A brief disquisition of the law of nature according to the principles and method laid down in the Reverend Dr. Cumberland's (now Lord Bishop of Peterboroughs) Latin treatise on that subject : as also his confutations of Mr. Hobb's principles put into another method : with the Right Reverend author's approbation.

PRINCIPLE I.

Man is not a Creature born apt for Society.

§. 1. MR. H. in his Philosophical Ele∣ments, or Treatise De Cive, Chap. 1. §. 2. lays down, and maintains this Principle, and gives certain specious Reasons for it; which because they are somewhat te∣dious, and divers of them very trivial, I shall rather chuse to contract them, than be at the trouble of transcribing all that he hath loosely enough laid down for the maintenance of this Assertion; referring you, if you doubt whe∣ther I rightly represent his meaning, to the Author himself in the place above-cited.

He there in the first place supposes, that Man is not a Sociable Creature, because it could not be otherwise in Nature, but only by accident; for if Man loved Man naturally, there could be no rea∣son

given why every one should not love every one alike, as being alike Man; or why he should rather frequent those in whose Society Honour and Profit is conferred, rather on himself, than others. Therefore we do not by nature seek Companions, but to be either honoured, or profited by them. These in the first place; but those in the se∣cond; And this he thinks he hath sufficiently proved, by shewing us for what end men herd to∣gether, and what they do when they are met; for if they come together for Commerce-sake, every one minds not his Companion's, but his own In∣terest. If for Publick Affairs, there arises a certain Court-friendship, having more of mutual fear than love; from whence often Faction, but never Good-will is produced. If for the sake of Mirth and Pleasure, every one is wont to please himself in those things which raise laughter; from whence he may (as it is the nature of what is ridicu∣lous) by the comparison of another's weakness or in∣firmity, become more acceptable to himself: And he there proceeds to shew from several Observa∣tions he had made in the Companies he had kept, That all men that converse together either for the sake, or the instruction of others, do only seek Company for their own profit, or glory, and not the good of others; that is, for the love of himself, not of his Companions: And therefore since Man can never seek Civil Society, only out of a desire of glory; and although the Profits and Conveni∣ences

of life may be encreased by mens mutual assi∣stance, yet since that may be much better procured by a dominion over others, than by their Society, no body can doubt, but that men are more vehemently carried by their Nature, when fear is removed, to dominion, than Society; therefore it is to be laid down for a Principle, That the original of all great and lasting Societies did not proceed from the mutual Benevolence of Men, but their mutual Fear; And by Fear, as he tells us in the Annota∣tion to this Paragraph, he doth not mean only to be frightned, but under that word Fear, he com∣prehends any prospect of a future Evil, as to distrust, suspect, beware, and to provide that they may not fear, to be also the part of those who are afraid.

§. 2. Having given you the Author's Sense, and in great part his own words; I shall now proceed to make some Observations upon them; and in the first place must observe, That the main strength of his Arguments consists in the ill, or false use of these words, unapt for Society. For if he only understands by them, that Men are born actually unapt for Civil So∣ciety, because they are Infants, or else unex∣perienced of the Evils proceeding from the Wants thereof; this is indeed a great disco∣very, and worthy a Philosopher, that Chil∣dren, or People without experience, are not

able to understand the meaning or force of Compacts; or are unable immediately to en∣ter into a Civil State. Nor is his Reason any better; That though Infants and persons of full Age, though unexperienced, partake of Human Nature; yet being thus unapt for So∣ciety, Man is not made fit for it by Nature, but Discipline.

§. 3. From whence I observe, That he only takes the measure of Humane Nature, from those Passions which precede the use of Rea∣son, Experience, and Discipline. And as they first and chiefly shew themselves in Chil∣dren and Fools; or persons unexperienced. Whereas, according to the Opinion of the best Philosophers, we suppose the truer na∣ture of Man, ought rather to be taken from his utmost Perfection, viz. his Reason, or the power of deducing Effects from their Cau∣ses; by which alone, he is distinguished from Brutes: And so the Will may incline us to those things, which Reason shall judge most fit and convenient for our Natures. And therefore Mr. H. doth very absurdly, to op∣pose Experience, and Discipline, to Nature; since whatever men learn by either of these, they must still attain to it by the force of their Rational Natures, and those Faculties of Rea∣son and Speech, which Brutes are not capable

of: And therefore the nature of a Creature is best judged of from the utmost Perfection it attains to: As the Nature of a Plant is not to be taken from its first appearance, or as soon as ever it peeps out of the Earth, but from its utmost state of perfection, when it comes to bear Flowers, Seed, or Fruit. And even that Ex∣perience, to which Mr. H. attributes all our Reason, he himself grants to be a natural, and not acquired Power: See his Leviathan, Chap. 8. where treating of Intellectual Ver∣tues, he hath these Words; The Intellectual Vertues are of two sorts, Natural, and acqui∣red. By Natural, I mean not that which a man hath from his Birth, for that is nothing else but sense, wherein men differ so little from one ano∣ther, and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst the Virtues. But I mean that Wit, which is gotten by use only, and experience, without method, culture, or Instruction.

