Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE IV. An involuntary effect proceeding from a voluntary cause is imputed to the agent, as if it were volun∣tary and directly chosen.

HE that is Husband of the wife is justly presum'd to be the Father of the child,* 1.1 and he that chuses the cause must own all those which are the ef∣fects and proper productions of it; and all causes are not immediate and contiguous to the effect. He that drinks himself drunk that without fear and shame he may fornicate, though when he fornicates he hath not the use of his reason any more then of his modesty, and cannot deliberate, and therefore cannot chuse, yet he is guilty of fornication as well as drunken∣nesse. He that eats high and drinks deep that in his sleep he may procure pollution, is guilty of that uncleannesse as well as of that excesse, which S. Paul intimates in those words, Make not provision for the flesh to fullfill the lusts thereof; that is, what you design as the purpose of your intemperance, is your crime, though it be a natural effect when things are by your choice so disposed:* 1.2 and when our Blessed Saviour commanded us to take heed of surfeting and drunkennesse, he forewarned us as well of the effect as of the cause; for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, surfeting hath it's name from the event, because it causes dissolutions of the nerves and dilutions of the brain, and consequently palsies, which when we have contracted, we are by our own fault disabled in the service of God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, surfeting is the product of yesterdayes debauchery: and since the effect is also forbidden, he that chuses it by delighting in the cause, chuses also what is forbidden, and therefore that which will be imputed to him.* 1.3 But this I have largely proved upon a distinct account, by making it appear that even a vitious habit, the facility and promptnesse to sin is an aversion from God, and makes us hatefull by a malignity distinct from that which is inherent in all the single actions. Thus he sins that swears by custome, though he have no advertency to what he saies, and knows no∣thing of it: he chose those actions which introduc'd the habit, and he can derive no impunity from his first crime: and he that is the greatest sinner can never come to that state of things that he shall take God's name in vain, and yet be held guiltlesse.

But this Rule is to be understood with these Cautions.* 1.4

1. The involuntary effect is imputed to the voluntary cause, if that effect was foreseen, or if it was design'd, though when it be acted, the foolish man knows but little of it, no more then a beast does of his own acts of pleasure, which he perceives by sense, but does not by Counsel enter into it. Of this there is no question, because he put his hand to a hook of iron, and that being fastned upon the rich vessels in the house draws forth what the man it may be knows not to be there; but his hand willingly mov'd the iron hook, and therefore his hand and his will is the thief.

2. The involuntary effect is not imputed to the voluntary cause,* 1.5 if after it is chosen by the will in one act, it is revok'd by another before the mischief be effected. Thus if Maevius shoot an arrow to kill Paternus, and in the instant of it's egression nollet factum, repents of the intended evil, that mischief which is then done shall not be imputed to him. This indeed is generally said both by the Divines and Lawyers; but it hath no effect at all that is material and considerable, save onely this, that the re∣pentance does wash away the guilt: but in true speaking the whole guilt was contracted, because the act of the will was completed up to action and execution, beyond which there can be no intension of the evil; but then the effect is therefore not imputed because the cause also is pardon'd by the meanes of repentance, and so it is even after the mischief is done. He that by repentance recalls the mischief, shall by pardon be clear'd from guilti∣nesse, whether that repentance be before or after.

3. But that which we can rely upon in this particular,* 1.6 and of which great use is to be made, is this, That though all the evil events which are foreseen, or ought to have been consider'd, are imputed even then when they are not in our power, to him who willingly brought in the cause of those evils; yet whatsoever was not foreseen, and therefore not design'd, nor yet chosen, by consequence and implication is not imputed to him that brought that foolish necessity upon himself. Consonant to this is the do∣ctrine of S. Austin,* 1.7 Culpandus est Loth non quantum incestus in ebrietate ad∣missus, sed quantum ebrietas meretur, Lot was answerable for his drunken∣nesse, but not for his incest caused by his drunkennnesse, which he foresaw not and designed not. But this case also suffers alteration. For if Lot had been warned of the evils of his first nights drunkennesse, and yet would be drunk the next night, he is not so innocent of the effect, the in∣cest lies nearer to him. Onely if after that monition he suspected as little as at first, he was not indeed guilty of the incest directly, but of a more in∣tolerable drunkennesse and a carelesse spirit, who by the first sad event did not consider and was not affrighted from the intolerable cause. But thus if a servant throws himself into a pit, and breaks a leg or an arme that he might not work, his not working is as much imputed to him as his uncha∣ritable injury to himself: but if afterwards, as Pyrrho saw his Master faln into a ditch, and by reason of that first fall he cannot help his Master out, that is not to be imputed to him; for he will'd it not, it was not included virtually in any act of his will or understanding. And thus it is also in the Divine judgements, which if we procure by our own vilenesses, all that impotency and disability of obeying God in external religion which is con∣sequent to the suffering that judgment which himself procur'd, & by which he is faln sick or mad or lame, is not imputed to him; because to make him∣self guilty of a thing, it is not sufficient that he be the meritorious cause of that which procur'd it, but he must be the voluntary and discerning cause. That evil of which a man is onely the meritorious cause depends upon another will besides his own, and is indeed an effect deserv'd by him, but not willingly consented to, but very much against him; and therefore can never be imputed to him to any other purpose but to upbraid his infelicity, who justly suffers what he would not foresee, and now cannot avoid.

