Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE V. Nothing is good or bad, but what we know, or con∣cerning which we can deliberate.

1. THe great measures of morality are, Chuse the good, and eschew the evil: before these can be chosen or avoided they must be consider'd and dis∣cern'd. And therefore those things concerning which there can be no de∣liberation are neither morally good nor bad, and those persons who cannot deliberate, can neither be vertuous nor vicious; but the things may be law∣full, and the persons be innocent, but both of them negatively, that is, the things are not evil, and the persons are not criminal. And therefore S. Paul celebrating the immense love of God to mankind, says that God would have all men to be saved; and in order to this, he addes, he would have all men come to the knowledge of the truth, as knowing this to be the onely way: no man can be sav'd unlesse he knows saving truth, but every man may be sav'd unlesse it be his own fault; and therefore there is to every man reveal'd so much truth as is sufficient to his salvation. It may be this saving truth is reveal'd by degrees, and so that he who hath the first general propositions of nature and reason, and uses them well, shall have more, even so much as is necessary untill he comes to all sufficient knowledge. He that comes to God (saith S. Paul) must believe that God is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him. This is the Gen∣tiles Creed, but such as at first will be sufficient to bring them unto God; whether when they are come he will give them his Holy Spirit, and teach them whatsoever is yet necessary. I am not here to dispute what is likely to be the condition of Heathens in the other world: it concerns not us, it is not a case of Conscience: but we are sure that all me have the Law of God written in their hearts; that God is so manifested in the creatures, and so communicates himself to mankind in benefits and blessings, that no man hath just cause to say he knows not God. We see also that the Hea∣thens are not fools, that they understand arts and sciences, that they dis∣course rarely well of the works of God, of good and evil, of punishment and reward: and it were strange that it should be impossible for them to know what is necessary, and stranger yet that God should exact that of them which is not possible for them to know. But yet on the other side, we see infinite numbers of Christians that know very little of God, and very many for whom there is no course taken that they should know him; and what shall be the event of these things is hard to tell. But it is very certain that without a mans own fault, no man shall eternally perish: and therefore it is also certain that every man that will use what diligence he can and ought in his circumstances, he shall know all that in his circum∣stances is necessary; and therefore Justin Martyr said well, voluntate igno∣rare illos, qui res ad cognitionem ducentes hebent, nec de scientia laborant.

Every man hath enough of knowledge to make him good if he please: and it is infinitely culpable and criminal that men by their industry shall be∣come so wise in the affairs of the world, and so ignorant in that which is their Eternal interest; it is because they love it not.

Non aurum in viridi quaeritis arbore, Nec vite gemmas carpitis: Non altis laqueos montibus abditis Ut pisce ditetis dapes,

No man looks for Emeralds in a tree, nor cuts his vines hoping that they will bleed rubies or weep pearls. Which of all the Heathens or Christians ever went to take goats in the Tyrrhene waters, or look'd for Crystall in a furnace? Many know what pits have the best Oysters, and where the fat∣test Tortoise feeds.

Sed quonam lateat quod cupiunt bonum Nescire caeci sustinent: Et quod stelliferum trans abiit polum Tellure demersi petunt,

and yet they look for immortality in money, and dig deep into the earth, hoping there to find that blessednesse which their reason tells them dwells beyond the starres. Men have enough of reason and law put into their hearts by which they read the will of God; and therefore no man can in the universall lines and measures of salvation pretend ignorance: I am sure we cannot, and that is all that concerns us. And therefore ignorance in the Law of God, in that which concerns our necessary duty, is so far from ex∣cusing any thing it causes, that it self is very criminal. Non est levius omnino nescire quod liceat, quam facere aliquid quod scias non licere, To doe somethings that we know to be unlawfull, is not so great a crime, as to be wholly ignorant of what is and what is not lawfull. So that since the great end why God hath given us liberty and election, reason and under∣standing, is that by these we should serve him and partake of his felicities, it follows that in all that is of necessity to our salvation God is not wan∣ting to give us sufficient notice; and of good and evil in general every man that hath the use of reason does or may understand the rules and diffe∣rences.

