it is necessary that we first carefully consider the Nature of divers Things without us, as also that of Mankind; and what we mean by Good and Evil, whether Natural or Moral. Lastly, we shall shew what those general Propositi∣ons are, which we affirm carry with them the Force or Obligation of Natural Laws, as declaring their Exercise or Performance

necessary to the compassing of an End, that ought to be endeavoured or sought af∣ter, in order to our true and greatest Happi∣ness.

§. 4. Nor let it seem strange, that I sup∣pose the Nature of divers Things, about which we are daily conversant, ought first to be looked into, and considered: For I will here suppose the Soul, or Mind of Man, to be at first, rasa Tabula, like fair Paper, that hath no connate Character or Idea's im∣printed upon it (as that noble Theorist Mr. * 1.1 Lock hath, I suppose, fully proved) and that it is not sensible of any thing at its coming into the World, but its own Existence and Action; but re∣ceives all its Idea's afterwards, from such Ob∣jects as it hath received in by the Senses: So that our Understandings being naturally de∣stitute of all Notions or Idea's, we cannot comprehend how they can operate, unless they be first excited by outward Objects. And indeed how can we understand what may be helpful and agreeable, or else hurt∣ful and destructive to Men's Minds and Bo∣dies, unless we first consider (as far as we are able) all the Causes, as well near as re∣mote, which have made, constitute, and still preserve Mankind, or else may tend to its

destruction, either for the time present, or to come? Nor indeed can it be under∣stood what is the fittest and best Thing, or Action, any Person can perform in a Case proposed, unless first all those Effects which may proceed from it, in all its various Cir∣cumstances, be duly considered and compa∣red together. So that the Contemplation both of the Causes on which Men's Safety and Happiness depends, as also of the Effects which may be produced by their joint or concurring Forces and Endeavours, must necessarily lead our Minds, first to the Con∣sideration of all other Men, and next of our selves, as a very small part of Man∣kind.

And in the next place, that we proceed to contemplate this System of Things, called the Visible World, but more especially GOD, as its Creator and Governour, according to the Method laid down in the Introduction to this Discourse; the Idea's of which being duly considered and digested in our Minds, we may draw from thence certain Conclu∣sions, by which we may judge or determine what Humane Things and Actions are cer∣tainly and necessarily conducing to the Common Good and Happiness of all Ra∣tional Beings, and in which every particu∣lar Person's Felicity or Well-being is con∣tained,

as a part thereof; and in which Rational Dictates, or Conclusions, I shall hereafter prove this Law of Nature to con∣sist.

§. 5. No body, I suppose, will think it necessary to the matter in hand, that I should here make Physical Disquisitions into the Natures of all Things that are the Objects of our Senses, that being the Business of profess'd Naturalists: It is sufficient for us to shew, That all the Rules of Moral Philoso∣phy, and the Laws of Nature, may be at last resolved into certain natural and easie Observations, gathered from common Ex∣perience; or else into certain Conclusions, established upon the known Principles of Mathematicks and Physicks; by which, I do not only mean all those natural Laws of Matter and Motion in Bodies, but also the Operations of our own Souls, as far as we are able to know or enquire into them. From all which, by the Order of Natural Causes, we may be led to the Know∣ledge of GOD their Creator and Or∣dainer, and so may acknowledge Him as the only Cause of all these excellent Ef∣fects, since this Nature of Things doth as well suggest to our Minds the Idea of a Creator, as of the Things created; and so supplies us with sufficient matter from which

we may deduce all the Laws of Nature, as so many true Practical Propositions, though it is only the Knowledge of the First Cause, or Creator, that can stamp any Authority or Obligation upon them.

Now although there may be many Things collected from our Knowledge of several Beings in the World, that may serve for our Moral Instruction, and the cultivating of our Manners; yet I shall, for Brevity's sake, only select some of the most material of them, and such as may serve to explain our short account of the Law of Nature, which (notwithstanding several Authors have so much enlarged upon it) I think may very well be reduced to this single Proposition, viz. The most universal Love, or most dif∣fusive Benevolence of all Rational Beings to∣wards each other, constitutes the happiest State they can be capable of: So that their Endeavour of the Common Good by this Benevolence, is the sum of all the Laws of Nature, and in which they are all contained. Note, That by this Love or Benevolence, I do not mean only a fruitless Desire, or Well-wishing, but an active Affection, exerting it self in all the Acts of Piety towards God, Duty towards Parents, Kindness and Gra∣titude towards our Country, Friends, and Relations, and of Charity and Humanity

towards all the rest of Mankind, as often as any opportunity offers it self.

§. 6. In the making out of which De∣scription of the Law of Nature, it is here needless to inquire into the Nature of our Souls, and the manner of our Knowledge and Understanding; since the former hath been so Learnedly perform'd by the Reve∣rend Dr. Ward late Bishop of Salisbury, and the latter so exactly done already in English by the above mentioned Author of the Essay of Humane Vnderstanding. I shall only briefly suppose upon his Principles, that our Souls do, 1. From the very birth, by de∣grees, receive Idea's drawn from outward Objects by our Senses. 2. That it is their faculty from divers single Notions, or Idea's put together, to come to make complex ones, that is, to make divers Propositions or Conclusions; not only concerning their own inward Actings, but also about all those outward Objects, with which they are daily conversant, and which may tend to the finding out the readiest means of attaining to, and preserving themselves in the happiest State and Condition they are able to ac∣quire. These things being suppos'd, it were needless to trouble you with any farther descriptions of this Love, or Benevolence, since every Person cannot but be sufficiently

sensible of its Nature, Degrees, and various Operations, that will but make any Self-re∣flection upon his own Inward Affections.

§. 7. But as for the due Connexion of the Terms of this Proposition, in which its Truth does chiefly consist, it seems to me plain enough: It being no more than to affirm, That our endeavour of procuring all the good things in our Power, and which are most conducing to our own pre∣servation and Happiness, and of all other Rational Beings, is the best, or chiefest thing that all Persons can do, to render both themselves, and all others, as happy as their Natures will permit or can require; and that there is no surer, or more powerful means to be discovered by us, whereby we may obtain a full enjoyment of all the good things of this Life, and the hopes of that to come, than by endeavouring our own Felicity in Conjunction with that of others So that from what I have already advanced, the Reader may Collect these two Propo∣sitions, 1. That the Foundation of all our Natural Happiness consists in an habitual de∣termination of the Will to the utmost of its Ability and Perfection, whereby we may be always ready and prepared to endea∣vour this Common good of Rationals. 2. That the true Happiness of each Indi∣vidual

Person, cannot be separated from that of other Rationals, since the whole doth not differ from all its parts taken to∣gether; so that this Proposition, concern∣ing this general or diffusive Benevolence, is thus to be understood; viz. Not to mean, or only intend, what any single, or a few Persons may perform towards the procuring of their own private Happiness, or that of their own Party or Faction, distinct from that of the rest of Mankind; but what all particular Persons may jointly contribute to render themselves and others happy; that is, what each of them may rationally per∣form towards the obtaining this Common Felicity. For it ought first to be known in general what all Men are able to do, or not to do, towards any common end, (such as is the common happiness of Ratio∣nals) and then what it is possible for any par∣ticular Person in this or that Case to per∣form; for example, towards his own pri∣vate happiness, as separate from that of all others; though such cases being Indefinite, cannot be certainly or distinctly known.

§. 8. But indeed the care of any parti∣cular Persons, or a few Men's happiness is rendred useless for the present, nor can be hoped for the future, if it is sought by op∣posing, or postponing the happiness of all

other Rationals; because the mind being thus affected, a main, and essential part of its own felicity must needs still be wanting; (viz.) That inward Peace of Conscience proceeding from a solid Reason, and true Prudence, always constant and agreeable to it self. For whilst such a Person resolves to act by one rule towards himself, and by a∣nother towards all others, who are of the same Nature, and therefore need and re∣quire the same things with himself, he must needs contradict his own Reason, and so wants that true Joy and Satisfaction con∣stantly springing in the mind of a Just, Benevolent, and Good-natur'd Person, from the sense of another's good and happiness when promoted, or procured by himself: So that it is impossible for any Man to be truly happy, who not only neglects the necessary causes thereof; God, and all other Men, (on whose Help and Assistance his true Happiness, and Well-being wholly de∣pends) but also provokes them to his cer∣tain ruine and destruction; so that there is no surer way, which can bring any Man to the attaining his own particular Hap∣piness, but that which leads him also to en∣deavour the Common Good of all other men, as well as his own.

§. 9. But I here acknowledge, that this

Proposition concerning Universal Benevo∣lence, cannot be of sufficient efficacy for the due ordering our Actions, and cor∣recting our Manners, until we have first propos'd to our selves this Common Good of Rational Beings; (viz.) Our own Felicity (in conjunction with that of others) as our main end, and that we are convinced that the various Acts contain'd under this gene∣ral Love, or Benevolence, are the only true means to procure it: The truth of which Proposition, is, in the first place, to be made manifest to us; in the next all those other Propositions that can be deduced from thence; such as are those less general ones, which determine concerning the Natural Power of Fidelity, Gratitude, Paternal and Filial Affection, as also of all other parti∣cular Vertues, necessary for the obtaining any part of this humane Felicity; for as well the whole truth of this Proposition, as of all those which follow from thence, de∣pend upon the Natural, and Necessary Pow∣er of such Actions, as real Causes producing such Effects.

§. 10. And though perhaps it may at first sight seem to detract from their certainty, that they depend upon such an uncertain Cause as Man's Will. Yet however it suf∣fices, for their truth and certainty, that

whenever such voluntary Causes shall exert themselves, such Effects will certainly be produced. Thus in Arithmetick we freely Add and Subtract; that is, we can choose whether we will perform those Operations or not; but if we reckon truly, we shall always find the Total, equal to all the par∣ticulars either Added or Subtracted. And there is a like certain, and true Connexion between all the Causes and Effects, which can be known in any other Science. And this I have likewise imitated in this Treatise of Moral Philosophy, by reducing all the parts, of which it consists, to this one Head or Summ, (viz.) Love or Benevolence; which Idea I shall improve by enquiring into its several Kinds, and shewing the ne∣cessary Connexion of this, or that particu∣lar Action, with the Common Good of Ra∣tionals, which ought to be the great end sought for by us.

§. 11. But since our voluntary Actions alone can be govern'd by Reason, and those only which concern intelligent Agents, are to be considered in Morals; it is evident, that from none of all these Actions we can frame a higher, or more comprehensive Idea, than this of Universal Benevolence, which comprehends the willing, and en∣deavouring of all good things, and the re∣moval,

or hindring of all evil ones, from those Objects about which it is conversant: And this Benevolence extends its self to all Moral Actions, as well those of considering, and comparing divers goods with each o∣ther, as of inquiring into the means by which they may be produced; nor is it more certainly true, that the Addition of several numbers makes a Summ Total, than that this Benevolence produces a general good effect to all those towards whom we exert it. Thus it is as certain, that Piety, Fidelity, Gratitude, paternal and conju∣gal Affection, together with filial Duty, make up the chief and constituent parts of this Benevolence, as that Addition, Sub∣straction, Multiplication and Division, are several parts of Arithmetick; so that it is no material Objection, That this Universal Benevolence may be prejudiced or lessened by the wickedness or ill-nature of Men. So that the great end, or Summ of the Law of Nature, cannot be thereby generally obtain'd as it ought, any more than it is an Objection against the certainty or usefulness of Arithmetick, or Geometry, that some Men should through Lazyness and Inadver∣tency, altogether neglect their Rules, or make false Conclusions from those Sciences, or should through Ignorance or prejudice,

deny their certainty. So likewise it is in the Science of Morality, as contain'd in the Law of Nature, which is chiefly imploy'd in weighing, and taking a true account of those humane Powers, that contribute to the Common Good of Rational Beings; which since they may vary somewhat in so great a variety of possible Cases, he may be said, (and that deservedly) to have well performed this task, who first affirms in ge∣neral, that all those Powers are compre∣hended under the most general and diffu∣sive Benevolence; though he may be able afterwards more particularly to demon∣strate; that a just division of things, Fide∣lity, Gratitude, and all the other vertues are contain'd under it, and also shew in what Cases they become useful to this end; by which means Religion, and humane So∣ciety, with all other things which may ren∣der Men's lives happy and safe, will be certainly improved and advanced. And herein consists the Solution of that most useful Problem concerning the Common good of Rationals, procur'd by the most diffusive Benevolence, which Moral Philo∣sophy teaches us to search after. Nor is the truth or authority of such Precepts at all prejudic'd or diminisht, though very many Persons will not obey them, or will set

themselves to oppose them; since this only can be the consequence of it, That they will thereby lose their own happiness, and per∣haps may draw others by their false reasons into the same misery: and so I doubt not on the other side, but that Men would think themselves oblig'd to perform all the Acts that constitute this Benevolence, if they were but once convinced that so great and noble an end, as the Common Good of Rational Beings, (and in which their own happiness is likewise contained) will be certainly procured thereby, and cannot be had by any other or contrary means.

§. 12. I come now to consider, that to∣gether with the knowledge of this visible World, (of which our selves make but a small part) there is likewise convey'd into our minds by our Senses a certain know∣ledge, 1. Of divers natural outward goods. 2. And those not only peculiar to our selves alone, but common to all those of our own kind. 3. Of which goods some are greater than others, and that good which hath none that we know excels it, we may call the greatest or highest. 4. Also of those, some are commonly in our Power, others we understand to exceed the narrow limits of our humane forces; but since the Na∣ture of these things is by two several ways

discovered to us, either more confusedly by common experience and daily Observation, or else more distinctly from experimental Philosophy, and the Mathematicks; the former of these methods being easie, and obvious to every one, I shall rather make use of that; whereas the other would be only proper for Philosophers and Mathe∣maticians, since the Grounds or Princi∣ples of the Law of Nature, ought to be a∣like evident to the Illiterate as well as to the Learned, for all are under the like ob∣ligation to observe them; and therefore I shall only put you in mind of such vulgar and easie Observations, which no Rational Man can dispute, or deny: and such, as from which I undertake to prove, that the Knowledge and Coherence of the Terms of this Proposition may evidently be de∣duced.

§. 13. Our first Natural Observation therefore is, that by our free use, and en∣joyment of those products of the Earth, that come under the general Titles of Food, Clothing, Houses, &c. and also by that help or assistance, which one or more Per∣sons can afford each other; Men may be preserved, and live as happily and content∣edly for several years, as their frail Nature will permit.

And in the next place, that these effects being not only agreeable, but necessary to our Natures, are naturally good, as tending to their Preservation or Perfection; and therefore by the same reason, Men's affections, from whence these outward things and acts do proceed, and which produce all these good effects, are con∣ceiv'd under the notion of good Will, or Benevolence, which must be also good; since whatever goodness is contain'd in the effects, must be likewise in the cause. And we are also sensible, that by this Benevolence, we are not only able to help our selves, or some few Persons, but many others, as well by our advice, as by our strength and in∣dustry; especially when we see divers others of our own kind who are able, and seem also willing to requite us in the like manner. So that each of us in particu∣lar, may be provided with a sufficient stock of all the necessaries of Life, by our mutual help and assistance, all which would not only be wanting to us, but we should be expos'd to innumerable mischiefs and hazards, as also to a great want even of necessaries, if all Persons looking only to themselves, should always shew themselves ill-natur'd, malevolent, and enemies to∣wards other Rational Beings; whereas the

contrary endeavours being thus helpful, and necessary to so many others, may easily and naturally produce in our minds a no∣tion of this Common good of Rationals, which from the obvious Similitude of Rati∣onal Beings to each other, must equally re∣spect all those, which we have opportu∣nity or occasion of knowing, or conver∣sing with, as also those with whom we have not.

§. 14. And I may add farther from con∣stant experience, that we are able to con∣tribute more to the good, and assistance of those of our own kind, than any other Creatures, because their Nature (and con∣sequently what is good, or destructive to it) is more evident to us from the know∣ledge we have of our selves, than of other Creatures. For as our Nature is capable of more, and greater goods than they, and in the attaining of which we can better assist each other; so we must also confess it to be liable to greater Dangers and Calami∣ties; for the declining and removing of which, God hath appointed our mutual Benevolence expressed by our endeavours, and assistance of each other, as the most suitable and necessary means thereunto.

§. 15. And we may also observe, that by our Advice and Counsel, communicated by apt Signs or Words, we are able to con∣tribute many helps and conveniencies of Life to those of our own kind, of which other Animals are altogether uncapable ei∣ther of acting or receiving. And farther, because of the Similitude of those of our own kind with our selves, we cannot but think it agreeable to our Rational Natures to do, or to procure the like things for them, as for our selves, and can also be sen∣sible of greater Motives to benefit Men, than other Creatures; since we have all the reason to hope, that those we have thus done good to, or obliged, being moved by our benefits, will make us a suitable return whenever it lies in their power, and that they may one time or other, in the like, or some other way oblige us. So that it is evident from Common Experience, that there can be no larger Possession, nor any surer defence for Mankind, than the most sincere Piety towards God, the Head of Rational beings, and the most diffusive Love, and sincere Benevolence of all Per∣sons towards each other; since if they prove malevolent, or ill-natur'd, they may easily bereave us of all things we enjoy, together with our Life it self: nor can the Love or

Good-will of others, be obtained by any more certain or powerful means, than that every one should shew himself so affected in his Actions towards others, as he desires they should be towards himself; That is, Loving and Benevolent upon all occasions, though more particularly to those to whom we are obliged by Friendship or Rela∣tion.

§. 16. Last of all, the same Experience that demonstrates the mutual Benevolence of particular Persons to be the most powerful Cause of their Felicity, does as necessarily teach us from a like parity of Reason, that the Love, or Good-will of any greater number of Men, towards any the like num∣ber, hath a-like proportionable effect; so on the other side, the constant Malice or Ill-will of all Men towards all, express'd by suitable Actions, would soon bring destru∣ction to the whole Race of Mankind, since it would soon destroy all the Causes re∣quisite to their Happiness, and Well-being, and introduce a perpetual Enmity and War, which are the certain Causes of the greatest Miseries and Calamities, which can befall Mankind: all which, though Mr. H. him∣self acknowledges, yet he will not own the necessity of Men's mutual Love and Concord, to be also as necessary to their

Preservation. But why the Causes of Men's Preservation and Happiness, as being Prior in Nature, should not be more evident than those of their Destruction; since the one is altogether as evident and necessary, and may be as easily foreseen and prevented, as the other, I can see no reason; and I should be glad if any of Mr. H's Disciples could shew us any sufficient Reason for that Opinion.

§. 17. So that these things which I have now laid down concerning the Natural means of Men's happiness, do appear so evident from our common Reason, and daily Experience, that they are of like cer∣tainty with the Principles of Arithmetick and Geometry, in all whose Operations, there are still supposed certain Acts depend∣ing upon our free, humane, Faculties; and yet neither of these Sciences are rendred the more uncertain, from the supposition of Men's Free-will, whether they will draw Lines, or cast up Sums, or not; since it suffices for their truth and certainty, that there is an inseparable Connexion between such Acts, which are supposed to be in our Power to exert, and all the effects sought for; To the finding of which, both the pleasure annexed to their Contemplation, and the various uses of Humane Life do at

once invite us. And in the like manner, the truth of all Moral Knowledge is founded in the Immutable Coherence between the high∣est Felicity, which Humane Power can attain to, with those Acts of universal Benevo∣lence, that is of Love towards God and Men, and which exerts it self in all the particular moral Vertues; yet in the mean time, these two things are still supposed, That Men desire, and seek the highest Fe∣licity they are capable of; and also, That they are able to exercise this Benevolence, not only towards themselves, but God and Men, as partakers with them of the same Rational, or Intelligent Nature. This I have thought fit to add, to prevent all those Cavils which Mr. H's Disciples are used to make against Morality, from the necessity of our Wills.

§. 18. But before I proceed farther to inquire into the Nature of things, I desire you to remember what I have already hinted in the Introduction to this Discourse, That this truth concerning the efficacy of Universal Benevolence, for the Preserva∣tion and Happiness of Rational Beings, as also all other Propositions alike evident, and contained under it, do all proceed from God, as the first Cause, and Ordainer of all things; and consequently of our Hu∣mane

Understanding, and of all truths therein contained. And since these Rules drawn from the Natures of things, tend to the procuring God's End and De∣sign, viz. The Preservation, and Happi∣ness of Mankind; and also that it hath pleased Him to annex certain natural Re∣wards, to the Observation of these Dictates of Reason, and Punishments to their Trans∣gression; so that they thereby becoming apt, and sufficient for the due ordering of our Thoughts, and governing our Actions towards God, our selves, and all others, (as I shall farther make out in this Dis∣course) I see nothing wanting to give it the Essence, and Vigour of a Law. And I shall farther shew before I have done, that under this general Rule of endeavour∣ing the Common Good of Rational Beings, or Universal Benevolence, is contained Piety towards God, and the highest Good∣will or Charity towards Men, and is the Summ both of the Moral Law of Moses, and of the Gospel of our Saviour Iesus Christ.

§. 19. These Things being thus propo∣sed in general, I come now more particu∣larly to shew, that a due Observation and Knowledge of these natural Things without us, will truly and clearly teach us what

Operations or Motions of them are good, or evil, for all other Men, as well as our selves; and also shew us how necessarily and unalterably all these Things are produced; for Natural Knowledge searches into the true Causes of that Generation and Cor∣ruption which daily happens to all Natural Bodies, and especially to Men, and so can demonstrate the necessary coherence of these Effects, with their Causes; and there∣fore those Causes that help to generate or preserve Men, and that make them live happily in this Life, are Natural Goods, as the Causes of their Misery and Dissolution are Natural Evils: And it then as plainly follows, That by this Knowledge we can as certainly demonstrate and foretell what Things are naturally Good, or Evil, for all Mankind, as for any single Person.

