A brief disquisition of the law of nature according to the principles and method laid down in the Reverend Dr. Cumberland's (now Lord Bishop of Peterboroughs) Latin treatise on that subject : as also his confutations of Mr. Hobb's principles put into another method : with the Right Reverend author's approbation.

The Second Part:

Wherein the Moral Principles of Mr. Hobbs's De Cive & Leviathan, are fully Considered, and Confuted.

INTRODUCTION.

§. 1 THough perhaps it may not seem unnecessary, after so much as hath been said, to prove the cer∣tainty, and constant obligation of the Law of Nature, of endeavouring the Common Good of all Rational Bei••gs; more particularly to confute the Principles of Epicurus, and his Follower Mr. H. it being a true Maxim in other Sciences, as well as Geometry, Rectum est Index sui, & obliqui: Yet since those Au∣thors have not only poisoned the World with their pernicious Tenets, but have also endea∣voured to support them with the specious ap∣pearances of Reason and Argument; it may be expected, that we should say somewhat in

answer to these Reasons and Arguments Mr. H. the Reviver of those Principles in this Age, hath brought in his Book De Cive & Leviathan, to maintain and support them. And therefore I have thought fit to add some Considerations, and Confutations of them, as far as they contradict the Principles we have here laid down; and rather to put them here all together at the end, than in the Body of our Treatise of the Law of Nature; since there they would not only have interrupted the Co∣herence of the Discourse it self, but would have also disturbed, and taken off the minds of the ordinary Readers (for whom I chiefly in∣tend it) from a due consideration of the truth and connexion of the things therein contained. And therefore I have thought fit rather to cast them all together into a distinct part by them∣selves; since if you are Master of that former Part of this Discourse, you will easily perceive, not only the Falshood and Absurdity of Mr. H's Principles, but that it was from his Ignorance, or Inconsideration of this great Principle of the Common Good of Rational Beings, that he first fell into those Errors, and made pri∣vate Self-preservation not only the first mo∣tive (which had been true enough) but also the sole end of all Moral Actions, which is al∣together false, and below the dignity, not on∣ly of a Philosopher, but a Man. I have there∣fore

gone through all his Moral Principles in order; and as for his Politick ones, if these are false, they will need no other Confuta∣tion; and I have reduced them into certain Heads, or Propositions, and have truly gi∣ven you this Sum of Arguments, that no man may find fault with me for misrepresenting his Opinions.

PRINCIPLE I.

Man is not a Creature born apt for Society.

§. 1. MR. H. in his Philosophical Ele∣ments, or Treatise De Cive, Chap. 1. §. 2. lays down, and maintains this Principle, and gives certain specious Reasons for it; which because they are somewhat te∣dious, and divers of them very trivial, I shall rather chuse to contract them, than be at the trouble of transcribing all that he hath loosely enough laid down for the maintenance of this Assertion; referring you, if you doubt whe∣ther I rightly represent his meaning, to the Author himself in the place above-cited.

He there in the first place supposes, that Man is not a Sociable Creature, because it could not be otherwise in Nature, but only by accident; for if Man loved Man naturally, there could be no rea∣son

given why every one should not love every one alike, as being alike Man; or why he should rather frequent those in whose Society Honour and Profit is conferred, rather on himself, than others. Therefore we do not by nature seek Companions, but to be either honoured, or profited by them. These in the first place; but those in the se∣cond; And this he thinks he hath sufficiently proved, by shewing us for what end men herd to∣gether, and what they do when they are met; for if they come together for Commerce-sake, every one minds not his Companion's, but his own In∣terest. If for Publick Affairs, there arises a certain Court-friendship, having more of mutual fear than love; from whence often Faction, but never Good-will is produced. If for the sake of Mirth and Pleasure, every one is wont to please himself in those things which raise laughter; from whence he may (as it is the nature of what is ridicu∣lous) by the comparison of another's weakness or in∣firmity, become more acceptable to himself: And he there proceeds to shew from several Observa∣tions he had made in the Companies he had kept, That all men that converse together either for the sake, or the instruction of others, do only seek Company for their own profit, or glory, and not the good of others; that is, for the love of himself, not of his Companions: And therefore since Man can never seek Civil Society, only out of a desire of glory; and although the Profits and Conveni∣ences

of life may be encreased by mens mutual assi∣stance, yet since that may be much better procured by a dominion over others, than by their Society, no body can doubt, but that men are more vehemently carried by their Nature, when fear is removed, to dominion, than Society; therefore it is to be laid down for a Principle, That the original of all great and lasting Societies did not proceed from the mutual Benevolence of Men, but their mutual Fear; And by Fear, as he tells us in the Annota∣tion to this Paragraph, he doth not mean only to be frightned, but under that word Fear, he com∣prehends any prospect of a future Evil, as to distrust, suspect, beware, and to provide that they may not fear, to be also the part of those who are afraid.

§. 2. Having given you the Author's Sense, and in great part his own words; I shall now proceed to make some Observations upon them; and in the first place must observe, That the main strength of his Arguments consists in the ill, or false use of these words, unapt for Society. For if he only understands by them, that Men are born actually unapt for Civil So∣ciety, because they are Infants, or else unex∣perienced of the Evils proceeding from the Wants thereof; this is indeed a great disco∣very, and worthy a Philosopher, that Chil∣dren, or People without experience, are not

able to understand the meaning or force of Compacts; or are unable immediately to en∣ter into a Civil State. Nor is his Reason any better; That though Infants and persons of full Age, though unexperienced, partake of Human Nature; yet being thus unapt for So∣ciety, Man is not made fit for it by Nature, but Discipline.

§. 3. From whence I observe, That he only takes the measure of Humane Nature, from those Passions which precede the use of Rea∣son, Experience, and Discipline. And as they first and chiefly shew themselves in Chil∣dren and Fools; or persons unexperienced. Whereas, according to the Opinion of the best Philosophers, we suppose the truer na∣ture of Man, ought rather to be taken from his utmost Perfection, viz. his Reason, or the power of deducing Effects from their Cau∣ses; by which alone, he is distinguished from Brutes: And so the Will may incline us to those things, which Reason shall judge most fit and convenient for our Natures. And therefore Mr. H. doth very absurdly, to op∣pose Experience, and Discipline, to Nature; since whatever men learn by either of these, they must still attain to it by the force of their Rational Natures, and those Faculties of Rea∣son and Speech, which Brutes are not capable

of: And therefore the nature of a Creature is best judged of from the utmost Perfection it attains to: As the Nature of a Plant is not to be taken from its first appearance, or as soon as ever it peeps out of the Earth, but from its utmost state of perfection, when it comes to bear Flowers, Seed, or Fruit. And even that Ex∣perience, to which Mr. H. attributes all our Reason, he himself grants to be a natural, and not acquired Power: See his Leviathan, Chap. 8. where treating of Intellectual Ver∣tues, he hath these Words; The Intellectual Vertues are of two sorts, Natural, and acqui∣red. By Natural, I mean not that which a man hath from his Birth, for that is nothing else but sense, wherein men differ so little from one ano∣ther, and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst the Virtues. But I mean that Wit, which is gotten by use only, and experience, without method, culture, or Instruction.

§. 4. To conclude this Head, I desire those Gentlemen of his Opinion, to take notice, That all Philosophers, and Writers of Poli∣ticks, as well as Mr. H. were not ignorant how unfit Infants, and Grown Persons, with∣out experience, or labouring under any unruly Passion, were to enter into Leagues, or Com∣pacts; or to perform any of the Duties of a Civil Society: But yet for all that, they sup∣posed

man to be born for those ends; which by the force of his Rational Nature, he may at last attain to, unless something preternatu∣ral (such as are those disorderly Passions, or Diseases of the Mind) intervene: And Iu∣venal's Saying is as old as true; Non aliud Natura, aliud Sapientia dictat. And sure it is a childish Inference, and favours more of So∣phistry, than true Philosophy, to say, Men are born Infants, and therefore unapt for Civil Soci∣ety. Since any Country Fellow could have taught him better, who thinks his Son born apt to be a Plough-man, or a Grasier, though he knows he will not be able to hold the Plough, until he is twelve or thirteen years of age▪ Nor yet to understand Grazing, until he is a∣ble to ride and go to Market.

§. 5. But let us now more particularly exa∣mine the Reasons this Author there gives us, why Man is a Creature naturally unapt for So∣ciety, which he will have to be only by accident; Because if one man loved another naturally as man, there could be no reason why every man should not love every man alike; or wherefore he should ra∣ther frequent those in whose company he is most likely to get Honour and Profit. Therefore we do not naturally seek Companions, i. e. for their own sakes; but either to gain Honour or Prosit by them: These in the first place; but those in the Second, &c.

In answer to which, I grant indeed, that particular persons, when they joyn with o∣thers, in any Society or Company, do usual∣ly consider some peculiar end, either of Profit or Pleasure; which may thence redound to themselves. Yet doth it not therefore follow that Man is not a Creature designed by God for Society; or that he is not obliged by the Laws of Nature, or right Reason to be friend∣ly and sociable even to those from whom no present advantage can be expected. For tho' it be granted, that men either from a peculiar agreement of dispositions, or that they sup∣pose they can sooner obtain some particular end or advantage, in some mens Conversati∣on than others; and do therefore prefer such mens Company before others; yet does not this prove, That man is not naturally a Soci∣able Creature: Since he himself grants, That men can neither live comfortably, nor be so much as bred up, or preserved, without the help and society of others.

Therefore if he is determined to the end, viz. happiness, and self-preservation, he is likewise as necessarily determined to the means, (viz.) Society. And his inclination to this or that man's company more than others, is no more an Argument against our Natures re∣quiring Society, than if I should argue▪ That because I love Mutton better than Veal▪

therefore it is not from my nature, but only by accident, that I am ordained to preserve my life by eating. And as for the instances which he gives, to let us see with what intent men meet together, from what men do when they are met. It is plain that Mr. H. here confounds that natural Society, which is ab∣solutely necessary for man's preservation, with these particular Clubs or Companies, which men keep for their greater pleasure or advan∣tage▪ And though I have already granted, that some mens particular profit or pleasure may be promoted or increased, by frequent∣ing some mens Companies, rather than o∣thers; as suppose there be a greater agree∣ment of Dispositions; or that we have been more used to this or that man's Company by Education, or long acquaintance, &c. And though it be likewise granted, that a man does more frequent their Company, among whom he finds most honour and profit. Since every man may lawfully pursue his own plea∣sures and advantages (if he knows rightly how to judge of it.) Yet this doth not at all contradict man's sociable nature, provided the Common Bonds of Society be not broken and disturbed, by any mans more particular Interests or Inclinations; and God has not so designed us to good for others, as that we should neglect all care of our selves; but that

this sociableness is therefore to be observed by mankind, that by a mutual communication of humane assistances, and other natural goods, between divers persons, we may more conve∣niently promote our own pleasure or advan∣tage jointly with that of others; Since a mutual love and benevolence, is to be obser∣ved among men, though not otherwise rela∣ted to each other, than by the common relati∣on of Humanity, and with whom we may preserve a sufficient concord, by doing them good, rather than hurt, whenever it lies in our power. And though a man, when he joyns himself with some particular Company, will in the first place consider his own pleasure or profit, before that of his Companions: Yet ought he not so to consult his private ad∣vantage, as that the good of the Civil Soci∣ety, or of Mankind in general, be thereby pre∣judiced, by injuring any of its particular Mem∣bers: And a man as well in Natural, as Mo∣ral and Civil Actions, may propose his own pleasure or profit, in the first place, though he may also intend some higher or nobler end of his thus acting. Thus a man who intends to marry, may lawfully propose to himself his own pleasure and satisfaction; though the great end of Marriage, (and which he may also chiefly intend) be the propagation of Mankind. So likewise a Master or Tutor that

instructs others, may lawfully propose to himself his own profit or advantage thereby; though he may also ultimately intend the in∣struction of his Scholars, or Pupils (that is, the Common Good of Mankind) as the great end of his taking that Profession. So like∣wise in Civil Societies or Commonwealths, a man may propose to himself his own Secu∣rity, Profit, or Honour, as a reason why he bestows his time and labour, or ventures his life in the service of the Publick: And yet he may farther propose to himself the love of his Countrey, or the good of the Common∣wealth, as the great End of his Actions.

§. 6. So that it is to little purpose, which Mr. H. alledges, That the original of the greatest and most lasting Societies, to wit, Commonwealths, did not proceed from mutual Good-will, but mutual Fear; (the Word Fear being used for any fore-sight, or precaution of a future Evil.) For we are not here considering the original of Civil So∣cieties, but of that natural sociableness a∣mong men, which we look upon as most ne∣cessary and agreeable to the nature of man; though some particular men being also sensi∣ble how obnoxious they were to the Inju∣ries of those who sought their own pleasure or profit, without any consideration of the

interest or good of others, did, to prevent them, unite themselves together in that stricter League of Amity, called Civil Socie∣ty. So that this Common Amity or Benevo∣lence, cannot be omitted to be first supposed, even in the very constitution of Common wealths: Since those who founded them, must have been before united, either by some natural relation; and a mutual confidence in, or benevolence towards each other; although perhaps, others might afterwards, out of fear of their Power, or a liking of their Government, be compelled or allured, to joyn or associate themseves with them.

§. 7. But as for those Instances Mr. H. gives us of those that seek Society only to censure the Lives and Actions of other men; thereby to gain Glory to themselves, from the Follies or Infirmities of those they converse with; Such sort of Conversation, consisting for the most part of some idle ill-natured men, who count themselves Wits, and have little else to do, but to speak ill of, and censure others, does not concern the major part of Mankind; who needing each others Society, for more necessary occasions, have commonly other Business to discourse of, when they meet.

§. 8. As for the rest of those things he says, That the Necessaries of life may be much bet∣ter procured by dominion over, than by the Society of others, that is altogether false, and precarious; since no man by his own single strength, and without the voluntary help or society of others, could ever yet subdue, and make Slaves of all other men he met with: And therefore if any man ever increased his natural power or advantage over others, it was not by vertue of his own sole power or strength, but by mens deference to his Va∣lour, or Vertue, when they chose him for their Head, or Leader; or else that they fol∣lowed him, and obeyed his Commands as their Father, or Grandfather, out of reve∣rence to his Wisdom, or Gratitude for his Benefits.

§. 9. To conclude, He himself there objects, that men cannot grow up, or live contented∣ly without the society and assistance of others: And therefore cannot deny, but men desire the society of each other, their Nature compel∣ling them thereunto. But to come off from this Objection, he will have nothing called Society, but Commonwealths; which, says he, are not meer Meetings, but Leagues, for making of which Compacts are necessary. And therefore still argues, that Infants, and

those that are unexperienced, are uncapable of them, &c. Upon which I shall only ob∣serve, That Mr. H. imposes upon himself, and others, by confounding that first, and most natural amity, and sociableness of Persons of one and the same Family, as of Husband and Wife, Parents and Children, &c. towards each other, with that artificial Society, which proceeding wholly from Compacts, we call a Commonwealth: So likewise he imposes on his Readers in the use of the words Nature, and Natural (as I have partly shewn already) for by these words is commonly understood, either something that is by Nature insepara∣bly proper to its subject, as to a Fish to swim; and other things are natural and proper to a Creature, not as a meer Animal, but as of such a Species, and at such an Age; as for a Man to go upon two Legs, and speak. Lastly, It sometimes signifies an aptness in a Subject to receive some farther perfection by culture and discipline, with which Nature intended it should be endued. So the Earth is intended by Nature for the production of Vegetables; yet it doth not naturally bring forth all Plants in all places alike, without Plowing, or Set∣ting; yet are not these Plants so sown, or set, less natural for all that: So likewise I have already proved, that whatever perfection we attain to by the power of our Reason or Ex∣perience,

it is not less natural notwith∣standing.

PRINCIPLE II.

All Men by Nature are equal.

§. 1. WHich he thus undertakes to make out in the Chapter last cited, §. 3. The cause of mutual Fear consists partly in mens natural equality, partly in their mutual Will of hurting; from whence it happens, that we are neither able to expect security from others, nor yet afford it to our selves; For if we consider Men grown up, and take notice how frail the Frame of a Man's Body is (which failing, all his force, strength and wisdom fails together with it) and how easie it is for any the most weak, to kill the strongest Man; there is no reason, that any man trusting in his own strength, should sup∣pose himself superior by Nature to others. For those are equal, who are able to do the like things against each other; but those who can do the great∣est thing, that is, take away life, are able to do like, or equal things to each other; therefore all men are by nature equal, that unequality which now is, being introduced by Civil Laws.

§. 2. Before I answer which, I shall first make these Concessions and Limitations: First, I grant, That all Civil unequality of ••••r∣sons is introduced by Civil Laws. 2dly, ••••at there is also such a natural equality among Men, that there is nothing which one man can arrogate to himself as a Man, but by the same reason which he judges it fit or neces∣sary for himself, he must also judge it alike fit and necessary for another man, who stands in like need of it. Thus if Victuals, Cloaths, and Liberty, are things necessary for his own being, and preservation, they are likewise equally necessary for the well-being and pre∣servation of all other men, and consequently that they have a like right to them; from which natural equality proceeds that great Rule of the Law of Nature, To do to others, as we would have others do to us: And in this sense I agree with him, that all men are equal; so that in this sense it is so far from being a cause of war, or dissention among men, that it rather per∣swades to amity and concord: Yet doth not this equality hinder, but that there is not∣withstanding a natural unequality of strength or power amongst men, both in body and mind; since any man, that doth but observe the great difference there is in both the strength and understanding of some persons above others, but will grant, that there is as

great, or greater difference between some men and others, than there is between some Brutes (supposing Apes, or Elephants) and men, in understanding: Yet does there not any natural equality follow from the Reason Mr. H. here gives us, That those are equal, that are able to do the like things to each other, to wit, take away their lives: For besides that, there are some born maimed, and cripled, or else so void of understanding, as not to have either the will or ability to hurt or kill others; and if a Coward and a stout man are to fight, or a very weak man and a strong, will any man say that they are an equal match? And this Mr. H. tells us, That it is easie for the weakest to kill the strongest man; he grants it must either be by chance, cunning, or surprize. I grant indeed it may happen by chance, and yet this will not make the match to be equal; any more than it is in Cockfighting, where the Gamesters will lay five to one on such a Cock's side against another set down to fight with him; and though perhaps the weaker Cock may happen to kill the stronger by a chance stroke, yet no man will therefore af∣firm, that both these Cocks were equal by nature; the same may be said of Men. But it may be replied, That there is a great diffe∣rence between Men and Beasts, since though Brutes cannot, yet a Man weaker in body or

mind than another he would be revenged of, may join, or combine with one as wise and strong as his Adversary, and then they will be an equal Match in point of strength. If this were a good Argument, it would prove more, or rather contrary to that for which it is designed; for this weaker man may com∣bine with one as strong and wise as the other, and then the odds will be apparently on the weaker man's side: But if I should grant the utmost that can be asked, that both these mens wit and strength taken together, are still but an equal match to the other, may not this wiser and stronger man as well also com∣bine with others as wise and strong as himself, and then will not the unequality be much greater than it was before? And as for cun∣ning, or surprize, it signifies as little, since the stronger man may be as cunning as the other, and may have also as good luck in sur∣prising him at unawares; but it is indeed a very trivial Argument to prove this natural equality, because those are equal that are able to do the like things to each other; since this were to level Man with the most despicable Creatures; For there is scarce any Beast, nay Insect, so weak, but may sometime or other destroy a man by force, or surprize; and we read of a Pope who was choaked by swallow∣ing of a Fly in his Drink, which if it could be

supposed to be done by the Fly on pur∣pose, would make the Fly and the Pope to be equal by Nature.

