reason; for the members give essence to the whole; that is, matter and form▪
and the integrum receives essence from them▪ being a symbol of the effect.
And how is it possible to conceive that that should be first in essence, that is
last in essence, receiving his essence from the essence of the parts?
Neither can any integrum be first cognitione distinctâ & noscibilitate per∣fectâ:
it may be notius nobis analytically, but not notius naturâ genetically.
When we analyse the frame and workmanship of god, we meet with the
effects, and go from them to the causes, which we perceive by their effects:
but the causes are better knowne by nature: because as Res sese habent in
esse, ita in cognosci, the intelligibility and Cognoscibility of things, followeth
their Entity and being.
Mr Hudson p. 278 speaks well and truly, cognitio sequitur ordinem natu∣rae
in se, But how the Kingdom of England can be known without or before
the knowledge of the distinct parts, I am not able to conceive. A man
may indeed know the Policy, Laws, and Priviledges; and not know all the
severall Towns: but the Towns are not the members of the Laws and Pri∣viledges.
A man cannot know the body of Laws distinctly, before he knows
any of the particular Laws; For it is certain, that as the essence of a thing
consists in his causes, so the knowledge of the essence of a thing consists in
the knowledge of the Causes. The common place of causes, is the fountain
of all Science; Scirique demum creditur, cujus Causa teneatur: ut merito dica∣tur
à Poëtâ. Foelix qui potuit rerum cognoscere Causas. It is a speculative hap∣piness,
and the ••oelicity of the understanding, to know the Causes of things.
But there is but small happiness to see the outside of the thing, not understand∣ing
the essentiall Causes, and ingredients into the essence, and being of it:
A man may as well know the nature and essence of a thing distinctly, with∣out
the knowledge of his distinct nature and essence; as know a thing di∣stinctly,
without knowledge of his Causes.
We have heard of some consectaries, from the definition of Genus; I shall
observe two things from the definition of species specialissima (which is that
which cannot be divided into other species.) The first is that individuum est
species. The second is that though species specialissima cannot be divided
into other species, yet it may be divided into members.
1. Individuum est species
Every singular, or individuall thing is a sp••cies.
Touching this question I shall first explicate, secondly confirm the Truth.
1. The explication may be given in these following theses, or positions.