But if we descend to particular rules and laws, the case is different. So Gregory Nyssen said, Universalium secundum electionem non esse invo∣luntariam ignorantiam, sed particularium, A man cannot against his will be ignorant of the universal precepts that concern our life Eternal and Ele∣ction, but of particulars a man may. That a man must not oppresse his brother by cruel or crafty bargains every man ought to know: but there are many that doe not know whether all usury be a cruelty or oppression, or in any sense criminal. But concerning these things we may better take an estimate by the following measures.

Of what things a man may or may not be innocently ignorant.

1. No man can be innocently ignorant of that which all the Nations of the world have ever believed and publicly professed; as that there is a

God; that God is good and just and true; that he is to be worshipped; that we must doe no more wrong then we are willing to receive or suffer. Because these things and the like are so conveyed to us in our creation that we know them without an external Teacher; and yet they are so every where taught, that we cannot but know them, if we never consulted with our natural reason.

2. No Christian can be innocently ignorant of that which the Catho∣lic Church teaches to be necessary to salvation. The reason of this is, be∣cause every one that knows any thing of God, and of heaven and hell, as every Christian is suppos'd to doe, cannot but know it is necessary he learn something or other in order to it; and if any thing, then certainly that which is necessary: and of that nothing can so well judge, nothing can teach so readily as the whole Church; for if the whole Church teaches it as ne∣cessary, then it is taught every where, and at all times, and therefore to be ignorant of such things can never be suppos'd innocent.

3. Of that which is by several Churches and societies of wise and good men disputed, a man may be innocently ignorant; for there is suppos'd dif∣ficulty, and obscurity, and every degree of these is the greatest indication that there is not of them any absolute necessity. What God hath made necessary to be known, he hath given sufficient means by which it can be known. But because every man cannot dispute, and of them that can, very many doe it to very little purpose, and they had better let it alone, and by disputing men often make more intrigues, but seldome more manifesta∣tions of what is obscure; it is certain that which cannot be known but with some difficulty and more uncertainty, may be unknown with very much innocence.

4. Those things which doe not concern good life, and the necessities of this world and of the other, are not of necessity to be known by every one; because there is beyond these no common and universal necessity. But beyond these.

5. Whatsoever concerns every mans duty in special, to which he is specially oblig'd, of that he cannot innocently be ignorant, because he hath brought upon himself a special obligation of a new duty, to which he must take care that sufficient aides and notices be procur'd. Thus must a Bishop understand not onely the articles of faith, but the rules of manners, not onely for himself, but for those which are under his charge; he must be able to instruct others in the mysteries of religion, and to convince the gainsayers; that is, he must have knowledge sufficient to doe what God re∣quires of him, and what himself hath undertaken. * But then as there is in the duty of every Christian, so there is in the charge of every office, some things that are primely necessary, some things that are onely usefull, and some for ornament, and some for excellency and perfection. So that as of every Christian so much knowledge is requir'd, that he be not igno∣rant of what is necessary for his great calling, but of other things lesse ne∣cessary there is lesse knowledge requir'd; so it is in every special calling. For although a Bishop must know how to teach sound doctrine, and to re∣prove evil manners; & if he knows not these things, his ignorance is crimi∣nal: yet a Bishop may be innocent and laudable though he be not so learned

as S. Gregory Nyssen. Valerius the Bishop of Hippo was a good man and a good Bishop, yet he was not so instructed and able as his successor S. Au∣stin; and Nectarius of Constantinople was accounted a good Patriarch, yet he was very far short of S. Chrysostome. Of what is more then of simple necessity, some may be innocently ignorant, but yet very few are. Because God hath not confin'd his providence and his spirit to the ministery onely of what is merely and indispensably necessary: and therefore when God hath largely dispensed and open'd the treasures of his wisedome and hea∣venly notices, we should doe well not to content our selves with so much onely as will keep us from perishing. Therefore that the Conscience may be directed how far it's obligation of inquiry does extend, and may be at peace when it inquires wisely whether the duty be done, these are the best measures whereby we can take account.