PRINCIPLE III.

That there is a mutual will or desire in all men in the state of Nature, of hurting each other.

§. 1. WHich Mr. H. thus endeavours to prove in the same Chapter of his De Cive.

There is a will (says he) indeed in all men of do∣ing hurt in the state of Nature, but not from the same cause, nor alike culpable. For one man, accord∣ing to a natural equality, allows to others all the same things as to himself, which is the part of a modest man, and of one that rightly measures his own strength; another esteeming himself su∣perior to others, will have all things to be lawful for himself only, and arrogates an honour to him∣self above others, which is the part of a proud disposition; therefore the will of hurting is in this man from a vain glory; and a false esteem of his own power, as it is in the other from a necessity of defending his own Goods and Liberty against the other's violence. Besides, since the strife of wit is the greatest amongst men, it is necessary that very great discord should arise from that Conten∣tion;

for it is not only odious to contradict, but also not to consent; for not to consent to another in a thing, is tacitly to accuse him of error in that matter; so likewise to dissent in very many things, is as much as to count him a Fool; which may ap∣pear from hence, that no Wars are more sharply prosecuted, than between different Sects of the same Religion, and the Factions of the same Commonwealth, where there is a strife concern∣ing Doctrine, or Civil Prudence. But since all pleasure and satisfaction of mind consists in this, That a man may have somewhat, by which, comparing himself with others, he may think highly well of himself; it is impossible but that they should shew their mutual hatred and contempt sometimes, either by laughter, words or gestures, or by some outward sign, than which there is indeed no greater vexation of, mind, neither from which a greater desire of hurting can arise. But the most frequent cause why men desire to hurt each other, arises from hence, that many desire the same thing at once; yet (which very often happens) they neither may, nor can enjoy it in common, nor will yet divide it; from whence it follows, that it must be given to the stronger; but who is the stronger, can only be known by fighting.

§. 2. From which, I shall first observe, That it is not true, that in the state of Nature,

there is in all men a like will of hurting each other: For in this State, the first, and most natural condition to be considered is, when men have not as yet at all provoked each o∣ther, nor done them either good or harm. And in this condition, none but a Fool, a Wicked man, or a Mad-man can have any desire to hurt another, who hath given him no provocation for it: Though I grant, that there are too many men (such as Mr. Hobbs describes) who will arrogate more things to themselves, than they either deserve, or real∣ly need; yet even in these men, there is not a will to hurt every man alike, but only those who stand in their way; and whose Goods, or other things, they may think may be use∣ful for themselves. Nor yet are these all Mankind, since he grants there are some, and perhaps as many, or more; who, according to natural equality, will allow to others all the same things, as to themselves, which he grants is the part of a modest man, and who makes a true estimate of his own strength. And certainly, if this modest man judges ac∣cording to right reason, who allows to others the same things, as to himself; this violent or proud man (he here describes) cannot acquire any right to the liberty or goods of others, from his own unreasonable judgment, and false estimation of his own strength or merit:

Nor is this self-defence, of the modest or ho∣nest man, properly a desire to hurt the other, but only a necessity to defend himself against his assaults, since he had no intention to hurt him, before this violent man gave him a just provocation.

§. 3. As for that strife of Wit, which (as he says) is the greatest among men; though there may be some difference in Opinions, and Contentions arise from thence; Yet doth it not therefore follow, that there must from thence necessarily arise a desire in all men, of hurting or destroying others: For there are many of so equal and reasonable a disposition, that they can find no cause of hating, much less of hurting others; though they often dif∣fer from them in opinion; or that they must take all others for fools, if they prefer their own Judgment before another Man's.

And as for Mr. H's Instances, that there are no Wars more sharp than those between the different Sects of the same Religion, or the Factions of the same Commonwealth, these Examples will not make out that for which he produces them; Since he grants, Wars about Religion do seldom happen, but amongst those of different Sects in the same Religion; which shews it doth not proceed from the Natural State of Mankind, which

ought to be governed by Reason, not Super∣stition; much less from natural Religion, but from an unreasonable Superstition, or blind Zeal, too often inflamed by the Priests of either Party; making it not their own, but God's Cause, or Glory, (as they call it) for which they would have them fight, per∣secute, and destroy each other. And as for the Wars and Contentions between the diffe∣rent Factions of the same Commonwealth; it is apparent they have no place in the meer state of Nature; since they are produced by mens entring into Civil Society; aud there∣fore they are not fairly urged by Mr. H. as an Instance of their desire to hurt each other in the state of Nature.

§. 4. In answer to his Assertion, That all sa∣tisfaction of the mind is placed in something, by which a man comparing himself with others, may thereby think highly well of himself: And there∣fore it is impossible but they must declare their ha∣tred and contempt of each other, sometimes either by laughter, &c. than which there can be no grea∣ter vexation, neither from which a greater desire of revenge doth usually arise.

I thus reply: First, Neither does this Ob∣servation reach, so that they must needs take pleasure in puting a higher value upon them∣selves, than they deserve; or that right Rea∣son,

or Prudence, should perswade them to affront others, either by Words or Actions: Neither yet to take for Affronts, and mortal In∣juries, all those things, which any silly, ill-bred Fellow may happen to do: Since such quarrels do not proceed either from Nature, or Reason, but from foolish Customs, and bad Education; as appears in making, giving the lie, an af∣front, which was not so, till about an Age a∣gone; neither is among other Nations, but us Europeans, any occasion of a Quarrel: Nor yet is there any necessity, but that men may, and often do differ from each other, in opini∣on and words too, without giving one ano∣ther the lie, or any just occasion of offence: And therefore these are no sufficient grounds to raise a general Rule of the Natural state of all Mankind, from the indiscretion, or ill manners of some, nay many men.

§. 5. As for his last Reason, from the de∣sire of divers men at once to the same thing, which cannot be decided without fighting.

In answer to this, I grant this may be true amongst Brutes; as also amongst brutish and unreasonable men: But since God hath endued men with Reason, either to divide the thing, if it be capable of division; or else to use it by turns, where it is not, where

divers have an equal right in it; or else to leave it wholly to the first occupant; since e∣very man hath a natural right to what he thus acquires, as is fully proved in the precedent discourse. Therefore granting mens Lusts and Passions do often encline them to War and contention, yet are not they therefore de∣termined, or necessitated thereunto; seeing God hath given Man Reason to foresee, as also to prevent the evils of War; and has likewise endued them with as strong Passions (as Mr. H. acknowledges) to incline them to peace; as hath been more fully made out, when we speak of the Natural State of Man∣kind: Neither in the state of Nature, hath God made so niggardly a distribution of things, that no man can desire; or make use of any thing necessary for life, but presently another must start up to be his competitor for it: Since if men lived according to right Reason, and the necessities of Nature, and still used the Fruits of the whole Earth in Common, there would be yet left a sufficient stock to supply the Necessities of them all, without coveting the Goods of others, or tak∣ing away that they are already possessed of.

PRINCIPLE IV.

That Nature hath given to every one a right to all things. De Cive. C. 1. §. 10.

§. 1. THAT is (as he explains it) in a meer natural state, or before men were obliged to each other by any Compacts, it was lawful for every one to do all things whatsoe∣ver, and against whomsoever it pleased him so to do; and to possess, use, and enjoy all things, which he would or could; but Since whatsoever things any one would have, they either seemed good for himself, because he desires them, and do either conduce to his own preservation, or at least may seem to conduce to it: But whether those things do really conduce to this end, he supposes he hath in the former Article proved the Person him∣self to be sole judge. So that those must be coun∣ted as necessary means, which he judges as such: And by the 7th Article aforegoing, those things are done and enjoyed by the right of Nature, which do necessarily conduce to the preservation of his own life and members: Whence it follows, to have and do all things in the state of Nature, is lawful for all men; and this is what is commonly said, That Nature hath given all things to all men: From whence also it is understood, that in the state of nature, Profit or utility, is the measure of Right.

Which Argument in his Annotations to this Article, he thus explains and contracts.

This is so to be understood, that that which anyone may do, in a meer natural state, is injuri∣ous to no man: Not that in such a state it is im∣possible to sin against God, or to violate the Laws of Nature; but injustice towards men supposes Human Laws, which are not in the state of Na∣ture▪ But the truth of the proposition so under∣stood, is demonstrated to the mindful Reader, in the foregoing Paragraphs: But because in some cases, the hardness of the Conclusion drives out the memory of the Premises, he contracts the Ar∣gument, and lays it thus to be seen at once; By Art, the 7th it is proved, that every one hath a right of preserving himself; and by Art. the 8th. Therefore the same person hath a right to use all means necessary thereunto. But by Art. the 9th, Those means are necessary, which he shall judge to be so. Therefore the same person hath a right to have, and possess all things which he shall judge necessary for his own preservation: Therefore in the judgment of the doer, that which is done, ei∣ther by Right, or by Injury. Therefore it is done by Right, because in the state of Nature nothing is injurious.

I have made bold to add this last Clause from what went before, because otherwise the Argument is imperfect.

Therefore it is evidently true, That in a mere natural State, every man hath a right to all things.

§. 2. For the destroying of which Princi∣ple, as also for the answering the Arguments which he brings to support it, I shall in the first place observe, That the Author's Conclu∣sion▪ which he makes from his Premises in his Annotations, viz. That every man hath a right to do, and possess all things which himself shall judge necessary for his own preservation, is not the same which he draws from the same Pre∣mises in the Text, (viz.) That every man hath a right to have, and do all things in the state of Nature. For indeed from his own Principles no other Conclusion can follow, than what he hath now drawn from thence in his Annota∣tion; for no man in his right Senses ever yet judged, that to have, and do all things what∣ever, was absolutely necessary for his pre∣servation; only that he had a right indefi∣nitely to as many of them as he should judge necessary for this End. 2dly, Neither ought a man in the state of Nature to propose the bare preservation of his own Life, and Mem∣bers, as the only end of living, since that may be enjoyed by those who are really very mise∣rable, as may be observed in such as labour under tedious and constant Infirmities, or are

condemned to the Mines, or Gallies, or suf∣fer themselves to be carried away by any do∣mineering, or irrational Appetite or Passion▪And if the preservation of a man's Life and Members, were the only ends of life; then if another in the state of Nature should threaten to kill or maim him, unless he would deny, or blaspheme God, or murther his Father, it were upon this Principle lawful, nay necessa∣ry for him so to do; it being the only means by which he could preserve his life and Limbs. 3dly, Neither doth any man's rash or false judgment, that such a thing is necessary for his own preservation, confer on him a right to that thing; for then God had given him a right to all things they should in any passion, or rash and inconsiderate humour fancy necessary for that end, tho it really tended to their de∣struction, or that of other innocent men; So that if a man should think the blood of his dearest Friend would cure him of some Distemper he lay under, he might lawfully upon this Prin∣ciple murther him (if he could do it safely); And then God should have given men a right of destroying themselves and others, whenever they thought (though falsly) that it conduced to their preservation, the satisfa∣ction of their unreasonable Appetites or Hu∣mours: since such an unlimited Right, or ra∣ther License, can be so far from conducing to

any man's preservation, that if any men should ever have gone about to put it in practice, it would have long since produced not only their own destruction, but that of all Man∣kind.

§. 3. And if Mr. H. his own definition of right Reason be true, Art. 7th of this Chap∣ter, That it is a liberty of using a man's Faculties according to right Reason; then certainly right Reason can never judge contradictory Propo∣sitions to be true, as that I should in the state of Nature have a right to all things my Neigh∣bour was possessed of, and his life into the bargain, if I thought it might conduce to my self-preservation; and that this should be likewise as true, and rational a conclusion, that he should have the like right against me; since the word right is never used by any Wri∣ters of this Subject, but with respect to some Law, either Natural, or Civil, which Mr. H. acknowledges in the next Chapter, Art. 1st, in these words. But since all do grant that to be done by Right, which is not done contrary to right Reason, we ought to suppose that done by Injury, which is repugnant to right reason; or which contradicts some truth collected from true Principles by right Reason; but that is done by Injury, which is done against some Law, therefore right Reason is a certain Law, which is called na∣tural,

since it is not less a part of Humane Na∣ture than any other Faculty or Affection of the Mind: as Mr. H. himself confesses in this 2d Chapter of this Treatise De Cive, §. 1. tho he strives to avoid the force of it in his Anno∣tations to this Article; where, by right Rea∣son in the state of Nature, he tells us, He does not thereby understand (as many do) any infallible Faculty in men, but the Act of Ratio∣cination; that is, every man's own true reason concerning his own Actions, as they may redound to the profit or hurt of himself, or other men; and the reason why he calls it a mans own Reason, is, that though in a Commonwealth the reason thereof, that is, the Civil Law, is to be taken as right by all the Subjects; yet out of a Common∣wealth, where no man can distinguish right Rea∣son from false, but by comparing it with his own, every man's own Reason is not only to be taken for the Rule of his own Actions, but also in his own Affairs, for the measure of all other mens Reason: But how this will agree with what follows, I cannot tell; When he calls right Reason that which concludes from true Principles; because that in false ratiocination, or in the folly of men not observing those duties towards others which are ne∣cessary to their own preservation, consists all the violation of natural Laws.

But how false ratiocination, or folly, should give them a right to all they have a mind to

act thus towards others, I cannot apprehend; but from these words of Mr. H. I shall only observe, That though I do not suppose Rea∣son to be any infallible Faculty, any more than the casting up of an Account into a Sum total, though false, to be right Arith∣metick, or true Counting; yet by right Reason, when it is not erroneous, is to be understood the true exercise of that Facul∣ty; not erroneous in its judgments, and there∣fore doth not consist in the bare act of Ra∣tiocination, but in its true effects; that is, when true Propositions, or Premises, being laid up in the memory, those Conclusions are drawn from thence, which when they are practical, and contain true moral Rules of life, are called Laws of Nature.

§. 4. And therefore it is not true, that in a Commonwealth the publick Reason, or Law thereof, are to be always taken for Right; for then if the Laws of the Common∣wealth should enact Parricide, Ingratitude, and breach of Faith, to be exercised as Vertues, and to conduce to the good and preservation of Mankind, they would presently become so; which, I suppose, neither this Author, nor any rational Man would affirm. Nor is his other Proposition any truer, that out of a Commonwealth, no man can distinguish right Reason from false, but by comparing it

with his own; and therefore that must be the measure of all his Actions, from whence he deduces the right of all men to all things; which Argument I shall reduce into the form of a Syllogism, that you may the better judge of its truth. It is lawful in the state of Nature for every one to possess all things, and to do all things towards all men, which some Iudge shall judge necessary for the preservation of his own life and Members: But those things that every man himself shall judge to be necessary to his pre∣servation, those the only Iudge in this case judges to be necessary for this end; (for he had proved before, that himself is the only Judge in the state of Nature, what things are necessary for his preservation;) therefore to have, and do all things, &c. is necessary for a man's own preser∣vation. In which Syllogism the major is cer∣tainly false, because though a man's self be the sole Judge in the state of Nature, yet he may give a false Sentence, and suppose those things to be necessary for his preservation which really are not; neither is there any reason that in the state of Nature, any more than in a Civil State, the bare Sentence of a Judge should confer a true and equitable Right on any man to an Estate, if the Judge determines contrary to all the Rules of Law and Equity. So likewise in the state of Na∣ture, a man's own judgment can confer no

Right upon him, when he quits the only true Rules of his Judgment, which in this State can only be the Laws of Nature, or right Rea∣son, and the nature of things, and Mankind, from whence only they are drawn. Nor can there be any State supposed, either Natural, or Civil, in which there is no Rule of Hu∣mane Judgment, or that whatsoever a man's mind shall rashly suppose things to be, that they must presently become such as he hath fancied them: Since the utility of things ne∣cessary for the preservation of Humane Na∣ture depend not upon mens rash judgments, but upon the force of their natural Causes; and a man by thus falsly judging, that he had a right to all things that he hath a mind to, and that they are absolutely necessary for his preservation, can no more make them become so, than if he should judge that Ratsbane were Sugar-candy, it would be thereby pre∣sently turned into wholsome Food: So like∣wise those general, and universal Causes, which procure the preservation, or mischief of Mankind, do depend upon such fixt Princi∣ples in Nature, as are not to be altered by the judgment of any Judge, whether he be a sin∣gle man in the state of Nature, or the Su∣pream Powers in a Commonwealth.

§. 5. But this Error of Mr. H. concern∣ing the force of his Sentence, which thus fals∣ly pronounces an absolute Dominion over all men, and all things, to be necessary for his preservation, and thereby to confer a Right thereunto; seems to proceed from hence, That he having observed in a Civil State the Sentence of the Supream Magistrate, or Judge, had that force with the Subjects, that whether his Sentence were according to the Rules of Law, or natural Equity, or not, it was nevertheless to be obeyed, and submitted to: Whereas this Submission proceeds whol∣ly from their Consents who instituted the Commonwealth, in order to the publick Good, and for the putting some end to Con∣troversies; since all the Subjects must submit to the Judgment of the Supream Power, or Magistrate, whether it be right or wrong; because they are all satisfied, that it conduces more to their common quiet and safety, that some few should sometimes suffer through an unjust Judgment, than that Controversies should be endless, or at least not without Civil Wars, or Disturbances. So that it is evident, That it is only from a greater care of the Com∣mon Good, than of the Lives or Estates of any particular person that lays a foundation for this Prerogative, which though I grant be∣longs to all Supream Powers, yet if this once

come to be generally and notoriously abused by constant course of wilful Violence, Op∣pression and Injustice, so that the Subjects cannot longer bear it, they will quickly make their appeal somewhere else, unless they are hindred by some predominant Power, or Force over them.