§. 20. Therefore we may truly conclude, That the Knowledge of all these Effects, which either Nature or Humane Industry can produce for Men's Food, Clothing, Habitation, and Medicine, is part of this Natural Knowledge: To which we may al∣so add the understanding of all other Hu∣mane Operations, and of the Effects procee∣ding from thence, for the Uses of Humane Life. For although the voluntary Actions of Men, as they exert themselves towards

Things without them, do not work exact∣ly after the same manner as meer Mechanick Motions, viz. from the Pulsion or Motion of other Bodies, but either from their Rea∣sons, or Wills; yet since all the outward Motions we exert, receive their Measure and Force from the Natural Powers of Hu∣mane Bodies, which are of the same Na∣ture with others, and so must perform their Natural Functions, as they are re∣gulated by the necessary Laws of Matter and Motion, much after the same manner as other Natural Motions, it is evident, that these voluntary Actions, whenever they are thus exerted, are regulated by the same Natural Laws: And it is commonly known how much Men's Industry, by the various Motions of their Bodies (which a Philoso∣pher can easily resolve into mechanick ones), does contribute to their own and other Men's Preservation, by providing and ad∣ministring Victuals, Cloths, Physick, Hou∣ses, &c. In performing which Effects, Men's Strength, and Skill in Husbandry, Building, Navigation, and other manual Trades, are chiefly employ'd. Nor are the Liberal Arts absolutely free from these Laws of Motion, since by the help of certain sensible Signs, and articulate Notes, or Marks, as Words, Letters, or Cyphers, the Minds of Men come

to be endued with Knowledge, and dire∣cted in most of their Civil and Moral Duties. I have only thought fit to hint thus much concerning Humane Actions, considered as meer Natural Things existing without us; but I shall treat more fully of them in the next Chapter, when I come to treat of the Nature of Man, considered as a voluntary Agent.

§. 21. Hence it plainly appears, That all these Natural Things, and the mutual Helps by which they are procured, may be cer∣tainly known, and foreseen by us, to be naturally and unalterably Good; that is, tending to the Preservation and Happiness of Mankind. And for the same Reason all those contrary Causes, or Motions, by which Men's Bodies are weakened or destroyed, by lessening or taking away the Necessaries and Conveniences of Life, such as Food, Ray∣ment, Liberty, Quiet, &c. And also those Actions by which Vertue and Knowledge may be rooted out of Men's Minds; and Errours, and unbridled Passions, destructive to the Common Good of Mankind, intro∣duced into their Rooms, are necessarily and in their own Nature Evil. Therefore when we determine of Natural Goods, or Evils, according to the Law of Nature, we are not only to consider the Preservati∣on

of a few particular Persons, since the Punishment; nay, Death of these, may of∣ten conduce to the Common Good; but rather that of the aggregate Body of Man∣kind, subordinate to GOD, as the Head of Rational Beings, in this Natural System or Commonweal, establish'd by Natural Laws: For the good of an aggregate Body, is no∣thing else but the Chiefest Good that can accrue to all its Parts, or the Indivi∣dual.

§. 22. Having now found out from the Nature of Things, by what means our Minds can receive the Idea's of a Common Natural Good, and Evil, and these no less certain and stable, than those by which the Causes of Generation and Corruption are exhibited to them; I come next to con∣sider, That that Matter and Motion, in which the Powers of Humane Bodies (as well as other Parts of this Visible World) consist, and exert themselves after a limitted manner, and have a finite Quantity, and certain Bounds, beyond which, they cannot act; from which Principles, flow those known Laws of Natural Bodies, as that they cannot be at once in divers Places, and therefore cannot be moved towards contrary Points, at the same time; or so as to be subservient to the contrary Wills

of divers Persons, at once; but are so bounded and determined in their Natures, as to be only ordered or disposed of, ac∣cording to the Will of one Person alone, or else of divers consenting or conspiring to the same End, or Design. For if Men should think thus to make use of them, they would be so far from conducing to their Benefit, or Preservation, that they would only tend to their Hurt, and De∣struction; since if the Stronger had a Right to take from the Weaker by Strength, and the Weaker from the Stronger by Cunning and Surprize, any of these Necessaries of Life, which he was once possessed of; yet when he had them, he could be no more assured that he should keep them, than he was that last possessed them, since one Stronger, or more Cunning than himself, may yet come, and serve him as he had done the other before; and so on, 'till all Men that enjoy'd them should be de∣stroy'd, and the Things contended for, pe∣rish without use: So that there could re∣main neither any Owner, nor Thing to be owned.

§. 23. From all which that hath been now laid down, I shall draw some Con∣clusions of great moment to our Subject; as, (1.) From this Knowledge of the Na∣ture

of Things, (and especially of our own Humane Nature) we may learn that so∣much celebrated Distinction of the Stoicks, between the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (i. e.) those Things which are in our own Power and Dispo∣sal, such as are the voluntary Motions and Inclinations of our Bodies and Minds; and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (i. e.) the Things out of our Power, such as are those Corporeal Mo∣tions, so violent and irresistible, which we daily observe to proceed from the Nature and Frame of the World, which we weak Creatures are not able to resist, and from whose irresistible Force, all things here be∣low are in a perpetual flux; whence also there happens to us Men, a perpetual vicis∣fitude of Things, as well Adverse as Pro∣sperous, as also of Maturation, Decay, and Dissolution: So that this Distinction (if duly observed) will be of singular use, as well in forming our Manners, as governing our Affections: For from hence we are taught not to expect any other or grea∣ter Happiness, as a Reward of all our Labours and Endeavours, than what may proceed from a prudent Management of our Rational Faculties, and from those Exter∣nal Helps which we may expect Divine Providence will afford us, in its governing the World; by which means we may be∣freed

from those fruitless Labours and En∣deavours, to which Men's vain Fears, and groundless Hopes, so often transport them: Nor shall we too much afflict our selves for those Evils, which either do now, or may hereafter, without our own Faults, inevi∣tably befal us, whence the greatest part of those Troubles and Molestations, which are wont to proceed from Grief, Anger, and Discontent at our present Fortunes, or Conditions, may, by our Prudence, or Pa∣tience, be prevented: Neither are we here∣by only directed to the avoiding of Evils, but here is also chalked out to us, a more short and compendious method, by which we may, by degrees, attain to those two greatest Blessings which can be enjoyed by us in this Life; the Culture of our own Minds, and the Government of our Pas∣sions.

§. 24. I need not prosecute this Subject any farther, but shall proceed to take no∣tice of those obvious Observations to our Purpose, viz. That it is evident from com∣mon Experience, That the natural Forces, or Powers, of any one Person, are too weak, scanty, and inconsiderable, towards the obtaining all that Happiness he desires and is capable of; to procure which, he still wants the Help and Assistance of many

other Persons and Things, to render his Life safe, pleasant, or contented: And, fur∣ther, that it is in the Power of any one of us, to contribute many Things towards the use of others of our own kind, which we do not need our selves; and which though of no use to us, yet may be of singular use to their Happiness, or Preservation. But since we are certain, from those known Bounds of our Power, that we are not able to compel all those by force, whose Assistance we stand in need of, to co-ope∣rate with us, towards this our main End and Design, viz. Happiness; there can be no surer Means, or safer Defence left us, than that by a constant offering and affor∣ding those Necessaries of Life, together with our Assistance to others, as often as it lies in our Power; we may thereby pro∣bably render them likewise Benevolent and Helpful to us in the like Necessities, or Oc∣casions: So that this Benevolence, or Cha∣rity, is only a constant Will and Endea∣vour of acting thus sincerely and diffusively, whenever any Opportunity offers it self; and that even in those Cases, in which it may oftentimes be probably foreseen, that no return can be immediately expected from the Person to whom the Benefit is done; since, however, it still contributes to the

general Good of Mankind, of which that Person we so benefit is a Member: Which general Benevolence doth not yet hinder, but that we may bestow and exercise a larger share, and higher degrees thereof, towards those from whom our own long Ac∣quaintance, and nearer Relation, may per∣suade us to hope for larger Returns of Friend∣ship.

§. 25. Whence we may, in the next place, observe, That if our Assistance, and other Things in our Power, certainly contribute to the Use, or Benefit of others, they can only perform this, as they are assign'd, or appropriated, to the particular Persons, that are to make use of them, according to some certain time and place. So that if Right Reason prescribe a Use of Things, and Hu∣mane Helps, as necessary for the Happiness and Preservation of Mankind, it, as neces∣sarily, prescribes, that this Use of these Things, should be appropriated to them, that are thus to use them, for the time they stand in need of them, and according to the place in which they are to be used. The Consequence is evident, because Right Rea∣son can only prescribe that to be done, which will consist with the nature of the Things that are to be used, and the Persons that are to use them. So that it is evident, a Divi∣sion,

or Appropriation of Things, and Hu∣mane Assistances and Labours, is absolutely necessary for the Subsistence and Happiness of all Men; whence it also follows, That this necessary Limitation, or Appropriation of any of these Things to particular Persons, for the time they stand in need of them, is a natural Separation of them, from the use of all others, during the time they are so made use of. By One Thing, I mean such single Things as are uncapable of division; and to make use of which, it is absolutely necessary that it be possessed whole and en∣tire, such as are Food, Cloths, and the like; for there are other Things which are likewise called One, as one Island, one Field, and the like, which may very well serve for the Use of divers Persons at once, and whose Division arising from the positive Consent of Men already entred into Civil Societies, or Commonweals, I need not now treat of.

§. 26. But from this natural Division, or Appropriation of Things, and its Necessity for the Preservation of Mankind, arises that Natural and Primitive right proceeding from Occupancy, which both Philosophers and Civilians grant to have place in the state of Nature, supposing a Community of most Things: For Right is but a certain Faculty,

or Power of Acting, or enjoying any thing granted us by a Law; but in this state, there is no other Law but that of Right Reason, given by GOD, concerning such Actions as are necessary for the Common Good of Rational Beings. Therefore since Right Reason requires a separate use of particular Things, and Humane Assistances, as neces∣sary and conducing to this End, there must needs follow from thence, a Right to the Use and Enjoyment of any particular Thing, during the time the Possessor so makes use of it; for a Man hath the same Right to live tomorrow, as he hath to day; and con∣sequently hath the same Right to all the Means which are necessary for his Preserva∣tion: Therefore if this House, Servant, or any thing else that I am now possessed of, be necessary for my Happiness or Preservation to day, I shall have also a like Right to it for the future as long as it continues thus neces∣sary: And in this state, there being no other Judge of the Means of my own Preservation but my self, I shall have a Right to it as long as I live, for the same Reason for which I had a Right to it at first. So that unless, the Use or Necessity ceasing, I alter my Mind concerning it, or assign my Inte∣rest in it to another, I have a perpetual Right in it, excluding that of any other, du∣ring

the time that I am thus possessed of it: Not that I hereby grant every Man a Right, in the state of Nature, to all Things which his unreasonable Passions, or Appe∣tites, shall fansie to be necessary for his own Preservation, or Happiness, but only to so much of the Means conducing thereunto, as any Man, whilst he judges according to Right Reason, or Equity, and the natural Necessities of himself and Family, shall rightly so determine, without arrogating, or assuming to himself more than is really necessary for those Ends, and without rob∣bing others of what is also necessary for them, which is down-right Violence and In∣justice.

§. 27. Whence it plainly appears, That this natural Division, or Property in Things, first proceeding from Occupancy and Pos∣session, as it is necessary for the Preservation of all particular Persons, so it must be like∣wise for that of Mankind, considered as an aggregate Body, consisting of divers Indi∣viduals, the same Means being necessary for the preservation of the whole, as are re∣quisite to all its constituent Parts or Mem∣bers, though this kind of Property may very well consist with Community, as at Ord'naries and Theatres, every one that

pays his Money hath a Right to his Dinner, or Place; yet none can tell which it is, or where it shall be, 'till he hath it on his Plate, or is actually seated in it.

§. 28. Whence it may appear, That these Principles being truly drawn from the Na∣ture of Things, will, without any more a∣do, destroy Mr. H.'s wild Hypothesis, con∣cerning the Natural Right of all Men to all Things, that he may thereby prove a Right, in the state of Nature, in all Men▪ of do∣ing whatsoever they please towards others, necessary to their Preservation; so that thence may arise a natural state of War of all Men against all. And hence it likewise appears upon what grounds every Man hath a Right to his own Life, Limbs, and Liberty, viz. because they are the natural Means by which we are enabled to serve GOD, and assist Mankind; in doing which, we prose∣cute the Common Good of Rational Be∣ings. And from these Principles here laid down, it clearly appears, That Mr. H.'s Do∣ctrines concerning the Law of Nature, and Dominion, are not only precarious, but manifestly false; which, first, suppose (with∣out any sufficient Proof) an unlimitted Right of all Men to all Things, to be neces∣sary to their Preservation, as the Founda∣tion of all Natural Laws, and Civil Societies.

For the proving of which, he only makes use of some false and specious Arguments, as I hope I have sufficiently made ap∣pear in the Second Part of this Trea∣tise.

§. 29. Having now established a Natural Property in such Things, and Humane Helps, or Assistances, as are necessary for Men's Happiness and Preservation, in order to the Common Good, I shall not concern my self to prove the Convenience of Civil Property, as now established in most Com∣monweals; nor shall now trouble you with those Mischiefs, which Aristotle, in his Po∣liticks, hath very well proved, would fol∣low from a Community of Things, from those unavoidable Strifes and Contentions, which would daily arise from our using the Fruits of the Earth in common: Only I think I may say thus much, That since Man∣kind is so multiplied in well-inhabited Coun∣tries, that there is not Land sufficient to be divided amongst all the Inhabitants, so as to serve for each Person's comfortable Subsi∣stence without foreign Trade, or mechanick Employments, there must necessarily follow a more full and exact Division and Appro∣priation of the Necessaries of Life, such as are Land, or the Use and Products thereof; as, Corn, Cattel, and the like, in order to the

Preservation and Happiness of that Nation, or Civil Society, by whose Consent such a Divi∣sion and Appropriation of these Things were at first introduced; which being once set∣led by Civil Laws, there is the like Reason for its continuance; and Men have as much Right to those Things they thus enjoy, by the particular Laws of the Countries where they live, as they had before in the state of Nature, to whatever they could possess by the Right of Occupancy, or Possession; since it is evident, That this more exact Property, or Dominion, consisting in a stricter and more limitted use of these Things, hath a greater efficacy in order to the Happiness and Preservation of that Na∣tion, or part of Mankind, which have thus agreed to it, than the bare Occupancy, or Possession of these Things had before such a Division made, or agreed upon; nor can it now be altered, however, perhaps, hard and unequal it may prove to some par∣ticular Persons, since it will always conduce to the Happiness and Tranquility of each particular Civil Society, or Commonweal, that it should continue as it doth, than it should be still altered, according to every Man's particular Fancy, or Interest, since such a Change can never be made, without inconceivable Discontents, and Civil Dissen∣tions,

which would quickly end in open Vio∣lence and Hostility.

§. 30. So that from these Principles here laid down, there is no Right conferred upon any Man, of doing whatever his own wild Fancy, or unbounded Appetite may prompt him to, but only, what he shall, according to right Reason, truly judge ne∣cessary to his own, or Family's Happiness and Preservation, in order to the Common Good of Mankind. Therefore I here de∣sire you to take notice, that whatever Right we enjoy, even to the things most necessary for our Preservation, it is found∣ed, if not in the Precept, yet at least per∣mission of this great Law of Nature, of endeavouring the Common Good of Ra∣tional Beings, when we truly judge ac∣cording to the Nature of things, concern∣ing the means necessary, and conducing to this great End; so that it can never be proved, that any one hath a right of Pre∣serving himself, unless it be first made out, how this Right of Self-preservation, con∣duces to, or at least consists with this Common Good. Since no Rational Man can ever believe, that God intended the Preservation, much less the Sensual Plea∣sures of any one Man, as the Sole End of His Creation. Which Principle being once

established, as the Foundation and Original of all the Natural, or Civil Rights we en∣joy; our own natural Powers and Rights, will appear so limitted thereby, that we cannot without injury, and injustice, vio∣late or invade the Rights of others, much less break out into open War against them without just Cause; nay all those Argu∣ments by which any one Man can assume a Right to Preserve himself by the Law of Nature, will likewise be of the same force to prove, that he ought to Preserve others also; and that it can never become lawful for us in any State, to rob Inno∣cent Persons of what is necessary for their Well-being and Preservation; but rather on the contrary, that all Men's natural Rights, should be secured from the mis∣chiefs of unreasonable Violence, and War, and Contention; which natural Security in a Civil State or Commonweal, is highly improved and encreased by the Assistance of Humane Skill and Industry, according to the established Laws of Property or Dominion.

§. 31. I have spoken thus much concern∣ing the necessary Connexion between the particular Actions above mentioned, and the Common Good of Mankind, that by considering their relation to this Great End, the Nature of all Humane Actions

may more certainly be known and prede∣termined. Since the Dependance of natu∣ral Effects on their Causes, are absolutely necessary and immutable; for as well in the state of Nature or Community, as of Civil Society, or separate Property, those Humane Actions which cause, or procure, that the minds of all other Persons should not be prejudiced by Errors, Lyes, or Perfidiousness; nor their Bodies hurt, nor their Lives, Goods, Fames and Chastities violated, or taken away, and also by which a grateful return is rendred to those that have done us good; or in short, all those Actions by which the true happiness of any one Man, or more is procured, without injury to others, as they always were, so they ever will be the certain Causes of the Common Good, and Happiness of Man∣kind, and are therefore distinguished by the Titles of moral Vertues, as I shall more at large demonstrate in this Discourse, when I come to shew how all moral Ver∣tues are derived from, and at last resolved into this Principle of the Common Good of Rational Beings.

But least the variousness of the Obser∣vations treated of in this Chapter, and their Independance upon each other, should render them perplext, and consequently

unconvincing to Common Readers, who may not be able to carry so long a train of consequences in their minds; I shall contract what hath been now said into these few plain Propositions.

1. That though all particular men are mortal, and but of a short duration, yet that God hath still preserved mankind with∣out any sensible failure or decay.

2. That in Order to this, God hath made man to be propagated by Generation, and also to be preserved by divers out∣ward means, which we call necessaries of Life.

3. That these Natural means can no way answer this End, but as they are allowed, or appropriated to the uses and occasions of particular Persons, during the time they stand in need of them, and so cannot at the same time answer the different or contrary desires, and necessities of divers men, endea∣vouring to use these things after contrary or different manner.

4. That the taking away those necessaries of Life, which another is rightly possessed of, doth not only cause the ruine and de∣struction of that Person and his Family, who were thus possessed of them; but by causing a perpetual strife among Man∣kind, will render these things uncapable of being made use of at all for their Com∣mon

Good and Preservation.

5. That such a Strife, if prosecuted to the utmost, will certainly end in the destruction, not only of particular Persons and Nations, but of all mankind contrary to God's design.

6. From all which we may Rationally collect, that God designs the Preservation and Happiness of Mankind, as also of all In∣dividual Persons as parts of it, as far as their frail and mortal Natures will permit, and in subordination to the good of the whole bo∣dy thereof.

7. That therefore there are no surer means to procure this great End of the Common Good of Mankind, than an Uni∣versal Benevolence towards Rational Be∣ings; consisting, First, in Divine Love or Piety towards God, and in Respect of Men, not only in permitting each other quietly to enjoy all the necessaries of Life, but also in making a settled division of them to o∣thers, so as to be appropriated to several mens uses or occasions; which dictates be∣ing given us by God as a rule of all our moral Actions, (in the exercise of which is contained our truest Happiness, as in its violation, our greatest Misery) is therefore truly and properly a Law, and indeed the Summ of all the Laws of Nature.

CHAP. II.

Observations and Conclusions, drawn from the consideration of Humane Nature and Right Reason, as also from the Nature of God.

§. 1. HAving in the former Chapter drawn such easie and obvious Observations, from the Nature of those things without us, which we daily stand in need and make use of, as may serve to prove, after what manner we ought to make use of them, and whence that Right arises we have to them. I come now to make the like Observations from the Nature of Mankind, in order to the proving, that we are designed by God for the Good and Preservation of others besides our selves, and that in the doing of this, we procure (as far as lies in our Power) the Good and Happiness of all Rational Beings, in which our own is likewise included. To perform this task, I shall first take notice of those

Qualities or Properties that belong to man (1) as a meer Natural Body, (2) such as be∣long to him as an Animal, (3) such as are peculiar to him as a Rational Creature, en∣dued with a higher and nobler Principle than Brutes, viz. an Immortal Soul.

§. 2. To begin with the first of these, it is evident, that as a Natural Body, he is endued with these Properties common to all other Natural Bodies. First, that all his motions, in which his Life, Strength, and Health consist, do all proceed from God, the first and Original, or Cause of them, and are necessarily complicated with, and depend upon the motions of innumerable other Bodies, among which the Corporeal motions of others, (which do often limit and restrain our own) are first and chiefly to be considered. (2) That from them, as from other Bodies, motion may be propa∣gated Indefinitely, and which does not pe∣rish, but concur with other motions to per∣petuate the Succession of things, that is, contribute to the conservation of the Uni∣verse; and as the former teaches us, that a particular end, viz. our own Preservation, depends upon our Common or joynt Forces, or Natural Powers; so this latter instructs us, that such Powers and motions of particular Persons, are often most Beneficial,

and conducing to the Common Good of all men. The first of these Conclusions for∣bids us to hope for, or endeavour our own private Good or Happiness, as separate and distinct from that of all others, and so ex∣cites us to seek the Common Good of Ra∣tionals, as the Original of our own parti∣cular Happiness. The other Conclusion shews, that this endeavour of the Common Good can never prove in vain, or to no purpose, since it concurrs with the Will of God, and conduces to the Preservation of the Universe, and of all Humane Creatures therein contain'd; and farther, that in each complicated motion, as well in that, towards which divers Causes concurr for the Pre∣servation of any Body for a certain time, as also in that, whereby each particular Body concurrs to the Conservation of the whole System. There is a certain order still ob∣served, whereby some motions are necessa∣rily determined by others in a continual Series, or Succession, all which are yet go∣verned or over-ruled, by the motion of the whole System of Natural Bodies. And al∣though this sort of Contemplation, may seem remote from common use, yet is it not to be contemned as altogether unprofitable in Humane Affairs; for it makes us more di∣stinctly perceive from some certain general

Principles, how necessary a constant and certain order is amongst those Causes, that Act from Corporeal forces; so that many of them, may each in their order Succes∣sively concurr to an effect foreseen, or de∣signed by us; and farther shews us a rule how we may certainly judge, what Cause does more or less contribute to the Effect sought for, or desired; so that from the Natural Power of these Causes, their Order, Dignity or Power, in respect to each Effect, are to be determined and judged of; and we are taught from the Nature of things, as well what Causes are to be most esteemed for those good Effects they have, or may produce, as also which are most diligently to be sought, for the obtaining those ends which we desire, and by which means it may be also known; that those Causes which Philosophers call Universal, viz. God the first Cause, and the motion of the Ce∣lestial Bodies as proceeding from Him, are the Original Causes of the Common Good or Happiness of Mankind, a part of which we either always do actually, or can hope to enjoy.

