To the extent possible under law, the Text Creation Partnership has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights to this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above, according to the terms of the CC0 1.0 Public Domain Dedication (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). This waiver does not extend to any page images or other supplementary files associated with this work, which may be protected by copyright or other license restrictions. Please go to http://www.textcreationpartnership.org/ for more information.
§. 9. But because a Man may contract an Obligation by an act not free from Obliquity, as the saying in such Cases is [Fieri non debet, factum valet] and we have a Ruled case for it in the Covenant, which the Princes of Israel made with the Gibeonites,
which thoughb sinfully made at the first, wasc necessarily to be kept afterwards: We are therefore to en∣quire into a Fourth Point, Whether the Gentlewoman having de facto bound her self, by such an unlawful promise, be still, by virtue of the said promise, bound in conscience to the performance thereof, or not? To answer directly to the Point, I take it she is not bound thereunto; for that say∣ing [Fieri non debet, factum valet] hath place only there, where the obli∣quity that maketh the act unlawful, may be severed from the substance of the matter, about which the act is conversant; as when a Man voweth to do something, which is not in it self, and for the substance of the mat∣ter simply unlawful to be done; but yet voweth it, either rashly, and with∣out
due advisement, or for some indi∣rect and unwarrantable end, or upon flight and insufficient inducements, or the like, any of these Obliquities are enough to make the vow unlawful, in respect of the act of vowing; yet because these Obliquities do not necessarily passe up∣on the matter it self, or the thing Vowed, but may be severed from it; therefore though the act of vowing were sinful, the Vow it self for all that may stand good▪ and bind the Party to performance, but where the sinful ob∣liquity passeth upon the substance of the matter, or adhereth inseperably there∣unto; there not only the act of vow∣ing is sinful, but the performance also becometh unlowful: In which Cases those other sayings ought rather to have place, Iuram ent•••••• non debet esse vinculum iniquitatis in malis promissis re∣scinde fidem, in turpi vot•• muta decrètum, &c.
§. 10. If it shall be said, that this difference being admitted, will no∣thing availe the Gentlewoman in our present Case, to free her from the ob∣ligation of her said promise; because here the matter of promise seemeth not to be in it self unlawful, especially on her part; for if the Gentleman her Friend, were presently free from the bond of Matrimony by the death of his Wife, as the Gentlewoman now is by the death of her Husband, they might perform what they had promised either to other, by joyning themselves in Matrimony, and that without sin, which is an argument that the sin∣ful obliquity was only in the act of promising; which therefore they ought to repent of: but doth not cleave to the matter of the promise, which there∣fore they ought not to violate. To this I answer, what in my opinion is
true, That if both the Parties were now actually free from the Marriage bond, they not only lawfully might, but were in conscience bound (unless some other lawful impediment should hinder) to joyn themselves together in Matrimony, because none of the fore∣mentioned Obliquities, which made the former act of promising unlawful, would fall upon the after-act of Marriage to make it unlawful. But that Allega∣tion is not direct to the Point in hand, nor to the Case as it is pro∣pounded; for it may be observed from the very from of the proposal, that the matter of the promise, where∣in the Parties interchangeably bound themselves, was not to Marry toge∣ther, when they should be both free; upon which false ground the Objection runneth; that was indeed the thing they aimed at therein; but the end is one
thing, and the matter another: but the very matter of the promise was, the continuance of their mutual affection either to other, with a resolution to stay the one for the other, when ei∣ther Party should happen to be free from the bond of the present Matrimo∣ny, till the other should be also free. The continuance of which affection and resolution, will upon examinati∣on be found subject to all, or some of the three Obliquities aforesaid; and therefore as such an affection and reso∣lution, could not be entertained at the first without sin; so neither can they be now continued in without sin; for, so long as they continue, the first of the said Obliquities remaineth still, both on his part and hers; the second indeed by the death of the Husband is ceased on her part, but remaineth still on his; and the third contrarily
being on his part ceased, remaineth still on hers, as will evidently appear to the understanding of any Man, that shall take the pains to exa∣mine it.
§. 11. Yea, and it is further to be considered, that the continuance of such an affection and resolution may be like∣ly to expose as well the one as the other to the assault of more strong and dangerous temptations, now since the Husbands death than before. The danger on the Gentlemans part, this, least by how much he is now by the Husband death, put into a nearer possi∣bility of enjoying his unlawful hopes, he should grow into so much the deeper loathing of his own bed, and and so much the earnester longing that, that which is now the only ob∣stacle to the fruition of his desires were removed; of which thoughts,
who can tell how fearful the issues might be? the slie Enemy being most ready at all times, to practice upon the corruption that is in the naughty heart of Man; but especially having a mighty advantage against him, when he hath got his conscience as it were in a snare, by the engagement of some vow, promise, or setled resolution. And then on the Gentlewomans part, the danger, this, least having by her own voluntary act debarr'd her self, of that which is the only allowed remedy, namely Marriage; she should by the just judgement of God, be left to the rage of the Disease of burning Lusts: for upon what sound warrant can she be confident, or with what Reason ex∣pect, that God should either preserve her from, or assist her against tempta∣tions in that kind, though she should seek it of him with Fasting, and
Prayers, and Tears, so long as she tempceth Him by persisting in a wil∣ful obstinacy, against that means of Re∣medy which He hath appointed? In∣deed, where the hand of God himself hath prevented the use of the Remedy (as if the Husband should be long de∣tained in a foraign Land, or held in close Prison, or taken with a dead Palsie, or some other bodily impotence, or the like) there the Wife might comfortably implore Gods assistance to preserve her from being overcome by carnal tempta∣tions, and assuredly rest upon it by faith, if she be not wanting to her self, in putting to her own utmost endea∣vours, because she hath a Promise to rest upon for that purpose; and God who is faithful in all his Promises, is also faithful in this, of not suffering his Servants to be tempted beyond their strength: but for the Wife, by some
inconsiderate act of her own, wherein she wilfully and obstinately persisteth to refuse the appointed means, and yet to expect Gods assistance nevertheless, for which she hath no Promise, is a fear, full tempting of God; and it is but a just thing with God, and she suffereth it worthily for her presumption, if she be left to her self, and so wrestle with the temptation by her own strength, and so be overcome thereby: For God who hath after a sort tied himself by his free and gracious Promise to protect us in Via Regia, so long as we walk in the ordinary known way that he hath appointed for us, hath no where bound himself to vouchsafe us the like power∣ful protection Extra viam Regiam, if we refuse that high way, to walk in by-paths of our own choosing, which present dangers on both sides, and the former Reasons laid together, do
sufficiently prove, that the Gentlewo∣man is not at all bound to performe her said unlawful Promise.
Josh. 9. 14, &c.
Ibid. ver. 19▪ 2 Sam. 21. 1, 2.