Eight cases of conscience occasionally determined by the late Reverend Father in God, Robert Sanderson, Lord Bishop of Lincoln.

The CASE of a RASH VOVV Deliberately Iterated.

The Case.

A Gentleman of good Estate, hath Issue one only Daughter, who placing her affections upon a person much below her rank, intendeth Marriage with him: The Father hearing of it, in great displeasure Voweth, and confirmeth it with an Oath, that if she Marry him, he will never give her a farthing of his Estate. The Daughter notwithstanding Marryeth him: After which the Father sundry times iterateth and re∣neweth his said former Vow, and that in a seri∣ous and deliberate manner; adding further, That he would never give her or any of her•• any part of his Estate.

QUAERE:

Whether the Fathers Vow so made, and so confirmed and iterated as abovesaid, be Obli∣gatory or not?

The Resolution.

My opinion is, That the Vow was Rash, and is not at all Obligatory.

1. The Question here proposed is con∣cerning the obligation only; yet I deem it expedient to declare my opinion concer∣ning the Rashness also: and that for two rea∣sons. First, Because there seemeth in the propo••al of the Case, to be some weight laid upon the after iterations, which were more deliberate, as if they added to the Obliga∣tion. And Secondly, Because I think it needful that the Vower should as well be convinced of the greatness of his sin in ma∣king such a Vow, for the time past, as satis∣fied concerning the present and future inva∣lidity of it.

2. It is easie to believe, that the Gentle∣man, when he first made the Vow, was pos∣sessed with a very great indignation against his Daughter for her high and inexcusable disobedience to him in so very weighty a bu∣siness. And truly it must be confessed, he had need to be a man of a very rare com∣mand over his own Spirit, and such as are scarce to be found one of a thousand, that could so contain himself within the bounds of reason, upon so just a provocation from an only child, (possibly some other aggrava∣ting circumstances concurring) as not to be transported with the violence of that passion,

into some thoughts and resolutions, not ex∣actly agreeable with the dictates of right reason. It can therefore be little doubted, but the Vow made whilst the Reason was held under the force of so strange a pertur∣bation, was a rash and irrational Vow.

3. Nor will these after-acts in confirma∣tion of the first Vow, though having more of deliberation in them, be sufficient to redeem either it or themselves from the imputation of Rashness: understanding rashness in that latitude as the Casuists do, when they treat de Voto temerario, under the notion whereof they comprehend all such Vows as happen per defectum plenae & discussae deliberationis, as they express it; For it is to be considered, that when an injury, disobedience, or other affront is strongly resented, it many times ••aketh a very deep impression in the Soul, which though after the first impetus have a little spent it self, it begin somewhat to abate, yet it doth so by such slow and insensible de∣grees, that the same perturbation, which first discomposed the mind, may have a strong influence into all succeeding delibera∣tions for a long time after. Even as after an acute Feaver, when the sharpest paroxysmes are over, and the malignity of the disease

well spent, although the party begin to reco∣ver some degrees of strength; yet there may remain for a good while after such a debility in the parti••s, as that they cannot exercise their proper functions, but with some weak∣ness more or less, till the party be perfectly recovered. Sith therefore the after-iterati∣ons on the first Vow in the present case, did proceed apparently from the rancor and ma∣lignity remaining in the mind, as the dregs and reliques of the same perturbation, from which the first Vow also proceeded: they must upon the same account (to wit, per de∣fectum plenae deliberationis) undergo the same censure of Rashness with the first. The same I say for the kind; some difference I grant there is for the degree: but Magis & Minus non variant speciem, we know. And the consi∣deration of that difference is only thus far useful in the present Case, that the more de∣liberate those after-acts were, the more cul∣pable they are, and the le••s capable either of Excuse or Extenuation; and consequent∣ly do oblige the party to so much the more serious, solemn, and lasting Repentance.