What diligence is necessary that our ignorance may be innocent.

1. Our inquirie after things necessary must have no abatement or di∣minution, nothing lesse then that it be so great and diligent as that the work be done. Because whatsoever is necessary is sufficiently communi∣cated, and without that we cannot doe our duty, or receive the felicity de∣sign'd for us; and in that where God's part is done, if the event answer not, it is because we have not done our part, and then we are not innocent. So that in these inquiries we are no otherwise to make a judgement of our diligence then by the event: whatsoever is lesse then that, is lesse then duty.

2. But in things not absolutely necessary, such which are of conve∣niency and ornament, of advantage and perfection, it is certain we are not tied to all diligence that is naturally possible: and the reason is, because these things are not simply necessary, and therefore not of necessity to be ac∣quir'd by all means. Adde to this, if a man were bound to use all dili∣gence to acquire all notices that can be usefull to him in his general or in his special calling, he should fall under a perpetual rack of Conscience. For considering that a mans life were not sufficient to doe this in some callings, and it is necessary in this world that a man doe many things more then the works of his office, he could never be suffer'd to attend to any necessity but what is mere and indispensable and indivisible, and never use any diver∣tisement, recreation, variety or ease, but he must first be tied upon the wheel, and feel the pains of a doubting and tormenting Conscience, by rea∣son of the impossibility of knowing whether we have done all that we can.

3. In acquiring notices concerning doing any work with advantages a moral diligence is necessary: for he that stops at the gate of simple necessi∣ty hath some love to himself, and great dread of God, but no love to him; for love cannot consist with a resolution of knowing no more then we must needs; to get so much and no more will well enough serve the ends and the design of fear, but not of love: and therefore although the man that does so is innocent as long as he is in that state, and as long as that state is ac∣ceptable; yet because the state of fear is but the state of infancy and imper∣fection, it must proceed further, or be imperfect for ever; that state will not be accepted long. For if a man does his duty in that state, he shall be

enabled to goe further; and then he must, or else he sins by despising the spirit of grace. But if he does not doe his duty in the first state, then he must not in that state of carelesnesse and neglect of using moral diligence pretend that he is innocent. A man that hath been blessed in his first at∣tempts must still follow the method and Oeconomy of the Divine spirit; that is, as God increases in aides, so the man must increase in diligence and labour, and must use what means are before him to doe still better and better.

4. In acquiring notices not simply necessary, a moral diligence is suffi∣cient. This is an immediate consequent of the second Rule, and therefore needs not particular confirmation, but explication rather.

Therefore by Moral diligence is to be understood such a diligence in acquiring notices as can * 1. consist with our other affairs, and the requi∣sites of our calling and necessities; * 2. such as is usual by our selves in the obtaining things which we value; * 3. such which is allowed by wise men, such which a spiritual guide will approve; * 4. and such as we our selves doe perceive to be the effects of a real desire. For there ought to be no∣thing of scruple or vexation in the acts of this diligence, nor in the inqui∣ries concerning it. And therefore if we are sure we desire to know what we can, and doe towards it such like things as we doe in the purchase of other things which we greatly value, we may be at peace. For this thing does not consist in an indivisible point, it is not just thus much, neither more nor lesse; but it is more or lesse according as our love is and our lei∣sure, our opportunities and abilities: and if we cannot judge concerning our selves so well as to rest in peace, let us ask a spiritual guide, having first declar'd to him the narrative of our life and actions whereby he shall be enabled to make a judgement.

What is a probable ignorance?