§. 3. But omitting those Motions which are not in our Power to influence or alter, it is certain, that among the things which are in either our Power to do or forbear;

those voluntary Humane motions proceed∣ing from an Universal Benevolence of all Men towards all others, are the principal Causes of their Common Happiness, and in which every one's private Good is included. Since from this source proceed all those Actions, by which Men's Innocence and Fi∣delity towards each other are preserved; as also by which Humanity, Gratitude, and almost all the other Vertues are exerted and performed, after as certain a manner, as the Natural motions of the Spirits, Bowels, Nerves, and Joynts in an Animal, do wholly proceed from the motion of the Heart, and Circulation of the Blood: which judgment or determination, being taken from the Nature of things duly considered, should, without doubt, cause us to yield Obedience to all the Laws of Nature, as contributing to this Common Good of Rational Agents, and may make us also diligently to take care, that the same be observed by others, so that there may be nothing wanting that can be done by us, whereby we may not be ren∣dered as happy as our frail Natures in this will allow; since right reason can pro∣pose no higher or nobler End, than this of all our moral Actions.

§. 4. Yet whilst we compare the Aggre∣gate Body of mankind, (as far as we can

Act by Corporeal force) with the Natural Systems of other Bodies. I am not un∣mindful of the manifest difference there is between them, viz. That all the Effects of meer Corporeal Systems, are produced by the Contiguity, and immediate Operation of Bodies, moving upon others that are to be moved by them; without any Sense, Deli∣beration, or Liberty, which are only to be found in Humane Actions, in whose Mo∣tions and Operations on each other, though a great difference often intervenes; yet for all that, it is evident, that the Corporeal Powers of Men when exerted, are subject to the same Laws of motion with other Bo∣dies, and that divers Men may often co∣operate to one certain Effect, relating to the Good or Hurt of others, so that there is the same necessity of a Subordination be∣tween Humane motions, as there is between those of other Bodies. And I must here far∣ther take notice, that Men have frequent opportunities of meeting together, and also many other means by which they may hurt or help each other, by Words, Writing, or other Actions. So that, if we consider the Nature of Mankind, in the whole course of their Lives, it ought to be considered as one entire System of Bodies, consisting of several particular parts; So that nothing al∣most

can be done in Relation to any Man's Life, Family, or Fortune, which doth not some way or other, either benefit or pre∣judice, those things which are most dear to others also: as the motion of any one Body in the System of the World, Communi∣cates it self to many others. For that great Prerogative of Knowledge and Understand∣ing, with which Man is endued, supplies the Contiguity required for motion in other Bodies. Men being often excited to Action, by certain Arbitrary signs or words, by which they understand, what hath been done by others in places far distant. So also our Intellect apprehending a likeness of Desires and Aversions, between those of the same Species with it self, as to things neces∣sary or hurtful to Life, as also being able to remember other Men's Actions towards themselves, or those they love, are from thence excited to hope for, or expect the like things from them, and are also provoked to a requital when occasion is offered. Such Properties being plainly Natural, and con∣stant in Humane Nature, are no less effica∣cious to excite Men to such Actions or mo∣tions, than a mutual contact between Bo∣dies, is to Communicate motion between all the parts of any Corporeal System.

§. 5. From which Natural Observations it is plainly manifest, that particular Men may hence Learn, that both their greatest Security from Evil, and all their hopes of obtaining any Good or Assistance from o∣thers, towards making themselves Happy, doth truly and necessarily depend upon voluntary Actions, proceeding from the Be∣nevolence of others, who do likewise them∣selves stand in need of the like means for their Happiness and Safety. From whence we easily perceive, that these mutual Helps and Assistances of Men towards each other, are highly beneficial to all of them, and answer that Concourse of Natural Bodies, and that Cession or giving place to each other, which is so necessary for the perfor∣mance of their motions. So that from this necessity of these mutual helps, it as neces∣sarily follows, that he who would consult his own Happiness and Preservation, should procure (as far as he is able) the Good will and Assistance of others, since he cannot but be sensible, that he is able to afford and perform to others, divers like Offices of kindness, and so is able to conspire with the whole System of Rational Beings, to∣wards the same End, (viz.) the Common Good of Rational Beings: and that on the contrary, the weak and inconsiderable forces

of any one Man, are not sufficient to com∣pel so many others, each of them equal (if not Superiour) to himself, both in Wit and Power, to yield him their help and assi∣stance, to their own prejudice, whether they will or no; which would prove as impos∣sible, as that a hundred pound weight placed in one Scale of a Balance, should bear down several other hundred weights, put on the opposite Scale: So likewise the force and cunning, of any single Person, is of no suf∣ficient Power or Force, against the several Necessities, Counsels, and Endeavours, of innumerable others towards their own, and the Common Good, without any conside∣ration of his particular Happiness alone. Therefore it is manifest from this natural Balance of Humane Powers, that men may be more certainly induced by our Benevo∣lence, or Endeavour of the Common Good, to yield us those things and assistances we stand in need of, than by using force or deceit, which Mr. H. * 1.2 sup∣poses, even the Good and Ver∣tuous may lawfully exercise in the State of Nature, as the only natural means of Self-preservation, in his Imaginary State of Nature.

§. 6. So that from these Natural Obser∣vations, concerning all the means necessary

to the Conservation of the Corporeal Uni∣verse, and of the several sorts of Beings therein contained, we may draw these con∣clusions. 1. That all things are so disposed, that not the least quantity of matter and motion, can ever be lost; but the same Spe∣cies of Animals, are still continued, and are rather encreased than lessened, notwith∣standing all the opposition of the cruel Pas∣sions, and unruly Appetites of some other Animals, so that in this perpetuity of mat∣ter and motion, by a continual succession of things, the Natural Good, or Conser∣vation of the Corporeal Universe consists, and towards which it is carried according to the immutable Laws of motion; nor can there be any sufficient reason given, why the Conservation of Mankind may not be looked upon as established by as cer∣tain and natural a Power of Causes, as the Successive Generations of any other Crea∣tures, since they depend alike upon the lasting Nature of the Corporeal Universe; and agree in all the Essentials of Animals. And certainly the Addition of a Rational Soul to our Bodies, does very often put us in a better Condition than that of Brutes, but can never make us in a worse; which will be evident to any Man that considers the benefits, which accrew to our Bodies

from the Government of our Reason, and which do abundantly recompense some in∣conveniencies which may happen to them from the errours of our minds. Nay, it is most certain, that its errours concerning Food, Pleasure, and other things which concern the Preservation of our Bodies, proceed from the Soul's yielding, against the Admonitions of Reason, to Carnal Ap∣petites, and Corporeal or Animal Passions. 2. That the matter and motion of all Bodies, as also of Men (considered only as such) do Mechanically, or whether they will or no, promote the motion of that of the Cor∣poreal Universe, since the motion of all particular Bodies is determined, by the ge∣neral motion of the whole System. In short, our Judgments concerning the neces∣sary means of the Happiness of Mankind, may be convinced from these Natural causes operating after the same manner, and by the same Natural Laws, by which the Cor∣poreal Universe is preserved, since they con∣sist in these two Rules: 1. That the endea∣vours of particular Persons towards their own Preservation, are as plainly necessary for the Conservation of the whole Species of Mankind, as the mechanick motions of particular Bodies, are to the general motion of the whole Corporeal System. 2. That

the Powers of particular Persons, by which they defend themselves against the force of others, should be so equally Balanced, as that (like the motion of other Bodies) none of them should be destroyed or lost, to the Prejudice or Detriment of the whole. Somewhat like which, is seen in all the mo∣tions of the Corporeal System of the World, which proceed from its Plenitude, and the mutual Contact of Bodies, and so extend themselves through the whole mass of matter; but it is the proper Talent of Humane Reason and Understanding, to observe that each Man's particular Happi∣ness, does depend upon the voluntary Actions of other Rationals, after a much nobler manner, even when they are far distant, and can therefore take care that all Humane Actions may in like manner con∣duce to the Common Good of Rational Agents, as the motions of all Bodies, do to the Conservation of the whole Corporeal Sy∣stem; which will be truly performed, if in all voluntary Actions which respect o∣thers, those two Rules aforegoing be ob∣served. So that we are taught from the real Natures of things, as well as that of Inanimate Bodies, after what manner, and to what Degree we ought to pursue our own particular Happiness, that is, only as

it conduces to, and is included in that of the Common Good of Rational Agents. So we are hence also instructed, what Actions are prescribed, or forbid by the Laws of Nature; since such Actions only are thereby commended, as promote this great End, and the contrary Actions for∣bidden, which disturb or hinder it; which is also supposed by all Princes and States in their Deliberations and Treaties of Peace, it being that, in which they all agree, as contributing to their Common Safety and Preservation, (viz.) That the Powers of all the several states concerned, should be so justly moderated and equally balanced, that none may destroy or oppress each other. Thus be∣tween neighbouring Nations, not Subject to the same Common Power; it is chiefly provi∣ded in all their Leagues and Treaties, that the Forces of each particular Common∣wealth, should be so equally balanced by the Assistance, and Support of their Consede∣rates and Allies, that it should be impossible for any one of them to swallow up, or de∣stroy another; but that there should be still left to each of them Power, and means sufficient to preserve themselves, and their Subjects in Peace and Safety, as being the main ends, for which they were at first or∣dained by God, and Instituted by Men.

§. 7. And as it is proper to all Natural Bodies, that whilst they persevere in their own motion, there is likewise a necessity they should also contribute, and be sub∣servient to the motions of innumerable o∣ther Bodies, from the general Laws of mo∣tion, for the Conservation of the Universe, and which Rule being also found true in Animals; it seems to admonish us, not only as meer Animals, but rational Agents, that we contribute our particular endea∣vours towards the general Good, or Pre∣servation of all those of their own Kind, since it is not only a possible effect, but also such a one, as depending upon Causes so perfect and certain, we may with rea∣son believe, that it will endure to the end of the World. But if we farther add to these Observations, those things that di∣stinguish Animate from Inanimate Bodies, they will yet more strongly convince us, and make us see more sufficient reasons, wherefore (not so much concerning our selves with o∣ther Corporeal Beings) we should be chiefly sollicitous in giving our assistance to those of our own Kind: First, then the Nature of Animate is distinguished from that of Inanimate Bodies, by such a fit disposition of parts, and an apt conformation of their Natural Organs, as suffices for their Gene∣ration,

Sensation, Imagination, Affections, Nourishment, and also all spontaneous mo∣tions. And it is by these Actions, that all sorts of Animals endeavour their Conser∣vation, and Happiness for the time that is appointed them, and thereby procure the Preservation of the whole Species.

§. 8. But I shall not dwell too long up∣on these common obvious things, which are so evident in themselves, but shall from hence deduce something more material to our purpose, (viz.) that from the same in∣trinseck Constitution of all Animals, where∣by they are determined to this Endea∣vour of Preserving themselves, there are besides given manifest Declarations, that Loving and Benevolent Actions towards those of their own Kind, are also necessary for their own defence, and constitute the hap∣piest State of Life they can enjoy. And likewise that it is farther ordained from the same concourse of External and In∣ternal Causes, that all Rational Agents can∣not but be sensible, or mindful of these Indications. The first of these Conclusions contains the Sense, and Sanction of the Law of Nature, as the latter regards its Pro∣mulgation, or the manner whereby it comes to be made known to us. I shall explain each of them in their order.

§. 9. It is therefore first to be observed, That the corporeal Bulk, even of the lar∣gest Animals, is contained within a small and narrow compass; as also that the space of Time wherein they can live, or be preser∣ved, is not long: From whence it follows, That but a few Things, and a small quan∣tity of them, are really necessary for their Nourishment and Preservation; or where there is need of a Concurrence of more of them, they are only such as may be free∣ly communicated to many at once; whence they are naturally led to desire but a few particular Things, but daily stand in need of divers others in common, whose use may yet be well communicated to many at once, without exhausting their store; such as are the free Enjoyment of Air, Light, Fire, Water, &c. And farther, if we consider the Structure of their Bodies, we may ob∣serve, That the same superficies of the Skin which hinders the effusion, governs also the Circulation of the Blood, and does at the same time fix bounds to those Appetites and Necessities by which they are urged to seek their own Preservation: So that those few Things that suffice to repair the vital Flame which daily consumes, are likewise suffici∣ent not only for the Conservation of their life, and natural strength, but also for inabling

them to contribute their Help and Assistance to others of the same kind. And, lastly, the Structure and Capacity of the Vessels, in which their Aliment is digested, and of those that convey the Chyle, as also of the Veins and Arteries that receive it, being but narrow, require but a small quantity to fill them. So that I think no Brute can be guilty of Mr. H's Errour, of judging or de∣siring all Things whatever, as necessary for its own Preservation; since from the intrin∣seck and constituent Parts of all Animals, it plainly appears, That but a few Things suffice to allay their Hunger and Thirst, and to prevent the Injuries of the Weather. And if, so few Things are necessary for their Happiness and Preservation, they may very well leave the rest of those Products which the Earth so plentifully brings forth, to be enjoyed by others of their own kind, since the finite quantity of their Bodies limitting their Appetites to the desiring, and their Powers only to the using a few necessary Things: From this Use and Necessity, there arises a natural Division or Appropriation of Things, amongst divers Animals of the same kind (as I shewed before in the last Chapter.) The allowance or permission of which Distribution, is the Foundation of all that mutual Concord and Benevolence

amongst them, and which their Nature re∣quires for their Preservation: So that if this innate Love, or Desire of Self-preservation in Animals, be limited after the manner we have now described, this once satisfied, there can be no Reason why they should with∣stand, or obstruct the Conservation of o∣thers of the same kind, either by hindring their Enjoyment of those Things which they themselves do not need, or in refusing to lend them their Help and Assistance, when there is occasion, and that it is not needful for them∣selves.

§. 10. The next Observation we make, is from the Effects of the Senses, as also the Imagination and Memory in Animals when they are taken up, and employed about o∣thers of the same kind: For since from the Impressions made on their Organs of Sense, they cannot but perceive, that such Crea∣tures are of the same Nature with themselves; such Notions must, from the Constitution of their Nature, move them to somewhat a like affection towards them as towards themselves. But I shall here avoid all Controversies con∣cerning the Knowledge of Brutes, or which way their Affections are moved by their Imaginations; and shall only suppose, That their Imagination excites their Passions, and that these Passions do likewise often pro∣duce

the like Motions, or Inclinations, in their fellow Animals: From whence I collect, That this Similitude of Nature does highly conduce to the procuring of Bene∣volence, or Concord, amongst those of the same kind, unless there be some unaccountable Antipathy, or Dissimilitude of Disposition, which may happen to excite Enmity, or Discord between them; which yet not of∣ten happens: Whence it follows, That A∣nimals, as long as they are in their Right Senses, and are mindful of themselves, can∣not forget others of the same kind, since under the same Idea's by which they con∣ceive their own Nature, and the Necessities thereof, they cannot but have an Idea of that of others of the same Species with them∣selves; and must also be sensible, that such Animals, being urged by the like Appetites of Hunger and Thirst as themselves, are thereby moved to seek Food when hungry or thirsty; and cannot but be also sensible, that it is highly grateful to them, when the use of these Necessaries is left free and un∣disturbed, or else is administred to them by others, or that they are any ways assisted by them in the obtaining them.

§. 11. But since Idea's of this sort do constant∣ly spring in the Minds of Animals, as also pro∣duce perpetual motions to love or Good-will,

arising necessarily from this similitude of Nature; it also follows, that they never so far deviate from their natural state, as when, through Madness, or any other violent Ap∣petite, or Passion, they act contrary to these first and most natural Dictates; as all Men grant it to be a preternatural Disease in a Dog, when seized with Madness, he bites all other Dogs he meets with; or when a Sow, through a depraved Appetite, eats her own Pigs. Nor indeed can I see any rea∣son why all other kinds of inordinate Pas∣sions, which disturb the natural Disposition of an Animal, so as to make it do extra∣vagant Actions, and hurtful to its own Spe∣cies, without any just Cause, (such as An∣ger, and vehement Envy often times pro∣duce) may not be justly esteemed as pre∣ternatural Distempers of the Blood, or Brain, very like to that of a mad Dog; for there often appears in those that are transported with these Passions, all the Symptoms of those Diseases that proceed from an over∣flowing of Choler, or a violent efferve∣scence of the Blood, such as an icterial black∣ness of the Face, paralytick Tremblings, and other Signs well enough known to Physici∣ans. Nor is an immoderate needless Fear of Animals of the same kind, to be less recko∣ned among such Diseases, since it is not only

preternatural, or besides their Constitution when in Health, but doth likewise, as well as other Diseases, destroy the Body, by driving them into an immoderate Sad∣ness, unseasonable Solitude and Watchings, with other Symptoms of predominant Me∣lancholy, whence an untimely Death is of∣ten accelerated. Neither can there be any Mean, or End, put to this unreasonable Fear, when once the Mind is touch'd and infected with a false Imagination, that all other Men design to kill and destroy them; which Madness is very like that of those, who being bitten by a mad Dog, are afraid of Water, and all Liquids, though they cannot live without them, of which I have met with a famous Example in the French Chronicles of King Charles VI. * 1.3 who being seized with a violent apprehension, that all his Servants were bribed, by his Son the Dauphin, to poison him, did quite abstain from all Food, 'till at last he died, as truly of Hunger, as Fear.

§. 12. And it is evident (and Mr. H. him∣self confesses it) that Men, as well as other sociable Animals, do more or less delight in the society of each other of the same kind, as may be observed from those signs of Joy and Satisfaction which they express when

they meet after any long absence: But since it is as plain, that the Causes of this Asso∣ciation and Agreement, proceed from the intrinseck Nature of the Creatures, and are no other than those by which the Blood, Spirits, and Nerves are continued and pre∣served, in a due and healthy state; it as evidently follows, That the Safety and Pre∣servation of each of them, cannot be sepa∣rated from a Propension, at least, to a friend∣ly Association with those of their own kind; so that though they sometimes quarrel about the same Meat, or Female, yet this does not any ways cross or contradict this great End of Nature, of procuring the Common Good of the Universe; but is rather in order to it, viz. when the Desire of Food, in order to their own Preservation, or Lust, to propagate their Species, prompts them to fight, and sometimes to destroy each other; the time of which Contention, is yet but small, in comparison of the greater part of their Lives, in which they are observed to live in peace: And that all Animals are de∣termin'd by Nature, to prosecute and en∣deavour the Common Good of their own Species, by the same Causes that preserve the Lives of each of them in particular, ap∣pears from the great Love and Kindness, which Creatures of the same Species, but of

different Sexes, express towards each other, and by virtue of which, they perform the Act of Generation, so highly grateful and pleasing to each other, and thereby propa∣gate their Off-spring; which when brought forth, they love and defend, as part of themselves, unless some unusual Distemper intervene, which may sometimes disturb or change these natural Propensions; as when Sows or Rabbets eat or destroy their young ones; which happening but seldom, is ra∣ther to be accounted among the Diseases of the Brain, or Distempers of the Appe∣tite, than to be ascribed to their natural State, or Constitution; and does no more contradict this general Law of Nature, than the ascent of Water in a Pump, does op∣pose that general Rule of the constant descent of heavy Bodies. So that we may, for all that, affirm, That the Procreation of their young, and that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or natural Affection they have for them, and desire of breeding them up, 'till they are able to shift for themselves, are seldom or never separated; for Preservation is but, as it were, the Generation of the same Crea∣ture still continued. So that the same na∣tural Causes excite Animals to the one, as well as the other. But it is evident, That their Off-spring can neither be generated,

or preserved, unless those of different Sexes do, for some time, maintain Peace, and a Co-habitation with each other, which in many others of them, continues much lon∣ger than the bare time of Generation, (viz.) for the whole season of Coupling and Breeding up of their young ones; and in divers others, as Doves, Pigeons, &c. This Affection continues (like Marriage) as long as their Lives. And that Creatures are excited to generate their like, from the same natural Causes for which their own Preservation is procured, appears from this anatomical Observation, that part of the same nutritious Juice passes into the Nou∣rishment of the Body, and the rest to the Propagation of Seed; and the whole Circulation of the Blood, with the Causes that produce and promote it, as the mu∣scular force of the Heart, and that strange and wonderful Artifice of the Valves in the Veins, do by one and the same Action, serve for the particular Nutrition of the Animal, and also perform the more pub∣lick Duty of Propagation of the Species, whilst it does, at the same time, send down part of that matter to the Spermatick Ves∣sels out of which the Seed is produced.

§. 13. But leaving the nicer Disquisition of these anatomical Observations to Na∣turalists and Physicians, I shall only add this one Observation, That it is evident that all Animals are, by these means, im∣pelled to the Love of those of a different Sex, and also of their own Off-spring, and so are brought to impart some of that Self-love, with which they are first en∣dued, to others of their own kind, from an irresistible instinct of Nature: And hence it is truly observed of Men, That after they are married, and have got Children, they are more prone to, and sollicitous after Peace than before; but that this desire of Propagation, disposes Men to a greater Affection towards those of the Female Sex, is so evident, that it needs no proof. But since Mr. H. and others of his Opinion, do grant these Observations, concerning the natural Propensions of Creatures to be true, but are wont to evade them, by affirming, That they only proceed from the sole Love of their own Pleasure and Satisfaction; and that all the Actions pro∣ceeding from thence, tend to no higher end than the Love and Preservation of themselves; as I do not in this part of the Discourse, intend to dispute, so have I not omitted to answer this Objection in the last

Chapter, which is designed on purpose for answering all those Objections that can well be made against our Definition of the Law of Nature.