4. But concerning rash Vowes (in as much as the knot of the Question lyeth not there) it shall suffice to note these few points. First,

That every Rash Vow is a sin; and that upon its own score, and precisely as it is Rash, al∣though it should not be any other way pec∣cant. All acts of Religious worship (by the importance of the third Commandment) are to be performed with all due sobriety, attention, and advisedness: how much more than a Vow? which is one of the highest acts of worship, as being a sacred contract, where unto God himself is a party. See Eccl. 5.1. &c. Secondly, That Rash Vows are for the most part, (besides the Rashness) peccant in their matter also; For they are commonly made in passion, and all passions are evil Counsellors, and Anger as bad as the first. The wrath of Man seldom worketh the righte∣ousness of God. Thirdly, That a Rash Vow, (though to be repented of for the Rashness) may yet in some cases bind. As for exam∣ple, A man finding himself ill used by a Shop-keeper, of whom he had formerly been accustomed to buy, voweth in a Rage that he will never buy of him again: This is a Rash Vow, yet it bindeth, because if the party had never made any such Vow at all, it had neither been unjust or uncharitable, (nor so much as imprudent) in him for to have done the same thing, which by his Vow

he hath now bound himself to do. So if a man impatient of his ill luck at Cards, should Vow in a heat never to Play at Cards any more; he were in this case also bound to keep his Vow: because there neither is any sin in keeping it, nor can be any great necessi∣ty why he should break it. That therefore Fourthly, if at any time a Rash Vow bind not; the invalidity thereof proceedeth not meer∣ly (nor indeed at all) from the Rashness (which yet is a very common error amongst men) but from the faultiness of it other∣wise, in respect of the matter, or thing vowed to be done; when that which is so Vowed, is either so evil in it self, or by rea∣son of circumstances, becometh so evil, that it cannot be performed without sin.

5. That therefore concerning the Vow in the present case, I declared my Opinion that it is not at all obligatory; it is done upon this ground (which is a most certain truth, and consented to by all) that Rei illicitae nulla obligatio. If a man shall Vow any thing that is contrary to Piety; as if having taken of∣fence at some indiscreet passage in a Sermon of his own Minister, he should vow that he would never come to the Church, or hear him Preach again,: Or that is contrary to

Iustice, as to take away the life of an inno∣cent person, as those 40 persons that had vowed they would neither eat nor drink till they had slain Paul: Or never to make re∣stitution to one whom he knew he had wron∣ged: Or contrary to Charity; as to be re∣venged of, or never to be friends with one that had done him wrong: Or that is con∣trary to Mercy; as if having lost some mo∣ney by lending to his friend, or having smar∣ted by suretiship, he should vow never to lend any man money, or become surety for any man again. Let such a Vow, I say, as any of these, or any of the like nature, be made either rashly, or deliberately, and strengthened with Oaths and Imprecations, in the most direful and solemn manner that can be devised to tie it on the faster; yet it is altogether null and invalid as to the eff••ct of Obligation. Whence those common say∣ings, In male promissis rescinde fidem; ne sit juramentum vinculum iniquitatis, &c. And we have a good president for it in David, after he had in a rage vowed the destruction of Nabal, and all that belonged to him; which vow, upon better consideration, he not only did not perform, but he blessed God also, for so providentially preventing the

performance of it, by the discreet demeanor and intervention of Abigail.

6. Now the reason why such vows are not binding, is very cogent and clear; Even because the party at such time as he is sup∣posed to have made such Vow as aforesaid, lay under another (a former, and therefore a stronger) obligation to the contrary. And it is agreeable to all the reason in the World, that he who either by his own voluntary act, hath bound himself (where lawfully he might so do) or by the command of his law∣ful Superior (that hath a right to his service, and may exact obedience from him) is al∣ready bound to do, or not to do this or that; should not have power to disoblige himself therefrom, at his own pleasure, or to super∣induce upon himself a new Obligation con∣trary thereunto: Obligatio prior praejudicat posteriori. As in the case of Marriage, a precontract with one party, avoideth all af∣ter-contracts with any other: And if a man convey Lands to several persons, by deeds of several date, the first conv••yance standeth good, and all the rest are void; and so in all cases of like nature. The Obligatory power thereof that is in Vows, Oaths, Pro∣mises, &c. is rightly said by some, to be a

constructive, not a destructive power. The meaning is, that such acts may create a new Obligation where was none before, or con∣firm an old one; but it cannot destroy an old one, or substitute another contrary there∣unto, in the place•• thereof.