Upon this account we can also give the measures and definitions of a probable ignorance, that is, such an ignorance which is next to an invincible or an irremediable ignorance: this the Schools call probable. For as the invincible ignorance is a mere nescience, and is either of such things which we are not bound to know, because God requires them of no man; or of such things which we cannot know, because we never heard of them, and are not taught sufficiently, and so God will not require them of us: so next to this stands the probable ignorance, that is, when the things are pro∣pounded to be known, and can be known if we would use all our natural and possible diligence; but yet because God hath not plac'd them in a neces∣sary order to salvation, he hath not tied us to use all our natural diligence, but some diligence he does require, which when we have us'd, and yet misse, the ignorance is probable. Now when that is so, we shall learn by the pro∣portions to the description of the parts and requisites of a moral diligence, and by these following measures.

1. Then our ignorance is probable, when we enter upon the action without temerity, and yet without doubt or trepidation; that is, when our addresse is with consideration, but we find no reluctancy against the action,

nor remorse after it. For then it must be that we have faith, and doe it with a good mind, not against our Conscience; and yet having no fierce∣nesse of passion or fancy, and a mind wary enough to discern any objection that is near, it will be very probable that there is none at all but what stands a great way off, and therefore farre enough from disturbing the innocence of the action.

2. But this is to be understood onely in the ordinary accidents and traverses of our lives. But if it be in matters of great concernment, such as are above our ordinary imployments, as if it be in the actions and duties of an eminent office, it is not sufficient that we have no regret or remorse, but we must have an actual consideration, a plain perceiv'd deliberation and counsel, and then no regret. It is not here enough that we have nothing against it, but we must have something for it, because in such persons and in such accidents the processe ought to be more then ordinary; that as there are greater abilities requir'd to the performance of that office, so there may be a proper use and exercise of those abilities. And there is in this a great evidence of truth. For in ordinary things, it is very often so that they are well enough if they have not evidently any evil in them. But in the actions of public imployments things are not so indifferent; they doe hurt unlesse they doe good, they are scandalous if they be suspicious; they are design'd always to doe benefit, and if they doe not they cannot be justified, and therefore they must be look'd on with an actual consideration: in which state of things it is certain that every thing will occurre that is obvious to be considered; and what it not obvious to such persons is indeed very difficult, and may well be suppos'd to leave a probable and very excu∣sable ignorance.

3. This also is to be extended to the case of confident asseverations, and confirming any proposition with an oath, in which no man can have a probable ignorance, but he that hath us'd a diligence of inquiry so great as to give confidence great enough to an oath, which must be of a thing so sure, that nothing can be a cause of doubt, unlesse some secret and undis∣cerned thing, to which a great and proportionable diligence hath not ar∣riv'd and made discovery, doe accidentally intervene. No man must swear a thing is so, and yet at last say, I did bonâ fide suppose it so: but I examin'd it, I search'd as well as I could, I entred into all the corners of it, I had great reasons to believe, I had fair assurances it was so, and I every day am assur'd of many things of which I had lesse testimony. If beyond this any thing escapes him, the ignorance is probable and excusable. But the rule is the same as at first: He is sufficiently and innocently confident, who hath no distrust, and upon inquiry finds no cause of distrust; always provided that the inquiry be in proportion to the dignity, and difficulty, and duty of the occasion and subject matter.

By the use of these premisses it will be easy to determine Plato's Case of Conscience which he propounded to Hippias the Sophister. Whether is the better or worse, he that sins willingly, or he that sins by folly & igno∣rance? of them that wrastle, whether is the more inglorious, he that falls willingly, or he that is thrown in despite of himself and all his strength? whether foot is better, that which halts upon designe, or that which halts with lamenesse? whether were it better for a man to have a fool or a knave