§. 14. The last general Observation to be drawn from the Nature of Living Creatures, may be taken from that Sweet∣ness and Pleasure they take and enjoy in those Actions and Passions that tend to the Common Good of their own Kind, since it is very well known to Naturalists, that in those sweeter Passions of Love, Desire, Hope, Joy, (especially when employed a∣bout any great Good towards others) the vital Motions of the Blood and Heart are then highly helped and promoted. So that the Veins and Arteries are filled with a milder and nobler Juice, whilst brisker and more active Spirits are thereby genera∣ted, and the Circulation of the Blood, and con∣sequently all the other animal Functions, are more easily and nimbly performed. So that by those very Affections by which they do good to Animals of their own Kind, they themselves are also satisfied and delighted, and as far as they feel this naturally rooted in their very Natures, they must needs in∣cline to these Affections so highly condu∣cing to their own Happiness and Preserva∣tion; whereas, on the contrary, in Hatred,

Envy, Fear, and that Sadness and Ill-hu∣mour which necessarily springs from those sour and immoderate Passions; the Circu∣lation of the Blood is obstructed, and the Heart rendred more heavy, and unapt to motion. So that it thereby expels the Blood with greater difficulty in its Systole, from whence proceeds meagerness and paleness of the Countenance, with innumerable In∣conveniencies to the whole Oeconomy of the Body, but chiefly in the Functions of the Brain and Nerves, such as are those Diseases which are attributed to the Spleen, deep Melancholy, and Discontent. But these things being rather of a medicinal Consideration, I shall but only just mention them, though the Writings of Physicians may yield us divers Examples of such who have hastened their own Fate, through immo∣derate Envy and Regret, that they could not satisfie their Malice or Revenge; of which I may chance to give you a taste when I come to consider the Sanction of the Law of Nature by Punishments, pro∣ceeding from the undue and immoderate exercise of those Passions.

§. 15. But as Mr. H. and his Disciples cannot deny these Natural Propensions in Brute Creatures towards mutual Concord, so they have no other way to evade these

Instances, but by supposing some things in Man's Nature, that render him worse Natur'd, and more unmanageable than Bears, Wolves, &c. That so being natu∣rally in a perpetual state of War, they can no way be kept from destroying each other, but by some Common Supreme Power set over them to keep them all in awe; which Arguments, and the Answers to them, since by their length they would too much perplex the Connexion of this Discourse, I shall refer you to the Second part, where∣in I hope I have made it appear, that there is nothing in Man's Nature considered as an Animal, that ought to be governed by right Reason, (and in which alone he ex∣cels other Creatures) that can lay any ne∣cessity upon him of being more fierce, and unsociable than Brutes.

§. 16. Having now dispatched these com∣mon and easie Observations concerning Man, considered as a meer Body, and also such as concern his Nature as an Animal, tending to prove, that the endeavour of the Common Good of his own Species, was one great End and Design of God in His Creation. I come in the next place to consider those particulars, in which the Nature of Man excels that of Brutes, and whereby he is rendred much more capable

than they of promoting, and performing this great End, viz. the Common Good of Ra∣tional Agents: which I shall divide into two Heads, either those belonging to the Body, or else to the Soul or Mind; as to the former, though there are divers Ana∣tomical Observations, made by curious A∣natomists and Learned Physicians, concern∣ing the differences between the Constitu∣tion of the inward parts, or vessels in Men and Brutes; yet I shall take notice of no more, than what are absolutely necessary to our purpose, and which may serve to shew, what are the natural Causes of that Excellency and Superiority, that is com∣monly found in Humane Intellects, above those of Brutes. The first of which Ob∣servations may be drawn from the large quantity of brains which is found in Hu∣mane Bodies, and which bears a much greater proportion in respect of their bulk, than in any other Creatures; for though the weight of an ordinary Humane Body, does seldom exceed above a fourth part of that of a Horse or Bull; yet for the mo∣tion and government of so much a smaller Body, Nature hath allowed him near dou∣ble the quantity of brains, viz. about the weight of four or five pounds, so that there is eight times as much brains, appointed for

the government of the like bulk in a Man, as in an Ox or Horse. And though the Carcases of the largest Sheep and Hogs, do often weigh near as much as a Humane Body: yet their brain is not above an eighth part of the weight in proportion to ours; which seems to be thus ordain'd by Nature, that by reason of the greater large∣ness of the Vessels, the Animal Spirits should be prepared in greater plenty, and also have more room to work, and so should become more lively and vigorous in Man, than in other Creatures; since all the Nerves do either spring from the brain, or else from the Spinal Marrow which is continuous, and of the same substance with it; whence it may follow that this larger quantity, and consequently greater strength of brain in a Man above other Creatures, was intend∣ed to serve him to direct, and govern that greater variety of Motions and Actions depending thereupon, with a more exact care and deliberation.

§. 17. A second Observation to prove, that Man is a Creature ordained by God for a fuller and more constant Association with those of his own Kind, (which also tends to the promoting of the Common Good of his Species) than other Creatures, may be taken from the natural Constitu∣tion

of his Blood, and Spermatick Vessels, by which his Appetite to Copulation is not confined (as in most other Creatures) to some certain times, but are equally the same at all seasons of the Year; from whence proceeds a desire of Marriage, or a con∣stant Cohabitation with one, or more Wo∣men, from whence must likewise follow a more constant generation of their Off-spring, and a more lasting care of them when ge∣nerated and brought forth. For whereas Brutes quit the care of their Young, and drive them away from them as soon as e∣ver they are able to shift for themselves; Man alone loves and cherishes his Off∣spring, and continues his love and care of them as long as they Live, and still loves them the more the longer they have con∣tinued with them, and the more care and pains they have bestowed on their Educa∣tion: and so likewise Man is the only Crea∣ture we know of, that makes any returns for this care, by Acts of Duty and Grati∣tude towards his Parents; for as for the Gratitude of Storks to their Sires or Dams when old, I look upon it as an old Fable.

§. 18. Lastly, I shall consider the won∣derful Frame and Structure of the Hand in Man, which though I grant it not peculiar

to him alone; all Creatures of the Ape or Monky kind, having their fore-paws very like it, and in many Actions using them to the same ends, both in feeding themselves, and carrying their Young ones; yet since we see our Hands were not given us in∣stead of Feet to go upon, (as in them) we may justly conclude, that they were Fram'd for some Higher and Nobler Use, than our bare Preservation, or the hurting or destroying of others. Since if God had ordained them only for this end, sharp Teeth, Claws and Horns, would have done much better, and would have saved us the trouble of making Swords, Spears, and such like Instruments, not only of self-pre∣servation but destruction; whereas we find that by the help of our Hands, directed by our reason, we are able to do much more than any of those weak silly Ani∣mals can do with their Paws, since they cannot serve them to make any of those ordinary Instruments, or Utensils of Life, which even the most Barbarous Nations cannot be without; or so much as to ad∣minister to each other, many of those or∣dinary helps and assistances, which Men by means of their Hands do daily afford each other. So that if we consider the Ordinary use of these Members, especially

in labouring Men and Mechanicks, we shall find, that they do not only serve for their own Sustenance and Preservation, but also for the benefit and maintenance of many others of their own kind, who cannot well Subsist without the manual Labour of o∣thers. And though I grant this noble In∣strument the Hand, is often abused by wicked and violent Men, to make unjust Wars, and commits Murders and Robbe∣ries, and by lesser Thieves to pick Pockets, Pilfer, &c. and that without this they could never commit such Villainies; yet doth it not follow, that their Hands were bestowed upon them by God for that end. Since if He intended the Common Good and Happiness of Mankind, as His great end, He never could intend that these In∣struments should be made use of to a quite contrary design, viz. their Ruine and Destru∣ction. So that whoever will but strictly consi∣der all this, cannot but confess, that we are made and ordained to depend upon each others assistance, and that Man was Created for a higher purpose than his own single Self-preservation.

§. 19. Which may be farther made out from the natural Constitution of Humane Nature, as that no Man is born Self-suffi∣cient, or able to procure all things neces∣sary

for his bare Subsistence, much less for a quiet or pleasant Life, but needs the Assistance of others to breed him up whilst an Infant, or to tend him when he is sick, old, or unable to help himself; or if it be sometimes possible for a time, yet it must be with great hardship and scantiness, that any Man's own single Labour, unassisted with the Help of others, can provide him∣self all the Necessaries of Life. Whence first arises another necessity of Marriage in the state of Nature, which is the Con∣tract of a Man and a Woman to live toge∣ther, for the propagation of their Species, and breeding up of their Off-springs, and also for mutual Help, and a joint Provision of the Necessaries of Life for themselves and them. And, secondly, a necessity of a Man's living in concord, or society, with all other Men, especially those of his own Nation, or Commonwealth. So that it is evident, the chief Happiness and Well-being of Mankind, depends upon their mutual administration of these Things, as often as need shall require; that is, upon Acts of the highest Love and Benevolence, in order to the Common Good.

To all which may be added another Ob∣servation, of the great difference in the Frame of Men's Bodies from those of Brutes,

in the upright posture of their progressive motion; Man alone going upon two Legs, whereas most other terrestrial Animals go upon all four, whereby Men have the con∣stant use of their Hands, both to help and assist themselves and others, to a much greater degree, and in a much more pow∣erful manner than what Brutes are able to perform. But whereas some Atheists have alledged, That this Posture proceeds rather from Custom and Example than Nature; I desire them to shew me any Nation in the World so barbarous, that doth not go upon two Legs as well as we: And though Children, 'tis true, before they can go, must crawl; yet it is not upon their Hands and Feet, but Knees: For a Man's Legs (as is notorious to Anatomists) are so much longer than his Arms, and are likewise so set on, that they cannot be brought to move in Right-Angles with the Arms, or Fore-legs, as in Brutes: And though I grant that some Beasts, as Apes, Monkeys, and Bears, can sometimes go upon their Hind-feet, yet is not this constant; but as soon as the present Necessity is over, they soon return to their natural posture. To conclude, I think I may leave it to any indifferent Reader to judge, whether from all these natural Observations from the

Frame of Humane Bodies, and the Nature of their Passions, it doth not evidently appear, That Man's Happiness and Subsistence in this Life, was not designed by GOD to de∣pend upon his own particular sensual Plea∣sure, or the meer satisfaction of his present Appetites and Passions, restrained to him∣self, without any Consideration of others of his own Kind, but was rather intended for the Common Good and Preservati∣on of the whole Species of Mankind.

§. 20. Having now dispatched those na∣tural Observations that may be drawn from the Constitution or Frame of Man's Body, in order to the rendring him capable of serving the Common Good in the propa∣gation of his Species, I shall proceed to the next Head before laid down, (viz.) those Excellencies, or Prerogatives, of the Hu∣mane Soul, or Mind; and in which he ex∣cels all other Creatures:

And, in the first place, Mr.* 1.4 H. very well observes, That it is peculiar to the Nature of Man, to be inquisitive into the Causes of the Events they see; and that upon the sight of any thing that hath a beginning, to judge also that it had a Cause which determined the same to be∣gin when it did: And also whereas there is no other Felicity amongst Beasts, but

the enjoying their daily Food, Ease, and Lust, as having little or no foresight of the time to come for want of Observati∣on and Memory of the Order, Conse∣quence, and Dependance of the Things they see. Man alone observes how one Event hath been produced by another; and therein remembers the Antecedence and Consequence.

Whence he certainly must be endued with a larger Capacity, for ob∣serving the natures of Things without him∣self; and is also able to make more curi∣ous and exact Searches into their Causes and Effects, than the most sagacious Brutes; who though they are endued with some few Appetites, or Inclinations, towards those Things that are necessary for their Preservation, and an Aversion for others that are hurtful to them; yet this seems to proceed from some natural instinct, or impression, stampt by GOD on their ve∣ry Natures, and not from Reason or Deliberation: As, young Wild-Ducks (they say) will run away from a Man, as soon as they are hatch'd; and Chickens know the Kite, though they never saw her be∣fore; and this not from any Experience or Rational Deduction. But as for Man, it is his Faculty alone, to proceed from some known Principles, to draw Rational De∣ductions,

or Conclusions, which were not known before: The exercise of which Fa∣culty, we call Right Reason, or Ratioci∣nation; which though I grant is not born with him, and so is not a Property belong∣ing to him as a meer Animal (since we see Children, 'till they come to some Years, and Fools, and mad Folks act without it so long as they live) yet is it not there∣fore Artificial, (as some would have it) since all Persons of Years of Discretion, and who will give themselves leisure to think, may attain to a sufficient degree of it, for the well-Government of their Acti∣ons, in order to their own Preservation, and the discovering that Duty they owe to GOD and the rest of Mankind: Which Notions being peculiar to Man, and also common to the greater part of Mankind, either from Men's own particular Obser∣vations, or Rational Deductions; or else from the Instructions of others, who them∣selves first found out such Rational Con∣clusions, and taught them to their Chil∣dren, or Scholars, with their first Elements of Speech, come, in process of time (having forgot when those early Notions were first instill'd into them) to be taken for con∣nate Idea's: So that I doubt they have been, by too many, (who have not well

considered their Original) mistaken for Idea's, or Notions impressed by GOD up∣on their Souls.

But leaving this, of which others have said enough, it cannot be denied but that from this Faculty of deducing Effects from their Causes, Man hath been always able to find out sufficient Remedies for his own natural Weakness, by the Invention of se∣veral Arts, such as Physick and Chyrur∣gery for his Preservation and Cure, when sick or hurt: And also those of a more publick Nature, such are the Knowledge of Policies, or the well-Government of Com∣mon-weals, of Navigation, Warfare, or the Art Military, for his Happiness and defence, as a Sociable Creature. So that, though Man is born naked, and without those natural defences and Weapons, with which divers Brutes are furnished by Nature; yet by the power of this Faculty, he is able, not only much better to secure him∣self from the violence and injury of the Weather, by providing himself with Cloths, Houses, and Victuals before-hand, since Na∣ture hath not made him to live like Beasts upon those Fruits of the Earth, which it spontaneously produces, but can also tame, subdue, and kill the strongest, fiercest, and cunningest Brutes, and make them subser∣vient,

to those Ends and Designs for which he pleases to employ them: So likewise from this Faculty of Judging of Consequences from their Antecedents, and foreseeing the Probability or Improbability of future E∣vents, he thereby distinguishes between real and apparent Goods; that is, between such Things that may please for the present, and do afterwards hurt him; and those which though they may seem displeasing for a time, yet may after do him a greater Benefit; which Principles, since they con∣tain Foundations of all Morality, and the Laws of Nature, which we now treat of, it will not be amiss here particularly to set down, as the Grounds of what I have to say on this Subject.

§. 21. First, It hath been already proved, That every Animal is endued with a Natural Principle, whereby it is necessarily inclined to promote his own Preservation and Well-being (yet not excluding that of others of their own Kind) that therefore which most conduces to this end, is called a natural Good; and, on the contrary, that which is apt to obstruct and hinder it, is evil. Among which Goods and Evils, there are several kinds or degrees, according as Things are endued with more or less fitness or pow∣er to promote or hinder this End. All

which, may be reduced to these plain Maxims, or Propositions, as I have taken them out of Dr. Moor's Enchiridion Ethi∣cum; so that I have collected these Axioms, and put them together in this method, as they are represented by those excellent Au∣thors above-mentioned, that you may see them all at one view; though I grant there are many other natural Truths, which are also useful to prove what Actions are productive of the Common Good, divers of which we have given you dispersedly in these two Cha∣pters.

Principle I.

THe lessening or escaping of an Evil, is to be reckoned under the Notion of Good.

Principle II.

The lessening or loss of Good, is to be recko∣ned under the Notion of Evil.

Principle III.

That which is Good, is to be chosen; that which is Evil, to be avoided.

Principle IV.

The greater Good is to be preferred before the less; and a less Evil to be endured, rather than a greater.

Principle V.

Such Things, or Events, whether Good or Evil, as will certainly come to pass, may fall under Computation, and be estimated according to their several Degrees as well as Things present: And the same likewise is for such Things as may probably come to pass, though this Probability may be somewhat re∣mote, as it is counted a valuable Thing, and may be estimated at a certain rate; for a Man to be one amongst four or five equal Compe∣titors for an Office, or to be the fourth or fifth Expectant of an Inheritance; and though in such Cases there may be the odds of three or four to one, yet the Price that is set upon this, may be so proportioned, as either to reduce the Purchase to an equality, or make it at least a very advantageous Bargain.

Principle VI.

A present Good may reasonably be parted with, upon a probable Expectation of a fu∣ture

Good, which is much greater, and more excellent.

Principle VII.

A present Evil is to be endured, for the avoiding of a probable future Evil which is far greater.

Principle VIII.

The greater the Evil, the more reason there is to venture the loss of a greater Good, or the suffering of a less Evil for the escaping it.

Principle IX.

It is better to be without any Good, than by the enjoyment of it to endure an Evil, as great or greater than that Good comes to.

And these last Principles respecting our selves, may serve to produce Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude in our Minds; the rest that follow, respect our Duty to∣wards others, and are the Foundation of all Right and Wrong among Men.

Principle X.

We ought to pursue the Chiefest, or Com∣mon Good, with the highest; and all less or subordinate Goods, with a less Affection, or Desire: Neither ought we to make the Highest, or Common Good, subordinate to the Meaner, or middle Goods, or the middle Goods to the least.

Principle XI.

Whatsoever Good you would have done to your self, in such and such Circumstances, you ought to do the same to another, in the same or like Circumstances, as far as may be, with∣out prejudicing the Community.

Principle XII.

Whatsoever Evil you would not have done to your self, you ought to abstain from doing that to another.

Principle XIII.

Good is to be recompenced with Good, and not with Evil.

Principle XIV.

It is good for a Man to enjoy all the Means wherewith he may live happily.

Principle XV.

It is better for the Publick, or Common Good, that one Man should not live voluptu∣ously, than that another should thereby live mi∣serable.

Principle XVI.

If it is a Publick, as well as a Private Good, for any one to have enough wherewith to live happy; it follows from the same Rule, That it is doubly better, when there is sufficient for two Men; and by the same Rule of Proporti∣on, a thousand times better if there be sufficient for a thousand to live happy: So that at last, from the same Principle, it must be confessed, That if all the Men in the World, or all Man∣kind, could live happily, it were the greatest Good we could suppose them capable of.

Principle XVII.

It is necessary to the Publick Good, That every Man's Right and Property be allowed

him, and its free Vse or Possession be likewise permitted him, without any Injury or Molesta∣tion from others, though it must be granted, that a Man may so behave himself, as what∣soever is his, whether by Possession, Gift, or Purchase; may lawfully cease to be so, as a Punishment for his Crimes, in transgressing this great Law of Nature, of endeavouring the Common Good.

Principle XVIII.

It is better to Obey God, declaring His Will to us by the true Principles of Natural Reason, than our own unreasonable Lusts and Passions, or the wicked desires or Commands of Men.

These and the like Principles may fitly be called Natural, as well as Moral Axi∣oms, as being the true results of Natural Reason, and are so clear and manifest of themselves, that if any one will consider them without prejudice, or being byass'd by Passion, or too much Self-love, they will not need a long train of Arguments to prove them; since they appear true and evident at the first Proposal. So also these Moral Principles, considered as Proposi∣tions declaring the Connexion of all Hu∣mane Actions, with the Natural effects that

depend upon them; as for example, when they shew us any Action which will most certainly conduce to our own, and all o∣thers happiness, and that it appears to be not only our Duty but Interest to perform them. These Principles thus considered, with relation to our future Actions, may be called Practical Dictates, since they do not only shew us the highest End we can propose to our selves, in order to our pre∣sent and future happiness; but do also di∣rect us to the choice of the fittest means to attain it.

But I think it doth sufficiently appear, that we are not only able to form a com∣plex Idea of this Common Good of Ratio∣nal Beings; but also from the faculty of com∣paring the likeness of our own Nature with that of all other Men, can also frame an uni∣versal or complex Idea of a Species, or kind of Creatures agreeing in the same na∣tural Properties, and requiring the same things for their Happiness and Subsistence as himself. Note that I do not mean by this, any adequate Idea of the true Phy∣sical Nature of Mankind, since of this (as of all other substances) we have no other knowledge but by their sensible qualities, therefore I mean only here an Idea fori, or such a common and inadequate Idea of the

Nature of Man, as serves us for all the mo∣ral Rules of Life, which Idea he can give a name to, and call mankind, and so comes to consider, and understand all the Causes and means, not only of his own Preserva∣tion and Happiness, but that of all other men's, considered as an aggregate Body. And from thence is able to draw divers Conclusions concerning the proportion, and degrees of men's natural Good or Happi∣ness, according to the Principles before laid down; till he at last arrive at this Uni∣versal Idea of the Common Good of Ra∣tional Beings, as the highest and noblest that he can attain unto, and which is most inseparably conjoyned with his own parti∣cular Conservation and Happiness. But whereas God hath Created other Crea∣tures to act for their own present Satisfa∣ction and Preservation, without any con∣sideration of that of others: He hath made man alone, not only able to contribute to the good and Preservation of his own kind, but hath also made him sensible of this Ability: and I shall farther shew in this Discourse, that he hath laid a sufficient Ob∣ligation on him to exert it.