§. 6. But on the other side it is certain, That men in the state of Nature cannot ad∣mit of any final Judgment, or determination of a doubt or difference, besides an evidence either from the things themselves, or from that trust or credit they place in some mens either Judgment or Testimony, whereby all manner of doubt or scruple is clearly remo∣ved out of the minds of the Parties concern∣ed; and that it appears evident to them, that they are not imposed upon; neither can there be any end of debates amongst divers Pre∣tenders, unless one Party being convinced by the strength of the other's Reasons, come over to his, or their Opinion; or else being satis∣fied of the Knowledge and Integrity of some third Person, as an Arbitrator, do willingly submit to his Sentence.

§. 7. For Humane Nature will ever ac∣knowledge a difference between right Rea∣son, and false; and between a just, and an

unjust Judgment; and 'tis only Truth and right Reason that have this Prerogative, that they can confer a right on us of doing those things which they prescribe. For even Mr. H. in his definition of Right, acknow∣ledges, that it is only a liberty of using our Faculties according to right Reason; where∣as all Error, or false Judgment, whether it be concerning Necessaries for the preserva∣tion of Life, or in any other practical matter, can give no man a right of doing that which he then falsly judges necessary for his preser∣vation. And therefore Mr. H's Conclusion, where he acknowledges at last, That right Reason is that which concludes from true Princi∣ples; and likewise that in the false reasoning, and folly of men, in not understanding their Duties towards other men, consists all the violation of the Laws of Nature; grants as much as I can de∣sire; but how this will agree with that loose definition of Reason, where he supposes every man's reason to be alike right, I desire any of his Disciples to shew me. Therefore to con∣clude, I can only allow that to be practical right Reason, which gives us leave to under∣take things reasonable and possible, and that forbids a man to arrogate to himself alone a dominion over all men, and all things, which is needless and impossible, indeed wholly per∣nicious to his preservation.

§. 8. But to avoid this difficulty, Mr. H. and his Followers fly to the Subterfuge of a natural necessity in men, that so judge thus falsly, and act contrary to the Laws of Na∣ture, or Reason: And therefore in his Preface to this Treatise, he supposes all men to be evil by Nature, and makes them necessarily determi∣ned by their Appetites and Passions (before they are endued with Reason and Discipline) to act mis∣chievously, and unreasonably; and therefore tells us, that Children, unless you give them every thing they desire, cry, and are angry, and will strike their very Fathers and Mothers; and it is by nature they do so, and yet are blameless; as well because they cannot hurt, as also that wanting the use of Reason, they are yet free from all its Duties: But the same persons, when grown up, and having got strength enough to hurt, if they hold on to do the same things, they then begin both to be, and to be called evil. So that a wicked man is almost the same thing, as an overgrown Child, or a man of a childish disposition, because there is the same defect of Reason at that age, in which by Nature, improved by Discipline, and experi∣ence of its inconveniencies, it commonly happens to be amended. So likewise the Author of Tractatus Theologico Politicus, who more open∣ly than Mr. H. (but upon the same Principles) endeavours to destroy all Religion, both Na∣tural, and Revealed; argues to this purpose,

in the 16th Chap. of the said Treatise. First, By the Law of Nature, He understands nothing but the Nature of every Individual; according to which, we conceive each of them naturally determi∣ned to exist after a certain manner. Thus Fishes are ordained to swim, and the great ones to de∣vour the less: Therefore Fishes live in the Wa∣ter, and devour each other by the highest Right: For Nature considered simply, hath a right to all things it can do, or its right extends it self, as far as its power; Since the power of Nature is but the power of God, who hath the highest right to all things. But because the power of Vniversal Nature, is nothing but the power of all the Indivi∣dual Creatures together, it follows that every Individual hath the highest right to all things it can do; that is, it extends it self as far as its power. And since it is the first Law of Nature, that every thing should endeavour, as far as it is able, to preserve it self in its Natural State: and that, without any consideration of other Creatures, but only of it self: Therefore it follows, that eve∣ry Individual hath the highest right to exist, and operate, as it is thus naturally determined: Nor will he allow any difference, by Nature, between men and other Creatures; neither between men endued with Reason, and those that have not yet attained the use of it; neither between Fools and Madmen, and others that are of sound Vnder∣standing; and his Reason is this, For whatever

any Creature doth by the force of its Nature, it doth it by the highest Right, viz. because it acts as it is by Nature determined, neither is it able to act otherwise: Therefore among men, whilst con∣sidered as living under the meer Empire of Nature, as well he that doth not yet understand Reason, or hath not acquired a habit of Virtue, lives by the highest Right, according to the Laws of his own Appetite, as well as he that directs his Life according to the Rules of Reason. So that as a Wise-man hath a Right to all things that Reason dictates, or of living according to its Rules: So likewise the ignorant and foolish hath a like right to all things which their Appetites desire. So that every man's Natural Right, is not determined by Right Reason, but by Power and Appetite. For all men are not naturally ordained to operate according to the Laws of Reason, but on the con∣trary are born ignorant of all things; and before they come to know the true Rules of life, or acquire a habit of Vertue, a great part of their life slips away, tho' they are never so well educated: And therefore he concludes, that whatever any one does in order as he thinks to his own preservation, or the satisfaction of Sensual Appetites, whilst he is in this meer state of Nature, it is lawful, because the only Rule he hath to act by.

§. 9. Having given you all that can be said for this wicked, as well as foolish Opinion,

in their own words; I shall now endeavour to confute it. In the first place therefore I ob∣serve, that this which they call the right of Nature, and which Mr. H. defines to be a state of perfect Liberty, is in their sense no other than that of absolute necessity: And there∣fore I shall leave it to the Reader to judge how properly this word Right belongs to Brutes, Infants, and Fools. For the Word Right is used by those that treat of Ethicks, only in respect of reasonable men, as capable of de∣liberation and judgment, and endued with freedom of Action, and so subject to Laws. For to call that necessity, by which Fishes de∣vour each other, and Mad-men beat their Keepers, a Right, were as proper to talk of a Right of Stones to fall downwards: no Phi∣losophers but these, ever using the word Right for necessity, but a liberty left by the Law of Nature, of acting according to Reason: 2ly, The last Author confounds the nature of Beasts, Fools and Mad-men, who have no knowledge of a God, or sense of a Moral Good and Evil, with that of rational Crea∣tures, who are ordained for greater ends, and to be governed by a higher Law, than that of meer Appetite or Passion: And I desire these Gentlemen to shew us, that such unrea∣sonable Appetites and Passions do necessarily and unevitably carry men to act constantly

according to them; so that the men had then no power left, to oppose, resist or restrain them: and tho' we grant that Children are not yet sensible; and Fools and Mad-men are never perhaps capable of the Laws of Reason or Nature, and so cannot be subject to them, nor are to be esteemed amongst voluntary Agents: Yet doth it not follow, that those that are of Mature Age, and sound Minds, and so can∣not plead invincible ignorance of the Laws of Nature, but out of their own wilful hu∣mour, or unreasonable Appetites, neglect to know or learn, or through wilful ignorance transgress it, should claim the like exempti∣on. For though we are not angry with Chil∣dren, or natural Fools, if they cry for, or take away any thing they see, and pity mad peo∣ple, even while they are outragious with those that tend them: Yet have we not the same forbearance and pity for men of sound Minds, and mature Age, if they do the like unreasonable things, and govern themselves by no other Law, but their own unreasona∣ble Appetites and Passions; Since it was in their power both to have known and acted otherwise; and to have deliberated and judged, whether it were not better for them to forbear such evil Acts, than to do them.

§. 10. Neither can invincible ignorance be any excuse as to them; for though perhaps they may not have Brains fit for the Mathe∣maticks, or are not able to deduce all the Laws of Nature from their true Principles; yet by the Precepts of others, as well as their own Reason, and the observation of their own Natures, as well as other mens, they might easily have learnt all the Duties of an honest man; that is, their Duty towards their Neighbour, by that Golden Rule, of doing as they would be done by: And their Duty towards themselves, by endeavouring their own true happiness and preservation, by the only means tending thereunto, viz. Without injuring others; and doing their Duty to∣wards God, in reverencing him, and obeying his Will, when discovered to them; also in endeavouring, to the utmost of their power, the Common Good of Mankind; and all which Principles have been ever so natural to men, that they have in all Ages acknow∣ledged them to have still remained the same. Therefore Mr. H. as also the Author of the Treatise last mentioned, are very much mi∣staken, so directly to oppose our knowledge of the Laws of Nature, to the Rational Na∣ture of Man; as if he were so much beholden to Art for them, that he could never have ac∣quired them himself, without teaching;

which were all one as to say, That because most men learn Arithmetick., therefore it is so absolutely besides, or above Nature, that no man ever attained it of himself, which is contrary both to Reason and Experience, since both Arithmetick and Geometry, as al∣so Ethicks, must have been natural to those that first taught them.

But I have already sufficiently proved by Mr. H's own Concession, That Reason and Experience are as natural to Humane Nature, as Hunting is to Dog's, tho in both of them there is required both Exercise and Experi∣ence to learn it.

§. 11. Nor doth Mr. H's Excuse, which he gives us in the 13th Chapter of his Levia∣than, signify any thing; (viz.) That mens Passions in the state of Nature are no Sins, nor the Actions which proceed from them, as long as they see no Power which can prohibit them; For neither can a Law be known before it be made, neither can it be made, till they have agreed upon a Legislator. To which may be easily an∣swered, that Mr. H. all along proceeds upon this False Supposition, That God is not a Le∣gislator without Divine Revelation; nor that the Laws of Nature are properly his Laws; both which Assertions, if they have been pro∣ved false in the preceding Discourse, it will

certainly follow, that the Laws of Nature or Reason proceeding from God himself▪ are truly Laws; and the Actions prohi∣bited by them are Sins, although men will not through wilful Ignorance discover this Legislator, nor will consent to his Laws. And Mr. H. himself acknowledges in his Chapter of Laws, that the Subjects lie under an obligation to obey them, if it can be made appear to them that the Legislator is endued with a Supream Power over them, and hath both sufficiently established, and promulgated his Laws; both which may be truly affirmed of the Laws of Nature.

§. 12. But indeed Mr. H. and his Followers have done very cunningly in taking away all freedom from Mankind, and to suppose an ab∣solute necessity of all moral Actions; since they could not otherwise destroy the Laws of Nature, and equal Men with Brutes, but by pulling up all the Foundations of moral Good and Evil.

But I need say no more on this Subject to shew the folly and unreasonableness of this Opinion, than to put down Mr. H's words on this Subject in Art. 11. of this Chapter, Where he confesses that this Right of all men to all things, is absolutely unprofitable for Mankind, because the effect of this Right is all one, as if

there were no such Right at all. For although any man might say of every thing, This is mine; yet could he not use it, because of his Neighbour, who might by an equal Right pretend that it was his. Which is as good as to own, that this right is none at all: For he himself in the Ar∣ticle before-going, makes Utility to be the measure of all Right; but here is a Right without any Utility at all; therefore these words Right and Vnprofitable, are contradicto∣ry; for Right refers in this definition to some use or profit that a man may make of his na∣tural Liberty; but to be unprofitable, owns that there is no use or need of this natural Li∣berty in that matter.

PRINCIPLE V.

That in the state of Nature, whatsoever any one doth to another, cannot be injurious to any Person.

§. 1. BEcause, says he, Injustice towards men supposes Humane Laws, none of which are yet in being in the meer state of Nature, De Cive, Cap. 1. Annot. ad §. 10. which he thus likewise endeavours to prove in his Leviathan, Chap. 13. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law; where there is no Law, no In∣justice;

Force and Fraud are in War the two Car∣dinal Vertues; Iustice and Injustice are none of the Faculties either of the Body or Mind; If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the World, as well as his Senses and Passions: They are all Qualities that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct, but only that to be eve∣ry man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it: All which is no more than what Epi∣curus long ago asserted, as Diogenes Laer∣tius hath told us in the Account he gives of his Life and Opinions; To this effect, That between those Animals which cannot be joined by any Compact or Bargain, that they should not hurt each other; there is no Right, or Injury: So it is likewise amongst Nations, which either will not, or cannot enter into Compact; that they do nei∣ther hurt, nor are hurt; For Injustice is nothing in it self; although in some places such a Bargain is made by mutual Compacts that they should not hurt each other. So that Injury is no evil in it self, but only consists in a fear, or suspicion, lest it should not be concealed from those who are ap∣pointed Revengers of such Injuries.

§. 2. In answer to all which, I doubt not to prove, that these Principles of Epicurus, as well as of Mr. H. and his Disciples, are taken

up without any just or solid grounds; for by the dictates of right Reason, considered as (they are) the natural Laws of God, a perfect Right is given to every man to his Life, and all those necessary means thereunto, without which he cannot subsist. For whatever a man enjoys by the right of Nature, it must needs be injury and injustice to take it away: for every invasion or violation of another's Right or Property, is Injury, by whatever Law he enjoys it: And much more if that Right be conferred upon him by the Law of Nature, given by God as a Legislator, than if it pro∣ceeded from meer Humane Compacts. And though Mr. H. here asserts, That no injury can be done to any man, with whom we have made no Compact; yet Chap. 2. Art. 1. of his De Cive, he says, That since all men will grant that to be done by Right, which is not con∣trary to right Reason; we ought to believe that to be done by Injury, which is repugnant to right Reason; that is, which contradicts any Truth collected by right Reason from true Principles: But what is done by Injury, we acknowledge to be done contrary to some Law. So that here he grants, that an Injury may be done contrary to the Laws of Nature, before any Compact, or translation of our Right to another; and since he there acknowledges those Dictates of Reason to be Laws, I would fain see how

those can give any man such a right to invade, or violate the Rights of another: For Right (as he himself well defines it) being a Liberty granted by right Reason, requires that men, who pretend to act or speak according to its Dictates, cannot act contradictorily to its other Principles, or Conclusions. And 'twere to no purpose for him to say, that the Injury is done to God alone, when his Laws are bro∣ken, unless he can shew that those Laws of God do not confer a right on men to their Lives, and all the necessaries thereof; and do not likewise prohibit others from violating this Right so granted.

§. 3. But yet this Author, when he is prest hard, does acknowledge, that there may be injury done to another out of Civil Govern∣ment: For it being objected, whether if a Son should kill his Father in the state of Na∣ture, he should not do him an injury; he an∣swers, That a Son cannot be understood to be in a natural State in respect of his Parents, he being as soon as ever he is born▪ under their power and command, to whom he owes his being and preser∣vation.

Yet sure a man's Parents, by begetting and breeding him up, do not thereby acquire a property or dominion over him as long as he lives; though I grant Children, when they

either marry, or otherwise, become lawfully discharged from the government of their Pa∣rents, still owe a filial piety and gratitude to them; and that it is a great impiety and injury in Children towards them, to hurt or destroy them, though they are no longer under their power and command. So likewise the same Law of Nature, which prescribes gratitude to these our natural Benefactors, doth make it injurious for any man to hurt or kill any other Person, who had educated, or maintained him, or otherwise highly obliged him; since the same Laws of Gratitude that make it injurious to hurt, or murther his Fa∣ther in the state of Nature, do also command the like duty towards any other Benefactor.

§. 4. But his Argument in his Leviathan is much more false and precarious; when he argues, That where there is no common Power, there is no Law; and where there is no Law, there is no Injustice. All which he brings to prove the necessity of his natural state of War. For, first, though I grant, where there is no Com∣mon Power, (that is, no Legislator) there is no Law, yet that is not true of the Laws of Nature; since if they proceed from God as a Legislator (as I hope we have proved in the precedent Discourse) they are truly Laws, before any Civil Power was instituted to

make Laws, or to see them observed; and consequently that it is the highest injury and injustice to take away any thing from others being innocent, and doing us no hurt, that is necessary for their Life, or preservation, which they are already possest of; and though it is true, that Justice and Injustice are no na∣tural Faculties of the Mind, yet right Reason is; from whence all Justice is deduced, and which a man is always bound to exercise as soon as he becomes capable of being a Mem∣ber of Humane Society: (I do not mean a Civil one) and if there be a natural Equity (as this Author acknowledges, De Cive, cap. 14. §. 14.) there is likewise a natural Justice, and Injustice too: but I shall say more of this in the next Principle.

PRINCIPLE VI.

That in the state of Nature there is nothing Good, or Evil.

§. 1. I Shall here give you Mr. H's Opinion, and his Reasons for it, in his own words, as they are in his Leviathan, cap. 6. Whatsoever is the object of any man's Appetite, or Desire, that is it which he for his part calls Good; and the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evil:

and of his Contempt, Vile and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evil, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the Person that useth them, there being nothing simply and abso∣lutely so; Nor any common Rule of Good and Evil to be taken from the nature of the Objects themselves, but from the person of the Man (where there is no Commonwealth) or, (in a Commonwealth) from the Person that represents it; or from an Arbitrator, or Iudge, whom men by disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his Sentence the Rule thereof. He speaks to the same effect in all his other Works; as in De Cive, cap. 4. §. 17. in his De Homine, cap. 11. which it were tedious here to repeat; and therefore I refer you to the places I have here cited.

§. 2. But this he endeavours Physically to explain in his little Treatise of Humane Na∣ture, cap. 7. § 1. compared with Chap. 3. where he supposes, That the motion, in which consists the conception of things without any inter∣vention of the Iudgment, passes from the Brain to the Heart; and as it there hinders, or helps its vital motion, it is said to please or displease; But that which so pleases any one, he calls Good: And that which displeases him, Evil: and hence from the diversity of Constitutions, or Temperaments, there are divers Opinions of

Good that is naturally and necessarily so. And in the state of Nature unblameably, from his Opi∣nion that judges it.

§. 3. There is nothing that Mr. H. hath writ∣ten more loosely, and unlike a Philosopher, than these unstable Opinions both of natural and moral Good and Evil. And therefore it is a matter of great moment to have a fixed and constant notion of Good; because as long as this is fluctuating and uncertain, all know∣ledge of our true Felicity (which is the greatest Good of every man) as also of the Laws of Nature, and of all particular Ver∣tues, (which are nothing but the means and causes of obtaining this Good) will be like∣wise various, wandring and uncertain.