7. And the reason of this reason also is yet farther evident; for that Quisquis obliga∣tur, alteri obligatur. When a man is obliged by any act, it is also supposed, that the ob∣ligation is made to some other party; to whom also it is supposed some right to ac∣crue, by vertue of the said act obligatory; and that that other party is by the said act sufficiently vested in that said right, of which right he cannot be again devested and depri∣ved by the meer act of him who instated him therein, and is obliged to perform it to him (unless himself give consent thereunto) without the greatest injustice in the World. Now God having a perfect right to our obe∣dience, by his own obliging Precept, both for the not doing hurt to any man, and for the doing good to every man upon all fit op∣portunities: and this right also confirmed, and ratified by our own obligatory act in a solemn manner, before many witnesses at our Baptism, when we vowed to keep all God's

Commandments: it were unreasonable to think that it should be in our power, by any after-act of ours to disoblige our selves from both, or either of those obligations. For then we might by the same reason free our selves from the obligation, of that latter Act also (suppose an Oath, or Vow) by another subsequent Oath, or Vow; and from that again by another: and so play fast and loose, make Vows, and break them in infinitum. Evident it is therefore, that every vow re∣quiring any thing to be done, which is repug∣nant to any office of Piety, Iustice, Charity, or Mercy, which we owe either to God or man, is void, and bindeth not, because it findeth us under the power of a former con∣trary obligation, and hath not it self power sufficient to free or discharge us from the same.

8. The general rule thus cleared, it re∣maineth to examine concerning the parti∣cular Vow now in question, whether it be void upon this account or no? It will be∣found hard I believe to free this Vow from being repugnant to the rules of Iustice, but impossible, I am sure, to reconcile it with the perfect Evangelical Law of Charity and Mercy. First, Civil and Political Iustice, re∣quireth

that every man should obey the wholsome Laws of his Countrey, and sub∣mit himself to be ordered thereby. Now, put the case (which is possible enough) that the Daughters Husband should for lack of support from his Father-in-law, or other∣wise, live and die in great want, leaving his Wife, and many small Children behind him, destitute of all means for their necessary su∣stenance. The Law would (as I suppose) in that case, upon complaint of the Parish, and for their case, send the Daughter and her Children to the Father, and compel him to maintain them out of his Estate. Which order he ought to obey, nor can refuse so to do, without the high contempt of publick Authority, and manifest violation of the Ci∣vil Justice, notwithstanding his Vow to the contrary: The Law must be obeyed what∣soever becometh of the Vow; in that case therefore it is evident the Vow bindeth not.

9. But say that should not happen to be the case (which yet is more than any man can positively say before-hand) the Parent is nevertheless in Moral Iustice bound to pro∣vide due maintenance for his Children and Grand-Children if he be able. Saint Paul saith that Fathers ought to lay up for the

Children. True it is, he speaketh it but upon the by, and by way of Illustration, in the handling of another argument, very di∣stant from this business: but ••hat doth not at all lessen the importance of it, such illu∣strations being ever taken à notiori, and from such common notions as are granted, and consented unto by all reasonable men. The same Apostle having amongst other sins of the Gentiles, mentioned disobedience to Parents in one verse, in the very next verse, mentioneth also want of natural affection in Parents. And the disobedience in the Child can no more discharge the Parent from the obligation of that duty he oweth to the Child, of affection, and maintenance, then the unnaturalness of the Parent, can the Child from the duty he oweth to the Pa∣rent, of Honour and Obedience. For the se∣veral duties, that by Gods ordinance, are to be performed by persons that stand in mutual relation either to other, are not pactional and conditional; as are the Leagues and Agree∣ments made between Princes (where the breach in one part dissolveth the obligation on the other) but are absolute and indepen∣dent; wherein each person is to look to himself, and the performance of the duty

that lyeth upon him, though the other party should fail in the performance of his.

10. Something I foresee may be obje∣cted in this point, concerning the lawfulness of the Parents withdrawing maintenance from the Child (either in whole, or at least in part) in the case of disobedience. Which how far forth it may, or may not be done; as it would be too long to examine, so it would be of little avail to the present busi∣ness. For it is one thing to with-hold main∣tenance from a disobedient Child for the present, and to resolve so to continue till he shall see cause to the contrary. And ano∣ther thing to bind himself by Vow or Oath, never to allow him any for the future, what∣soever should happen. Let be granted what∣soever can be supposed pleadable on the Fa∣thers behalf in the present case; yet there will still remain two particulars in this Vow, not easily to be cleared from being unjust. First, let the Daughters disobedience de∣serve all this uttermost of punishment f••om the offended Father; yet how can it be just, that for the Mothers fault, the pour in••o∣cent (perhaps yet unborn) Children, should be utterly, and irrecoverably excluded from all possibility of relief from their Grand∣father?