§. 22. Another faculty of the Rational Soul, and only proper to Man as a sociable Creature, is, That of Speech, or expressing

our Notions by significant Words or Sounds; which though it be not born with us, yet however may be reckoned amongst the Natural faculties of Mankind, as well as going with two legs; since we find no Brute Creatures capable of it, though di∣vers of them are endued with Tongues like ours, and that divers Birds can pro∣nounce whole Sentences, yet have they no notion of what they say: whereas there is no Nation, though never so Barbarous, but hath the use of Speech. And to shew you farther, how natural some sort of Speech is to Mankind, I have heard of two young Gentlemen that were Brothers, (and I knew one of them my self) who though born deaf, and consequently dumb; yet by often and long Conversation with each other, came to frame a certain Language between themselves, which though it seemed perfect Gibberish to the standers by, yet by the sole motion of their Lips and other signs, they perfectly understood each o∣ther; which was likewise evident from this, that in the dark they were not able to converse at all. So that this faculty seems to have been bestowed by God on Man∣kind, not for his Preservation as a meer Animal, Since divers Brutes are able to subsist for more years without it; and

therefore seems to be intended to render Man a Sociable Creature, and who was by this Faculty to benefit others of his own kind, as well as himself; for we are not only hereby able to impose certain Arbi∣trary names to particular things; but ha∣ving first framed Universal Idea's, can like∣wise give names to them, as to this gene∣ral Idea applicable to all particular Men in the World, we can give the name of Man; and herein consists the main difference be∣tween Men and Brutes, and not in Rati∣ocination alone. Since I suppose even Brutes have right Idea's of those Objects they have received by their Senses; and can likewise inferr, or reason right about them: As when a Dog by often seeing his Master take down his stick before he goes abroad, does thence argue when ever he does so, that his going abroad will follow, expressing his Joy by barking and leaping: yet we cannot find that Brutes have any general or complex Idea's, much less names for them, having no more but a few Ordi∣nary signs, whereby to express their pre∣sent Appetites and Passions; but the main benefit of Speech seems to respect others more than our selves, since we are hereby able to instruct them in many Arts and Sci∣ences, necessary for their Happiness and

Preservation, and also to advise and ad∣monish them in all Civil and Moral Duties; and there is scarce any one so Brutish, who is not sensible that in the exercise of this Faculty, consists one of the greatest plea∣sures of Humane Life, (viz.) Conversation: and supposing Men in a state of War, I do not see how they could ever well get out of it again, were it not for Treaties and Articles of Peace; but must (like game Cocks and Bulls) fight it out, till one side were either quite destroyed, or forced to run away, and quit that Territory or Coun∣try where they Liv'd.

§. 23. Nor can we omit another great benefit we receive from Speech, (viz.) the Invention of Letters, by which we are not only able to Register our present Thoughts for our own remembrance; but can like∣wise Profit and Instruct, not only the pre∣sent, but also all future Generations; by Books or Writings, as we do now make use of the Knowledge and Experience of those who dyed, some Thousands of Years before we were born. But since Mr. H. and others, have made some Objections against the benefit of Speech and Letters, as that they tend oftentimes to promote false Opinions, and War amongst Mankind. Granting it to be so, it is no more an Obje∣ction

against the benefits we receive by them, than it were to say, that the Air, Water, or Food, (the only means of Life) are hurtful to Mankind; since by the ne∣cessary course of Nature, or else our own Intemperance, they often become the causes of Plagues, Surfeits, and divers other dis∣eases, whereby Mankind is destroyed. Yet since that Author hath made the use of Speech, one great Reason why Men can∣not live so peaceably as Brutes, and there∣fore fansies they must be in a Natural state of War: I shall therefore referr the Answer∣ing it to the Second Part, since my In∣tention is not here to Argue, but In∣struct.

§. 24. Men do also far exceed Brutes in their Rational or discoursive Faculty, as appears in the Knowledge of Numbers, or Collecting divers single things into one Total Summ, which we call Arithmetick; so necessary for all Affairs of a Civil Life, and the Duties of distributive Justice. And though I grant it is an Art, and that divers Barbarous Nations want that exact knowledge of it which we have; yet by reckoning upon their fingers they have a sufficient use of it, as much as is ne∣cessary for their purpose or business; and if they did but apply their Minds to it, I

doubt not but that they would arrive to the same perfection in Arithmetick as we do. But I look upon this Faculty as pe∣culiar to Mankind, since we cannot per∣ceive Brutes to have any knowledge of it. Thus if from Bitches or Sows, you take away never so many of their Young ones; yet if you leave them but one or two, they do not miss the rest; which shews that they have no Idea's of Numbers, whatever they may have of Quantity.

§. 26. To this Observation may likewise be added as a Consequence thereof, that Faculty so proper to Mankind, of measuring the quantities of Bodies, the distances be∣tween them, and the Proportions they bear to each other, which Science we call Geo∣metry or Mathematicks; which Arts were certainly invented by Man, as a Creature intended for a Sociable Life; since on some of these depend most Trades, all Com∣merce, Architecture, Navigation, and most of the Rules of distributive Justice, with other Arts needless here to be set down. So that whoever will but seriously reflect upon the excellency of these Sciences, as well in the certainty of their Demonstra∣tions, as in the vast and Stupendious effects they produce; cannot but acknowledge

that our Rational Faculty, exceeds that of Brutes by many degrees.

§. 27. But there yet remain behind two of the greatest Prerogatives of Man's Soul, and in respect of which alone he is made a sit Subject of the Law of Nature. The first is freedom in Actions, or the power of doing or forbearing any Action; which does not only consist in indifferent things, as when a Man of two different Objects, chuses which of them he pleases; but is also able to chuse a greater Good, before a less, and does likewise often preferr (though unjustly) a present less Good grateful to his Senses, before a greater Good approved of by his Reason; yet however it cannot be denyed, but that Man by the power of his Reason, is able to move and excite his Passions of Love and Pity, when he sees Objects that re∣quire his help and assistance: Nay, can also by deliberation, command and over∣rule those domineering Passions of Lust, Anger, and Revenge, &c. When they happen to prompt him to Actions that are contrary to his own true Good, and that of the rest of Mankind. And lastly, Man being capable to comprehend all par∣ticular goods, and to add them together into one Sum, viz. the Common and Ge∣neral

Good of Rationals, as the best and most noble End he can imploy himself a∣bout, is also able to divert his thoughts from his own private pleasure and profit alone; and fix them upon the care of his Relations and Friends, or the more pub∣lick Good of his Country. And though I grant it is difficult, exactly to explain after what manner we exert this Faculty, since the Nature and Actings of the Ra∣tional Soul, are very abstruse; yet I ap∣peal to every Man's own Heart, whether he does not find in himself, not only a Liberty to do or forbear indifferent Acti∣ons, such as going abroad or staying at home; but likewise such as are certainly better by a Rational estimate, if he will but give himself time to consider, and weigh the Nature and Consequence of them, or else to what purpose is he sorry? Or why does he repent the having done any foolish, wicked, or rash Action? Since if all Acti∣ons were absolutely necessary, it were as idle and insignificant as if he should be sorry, that he were not made a Prince, rather than a private Person; or instead of a Prince that he was not an Angel. So that certainly, God would not then have endued Man with these two Pro∣perties peculiar to him, viz. That of Con∣science,

or a Reflection upon the Good or Evil of his own Actions, and that of Repentance or Sorrow, for having done amiss, altogether in vain, since both were needless, if all Actions were a-like ne∣cessitated.

§. 28. But the last and highest Faculty, and whereby Man's Nature is chiefly di∣stinguished from that of Brutes, is, when by the force of his Reason, (acting by the method and means here describ'd) he be∣comes sensible of the existence, Providence, and other Perfections of the Deity; from whence we may inferr, that it is highly improbable, if not impossible, that this most Wise and Powerful Being, which we call God, should have Ordained any Power or Faculty in Man's Soul to no purpose. If therefore He hath Endued Man alone of all his Creatures, with the Knowledge of his own Existence and Attributes, as far as is necessary for us Finite Creatures to conceive of them; since I grant we are not able to comprehend Infinite Perfecti∣ons, it is not likely, that God should en∣due Man alone with this so excellent a Knowledge, for so useless an End as bare Speculation; which alone is of no great Use or Benefit, either to himself, or the rest of Mankind, whose Good and Hap∣piness

God chiefly intended in their Crea∣tion: So that indeed we cannot apprehend any End more worthy his Divine Wisdom and Goodness, in Creating us capable of these Idea's, than what is Practical, that is, as it some way serves to direct our Actions, as free and voluntary Agents towards the obtaining our own Good and Happiness, Conjoyn'd with that of other Rational Beings. Nor can any Actions render us more Happy, than those that testifie our high Veneration of God's Infinite Perfe∣ctions, and a deep Sense of his Goodness towards us, and whereby we may be dis∣posed to an entire Obedience to his Laws, whether Natural or Reveal'd, whenever they are made known to us; so that if it can be prov'd, that these Dictates of right reason, called the Laws of Nature, derive their Authority from God as a Law-giver, and were intended by Him for the Hap∣piness and Preservation of Mankind, and as Rules whereby he would have us direct all our Actions to this great End; there can be no doubt but we lie under a suf∣ficient Obligation to observe them; and to prove this, will be the next and greatest part of our task.

§ 29. But before I undertake this, it will not be amiss to Treat a little, concerning those Attributes of the Deity, as far as we can have any Idea's of them; since from the consideration of the Nature of things, and also of our own Humane Nature, we can∣not but be carry'd on to consider the Na∣ture of God Himself; and if from the Cre∣ation of the Universe, we cannot but con∣ceive Him of Infinite Power; so from His Acting and Ordaining all things, for the best and Worthiest End, we may likewise affirm Him to be also Infinitely Wise and Good; so that His Infinite Power always Acting for the best and wisest Ends, is still so limitted by His Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, that it cannot Act any thing de∣structive to the Common Good of Ratio∣nal Beings, of which Himself is the chief; and from hence proceeds the certainty of the Law of Nature, as also our perpetual Obligation to it. For as I will not affirm that God could not have made the World, and the Things therein, after another man∣ner than He hath done; so since He hath made it in the Order we now find it, this great Law of Nature, of endeavouring and procuring the Common Good of Rational Beings, is of the same Duration with that

of the Universe it self; and so consequently of constant and perpetual Obligation in respect of Himself, and all those whom He hath Ordained to be His Subordinate means, or Instruments to procure it, especially as Men, whom He hath made Conscious of our Duty, and able to Co-operate with Him for this Great and Excellent End.

CHAP. III.

Of the Law of NATURE, and that it is reducible to one single Proposition, which is Truly and Properly a LAW, as containing all things necessary there∣unto.

§ 1. HAving already in the Two former Chapters from the Great Book of Nature, (that is, as well that of things without us, as of our selves in par∣ticular, and of Mankind in general) made several Observations for the proving of this Proposition, That Man was Ordain'd by God for a Sociable Creature, whose Being, Preservation and Happiness, was to depend upon the Assistance and Good-will of God his Creator, as also those of his own kind; I come in the next place to shew, That e∣very one is oblig'd to a return of the like Benevolence to others; for we can by no means be better assured of the like Good-will from them, than by doing them the same good Offices, as often as it lies in our

Power, which we desire they should do for us, and that this constitutes the happiest state Men are capable of in this Life, viz. Peace and Concord, not only among par∣ticular Men, but also between all Common∣wealths and Nations, of which the whole body of Mankind consists, so that it evi∣dently appears, that the true and Natural state of Mankind, is, That of Peace, Love, or mutual Benevolence, and which indeed would require no other Rewards, than what proceeds from it self, (were Man a Creature always governed by right reason and his own true Good) Rewards and Punishments being Ordained for Men, as too often go∣vern'd by their Passions and Sensual Appe∣tites, and not according to the perfection of their Rational Nature. Yet since it pleased God, to Create Man a mixt Creature, con∣sisting of a Body and a Soul, and being too often drawn aside by Passions, not directed by right reason, and to stand in need of Punishments as well as Rewards, to keep him to his duty; thence arises a necessity of His dealing with Man as a Legislator, and of giving him certain natural Laws or Rules, whereby to govern his Actions, with certain Penalties and Rewards annext to them; which Laws may be very well contracted into one single Proposition, or practical Conclusion

drawn from the Nature of God, our own Nature, and that of things without us, by the Observations already laid down, viz. That God wills or commands, that all rea∣sonable Persons should endeavour the Common Good of Rational Beings, as the great End for which they were Created, and in pursuance of which, consists their own true Good or Hap∣piness, as in its neglect or violation, their greatest Misery.

§. 2. Having given you this summary descri∣ption of the Laws of Nature, as coming from its first Cause, God, I shall now explain the terms therein contain'd, to avoid all Ambi∣guity and Exception. (1) By Wills and Commands, I do not mean any Commands by Words, that being the method of God's Re∣vealed, and not Natural Will, and so is not the Subject of this Discourse; and therefore I do here only understand that Will or Command of God, which is to be learned from the Consideration of his Di∣vine Nature, our own, and that of all other things, consisting not in Words, but in Idea's; that is true Conclusions drawn from right Reason; but that words are not always Es∣sential to a Law, or that it cannot be made known to the Subjects, without some set form of Speech, may appear by Persons born Deaf and Dumb, whom we often find

to have Notions of a God, and a Law of Nature, though they were not convey'd in their Minds by Words or Writing, for it is sufficient if the Will of the Legislator may be discovered by any other sit means or signs, especially when (as in this Law we now treat of) there are such certain Re∣wards and Punishments, annexed to their Observation or Transgression, as may make it their Interest, rather to observe than trans∣gress them; which is not only visible in Men but Brutes. Since we see, that by certain Signs imprinted in their Minds, by the means of fit Rewards and Cor∣rections; Elephants, Horses, Dogs, &c. are made Susceptible of Humane Commands, (and as far as their Natures permit) are governable by Laws of our Prescribing; For we can shew them by such signs, what Actions are to be done or omitted by them; and certainly God hath not left us less plain demonstrations of his Will, in re∣ference to our Duty towards him, from that Knowledge he hath given us of his Ex∣istence, as also of our own Nature, as I shall farther prove in this Discourse. By Rational Persons, I mean, all those, though of never so mean a Capacity, who are able to make such easie and natural Observations and Con∣clusions, as I have already laid down: And

therefore Children, under the Years of Dis∣cretion, Idiots and Mad-folks, are still to be excepted from this Law, who not having the actual use of right reason, are not able to draw those Observations and Consequences from the Nature of things, as are already laid down, and which are necessary for the right understanding thereof. By Endeavour, I mean all such voluntary Actions, which Persons of sound Minds can knowingly, and deliberately perform towards the good of others, without destroying or hurting their own true Happiness; which endeavours, though (by many unforeseen accidents in the Course of Nature) they may be often frustrated, and so fail of their intended de∣sign: yet when we have done the utmost we are able, we have sufficiently perform'd our Duty, since no Laws require the per∣formance of more, than is in our Power to perform. By the Common Good of Rational Beings, I understand the collective Happi∣ness of the Deity, as the head of them, and that of all the individual Persons of Man∣kind, existing together with us, as the con∣stituent parts or members; and in which each Man's particular Good and Happiness is included; since it is impossible to endea∣vour the Happiness of others, as voluntary Agents, unless each particular Person whose

duty it is so to do, have first a right to preserve, and make himself happy, jointly with others in his Proportion, to the whole Body of Mankind. By true Good or Happi∣ness, I mean, all those Goods whether of Body or Mind, by which Men may be ren∣dred truly Happy, and contented in this Life, and in that to come; but in which, whenever the former stand in Competition with the latter; the Goods of the Soul are to be preferred; that is, the good of our better or Eternal part, before that of our Body, which is less valuable and temporal. But I need add nothing here to prove, That God is the Head of all Rational Beings, and in what Sence we may be said to procure or endeavour his Good and Happiness, since I have spoken so largely of that in the Preface to this Discourse; and as for the difference between Natural and Moral good, I have said so much concerning it in the Second Part, in the Confutation of Mr. H's Sixth Principle, that by Nature nothing is Good or Evil; that it would be impertinent to repeat it here. I shall now prove, that this Proposition, containing this Description of the Law of Nature is true, that is, agreeable to the Will of God, as far as it is declared to us; by what we are able to know of His Divine Nature, or can collect from our own,

and the Natures of all things without us, and that all the Moral Duties we owe, either to God, ourselves, or others, are contained in, or may be reduced to this one Proposition, Of our endeavouring the Common Good of Ra∣tionals; in order to which, I shall lay down these Propositions.

§. 3. 1. That God in the first place Wills and Intends His own Glory and Service, and in the next, the Good and Preservation of all Mankind, and of all particular Persons therein contain'd, as far as consists with that frail and Mortal state wherein He hath Crea∣ted them. This Proposition hath already been made out in the First Part of this Dis∣course; wherein I have proved, that the Pre∣servation and continuance of all the Species of Creatures, (and consequently of Mankind as one of them) does wholly depend upon God's Providence. And as for the Individuals, or particular Persons, since God's Know∣ledge is Infinite, and extends even to the least things; and also that of these Particu∣lars, each Species of Creatures is made up, and consists. It is likewise as evident, that God designs their Good and Preservation, as well as that of the whole kind; though I grant He prefers the Good of the whole Spe∣cies, before that of the Individuals.

2. It is the Will of God that all Men of

sound Minds, should be made conscious of this His intention of the Good and Preserva∣tion of Mankind, and that they should ope∣rate as His Subordinate means, or Instruments towards this great End. Which I shall prove thus: 1. It is evident that all Men of sound Minds, have a notion of the Good and Hap∣piness of others as well as of themselves. 2dly. That this Notion or Idea, when truly pursu∣ed, will at last extend it self to all Mankind; for it can never stop short of it, as long as it may still proceed farther, and find new and fit Objects to work on; every Individual Member of Mankind making a part of this Universal Idea.

3. That this Notion of endeavouring the Common Good of Rational Beings, is not only possible to be performed, but is also highly Rational, and the greatest and noblest End we can imagine or propose to our selves, as comprehending the Good and Happiness of the whole System of Rational Beings, and is also true, i. e. agreeable with the Divine Intellect: which I thus make out, these grounds being supposed.

§. 4. First, It is certain, that all the truths our Minds are endued with, or capable of, are from God, since whatever perfection is found in the effect, must needs have been first more eminently in its Cause. Therefore

if the Knowledge of Truth be a perfection, (as doubtless it is) it must be much more so in God, the Original Cause thereof, so that if this Idea of the Common Good of Ratio∣nal Beings, as the highest Good we Men are capable of knowing, it being a clear and perfect (though complext) Idea, drawn from the Nature of God and all other things; and being a Collection of the Good and Happi∣ness of the Deity, and of all other Rational Agents; it must be true, and consequently from God. And the Divine Intellect, doth as certainly agree with our Idea's concerning it, as it doth when we judge, that the Base of an Equilateral Triangle, is equal to either of the Crura or Legs. Therefore this Idea of the Common Good is true, and that it is also certain, that all Truth is from God, as like∣wise that He hath made us truly to under∣stand, that he Wills the Good and Happiness of Mankind; it is likewise as certain, that he would have us act as Rational Agents, con∣scious of this His great design.

§. 5. The Second Part of this Proposition (viz.) That God would have us Operate as his Instruments to this End; will be likewise as clear when you consider what I have al∣ready said, That God who hath made no∣thing in vain, would not have endued us with an Idea of this Common Good, as the greatest

End we can propose our selves, for mere Speculation, but rather for some practical End, in order to our own Good and Hap∣piness, with that of others; especially since God hath placed it so much in our Power to promote and procure this Common Good, since as far as we endeavour the Good and Happiness of particular Persons, we do so far contribute our share to that of Mankind, considered as one aggregate Body. Thus whatsoever does good to any one Member, does so far benefit the whole Body; and the Good and Happiness of an aggregate Body consisting of divers distinct Members, con∣sists in that of each of its parts. So then, if God intends the End, (viz.) the Common Good of Mankind, (as I have already pro∣ved) he designs likewise the means to pro∣duce it: Nor can there be any better means, or fitter Instruments for this End, than the joint Endeavours of all Men, expressed by all the Acts of Benevolence and Kindness towards each other; since it is certain (as I said before) that Men can contribute more to the Hurt, or Benefit, of each other, than all the rest of the Creatures put together. Therefore as God hath designed the End, and ordained sufficient means to produce it, (viz.) Men's kind and benevolent Actions; so it is as evident, That he will make use of

Men, as the necessary means for this End. Tho' I grant he hath ordained us to operate, not only as mechanick Causes, but rather as free and voluntary Agents to produce it; that is, as true Subjects to this Law of Nature. * 1.5 Thus by the same steps that we arrive at the know∣ledge of God the Supreme Being, we are likewise brought to an acknowledgment of this his great Design, of the Common Good of Ratio∣nal Beings. And if from all the wonderful Ob∣servations, and curious Contrivances (obser∣ved in this last Chapter) drawn from the Na∣ture of Things, and Mankind, we cannot but conclude, That they were so disposed by a most Wise, Intelligent Being, towards this great End: And the very same appea∣rances that discover these Things, must like∣wise declare his Intention of making use of us men, as necessary means thereunto.

§. 7. The last Proposition for the pro∣ving this Description of the Law of Nature to be true, is this: That GOD having made this Discovery of his Will unto us, we there∣upon lie under a sufficient Obligation, to ob∣serve this great Law of endeavouring this Common Good: To prove which, I first suppose that Obligation to an Action enjoy∣ned by the natural Law, is the necessary and

constant effect thereof, upon every Person subject to it; and that this immediately re∣sults from its own Nature, this Law being always just and right as the Will of GOD, the Legislator is, from whence it proceeds: So that I understand Obligation to Active Obe∣dience to be the immediate effect of this Law, yet that it primarily flows from that Will of GOD, which ordained this Law, and made Man a Creature subject to it; as Heat in us is the immediate Effect or Action of Fire upon us, but originally both the Fire and Heat is from the first Cause. Now there is no legal Liberty left us in the case of natural Laws, to chuse whether we will be obliged to the Actions therein comman∣ded, or rather will submit to the Punish∣ment attending the Violation thereof; and although our natural Liberty of Will be not destroyed thereby, yet we have no Right left us to determine our selves otherwise than natural Law directs, because all Moral Truth, or Rectitude, is comprehended with∣in that Law. But in Humane Laws, because they may enjoyn something amiss, there a Right is often left to us to chuse rather to bear the Penalty, than to obey them, (be∣cause we are obliged rather to obey GOD than Man) in case they command any Acti∣on

contrary to the Divine Law, whether Natural or Revealed.