§. 4. Therefore, although it must be con∣fest, that because of some peculiarity in the divers Temperaments of men, it sometimes happens that one sort of Diet, or Medicines, may be hurtful to one, which may not prove so to another; yea, which Experience hath approved, not only to be innocent, but whol∣some for others: Something like which may be observed in the Genius and Manners of Nations quite different from others, in some particular Customs and Constitutions; yet this doth not any more take away the com∣mon

Consent of Mankind concerning the na∣ture of Good, and its constituent parts and degrees, than the small difference of mens Faces takes away the agreement between them in their common Natures as Men, or that general likeness that is between them, in the conformation and use of their principal Parts. For sure there is no Nation so barbauros which will not own, that there are greater hopes and satisfaction in loving, and obeying God, than in blaspheming and disobeying of him. There is scarce any Nation that is not sensible, that filial duty towards Parents, gratitude to their Benefactors, love and kind∣ness to their Friends and Neighbours, fidelity in their Promises and Agreements, are good and necessary for their own welfare and pre∣servation, and consequently of Mankind. No difference of Temper makes any man in his Senses not perceive it to be good for all men, that the Lives, Liberties Estates and Mem∣bers of all innocent Persons, should be pre∣served; And therefore that the killing, or robbing of them should be every-where pro∣hibited under the most severe Penalties. Or lastly, What peculiar humour in men can make them not think it good and beneficial for particular Families and Nations, that the Conjugal Fidelity of the Marriage-bed, the Chastity should be preserved inviolated. The

same may be said concerning the right of using and enjoying all those outward things, that are necessary for life, or conduce to our health, fame, honour, the education of our Children, and the preservation of Friendship, since in their Judgment concerning the goodness of these things about which the whole business of the Laws of Nature, and of most Civil Laws is taken up, all rational men do as equal∣ly agree in their Opinions as concerning the whiteness of Snow, or the brightness of the Sun; Though I do not lay the main stress of their obligation to these Actions on this ge∣neral Agreement, since I have laid down contrary Principles in the foregoing Dis∣course.

§. 5. But I shall now proceed to give you a more true and setled Notion of Good and Evil, both natural and moral: I therefore de∣fine Good in general to be, that which pre∣serves, encreases, or perfects the Faculties and Powers of one or more things; for by these effects that peculiar agreeableness of one thing with another declares it self to us, and which is requisite to make any thing to be tru∣ly called good for the nature of this Being be∣fore others. Which effects likewise discover to us the hidden powers, and intrinsick natures of things. These strike upon our Senses, and beget

a knowledge in us of those things from whence they flow; which Goods I grant may be diffe∣rent, according to the divers natures of those Beings which they respect. Thus a suitable Soyl, Air, and Moisture are naturally good for Plants, because they are agreeable to their nature, and are necessary for their preserva∣tion, growth and perfection: So likewise convenient Food, Health and Liberty, are naturally good for an Animal; since they serve for their preservation and happiness as long as they continue to live. So likewise, That is also good for man, which preserves and encreases the powers of his Mind and Bo∣dy, without doing hurt to, or prejudicing any others of his own kind; nor doth the mind of Man make these Rules concerning the nature of one, or a few Creatures of a sort, but is able from the knowledge it hath of singulars, to make certain general Propo∣sitions, or Conclusions, concerning what is good, or evil, for the whole Species, or Kind, whose nature he hath enquired into; because, since there is the same general nature in every one of the Individuals of this or that Kind, the true happiness of one or more of them be∣ing once known, it is easie likewise to know what share and kind of happiness is to be desired by all of them: For it is apparent, That the improvement of the Understanding

in knowledge, and the government of the Will by sedate and regular Affections; as also the health and vigour of the Body, in which the true happiness of any particular man does chiefly consist, do also comprehend (if uni∣versally considered) the common happiness of all men, that ever have been, or shall be born, which also may be affirmed concerning the means to these natural Goods, and which are required as necessary to all Mankind; such as Food, Exercise, Sleep, and the like; And this, because of the identity between the parts and the whole; that is, between the nature of any one, or more men, with that whole Systeme of Rational Agents, compre∣hended under the general Name and Idea of Mankind. From whence it also follows, that whatsoever doth good to one member, or part of this aggregate Body, all the rest being unhurt, or unprejudiced, thereby may be truly said to do good to the whole aggre∣gate Body of Mankind; which Consideration may excite us to a due care of our selves, pro∣vided it be not prejudicial to others from a con∣sideration of the common Good of Mankind. Analogically unto this we may also judge, that to promote the efficacy of God's Natural Right to rule our selves, and all other rational Creatures, is to perform a thing good, or grateful to God, as Supream Governour of

the World; and this we do by a due care to promote obedience to his own Laws, either in our selves, or others.

And therefore, though we so far agree with Mr. H. that that may be called good which is agreeable to any other Being, and so must be meant relatively; yet doth not this always refer to the Appetite of him that desires it, nor yet to the irrational Opinions of any one or more men, if they judge contrary to the Rules and Principles of Nature or Rea∣son. And therefore, though a Wench that hath the Green-Sickness, by reason of her de∣praved Appetite, may fancy Tobacco-pipes, or Charcoal to have an excellent relish, and so to be good for her; yet will not her thinking so, make them become a wholsome nourishment. The like may be said of any Actions, or Vices, which a Vicious or unrea∣sonable man may take pleasure in; such as Drunkenness, Whoredom, &c. which how∣soever they may please him at the present, yet will certainly in time destroy him in this life, or in that to come. And therefore it is not true, which Mr. H. here lays down, That all Good and Evil is only to be taken in respect of him whom at that time it pleases or displeases: Whereas every rational Man ought first rightly to judge what things are good, and then to desire them, because they

are really so; that is, because their natural powers or effects are really helpful, or agree∣able to our Nature: And to consider a private Good, as that which profits one person; and a common Good, as it profits many. And that not because it is at that instant desired, and approved of out of a depraved Appetite, or wanton humour: it being only the part of Brutes, Mad-men and Fools, to measure the goodness of Things, or Actions, by their present Lusts, without any government of Reason, or thoughts of the future.

§. 6. But Mr. H. himself doth sometimes talk more soberly; and though he doth here, as also elsewhere, inculcate, That every thing is either good, or evil, according to the opi∣nion of the Person that so judges it (in the state of Nature) or else (in a Civil State) of the Person that represents the Common∣wealth; yet in his Leviathan, Chap. 30. when he reckons up the Offices of the Civil Soveraign, he makes one of the chiefest to be the making of good Laws. Now he there tells us, A good Law is that which is needful for the good of the People, and withal perspicu∣ous; and a little farther he thus goes on; And therefore a Law that is not needful, having not the true end of a Law, is not good. A Law may be conceived to be good, when it is for the benefit of

the Sovereign, though it be not necessary for the People; but it is not so: where you see, the good of the People (which is certainly that which is common to many) is here acknow∣ledg'd by him, and proposed as the main end of the Legislator's Duty: But this end being thus proposed, the true nature of it is first to be known, and determined, before the Law can prescribe what is good or evil for the People. So likewise Chap. 14. §. 4. of his De Cive, speaking concerning the Rules of right Judgment in a Civil State, he tells us; That since it is impossible to prescribe any Vniver∣sal Rules whereby all Controversies (which will be infinite, may be judged) it is still understood in every case pretermitted by the written Laws, that the Law of natural Equity is to be followed. Where you see he grants that the Laws of na∣tural Equity may be known, and followed; And that divers more Cases may be deter∣mined from thence, than can be by the Civil Laws themselves: but we do only so far con∣tend with him, that some Rules of Equity may be so evidently and naturally known, that all honest and sincere men cannot at all differ about them; though in the mean time we freely grant, That there are divers things so indifferent, that no human Reason can universally determine, that it is more neces∣sary for the common Good, that a thing be

done, or a Case judged this way, rather than the other.

§. 7. Having stated what we mean by a na∣tural Good, and Evil; I shall now give a right notion of a moral Good, and how it differs from the former. A moral Good is those voluntary Actions and Habits which are conformable to the Law of Nature, or Rea∣son, considered as given by God, as a Law-giver, for a Rule of all our Humane, or vo∣luntary Actions: For there are many natural Goods that conduce to a man's happiness, which are not morally good, nor are com∣manded by any Law. Such as are quickness of Wit, Learning, Strength of Mind and Body, &c. On the other side, I suppose, that no Action of the Will can be commanded by God, (and so morally good) which doth not by is own nature, as well as from the Will of God (the Legislator) conduce to the hap∣piness of Mankind: The not taking notice of which distinction, between natural and mo∣ral Goods, hath been the occasion of another great Error in Mr. H. when he makes that which seems good to every man's own self, to be the only object of his desires, as he doth in his De Cive, Cap. 1. Art. 2. which he likewise more fully expresses in Cap. 3. Artic. 21. Every one is presumed to seek that which is good

for himself; but that which is just only by accident, and for peace sake; viz. That which is just, he will only have to regard another's good; which he supposes no man will seek, unless it were for fear of those Evils which proceed from a state of War: But all he says only tends to prove, that men are so framed, that it is repugnant to their Nature, and so abso∣lutely impossible for them to mind, or desire any thing, unless for their own particular worldly profit, and glory, as he hath laid down in those Principles we have already considered.

§. 8. But I cannot but take notice, that Mr. H. himself in his Treatise De Homine, (published after his De Cive) Cap. 12. §. 1. seems not at all to approve of this ill humour in men, by these words. We confess that it may so fall out through the ill use of his free will, that a man of a narrow Soul may consider nothing but himself, and so may desire nothing but what he judges for his own private advantage. And in the same Treatise, Cap. 11. §. 14. where he doth purposely consider which is the greater, or lesser amongst Goods; he plainly confesses, That it is a greater good which be∣nefits more persons, than that which doth good to fewer.

§. 9. But giving him leave to contradict himself as much as he will, yet notwithstand∣ing all that he hath said to the contrary, I doubt not but all rational and good men are of a more generous Spirit; who do not only esteem that to be good, which is good for themselves alone, but also whatsoever tends to the conservation, happiness and perfection of Mankind. And whatsover they thus esteem to be good, that they will also desire, wish for, and contribute their utmost endea∣vour to procure for others, as well as them∣selves: Nor do I see any reason to hinder, but that whatsoever I find agreeable to any mans Nature, I may do my endeavour, as far as lies in my power, that he may obtain it; But this much I must freely confess, That if men do not propose to themselves one common End, or Effect, viz. the common good of Rational Agents, whose Causes (whether ef∣ficient, or perfective) should be before-hand agreed on to be Good; and those that hinder its production, Evil; the words Good and Evil will always be equivocal, various, and uncertain; being still to be taken in as many different Senses, as there are particular Men. So that whatsoever Action, or thing, is cal∣led good by any one man, because it serves his turn; that other men, if it crosses their desires, will be sure to call evil, which is incon∣gruous

to Reason, and to the Communication of knowledge among men, which is the main end of Speech; Whereas, if the words Good and Evil are applied to those things which concern the nature of Rational Beings in ge∣neral, they will have a certain and determi∣nate sense and signification, which will not only be constantly true, and intelligible, but prove most useful and profitable to all Man∣kind; and that we are not only capable of un∣derstanding, but also of contributing our En∣deavours for the procuring of this Common Good, and are also under a sufficient obliga∣tion thereunto, is, I hope, fully made out in the Fourth Chapter of the precedent Dis∣course, where we expresly treat of the Law of Nature, and its obligation.

PRINCIPLE VII.

That the State of Nature is a State of War.

§. 1. ALL the Principles that Mr. H. hath hitherto laid down, have been only in order to the establishing this Darling Prin∣ciple of the natural state of War. But since we have already in our Answer to his former Principles, shewn their falshood and absur∣dity; If those Foundations be ill laid, the

Superstructure must needs be infirm, and therefore I shall omit all that he hath in his De Cive inferred from those false Principles; and shall only apply my self to what he hath in his 13th Chapter of his Leviathan, given us a-new for the proof of this Principle, and which doth not depend upon the former; For here he derives this natural State of War from Three Principal Causes in the nature of Man. First, Competition. Secondly, Diffidence. Thirdly, Glory. The first makes man invade for Gain. The second for Safety, and the third for Reputation. The first use Violence to make themselves Masters of other Mens persons, Wives, Children and Cattel. The second to defend them. The third for Trifles; as a word, a smile, a different Opinion, and any other sign of undervaluing, either directly in their persons, or by reflection on their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name. Hereby it is manifest, That during the time men live without a Common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called War, as is of every man against every man. For War consists not in Battel only, or the Act of Fighting; but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by Battel is sufficiently known. And therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of War, as it is in the nature of Wea∣ther. For as the nature of Foul-weather lies

not in a shower or two of Rain, but in an inclina∣tion thereto of many days together. So the nature of War consists not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other is Peace.

§. 2. In answer to which, I must first take notice, That Mr. H. in his Leviathan deduces this Right of War of all men against all, from other Principles than he doth in his De Cive, Chap. 1. §. 12. where from the supposed right of all men to all things, he deduces a war of all men against all, and which renders it both lawful and necessary: But in his Le∣viathan, in the Chapter here cited, he first asserts the state of Nature to be a state of War, and from thence argues all things therein to be lawful; as you may see in the Conclusion of that Chapter, where he tells us, That by the same right that one man invades, the other resists; from whence arises a War on both sides just. So that being not at all sollicitous about the Right of making War, he only supposes this War must needs arise from the nature of mens Pas∣sions, and Desires; and this War being once supposed, he positively asserts, That it must follow (though without any proof) that there is in this State nothing just, or unjust: Indeed his way of arguing in his Leviathan

is more plausible, but less close than the for∣mer in his De Cive; For all Persons of sense must agree, that a War ought first to be pro∣ved just, before it can be thence deduced what things are lawful therein, even towards Ene∣mies: Neither doth himself suppose that all things are lawful, even in the justest War; for in his De Cive, Annot. ad Art. 37. cap. 3. he grants that Drunkenness, and Cruelty, are not to be practised even in War; and there∣fore it is necessary that some natural Princi∣ples, or Laws, be first acknowledged, by whose command or permission we may be able to judge of any War, whether it be just, or not, or before we can thence infer those things to be lawful which are acted therein; for otherwise even contradictory Propositions may be alike true; and Titius, for example, might have a right to the Life and Goods of Sempronius, if he thought them necessary for his own Preservation; and so likewise Sem∣pronius would have the same Right against Titius: which would be contrary to all the Rules of right Reason, and Equity; and this is so evident, that Mr. H. himself, although in the latter part of this first Chapter, De Cive, he affirms, That in the state of Na∣ture, there is no difference between just and unjust; yet in the former part he endeavours to prove, that this power of making War

ought to be allowed to every man in that state as necessary to his own preservation; which is all one, as if he had affirmed this War to be just and lawful on both sides; which is contrary to Reason. But whatsoever proves any thing to be just, and lawful in any State, must likewise suppose, that there is a diffe∣rence between lawful and unlawful in the same State, and must suppose some Law in force, by whose command or permission at least, that Act becomes lawful: which, as we endeavour to establish, so doth Mr. H. as plainly destroy it, whilst he asserts no diffe∣rence between just and unjust: but with what reason I shall leave it to the indifferent Reader to judge.

§. 3. But since I have already answered those Preliminary Principles which he hath laid down in his De Cive, to prove the neces∣sity of this state of War, there remains no∣thing else for us to do, but to examine those new Reasons Mr. H. hath here given us in this Chapter of his Leviathan to prove this state of War to be both natural, and necessa∣ry; which he here deduces from three Affe∣ctions in the nature of man. 1. Competition for the same thing. 2. Diffidence of each o∣ther. 3. Glory to himself. The first is ma∣nifest; That during the time men live with∣out

out a Common Power to keep them in awe, they are in that Condition which is called War.

Whence I cannot but again observe, That this Author takes the natural state of Man∣kind only from their Passions, without any consideration of Reason, or Experience; al∣though he hath already supposed both of these to be natural Faculties of the Mind: and the true nature of a thing is to be taken not from its imperfections, or weaknesses, but from the utmost perfection that it is by its na∣ture capable of; and therefore this Author hath dealt very preposterously to treat of the natural State of Man, as of a meer Animal, only governed by the force of his Passions; whereas, the principal part of Man, and which ought to have the government over all the other Faculties, is Reason; or that Facul∣ty of the rational Soul, whose due use and exercise ought not to be excluded, but rather conjoined with the operations of all the o∣ther natural Faculties, by any Writer who will truly describe the Nature of Man; nor yet are men necessarily impelled by these Pas∣sions, as meer Machines are driven or moved by the Wind, or Weights; but that they may be governed, and restrained by Rea∣son, or fear of future evil: so that they do not hurry men into War by any natural, or

inevitable necessity. Indeed those Ideas of the Mind, which are necessarily generated therein from the impulse of outward Objects, are not prohibited by the Law of Nature, because we are design'd by God to govern those Actions only which are in our powers: Whereas these Passions and Ideas, from whence Mr. H. col∣lects this state of War to be necessary, are of this sort, since being concerning things fu∣ture, and at a distance, and depending upon mens reason, and foresight, they may be also governed thereby; and Mr. H. himself ac∣knowledges in his De Cive, Chap. 3. §. 31. That though men, because of their different Appetites, cannot agree of the present, yet they may of the future, and from thence ac∣knowledges, that Peace is to be sought as the foundation of all natural Law.

§. 4. And therefore I think I shall be able easily to shew, that every one of these three Master-Passions, which he hath here described as the Causes of War, ought (if governed by Reason) to persuade the contrary. And in the first place, for his Passion of Competi∣tion, That when two men desire the same thing, which they cannot both enjoy, they become Enemies; and in the way to their end, endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another. Now certainly Reason in this Case will never

incite a rational man to enter into a state of War with another, for the obtaining of that which he hath a mind to as well as he. For if it be a thing the other is already possessed of, he ought by the Rules of Reason, and Equity, to let him enjoy it by right of Occupancy or Possession; it being then necessary for his pre∣servation, or happiness; and he himself, if pos∣sessed of the like thing, would think it rea∣sonable that he should be likewise permitted quietly to enjoy it: So that if he act by one Rule in relation to himself, and by another in respect of all other men, in the same Case, or Circumstances, this must be altogether un∣reasonable: And Mr. H. himself doth suffici∣ently shew the grievous mischeifs of such an unreasonable way of proceeding, when he tells us, That from hence it comes to pass; That where an Invader hath no more to fear than ano∣ther man's single Power, If one plant, sow, build or possess a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with Forces united to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the Fruit of his Labour, but also of his Life, or Liberty; and the Invader again is in the like danger of ano∣ther. To which I may also add, and he again of a third; till at last all the Owners of it be∣ing successively destroyed, the House or Seat will become void, and no man left to in∣habit it; which Condition Mr. H. himself

confesses to be so sad, and deplorable, that he will have Mankind from the Dictates of Rea∣son to do all they can to get out of it, by en∣tering into a Civil Society. But I suppose that right Reason will rather hinder all ratio∣nal men from ever falling into this State at all, if they can by any means avoid, or pre∣vent it; since Peace is to be valued from its own Conveniences without trying, or com∣paring it with the Evils of War, as Health is valuable for its own agreeableness to our Na∣tures, without trying by woful experience▪ what sickness is.