§. 4. To conclude this Head, I desire those Gentlemen of his Opinion, to take notice, That all Philosophers, and Writers of Poli∣ticks, as well as Mr. H. were not ignorant how unfit Infants, and Grown Persons, with∣out experience, or labouring under any unruly Passion, were to enter into Leagues, or Com∣pacts; or to perform any of the Duties of a Civil Society: But yet for all that, they sup∣posed

man to be born for those ends; which by the force of his Rational Nature, he may at last attain to, unless something preternatu∣ral (such as are those disorderly Passions, or Diseases of the Mind) intervene: And Iu∣venal's Saying is as old as true; Non aliud Natura, aliud Sapientia dictat. And sure it is a childish Inference, and favours more of So∣phistry, than true Philosophy, to say, Men are born Infants, and therefore unapt for Civil Soci∣ety. Since any Country Fellow could have taught him better, who thinks his Son born apt to be a Plough-man, or a Grasier, though he knows he will not be able to hold the Plough, until he is twelve or thirteen years of age▪ Nor yet to understand Grazing, until he is a∣ble to ride and go to Market.

§. 5. But let us now more particularly exa∣mine the Reasons this Author there gives us, why Man is a Creature naturally unapt for So∣ciety, which he will have to be only by accident; Because if one man loved another naturally as man, there could be no reason why every man should not love every man alike; or wherefore he should ra∣ther frequent those in whose company he is most likely to get Honour and Profit. Therefore we do not naturally seek Companions, i. e. for their own sakes; but either to gain Honour or Prosit by them: These in the first place; but those in the Second, &c.

In answer to which, I grant indeed, that particular persons, when they joyn with o∣thers, in any Society or Company, do usual∣ly consider some peculiar end, either of Profit or Pleasure; which may thence redound to themselves. Yet doth it not therefore follow that Man is not a Creature designed by God for Society; or that he is not obliged by the Laws of Nature, or right Reason to be friend∣ly and sociable even to those from whom no present advantage can be expected. For tho' it be granted, that men either from a peculiar agreement of dispositions, or that they sup∣pose they can sooner obtain some particular end or advantage, in some mens Conversati∣on than others; and do therefore prefer such mens Company before others; yet does not this prove, That man is not naturally a Soci∣able Creature: Since he himself grants, That men can neither live comfortably, nor be so much as bred up, or preserved, without the help and society of others.

Therefore if he is determined to the end, viz. happiness, and self-preservation, he is likewise as necessarily determined to the means, (viz.) Society. And his inclination to this or that man's company more than others, is no more an Argument against our Natures re∣quiring Society, than if I should argue▪ That because I love Mutton better than Veal▪

therefore it is not from my nature, but only by accident, that I am ordained to preserve my life by eating. And as for the instances which he gives, to let us see with what intent men meet together, from what men do when they are met. It is plain that Mr. H. here confounds that natural Society, which is ab∣solutely necessary for man's preservation, with these particular Clubs or Companies, which men keep for their greater pleasure or advan∣tage▪ And though I have already granted, that some mens particular profit or pleasure may be promoted or increased, by frequent∣ing some mens Companies, rather than o∣thers; as suppose there be a greater agree∣ment of Dispositions; or that we have been more used to this or that man's Company by Education, or long acquaintance, &c. And though it be likewise granted, that a man does more frequent their Company, among whom he finds most honour and profit. Since every man may lawfully pursue his own plea∣sures and advantages (if he knows rightly how to judge of it.) Yet this doth not at all contradict man's sociable nature, provided the Common Bonds of Society be not broken and disturbed, by any mans more particular Interests or Inclinations; and God has not so designed us to good for others, as that we should neglect all care of our selves; but that

this sociableness is therefore to be observed by mankind, that by a mutual communication of humane assistances, and other natural goods, between divers persons, we may more conve∣niently promote our own pleasure or advan∣tage jointly with that of others; Since a mutual love and benevolence, is to be obser∣ved among men, though not otherwise rela∣ted to each other, than by the common relati∣on of Humanity, and with whom we may preserve a sufficient concord, by doing them good, rather than hurt, whenever it lies in our power. And though a man, when he joyns himself with some particular Company, will in the first place consider his own pleasure or profit, before that of his Companions: Yet ought he not so to consult his private ad∣vantage, as that the good of the Civil Soci∣ety, or of Mankind in general, be thereby pre∣judiced, by injuring any of its particular Mem∣bers: And a man as well in Natural, as Mo∣ral and Civil Actions, may propose his own pleasure or profit, in the first place, though he may also intend some higher or nobler end of his thus acting. Thus a man who intends to marry, may lawfully propose to himself his own pleasure and satisfaction; though the great end of Marriage, (and which he may also chiefly intend) be the propagation of Mankind. So likewise a Master or Tutor that