§. 8. For the further clearing of this, I shall premise somewhat to explain this Word Obligation, which the Civilians thus define: Obligatio est vinculum Iuris, quo quis astrin∣gitur debitum persolvere. That is, an Obli∣gation is that Bond of Law, whereby every one is obliged to pay his Debt, or Due: Which Definition doth well include all sorts of Obligations, if by the Word Ius, or Law, we understand that Law whose Obli∣gation we propose to define. So that by vinculum Iuris in this Definition, we under∣stand that Bond, or Tye, of the Law of Na∣ture, by which every one is obliged to pay this natural Debt, i. e. to perform that Du∣ty which he owes to GOD his Creator, by reason of his own Rational Nature, or else to undergo those Punishments which are ordained for his Disobedience or Neglect. So that there is a twofold Tye, or Obligati∣on, in all Laws; the one active in the Debt, or Duty; the other passive, in a patient sub∣mission to the Punishment, in case of any wilful neglect, or omission thereof: Of both which, we shall speak in their order.

§. 9. But you are first to take notice, That none can oblige us to do, or forbear any Action, but such who have a right to Com∣mand

us: So that this Obligation proceeds from that just Right of Dominion, which a superiour Power hath over us and our Acti∣ons; and as far as we are subject to others, we are so far under an Obligation to their lawful Commands, which obliges us to a dis∣charge of that Debt, or Duty, we owe them; that is, when we are obliged to do, or for∣bear any Action from the Will, or Command of a Supreme Power, or Legislator, to whom, when sufficiently made known to us, we are bound to yield Obedience to the utmost of our Power: And herein consists the Obligation, or Duty, (viz.) in the Con∣formity of our Actions to a Rule, such as is declared by the Will of the Legislator. So that all our Obligation to the Laws of Nature, is at last resolved into that absolute Domini∣on, which GOD, as he is the Great Crea∣tor and Preserver of Mankind, hath over us: For I cannot understand a Right (espe∣cially of Dominion) to be invested or seated in any Supreme Power, but by virtue of something which may be called (at least ana∣logically) a Law. 2. That every Dictate of the Divine Wisdom, concerning Matter fit to be established by a Law, is such a Law: And so Cicero (the best Master of Language) speaks, towards the end of his First Book de Legibus. 3. That the Eternal Wisdom of

GOD, contains eminently, or analogically, in it, all that we can know to be Natural Law. 4. But to know that it is Natural Law, or the Dictate of true Reason, concer∣ning the fittest means to the best End, or greatest Good, it is necessary to this purpose, That the Supreme Government of all Things (and especially of Rational Creatures) should be in him, who is most able and willing to pursue and attain that greatest End; that is, it must be setled in GOD. 5. So that by this Dictate of Eternal Wisdom, or of performing all Things for the best End, the Soveraign∣ty becomes his Right; and our Knowledge that this Dictate of Eternal Wisdom is in him, assures us, That this Right is immuta∣bly fix'd and vested in him. 6. Although in the method of investigating the Laws of Nature, as they subsist in our Minds, the first Law respects the End, and this concer∣ning the Means, comes in the second place: Yet in our Thoughts concerning GOD, we know that infinite Wisdom comprehends all these Dictates together; and therefore that the Dictate, or Law, setling Universal Do∣minion in GOD, is co-eternal with him; and so is as early in his Nature, as the first Natural Law; the Obligation of which, we are establishing in this Chapter. And here arises the difference between a Moral Obli∣gation

(which is that we now treat of) and a Civil one, or that by which we are obliged to Laws in Civil Governments, the former being in respect to GOD's immediate Will, as the Supreme Legislator; whereas all the Duty we owe to our Civil Magistrates, Pa∣rents, and Masters, &c. is only in subordi∣nation to GGD's Will so declared unto us, and who hath ordained this Obedience for his own Worship and Glory, and in order to the Common Good of all Humane So∣cieties and Commonwealths, that is, of Man∣kind in general.

§. 10. Yet I think notwithstanding all we have said of the Force and Nature of this O∣bligation, it may well enough consist with the natural Freedom of Man's Will, since all these Considerations do still but excite, not necessitate Him to act one way or other: For it is still left in his Power either to chuse that which is absolutely the best in obeying this Will of God, or else to preferr a less pre∣sent Good before it, in the satisfaction of his Appetites, or Passions: And herein likewise consists the difference between an Animal Good, or Evil, and a Moral one; the for∣mer being those natural Means conducing to each Man's preservation, or destruction, con∣sidered as a mere Animal, without any re∣spect to God as their Author, or the Com∣mon

Good of Rationals as their Rule. The latter, that is of all Humane Moral Actions, or Habits, considered as agreeable, or dis∣agreeable unto the Laws of Nature, ordai∣ned by God as a Legislator, and made known to Man, in order to the Common Good of Rational Beings; so that they are thus mo∣rally Good, or Evil, only in respect of their Conformity, or Disagreement with the Will of God; and as their Observance, or Ne∣glect, brings either Good, or Evil (that is, Happiness, or Misery) upon us in this Life, or in that to come. From whence you may observe the necessity of putting God, in all our descriptions, or definitions of the Law of Nature, as the Author thereof: For were it not for his existence, in whose divine In∣tellect the Idea's of Moral Good, and Evil, are eternally established, and into whose will so ordaining them, they are ultimately to be resolved. Mr. H.'s (or rather Epicurus's As∣sertion) would certainly be true, That there is nothing morally Good, or Evil, in its own Nature. And it may here be also observed, That the great omission of divers Writers on this Subject, in not placing God as the Cause, or Author of the Law of Nature, in their de∣finitions, hath been perhaps the main, if not only Reason of that false Assertion, That the Laws of Nature are not properly so,

'till they are established by the Authority of the Supreme Civil Power; so on the other side, if it be made evident, That God Wills, or Commands, all Men should endeavour the Common Good of Rationals, as the greatest they are capable of; it must neces∣sarily follow, That we lie under a sufficient Obligation, by all the Tyes of Duty and Gratitude, to concurr with God's Will and Design, in pursuing and endeavouring this great End.

§. 11. But since God hath thought fit to make Man a Creature consisting of two dif∣ferent and distinct Parts, or Principles, a Soul and a Body, both capable of Good and Evil, i. e. of Rewards and Punishments; I come now to the other part of this Duty, or Obligation, by which we are bound, by all the Rational Motives, or Rewards, that Man's Nature is capable of, to observe this great Law; and deterred by all the contra∣ry Evils, or Punishments, from neglecting or transgressing it: In order to which, I shall lay down these plain Axioms, drawn from the Nature of Moral Good and Evil, which you may find in the Learned Bishop Wilkin's excellent Discourse of Natural Reli∣gion.

Axiom 1. That which is morally good, (i.e.) agreeable to the Will of God, is to

be desired and prosecuted; and that which is evil, i. e. contrary to his Will, is to be a∣voided.

Ax. 2. The greater congruity there is in any thing to the Reason of Mankind, and the greater tendency it hath to promote or hinder the Perfection of Man's Nature, in the endeavour of the Common Good; so much greater degrees it hath of moral Good, or Evil; and according to which, we ought to proportion our Inclinations, or Aversions thereunto.

Ax. 3. So that it is suitable both to the Reason and Interest of Mankind, that all Persons should submit themselves to God's Will, upon whom they depend for their Happiness and Well-being, by doing such Things as may render them acceptable to Him, and avoiding those contrary Actions which may provoke his Displeasure, that is, in short, in prosecuting the Common Good of Rational Beings.

Ax. 4. Hence the Rational Nature, and the Perfections belonging to it, being more Noble than the Sensitive, a moral Good is to be preferred before an animal Pleasure; and that which is morally evil, is more to be avoided, than that which is merely animal.

Ax. 5. A present animal Good may be par∣ted with, upon a probable Expectation of a greater future moral Good.

Ax. 6. A present Evil is to be endured, for the probable avoiding of a greater, though future Evil.

But since all the Rewards which God can bestow upon us, for our observing this fun∣damental Law, of endeavouring the Com∣mon Good of Rationals, does only amount to the truest and highest Happiness that Man's Nature is capable of; it is fit that we sufficiently state that Happiness, and where∣in it consists: For the clearing of which, I shall lay down these two plain Propositions.

§. 12. Prop. 1. That which gives, or con∣stitutes the Essence of any thing, and distin∣guisheth it from all other things, is called the essential form of that thing.

Prop. 2. That State, or Condition, by which the Nature of any thing is advan∣ced to the utmost perfection which it is capable of, according to its kind, is called the Chief End, Good, or Happiness of such a Being: Thus, for Example, (to give you a Scale, drawn from the Nature of those Be∣ings we know to be endued with Life or Motion) 1. The Nature of Plants consists in having a vegetative Life, by which they re∣ceive Nourishment and Growth, and are enabled to multiply their kind. The utmost Perfection which this kind of Being is ca∣pable of, is to grow up to a state of Matu∣rity,

to continue unto its natural Period, and to propagate its kind. 2. The Nature of Brutes (besides what is common to them with Plants, consists in their being endued with Faculties, whereby they are capable of apprehending external Objects, and of re∣ceiving Pain or Pleasure from them, in order to their own Preservation, and the propa∣gation of their Species. The utmost Per∣fection of these, consists in mere sen∣sitive Pleasures; i. e. of doing and en∣joying such Things as are grateful to their Appetites and Senses. But the Nature of Man, (besides what is common to him with Plants and Brutes, both in the vegetative and sensitive Life) consists in the Faculty of Right Reason, whereby he is made capable of understanding the Law of Nature, and of its Rewards and Punishments, either in this Life, or that to come, to induce him to their Observation, and deterr him from the trans∣gression of them: Which Sentiments, as no Creature in this visible World, except Man, does partake of; so his Chief Good, or Happiness, consists in the improvement and perfection of this Faculty; that is, in such Actions as are most agreeable to Right Rea∣son, and as may best entitle him to the Divine Favour, and afford him the greatest Assurance of a lasting Happiness, both in

this Life, and after it is ended. So that all the Actions of Man, considered as vo∣luntary and subject to the Law of Nature, and thereby capable of Rewards and Punish∣ments, are called Moral, as being directed by God the Supreme Legislator, to the grea∣test and most excellent End, viz. the Com∣mon Good of Rational Beings.

§. 13. Having laid down these Principles of moral Good and Evil, in order to the set∣ling and clearing the Nature of this Obliga∣tion, and wherein it consists; I shall, in the next place, particularly declare the Sanction of this Law, (viz.) those Rewards which God hath ordained for the Observation of this Law of Nature, of endeavouring the Common Good, and those Punishments he hath appointed for its Breach, or Trans∣gression. But I have already laid down, That all Obligation upon the Soul of Man, arises properly from the Commands of some rightful Superior Power; that is, such a one who hath not only force sufficient to in∣flict what Evils he pleases upon the Disobe∣dient; but, who hath also given us just Grounds, or Reasons, wherefore he requires us to determine the natural Liberties of our Wills, according to his Pleasure; both which, whenever they meet in any Supreme Power; and that he hath once signified his Will to us,

ought to produce in our Minds not only fear to offend, but also a love of, and obedience to his Commands. The former, from the Consi∣deration of his irresistible Power: The lat∣ter, from their own intrinseck Goodness, as also from all those Motives which ought to persuade us to perform his Will. For as one who hath no other Reason than down-right force, why he will have me perform and submit to his Commands, whether I will or no, may indeed so far terrifie me, that to avoid a greater Evil, I may think it best to obey him; yet that fear once removed, there will then remain nothing that can hinder me from acting according to my own, rather than his Will, or Humour: So on the other side, he who can give me never so good Reasons why I ought to obey him; yet if destitute of Power, to inflict any Punish∣ment upon me for my Disobedience, such his Commands may, without any outward inconvenience, be neglected by me, if I think fit, unless he is endued with sufficient Power to vindicate the Neglect, or Con∣tempt, of his Authority. Therefore the strictest Sanction which any Soveraign Pow∣er can give unto its Laws, is, when it is not only able, but hath also sufficiently declared, That it will conferr a sufficient share of good Things, or Rewards, for so doing; and of

Evils, or Punishments, upon any breach, or neglect of its Commands: So though I grant the whole force of this Obligation is proper∣ly resolved into the Will of the Legislator, or those to whom the Custody of these Laws are committed; all which, are inclu∣ded in this Law of Nature, since we find God commanding it, to whom we ought to yield absolute Obedience; though not in Right of his irresistible Power alone, but ra∣ther as he hath, by his Eternal Wisdom and Goodness, in his Creation and Preservation of us, an absolute Dominion over, and an undoubted Right to Command us; and consequently we are obliged to yield Obe∣dience to his Laws, as they are not only highly reasonable, (being ordained for the Common Good of Rationals) but are also established by sufficient Rewards and Punish∣ments. But since the former seem more plainly declared to Mankind, and are like∣wise more agreeable to our Rational Na∣ture, which should rather delight to be al∣lured by Rewards, than terrified by Punish∣ments; I shall first begin with the natural Rewards annexed to the Observation of this great Law of Nature, of endeavouring the Common Good: Which may be divided in∣to Internal, or External; that is, either in relation to the Soul alone, or to the Body and the Soul joyntly considered.

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judice to his Health, do so much indulge his Genius, as to keep a Table above his Estate, and thereby become unable to provide for his Family, or to contribute to the publick charges of the Commonweal, he is highly guil∣ty of Intemperance, though perhaps he may do it without any prejudice to his Health.

§. 18. And as for that other sort of Tem∣perance, called Chastity, or Continence, I need not farther to declare how much the Common Good and Happiness of Mankind depend upon it, having already shewn di∣vers of those Evils, and Inconveniencies, that do necessarily follow the contrary Vi∣ces: I shall only add, That it is sufficient that the commission of this Offence of In∣continence, makes a Man guilty of another's Sin, as well as his own: Therefore I define Chastity to be the abstaining from all inor∣dinate, or forbidden Lusts, in order to the Common Good, or for the propagation of Mankind; and therefore is not only confi∣ned to the bare forbidding of Fornication, but also extends it self to that moral Obliga∣tion, or Contract, which we call Marriage: So that out of a consideration of this great End, those promiscuous Copulations between Brothers and Sisters, and divers other near Relations, which upon the first Peopling of the World were lawful because then neces∣sary

for the propagation of Mankind, are now, for the same Reason, become un∣lawful; since without an abhorrence of this Copulation between Brothers and Sisters, it were hard, if not impossible, that the Cha∣stity of such young Persons, conversing so constantly and intimately together from their youth, should be otherwise preserved, without an early prepossession of the hor∣rour of such promiscuous Copulations. And hence also I suppose, That Natural Reason taught most Nations, after Mankind began to be multiplied upon the Earth; and the memory of their first original Relation they had to each other, to be forgotten, to prohibit Marriage between near Relations, that by this means new Friendships, and stricter Bonds of Amity, should be contracted be∣tween Families and Persons not nearly rela∣ted in Blood; from whence a larger diffu∣sion of Friendship and Kindness, proceeding from this Relation, might be spread amongst Persons not only of the same Commonweal, but of divers Nations; and also that those Factions, and Enmities, which would often happen between particular Men, and Fa∣milies, were they only to marry into their own Clan, or Tribe, may be prevented; or if begun, may, by fresh Alliances, be re∣conciled and taken away. So that it is evi∣dent,

That the Reason of this Vertue of Chastity, or Continence, can no way be truly explained, or understood, without a true knowledge of the End for which it was ordained, viz. the Common Peace, Hap∣piness, and Preservation of Mankind.

§. 19. I shall only add somewhat more concerning that other sort of Temperance, relating to our seeking after, and acquiring those outward Goods often conducing, though not absolutely necessary, to our Well being, (viz.) Riches and Honour; and therefore the same general Law which limits our Love towards our selves, in order to the Common Good, ought also, from the same Consideration, to limit and regulate our Desires, both in acquiring and keeping these Advantages; and therefore they are to be sought for to no other End, than as they may render us more capable of promo∣ting the great End above-mentioned, and to which they ought always to be subordinate. The former of these Vertues relating to Riches, is called Moderation, which is a li∣mitted Care in acquiring and keeping Riches; of which I need speak no farther, having sufficiently shewn the Measure and Reason of it, when I defined Liberality and Fruga∣lity, with their opposite Vices: The other sort of Temperance relating to Honours, is

called Modesty, and may be defined a Ju∣stice towards our selves, in a reasonable De∣sire of Honours, in order to the Common Good; and therefore consists in a due Me∣diocrity, as well in desiring Honours, as a∣voiding Infamy; and this Vertue, as it curbs the Desire from seeking higher Things than the Person really deserves, or may well pre∣tend to, in order to this great End, is called Humility; which is a low or true esteem of a Man's self, or personal Merits. But as this Desire of the Common Good, often elevates the Mind to the performing of great and noble Actions, whereby he may acquire the highest Honours, it is then called Magnani∣mity; and therefore the Magnanimous is still supposed to be endued with perfect Ver∣tue, and a most large Desire of the Common Good of Mankind, as believing he hath rea∣son to judge himself worthy of any Honour that he can justly pretend to: And I suppose every Man is sensible, That it is a part of the same Vertue, not only to seek for true Ho∣nour, but also to take care to preserve it, when it is obtained: And from the Conside∣ration of these Vertues, the contrary Vi∣ces are more easily understood; for Pride is directly opposite both to Magnanimity, and Humility shewing it self in a preposterous Am∣bition, foolish Arrogance, or Vain-glory; and so

Pusillanimity, or meanness of Spi∣rit, is directly contrary to Magnanimi∣ty.

§. 20. Thus we have run through al∣most all the particular Vertues, and do still find in each of them a constant Re∣spect, or Tendency, to the Common Good of Mankind: So that whether they regard our selves or others, the same great End is still intended by God, the most Wife Legislator: And this Law being thus e∣stablished, there is therein contained the largest and most diffusive Society between divers Nations, or Commonweals, and the truest Love and Benevolence between all the Members of the same Commonweal, as also between particular Families: So that there may be hence demonstrated and de∣termined the certain Rules and Measures of true Piety towards God, as distinguish'd from Impiety and Superstition; and also of all other Vertues towards Men, which must be first truly known, and applied to their right Objects, that the Names of these Vertues, when falsly imposed on Actions contrary to the Laws of God and Nature, may not deceive us: For it is hence evi∣dent, That all the parts of universal Ju∣stice and Benevolence, (viz.) all the parti∣cular Vertues contained under them, are

only commanded in order to this Common Good; because it is manifest by Experience, That such Just and Benevolent Actions, are always endued with a natural Power of procuring and promoting the Common Peace and Happiness of divers Nations and Commonweals, as also of lesser Societies and particular Persons; of all which, considered in their due order and subordination to each other, this Common Good of Mankind is made up, and consists.

§. 21. And, farther, it may be hence clear∣ly shewn what is that Right Reason, by which every prudent Man ought to pre∣scribe to himself a just Mediocrity in all his moral Actions; for it only consists in practical Propositions, proposing or declaring to us this great End; and also shewing us all the means in our Power whereby we may attain it; which are those that, in the first place, prescribe the Rules of Piety, and Divine Worship, both private and publick. (2.) Those that concern the Society and Commerce of di∣vers Nations and Commonweals. (3.) All positive Laws, whether Civil or Domestick, tending to the Good of the Civil Society wherein we live. (4.) True and rational Conclusions, drawn from Knowledge, or Experience, either of our selves, or others,

concerning the natural Efficacy of Things and Actions, all which are at last resol∣ved into the natural Power of such Hu∣mane Actions, as may either benefit, or hurt Mankind, considered apart, or in an aggregate Body, as in a Family, or Nati∣on; since Experience doth not with less certainty teach us, what kind of Actions are beneficial, or hurtful to Mankind; then it shews what sort of Diet will either nourish, or destroy us: Nor is it more difficult to understand the Truth of this Proposition, That a right, or equal Distribution of all Things necessary for Life, is requisite to the Common Good and Happiness of Man∣kind, than it is to know in Physick, That it is necessary for the Life and Health of an Animal, that a due proportion of Nourish∣ment be equally distributed to all its Parts, or Members; both which Truths, are groun∣ded on the same natural Principles, (viz.) That the same Things which preserve the whole, do also preserve all its parts; and, vice versa, the same Things which preserve all the Parts, or Members, do likewise serve to the Conservation of the whole; which being evident from true Principles, is a Science taught by Experience, drawn from the Nature of Things.

§. 22. And th•••• from the immutable Effi∣cacy of Corporeal Causes of this sort; for the production of their Effects on all Hu∣mane Bodies▪ depends all the Certainty and Knowledge of Natural Philosophy and Phy∣sick: So likewise from their immutable In∣fluence, or Powers on Humane Actions, for the Conservation of particular Persons, Fa∣milies, and Commonweals, proceeds all the Certainty of those practical Propositions, cal∣led Natural Laws, which constitute Moral Philosophy, shewing and determining the Na∣ture of all Vertues and Vices: Nor is that va∣riety of Actions, which may be prescribed to Persons in distinct Families, or Commonweals, and under various Circumstances of Life, more repugnant to the constant Care of pre∣serving all the Parts, or Members, which contribute to this great End, than the di∣versity of Diety, and ways of living peculiar to divers, Climates, Ages, or Constitutions of Men's Bodies, are to the constant Care that all Men have of preserving their own Lives and Healths, according to the several Necessities of their Natures: For as in these we cannot, by doing whatever we will, promote this End; but Nature hath put some limits thereunto, although our weak Understandings cannot attain to a nice, or mathematical exactness in assigning them, as

we may live long and healthfully enough, without weighing our Meat and Drink, like Lessius; so we may likewise procure the Common Good, as far as lies in our Power, although we do not always perform that which is absolutely or simply best in all Cases; it is as much as God the Legislator requires, if we truly endeavour it, and contribute as far as we are able unto this great End.

§. 23. In the last place, I shall here repeat what I have before laid down, That this Common Good of Rationals, as it is a Col∣lection of all natural Goods (and the grea∣test of all others) so it is the true Standard of all other Goods, either natural, or moral: So that by our comparing them with this, we may truly determine whether they are grea∣ter, or less than each other; and so whether they are principally to be desired and sought after, or to be postponed to other greater Goods. Likewise the same measure where the proportion of these Goods is taken, gives us a true estimate of all the contrary E∣vils, and so shews us what is more, or less to be avoided, or repented of.