4. When a man falls into a state or condition in which he cannot chuse,* 1.8 those acts which are done in that state are imputed to him, if they be such

acts to which no new consent is requir'd, but that it be sufficient that he doe not dissent, and if those acts be consonant to his former will, all such effects are imputed to the will. Thus if Titius being a Catechumen desir'd to be baptized, and then falls into madnesse, or stupidity, or a lethargy he is capable of being baptized, because nothing is in some persons requir'd but a mere susceptibility, and that there be no just impediment; the grace of the Sacrament being so mere a favour, that it is the first grace to which no∣thing on our parts is previous but that all impediments be removed. Since therefore in this a man is passive, his present indisposition of making new acts of election renders him not incapable of receiving a favour; always pro∣vided that there was in him no indisposition and impediment before his present accident, but that he did desire it and was capable before: that vo∣lition hath the same effect in the present state of madnesse or stupidity as it could have if he had been well. But when this comes to be reduc'd to practice, I know of no material change it works upon the man in case he dies in that sad affliction, but what was by the mercies of God laid up for him upon the account of his own goodnesse and the mans former desire. But if he does live, that susception of the Sacrament of baptisme is suffi∣cient for him for his whole life, and the daies of his recovery; that is, all that which he could be bound to in the susception, is perform'd effectively in that state in which he could not presently chuse. But I shall resume this consi∣deration and inquiry upon occasion of something to be explicated in the sixth Rule of this Chapter.

5. But in matter of punishment the case is something different.* 1.9 The case is this; Mizaldus a Florentine smote an Officer of the Great Duke in the Court, and apprehending that he was in great danger of suffering a great punishment, grew sad and impatient, and at last distracted •• the que∣stion upon the case is,

Question.

Whether or no Mizaldus may, being mad, be punished by death, or the abscission of his hand, for a fact he did in his health and the days of under∣standing. To this the answers are various by reason of the several cases that may arise.

1. If the punishment cannot be inflicted without legal processe,* 1.10 trial, conviction and sentence, the mad man cannot be punish'd, because he is not capable of passing through the solennities of law: but if the sentence was pass'd before his madnesse, then the evil may be inflicted, that is, it is just if it be; and it may be done unlesse some other consideration interpose to hinder it.

2. In punishments where no judicial processe is requir'd,* 1.11 a man that is mad may be punish'd for what he did when he was sober. If a son strikes his Father,* 1.12 and then falls mad, the Father may disinherit him for all his mad∣nesse, because the Father may proceed summarily and upon sense of the crime; and he that by his own voluntary act did deserve it, is not by mad∣nesse made uncapable of the punishment, to which in this case nothing but a passivenesse is requir'd.

3. This also holds in cases of punishments ipso facto incurr'd, that is,* 1.13 which a man is fallen into as soon as ever the crime is committed. And of this there is a double reason; the one is because the punishment is actu∣ally incurred before he is actually mad, for the very crime it self is to him as a Judge and sentence, and the sanction of the law is all the solennity: and that's the other reason, consequent to the former; in this case there needs no processe, and therefore the sinners indisposition cannot make him unca∣pable of passing into punishment.

4. In punishments Emendatory,* 1.14 that is, such which besides the exem∣plar justice, intend to reform the Criminal, he that is fallen into madnesse ought not to suffer them, whether the sentence be to be pass'd by the law or by the Judge, whether it be solemn or summary, whether it be pass'd before his calamity or after. The reason of this is plain, because such punishments being in order to an end which cannot be acquired, are wholly to no purpose, and therefore are tyrannical and unreasonable; the man is not capable of amendment, and therefore not of such punishments which are emendatory.

But after all this,* 1.15 the moderation of charity in Christian Judicatories is such, as that they refuse to inflict corporal penalties on distracted people, it being enough that they are already but too miserable.

Solus te jam praestare potest Furor insontem:* 1.16 proxima puris Sors est manibus, nescire nefas.

He that knows not what he does, or what he hath done, is next to him that is innocent. And when the man is civilly dead, it is to little purpose to make him sink further under the civil sword. That's a dreadfull justice and security that would kill a man twice over. Onely when any thing of ex∣ample, or public interest, or detestation of the fact is concern'd, it may be done according to the former measures, and for the present considerations; just as it is in some cases lawfull to punish a man after he is dead, by denying him an honourable or Christian sepulture: where although there be some∣thing particular in the case, the nature of this punishment being such, that because we doe not bury them before they be dead, this evil must be inflicted upon him that feels it not, or not all be inflicted; yet indeed it is true that it ought not at all to be inflicted upon any direct account of justice, but upon collateral considerations, as for terror and exemplarity; and so it may be in the case of the present question.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1.
• * 1.2

  Luke 21. 34.
• * 1.3

  Unum necessar. cap. 5.
• * 1.4

  2.
• * 1.5

  3.
• * 1.6

  4.
• * 1.7

  lib. 22. contr. Faust. cap. 44.
• * 1.8

  5.
• * 1.9

  6.
• * 1.10

  7.
• * 1.11

  8.
• * 1.12

  Bartol. in l. ex facto. in prin∣cip. ff. de vulg. & pupilla sub∣stit.
• * 1.13

  9.
• * 1.14

  10.
• * 1.15

  11.
• * 1.16

  Senec. Herc. Fur.