instructs others, may lawfully propose to himself his own profit or advantage thereby; though he may also ultimately intend the in∣struction of his Scholars, or Pupils (that is, the Common Good of Mankind) as the great end of his taking that Profession. So like∣wise in Civil Societies or Commonwealths, a man may propose to himself his own Secu∣rity, Profit, or Honour, as a reason why he bestows his time and labour, or ventures his life in the service of the Publick: And yet he may farther propose to himself the love of his Countrey, or the good of the Common∣wealth, as the great End of his Actions.

§. 6. So that it is to little purpose, which Mr. H. alledges, That the original of the greatest and most lasting Societies, to wit, Commonwealths, did not proceed from mutual Good-will, but mutual Fear; (the Word Fear being used for any fore-sight, or precaution of a future Evil.) For we are not here considering the original of Civil So∣cieties, but of that natural sociableness a∣mong men, which we look upon as most ne∣cessary and agreeable to the nature of man; though some particular men being also sensi∣ble how obnoxious they were to the Inju∣ries of those who sought their own pleasure or profit, without any consideration of the

interest or good of others, did, to prevent them, unite themselves together in that stricter League of Amity, called Civil Socie∣ty. So that this Common Amity or Benevo∣lence, cannot be omitted to be first supposed, even in the very constitution of Common wealths: Since those who founded them, must have been before united, either by some natural relation; and a mutual confidence in, or benevolence towards each other; although perhaps, others might afterwards, out of fear of their Power, or a liking of their Government, be compelled or allured, to joyn or associate themseves with them.

§. 7. But as for those Instances Mr. H. gives us of those that seek Society only to censure the Lives and Actions of other men; thereby to gain Glory to themselves, from the Follies or Infirmities of those they converse with; Such sort of Conversation, consisting for the most part of some idle ill-natured men, who count themselves Wits, and have little else to do, but to speak ill of, and censure others, does not concern the major part of Mankind; who needing each others Society, for more necessary occasions, have commonly other Business to discourse of, when they meet.

§. 8. As for the rest of those things he says, That the Necessaries of life may be much bet∣ter procured by dominion over, than by the Society of others, that is altogether false, and precarious; since no man by his own single strength, and without the voluntary help or society of others, could ever yet subdue, and make Slaves of all other men he met with: And therefore if any man ever increased his natural power or advantage over others, it was not by vertue of his own sole power or strength, but by mens deference to his Va∣lour, or Vertue, when they chose him for their Head, or Leader; or else that they fol∣lowed him, and obeyed his Commands as their Father, or Grandfather, out of reve∣rence to his Wisdom, or Gratitude for his Benefits.

§. 9. To conclude, He himself there objects, that men cannot grow up, or live contented∣ly without the society and assistance of others: And therefore cannot deny, but men desire the society of each other, their Nature compel∣ling them thereunto. But to come off from this Objection, he will have nothing called Society, but Commonwealths; which, says he, are not meer Meetings, but Leagues, for making of which Compacts are necessary. And therefore still argues, that Infants, and

those that are unexperienced, are uncapable of them, &c. Upon which I shall only ob∣serve, That Mr. H. imposes upon himself, and others, by confounding that first, and most natural amity, and sociableness of Persons of one and the same Family, as of Husband and Wife, Parents and Children, &c. towards each other, with that artificial Society, which proceeding wholly from Compacts, we call a Commonwealth: So likewise he imposes on his Readers in the use of the words Nature, and Natural (as I have partly shewn already) for by these words is commonly understood, either something that is by Nature insepara∣bly proper to its subject, as to a Fish to swim; and other things are natural and proper to a Creature, not as a meer Animal, but as of such a Species, and at such an Age; as for a Man to go upon two Legs, and speak. Lastly, It sometimes signifies an aptness in a Subject to receive some farther perfection by culture and discipline, with which Nature intended it should be endued. So the Earth is intended by Nature for the production of Vegetables; yet it doth not naturally bring forth all Plants in all places alike, without Plowing, or Set∣ting; yet are not these Plants so sown, or set, less natural for all that: So likewise I have already proved, that whatever perfection we attain to by the power of our Reason or Ex∣perience,

it is not less natural notwith∣standing.