§. 24. We may also hence learn what degrees of Passions, or Affections are law∣ful; for it is certain, That only such a pro∣portion of Affections are required, as are congruous to our Rational Nature, and

exactly answering the true Estimate of those good, or evil Things by which they are excited; but since the Government of our Appetites and Passions, is a thing of so great moment, as that on which all our Vertue and Happiness (as far as it is in our Power) depends; which Govern∣ment proceeds from our knowledge of a true measure of all Goods, and Evils, accor∣ding to which they are to be judged; therefore I shall be the larger in explai∣ning what I have a little before laid down, (viz.) That the Common Good ought to be the Standard of all our Affections and Passions, as being so ordained by God, and determined by the Nature of Things; which is evident, in that we have demon∣strated this Common Good, to be that great End, to whose prosecution all Men are naturally obliged, by the Will of God, as a Legislator, who must have given us the knowledge of any thing as Good, or Evil, to little purpose, unless he had also given us a Rule by which we might judge of the several measures, or degrees of this Goodness: So that this Common Good being once established as a certain Measure, or Standard for this End, the Good of each particular Person will bear such a pro∣portion to that of the whole Body of

Rationals, as the Soundness of any one Member, does to the Health of the whole Body. So from the knowledge of this Or∣der of divers subordinate Goods, and the proportion which any one of them bears to the Common, or Greatest Good, may easily be deduced how much the Well-being, or Happiness of every single Per∣son, may contribute to that of the whole Family; the Felicity of a Family, to that of a Commonwealth; that of a Common∣weal, to the Happiness of all Nations; and of all these considered together, what proportion they may bear to the Common Felicity of Mankind. So that hence you may be easily satisfied how much the knowledge of this one Truth, conduces to our right prosecution of this great End, and, indeed, Sum of all the Laws of Na∣ture.

§. 25. Lastly, (which yet ought rather to have been put in the first place of all) let us consider the chief and principal of all the moral Vertues, Love, or Piety to∣wards God, expressed in all the Acts of Divine Worship, as Prayer, Praise, Thanks∣giving, &c. This must needs be a Ver∣tue, since it does that which is highly grate∣ful and pleasing to God the Head of all Ra∣tional Beings, and speaking after the man∣ner

of us Men, performing somewhat Good, and agreeable to his Divine Nature; and which also in respect of our selves, makes us most happy, not only by rendring the Dei∣ty propitious to us, but also by a nearer spi∣ritual approach and conversation with it, in those holy Exercises, it puts us in the happiest state we can be capable of in this mortal Life, and so makes us more able to perform the great End of our Creation, (viz.) Our contributing to the Common Good of Ra∣tional Beings.

§. 26. I have been the larger in laying down, and explaining this Law, as a Mea∣sure, or Standard of all good Actions, to the end that we should esteem all Good, or Evil, not as it more or less profits or hurts our own particular Bodies alone, but as it may more or less add to, or detract from this Common Good: So that in comparing of all Goods together, whether Natural or Moral, we ought still to look upon that as the greatest Good which conferrs most; and that to be the least, which contributes least to this great End, which is therefore to be desired, or prosecuted by us with pro∣portionable Affections and Endeavours: From whence also may be drawn a general and powerful Remedy, against all those inordi∣nate Passions proceeding from excessive Self-Love,

by which Men are most commonly drawn to hurt or injure others: For a Man who thus governs himself, will not extra∣vagantly desire any of these outward Things, nor suffer his Soul to be disturbed by the con∣sciousness of any Crime, who judges nothing truly Good, but what really conduces to the common Good of Rationals.

§. 27. Thus I hope I have demonstrated the true Reasons and Grounds of Moral Good and Evil, or of Vertue and Vice; and have endeavoured to render Moral Philo∣sophy (or the true Knowledge of the Laws of Nature) a practical Science, and not merely Speculative, or Notional, like that of the Stoicks; who whilst they allowed nothing to be really good, but Vertue; or Evil; except Vice; and kept such a po∣ther to extol the real Good of the for∣mer, and declaim against the certain Evil of the latter; yet by not giving us the true Reasons, or Grounds, why Vertue should be embraced, and Vice avoided, they rendred their Philosophy merely speculative, and only fit for those idle Porches in which they declaimed, scarce having any farther influ∣ence upon the Actions of Life, when ei∣ther their own Affections, or any power∣ful outward Temptation, did at any time prompt them to act contrary thereunto:

For Vertue is only to be esteemed as the highest or most perfect Good; not as it is a well-sounding Word, or that fills our Minds with some vain empty Notions, but as it de∣termines our Actions to their utmost influe∣ence upon the Common Good of Rational Beings, which is the only true Piety, as con∣sisting in the Performance of the Commands and Will of God, by the imitation of his Di∣vine Goodness and Beneficence.

§. 28. So that I shall conclude this Cha∣pter with Dr. Parker's excellent Considera∣tion on this Subject; and which being bet∣ter than any thing that I can now think of, I shall make bold to give it you almost in his own Words,* 1.6 with a little alterati∣on. So that it is now demonstratively cer∣tain by induction of Particulars (according to the method we have now taken) that every Vertue hath some natural Efficacy to promote the Common Good of Rationals; and is no otherwise a Vertue, but as it con∣tributes to this great End, and that each Man's true private Interest and Happiness, is therein contained, and inseparably con∣nected with it, by the necessary order of Nature, i. e by the Contrivance and Wisdom of Divine Providence: So that no∣thing can be more evident, than that its Au∣thor

commands all his Rational Creatures, that are capable of any knowledge of his Will, and sence of their Duty, to act sui∣tably to that Order of Things which he hath established in the World, and to that Declaration of his Will, which he hath made by that Establishment, in order to the bringing about this great End of the Com∣mon Good of Rational Beings.

CHAP. V.

Containing an Answer to such Objections as may be made against the Law of Nature, thus ex∣plained and reduc'd into this Proposition, Of Endeavouring the Common Good of Ratio∣nal Beings; with a Conclusion, proving this to be the sum of all Laws, whether Natural or Revealed.

§. 1. SInce there are two sorts of men, who according to their several Principles, and Inclinations, may make different Obje∣ctions against this our Method of proving, and deducing the Law of Nature, and con∣tracting it into this sing'e easie Proposition, of our endeavouring the common good of Ra∣tional Beings; I shall therefore divide them into Platonists, or Epicureans. Those who put the whole stress of their belief of the Laws of Nature upon innate Ideas, or Principles of Moral Good and Evil imprest by God upon mens Souls; and who, I doubt not, may have a true zeal (though without knowledge) for this Common Good; which is more than I can promise for those, who fal••ing into the other extream, will not acknowledge that we can have any true or certain notion, or idea, of this Common Good, so as to make it the

main end of all our Actions. I shall therefore in the first place consider those Objections that may be made by the former sort of Men; whose first Objection may be this, That it is most suitable to the goodness of God to im∣print upon the minds of men certain Charac∣ters and Notions of himself, and also of those Moral Duties which he requires of them; and not to leave them in the dark, and in doubt about things of so great a Concernment to them; since by that means he would not only have secured himself of that Worship and Veneration which is due from so Intelli∣gent a Creature as Man, but would also with great ease and certainty have taught him his duty towards himself, and others, without puting him to the trouble and pains of disco∣vering his Existence, and all those Moral Du∣ties that depend upon it, by so tedious a Me∣thod as I have here proposed; which every man hath not time to inquire into, nor per∣haps Faculties strong enough to make such rational Conclusions or Deductions from the Nature of God, and other things, for the un∣derstanding of the Laws of Nature, as we have here laid down: and therefore, that God (who doth all things by the best and easiest means) hath imprest all the Notions or Ideas of Good and Evil upon mens Souls.

§. 2. To which Objection I need return no other Answer than what is already made by the Author of the Essay concerning Human Vnderstanding (so often cited by me); I shall therefore give it to you in his own words, Book I. chap. 4. §. 12. This Argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than those who use it in this case expect from it; for if we may conclude, That God hath done for men, all that men shall judge is best for them, because it is suitable for his Goodness so to do; it will prove not only, that God hath imprinted on the minds of men an Idea of himself; but that he hath plainly stamped there, in fair Characters, all that men ought to know or believe of him, and all that they ought to do in obedience to his Will; and that he hath given them a Will and Affections conformable to it. This no doubt every one will think is better for men, than that they should in the dark grope after Knowledge, as St. Paul tell us, all Nations did after God, Acts VIII. 27, or than that their Wills should clash with their Vnderstand∣ings, and their Appetites cross their Duty. The Romanists say, 'Tis best for men, and so suita∣ble to the Goodness of God, that there should be an Infallible Iudge of Controversies on Earth, and therefore there is one: And I by the same reason say, 'Tis better for men that every man himself should be infallible. I leave them to consider, whether by the force of this Argument

they shall think that every man is so. I think it a very good Argument to say, the infinitely Wise God hath made it so, and therefore it is best. But it seems to me a little too much confidence of our Wisdom, to say, I think it best, and therefore God hath made it so; and in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a Topick, that God hath done so, when certain Experience shews us that he hath not. But the Goodness of God hath not been wanting to men, without such original im∣pressions of Knowledge, or Ideas stamped on the mind, since he hath furnished man with those Fa∣culties which will serve for the sufficient discove∣ry of all things requisite to the end of such a Be∣ing: And I doubt not but to shew, that a man by the right use of his natual Abilities may, without any innate Principles, attain to the knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him: God having endued man with those faculties of Know∣ledge which he hath, was no more obliged by his Goodness to implant these innate Notions in his Mind, than that having given him Reason, Hands and Materials, he should also build him Bridges, or Houses; which some People in the World, however of good natural parts, do either totally want, or are but ill provided of as well as others are, (perhaps) wholly without Ideas of God, and Principles of Morality, or at least have but very ill ones. The reason in both Cases being this, That they never employed their Parts, Faculties

and Powers industriously that way, but contented themselves with the Opinions, Fashions, and things of their Countrey, as they found them, without looking any farther. So far this Learned Author.

§. 3. And as for what is farther urged, the difficulties of the coming to the knowledge of the Being of a God, by the method we pro∣pose, if this were not plainly to be read from the great Book of the World, St. Paul had in vain accused the general corruption of the Gentiles, and their loss of the knowledge of the true God, as he doth in the 1st of the Romans, v. 19, 20. Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath shewed it unto them: For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power, and Godhead: so that they are without exaus. Where you may ob∣serve, the Apostle here appeals to the com∣mon Reason of Mankind, guided by things without us, for the proof of the Existence of a Delty, that they may be left without all ex∣cuse for this their wilful ignorance and ne∣glect.

§. 4. And as for the other part of the Ob∣jection, concerning the difficulty and labori∣ousness

of the Method we have here proposed, for the discovery of the Law of Nature, and the weakness of mens Faculties, for the mak∣ing such rational Conclusions from the Nature of Things; I think that will signifie much less than the former, if those that make this Objection will please to consider how obvious such Conclusions are, and how easily made out, in the Third Chapter of this Discourse; where I particularly treat of the Natural Power of mens Minds, in making Observati∣ons from the Nature of Things, and redu∣cing them into certain practical Propositions, in order to their own future happiness, in conjunction with that of others: So that I think I may safely affirm, that those who are not of Natural Parts sufficient to discover the Being of a God, and a Providence; as also to understand the Laws of Nature, which de∣pend upon that Knowledge: If they did but duly apply their Minds to think upon their own Original, and that of the World, by true Principles of Reason, must be either Fools or Madmen, and so not capable Subjects of the Laws of Nature, as not being to be reckoned amongst rational Creatures; or else, which is worse, are down-right Atheists; who, to indulge their own unreasonable Lusts and Passions, do absolutely deny all those clear Demonstrations from Natural Things, which

are brought for the proof of a Deity, and of their Duty towards it.

§. 5. And tho I grant that all men do not ordinarily reduce all the Laws of Nature into this one single Proposition, of endeavouring this common good of Rational Beings, or may not have an explicite Notion of it; Yet this will not hinder, but that they may for all that really pursue it, tho' they may not have so large and perfect a knowledge of the grounds of their Duty, as they would have if they were sensible of this Idea: For if a man be but throughly convinced that he is not made for himself alone, but that he ought to mind the good and preservation of others besides himself; and that he doth truly ob∣serve the Laws of Nature, towards himself, by a temperate and a rational Life: As also, towards his Neighbour, by observing that great Rule, of doing as he would be done by, in all cases towards others. I say, such a man, tho' never so simple and ignorant in o∣ther things, doth really contribute his share of endeavour towards procuring the com∣mon good: And tho' he may not distinctly know all the true reasons and grounds of his own Actions; yet if he thus lead his Life, and observe all these Rules tending to this End, I doubt not but that he will meet with

all those Rewards intended by God for Vertu∣ous Actions; provided he have never heard of, or at least wilfully refused the more per∣fect Law of the Gospel, delivered by our Sa∣viour Jesus Christ, when duly proposed to him. Thus a Countrey Carpenter may de∣serve sufficient Wages, and Commendation, if he can build a House, and honestly perform his Work, according to those few practical Rules he hath learnt, tho' he doth not un∣derstand all the Principles of Geometry, or Architecture, according to which, all that he hath wrought may easily be demonstrated to him, if he will but take the pains to un∣derstand them.

§. 6. There is another Objection which this sort of men may make against our Method of finding out, and demonstrating this great Law of Nature, in that I make every man's obligation to endeavour it, to arise from its being good or evil to himself alone; where∣by it may seem, as if we supposed the honour of God, and the common good of mankind were to be postponed▪ and made subservient to the happiness of any particular person. To satisfie which Scruple, I do in the first place affirm, that we do not intend any such thing, since we have all along endeavoured to esta∣blish the quite contrary Doctrine; For I as∣sert,

that no man hath any Right, properly so called, to his own Life or Being, but in order, and as it conduces to the honour and service of God, and the common good of mankind. I shall therefore now more distinctly declare how these (tho' some may think them con∣trary to each other) do very well consist. In the first place therefore I desire you to take notice, that our Natural Obligation to this Law is not discovered by us in the same order and method, as it is constituted by God in the nature of Things; for our weak finite Under∣standings, when acting without the assistance of Divine Revelation, do slowly enough at first, attain to the knowledge of Individual, or Single Things; and thence taking rise from such common effects as are most obvious to our Senses, proceed to their more obstruse Causes, until at length discovering one Infi∣nite Being, called God, to be the first Cause and Creator of all things. We from thence collect not only what is his Nature, but also what is his Will; whereby we do not only find that he is the best, and most perfect Be∣ing; But that as such, he willeth and procures the good and preservation, not of some few Singulars alone, but of the whole Species of Mankind. And lastly, that he would have us men cooperate, as subordinate, (tho free Agents) to this End, as the greatest and wor∣thiest

we can undertake: Which tho' it be the last thing we come to the knowledge of, yet is that which is first and chiefly intended by God, as the principal object of our Know∣ledge, and the main End of all our Moral Actions. So that it seems evident, this know∣ledge of our selves, and of things thus learnt from experience and observation, was intended by God, only to serve as steps to raise us to that larger knowledge, and nobler desire of pursuing the common good of Rationals, as the sum of all our Moral Duties. And that our Wills and Affections towards this end, are not to be regulated or directed in the same or∣der, by which this common good comes to be discovered; i. e. (with a respect to our selves alone); but from a true judgment concern∣ing the measures of that natural good and per∣fection therein contained. So that tho' we are at first indeed excited to the procuring our own happiness, as the prime and most natu∣ral motive of all our Actions; yet we come at last upon better consideration to discover, that this happiness of ours is contained in our endeavours of the Common good of Rational Beings, and is inseparable from it, as the con∣servation of any of our particular Members is contained in the health and preservation of the whole Body.

§. 7. And this Proposition, that every sin∣gle man's good is contained in the common-good, proves indeed, that the sanction of this general Law, is by rewards and punishments to Every single man: But that Every is not to be restrained to my self, or any one man a∣lone, but extends alike to each other man, or all men: Since it is evident, that these words (Every man) collectively taken, amount to all men; as every part collectively taken sig∣nifies the whole. And tho' the main end in∣tended by God, the Legislator, from such Re∣wards and Punishments, are obedience to his Laws, and the preservation of Mankind, as his Subjects (which are indeed of much grea∣ter value to him, than the happiness of any one single person); Yet will it not detract from the perfection or sincerity of this obedi∣ence, if from the consideration of a man's own particular happiness or misery, he thereby comes to consider and understand, that God hath commanded him to pursue an higher and nobler end than that alone; yet to which his own happiness or misery are inseparably con∣nected.

§. 8. I come in the last place to these ob∣jections, that may be made by men of quite contrary Principles; and who will not ac∣knowledge, that we either can, or ought to

propose this common good, as the Sum of all the Laws of Nature, and the main end of all our Moral Actions. Their first objection may be this; That it seems not suitable to God's Infinite Goodness, and Power, and Wisdom, in the Government of Mankind, if he did re∣ally intend its good and happiness (as we here suppose) to permit so great a Design to be so often disturbed, if not quite frustrated, in divers parts of the World, by the various Passions, and unreasonable Appetites, of so many violent, wicked and unjust men; which, if Mankind is well considered, do make up the greatest part of this Aggregate Body.

In answer to this objection, I might tell those that make it, that the true original of that depraved State of Mankind, and from which all that Disorder, which we now find in Humane Nature is derived, was the Fall of Adam, the first Father of Mankind; who thereby conveyed a weakness of Reason, and that prevailing Power which we feel in our sensual Appetites and Passions to all his Po∣sterity, whereby man is become very prone to Evil, and too apt to transgress the Laws of Nature. But I shall not insist upon this, be∣cause the Gentlemen with whom I have to do, may laugh at all Divine Revelation, not accept of any Proofs as sufficient, but what can be brought from meer Natural Reason,

I shall therefore answer them in their own way; and shall first of all grant; That God might, if he had thought fit, have created Man without any possibility of sinning, and have determined him only to that which is morally good. But then God hath not crea∣ted a Man, but quite another Creature: For he having made Man to consist of two diffe∣rent Principles, a Body and a Soul; the one to be driven on by Sensual Appetites and Pas∣sions; the other to be governed by Reason: It was necessary that he should be carried to∣wards Good or Evil, as one or other of these should prevail. So that considering what sort of Creature God hath made us, he hath done all he needed to do towards the good and happiness of Mankind; Supposing that he hath created us, and deals with us as free, voluntary Agents, endued with a freedom of choice, either to deliberate upon the conse∣quence and nature of all our Moral Actions before we do them; and either to act accor∣ding to the Rules of Right Reason, or else clean contrary thereunto, that is, wholly at random, or by chance, which is unworthy our Rational Nature.

§. 9. So that God having thus left the great∣est part of man's happiness in his own power, either to be obtained by endeavouring this

common good; or else missed of, or lost by his own neglect of it. It is not to be wonder∣ed, if mens unreasonable Appetites and Pas∣sions, looking no farther than their present Pleasures, or outward Advantages, do often carry them away without any consideration of those future, but as certain and greater evils which may follow them in the whole course of their lives. By which abuse of mens natural Freedom, I grant the good and happiness of Mankind is very much disturbed and diminished: Therefore it is no wonder, that (tho' God's will be sufficiently declared against such Actions,) it is not more often observed and followed; nor could God have ordered things better or otherwise than they are; unless he should have made man with out all freedom of choice, and have determi∣ned his Will only to one sort of Actions; which had rendered him quite another Crea∣ture, and incapable of those rewards and pu∣nishments, which are absolutely necessary for the government of man, as he is made by God, a free, voluntary Agent. Secondly, Tho' God hath thus made us free Agents, but that by the ill use of our Faculties, we be∣come more prone to evil Actions than good ones; Yet it must still be acknowledged, God's Infinite Power and Providence hath set such limits to the unruly Appetites and

Passions of wicked men, that tho' it must be confessed, that by private Violence, Wars and Persecutions for Religion, they do more mischief to Mankind than all the Savage Beasts, Earthquakes or Plagues in the World ever did: Yet this is but in some few particu∣lar Places or Countries at a time; and God hath so restrained these Passions and Lusts, not only by Natural, Divine and Civil Laws; but also by necessary ill consequences that fol∣low such Actions; that it is not often that such men can accomplish their wicked de∣signs with that success and pleasure they pro∣pose to themselves. And in those Countries where these Violences are acted, the Scene often alters: And in those Countries where Civil-Wars and Persecution for Religion, have not only very much disturbed the Com∣mon Peace and Happiness, but also diminish∣ed the number of the Inhabitants, God doth often think fit, either through mens wea∣riness of Wars, or by the sudden death of a Cruel and Ambitious Prince (who was the chief cause of it) again to restore peace and happiness to these Kingdoms or Countries where Civil-Wars and Persecutions had be∣fore so cruelly raged, and so long prevailed. So that notwithstanding all that can be obje∣cted, against God's intending the good and happiness of Mankind; it is certain, that

from the beginning of the World to this day, he hath preserved it in the same State; as he hath also done all other Species of Crea∣tures. So that we may boldly affirm, the number of men in the world rather increases than diminishes; tho' it may please God, for the correction or extirpation of some extreme∣ly wicked, and incorrigible Nations, to per∣mit them to be oppressed, diminished, or quite destoyed by Forreign Force, Civil Wars, or Domestick Tyranny.