§. 5. And as for his next Passion, Diffidence of each other; That there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable as Anticipa∣tion; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other Power great enough to endanger him. And that this is no more than his own conservation re∣quires, and is generally allowed. Now can all this reasonably persuade a man to put himself in so hazardous a condition, as by force, or fraud, as to go about to master and subdue all those he will be afraid of; or to think he is able to do this by his own single strength till he sees no other Power great enough to endanger him? Since for any man to be able to do this, he must have more cunning, natural Strength

and Courage and Cunning, than ever Homer supposed Vlisses, or Achilles, to have been masters of; or our Modern Romance-makers can feign in their Heroes; Since upon these Terms of Self-preservation, a man (like a Game-Cock) would be forced to fight a Battel, or two, every day whilst he lived, and how long this would last, supposing other men of equal strength, and as well prepared as himself, I refer him to the experiment of fighting-Cocks, who seldom survive the twelfth or thirteenth Bat∣tel; and though it is true, that there are some that taking pleasure in contemplating their own Power in Acts of Conquests, which they may pursue farther than their own Secu∣rity requires; yet this was never known to be performed by any man's single strength, but by a Combination with divers others, who through the esteem they had of his Inte∣grity, or Courage, chose such a man to be their Leader, or Prince, before another: And this Account, both the Ancient Histo∣rians, and Poets, give us of the Original of the first Monarchs, and Ancient Kings, in the Heroical Times; and admitting the first Kingdoms to have begun by Fathers, or Patri∣archs of Families, as some Divines suppose, yet they could never have raised a sufficient Force to have conquered others, without the Com∣bination of the Heads or Fathers of other Fa∣milies:

Nor could Nimrod himself, (who is supposed the first Tyrant, or Conqueror,) ever have enlarged the Bounds of his Empire by his own single strength, or that of his par∣ticular Family, without such a Combination which requires Compacts between the Per∣sons that make it; and when they once do this, they are then no longer in the meer state of Nature, having set up and acknowledged a common Power over them to keep them in awe: from whence it appears, that it is ridi∣culous, nay absolutely impossible, for any sin∣gle man to take pleasure in contemplating his own Power in Acts of Conquest by his own personal Valour, or Cunning, as Mr. H. supposes a man may do in the state of Nature.

§. 6. And as for his appeal to Experience, That when a man taking a Iourney, arms him∣self; when going to Bed, he locks his Doors; when even in his House, he locks his Chests: And asks what opinion he hath of his Fellow-sub∣jects, when he rides armed, and shuts his Doors; or of his Children and Servants, when he locks his Chests; And whether he doth not thereby ac∣cuse Mankind as much by his Actions, as he doth by his Words? To all which I answer, No, he doth not. For though I grant it is no fault to distrust, and secure himself as well

as he can against violent and unjust Persons, either upon the Road, or in his own House; yet doth not this Diffidence accuse all his Fellow-subjects, or all his Children, and Ser∣vants, much less all Mankind, of a design to murther, or rob him; or give him any Right to make War upon them by way of anticipa∣tion; for when he goes armed, or locks his Doors, or Chests, 'tis true, he grants there are some violent and wicked Persons, whom he would secure himself against: yet doth not this accuse all Mankind of this wicked Design, since a man will do all this, if he be satisfied that there are but two or three Thieves be∣tween his own House and London; or but one thievish Person in his Family, which is but a small proportion to a whole Countrey, or Kingdom, or even to his own particular Fa∣mily▪ much less doth he thereby pass a Cen∣sure upon all Mankind: though it is true, he thereby acknowledges, that there is, and ever will be, amongst men, divers who are more governed by their present Appetites and Passions, than by Reason, or the Laws of Na∣ture. Much less doth such a diffidence give a man a right in the state of Nature of set∣ting upon, mastering, and killing all Per∣sons whatsoever, that he fancies have power sufficient to endanger him in his Life, or Goods, before they have given some suffi∣cient

signs that they intend so to do; for then it might be lawful (were it not for the Laws) for a man, when he is thus armed, to set upon, not only Thieves, but every man he meets, for fear he should set upon him first; nay, might likewise kill, or knock in the Head, (if he were in the meer state of Nature) any of his Children, or Ser∣vants, or even his Wife her self, if he did but fancy they went about to murther, or rob him; which how wicked and unreaso∣nable a thing it would be, I leave to any man's Reason and Conscience to judge. Nor does his comparing the state of War to the nature of Foul-weather, at all help him, which he saith, doth not lie in a shower or two of Rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: So the nature of War consists not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto: all which I easily grant, but he must likewise own that it is ne∣ver called a Rainy, or foul Season, till it hath actually rained; till then we ne∣ver say it is foul weather, though it be never so cloudy; so neither is this bare in∣clination to hurt, an actual War, till there hath been some signs or tokens of hosti∣lity expressed.

§. 7. Yet he grants there was never such a condition of War as this that he describes ge∣nerally all over the World: But that there are many places where men live so now, and Instances in many savage People of America; where, except the Government of small Fa∣milies (the concord whereof depends on Na∣tural Lust) they have no Government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner he hath before described: But were it so as he affirms that brutish way of living, which is in too many Particulars practised by these Sa∣vage People, both in Affrica, and America, where they have almost lost all knowledge of a God, or of a Moral Good and Evil; Ought the Practice of such Barbarous People to be of sufficient Authority to prove, that they live according to the true state of Human Nature, or that they have a right to live and act thus in all things they thus unreasonably practice? But had this Author read any true or exact relations of those Places in America he menti∣ons, he might have found that in many of those Nations,* 1.1 even, where there is no Civil Power to keep them in awe, and tho' they have no other Government in time of Peace, but that of the Fathers, or Heads of Families: Yet doth not their con∣cord wholly depend upon Natural Lust: For

besides the Government of Husbands over their Wives, and those conjugal Duties and Services which their Wives yield them in these Places; Parents are more fond of their Children, and Children again are more duti∣ful and kind to their Parents, and take more care of them when they are sick or old, than they commonly do with us: And though there be no Common Power to keep them in awe, yet having no Riches, but the meer necessary U∣tensils of Living, nor any Honours, except Mili∣tary, to contend for, and which are not obtained without great hardships and sufferings; and having also few Words of contempt, or dis∣grace among them; whole Towns, nay Na∣tions, have lived together for many Ages in suf∣ficient Amity and Concord, without ever fal∣ling together by the ears. And if there be a∣ny Murthers and Adulteries committed among them, every particular person injured, or else the Relations of the Party slain, are their own Judges and Executioners; the mu∣tual fear of which, joyned with the Natural Peaceable Temper of the People, causes fewer of those Crimes to be committed among them, than with us, where there are Laws and Pub∣lick Officers appointed to punish all such Inju∣ries: And for the Truth of this, I refer you to two Authors of undoubted Credit, (viz.) Le∣rius in his History of his Navigation to Brazil,

Chap. 18. and the French Author of the Na∣tural History of the Caribbè Islands, Part. 2d. Chap. 11. and §. 19. besides other Authors on this Subject, whom you may consult in Purchas's Pilgrimes, in his Volume of Ameri∣ca. And though these People have often Wars with their Neighbours, yet is it not with all, but only some particular Nations, with whom they have constant Wars, and eat them when they can take them Priso∣ners. Yet do they at the same time maintain Peace with all others. So remote is it from Truth, that any Nation in the World can live and subsist, by maintaining a constant War a∣gainst all others. Nor did I ever hear of any more than one People or Nation in the West-Indies, near Carolina, called the Westoes, that made this Fatal Experiment, by making war upon all their Neighbours, one after another, till they were in a short time reduced from 7000 Fighting Men, to 700, and were after∣wards quite extirpated by those Nations they had injured: Which Relation I receiv'd from a Gentleman of Quality, who hath a considerable Interest in those parts. So impossible a thing it is, for Mankind to subsist, or be preserved a year together in Mr. H's imaginary State of War.

§.8. Nor is his other Instance from the Actions of Kings, and Persons of a Soveraign Autho∣rity, any better, whom he makes like Gladia∣tors,

Having their Weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on each other; That is, their Forts, Garrisons and Guns, upon the Frontieres of their Kingdoms, and continual Spies upon their Neigh∣bours, which is a posture of War. Where I may first observe, that he doth not directly affirm, That all Princes are in a State, but only in a Posture of War, which I grant is both lawful and necessary: Since no Prince or Common∣wealth can be secure, that his Neighbours will constantly observe the Laws of Nature, and not invade his Territories, without any just cause given. Yet I think no Prince, or other Supreme Power (whom he makes the only Judges of Good and Evil) will be so wicked or unreasonable to affirm, that they have a natural right to invade the Territories, Lives and Estates of all Neighbouring Princes, and their Subjects; much less, when they have made Leagues or Compacts of Peace with each other, that they are not obliged to ob∣serve them, only for prevention that they may not do the like to them, and break their Compacts first: For that he himself confesses to be absolutely contrary to the Laws of Na∣ture, and of Right Reason. But that upon Mr. H's Principles such Compacts being made in the meer State of Nature, and without any Common Power to see them observed, do not at all oblige, I shall shew you more particu∣larly by and by.

§. 9. I come now to his last Passion, (viz.) Glory, for which he would have all men to be naturally in a State of War. But admit∣ting that divers men look that their Companions should value them at the same rate as they do themselves; and upon the least signs of Contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavour as far as they dare, to extort a greater value from their Contemners, which amongst them that have no Common Power to keep them quiet, may be enough to make them destroy each other. Yet doth not this hold true in every man; for even among those that labour under this Passion of Vain-glory, there are many in whom fear of others is a much more predominate passion, and such will rather take an affront, than venture to beat or kill another to revenge it: Since the hazard is certain, but the Victory (supposing the person every way his equal) uncertain. And if this Vain-glory may be so far mastered by another stronger Passion; why may it not also be overpowered by Reason? For a ratio∣nal man will consider, that he cannot force men to have a better esteem of his Words or Actions by fighting every one that shall de∣clare their dislike of them, or else knows that he is not at all the worse for the foolish cen∣sures of unreasonable men; or that he is ob∣liged to take for an affront, whatsoever every scurrilous impertinent Fellow shall intend so:

And he himself doth here likewise suppose, that there are other as strong Passions that incline men to Peace, as fear of Death, desire of such things as are necessary; commodious living; and a hope by their Industry to obtain them; from whence I observe, that the greatest part of these Passions which now incline men to Peace, are but the same in other words, which before inclined them to War: For what is this Diffidence of another, and this Anticipa∣tion, which he makes so reasonable, but a fear of Death, or other mischief, from those whom he thus goeth about to prevent? And what is this desire of things necessary for life, but a Branch of that Right which he supposes all men have to all things? But granting that the same Passions may in some men produce different effects; yet if these Passions that in∣cline men to peace are more strong and pow∣erful than those that excite them to War, then certainly Peace will be their more constant and Natural State: Since as Mariners relate the violent blowing of two contrary winds, doth often in the Center of their Motion pro∣duce a Calm. And therefore Mr. H. pro∣ceeds very rashly, to lay such a great stress on those Passions, which provoke men to War, without also considering, and putting into the contrary Scale all those that incline men to the contrary, which certainly are more pre∣valent

in most men: For what can more strongly influence mens Actions, than fear of Death, and all those other miseries which he himself so lively describes to be the necessary Consequences of the State of War: And whereas he tells us, that reason suggesteth con∣venient Articles of peace; I think I have suf∣ficiently proved, that Reason is so far from needing Articles of peace, that it can never prompt considering men to believe themselves naturally in so dangerous and miserable a State, as this which Mr. H. supposes; much less to fall into it on purpose, without any just cause given. But since this Author un∣dertakes to give us many Reasons why mens Passions will not permit them to live in peace as well as divers other Creatures, whom he confesses can do so without Laws; We will a little examine those Reasons he brings, Why mens Nature will not naturally permit them to live in peace, as well as those brute Crea∣tures; and therefore I shall put them down in his own Words, as you may find them in his Lev. Chap. 17.

§. 10. It is true, that certain living Crea∣tures, as Bees and Ants, live sociably one with a∣nother (which are therefore by Aristotle, num∣bred amongst Political Creatures) and yet have no other Direction than their particular Iudg∣ments,

and Appetites, not Speech, whereby one of them can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the Common Benefit. And there∣fore some men may perhaps desire to know why mankind cannot do the same? To which I an∣swer.

First, That men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these Creatures are not; and consequently amongst men, there a∣riseth from that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally War; but amongst these not so.

To which I reply, That these Civil Ho∣nours, about which he supposes these Con∣tentions do so often arise amongst men, have no place in the State of Nature, being not known amongst men, before the Institution of Commonwealths; and therefore they can∣not in this State, which he now treats of, con∣tend for them more than Brutes. So that the only true Glory and Honour which can be found, out of a Civil Government, is as Cicero very well defines it in his Tusc. Quest. the a∣greeing praise of good men, and the uncorrupted Suffrages of those that rightly judge of excellent Vertue. But all the Vertues being contain∣ed under the study of the Common Good of Rational Beings, from thence alone can spring the praise of good men: And the de∣sire of such Honour, is so far from causing a War against all men, that as from a contrary

Principle, men may by this be excited to the exercise of all those Virtues, which Mr. H. himself allows, Lev. Chap. 15. to be the necessary means of Common Peace and Safety.

§. 11. His Second Reason is, that amongst these Creatures, the Common Good differeth not from the Private; and being by nature inclined to their Private, they procure thereby the Com∣mon Benefit. But Man, whose joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish no∣thing, but what is eminent.

To which we may reply, that Mr. H. has done us a Courtesie, in acknowledging before he is aware; that even out of Civil Govern∣ment, there is some common and publick Good, which may be indeed procured even by Brutes themselves: And he has elsewhere also told us (as in his Treatise De Homine, Chap. 10. the very last Words) But we sup∣pose the knowledge of the Common Good, to be a fit means to bring men both to Peace, and Vertue; because it is both amiable in its own Nature, and the surest defence of each man's private Good. And sure its difference in some cases from the pri∣vate good of some men, is no sufficient Rea∣son why men should rather fall out and fight among themselves, than Bees or Ants, whose Common Good is likewise distinguished from

the private. But as for what he affirms, con∣cerning the Nature of men, if it be univer∣sally understood of all men (as his words seem to intend) 'tis false, and spoken with∣out all manner of proof, unless we must be sent back to his general Demonstration of these things in his Introduction to his Lev. when he advises every man to this Rule, Nos∣ce teipsum; and therefore would teach us from the Similitude of the thoughts any passions of one man to those of another, thereby to know what are the thoughts of all other men, upon the like occasion. Perhaps Mr. Hobbs knew himself very well, and was sensible there was nothing more plea∣sant to him, than comparing himself with o∣ther men, and so could relish nothing in him∣self, either as his own Natural Endowments, or acquired Improvements, but what was more eminent, and greater than other mens; and from thence gathered the same thoughts to be in all others: But he ought to have shewn something in the nature of man, from whence it is necessary that all men should so judge; for certainly all that are truly rational, can know from the true use of things, and from the necessity of their own Natures, how to judge concerning their own things, whe∣ther they are pleasant or not, and to what de∣gree they do delight them, without compa∣ring them with those of other men: So that in∣deed

none but the foolish or envious can only be pleased, as far as their own things exceed those of others. But if he would have this censure, only to concern such men, it will not then afford a sufficient cause of an Universal War of all men against all; And though per∣haps Strife and Contention may be begun amongst such envious, foolish People, yet the strength or reason of the more prudent and peaceable may easily restrain it, that it shall never hurt, or destroy all men, by ma∣king them enter into a state of War against all.

§. 12. His Third Reason is, That these Creatures having not (as man) the use of Rea∣son, do not see (or at least think they see) any fault in the administration of their Common bu∣siness: Whereas amongst men, there are very many that think themselves. Wiser, and Abler to govern the Publick, better than the rest; and those strive to Reform, and Innovate, one this way, another that way, and thereby bring it in∣to Distraction, and Civil War.

To which we may thus Reply, That this Reason offers nothing whereby men may live less peaceably among themselves, if they were in the state of Nature, and Subjects to no Civil Government, than Brutes: But in this state, mens Natural Propensions to uni∣versal

Benevolence, and to the Laws of Na∣ture, would have some place, notwithstand∣ing what he hath here alledged to the contra∣ry; as I have sufficiently proved in the pre∣cedent Discourse. Nor doth he here offer any thing whereby men could less agree among themselves to institute a Common∣wealth, for this is the thing whose causes we are now seeking for. But he only objects something, which will hinder them from pre∣serving it, when it is instituted; and there∣fore this will also shake all the foundations of Peace, even in a Commonwealth, when it is made never so firm according to his own model. But we do well to consider, whether mens Reason does not more powerfully pro∣mote Peace and Concord, by detecting ma∣ny errors of the Imaginations and Passions, than it doth Discord, by its fallibility about those things which are necessary, being but few, and those plain enough. Besides, men do not presently make War, as soon as they suppose they spy out somewhat they may blame in the Administration of publick Affairs; for the same reason which discovers the fault, does also tell them, that many things are to be born with for Peace sake, and sug∣ggests divers means whereby an emendation of that fault, or miscarriage, may be peaceably procured.

So that I dare appeal to the Judgment of the indifferent Reader, whether the conditi∣on of Mankind is worse than that of Brutes, because it is Rational; and whether Mr. H. doth not judge very hardly of all men, by making their Reason guilty of all these mi∣series, which in other places he imputes on∣ly to the Passions; and from this cause would prove that men must live less peaceably with each other than Brute Creatures. In short, Mr. H's Answer is nothing to the purpose, for our inquiry is concerning the obligation of the precepts of Reason in the state of Nature; and his Answer is, That most mens Reason is so false, as that it would dissolve all Com∣monwealths already constituted.

§. 13. His fourth Reason is, That these Crea∣tures, tho they have some use of voice in making known to one another their desires, and other affe∣ctions; yet they want that art of words by which some men can represent to others, that which is Good in the likeness of Evil, and Evil in the likeness of Good; and augment or diminish the apparent greatness of Good and Evil, discon∣tenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure.

The force of which Answer is no more than this; That because it sometimes falls out, that the common People are moved to

Mutiny and Sedition by a specious, or sophi∣stical Sermon, or Oration, that therefore men, as having the use of Speech, cannot maintain peace among themselves: which consequence is certainly very loose; for he ought to prove, that all men do necessarily and constantly make such Speeches, tending to Civil War, and Sedition; and also that such Speeches, when heard, do constantly prevail on their Auditors, or the most part of them, that they should presently take up Arms: For it may be, that even the Vulgar may see through such false and specious Speeches, and may not suffer themselves to be deluded by them. It may also happen, that they may rather give credit to the peace∣able Speeches of the more wise, and mode∣rate, as founded upon more solid Reasons: And it may be, that they will rather consider the true weight of the Arguments, than the empty sound of the Words; and certainly mens rational Nature leads them to do this; for they know they cannot be fed, or defend∣ed by Words, but by Actions proceeding from mutual Benevolence: What then doth hinder, but that the Eloquence and Reason of the Good and Peaceable may not often prevail, with which both the Reason of the Speaker, the true interest of the Auditors, and the nature of things do all agree; But I

shall speak no more of this Subject now, ha∣ving in the precedent Discourse sufficiently proved, That men receive much greater Be∣nefits from the use of Speech (though it may sometimes be the cause of Civil Discords, and Wars) than they do Evils and Mischiefs thereby. And I suppose Mr. H. himself (were he alive) would confess that Man∣kind would not be rendered more peaceable, or easie to be governed, had they been all created dumb, or else had all their Tongues been cut out by the irresistible power of his great Leviathan, the Civil Soveraign.