to his servant? But this discourse of Plato concerns arts onely and sciences. But Hippias answer'd well, It was not so in vertues; the differences of which Plato did not seem to discern, but Aristotle afterwards very well explicated. The sense of which in order to the purpose of the present Rule is well ex∣pressed by Seneca; Vis scire quam dissimilis est altarum artium cognitio & hujus? In illis excusatius est voluntate peccare quam [casu,] ignorantiâ: in hac maxime culpa est, sponte delinquere. If a Grammarian speaks a soloe∣cisme on purpose, he blushes not; but if ignorantly, he hath reason to be asham'd. If the Physician knows not what his patient ailes, it is more shame to him then if he on purpose names a wrong disease. At in hac parte vivendi, turpior volentium culpa est; But in manners to erre willingly is the more intolerable. The reason of these things is plain, which who please may read ina Gifanius the interpreter of Aristotle, andb Marsilius Fi∣cinus the expositor of Plato: for indeed it is evident that to moral actions the rectitude of the appetite is requir'd, not so to arts and sciences and the vertues intellectual. It is enough to art that the work be well done, though with what mind it matters not as to that: and when the Italian painter, who was to depict a Crucifix, hir'd a slave to be tied to a Crosse, that he might lively represent a body so hanging and so extended, did afterward stab him to the heart, that he might see and perceive every posture and accent and little convulsion of a dying man, he was very much the worse man for it, but no whit the worse Painter; as appear'd by the incomparable excellency of that piece; and the principles of Art cannot be corrupted with the evil manners of the Man: but because evil desires pollute the manners, the will is to be taken care of, as the principle of all morality. To which we may adde that he who in arts erres willingly, can mend it when he please; but so cannot he that erres ignorantly. Ignorance is the onely disparagement of his art, and malice is the onely disparagement of our manners.

But this, though disputed to little purpose amongst the Philosophers, may be of good use in Cases of Conscience. Cardinal Campegius having wickedly said to the Senate at Norimberg, that it was worse for a Priest to marry then to fornicate, offer'd in justification of it a reason that could lesse be justified. For (saith he) the Priest that fornicates knows he does amisse, and therefore may in time repent; but the Priest that marries thinks he does well, and therefore will never change his mind, he will never re∣pent. It is true, he needs not, because he believes he does well; and he is not deceiv'd. But suppose he were deceiv'd, and abus'd by error, what man before him was ever so impious as to say that he that knows he does evil is in a better condition then he that erres with a good mind, & supposes he does very well? For the present, the state is infinitely different: & for the time to come, which is the more likely to obtain mercy, he that does a thing ignorantly, or he that does it maliciously, we shall not need to appeal any whether but to all the notices of vertue and vice which are in mankind.

Indeed there are some sins of ignorance, that is, such which are sub∣jected in the understanding, which are worse then some sins of malice, or such which are subjected wholly in the will and the faculties which obey it. Thus to be ignorant of the fundamental articles of faith is a worse state of things then to have committed an act of gluttony, or to have en∣tertain'd a wanton thought, or to have omitted Divine service upon a Fe∣stival. They Jewes had an opinion that thoughts were free, and God did

not require them of us with severity; but a thought against faith, that was highly criminal. Cogitationem pravam Deus non habet vice facti, nisi concepta fuerit in Dei fidem atque religionem, said R. David Kimchi; mea∣ning that no sin was greater then heresy, or an error in faith. But the rea∣son of this is, not onely because the effect of heresy is, like the plague, infectious and disseminative; but because by how much the articles of faith are more necessary to be believed, by so much is the ignorance of them more criminal, and more voluntary, and therefore lesse excusable. But even in matters of faith, where there is lesse of malice or wilfull negli∣gence ingredient into the ignorance of them, there the crime is lesse then any thing else, be the instance what it will. But this will be more expli∣cite in the sequel.

Notes

• 1.
• 1 Timoth. 4.
• Bo••th. lib. 3. de Consol. Phi∣los.
• Seneca.
• 2.
• lib. 5. de Phi∣losoph. cap. 2.
• 3.
• 4.
• 5.
• 6.
• 7.
• 8.
• 9.
• 10.
• 11.
• 12.
• 13.
• 14.
• 15.
• 16.
• l. de Mendacio.
• lib. 6. Ethic. cap. 5.
• Epist. 98.
• a

  in l. 6. Eth. c. 5.
• b

  in Hippia minor.
• 17.
• Sleidan. lib. 4.
• 18.
• in Psal. 66. v. 18.