§. 10. A Second Objection that may be brought by those of Epicurean Principles, is, That if the Being of a God, and the certainty of the Laws of Nature be so easy to be found out, and discovered by mens Natural Reasons and Observations; how it comes to pass that there are some whole Nations in the World, who have (as we know of) no Notions at all of a God, or a Moral Good or Evil; as Travel∣lers report of those Negroes, who inhabit near the Bay of Soldania, not far from the Cape of Good-Hope; who also fell their Children for Slaves, to those that will give most for them: As also others in the West and East-In∣dies; that make War upon, and devour all Strangers they can take Prisoners O∣thers, as in the Isle of Formosa, rendring a∣bortive all Children that the Mothers con∣ceive,

before they are thirty years old. O∣thers in the West-Indies, and in Africa, steal∣ing from Strangers whatsoever they can lay their hands on. It were tedious to relate all the particular Instances of this kind. Whoso∣ever desires to see more of them. may consult the Learned Author of the above-mentioned Essay of Human Understanding, Book the I. Chap. III. §. 9. besides what he may himself collect from his own reading, or observation. So that it may be urged, that if these People are part of Mankind, and therefore Rational Creatures, how it comes to pass that they should not be able, as well as we, to come to the knowledge of a God, and of those Natu∣ral Laws, which we suppose to be given to Mankind?

§. 11. To all which I shall reply, not by denying, as some do, the matters of Fact themselves, which is an easy, but too positive a way of confutation; but shall take them at present for granted, since they are delivered to us by many Authors of sufficient credit. And therefore, first of all, I think I may safe∣ly affirm, That tho' these Instances may be of considerable weight, against those who found all our Knowledge of the Laws of Na∣ture upon certain Innate Principles, or the common consent of Mankind: Yet they will

prove nothing against us, who have, I hope, made out the certainty and obligation of this Law, from more evident Principles: So that the contrary belief or practice of divers Nations in the World, is no more an Argu∣ment against the Being of a God, or of the Laws of Nature, than their ignorance in A∣rithmetick and Geometry, is against the cer∣tainty or usefulness of those Sciences; these people, being most of them not able to reckon beyond their ten Fingers. Now setting aside Innate Ideas, and Consent of Nations, as proofs of the Laws of Nature; what other means do there remain; but the uncertain Tradition of a God, and these Moral Laws from their Parents, or Ancestors; or else to discover them by Reason, and taking observa∣tion from the Nature of things, according to the method here laid down. The former of these (if they had ever any such thing) it is certain that they have now quite lost so that no Footsteps of it now remains among them. And as for the latter, these ignorant and barbarous Nations, being wholly taken up, through the whole course of their lives, either in procuring for themselves the com∣mon necessaries for life, or else in brutish and sensual Lusts and Pleasures; it is no wonder that they give themselves no time or opportu∣nity to think of these things, nor yet employ

their thoughts, in considering the cause of their Being, or for what end they came into the World. So that it is not strange that they should be so little sensible of the Being of a God, and what Worship or Duties he re∣quires of them: Nor can I give a better ac∣count of this ignorance, than what you may find in the Author last mentioned, who thus concludes his Paragraph against the necessity of Innate Principles (already cited in the begin∣ning of this Chapter.)

Had you or I been born (says he) at the Bay of Soldania, possibly our Thoughts and Notions had not exceeded these brutish ones of the Hoteutots that inhabit there: And had the Virginian King, Apochan∣cana, been educated in England, he had per∣haps, been as knowing a Divine, and as good a Mathematician as any in it. The difference between him, and a more impro∣ved English-man, lying barely in this, That the exercise of his Faculties was bounded within the Ways, Modes and Notions of his own Countrey, and was never directed to any other, or farther Enquiries: And if he had not any Idea of a God, as we have, it was only because he pursued not those Thoughts that would certainly have led him to it.

§. 12. Which account, tho' it were suffi∣cient alone to take off this difficulty, yet I shall farther add; That altho it is true the Exi∣stence of a God, and the Laws of Nature are to be discovered by Natural Reason; yet this must be exerted, and made use of according to a right Method, and is like the Talent in the Gospel, either to be infinitely increased, or else may be buried, without ever being made use of as it ought. So that mens not making use of their Reason, and those Facul∣ties which God hath given them, is no more an Argument against God's not having given men sufficient Means and Faculties to attain to the knowledge of these things, than if a man, who by perpetual sitting still, should have lost the use of his Legs, had reason to find fault with God, for not giving him suffi∣cient means of going, and helping himself. So that it seems evident to me, that it is left in most mens power, whether they will by a due use of their Reason, raise themselves to the highest perfection and happiness that thei human nature is capable of; or else by em¦ploying their minds about meer sensual objects and carnal enjoyments, debase themselves in∣to the state of Brutes: For I am satisfied, that it is not reasoning about common and out∣ward things, that constitutes the only diffe∣rence between us and them; since they rea∣son

right about those things that are the objects of their Senses; but that it rather consists in the more excellent Faculties of framing Uni∣versal Ideas, and by a due enquiry into the causes and nature of things, of coming to the knowledge of God, and of his Will, either naturally declared, according to the method here laid down; or else supernaturally reveal∣ed in the Holy Scripture. And indeed, I think, a Dog or a Horse, to be a much better Creature than a Man, who hath never had, or else hath totally extinguished the belief of a God, and of his Duty towards him; for the one lives according to its nature, and those Faculties God hath given it: But a Man, who wants the knowledge of God, and of his du∣ty towards him, by neglecting the chief end of his Creation, and by giving himself whol∣ly up to the government of his Passions, and unreasonable Appetites, debases his nature, and so becomes, by his own fault, like a Brute.

§. 13. The last Objection that I can think of, and which may be also made by Mr. Hobs's Disciples, is; That they look upon this en∣deavour of the Common Good of Mankind, as a meer Platonick Idea, or Term of Art, without any reality in nature to support it. Of which opinion Mr. Hobs seems to be, when

he tells us, in his Leviath. Book I. chap. 4. That of Names, some are proper and singular to ore only thing, as Peter, John, This Man, this Tree; and some are common to many things, as Man, Horse, Tree, every of which, though but one name, is nevertheless the name of divers par∣ticular things, in respect of all which together it is called an universal, there being nothing in the World universal, but Names. For the things named are every one of them individual and sin∣gular. So that on these Principles we can have no knowledge of any common good out of a Commonwealth, where it arises merely from Compacts; every man being naturally determined to seek his own particular preser∣vation and satisfaction, without the least consi∣deration of any thing else.

§. 14. In answer to which Objection, I desire you to take notice, That if in our De∣scription of the Law of Nature, or Explication of it, we had any where supposed, that in this endeavour of the common Good, a Man either could, or ought to neglect his own pre∣servation, and true happiness, there might have been some reason for this Objection; But since I have proved, that the true good and happiness of every particular person is inclu∣ded in the Common Good of Rationals, and depends inseparably upon it; though I grant

every man's own happiness and misery is a main motive of his acting to this end, and al∣so consists in a right endeavour of it; which if it be so, this part of the Objection falls of it self, unless they will affirm, That a Man's self-preservation and happiness only consists in the present satisfaction of his own sensual Appe∣tites and Passions, let what will be the con∣sequence; which how false and unreasona∣ble a thing it is, any rational Man may judge. 2dly, We have also sufficiently made out, that there is an unalterable Common Good and Evil established by God in the nature of things, necessary for the preservation, or tending to the destruction, not only of this, or that particular man, but for all the men in the World, conceived under the collective Idea of Mankind, and that in the state of Na∣ture, and out of a Civil State or Common∣wealth: Since by comparing our own particu∣lar Natures with those of all other men, and finding them to agree in the same Wants, general Properties, and desires of like things necessary for life, and an aversion to others destructive to it, we can thereby certainly determine what Things or Actions will con∣duce not only to our own happiness and pre∣servation, but to all others of our own Kind. From whence there arises a clear Idea of the Common Good of Mankind, since (as I have

already proved) one peculiar Faculty of hu∣man Nature different from that of Beasts, is, to abstract universal Ideas from particular things, and then to give general Names to those Ideas, which though they are but Crea∣tures of our own understanding, and not ex∣isting out of our own Brains; yet are for all that true Ideas of the general Natures of those things from whence they are taken; and as for the general Names of them, if there were not real notions in our minds, agreeable to the nature of those things from whence they were taken, and that before any Names im∣posed upon them, they would indeed be non∣sense, or meer empty Sounds, without any Ideas to support them: But the before-cited Author of the Essay of Humane Vnderstanding, Book II. Chap. 24. grants, That the Mind hath a power to make complex, collective Ideas of Sub∣stances, which he so calls, because such Ideas are made up of many particular Substances, consider∣ed together as united into one Idea, and which so joined, are looked on as one; v. g. the Idea of such a collection of men as make an Army, though con∣sisting of a great number of distinct Substances, is as much one Idea as the Idea of a Man. And the great collective Idea of all Bodies whatsoever, signified by the name World, is as much one Idea, as the Idea of any the least particle of matter in it; it sufficing to the unity of any Idea, that it be

considered as one Representation, or Picture, tho made up of never so many particulars. And he likewise farther grants, That it is not harder to conceive how an Army of Ten thousand men should make one Idea, than how a Man should make one Idea; it being as easie to the mind to unite into one the Idea of a great number of men, to consider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct Ideas that make up the composition of a Man, and consider them altoge∣ther as one.

Therefore I can see no reason, why any man by considering the nature of all the Men in the World, may not only have a true Idea of all Mankind, but also of the things or means that may produce their common good, or happiness, as well as a General of an Army of 100000 men can have a true Idea of that col∣lective Body of Men, and order all things ne∣cessary for their common safety and preserva∣tion; And if Mr. Hobs's Assertion be true, That there is nothing universal but Names, his beloved Sciences of Arithmetick and Geome∣try would also be false and uncertain; since they only considering Numbers, Lines and Fi∣gures in general, and collecting universal Ideas from thence, do raise true Rules or Axioms in those Sciences from those universal Ideas, though there be nothing really existing in Nature out of our own Brains, but Units

and single bodies. And therefore Mr. H. is mistaken, when he will have nothing to have any real Existence in nature but single things, as if our abstract Idea's of Universals were Nothing, because they are not Bodies: But if these general Idea's are true, as agreeing with the things from whence they are taken, it will also follow, that they have a real exi∣stence, and consequently may have Names given them, whereby to signifie and represent them to our own minds, and those of others we converse with. So that whatsoever we find to contribute to the Preservation, Happi∣ness and Perfection of all the men we know, or have heard of, we may as certainly con∣clude to be naturally good for all Mankind, and so a much greater good than that of any one particular Person; which Mr. H. himself acknowledges in his Treatise De homine, Chap. 11. §. 14. where treating of the De∣grees of Good, which of them are greater or less he plainly declares, that to be a greater good (coeteris paribus) which is so to more men, than that which is so to fewer.

So that if the Rational and free use of a man's Will consists in its consent with that true judgment the Understanding makes, concern∣ing those things that agree in one Common Nature; and if we can thereby truly judge or determine what things are necessary, or bene∣ficial

for the Natures of all other men, as well as our own; I see no reason why we may not desire, that they should also enjoy the like good things with our selves, and likewise endeavour (as far as lies in our power) to procure it for them; since it is also a Duty imposed upon us by God; and that we lie under sufficient obligations to do it, we have already proved.

In short, This Common Good of Rationals, being thus made known to us, may very well be proposed as the end of all our Moral Acti∣ons, and being the greatest we can desire or imagine, the Understanding judging aright, cannot but determine, that this Knowledge and Desire will more conduce to the Happi∣ness and Perfection of our Human Nature, than that of any lesser Good: So that if this be greater than any other Good we can come to the knowledge of, it will likewise prove to be the greatest and noblest end men can pro∣pose to themselves. And Mr. H. himself is also sometimes sensible of this Common Good, when in the 31 Chap. of his Leviathan, in the last Page, he hath made in his Latin Translation, this Addition.

That he doth not despair that this Doctrine of his being become more acceptable by custom, will at length be received bono publico, for the Com∣mon Good.

So that it seems he presages his Doctrine will come one day to be beneficial not only to one particular State, or Commonwealth, but for the Common Good of all men, who are with him yet in the State of Nature: And if Mr. H. hath so perfect a Notion of the Com∣mon Good of all Nations, I think there will be no great difference but in Words, be∣tween that and the Common Good which we maintain.

§. 15. But to come to a conclusion; I hope, notwithstanding all that hath been objected to the contrary, it hath been sufficiently made out, that not only all the Moral Vir∣tues are contained in, and may be reduced to this one Principle, Of endeavouring the Com∣mon Good of Rational Beings; But that like∣wise all the Laws of Nature, (which are but the Exercise or Practice of these particular Vertues upon their due Objects, may be also reduced into this single Proposition; since they all of them respect either a man's Duty towards God, by a dué worship of him, or else towards himself, in the exercise of Tem∣perance, &c. or else by the due observation of Justice and Charity, or the most diffusive Be∣nevolence towards others of our own Kind; according to the Order we have already laid down in the former Chapter. All which is

but our endeavouring to procure (as far as we are able) this Common Good of Rational Agents.

'Tis true Mr. H. in his Lev. Chap. 13. con∣tracts all the Laws of Nature into this short and easy Rule which he says is intelligible even by the meanest capacities (viz.) Do not that to another, thou wouldest not have done to thy self. Which Rule, tho' very true, and the same in effect, which was given by our Blessed Sa∣viour himself; yet without the considerati∣on of the Common Good of Mankind, would too often fail. For if this Rule were strictly and literally to be understood, no Prince, Judge, or other Magistrate, could condemn a Malefactor to death; for in so doing, he did that to another, which he would not have done to himself, in the like State: Since he himself, as well as the Criminal he condemns, would then desire to be pardoned if he could. But indeed the reason why all Judges, and other inferior Officers of Justice, are excu∣sed from the observation of this Rule, in their publick Capacities, is, Because they do not then act as private persons, but as publick Representatives, or Trustees, with whom the Common Good and Peace of the whole Kingdom or Commonwealth is intrusted; which (as I have already shewn) makes but a small part of the Common Good of all Ra∣tional Agents.

§. 16. There are likewise others who re∣duce the Laws of Nature into this single Rule or Precept, Preserve or do good to thy self, and any other innocent persons as to thy self: Which tho' I grant to be a true Rule, as con∣taining our Saviour's Epitome of the Com∣mandments of the Second Table, Love thy Neighbour as thy self: Yet doth it not express the Reason or Principle on which it is founded; for we have no reason to love our Neighbour, but as they partake of the same Common Ra∣tional Nature with our selves; and that our doing them good, doth conduce to the pre∣servation and happiness of the whole Body of Mankind; of which that person, as well as our selves, are but small parts, or Members: Nor have we any particular obligation to en∣deavour our own particular Good, but as it conduces to, and is part of the Common Good of Mankind.

§. 17. And as the whole Law of Nature, so likewise the Revealed Law, given from God by Moses to the Iews, and intended in due time to be made known to all Mankind; tends to no other end, than this great Law of endeavouring the Common Good of Rational Agents. For all the Precepts of the First Table of the Decalogue, which prescribe our Duty towards God, and which our Sa∣viour

hath so excellently well contracted into this single Precept, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, &c. contain nothing more than this great Rule. For as God, be∣fore he thought fit to create the World, and whilst there was yet no Creature to worship or serve him, was not then less happy or per∣fect; so neither now he hath created them is he the happier, if we worship him, or the more unhappy, if we omit it. For man be∣ing created as an Object for the Divine Good∣ness to exert it self upon, it must necessarily follow, that all the Precepts of the First Table, as well as of the Second, are in some sort in∣tended for Man's Good and Happiness, as well as God's Honour and Service. So that even that Great Commandment of keeping holy the Seventh day, which most chiefly re∣spects God's own Glory and Service, did al∣so promote the Good and Happiness not only of the Iews, God's particular Subjects, but also of all Mankind, whensoever this Law should be discovered to them. So that tho' it commands the dedicating of that day to the Worship and Service of God, and is observed in obedience to his Commands; Yet even in this, he does not design his own Glory and Honour alone; (nay, according to

Saint Austin, Our Good only) but also our Good and Happiness;* 1.7 which is then most perfect and compleat, when we bestow our time in the contemplation of his Infinite Perfections and Goodness towards us, and in rendring him thanks for his unspeakable Benefits. So that though I grant he hath made and ordained us for his Service; yet he hath so constituted our Nature, as to make our highest happiness inseparably con∣nected with all the particular Acts of his Worship. And therefore our Saviour re∣proves the Iews, when they found fault with him, for suffering his Disciples to pluck the Ears of Corn on the Sabbath day, expresly telling them, That if they h••d known what this means,* 1.8 I will have mercy, and not sacrifice, they would not have con∣demned the guiltless; for the Son of Man [i. e. not Christ alone, but every Christian] is Lord even of the Sabbath-day: And in St. Mark,* 1.9 That the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath. There∣by teaching us, that the Sabbath it self was also instituted for Man's sake; and that in cases of necessity, he is Master of it. And so likewise our Saviour himself, by chusing to do his greatest Miracles of healing on the

Sabbath-day, hath taught us, that the perfor∣mance of acts of Charity and Mercy on that Day, is a great and necessary part of God's Service.

§. 18. But as for the Precepts of the Se∣cond Table, I need not insist upon them; be∣cause our Saviour himself hath contracted them all, (even that of honouring our Pa∣rents) into this short Precept, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self: Which is no more than to bid us endeavour the common good of Mankind, to the utmost of our power. So that as this Law of the most diffusive Benevo∣lence of Rational Agents, contains the Sum of all the Laws of Nature, as also of the Moral Law, contained in the Ten Commandments; so likewise is it the Sum of the whole Gospel delivered by our Saviour Christ, and his Apo∣stles. For as one great design of our Saviour's coming into the World, was by his most ex∣cellent Precepts and Examples, to exalt the Law of Nature to a higher perfection, than what Men, by the common use of Reason, could generally attain to; so likewise was it one of the main designs of his coming, to re∣store the Law of Moses to its Primitive Purity and Perfection; and to free it from those false Interpretations and Traditions, with which the Pharisees had corrupted it. For whereas

they had confined the observation of that Command of loving our Neighbours, only to outward Acts, or at least, restrained it only to those of their own Nation or Religion; our Saviour Christ commands a greater per∣fection, and forbids even so much as the thoughts or desires of Murder, Adultery, &c. And whereas the Iews did suppose, that they were not obliged to shew Acts of Charity or Mercy, to those of a different Religion from themselves,* 1.10 our Saviour teacheth them by that excellent Parable of the Traveller that fell amongst Thieves, and was taken up and cured by the merciful Samaritan, when the ill-natured Priest and Le∣vite had passed him by, saying to the Lawyer who had ask'd, Who is my Neighbour, Go thy ways, and do thou likewise. By which he plainly intimates; That we ought to do all Acts of Charity and Benevolence, to all per∣sons that stand in need of them, let their Na∣tion or Religion be never so different from our own. So that whosoever will but seriously consider the great end of our Saviour Christ's coming into the World, and also the whole scope and design of his Doctrine; will find, that it was only to procure, as well by his Example as Precepts, the good and happi∣ness of all Mankind. For to what end else did he take upon him the Form of a Servant,

and endured a poor and miserable life, with an ignominious Death, but to procure ever∣lasting happiness for all those that should tru∣ly believe in him? Or to what other end were all those excellent Precepts, so often given by Christ and his Apostles, of loving one another? And therefore St. Paul tells the Romans, Chap. 13. v. 8. that he that loveth another, hath fulfilled the Law: And more fully in the last Chapter to the Galatians, v. 14. For the Law is fulfilled in this one word, even in this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self. And in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, Cap. 13. he is very large and particular in setting forth the necessity, and exalting the excellency of Charity, above all the other Spiritual Graces; without which, he tells them, If he had Faith so as to remove Mountains; yet, if he had not Charity, he were nothing. Now what is this Charity, but an unfeigned love and good-will to all Mankind? Ch. 2.17. And St. Iames tells us, That Faith without Works is dead, being alone. And St. Iohn in his First Epistle, makes the love of our Brethren, (that is of all men) the great sign and demonstration of our love to God, when he tells them, that if a man says, I love God, and hateth his Brother, he is a lyar; for he that loveth not his Brother, whom he hath seen, how can he love God, whom he hath not seen. And this Commandment we have from him, That he

who loveth God, love his Brother also. So that whoever will but consider what hath here been said, cannot but acknowledge, that this excellent Doctrine of the Gospel, concerning the most intense love towards God, and the most diffusive Charity towards Men, doth not only far exceed all the Precepts of Philoso∣phers, but also the Revealed Law of Moses it self. Now what can be the design of all these excellent Precepts? but by all the Com∣mands and Perswasions imaginable, and by all the Promises of the most glorious Rewards and Threatnings of the most terrible and last∣ing Punishments, to advance the Glory of God, and to procure the Welfare and Hap∣piness of the whole Race of Mankind.

§. 19. To conclude; Though I suppose the Law of Nature, if duly observed, where it hath pleased God to give men no other knowledge or discovery of his Will, may yet give them a rational share of happiness, not only in this Life, but in that to come; yet I hope no indifferent or rational Man, but upon due consideration of the lapsed and depraved state of Humane Nature, and how prone it is to be carried away by exorbitant Lusts and Passions, contrary to the Dictates of right Reason, and his own Conscience, but must also acknowledge, that it was a great demon∣stration

of God's Goodness and Mercy, to give us the most Glorious Light of his Go∣spel; and to send his Blessed Son, not only to instruct us, but also to die for us. Which great Mystery, that in God's due time, and according to his Promise, may be speedily re∣vealed to all Mankind, we ought daily to make it our hearty Prayers to his Divine Ma∣jesty, That every Heart may know, and every Tongue confess, That Iesus is both Lord and Christ; who hath brought Life and Immortality to light, through the Gospel.

The End of the First Part.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Vid. his Essay con∣cerning Humane Vn∣derstanding, Book I. Chap. 11.
• * 1.2

  Vide, The Preface to De Cive.
• * 1.3

  Vid. Mezeray's Hist. in the Life of this Prince.
• * 1.4

  Leviath. Part I. Chap. 12.
• * 1.5

  Vid. Dr. Parker's Demonstration of the Law of Nature, pag. 24.
• * 1.6

  Demonstration of the Law, &c. pag. 23.
• * 1.7

  —Credendum est totum qd; colitur Deus, homini prodes∣se, non Deo. De Civit. Dei Lib. X. Cap. 5.
• * 1.8

  Matt. 12.7, 8.
• * 1.9

  Mark 2.27.
• * 1.10

  Luk. 10.30.