§. 14. His fifth Reason is, That irrational Creatures cannot distinguish between Injury, and Damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended at their Fellows: Whereas man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease; for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdom, and controul the Actions of them that govern the Commonwealth.

By which Antithesis, he would infer, That men live together less peaceably than Brutes, because they distinguish between Injury and Damage: But we think much otherwise; and that most men would more willingly suffer some damage, even done by other men, so it be not done injuriously. And I acknow∣ledge that all the distinction between these

two, is founded in the knowledge of Right, and Law, which indeed is only proper to men. But that this Knowledge should make them more prone to violate the publick Peace, and to trample upon the Laws and Rights of their Superiors, I can by no means admit; much less, that Subjects that abound in peace, and riches, are more apt to envy their Superiors, and to shew their wisdom in finding fault with their Rulers; or that the Subjects of England, for example, who (God be thanked enjoy both sufficient peace, and plenty) are more apt to find fault with their Governors, than those in France or Turkey, where they are poor and miserable by Taxes, and other Severities; or that they can even there forbear repining at the cruel Treatment of their Rulers, though perhaps their Spirits may be so debased, and their Powers so weak∣ned by this oppression, that they may not be so able to shew it by publick discourse, much less by resistance; and so free themselves from this Tyranny, as perhaps they would do if they had sufficient Riches and Courage. And that I conceive is the true reason why this Author is such an Enemy in all his Books to the happiness and wealth of the People, whom he would all along make Slaves instead of Subjects.

But suppose that the lawful Rights of Princes are sometimes violated by the unbri∣dled Lusts of some evil men, yet I do not see how this knowledge of the difference be∣tween those things which are done by right, and those which are done by wrong, do ren∣der them more apt to do Injuries to others. But he tells us, That man is then most trouble∣some, when he is at ease. But sure, it is not without Injustice, that he imputes the Faults of some men to all Mankind, and that with∣out any proof; unless, perhaps, finding such Passions in himself, he thence concluded that they must likewise be natural to all others, according to the method he makes use of in his Introduction to this Book; which I have before taken notice of, when he bids us exa∣mine this similitude of Passions, and so whe∣ther they do not agree with his own Thoughts. But I must freely confess they do not agree with mine; let me be but happy, and want nothing, and though others may be richer, or happier, I shall not envy them, nor am I at all the worse for it: But indeed Mr. H. does very preposterously to alledge this fault of mens love to shew their wisdom, and controul the Actions of them that govern the Commonwealth, against all Man∣kind; whilst he yet supposes men in the state of Nature, which sure (according to his

own Hypothesis) precedes all Civil Govern∣ment.

But we are now come to Mr. H's last Rea∣son; and let us see if he can thereby prove any better, That Mankind is less prone to Peace than Brute Creatures.

§. 15. Lastly, The agreement of these Crea∣tures is natural, that of Men is by Covenant only, which is artificial; and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides Cove∣nants to make their Agreement constant, and lasting; which is a Common Power to keep them in awe, and to direct their Actions to the common benefit.

To which I reply, That the true natural Causes intrinsical to Men as they are Animals, and which can bring them to consent to the exercise of Peace, and mutual Benevolence amongst themselves, are alike with those that are found in other Animals, even the fiercest, and cruellest, suppose Lions, or Bears, (if you will) as I hope I have sufficiently proved in the former part of this Treatise. Nor can Mr. H. shew any thing which is wanting to man, but yet is found in Brutes as a cause of their peaceable agreement; for that which he urges, That the Agreement of these Creatures is natural, that of men is by Co∣venant only, and therefore artificial, may

perhaps impose upon the Vulgar, but may easily be confuted by any one that will but consider to the next Consequence: For those very Compacts or Covenants he mentions, are made by the power, as well of mens Ra∣tional, as Animal Natures: And certainly if there had been no Covenants made among men, and that they had not the use of Reason, yet the common Nature of Animals of the same kind, would have had as much force with them, as with other Creatures, that they should agree to maintain a mutual bene∣volence, as well as Brutes of the same kind, without destroying each other, whose agree∣ment is by him acknowledged to be natural: What then hinders, but after there is besides added to Mankind Reason, and the use of Speech, but that the same natural agreement may still remain? Reason sure doth not take away the natural endeavours, and propen∣sions to Concord in Man, more than other Animals; neither is this agreement less natu∣ral, or constant, because it is expressed by words: As our Appetite, and taking in of Food, do not cease to be natural Actions in us, although we may express this Appetite by words, or signs; and may also appoint the time, place, and what sort of Meat we will eat. And Mr. H. himself (as well as others) does sometimes acknowledge Reason

to be a natural Faculty, as he does in his De Cive, in the place already quoted: From whence it follows; That this stricter Society or Agreement which Reason dictates should be established by Compacts, wholly proceeds from the rational Nature of Mankind. But it will farther appear, That this Agreement proceeding from the use of Speech, is there∣fore more fitly called natural, if we consider our practical Reason to be altogether deter∣mined from the nature of the best End we can foresee or propose; and the best means we can use thereunto. And farther, there is no∣thing more can be effected by the utmost en∣deavours of our Reason, than that those pro∣pensions to concord, with others of our own kind, (which are so natural to all Ani∣mals) should be directed to their fit object (viz.) all other rational Creatures, and that all our particular actions should be thence exerted according to their due place, time, and other circumstances. So that the very taking in of Meat, and Drink, is most natu∣ral, and proceeds from the natural constituti∣on of an Animal. Yet this in all particular ca∣ses, is best governed, and directed by a man's Reason, taking care of his own Health without any irregularities in his Diet; whilst those precepts of thus regulating his Diet, whose force and certainty he observes

from the Nature of things, and his own par∣ticular Constitution, may very well deserve in some cases, the name of an Art.

Therefore Mr. H. hath done very ill in making that agreement among men, which is expressed by Compacts, to be so artificial, as it must be quite opposed to what is natural.

I shall not indeed deny, those words by which Compacts are expressed, to have pro∣ceeded from the Arbitrary agreements of men: Yet that consent of their minds, con∣cerning the mutual offices of Benevolence, of which words are only the signs, is altoge∣ther Natural: For in that consent of minds concerning the mutual commutation of Du∣ties, consists the whole Nature of Compacts; as all its obligation proceeds from thence: But the knowledge and will of constituting some signs, either by words or Actions, whereby this sort of consent may be declared, is so natural, and easy to men, without any Teaching, that it may be observed in persons born Deaf and Dumb, as I have given some instances in the foregoing Di∣scourse. In short, this consent express'd by Compacts, concerning, these most general acts of Benevolence, which may be considered in any disquition concerning the Laws of Na∣ture, is either not to be called Artificial, or if it be so termed, that Term is so to be under∣stood,

as it agrees with all mens natural Con∣sents, and not as it may be opposed to them; that so it may become thereby less firm and durable, as Mr. H. supposes it; for the sig∣nification of a natural Consent, constituted by words, tho with some kind of Art, doth not at all diminish its firmness or duration; and therefore I think it doth sufficiently ap∣pear, that Mr. H. is very much mistaken, when he supposes that the agreement of Brutes of the same kind is more constant and natural than that among men; and that mens natural propensions to a Benevolence towards others, are not so strong in men, as in other Animals: So that I shall leave it to the im∣partial Reader, whether upon a due conside∣ration of his Answers, and our Replies, he will conclude, as this Author doth in his Treatise de homine, chap. 10. That men do ex∣ceed Wolves, Bears, and Serpents, in Cruelty and Rapacity, who are not rapacious beyond hun∣ger; which if he had affirmed of some men who are degenerated from all sentiments of humanity, had not been much amiss; but to affirm it of all mankind in general, is too severe and false a censure to be let pass: Whereas it must be at the worst, acknow∣ledged, That no general Propositions can be made, concerning the particular Passions and Humours of all men; since there is not only

a greater difference of Wit, but also a greater variety of Passions and Inclinations amongst men, than brutes; and that not only among whole Nations, but particular persons: For all the kinds of brutes have almost the like Inclinations, and are governed by the like passions and appetites; so that if you know one of them, you almost know them all; but in mankind, so many men, so many Minds, and so many almost several Humours and Dispositions: And which is more, the same man doth not only differ from others, but also oftentimes from himself; and that which at one time he mightily loves and ap∣proves of, at another he abhors and condemns.

§. 16. Yet so much I shall grant Mr. H. That men are tormented with many Passions unknown to Brutes, such as are Coveteous∣ness, Ambition, Vain-glory, Envy, Emu∣lation, or Strife of Wit, with the Sense of which Brutes are not at all concerned; all which I confess, do extremely hinder mens natural Peace and Concord: So on the other side, he hath not only several other Passions, that as strongly persuade him to seek and ob∣serve them, yet God hath also endued him with reason whereby from the consideration of his own Nature, and of other things, he may attain a knowledge of his Deity, and be there∣by

led to discover, that all the Laws of Na∣ture are not only bare dictates of Reason, but are also Laws truly established by the Will of God the Legislator, for his own Honour, and the Happiness and Preserva∣tion of Mankind; but so far I shall agree with Mr. H., that in any Country, where men live without any knowledg of a Law, either natu∣ral or reveal'd, that in all those places they are in as bad or worse state than Brutes can be imagined to be.

§. 17. To conclude, I cannot but take no∣tice, that Mr. H's Hypothesis labours under these great Absurdities. First, He supposes that in the State of Nature a man's Reason tells him, that his Self-preservation cannot be obtained without this War against all men; but afterwards finding by experience the fatal Evils and Mischiefs proceeding from this kind of Life, to have also by his reason found out, and then proposed those Condi∣tions of Peace, called Laws of Nature, in order to his own Happiness and Self-preser∣vation; as if right Reason could ever dictate contradictory or opposite means to this same end, such as are a State of War, and a State of Peace; a neglect and violation of all the Laws of Nature, as lawful and necessary for a man's safety in the State of Nature, and a

strict observation of them when once enter∣ed into a Civil State, for the same de∣sign.

Secondly, This Hypothesis is highly dero∣gatory to the Goodness and Providence of God; for if he were the Author and Crea∣tor of Mankind (as certainly he was) then whoever believes this * 1.2 Hypo∣thesis, must also believe that God contrived things so ill, that unless his Creatures had been more cunning and provident than himself, they must of necessity (like the Earth-born Brethren in Ovid's Metamorphosis, have perished by each others hands as soon as they were made. So that the preserva∣tion and well-being of Mankind would be entirely attributed to their own Wit and Cun∣ning, and not to God's Goodness or Provi∣dence, who must have sent his Creatures into the World in such an evil state as should oblige them first to seek their own mutual Ruin and Destruction, as the way to their Preservation. So that Mankind must owe all the happiness and comfort of their Lives, not to their Creator, but themselves: since with him the Laws of Nature, whereby they are preserved, were not given or established by God their Legislator, but are only so many Rules of Art or humane Wit, like other In∣ventions

of mens contriving, and still suppose man to be departed from that natural state of War in which God put him, into an Artificial one of Peace of his own making: But cer∣tainly the Deity that made us (if we suppose him Good and Wise) made us not to be mise∣rable (as Mr. H. himself confesses we must have been) had we continued in this state of War. So that to suppose God made us, and left us in that condition, it is directly to deny our Creator's Goodness. And then if we suppose him wise, we cannot imagine that he would frame a sort of Creatures only to destroy themselves, unless we can believe his only design was to sport himself in their folly and madness, in beholding them by all the ways and arts of Force and Fraud contri∣ving their own mutual Destruction. And therefore if the Creation of Man were the pro∣duct of the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, his Natural State must have been that of Peace, and not such a Condition as that which this Author supposes.

Lastly, Mr. H. doth himself ingenious∣ly confess, that he believes there was never actually such a state of War, as he supposes and describes: And therefore, tho I grant it is both lawful and usual for natural Philoso∣phers, who not being able through the imbe∣cility of our humane Faculties, to discover

the true nature and essences of Bodies, or other Substances, do therefore take a liberty to seign or suppose such an Hypothesis, as they think will best suit with the nature of the things themselves, of which they intend to treat; and from thence to frame a body of natural Philosophy, or Physicks, as Aristotle of old, and Monsieur Des Cartes, in our age have performed: Yet can we not allow the same liberty in moral or practical Philosophy, as in speculative. And therefore such a pre∣carious Hypothesis, as this of a natural state of War, is by no means to be admitted as the necessary consequence of that natural Right, which every man hath to preserve himself: For whether we consider Mankind to have been together with the world, gene∣rated from all eternity, as Aristotle, and the more modern Platonists did believe; or else to have sprung out of the earth like Mush∣rooms, as Epicurus of old, and Mr. H. in his De Cive suppose; or else as we (according to the Divine Revelation of the holy Scriptures) do believe, That Mankind was at first pro∣pagated from one Man, and one Woman, created for that purpose by God: Now let us at present suppose which of these we please to be the true Original of Mankind, we can∣not from thence with any reason conclude, that it was at any time such a state of War of

all men against all; for if, according to the first Hypothesis, we suppose Mankind to be Eternal, they were likewise from all Eterni∣ty propagated by distinct Families, and divi∣ded into several Nations, and Common∣wealths, as they are at this day: But if it be objected, that those distinct Nations or Commonwealths, were always such from all Eternity; Then it will likewise follow, that they were also from all Eternity in the same state they now are; that is, not of War, but Peace. But we shall further shew the absurdity of that Supposition, before we have concluded our Considerations upon this Head. So on the other side, if we pro∣ceed upon the Epicurean Hypothesis, of Man∣kind's springing out of the Earth; if we do not likewise suppose them to have been made like Game-Cocks, or those Earth-born men I have already mentioned, who presently fell a fighting, and destroying each other with∣out any Cause; it will not do the business: And therefore let us now with Mr. H. sup∣pose these men, being all made of equal strength, both of body and mind; it is plain, that they must be at first in a state of Peace, before they could ever fall together by the Ears; so then the state of Peace was Prior in Nature to that of War, and also more agree∣able to Human Nature.

2dly, Supposing these Earth-born men to have been all rational Creatures, and equal in strength and cunning, they would never have entered into a state of War, and have fallen a cutting each others Throats without some just Cause, or Provocation first given. For if they were all equal, every man would consider each of his Fellows as of a like ability with himself; and that if he struck him first without any cause, he would be as well able to resist, and make his party good with him, as he could be to hurt him; the fear of which would have rather caused Peace than War: Since whoever struck first, could not be sure of the Victory; And if any two should have fal∣len to Cuffs, this could be no reason for all the rest to have also fallen together by the Ears, since there was no cause why they should suppose a Will or Inclination in each other to War, till they had expressed it by some outward signs; so that this natural Equality among men, and mutual fear of each other, which Mr. H. supposes to be the chief causes of War, would certainly have rather inclined these men to Peace.

But if we follow the Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures, it is then certain, That all Mankind being derived from one Man, and one Woman, their Children could never be in this state of war towards their Parents,

by Mr. H's own confession; much less could the Parents ever be so unnatural towards their Children, who were made out of their own Substance; nor yet could the Brothers, or Sisters, who partake of the same Human Na∣ture derived from their Common Parents, and who were bred up together from their Infan∣cy in a state of Peace and Amity, be rational∣ly supposed presently to have fallen together by the ears without any other cause, or pro∣vocation given, than Mr. Hs Passions of mu∣tual distrust, and desire of glory: Therefore when after the Fall of Adam, man's Nature was degenerated into that state we now find it, wherein mens Passions, I own, do too often domineer over their Reason; and that Cain, through Malice and Envy, slew his Brother, as we read in Genesis. Of this state of War, as it is the first Example of man's Degeneracy, so it is also of God's dislike, and punishment of this cruel Sin of Murther, which is indeed but the effect of this Author's state of War.

But I beg the Reader's pardon if I have been too prolix in the confutation of this Prin∣ciple; this being the main foundation of all those Evil and False Opinions contained in this Author's Moral and Political Works: if therefore this is throughly destroyed, all that is built upon it will fall of it self. But since Mr. H. hath by his Supposition of certain

Compacts, or Covenants, undertaken to shew a Method how men got out of this wretched state of War; in which let us see whether his next Principle answers the Designs he pro∣poses.

PRINCIPLE VIII.

§. 1. That mutual Compacts of Fidelity in the State of Nature, are void, but not so in a Com∣monwealth.

WHich Principle he expresses and proves at large, in his de Cive, cap. in these words: But those Covenants that are made by Contract, where there is a mutual Trust, neither party performing any thing presently in the state of Nature, if any just Fear shall arise on either side, are void. For he who first performs, because of the evil disposition of the greatest part of men, only studying their own profit, no matter whether by right or wrong, betrays himself to the lust of him with whom he contracts: For there is no reason that any man should perform first, if it is not likely that the other will perform afterwards; which whether it be likely or not, he who fears, must judge, as it is shewn in the for∣mer Chapter, Art. 9. I say things are thus in the state of nature; but in a Civil state, where

there is one who can compel them both, he who by Contract is first to perform, ought first to do it. For since the other may be compelled, the reason ceases, for which he feared the other would not perform.

Which Principle is somewhat otherwise expressed in his Lev. chap. 14. which since it differs something from the other, in the manner of expression, I shall likewise give in you his own words. If a Covenant be made wherein neither of the Parties perform presently, but trust one another, in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of War of every man against every man) upon any reasonable supposition, it is void; but if there be a common Power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void; for he that performeth first, hath no assurance the other will perform afterwards, because the mere bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens Ambi∣tion, Avarice, Anger, and other Passions, with∣out the fear of some coercive Power, (which in the condition of mere Nature, where all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed); and he which performs first, doth but betray himself to his enemy, contrary to the Right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.

§. 2. You may now more plainly see the reason why he supposes in the foregoing Chapter, That all Kings and persons of So∣veraign Authority, are always in a posture, or state of War; which he more plainly ex∣presses in his de Cive, chap. 10. §. 17. in these words; But what are divers Commonwealths, but so many Garisons fortified against each other with Arms and Ammunition? Whose State, be∣cause they are kept in awe by no common Power, (altho an uncertain Peace, or short Truces may intervene) is yet to be accounted for the state of Nature, that is, for a state of War. From all which it is easie to deduce the grievous mis∣chiefs that would thereby happen to man∣kind. For in the first place these Civil Sove∣reigns he mentions, can never be obliged by any Covenants from making War upon, and ruining each other, nor can be accused for breach of Faith, or Infidelity, when they do so; for being still in the state of Nature, that will necessarily follow, which he lays down at the end of his former Chapter, as the con∣sequences of this state: To this War of every man against every man, this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Iustice and Injustice, have there no place; where there is no common Power, there is no Law; where no Law, no Injustice. Force and Fraud are in War the two Cardinal Vertues.