Secondly, It is (if not unjust, yet what differeth very little there-from) the ex∣tremity of rigid Justice; that any offender (much less a Son or Daughter) should for any offence, not deserving Death, be by a kind of fatal peremptory decree, put into an incapacity of receiving relief from such per∣sons, as otherwise ought to have relieved the said offender, without any reservation either of the case of extreme necessity, or of the case of serious repentance.

11. However it be for the point of Iu∣stice; yet so apparent is the repugnancy of the matter of this Vow, with the Precepts of Christian Charity and Mercy; that if all I have hitherto said were of no force, this repug∣nancy alone were enough (without other e∣vidence) to prove the unlawfulness, and con∣sequently the invalidity, or inobligability thereof. It is (not an Evangelical Counsel, but) the express peremptory precept of Christ, that we should be merciful, even as our heavenly Father is merciful. And inas∣much as, not in that passage only, but for the most part wheresoever else the duty of mercy is pressed upon us in the Gospel from the example of God: God is represented to us by the Name, and under the notion of

a Father, although I may not lay much weight upon it, as a demonstrative proof; yet I conceive I may commend it as a ratio∣nal Topick, for all that are Fathers to con∣sider of, whether it do not import, that mercy is to be expected from a father as much as (if not rather much more then) from any other man; and that the want of mercy in a Father, is more unkindly, more unseemly, more unnatural then in another man: But ••his by the way, from that Precept of Christ, we learn that as there is in God a two-fold mercy, (a giving mercy, in doing us good, though we deserve it not, & a forgiving mercy, in pardoning us when we have done amiss:) so there ought to be in every good Christian man a readiness (after the example of God) to shew forth the fruits of mercy to others, in both kinds, upon all proper and meet occa∣sions. So that if any person, of what quality or condition soever, shall upon any provoca∣t••on whatsoever Vow that he will never do any thing for such or such a man; or that he will never forgive such or such a man: every such Vow, being contra bonos mores, and con∣tra officium hominis Christiani, is unlawful, and bindeth not.

12. The offices of mercy in the former of

those two branches, viz. of doing good, and affording relief to those that are in necessity, are themselves of so great necessity (as the case may be) that common humanity would exact the performance of them from the hand, not of a stranger only, but even of an enemy. If a stranger or an enemies Beast lie weltering in a Ditch, a helping hand must be lent to draw it out. The Samaritans compassion to the wounded Traveller in the Parable, Luk. 10. (There being a feud, and that grounded upon Religion, which commonly of all others, is the most deadly feud between the two Nati∣ons) is commended to our example, to the great reproach of the Priest and Levite, for their want of Bowels to their poor Brother of the same Natio•• and Religion with them∣selves; For the nearer the Relation is be∣tween the Parties, the stronger is the obliga∣tion of shewing mercy either to other. And there is scarce any relation nearer, and more obliging, then that of Parents and Children.

Our Saviour, who in Matth. 15. sharply reproved such vows, (though made with an intention to advance the Service of God, by inriching his Treasury (as hindred Children from relieving their parents, will not certainly approve of such vows (made without any o∣ther

intention then to gratifie rage, and im∣patience) as hinder Parents from relieving their Children.

13. If to avoid the force of this argument, it shall be alledged, that the Daughters dis∣obedience, in a business of so high concern∣ment, might justly deserve to be thus severe∣ly punished, and that it were but equal that she, who had so little regard to her Father, when the time was, should be as little re∣garded by him afterwards. All this granted, cometh not yet up to the point of shewing Mercy according to the example of God. No Childs disobedience can be so great to an earthly Parent, as ours is to our heavenly Father: Yet doth he notwithstanding all our ill deservings continually do us good, com∣municating▪ to our necessities, and causing his Sun to shine, and his Rain to fall, and infinite benefits in all kinds to descend upon man∣kind, not excluding the most thankless, and disobedient, and rebellious, from having a share therein.

14. And as for that other branch of mercy in pardoning offences, God giveth a rich example to all men, of their duty in that kind, (and to Fathers particularly (by his great readiness to pardon the greatest offenders, if they sin∣cerely

seek to him for it. If the Father in the Parable, Luke 15. had proceeded with such severity against his riotous Son, as to have vowed never to have received him a∣gain; he had been a very improper ••xem∣plar, whereby to shadow out the mercy of God to repentant sinners. Concernin•• the great importance of this duty, which is so frequently inculcated by Christ and his Apo∣stles, and so peremptorily enjoyned, as not any other duty more. See Matt. 6.4, 15. Matt. 18.21.—35. Eph. 4.32. Col. 3.13. Iames 2.13. See also Sirac. 28.1, &c.] I shall not need to say much; only as to the present Case, it would be considered, how perverse a course it is, and contradictory to it self, for a man to think himself obliged by one inconsiderate act, never to forgive his Daughter; when as yet he cannot beg par∣don of his own sins, at the hands of God, (as he ought in his daily Prayer to do) with∣out an express condition of forgiving every body, and an implicit imprecation upon himself, if he do not.