§. 3. So that you see upon these Principles it is altogether in vain for Princes to make any Articles or Covenants of Peace with each other; no, not if they swear to them never so solemnly; for in the last words of this Chapter he tells us, That the Oath adds nothing to the obligation; for a Covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath, as much as with it; if unlawful, binds not at all, tho it be confirmed with an Oath: So that if the Covenant could not oblige, the Oath will serve to as little purpose: What Princes will thank him for this Doctrine, I know not; but I hope it is not an Apology for the late actions of any Princes but the Ot∣toman Emperor, and our Christian Grand Signior on the other side the water; but if the state of Princes towards each other is so bad, that of the Subjects is much worse; for from these Principles the safety of all Ambas∣sadors, Merchants, and Travellers in the Territories of any Prince or State with whom we are at Peace, is thereby utterly ta∣ken away; nor can the Subjects be in a better condition than their Masters; for by this Author's determination, they are present∣ly Enemies as soon as they come under a Foreign Power: For such Princes being always in the state of Nature towards each other, it is a part of their Natural Right or

Prerogative, to force all those that are weaker to give a Caution of their future Obedience (and good behaviour) unless they will rather suf∣fer Death. For nothing can be imagined more absurd, than that he who being weak you have in your power, by letting him go, you may ren∣der both strong, and your Enemy. All which are his own words, in his De Cive, Cap. 1. §. 14. Nor can I understand what he means by a future Caution of Obedience, but the Submission of those who are thus seized up∣on, and their coming into the same Com∣monwealth, and subjecting themselves wholly to their Empire, who thus lay hold on them: For he tells us presently after, That a certain and irresistible Power confers a Right of Govern∣ing and Ruling those, who cannot resist it. So that if this Doctrine be true, in what an ill condition are Ambassadors, and other Strangers in foreign Countries now at League with us, any one may easily perceive. Well, but suppose such Strangers could or would submit themselves absolutely to these Foreign Powers, they may yet chuse whether they will accept it, since no Law of Nature, ac∣cording to Mr. H's Principles, can oblige Fo∣reigners to any outward Acts of Kindness or Mercy towards others, who are not of the same Commonwealth, since they may either ac∣cept of this their Submission, or else refuse it,

and put them to Death, tho otherwise never so innocent.

§. 4. But if Compacts with those of diffe∣rent Commonwealths, whether Princes or Subjects, are of so little force, let us see whether they will signify any more among those, who having agreed to renounce this State of Nature, are willing to transfer all their Power upon one, or more Persons, and so enter into his Commonwealth. Where, first, I desire you to observe, that these Pacts or Covenants, by which every Man renoun∣ces his Natural Right, are still made in the State of Nature, in which State, it is lawful for any Man to doubt of another's Fidelity; but whether a Man justly fears that another will not perform his part, he that fears, is the only Judge; and therefore Mr. H. con∣cludes, that every man hath cause to fear, whenever he is afraid. Which reason, if it were of any force, would infer, that not on∣ly those Compacts are invalid in which no∣thing is performed on either part; but also those in which any thing of any moment re∣mains yet to be done by either Party, for he who will not keep Faith any longer, may when he pleases pretend to be afraid, lest the other should break his Faith with him, and that very justly, whilst he himself is the

only Judge of it; and therefore his Reason (which is always supposed to be right) may not only tell him, that he need not perform his part of the Covenant, but also that it is absolutely void, if he thinks fit to make it so. But if any one will say, that he himself hath prevented this Objection by his Annotation to this Article; as also in his Lev. in this Chap. That the Cause of fear, which makes such a Co∣venant invalid, must be always something ari∣sing after the Covenant made, as some new fact, or other sign of the Will not to perform, else it cannot make the Covenant void. For that which could not hinder a Man from promising, ought not to be admitted as an hindrance of per∣forming. All which, tho it be very true, yet if what he hath already alledged in his foregoing Section be also true, it will not signify any thing; because he there tells us, that whether it is likely that he will perform, or not, he who is afraid, is the only Judge, (right or wrong, it is all one) and therefore this fear of another mans failing in his trust, may either arise from his calling to mind the false and evil Disposition of all men, which before the Compact he had not well consi∣dered, or else he may suppose any Act of the other Parties (tho never so innocent) to be a sufficient sign of his Will not to perform his part. Nor is there any thing in the State

of Nature, which can make such a timerous man secure of the Fidelity of others, for the performance of their Compact; be∣cause as Mr. H. tells us in his De Cive, Cap. 5. §. 1, 2. Cap. 7. §. 27. All the hope of security is placed, in that a man may prevent all others, either openly, or by surprise. So, that altho it appears that the Utility of observing of Compacts be never so manifest, yet cannot it by this Principle lay any firm Obligation upon mens minds, but that they may depart from them, whenever they will neglect or oversee this Utility, or that they think they may better secure their own interest by any other means; since the Will and Consci∣ence of man can never be so obliged by their naked Compacts, that they may not depart from, or act contrary to them, whensoever they think they may safely, and for their own private advantage do it. For the Obli∣gation will not only cease, if it shall please all those who have so covenanted to depart from their Covenants at once, as when men discharge themselves of them by mutual con∣sent: But supposing also this consent still to continue, the force of an Obligation will yet be wanting; for since that dictate of Reason of keeping Compacts, has not as yet attain∣ed the force of a Law, as being made (as I have already observed) in the meer state of

Nature; any single Person, according to his particular Humour, or predominant Pas∣sion of Fear, or Suspicion, or Self-interest, may depart from this dictate of Reason, tho the rest do not agree so to do; because no man according to Mr. H. in the Law of Na∣ture, can ever be tied by any Compact to quit the doing of that which he judges necessary for his own Interest, or Self-defence. For in the very beginning of this 14th Chapter in his Lev. he defines a Law of Nature to be a Precept, or general Rule found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his Life, or takes away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. So that for the preservation of a man's life, or whenever he thinks those Compacts may take away the means of preserving it, he may without crime fail in keeping his Com∣pacts either for Publick Peace, or the obser∣vation of Justice with his Fellow-subjects, or of Fidelity, or of Obedience to his Civil So∣vereign; who upon these Principles, is in no better a condition, nor so good, as any of his Subjects: Because Mr. H. doth not allow in his Leviathan, Cap. 18. of any compacts to be made between the Sovereign, and the Sub∣jects; who only Covenant one with the other, and not with him, to give up their

right of governing themselves to this man, or Assembly of men, and that they do thereby authorize all his Actions. So that since this Compact is made in the state Nature, and that this Law of keeping of Compacts, is only a dictate of Reason, and no Law; it can lay no higher obligation upon mens Consci∣ences in the state of Nature, than any other Law of Nature, which Mr. H. plainly tells us Chap. 17. In the state of Nature do not oblige, nor can the Common Power set over men, lay any obligation in Conscience upon them, why they should not break these Compacts towards each other, when ever they think it convenient: For since the Civil Sovereign can only oblige them to its outward observation by those Punishments as he pleases to appoint for such offences as are destructive to the Pub∣lick Peace, every man that will venture the fear of discovery, or being taken, or whenever he thinks he can make a Party strong enough to defend himself from those that would pu∣nish him for the breach of them; may safely, nay lawfully, transgress them, when-ever the awe, or fear of the Civil Sovereign ceases. So that it is evident there doth still need some higher Law, or Principle than this of meer Fear of the Civil Power to make men honest, or to keep their Compacts when they have made them.

§. 5. To Conclude, Mr. H. doth far ex∣ceed his Master Epicurus in this rare inventi∣on; for that old Fellow, one would think, had sufficiently shaken the foundations of all common Peace, and Justice, when he laid down in his ratis sententiis or established dictates, That there is no such thing as Iustice between those Nations who either could not, * 1.3, or would not enter into mutual Covenants that they should not hurt, or be hurt by each other; Yet however, he thought fit to leave the force of those Compacts unviolated, although there was no common Power over them, which might keep those Nations in awe. But Mr. H. that he might indulge as much as he could to his darling passion of Fear, hath also allowed men this Liberty, That in the state of Nature, Compacts of mutual Fidelity may by right be violated, without any other cause given than the fear or suspicion of the Party afraid.

PRINCIPLE IX.

The Law of Nature is not properly a Law, un∣less as it is delivered in the Holy Scriptures.

§. 1. WHich Principle he endeavours to prove in his De Cive Cap. 3. Art. the last, in these words: But those that we call Laws of Nature, being nothing else but certain conclusions understood by reason concerning the doing of things; (whereas a Law properly and accurately speaking, is the word of him that com∣mands something to be done, or not done by others); they are not Laws, properly speaking, as they proceed from Nature: Yet as far as they are given by God in the Holy Scripture, they are pro∣perly called by the name of Laws; Which likewise he hath more briefly contracted in his Levia∣than, Cap. 15. in these words: These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the Name of Laws, but improperly, for they are but Conclusions, or Theorems concerning what conduceth to the con∣servation and defence of themselves; whereas Law properly is the word of him, that by right hath a command over others. But yet if we con∣sider the same Theorems as delivered in the word of God, that by right commands all things, then are they properly called Laws.

§. 2. The Reason for which opinion he gives us in his De Cive Cap. 5 §. 1, 2, 3. in these words; It is self-manifest, that the actions of men do proceed from their Will, and their Will from Hope and Fear: So that as often as it seems, that a greater Good, or lesser Evil is like to happen to them, from the violation of Laws, men willingly violate them; therefore every man's hope of security and preser∣vation is placed in this, that he may be able to prevent his Neighbour either by his own force or art, openly or at unawares. From whence it is plain, that the Laws of Nature do not presently, as soon as they are known, give sufficient security to every one of observing them; and therefore as long as no caution can be obtained from the In∣vasion of others, that Primitive Right must still remain to every one, of taking Care of himself by all the ways that he will, or can; which is the Right of all men, to all things, or the Right of War; and it suffices for the fulfilling of the Law of Nature, that any one should be ready or willing to have Peace when it may be had with security.

§. 3. So likewise in his Leviathan, Chap. 14. tho he grants that the Laws of Nature ought to be observed, yet because they are contrary to our Natural Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like; and their Cove∣nants

without the Sword, are but Words, and have no strength to secure a man at all; there∣fore notwithstanding the Laws of Nature, if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will, and may law∣fully rely on his Strength and Art, for caution a∣gainst all other men. And in his 15th. Chap. of his Leviathan, he farther tells us, The Laws of Nature oblige in foro interno, that is to say, they bind to a desire that they should take place: But in foro externo, that is, to the putting them in Act, not always. For he that should be modest and tractable, and perform all he promises in such time, and place, where no man else would do so, should but make himself a Prey to others, and procure his own certain Ruin, contrary to the ground of all the Laws of Nature, which tend to Nature's Preservation.

§. 4. I have been the larger in giving you his own words in this place, because I could not well contract them without spoiling his sense; and also that you may the better see whether he be clearly answered, or not. In the First place therefore, if it be already made out in the precedent Discourse, that in this Proposition of endeavouring the Common Good of Rational Beings, are contained all the Laws of Nature, and that it doth like∣wise appear to proceed from God, from the

Nature of things, and those Rewards and Punishments he hath annexed to its observati∣on and transgression: Then notwithstanding what Mr. H. hath here said, this Law of Na∣ture is properly a Law; as having all the conditions necessary thereunto: But that which might lead Mr. H. into this Error, was, That all Writers upon this Subject, thought it sufficient to define the Law of Na∣ture to be only a Dictate of right Reason, without deducing its Authority from God, as a Legislator: Or if they have supposed God the Author of it, as Suarez in his Book de Legibus; and Grotius in his de Iure Belli & pacis have done: Yet they contented them∣selves with supposing, that God had impress'd these Idea's upon mens Souls, as so many in∣nate Notions, which they call the Light of Nature, without shewing us by some more plain or certain means (as our Author hath done in the preceding Discourse) how we may attain to the knowledge of this Law. The weakness, or precariousness of which Hypothesis being discovered by Mr. H. gave him occasion to suppose that the Law of Na∣ture was not properly a Law, for want of a Legislator; and farther, they having defined this Law of Nature to be a dictate of right reason, which seems only proper to revealed or Civil Laws, delivered in some set form of

words, Mr. H. hath here also defined a Law, To be the Word, or Speech of him who hath a Right to Command a thing to be done, or not to be done: And so the Laws of Nature not being delivered in any set form of words, cannot be upon these grounds properly Laws.

§. 5. But I think we have already suffici∣ently proved, that the Law of Nature, being to be collected from our own Natures, and that of other things without us, does not con∣sist in any set form of words, but in those true Notions or Idea's taken from the things themselves: And we have already shown, that Persons born deaf or dumb; are capable of understanding this Law, though they have not the use of words. And Mr. H. himself before he is aware, doth sufficiently confess this Truth in more places than one of his de Cive. For after he hath in the last Art. of his Third Chap. denied the Laws of Nature to be properly Laws, he begins his 4th. Chap. with these Words.

That which is called the Natural, and Moral, the same is wont to be also called the Divine Law, nor undeservedly; because Reason, which is the very Law of Nature, is immediately given by God to every man, as the Rule of his Actions, as also because the Precepts of Life which are

thence derived, are the same which are given by the Divine Majesty for the Laws of his Heaven∣ly Kingdom by our Lord Iesus Christ, and his Holy Apostles. Those things therefore which may be before understood by Reason concerning the Law of Nature, the same we shall endeavour to confirm from the Holy Scripture. So likewise in his 15th. Chap. Article 3. he tells us, That the Laws of God are declared after a Threefold manner. The First of which is by the Tacit Dictates of Right Reason: From both which places we may plainly collect, That if the Laws of Nature are Dictates of right Reason, and if the Laws of God and Nature, or Reason, are all one and the same, and that Right Reason is the very Law of Nature, and is immediately given by God to every Man as a Rule of his Actions, it will likewise as necessarily follow, that those Laws or Dictates of Reason are also Divine, since they proceed from God as a Legislator. Nor will it serve his turn to alledge, as he doth in his Leviathan 15. Chap. That the same Laws (viz.) of Nature, because they oblige only to a desire, and endeavour (I mean an un∣feigned and constant endeavour) are easy to be observed. For in that he requireth no∣thing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, as far as he can fulfilleth them, and he that fulfilleth the Laws, is just.

§. 6. This will prove a meer Evasion, if you please to consider, That unless the Laws of Nature regard the outward Actions of men, they cannot partake of the nature of Laws, nor do they carry any obligations along with them, because it is impossible to seek Peace with others, or to depart from our na∣tural Rights by any internal Act of the Mind alone, without outward Actions, and most of those Actions do in their own nature necessa∣rily regard, and concern others besides our selves. But if he should reply, that such Actions are improperly called Laws, for want of Rewards and Punishments: To this we may likewise return, That we have already fully proved in this Discourse, that they carry with them the true force of Laws, as con∣taining all the Conditions necessary thereun∣to. And he himself in his Leviathan, chap. 21. doth expresly acknowledge, and set down di∣vers of those natural Punishments which are appointed by God as natural effects of the Transgression or breach of the Law of Na∣ture. Which Passage, because I have alrea∣dy transcribed it in the Discourse it self, Chap. 3. I shall therefore refer you thither. But in short, If there be no Laws of Nature properly so called, in the state of Nature, it will likewise necessarily follow, that there is no such thing as Natural Rights properly so

called; And so his Right of all men to all things, and to make war upon all men, will be very improperly called a Right; for they cannot be properly so, but as they are grant∣ed, or permitted us, by some Laws properly so called, which in this state can only be those of God, or Nature.

§. 7. But we are weary of such Contra∣dictions, and therefore let us now farther ex∣amine the only Reason he brings why he de∣nies their obligation to external Acts in the state of Nature, (viz.) Because we cannot be secured that others will observe them in those things which are necessary to our preservation; [and therefore infers] that every man's hopes of his own Security are placed in this, That by his own Force or Wiles he may pre∣vent his Neighbour openly, or at unawares. This is that invincible Argument which seems strong enough in his Judgment to destroy all outward Obligations to the whole Law of Na∣ture. Yet I think for all that, it is easy enough to be answered. And therefore in the first place, we reply, That there is no need of sup∣posing such a perfect Security to be afforded by the Laws of Nature concerning other mens observing them, as must needs be free from all Fear, before we can be obliged to external Actions conformable to them; for

the Will of God, the first Cause, being known, whereby he establishes these Laws, there will arise a certain obligation to the per∣formance of such external Actions; though some men may be so wicked, as to break, or neglect them, and to practice evil and vio∣lent Actions towards those that would ob∣serve them.

But I shall now farther prove (notwith∣standing this Objection) that we are under a greater obligation to the Laws of Nature, than we are to the Civil Laws of our Coun∣try, to whose external obedience he will have all men whatsoever obliged. For all Persons, although they are not under the same Com∣monwealth, yet are all Members of the same more large Empire of God himself. Now it is most notorious, that those that are Subjects to the same Civil Power, cannot be perfect∣ly secure, either that their Fellow-subjects will observe all the Civil Laws, by abstaining from Murther, Robbery, or Rebellion, &c. or that the Civil Sovereign can, or will al∣ways punish all the Transgressors of his Laws, especially where Factions are potent, though he is never so watchful over the Publick Good. So that if to these cautious Men of Mr. H's Principles, it seems a sufficient Rea∣son for their outward obligation to the Civil Laws, if it appears more probable that the

Civil Sovereign both will, and can take care of the Authority of his Laws, by protecting the Obedient, and punishing the Refractory, than that he will forbear, or neglect so to do; it will likewise follow, That to all men who exercise true Piety, and Obedience to God's Natural Laws, their obligation to observe them will not prove the more infirm, though God doth not always presently, and immedi∣ately punish all the Transgressions and Viola∣tions of his Natural Laws; it being a suffici∣ent security to them of his Goodness and Ju∣stice, since he will certainly inflict more se∣vere Punishments upon their Transgressors, either in this life, or in that to come, than any Humane Power can do upon Offenders against their Civil Laws. So that if Mr. H's Argument were valid, not only the outward obligation of all Natural, but also of all Civil Laws, would be quite destroyed; since in neither State we can be perfectly secure, that all others will observe them; and indeed he demands that which is altogether impossi∣ble, when he requires an absolute and per∣fect Security concerning future voluntary Actions, either in a Civil, or a Natural State; which as such can be only con∣tingent.

§. 8. But if he will permit us to call that a State of security, which is the most free of any from the fear of future Danger, or Misery, we assert, That God has made it ma∣nifest to all men, by all those signs, (which we have already shown to be sufficient to evince our Obligation) that even out of a Civil Government, he shall be much more safe from all sorts of Evil, who shall most strictly and constantly observe all the Laws of Nature in his outward Actions, as well as internal Inclinations, than he who (ac∣cording to Mr. H's Doctrine) shall seek this Security by endeavouring to prevent, and assault all other men by force or fraud.

But it is necessary when we compare the dangers, or security of the good or just men, (which are only those who observe the Laws of Nature in their outward Actions) as also of the wicked or unjust, who do otherwise, to make a true Experiment, which of these will give most certain security; there is not only to be reckoned into this ac∣count, those Evils which may happen to them from the Violence of other men, but also those, which such wicked men bring upon themselves by their inconstant and unreason∣able way of living, as also by their inordinate

Passions, such as Envy, Anger, Intempe∣rance, &c. and moreover, all those Evils, or Punishments, which may with reason be feared from God, both in this Life, and in that to come; which also are to be compa∣red not in any one particular case, or in a few circumstances only, but in all those that may happen through the whole course of their Lives; for otherwise it is impossible, that we should truly judge which course of Life, either that of constant Justice or Inju∣stice would be more secure. But we have, I hope already, sufficiently made out, that their condition is much more happy and se∣cure, who observe the Laws of Nature in the whole course of their Actions, than those who act otherwise.

To which I shall only add, That altho Mr. H. himself, when he treats of the secu∣rity requisite to the outward Observation of the Laws of Nature, doth wholly insist up∣on a perfect security from the Invasion of other men, and affirms, Because it is not to be had in the State of Nature, that therefore no body is obliged in that State to outward acts of Justice, but hath still a right to all things, and of making War upon all Men; Yet in other places of his Book, as if he had forgot himself, he doth acknowledge (altho but sparingly) that he himself perceived that

there was a sufficient Obligation to an exter∣nal Conformity to the Laws of Nature, even out of a Civil State, lest we should fall into other Evils besides those which may be fear∣ed from the violence of men. As for Ex∣ample, when he endeavours to prove in his De Cive, Cap. 3. §. 2, 3. That Faith is to be kept with all men, he fetches his reason from hence, That he who violates his Covenant, commits a Contradiction, which he acknowledges to be an Absurdity in Humane Conversation. And therefore, if he can admit in this case, that it is better to observe, than to violate our Covenants, lest we should fall into a Contradiction; what reason is there, why we should not also universally infer the same consequence from the breach of every Law of Nature, and consequently an Obligation to all their outward Actions? So that it will be better to observe than to transgress them in the State of Nature, because their Viola∣tion doth still imply a Contradiction or Ab∣surdity in all Humane Society or Conversa∣tion; for whosoever will seriously consider the Nature of rational Agents, will acknow∣ledge, that all the Felicity possible for them, doth depend upon the Common Good and Happiness of the whole System, as its ne∣cessary and adequate Cause; and therefore every man ought to seek both of them toge∣ther;

for whensoever he transgresses any Law of Nature, he then separates his own private Good or Advantage, from that of the publick; which being contradictory ways of acting, must needs raise a Civil War, or Contest in a mans own Conscience, between his Reason, and his Passions, which must grievously disturb its Tranquility; which Evil, since it also takes away his Peace and Security, is no contemptible Punish∣ment naturally inflicted by God for such Offences.

§. 9. I shall now only propose two Rea∣sons more, whereby I think we may demon∣strate the falseness of this Argument of Mr. H. The first is, That Presumption of the Civil Laws, both in our own, and all other Kingdoms, which sufficiently declares what Judgment Civil Sovereigns (whom this Author makes the only Judges of right or wrong) have made of Humane Nature; to wit, that every one is presumed to be good, until the contrary be proved by some out∣ward Action, and that made out by suffici∣ent Proof or Testimony; and therefore, if their Judgment be true, he must own all other men ought not to be esteemed as Ene∣mies, or so wicked as he is pleased to sup∣pose; so that they may be set upon and

killed, tho never so innocent, for any pri∣vate mans security. And this Presumption is more strong against Mr. H. because he founds that Security, which he acknow∣ledges to be sufficient in Commonwealths, upon those Punishments by which the Su∣preme Powers can restrain all Invaders of other mens Rights; but it is certain, that no Punishments are inflicted in Civil States, unless according to the Sentence of some Judges, who always give Sentence according to this Presumption. This therefore is either a true Presumption, and so able to direct our Actions in the State of Nature, or else even in Commonwealths there is not to be found a sufficient security by the Laws made and Punishments inflicted according to this Presumption; and so neither Civil Laws themselves do oblige us to outward Acts, and thus every Commonwealth would soon be dissolved. But since we are satisfied, that publick Judgments given according to this Presumption, do for the most part render mens Lives secure enough, and certainly much more safe, than if all who are arraign∣ed at the Bar were presumed to be Enemies, and according to Mr. H's rule of prevention, should be all forthwith condemned to suffer as guilty; therefore it also follows, that the private Judgments of particular men con∣cerning

others, made according to this Pre∣sumption, do more conduce to the security of all men, than this Authors rash Presump∣tion of the Universal Pravity of all men, and would thence persuade us that all others in the State of Nature are to be prevented, and set upon by force and fraud.

§. 10. A second reason to prove, that the violation of the Laws of Nature, as to out∣ward acts, will procure us less security than their exact observation, may be drawn from hence, That Mr. H. himself confesses, there will thence necessarily follow a War of all men against all; which War being once sup∣posed, he rightly acknowledges, that all men would become miserable, and must presently perish: From whence it appears, that all security is sought for in vain, by this mad state; so that there can remain no more hopes of it; tho Mr. H. teaches otherwise in his de Cive, cap. 5. §. 1. and Lev. cap. 13. viz. That in the mutual fear of men, no body hath a better way of security, than by this anticipati∣on or prevention; that is, every one may endea∣vour so long to subject all others by force or fraud, as he sees any man left, of whom he ought to be∣ware; that is, as long as there is one man left alive; and so the whole earth would soon become a desart, and the common sepulchre

of mankind; for no man can provide any aid or assistance for himself from other men in this state, because Covenants of mutual Faith, by which alone others can be joined in Society with him, will not oblige to ex∣ternal acts in this state, as I have shewed he acknowledges; and therefore there remains no security by this way of anticipation: So that if there be any security in Nature, I ap∣peal to the reasons and consciences of men, whether this is not more likely to be had by the endeavour of the common Good of Man∣kind, by doing good and not evil to those who have done us no harm, than by Mr. H.'s me∣thod of Anticipation which can yield no secu∣rity at all.

PRINCIPLE X.

That the Laws of Nature are alterable at the Will of the Civil Soveraign.

§. 1. THis is a natural consequence from what he hath already laid down, That nothing is morally good or evil in the state of Nature, before the Institution of a Commonwealth. Yet that you may see that I do not impose upon Mr. H. in this Asserti∣on, I will give you his own words, in his de

Cive, cap. 14. §. 9, 10. But because it arises from Civil Laws, that as well every one should have a proper Right to himself, distinct from that of another, as also that he may be forbidden to invade other mens Properties, it follows that these Precepts, Honour thy Parents, Thou shalt not defraud any man in that which is appointed by the Laws; Thou mayest not kill a man whom the Laws forbid thee to kill; Thou shalt avoid all Carnal Copulation forbidden by the Laws; Thou shalt not take away another mans Goods without his consent; Thou shalt not frustrate Laws and Iudgments by false Witness, are all Civil Laws. It is true, the Laws of Nature prescribe the same things, but immplicity; for the Law of Nature, as is said before, Cap. 3. §. 2. com∣mands Compacts to be observed; and therefore, also to yield Obedience when Obedience was co∣venanted; and to abstain from what is anothers, when it is defined by the Civil Law, what it is; but all the Subjects do Covenant from the Consti∣tution oi the Commonwealth, to yield Obedience to his Commands, who hath the supream Power, that is to the Civil Laws. For the Law of Na∣ture did oblige in the state of Nature, where first of all where Nature gave all things to all men, nothing was anothers, and therefore impos∣sible to invade it; and in the next place, where all things were common; therefore also all Carnal Copulations were lawful. Thirdly, Where

there was a state of War, it was then lawful to kill any man. Fourthly, Where all things were determined by a man's own Iudgment, therefore also were the Honours and Duties due to Fa∣thers. Lastly, Where there were no publick Iudgments, therefore there was no need of gi∣ving Testimony either true or false; since there∣fore the Obligation to observe those Laws, is pri∣or to the Promulgation of them, as being con∣tained in the very constitution of the Common∣wealth, by vertue of this Law of Nature, which prohibits the violation of Compacts; the Law of Nature commands all Civil Laws to be obser∣ved. For where we are under an Obligation to Obedience, before we know what will be com∣manded, we are there universally, and in all things obliged to obey; from whence it follows, That no Civil Law which is not made in reproach to God, (in respect of whom, all Common∣wealths are not at their own Disposals, nor can be said to give Laws), cannot be against the Law of Nature. For altho the Law of Na∣ture prohibits Theft, Adultery, &c. Yet if the Civil Laws should command you to take away any thing from another, or to lye with any Woman; that is not Theft, Adultery, &c. For the Lacedemo∣nians of old, when by a certain Law, they per∣mitted their Boys privately to take away other people's Goods; they then commanded those Goods not to be the Owners, but theirs who thus stole

them. And therefore such a private taking, was no Theft. In like manner, the promiscuous Co∣pulation of Sexes amongst the Heathens, ac∣cording to their own Laws, were lawful Mar∣riages.

§. 2. There is nothing that Mr. H hath written more rudely and wickedly, and wherein he more contradicts himself, than in this Assertion, concerning the mutability of the Laws of Nature, as to outward Actions; since he himself tells us immediately after, That the Laws of Nature are immutable and e∣ternal; and that Injustice, Ingratitude, Arro∣gance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of Persons, and the like, can never be made lawful: for it can never be that War shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it. But how the Laws of Nature can be immutable, and yet alterable as to outward Actions, at the Will of the Civil Soveraign, I cannot comprehend.

But since we have already destroyed those two main Principles introductive to this, (viz.) That no Action is good or evil in the state of Nature, till either the revealed Law of God, or that of the Civil Soveraign hath made it so; and also that the Laws of Na∣ture are not properly Laws in the state of Nature; Let us now examine the only reason he here gives us for this Assertion, which is

this; That the Law of Nature which prohi∣bits the violation of Compacts, commands all Civil Laws to be observed; since our O∣bedience to the Supream Powers is one of the first Compacts that men made at the Institu∣tion of the Commonwealth; granting all which to be true, yet was it not absolutely, or in all things, that this Obedience was promi∣sed, but only in such as regard the publick good of the Commonwealth, or tend to the common Good or Preservation of Mankind; for if the Civil Soveraign should make a Law, that every one might knock his Father in the Head, when he came to such an Age, and marry his Mother, or rob any other man, tho' his dearest Friend, of all the necessaries of Life: All these wicked Actions will be∣come lawful to be done, nay, every man were obliged to do them, if the Law of Nature commanded all Civil Laws to be ob∣served without distinction; but he here tells us, That no Civil Laws can be against the Law of Nature, which are not made in direct reproach to God. And upon this Principle no Law can be so, but what directly denies his Exi∣stence; since in his Leviathan, Ch.—he makes even Idolatry lawful, if it be once command∣ed by his infallible Leviathan, the Supream Power: But if Mr. H. had but read and considered any ordinary System of Ethicks,

he would have found, that it was one of the first Principles in that Science, that the Laws of Nature (like the moral Vertues) are so nearly linked, and have such an inseparable dependance upon each other, that the first and prior Laws of Nature can never be con∣tradicted by the latter, or secondary. And therefore tho' it is true, that Compacts are to be observed by the Law of Nature, and that Obedience to the Commands of the Ci∣vil Soveraign, is one of those Compacts which men make when they institute, and enter into a Commonwealth, or Civil State; yet were those Promises of Obedience only made concerning such things, which the Laws of Nature have commanded, or permitted to be done, in order to the common good of rational Beings. I grant therefore, That the Civil Laws of every Commonwealth, as they may appoint what outward Rewards or Punishments they please for the Observati∣on or Transgression of the Law of Nature; and also in order to this end may ordain what outward Acts shall be called Murder, Adul∣tery, Theft, &c. yet doth it not therefore follow, That they have a Power to alter the Nature of all moral Actions, and so make a new Law of Nature; tho' I own they may enlarge or restrain their exercise in some par∣ticular Actions or Instances. But since this

is best cleared by examples, I shall here give you some of each sort. First, Therefore tho' our Laws give leave to men to converse alone with married Women without any Crime, yet in divers Countries it is not so, But whoever is found alone in the Company of another man's Wife without his leave, it is lawful for the Husband to kill them both; because such private Congresses being esteem'd as bad as downright Adultery, the Punishment of it is left as it was in the state of Nature, to the discretion of the Husband: But doth it therefore follow, That the Su∣pream Power might make a Law, whereby it may be lawful for a Husband to kill every man that should but happen to look upon his Wife, because he may at the same time commit Adultery with her in his heart? So likewise by our Law, the Husband is to be esteemed the Father of all Children which his Wife shall bring forth, if he were within the English Dominions at the time when the Child was Begot, though he were at that same time an Hundred Miles off, and though the Mother should assure the Child, that not her Husband, but another man were really his Father; Yet is not such a Child obliged to believe her, or to pay any Duty or respect to that Person, though he be really his Father: But will it therefore follow,

that the King and Parliament may make a Law, That no Child whatsoever should Ho∣nour and Obey his Parents. But to come to the Author's last instance of the Lacedemoni∣an Boys; I will not deny but it might be law∣ful for the Spartans (as the Egyptians likewise did) to make a Law, That private Thefts com∣mitted without discovery, or violence to mens Persons, should not only alter the Pro∣perty in the things stolen, bu also pass unpu∣nished; since this may very well consist with the Publick Peace and safety of the People, and may also tend to the Publick good of the Commonwealth; since it might not only make men more careful of their Goods, but might also serve to make those Boys more crafty, secret, and undertaking in greater matters, when they should come to be men; which as Plutarch tells us, was the main reason why Licurgus made this Law: But does it therefore follow, that either the Lacedemonians or Egyptians might have made it Lawful for Thieves and Robbers to assault all mens Persons, and take away their Goods by Force, or to Rob men of those things (such as Food and Rayment) which are absolutely necessary for Human Life, or that such a Law could ever have been made practicable, or have been observed, without the absolute dissolution of the Civil

Government? Whereas if Mr. H. had but considered the distinction between that Natu∣ral and Civil Property, which we have made out in the first Chap. of the preceding Discourse, he had never fallen into this Er∣ror, of supposing all Theft or Robbery what∣soever to become Lawful, if once ordained so by the Supreme Power.

§. 3. I shall give you but one instance more from the Laws of our own Kingdom, by which it is enacted, That who∣ever shall relieve a way going Beggar, * 1.4 shall forfeit Ten shillings to the Poor of the Parish; which Law was made for the Publick Good, and to prevent Wandering, Idleness, and Beggary in the Poorer sort of People. But doth it therefore follow, that it might be Lawful for the King and Parliament to make a Law against all Charity, or Relief of the Poor whatsoever? So that you may see, that no Civil Laws whatsoever, can lay any obligation upon mens Consciences, but as they either regard the publick Good of the Commonwealth, or the more general good of all Rational Beings.

§. 4. But whether Mr. H. fell into this Er∣ror for want of a due knowledge and conside∣ration

of this great Law of Nature; or else out of a desire to flatter all Civil Sovereigns, is hard to determine; though it be very sus∣pitious, that he did it rather out of design than ignorance; since he teaches us in his de Cive, and Lev. That Princes being free from all Promises and Compacts to their Subjects, may dispose of their Lives and Fortunes at their pleasure, and therefore can do them no inju∣ry, though they treat them never so cruelly, because he is in respect of them still in the state of Nature; by which means he at once endeavours to destroy all Virtue and Goodness in Princes, and all Reverence and Respect in the minds of their Subjects; and makes no difference between a Nero or Caligula, and a Trajan or an Antonine. And consequential to this, he likewise makes the will of the Su∣preme Power, though perhaps but one single man, to be the only measure of Good and Evil, Just and Unjust: So that whatever he Commands or Forbids, must immediately be look'd upon as Good or Evil, because he hath Commanded it, or Forbidden it; by which means, Princes would have no other Rules left them of their Moral, or Politick Acti∣ons, but their own Arbitrary Humours, or Wills: Which if it were so, men would be in a much worse condition under the Power of this irresistible Leviathan, than they were

in the state of Nature; since a man is in more danger, as to his Life and Fortune, who is at the Mercy of one Cruel and unrea∣sonable man, who commands an Hundred thousand men, than he who was before in danger of the violence of an Hundred thou∣sand single men in the state of Nature, since it was Lawful for him to have provided for his own security by combination with others, which in a Civil state it is upon his Principles unlawful to do; though I confess, not being true to them, he leaves every man a Right of self-defence, or Resistance, even under a Civil Government whenever he is strong enough to Rebel, or Resist the Magistrate, by which means he takes away with one hand, all that he had before bestowed with the other.

§. 5. But I think I have now sufficiently exposed the Falseness, as well as Wickedness of those Principles: And though I will not be so uncharitable as to affirm, that either Mr. H., or all his Followers, either did, or would always act according to them, (yet as Cicero long since observed in his Offices) they have more reason to thank the natural good∣ness and generosity of their own Natures, than the Doctrines they have embraced, if they do not. But if I have been too tedious

in the performance, I hope the Reader will pardon me, if these pernicious Principles are sufficiently Confuted at last, since it is im∣possible for any man to judge of their Truth or Falsehood, without first considering the Author's Opinion, in his own words, and then strictly examining the reasons he brings for them; which could not well be contract∣ed into a less compass. But having not on∣ly, I hope, laid foundations for a more solid building in the precedent Discourse; but also cleared off that Rubbish in this second Part, that might obstruct its Evidence in the minds of all Candid and indifferent Readers; I shall therefore beseech God, the great Ruler of mens hearts and affections, That what we have said in this Treatise, may have that good effect, as if not to produce, yet at least to increase true Piety towards God, and good Will and Charity among men.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  V•• Jo. Lerius Hist. Brasil; as also the French Histo∣ry of the Ca∣ribbè Islands.
• * 1.2

  Vid. Dr. Par∣ker's Ecclesiastical Policy, Chap. 4. p. 126, 127.
• * 1.3

  Vi. Diog. Laert. in vi∣ta Epicuri.
• * 1.4

  Stat 7. Jacobi. Cap. 7.