15. But shall the Daughter that hath thus grieved the spirit of her Father, thus escape unpunished, and be in as good a condition as if she had never offended? And will not

others be incouraged by her impunity, to de∣spise their Parents after her example? There is much reason in this objection; and there∣fore what I have hitherto written, ought not to be understood, as if thereby were inten∣ded such a plenary indulgence for the daugh∣ter, as should restore her in integrum, but only that she should be made capable of re∣ceiving such relief from her Father, from time to time, as in relation to her necessi∣ties, and after-carriage, from time to time, should seem reasonable; and that his Vow ought not to hinder him from affording her such relief. But by what degrees, and in what proportion, the Father should thus re∣ceive his daughter into his fatherly affection, and relieve her, must be left to discretion, and the exigence of circumstances. Only I should advise (in order to the objection, viz. for examples sake, and that the daughter might be made, even to her dying day, and kept, sensible of her great and sinful disobe∣dience to her Fath••r) that the Father should cut off from his Daughter, and her Posterity, some meet portion of his Estate, (as per∣haps a fifth part at the least; or if a fourth, or a whole third part, I should like it the bet∣ter;) and by a solemn deliberate vow, de∣dicate

the same to be yearly imployed in some pious and charitable uses. These times will afford him choice of objects, if God shall move his heart so to do; and by so do∣ing, he may, First, in some sort redeem, and make a kind of satisfaction for his former Rashness, (not Popishly understood, and in re∣gard of the Iustice of God, but) in a moral sense, and in regard of the World, and his own Conscience. Secondly, it may be a good means to keep the Daughter in a continual fresh remembrance of her fault, that she may not, after a short and slight repentance (as in such cases too often it happeneth) for∣get the same; whereof she ought to have some remorse all the daies of her life. Third∣ly, he shall thereby after a sort, perform his first vow; I mean according to the general inte••∣tion thereof, and the rational part, (which was to make his Daug••ter repent her folly, and to smart for it:) the over-plus more tha•• ••his, be∣ing but the fruit of rancor and pertu••bation. Lastly, he shall in so doing, doubly imitate God, our heavenly Father. First, when a rash or sinful act is made an occasion of a pious or charitable work, it beareth some resemblance of, or rather is indeed it self a gracious effect of that good∣ness and wisdom in God, whereby he bringeth light out of darkness, and good out of evil. Se∣condly, God Himself when he graciously par∣doneth

an high presumptuous sin, as he did Davids great sin, in the matter of Vriah, com∣monly layeth some lasting affliction upon the offender, as he did upon David, who after the sealing his pardon for that sin by Nathan, scarce ever had a quiet day all his life long. The rea∣son whereof seemeth to be double, partly for admonition to others, that none presume to provo••e God in like manner, lest they smart for it also in like manner; and partly for the good of the offender, that he may by the smart be brought to the deeper sense of his error, and be eftsoons reminded of it, lest he should too soon forget it.

Thus have I with very much ado, (in that weak condi∣tion I have been in, ever since the question came to my hands, and wherein I yet continue) declared my opinion fully con∣cerning the whole business as far as I understand it. More larg∣ly I confess than I intended, or perhaps was needful; and with greater severity than (it may be) the parties will well like of. But truly I desired to do the part of a faithful Confessor, and the sores on both parts seemed to be such as were not to be touched with too gentle a hand: In the Daughter, an act of high disobedience, transported by the passion of in∣ordinate love; and in the Father an act of great Rashnes••, transported by the passion of inordinate anger: both beyond the bounds of right Reason, a••d Religion; and both to be deeply repented of. Howsoever, I cannot be suspected to have written any thing, either out of favour for, or prejudice a∣gainst either party; not having the least conjecture who the persons are that are concerned in the business; nor so much as in what part of the Nation they live. I shall pray that God would direct them both, to do that which may best serve to his glory, and bring the soundest comfort to their own souls. Amen.

FINIS.